‘You could obviously explain an hypothesis by means of
pictures. I mean, you could explain the hypothesis “there is a book lying here”
with pictures showing the book in plan, elevation and various cross sections.’
a picture shows the proposition in another format –
in another proposal
–
if you say that duplicating a proposition is to explain it –
then you may as well just repeat the proposition in its
original form
to explain a proposition is to give some account of it –
replicating the proposition – does not account for it –
repetition is not explanation
when is an explanation required for ‘there is a book lying
here’?
or more generally – when is there a question of explanation?
I don’t think ‘there is a book lying there’ – in any common
usage – is likely to raise any question
if the proposition is put in a special context – questions
can be raised
i.e. Wittgenstein’s context here – a philosophical context –
what is really being asserted here?
in relation to the ‘book’ – a question might be – are we
really referring to sense data – and what does that amount to?
and ‘there’ – might raise questions of how we are to understand space
these questions do not immediately present themselves with
the proposition ‘there is a book lying there’
but in specialized contexts they can be asked
and furthermore – any answer will lead to further proposals
– further propositions –
and any answer – any proposal will be open to question – to
doubt – will be uncertain
there is no logical end to explanation –
except thin the decision to stop – asking questions
‘Such a representation gives a
law. Just as the equation of a curve gives a law, by means of which you may
discover the ordinates, if you cut at different abscissae.
In which case the verification of
particular cases correspond to cuts that have already been made.
If our experiences yield points
lying on a straight line, the proposition that these experiences are various
views of a straight line is an hypothesis.
The hypothesis is a way of
representing this reality, for a new experience may tally with it or not, or
possibly make it necessary to modify the hypothesis.’
‘such a representation gives a
law’ –
out of such a representation an hypothesis can be formed
a so called ‘law’ – is simply an
hypothesis –
if an hypothesis is regarded as a
law – that usually means the practitioners have been lured into a false sense
of security – or just got lazy
(how’s that for an hypothesis!)
and let’s not play dumb here –
‘verification’ of an hypothesis –
of a proposal – is always open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –
it is never ‘done’
verifiers can be done – but not
verification
an hypothesis is a proposal for a
reality –
and any proposal – any reality –
is open to question
‘If for instance we use a system
of coordinates and the equation for a sphere to express the proposition that a
sphere is located a certain distance from our eyes, this description has a
greater multiplicity than that of verification by eye. The first multiplicity
corresponds to not one verification but to a law obeyed by verifications.’
‘a greater multiplicity than
verification by the eye’?
the system of coordinates and the
equation – is a different method of
verification –
than that of verification by the
eye
any so called ‘verification’
– or any method of verification –
is a proposal –
open to question – open to doubt
– uncertain –
what you go with – what you
operate with – will be a function of circumstance and context –
it is a question of behaviour –
and all the questions that go with that
a greater multiplicity – is this
to suggest – greater verification?
a greater multiplicity of
proposals –
will mean a greater number of
proposals – open to question – open to doubt –
quantitatively speaking – more
uncertain proposals to deal with –
and logically speaking – that is
a good thing –
more ways of seeing – more ways
of doing –
more possibilities
‘a law obeyed by verification’?
you can have a proposal for verifications –
if it is held to be a ‘law’ –
does that mean it is not questioned?
if that is the case – the
proposal is corrupted –
corrupted in the way it is held –
if on the other hand –
‘law’ is just a term for a well
used – and well practiced proposal –
one that is held to be open to
question – and held open to doubt –
then OK
it is logic that should determine
our behaviour –
everything is arse about – if it
is behaviour that determines logic –
we can be open or closed –
the proposition is open – as a
matter of logic –
we should follow suit
‘An hypothesis is a law for forming propositions.
You could also say: an hypothesis is a law for forming
expectations.
A proposition is, so to speak, a particular cross-section of
an hypothesis.’
an hypothesis is a logically transparent form or expression
of the proposition
it displays the logic of the proposition – openly
it is a clear expression of uncertainty –
as for ‘law’ – there are no laws – only proposals –
the form of the proposition – is not essential – what is
essential is the logic of the
proposition –
the proposition is a proposal
–
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
‘According to my principle two suppositions must have the
same sense if every possible experience that confirms the
one also confirms the other, if, that is, no decision between the two is
conceivable on the basis of experience.’
