‘When Frege and Russell talk of
concept and object they really mean property and thing; and here I am thinking
of a spatial body and its colour. Or one can say: concept and object are the
same as predicate and subject.’
the concept-object view of
reality is a proposal –
the subject-predicate view – is a
proposal
they are not the same –
they are proposals with different
histories – different ontologies – perhaps even different epistemologies –
they are different world views
and yes they can be inter-related
‘The concept of the material
point in physics is an abstraction from the material objects of experience; in
the same way the subject-predicate form of logic is an abstraction from the
subject-predicate form of our languages.
the material point in physics –
functions as an explanation of the material objects of experience
and subject predicate logic
functions as an explanation of the subject-predicate form of language
in both cases what we have is an
initial description – ‘material objects’ – and ‘the subject-predicate form of
logic’
the material point – and
subject-predicate logic – are descriptions of
these initial descriptions –
‘meta- descriptions’ or secondary
descriptions – if you like
the essential point to keep in
mind here is that any proposal – any physics – any logic – any description – is
open to question – to doubt – is uncertain
that a physics or a logic gains
currency – becomes entrenched and
has an ‘authoritative’ status is a function not of logic –
rather it is a function of rhetoric –
argument and persuasion
‘The pure subject-predicate form
is supposed to be a e f(x), where “a”
is the name of an object. Now let us look for an application of this schema.
The first thing that comes to mind as “names of objects” are the names of
persons and of other spatial objects (the Koh-i-Noor). Such names are given by
ostensive definitions (“that / is called ‘N’”). Such a definition might be
conceived as a rule substituting the word “N” for a gesture pointing to the
object, with proviso that the gesture can always be used in place of the
name……..’
a name identifies –
naming is recognized as an action
of identification –
this is the practise – the
propositional practice
a name is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – uncertain
however the action of naming – is
essentially pragmatic –
we name in order to proceed – to
get on with it
language – you might be tempted
to say – is all about motion
as to ostensive definition –
an ostensive definition may be
used to identify the object of a name –
and it is used to initiate one
into the naming game –
and even to activate the
language-game itself
‘However, this isn’t the normal
way of using a name; it is an essential feature of the normal use that I can’t
fall back on to a sign of the gesture language in place of the name. That is to
say, in the way in which we use the name “N”, if N goes out of the room and
latter a man comes into the room it makes sense to ask whether this man is N,
whether he is the same man who left the room earlier. And the sentence “N has
come back into the room” only makes sense if I can decide the question. And its
sense will vary with the criterion for this being the object that I earlier
called ‘N’. Different kinds of criteria will make different rules hold for the
sign ‘N’, will make it a ‘name’ in
a different sense of the word. Thus the word ‘name’ and the corresponding word
‘object’ are each headings to countless different lists of rules.’
if the context is such that it
does make sense to ask whether this man is N –
then gesture will be of no use
we are now well and truly in the
language-game –
that is – into the business of
question – and doubt
‘Thus the word ‘name’ and the
corresponding word ‘object’ are each headings to countless different lists of
rules.’
‘name’ and ‘object’ – are
proposals –
yes open to question – open to
doubt – thus – uncertain
‘rules’ – are no more than
proposals – propositions –
open to question – open to doubt
– uncertain
if they are held to be otherwise–
then they are propositions that
have been corrupted
‘If we give names to spatial
objects, our use of such names depends on a criterion of identity which
presupposes the impenetrability of bodies and the continuity of their movement.
So if I could treat two bodies A and B as I can treat shadows on the wall,
making two into one and one into
two again, it would be senseless to ask which of the two after the division is
A and which is B, unless I go on to introduce a totally new criterion of
identity e.g. the direction of their movements.
what this illustrates is that
naming is essentially just tagging –
and the value of a name – a tag –
will change with the circumstances
identity – we do identify
and we use names and signs to
mark the identification
any identification is open to
question – open to doubt –
identification is uncertain
criteria for identity – or
criteria proposals – underwrite the
act of identifying –
logically speaking this
underwriting occurs after the fact of identification
criteria of identity can be
useful – e.g. in a debate
or they may just be propositional
dressing –
after the fact
‘So it doesn’t always make sense
when presented with a proposition “(Ex).fx” to ask “Which xs satisfy f? “Which red circle a centimetre across is in the
middle of this square?” – One mustn’t confuse the question “which object
satisfies f” with the question “What sort
of object …etc?” The first question would have to be answered by a name,
and so the answer would have to be able to take the form “f(a)”; the question “what sort of ..?” is answered by
“(Ex).fx.ox”. So it may be senseless to ask “which red spot do you see?” and
yet make sense to ask “what kind of red spot do you see (a round one, a square
one, etc.)?”
we don’t begin with formal logic
and then ask which propositions satisfy it –
any formalization is a
translation from it’s non-formal presentation
such formal characterization of
propositions may be useful in certain contexts –
but the formalization – is just a
rewrite – it determines nothing
‘I would like to say: the old
logic contains more convention and physics than has been realized. If a noun is
the name of a body, a verb is to
denote a movement, and an adjective to denote a property of a body, it is easy
to see how much that logic presupposes; and it is reasonable to conjecture that
those original presuppositions go still deeper into the application of the
words, and the logic of propositions.’
