SPINOZA’S ETHICS: A
CRITICAL EXPLORATION
In what follows I
offer a critical examination of Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’
I will present each
proposition and following it with my remarks.
FIRST PART
CONCERNING GOD
DEFINITIONS
I. I UNDERSTAND
that to be a CAUSE OF ITSELF (causa sui) whose essence involves
existence and whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing.
a proposition is a proposal
–
and any proposal
put is a propositional action
a proposal /
propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘cause of itself’ –
makes no sense
any proposed cause
– has a proposed effect
the idea that a
cause is its effect – destroys the causal analysis
what exists is what
is proposed – and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt and is
uncertain
existence is
uncertain –
the ‘essence’ of
anything – of any proposal – is a description – a propositional
description of the proposal – and as such – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
we propose against
– and in response to – the unknown
outside of proposal
– is the unknown
II. That thing is
said to be FINITE IN ITS KIND (in suo genere finita) which can be
limited by another thing of the same kind. E.g., a body is said to be
finite because we conceive another larger than it. Thus a thought is limited by
another thought. But a body cannot be limited by a thought, nor a thought by a
body.
a ‘body’ is a
proposal – a ‘thought’ is a proposal –
there is no ‘finite
in its kind’ –
any proposal
can be ‘limited’ by any other proposal – that is – put in relation to any
other proposal
there is only one
‘kind’ of proposal – or – all and any proposals are open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
III. I understand
SUBSTANCE (substantia) to be that which is in itself and is conceived
through itself: I mean that. the conception of which does not depend on the
conception of another thing from which it must be formed.
a ‘substance’ – is
a proposal
it makes no sense
to say of a proposal that it is ‘in itself’ – just as it makes no sense
to say that a proposal is ‘outside itself’ – or ‘not in itself’ –
a proposal does not
have a ‘self’
propositional
actors can be said to have a self
and it is
propositional actors that ‘conceive’ – that is propose – proposals /
propositions
a proposal is put –
does not ‘depend’ on any other proposal
IV. AN ATTRIBUTE (attributum)
I understand to be that which the intellect perceives as constituting the
essence of a substance.
an ‘attribute’ – is
a proposal – a propositional description
the ‘intellect’ –
is a name for propositional action
a ‘substance’ – is
a proposal –
if ‘essence’ is
meant as a description that is certain – logically speaking – there is no
essence
any propositional
description – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
V. By MODE (modus)
I understand the Modifications (affections) of a substance or that which
is in something else through which it may be conceived.
a ‘mode’ or
‘modification of a substance’ – is a propositional description of a ‘substance’
/ proposal
one proposal is not
‘in’ another proposal
a proposal is put
in relation to another proposal –
any proposed
relation – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
VI. GOD (Deus)
I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting
of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.
Explanation.
– I say absolutely infinite, but not in its kind. For whatever is infinite only
in its kind, we may deny the attribute to be infinite; but to the essence of
what is absolutely infinite there appertains whatever expresses essence and
involves no negation.
‘God’ – is a name
for the unknown –
the unknown has no
attributes – no properties – no characteristics
the unknown is
silent
the unknown is that
to which all proposals are put –
we make known with
proposal – with propositional action
any proposal put –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
VII. The thing is
said to be FREE (libera) which exists by the mere necessity of its own
nature and is determined in its actions by itself alone. That thing is said to
be NECESSARY (necessaria), or rather COMPELLED (coacta), when it
is determined in its existence and actions by something else in a certain fixed
ratio.
a ‘thing’ – is a
proposal –
any proposal is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
it is propositional
uncertainty – that is the ground of freedom
if by necessary a
proposition is meant a proposition that is certain – there are no necessary
propositions –
any proposal /
proposition – is open to question – is logically uncertain
and any so called
‘determination’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
VIII. I understand ETERNITY (aeternitas)
to be existence itself, in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from
the definition of an eternal thing.
Explanation. – For such an existence
is conceived as an eternal truth, just as is the essence of a thing, and
therefore cannot be explained by duration or time, although duration can be
conceived as wanting beginning and end.