‘every possible experience …’
you can’t know
‘every possible experience’ –
so it’s a waste of time pretending
to consider the notion
you can only go on what is proposed
as for sense –
sense is a moving feast
the sense of a proposition is only revealed when it is proposed –
and then it is open to question – open to doubt
sense is uncertain
confirmation can only be a hunch in the midst of uncertainty
–
‘experience’ – is logically speaking an open concept –
how it is defined will depend on who’s doing what –
and any ‘definition’ here – will be open to question
a decision is always ‘conceivable’ –
at the very least you decide to proceed – or not to proceed
– with whatever it is that you have in mind
helps if there are a lot of nodding heads – one way or the
other
dress it up anyway you like –
any proposal – or assessment – or decision –
logically speaking –
is open to question – open doubt
uncertain
‘The representation of a curve as a straight line with
deviations. The equation of the curve includes a parameter whose course
expresses the deviations from a straight line. It isn’t essential that these
deviations should be “slight”. They can be so large that the curve doesn’t look
like a straight line at all. “Straight line with deviations” is only one form
of description. It makes it easier for me to eliminate, or neglect, a
particular component of the description if I so wish. (The form “rule with
exceptions”).’
yes – there is no definite description –
the object of any description – is an unknown
it becomes known – in description – in proposal
the unknown – does not determine how it is described –
the unknown is silent
the unknown is the source of possibility – possible
descriptions
if you want ‘know’ to why a particular description is
proposed and used –
you need to have some understanding of the circumstances
involved
and here – you are still faced with uncertainty
once a description is proposed – it is open to modification
– open to replacement –
open to question – open to doubt –
it is always a question of what’s going on and why
and it is this uncertainty – propositional uncertainty –
‘that makes it easier for me to eliminate, or neglect, a particular component
of a description if I wish to do so’
‘rule with exceptions’ –
is really just an attempt to shut the gate after the horse
has bolted –
or to be more precise –
to pretend there was a gate
‘What does it mean, to be certain that one has a toothache?
(If one can’t be certain, then
grammar doesn’t allow the use of the word ‘certain’ in this connection.)
The grammar of the expression ‘to be certain”.’
to be certain – is to be deluded
by all means propose that you have a toothache –
but there is no more certainty in this proposal than in any
other –
what we deal with is proposals
–
and a proposal is – open to question – open to doubt – is
uncertain
to claim certainty in relation to any proposal –
is to deny – the proposal –
it is to deny the nature of the proposal –
it is essentially an act of propositional corruption
to claim certainty – is to claim an authority for your
proposal –
the only authority you have – is authorship –
authorship is logically irrelevant –
therefore the claim of authority – is logically irrelevant –
if persist with such a claim – your claim is not logical –
it can only be described as rhetorical – that is to say
logically false
once this is understood – it is easy to see that the grammar
of ‘certainty’ –
is the grammar of rhetoric –
the grammar of persuasion –
of bullshit
‘We say “If I say that I see a chair there, I am saying more
than I know for certain”. And commonly that means “But all the same, there’s
one thing that I do know for certain.” But if we now try to say what it is, we
find ourselves in a certain embarrassment.
“I see something brown
– that is certain.” That’s meant to say that the brown colour is seen and not
perhaps merely conjectured from other symptoms. And we do indeed say quite
simply: “I see something brown.”
‘I do know something for certain’ But if we try to say what
it is, we find ourselves in a certain embarrassment’ –
reason being we can’t say
– what it is –
and really – if we can’t say what it is – we have nothing to
say –
and if we persist in trying to say something that can’t be
said – well we are likely to be feel confused –
and to claim certainty – is to be logically confused –
anything we say – is a proposal
– and a proposal is open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
point being – certainty has no place in propositional logic
–
the claim of certainty – is the failure to understand
propositional logic –
it is illogical
now this is not to say that the claim of certainty does not
have a place or function in language use –
it does –
it basis – and it function though – is not logical – it is rhetorical
the claim of certainty is a rhetorical devise –
it’s function – is persuasion
‘I see something brown
– that is certain’ –
is a good
example of this
the proposal ‘I see something brown ‘ – is a straightforward
proposal
‘that is certain’ –
is no more than the attempt to persuade – either myself – or others –
of what I say
‘I see something brown’ – like any other proposal – is open
to question – open to doubt
is uncertain
the embarrassment that Wittgenstein refers to – only occurs
if you think you are making a logical statement
if on the other hand – you are aware that you claim to
certainty – is purely rhetorical –
then should feel no embarrassment at all
‘If someone tells me “look into this telescope, and make me
a sketch of what you see”, the sketch I make is the expression of a
proposition, not of a hypothesis.’