is it logic that presupposes
language –
or is it language that
presupposes logic?
really you can’t run it both ways
– and claim you have explained anything
this is the way to think about it
–
we have proposals – propositions
– that can take different forms –
and those forms can be propositionally inter-related –
if by ‘logic’ – you mean a
certain body of propositions –
and if by physics you mean
another body of propositions –
you can put propositions that
inter-relate the two
the key point to make is that the
logical process that underlies any
propositional action
is questioning and doubt
‘If a table is painted brown is
painted brown, then it easy to think of the wood as bearer of the property
brown and you can imagine what remains the same as the colour changes. Even in
the case of one particular circle which appears now red, now blue. It is thus
easy to imagine what is red, but
difficult to imagine what is circular. What remains
in this case if form and colour alter? For position is part of the form and it
is arbitrary for me to lay down that the centre should stay fixed and the only
changes in form be changes in the radius.
‘what remains in this case if
form and colour alter?’
what remains – is propositional
uncertainty
‘We must once more adhere to
ordinary language and say a patch is
circular’?’
‘a patch is circular’?
‘patch’ is a proposal – a
description –
if it is used – it will be used
because it functions in a propositional context –
any proposal – any description –
can have a place – can have function – it depends on context –
and any proposal – regardless of
context – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
this ‘ordinary language argument’ – is just a con –
it is just another attempt to
impose a standard of use – where logically speaking – there just are no
standards –
there is just use – and however you describe it
who’s to say what is ‘ordinary’ –
and does it matter? –
in certain contexts ‘patch’ – may
have a very specialized use
‘ordinary’ and ‘specialized’ –
and whatever other label you want to apply – are descriptions of language use –
which like the usage they
describe are anything but certain
‘If I point to a curve and say
“That’s a circle” then someone can object that if it were not a circle it would
no longer be that. That is to say,
what I mean by the word “that” must be independent of what I assert about it.’
‘that’ – is a logical space – for description –
‘that’ – is a token for the unknown
‘that’ – logically speaking – can be however you describe it –
whatever it is proposed to be
‘“Is it conceivable that two
things have all their properties in common?” – If it isn’t conceivable, then
neither is its opposite.’?
when we are talking about a
‘thing’ here – we are talking about a proposal –
two things – two proposals
if these proposals are
distinguished at all – they are distinguished by proposal – a third proposal
if they are not distinguished
propositionally –
what you have two proposals –
that – as far as it goes – have their descriptions – in common
‘How are two circles of the same
size distinguished? This question makes it sound as if they are pretty nearly
one circle and only distinguished by a nicety.
In the technique of
representations by equations what is common is expressed by the form of the
equation, and the difference by the difference in the coordinates of the
centres.
Couldn’t you then say, instead of
“this is a circle”, “This point is the centre of a circle”? For to be the
centre of a circle is the external property of the point.”
yes you could say ‘this is the centre point of a circle’ –
that would identify one circle –
and of the other?
would you say again ‘this is the
centre of a circle’?
not if the idea was to
distinguish two circles of the same size –
perhaps you would say ‘ … and
that is a centre of the other circle’
–
or it might be enough to say –
‘this is a circle and that is a
circle’ –
it would depend on context
‘For to be the centre of a circle
is the external property of a point’ –
yes – you could say this – but is
it to the point?
aren’t you just involved in a
reworking of the original question?
‘how do you distinguish two
points?’
the point here is that the
question can be interpreted in a number of ways –
it’s still the same question –
the reality is we make the distinction
– and if we have a mind to – or are asked to –
we attempt to explain the
distinction
the explanation – is not the
distinction –
granted we may not know how we do
what we do – how indeed we distinguish –
and yes we have a go at
explaining it
the distinction made – and the
explanation of it – are proposals – open to question – to doubt – uncertain
‘All that I am saying comes to
this, that O(x) must be an external description
of x’
an internal description – an
external description – these are descriptions of description
there is no definite description
– and there is definite description of description
“We do indeed talk about a
circle, its diameter, etc. etc., as if we were describing a concept in complete
abstraction from the objects falling under it. – But in that case ‘circle’ is
not a predicate in the original sense. And in general geometry is the place
where concepts from the most different regions get mixed up together.’
it is common practice to talk
about a circle as if we were describing a concept in complete abstraction from
the objects falling under it –
this is one way of talking about
the proposal ‘circle’ –
and yes – there is a disconnect
between this way of talking about a circle – and regarding ‘circle’ in terms of
subject and predicate –
there is no conflict here –
what we have here is different
approaches to – different interpretations of – different uses of – ‘circle’
any proposal is open to question
– open to doubt – is uncertain
and it is this uncertainty that
generates different propositional responses
by the way – it is not just in
geometry that ‘concepts of different regions get mixed up together’ –
it’s everywhere –
and I think we are all the better
for it –
however whether you agree with
this value judgment or not –
it is how it is
© greg t. charlton. 2015.