‘eternity’ is an absence of reference to
time
what exists is what is proposed –
any proposal can be put with or without
a reference to time
an ‘eternal thing’ – is a proposal put
without reference to time
AXIOMS
a ‘thing’ – of any description – is a
proposal –
a proposal does not have a ‘self’ – and is
therefore not ‘in itself’ –
a proposition put – is not in another
proposition –
relations between propositions can be
proposed –
any proposition – or any proposed relation
between propositions – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
II. That which cannot be conceived through
another thing must be conceived through itself
a proposition does not conceive itself
propositional actors conceive / propose –
proposals / propositions
a proposal may be put in response to or
in reaction to another proposal
or a proposal may be put without any
relation to another proposal
any causal analysis / proposal – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
furthermore – we can negotiate our
propositional reality quite successfully without a causal analysis
there is no propositional necessity –
a proposal is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
proposals / propositions – are contingent
what we propose is what we know –
and what we know – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
if you propose a causal explanation
of an event – the proposal just is that your knowledge of the effect
depends on your knowledge of the cause
here we have the adoption of an
epistemological framework –
it is an epistemological framework that has
been – and is – used extensively – and one regarded as useful and productive
however – any such framework – in a logical
– as distinct from pragmatic – sense – is a proposal – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
V. Things which have nothing in common
reciprocally cannot be comprehended reciprocally through each other, or the
conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.
reciprocity is a relation – a proposed
relation
and just whether such a relation is said to
hold will depend on how the things in question are defined – how they are
characterized
any definition of a thing – any
characterization of a thing – and any relation – is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
VI. A true idea should agree with its ideal
(ideatum), i.e., what it conceives.
an ‘idea’ is a proposal
the proposal is the ideal – is
what is proposed
there is no distinction between ‘idea’ and
‘ideal –
and no question of ‘agreement’
VII. The essence of that which can be
conceived as not existing does not involve existence
what exists is what is proposed
that which does not exist – is that which is
not proposed
PROPOSITIONS
PROP. I. A
substance is prior in its nature to its modifications
Proof – This obvious from Def. 3 and 5
a ‘substance’ is a
proposal –
the modifications
of the substance – are the propositional descriptions of the proposal
propositional
descriptions – are the proposal described – i.e. – the ‘substance’
described
a proposal is not
prior to its description – the proposal is its description
and any description
proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. II. Two
substances, having different attributes, have nothing in common between them.
Proof. –
This also is obvious from Def. 3. For each of them must be in itself and
through itself be conceived, or the conception of one of them does not involve
the conception of the other.
a substance is a
proposal –
an attribute is a
proposal – a propositional description
two proposals put –
with different descriptions / attributes – are open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
this – they have in
common
and logical
uncertainty invites further description –
and with that the
possibility of proposing – descriptions / attributes that are held in common –
any description /
attribute proposed – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
Proof. – If they have nothing in
common reciprocally. therefore (Ax.5) they cannot be known through each other,
and therefore (Ax.4) one cannot be the cause of the other. Q.e.d.
’two things’ – are two proposals
‘causation’ – is a proposed relation –
between proposals
if it is proposed that PA causes PB – then what
is being proposed is that PA and PB have something in common
just what that is – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
if they are not ‘known through each other’ –
that is – if there is no relation proposed – then they are not related –
and one cannot be said to be the cause of the other
‘causation’ – as with any proposal – any
propositional relation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. IV. Two or three distinct things are distinguished one
from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or
by the difference of their modifications.
Proof
– All things that are, are either in themselves or other things (Ax. 1), that
is (Def. 3 and 5) beyond the intellect nothing is granted save substances and
their modifications. Nothing therefore is granted beyond the intellect, through
which several things may be distinguished one from the other except substances,
or what is the same thing (Def. 4) their attributes and modifications. Q.e.d.
a ‘substance’ – is a proposal – an ‘attribute’ a description of
a proposal – and a modification – like ‘attribute’ – is a propositional
description –
proposals
and propositional descriptions – are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘distinct
things’ – are proposals –
any
proposal is different from any other – and proposals can be distinguished one
from the other in any number of ways –
i.e.