the sketch I make is
a proposal – is a proposition
‘If I say “here there is a chair”, I mean more – people say
– than the mere description of what I perceive. This can only mean that the
presupposition doesn’t have to be true, even though the description fits what
is seen. Well in what circumstance would I say that that proposition wasn’t
true? Apparently, if certain other propositions aren’t true that were implicit
in the first. But it isn’t as if the first turns out to have been a logical
product all along.’
we propose – in relation to propositions –
yes – you might propose that ‘here there is a chair’ – could
be seen as presupposing another or other propositions
‘This can only mean that the presupposition doesn’t have to
be true, even though the description fits what is seen’
why would you put up a presupposition that is not true – that
is to say one that you don’t assent to?
‘in what circumstances would I say that the proposition
wasn’t true?’
when it’s presuppositions aren’t true?
you might still assent to the proposition – and end up
taking the view – that your presuppositions – are rubbish
‘But it isn’t as if the first turns out to have been a
logical product all along.’
you can construct a propositional
story around a subject proposition –
this is to say – play a
language-game
and the game you play could be
‘logical product’ –
interesting – inventive – and
useful as such a game might be –
and presumably it is these things
– if you play it
it is in the end – no more than a
proposal –
that as with any proposal – is
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
and hey – there is no
propositional story you have to subscribe to –
and no language-game you must
play
‘The best comparison for every hypothesis. – something that
is itself an example of an
hypothesis – is a body in relation to a systematic series of views of it from
different angles.’
the ‘hypothesis’ – as in ‘an uncertain proposition’ – one open to question – open to doubt
only has meaning in a logic that holds that that there are
certain propositions –
propositions beyond question – beyond doubt
if you understand that the proposition is a proposal –
and that a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is
uncertain –
that all
propositions are proposals –
that all propositions are uncertain
then there is no need for the term ‘hypothesis’ –
or to put it another way –
every proposal is an hypothesis
every proposition is an hypothesis
‘Making a discovery in a scientific investigation (say in
experimental physics) is of course not the same thing as making a discovery in
ordinary life outside the laboratory; but the two are similar and a comparison with the former can throw light on the
latter.’
the ground of any discovery – is propositional uncertainty –
engaging in propositional uncertainty is engaging in
discovery
what proceeds from uncertainty – in a logical sense – is
uncertainty –
any discovery is uncertain
when we adopt a proposal that emerges from uncertainty –
a proposal that gives us a new perspective –
we say we have made a discovery
the proposal – the proposition – is the form of discovery –
it is how we discover –
we propose – and we investigate – and this may lead to a new proposal –
a proposal which like it’s antecedent – is open to question
–
open to doubt – is uncertain
our propositional life – is the life of discovery
a scientific discovery – in principle – in terms of its
logic –
is no different to any other discovery
and as to the question of method –
there is no one sure way of proceeding –
there is just what people do – just how they proceed – in
whatever contexts they operate in
be that in ordinary life – or in science – or any other
propositional activity
perhaps scientific procedure is more disciplined than the
procedures of ordinary life –
there may well be circumstances in ordinary life – where a
scientific approach seems warranted
and it may well be that in science – circumstances may
prevail – where unfettered speculation has a place
‘There is an essential distinction between propositions like
“That is a lion”, “The sun is larger than the earth”, and propositions like
“Men have two hands”. Propositions like the pair contain a “this”, “now”,
“here” and thus connect immediately with reality. But if there happened to be
no men around, how would I go about checking the third proposition?
there is no ‘essential distinction’ here –
the above propositions are proposals – open to question – open to doubt
‘how would I go about checking the third proposition’?
look at your own hands –
that would be a start
‘At all events, there can’t be any distinction between an
hypothesis used as an expression of an immediate experience and a proposition
in the stricter sense.’
