“In a certain sense, an object cannot be described” (So too Plato: “You
can’t give an account of one but only name it.”) Here “object” means “reference
of a not further definable word” and ‘description” or “explanation” really
means: “definition”. For of course it isn’t denied that the object can be
“described from outside”, that properties can be ascribed to it and so on.
So when we use the proposition above we re thinking of a calculus with
signs or names that are indefinable – or more accurately, undefined – and we
are saying that no account can be given of them.
“What a word means a proposition cannot tell.”
first up – ‘object’ is a description – a meta-description –
the very point of such a description – is that it is a logical place for description
‘a reference of not further definable word’ –
what it is – is a reference place
for definition
‘described from the outside’? –
here we have a theory of description –
what if I don’t think in terms of inside and outside –
what if my criterion for description is utility – and thus when I set
about describing I am looking for a description that I imagine will be useful?
our descriptions are open to question – open to doubt –
but so too any criteria of description
‘So when we use the proposition above we are thinking of a calculus with
signs or names that are indefinable – or more accurately, undefined – and we
are saying that no account can be given of them.’
if we are thinking of a calculus with signs and names – and saying no
account can be given of them –
this ‘calculus’ – is meaningless –
which is to say – we are not
thinking of a calculus at all
a proposition is a proposal – its terms – signs – names – are open to
question –
if you have a ‘proposition’ – with no content – nothing that can be
questioned
whatever it is you think you’ve got – it’s not a proposition –
“What a word means a proposition cannot tell.”
any word is open to question – open to doubt
as with any proposal in relation to it
‘What is the distinction then between blue and red?
yes – the question of distinction –
the reality is that we do
distinguish –
and any account – ‘explanation’ of this action of distinguishing –
will be open to question – to doubt – will be uncertain
that we distinguish is clear –
the grounds of any distinction – are not
let’s be clear – an explanation – is not the act
an explanation of a distinction – is not the action of distinguishing
‘explanation’ is – logically speaking – after the fact
the act – the act performed – without explanation – is unknown –
we propose – put forward propositions – descriptions – in order to make known
and any ‘knowledge’ we have – that is any proposal we make –
is uncertain
Wittgenstein: ‘So what I am saying means: red can’t be described.’
red – can’t be described?
‘red’ is the description –
so – what of red – as distinct from ‘red’
in the absence of description – what you deal with is the unknown
‘red’ – is the description – ‘red’ makes known
with the use of ‘red’ – we have – red – voila
‘red’ – as with any word – as with any proposition –
is open to question – open to doubt is uncertain –
with any word – any proposal – we can ask – what does it mean?
I suggest that the meaning of a word or of a proposition is – its use –
‘this is how we use the word ‘red’ … etc’ –
but however you account for meaning – whatever proposal you put forward
–
the uncertainty remains –
all you ever have – logically speaking – is a proposal –
open to question –
certainty has nothing to do with logic –
certainty is the show piece of rhetoric – of pretence
put it this – what you have with any word – any sign –
is its mark – its syntax –
its ‘meaning’ – is uncertainty – is possibility –
the uncertain use – of syntax
the syntax is a form or a vehicle for uncertainty –
and syntax is – itself – open to question
‘ “If you call the colour green an object, you must be saying that it is
an object that occurs in the symbolism. Otherwise the sense of the symbolism,
and thus its very existence as a symbolism, would not be guaranteed.”
But what does that assert about green, or the word “green”?’
‘if you call the color green an object …’?
that is to say –
if you describe – one description – ‘the colour green’ – in terms of
another description ‘object’ –
‘you must be saying that it is an object that occurs in the symbolism …’
what you are saying is that the
description occurs in the symbolism –
even this is a little odd –
reason being – the ‘symbolism’
and the ‘description’ –
are of course – one in the same
‘But what does that assert about
green, or the word “green”?’
describing green as an ‘object’ –
runs the risk of taking the colour out of green –
not I think a move in the right
direction –
but – it all depends on who’s
doing what and for why
we deal in proposals
–propositions –
the world is propositional –
this is not to say there are no
objects – or whatever else you pin
your hopes on –
everything is just as it is –
it is just a question of what
descriptions we use
‘object’ – is a word you might
call ‘solid’ – entrenched in use
open to question – open to doubt –
but it has form
what exists is what is proposed
and logically – any proposal – is
open to question – to doubt – is uncertain –
and yes –
you could jump from this to
saying –
existence is uncertain
(what a revelation)
© greg t. charlton. 2015.