– where it is put that ‘the same thing’ is proposed in separate proposals – the
proposals can be distinguished in terms the propositional actors that propose
them – in terms of time and place of proposal – and in terms of their form or
expression
where
different things are proposed – propositions are distinguished by what they
propose
the
‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action –
beyond
propositional action – or outside of propositional action – is the unknown
Proof. – If several distinct
substances are given, they must be distinguished one from the other either by
the difference of their attributes or their modifications (prev. Prop.).
If, then, they are to be distinguished by the difference of their attributes,
two or more cannot be granted as having the same attribute. But if they are to
be distinguished by the difference of their modifications, since a substance is
prior in its nature to its modifications (Prop. 1), therefore let the
modifications be laid aside and let the substance itself be considered in
itself, that is (Def. 3 and 6), truly considered, (prev. Prop.), two or more
substances cannot have the same nature or attribute. Q.e.d.
a ‘substance’ is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
an ‘attribute’ is a description of a
proposal – and is open to question
a proposal may be given many different
descriptions
different proposals – may be given the same
description – and also may be distinguished by other descriptions
all proposals have the same logical ‘nature’
– they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – There cannot exist in the
universe two substances of the same attribute (prev. Prop.), that is (Prop. 2),
which have anything in common, and accordingly (Prop. 3) one of them cannot be
the cause of the other or one cannot be produced by the other. Q.e.d.
Corollary. – Hence it follows that a
substance cannot be produced from anything else. For in the nature of things
nothing is given save substances, as is obvious from Ax.1 and Def. 3 and 5: and
it cannot be produced from another substance (prev. Prop.). Therefore a
substance cannot be produced from anything else whatsoever. Q.e.d.
Another Proof. – This can be more
easily shown by the method of proving the contrary to be absurd. For if a
substance can be produced from anything else, the knowledge of it should depend
upon the knowledge of its cause (Ax.4), and consequently (Def. 3) it would not be
a substance.
a ‘substance’ is a proposal –
proposals do not ‘produce’ proposals
propositional actors ‘produce’ proposals –
and any proposal produced is open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
what
exists is what is proposed –
‘substance’
is a proposal –
‘substance’
proposed – is substance existing
and
what is proposed is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
there
is no necessity – only logical / propositional uncertainty –
existence
is uncertain
a
proposal – a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
there
is no logical end to the logical activity of question – of doubt – and the
exploration of propositional uncertainty –
propositional
uncertainty defies any claim of necessity
Proof.
– No two or more substances can have the
same attribute (Prop. 5), and it appertains to the nature of substance that it
should exist (Prop. 7). It must therefore exist finitely or infinitely. But not
finitely. For (Def.2) it would then be limited by some other substance of the
same nature which also of necessity must exist (Prop 7): and then the two
substances would be granted having the same attribute, which is absurd (Prop.
5). It will exist, therefore, infinitely. Q.e.d.
a
substance is a proposal
an
attribute is a proposal – a descriptive proposal
what
is proposed – is what exists
two
or more proposals – can have the same description – and can also have different
descriptions
proposals
are not limited by other proposals –
no
proposal must exist –
propositional
action is uncertain – and comes out of uncertainty
Note
I. – As to be finite is, in reality, a denial in part, and as to be infinite
is the absolute assertion of the existence of its nature, it follows, therefore
(from Prop. 7 alone) that all substances must be infinite.