there is no logical distinction between an hypothesis and a
proposition
the proposition is a proposal
the hypothesis is a proposition
‘an expression of an immediate experience’ – is a proposal –
there is no ‘proposition in the stricter sense’ –
the great beauty of the proposition – of the proposal –
is that it is without
strictures –
it is open – open
to question – open to doubt
it’s ground is uncertainty –
and uncertainty –
is the ground of possibility
‘There is a distinction between a proposition like “Here
there is a sphere in front of me” and “it looks as if there is a sphere in
front of me.” The same thing shows itself also thus: one can say “there seems
to be a sphere in front of me”, but it is senseless to say “it looks as if
there seems to a sphere in front of me”. So too one can say “Here there is
probably a sphere”, but not “Here there probably appears to be a sphere”. In such
a case people would say “After all, you must know whether there appears to
be”.’
yes – we have here different expressions – different
proposals –
and any differences will come out because these proposals –
these propositions – as with any proposal – any proposition – are open to
question – open to doubt
the proposal – the proposition – is logically speaking –
open –
it invites question – it invites doubt –
it is in response to this logically uncertainty that that
propositions are modified for use – made context useful – made actionable –
and it is out of this – logical uncertainty – that new
proposals – new ways of thinking – and doing – emerge
it is good to have a question about the sense of proposition
– no harm done having a hard look at a proposition and seeing whether and how
it will function
however function here – is function in context –
and unless you have a good grasp of the context in which a
proposal has been put –
you really can’t get into the business of saying whether it
makes sense
just presenting a proposal – out of context – and examining
it – in a so called ‘objective’ fashion – is small potatoes
neat little language game
actual language use – is flesh and blood – gesture – face – eyes – and history –
in the colours and the substance of the world – place and time
if you think understand where someone is coming from – and
this is not always easy – it doesn’t always happen –
what they say and how they say it – strange as it might be –
can make sense
‘There is nothing hypothetical in what connects the
proposition with the given fact.’
the so called
‘given fact’ is nothing more than a proposal
– open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
a proposition – that is to say a proposal – in relation
to – another proposal – ‘the given
fact’ – is likewise – open to question – open to doubt
is what connects the proposition to this ‘given fact’ –
hypothetical?
that is – is the
proposal of a relation – of any sort of relation – between the two
propositions –
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain?
yes – of course
‘It is clear that reality – I mean immediate experience –
will sometimes give an hypothesis the answer yes, and sometimes the answer no
(here of course the “yes” and “no” express only confirmation and lack of confirmation);
and it is clear that these affirmations and denials can be given expression.’
reality is what we propose
what we propose is open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
propositional uncertainty – is the source of all questioning
–
the source of all answering
it is propositional users – who ask questions –
and propositional users who give answers
‘yes’ and ‘no’ –
assent and dissent – are proposals –
open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
‘The hypothesis, if that
face of it is laid against reality, becomes a proposition.’
the hypothesis is a proposition – is a proposal
‘laid against reality’?
propositions are laid against propositions
‘reality’ – is a proposition –
what such a proposal amounts to is a propositional question
–
a propositional question that will be answered with
proposals –
with propositions –
propositions – open to question – open to doubt –
uncertain
‘It may be doubtful whether the body I see is a sphere, but
it can’t be doubtful that from here it looks to be something like a sphere. –
The mechanism of hypothesis would not function if appearance too were doubtful
so that one couldn’t verify beyond doubt even a facet of the hypothesis. If
there were a doubt here, what could take that doubt away? If this connection
too were loose, there would be no such thing as confirming an hypothesis and it
would hang entirely up in the air, quite pointless (and therefore senseless).
‘It may be doubtful whether the body I see is a sphere, but
it can’t be doubtful that from here it looks to be something like a sphere.’?
‘it looks to be something like a sphere’ –
this proposition that purports to be beyond doubt –
expresses a doubt –
‘something like a
sphere’ – makes clear the uncertainty of the perception – of the proposition
quite apart from this though –
what we have here is a proposal
–
and the proposal – the proposition – regardless of who holds
it – and how they hold it – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘The mechanism of hypothesis would not function if
appearance too were doubtful so that one couldn’t verify beyond doubt even a
facet of the hypothesis’?
the ‘hypothesis’ – is a proposal –is a proposition
any statement of appearance – like any other proposal – any
other proposition – is open to question – open to doubt
one cannot verify beyond doubt –
any verification proposal – is open to question – to doubt
‘If there were a doubt here, what would take that doubt
away?’
