'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Sunday, March 08, 2015

Appendix 5. Is time essential to propositions? Comparison between time and truth-functions


‘If we had a grammar set out in the form of a book, it wouldn’t be a series of chapters side by side, it would have a different structure. And it is here, if I am right that we would have to see the distinction between phenomenological and non- phenomenological. There would be, say a chapter about colours, setting out the rules for the use of colour-words; but there would be nothing comparable in what the grammar had to say about the words “not”, “or”, etc (the “logical constants”).

How does the temporal character of facts manifest itself? How does it express itself, if not by certain expressions having to occur in our sentences? That means: how does the temporal character of facts express itself, if not grammatically? ”Temporal character” – that doesn’t mean that I come at 5 o’clock, but that I come at some time or other, i.e. that my proposition has the structure it has.

We are inclined to say that negation and disjunction are connected with the nature of the proposition, but that time is connected with its content rather than its nature.

But if the two are equally universal, how can it show itself in grammar that one of them is connected with the nature of the proposition and the other is not?

Or should I have said that time is not equally universal since mathematical propositions can be negated and occur in disjunctions, without being temporal. There is indeed a connection here, though this form of portraying the matter is misleading.

But that shows what I mean by “proposition” or “the nature of the proposition”.’

a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

we can further describe – the proposition – in terms of other proposals – i.e. ‘phenomenological’ – ‘non-phenomenological’ –

and we can describe the proposition in other terms –

we can put forward the proposal of form – and the proposal of content – the proposal of grammar

these are descriptive decisions –

to put forward a description of the proposition in terms of logical constants – is to put forward a structural description

and you can say it is a description of possibility –  possibilities within a structure –

possibilities of manipulation – of use –

and further we can question the relation between a proposal of form and a proposal of content – in relation to time

looking at a proposition in terms of time – is one way of considering it

i.e. – is the form non-temporal and the content temporal?

and if so how can this be?

this is the discussion Wittgenstein embarks on

there is no necessity to describe a proposal – in these terms

but by the same token – there is nothing to stop you describing the proposition in this way

the proposition – any proposition – is open to question – in any way you want to question it – it is open to any doubts you have – open to any kind of description –

it’s nature is uncertain

it strikes me that you can view the proposition – be it ‘phenomenological’ – ‘non-phenomenological – mathematical – or whatever – as temporal

I question and doubt – deal with uncertainty – in time

and yes – I can regard the action of questioning – of doubt – of uncertainty – as not being related to time –

i.e. a proposal is a proposal – regardless of when it is put forward

why you would describe a proposition in terms of either or both – depends just on what you are doing and why – it’s a question of use

Wittgenstein asks –

‘how does the temporal character of facts express itself, if not grammatically?’

firstly it is important to understand that a ‘fact’ is what is proposed – a fact is a proposal

secondly – the proposal – in whatever form – is the expression

now you may wish to explain that – grammatically –

any ‘explanation’ though will be a proposal – and as such an expression

there will be no ‘explanation’ of the proposition – that is beyond question – that is beyond doubt –

no fix on the proposition

just as the proposition itself – logically speaking is no fix – on anything

we propose – and just what that amounts to – how we describe that action – how we account for it – is logically speaking – up for grabs –

the point of a proposition is its use –

and mostly – I think we run with what is at hand – in whatever context we are operating in –

we have learnt usage

and propositional usage is not an optional extra – it is a natural necessity –

a natural necessity if we are to be functioning human beings

however logically speaking –

any usage is open to question –

is uncertain



© greg t. charlton. 2015.