a
proposal / proposition – is finite in its form
and
any proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain – and logically there is no end to this process
we
act with propositions – and in acting with a proposition – we may suspend the
process of critical discovery –
nevertheless
– any proposition put to use – is – from a logical point of view – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Note
II. – I make no doubt but that to all those who form injudicious opinions
of things and are not wont to see things through their first cause, it may be
difficult to conceive the truth of the seventh Proposition; doubtless because
they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and the
substances themselves, nor know they in what manner things are produced. Hence
it comes to pass that they apply the principle which they see in common things
to substances. For those who do not know the real causes of things confuse
everything, and without the least mental repugnance they picture trees no less
than men as speaking, and imagine men to be formed from stones no less than
from seed, and any forms to be changed into any other forms whatsoever. Thus
those who confuse divine with human nature easily attribute human passions to
God, more especially if they do not know how passions
are
produced in the mind. But if men would give heed to the nature of substance
they would doubt less concerning Prop. 7: rather they would reckon it an axiom
above all others, and hold it among common opinions. For then by substance they
would understand that which is in itself, and through itself is conceived, or
rather that whose knowledge does not depend on the knowledge of any other
thing: but by modification that which is something else, and whose conception
is formed from the conception of whatever it is in. Wherefore we may have true
ideas of modifications which do not exist; since although they do not really
exist outside the mind, yet their existence is comprehended in something else,
and through that they may be conceived. The truth of true sentences does not
exist outside the mind unless it exists in themselves, because through
themselves they are conceived. If anyone should say, then, that he has a clear
and distinct, that is true, idea of substance, and should nevertheless doubt
whether such substance existed, he would indeed be like one who should say that
that he had a true and yest should whether it were false (as will be manifest
to anyone who regards it carefully); or if anyone should say that the substance
was created, he would state at the same time that a false idea might be made
true, than which it is difficult to conceive anything more absurd. And
therefore it must be necessarily acknowledged that the existence of substance,
like its essence, is an eternal truth. And hence we may conclude in another
manner that there cannot be two substances of the same nature: which it is now
perhaps worthwhile to show. But let me arrange this in its proper order,
therefore note: (1) the true definition of each thing involves nothing and
expresses nothing else but the nature of the thing defined. From which it
follows (2) that clearly no definition involves any certain number of
individuals nor expresses it, since definition expresses nothing else than the
nature of the thing defined. E.g., the definition of a triangle expresses
nothing else than the simple nature of a triangle, but not a certain number of
triangles. Let it be noted again (3) that for each existing thing a cause must
be given by reason of which it exists. Note, moreover, that this cause, by
reason of which anything exists, should either be contained in the very nature
and definition of an existing thing (clearly because it appertains to its
nature to exist), or should be given outside itself. It follows from these
positions that if a certain number of individuals exist in nature that a cause
must necessarily be given why those individuals, and why not, more or less
exist. E.g., if in the nature of things twenty men were to exist (whom for the
sake of better explanation I will say to have existed at the same time, and
that none existed before them), it would not be enough when giving a reason why
twenty men existed, to show the cause of human nature in kind, but it would be
necessary also to show the cause why not more or less than twenty existed;
since (Note 3) a reason or cause should be given why each thing existed. But
this cause cannot be contained in nature itself (Notes 2 and 3), since the true
definition of man does not involve the number twenty. Hence (Note 4) the reason
why these twenty men exist, and consequently why each of them exists, must
necessarily be given outside each of them: and therefore it may be absolutely
concluded that everything whose nature involves the existence of a certain
number of individuals must of necessity have, since they exist, an external
cause. Now since, as has been shown already in this Note, existence appertains
to the nature of substance, its definitions must then of necessity involve
existence, and therefore from its mere definition its existence can be
concluded. But since, in Notes 2 and 3, we have shown that from its own
definition the existence of several substances cannot follow, it follows
necessarily therefore that two or more substances cannot have the same nature
as was put forward.