only another doubt –
the point is we operate with an in uncertainty –
we make calls – we adopt proposals – we deal with – and
indeed – we make the world we live in –
however whatever we propose – decide or make –
is open to question – open to doubt –
is uncertain
‘If this connection too were loose, there would be no such
thing as confirming an hypothesis and it would hang entirely up in the air,
quite pointless (and therefore senseless).’?
there is no such thing as confirming an hypothesis – if by
‘confirmation’ – you mean certainty –
this is really so obvious – it shouldn’t need to said
any confirmation – logically speaking – is – up in the air
the fact that a decision is made to proceed on the basis of
a so called ‘confirmation’ –
is anything but pointless
logical uncertainty – does not equal inaction
we act – the logical safety net that we have – is propositional uncertainty –
for while we adopt a proposition – run with a proposal –we
always have the option to review – to reconsider –
this possibility of review is not some optional extra – it
is of the nature of the proposition – of any proposition
‘If I say “I saw a chair”, that (in one sense) isn’t
contradicted by the proposition “there wasn’t one there”. For I could use the
first proposition in the description of a dream and then nobody would use the
second to contradict me. but the
description of the dream throws a light on the sense of the words “I saw”.
Again, in the proposition “there wasn’t one there”, the word
“there” may have more than one meaning?
yes but why is the
question?
and the answer goes to
the heart of philosophical logic –
it is because any proposition – any proposal is open to
question – open to doubt – is uncertain
and what these examples of ‘saw’ and ‘there’ – show –
is that from a logical point of view the terms of any proposal
– are proposals – open to question –
open to doubt – uncertain –
meaning – is uncertain –
we only define meaning in terms of our proposals – in
propositional terms –
and these proposals themselves – can be questioned – as it
were from any angle at all
you can move forward with a proposal – and you can and do
move forward in uncertainty –
but nothing you move forward with is logically stable
‘I am in agreement with the opinions of contemporary
physicists when they say that signs in their equations no longer have any
“meanings” and that physics cannot attain to such meanings, but must stay put
at the signs. But they don’t see that signs have meaning in as much as – and
only in as much as – observable phenomena do or do not correspond to them, in however
circuitous a manner.’
if the ‘contemporary physicists’ are saying that the signs
in their equations have no definite or certain meaning – they are right –
as to saying physics ‘cannot attain to such meanings’ –
physicists work – as indeed we all do – in uncertainty
the equations they use – are open to question to doubt – are
uncertain –
the logical reality of the proposition – whatever form it
takes –
is no argument against its use
physicists operate in uncertainty – with uncertainty
and if by ‘signs’ here we mean syntax – the logical reality
is that syntax will be interpreted –
to ‘stay put at the signs’ – without any interpretation – is
simply an argument for silence – for inactivity – it’s a recipe for nothing
if by to ‘stay put at the signs’ – one means – that one
doesn’t question or doubt – a given meaning –
then to ‘stay put at the signs’ – is to come to a logical
stand still –
fortunately this does not happen
‘observable phenomena do or do not correspond to them’
well this is the question isn’t it?
firstly just what counts as ‘observable phenomena’ – is open
to question – to doubt –
is uncertain
and secondly –
whether a physicist’s equation – with all it’s uncertainty –
applies to a proposal of ‘observable phenomena’ – will be – logically speaking
– open to question – to doubt –
this is just the way of it –
this logical reality – understood or not – does not stop the
business of proposal – of science
I would say that it is clear that one consequence – one
among many – of propositional uncertainty – is science
‘Let us imagine that chess has been invented not as a board
game, but as a game to be played with numbers and letters on paper, so that no
one had ever imagined a board with 64 squares in connection with it. And now
suppose someone made the discovery that the game corresponded exactly to a game
which could be played on a board in such and such a way. This discovery would
have been a great simplification of the game (people who would earlier could
now play it.) But it is clear that this new illustration of the rules of the
game would be nothing more than a new, more easily surveyable symbolism, which
in other respects would be on the same level as the written game. Compare with
this the talk about physics nowadays not working with mechanical models but
“only with symbols”.’
a proposition of any form – of any practice – is a proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – uncertain –
any translation – any application – of a proposal is open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
uncertainty is the ground of imagination –
not everyone – physicists included –
are grounded
© greg t. charlton. 2015.