I
will here consider this Note –
‘I
make no doubt but that to all those who form injudicious opinions of things and
are not wont to see things through their first cause, it may be difficult to
conceive the truth of the seventh Proposition; doubtless because they do not
distinguish between the modifications of substances and the substances
themselves, nor know they in what
manner
things are produced. Hence it comes to pass that they apply the principle which
they see in common things to substances. For those who do not know the real
causes of things confuse everything, and without the least mental repugnance
they picture trees no less than men as speaking, and imagine men to be formed
from stones no less than from seed, and any forms to be changed into any other
forms whatsoever. Thus those who confuse divine with human nature easily
attribute human passions to God, more especially if they do not know how
passions are produced in the mind. But if men would give heed to the nature of
substance they would doubt less concerning Prop. 7: rather they would reckon it
an axiom above all others, and hold it among common opinions.’
the
’first cause’ for Spinoza – is the ‘cause in itself” – which is that which has
no cause
his
use of ‘cause’ here is a misuse –
and
furthermore – the notion of first cause contradicts his argument that substance
is infinite
really
all we have here is a ‘first principle’ – that is put as certain – and
therefore is rightly termed a ‘first prejudice’
as
to distinguishing between ‘modifications’ and ‘substance in itself’ –
there
is no real distinction – in Spinoza’s terms –
modifications
are substance expressed – or if you like – substance experienced
and
as ‘for those who do not know the real cause of things’
if
there is no cause (the ‘cause in itself’) – then you would think that they are
free to know the world – however they do know it – however they propose
it
and
– ‘those who confuse divine nature with human nature’ –
in
so far as – all that exists is substance – is therefore ‘God’ – in Spinoza’s
own terms there can be no confusion
it
is all of the one nature
prop
7 – ‘All substance is necessarily infinite’ –
the
logical reality is that this proposal – this proposition – is – as with any
proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
which
is to say – more generally – how we understand the world – is an open matter
there
is no necessity in how we characterize – how we describe – anything –
any
proposal that we put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘necessity’
– in so far as it is a concept – a proposal – that is designed to defy
propositional uncertainty – is illogical
it
is a refuge of the dogmatic – which is to say – those who have for whatever
reason – decided against logic – have decided against rationality
‘For
then by substance they would understand that which is in itself, and through
itself is conceived, or rather that whose knowledge does not depend on the
knowledge of any other thing: but by modification that which is something else,
and whose conception is formed from the conception of whatever it is in.
Wherefore we may have true ideas of modifications which do not exist; since
although they do not really exist outside the mind, yet their existence is
comprehended in something else, and through that they may be conceived. The
truth of true sentences does not exist outside the mind unless it exists in
themselves, because through themselves they are conceived. If anyone should
say, then, that he has a clear and distinct, that is a true, idea of substance,
and should nevertheless doubt whether such substance existed, he would indeed
be like one who should say that that he had a true and yet should whether it
were false (as will be manifest to anyone who regards it carefully); or if
anyone should say that the substance was created, he would state at the same
time that a false idea might be made true, than which it is difficult to
conceive anything more absurd. And therefore it must be necessarily
acknowledged that the existence of substance, like its essence, is an eternal
truth. And hence we may conclude in another manner that there cannot be two
substances of the same nature: which it is now perhaps worthwhile to show.’
‘substance’
– is a proposal –
what
is proposed – is what is known
what
does it mean to say that something – anything – is ‘conceived through itself’?
it
is to say that the thing – whatever it is – conceives itself – i.e. – a stone –
conceives itself
in
logical terms – this is to say a proposal – proposes itself –
proposals
do not propose – generate – themselves –
human
beings – propositional actors propose –
Spinoza’s
reality of ‘substance conceived through itself ‘– is for us an alien world – a
world that actually has no place for human beings
Spinoza’s
world has no moorings in humanity
Spinoza
in his conception – negates humanity
modification
– ‘whose conception is formed by the conception of whatever it is in’
a
conception is not in a conception –
a
conception is a proposal – and in relation to a proposal – proposals can be put
proposals
are not in proposals – proposals are put to proposals
proposals
are put in relation to proposals
a
true idea does not exist outside the mind?
the
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
an ‘idea’
is a proposal – truth is a proposal of affirmation – falsity – a proposal of
denial
the
truth or falsity of an idea / proposal is a propositional response to a subject
proposal
any
such response – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
clear
and distinct idea –
in
a logical sense – there are no clear and distinct ideas – if by that is meant
ideas that are certain
any
idea – whether clear and distinct – or unclear – or indistinct – is a proposal
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a
‘true idea’ – is a proposal affirmed – a ‘false idea’ – a proposal denied –
any
proposal is open to question – any propositional response to a subject proposal
– is open to question
affirmation
can be changed to denial – denial changed to affirmation –
we
deal in propositional uncertainty – and at base our propositional assessments
are uncertain
‘the
existence of substance like its essence an eternal truth’ –
‘substance’
– is a proposal –
if
by ‘essence’ you mean a certainty – there is no essence –
if
by ‘essence’ – you mean a description – then ‘essence’ is a proposal – open to
question
if
by ‘eternal truth’ is meant – a truth that is certain for all time – there is
no such thing
any
proposed truth – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
that
there cannot be two substances of the same nature?
the
logical ‘nature’ of any proposal – is that it is uncertain
all
propositions have the same logical nature
‘But
let me arrange this in its proper order, therefore note: (1) the true
definition of each thing involves nothing and expresses nothing else but the
nature of the thing defined. From which it follows (2) that clearly no
definition involves any certain number of individuals nor expresses it, since
definition expresses nothing else than the nature of the thing defined. E.g.,
the definition of a triangle expresses nothing else than the simple nature of a
triangle, but not a certain number of triangles. Let it be noted again (3) that
for each existing thing a cause must be given by reason of which it exists.
Note, moreover, that this cause, by reason of which anything exists, should
either be contained in the very nature and definition of an existing thing (clearly
because it appertains to its nature to exist), or should be given outside
itself. It follows from these positions that if a certain number of individuals
exist in nature that a cause must necessarily be given why those individuals,
and why not, more or less exist. E.g., if in the nature of things twenty men
were to exist (whom for the sake of better explanation I will say to have
existed at the same time, and that none existed before them), it would not be
enough when giving a reason why twenty men existed, to show the cause of human
nature in kind, but it would be necessary also to show the cause why not more
or less than twenty existed; since (Note 3) a reason or cause should be given
why each thing existed. But this cause cannot be contained in nature itself
(Notes 2 and 3), since the true definition of man does not involve the number
twenty. Hence (Note 4) the reason why these twenty men exist, and consequently
why each of them exists, must necessarily be given outside each of them: and
therefore it may be absolutely concluded that everything whose nature involves
the existence of a certain number of individuals must of necessity have, since
they exist, an external cause. Now since, as has been
shown already in this Note, existence appertains to the nature of substance,
its definition must then of necessity involve existence, and therefore from its
mere definition its existence can be concluded. But since, in Notes 2 and
3, we have shown that from its own definition the existence of several
substances cannot follow, it follows necessarily therefore that two or more
substances cannot have the same nature as was put forward.’
as
to (1) – a true definition expresses the nature of the thing defined –
any
‘definition’ – is a proposal – open to question
as
to the ‘nature’ of the thing proposed
a
proposal regarding the ‘nature’ of anything proposed – is of course – open to
question
(2)
that no definition involves any number of individuals
if
a man is defined as a member of a species – then being a member of a
species – is a definition that involves any number of individuals
there
are two modes of propositional action –
the
critical mode where proposals are put to question – put to doubt – their
uncertainty explored
and
the game mode
a
game is a rule governed propositional exercise
if
you play the game – you play according to the rule of the game
if
you don’t play in accordance with the rule – there is no game
human
beings critically evaluate their proposals – their propositions
and
human being have devised and play rule governed games –
in
short – we think and we play
mathematics
is a rule governed propositional game –
a
definition which involves number is a definition in which the number game has
been applied
(3)
that for each existing thing – a cause of its existence – must be given
the
question why anything exists – is a natural philosophical question – and there
will be various answers – and various ways to answer this question – and the
matter will remain open – open to further proposal –
as
to their must be a cause given for why anything exists – no – there is
no necessity here – a thing can exist quite happily without the burden of a
causal explanation
and
yes – you can include a proposal as to the cause of a thing’s existence – in a
definition of its nature – but again there is no necessity to do this
the
propositional reality is that we will have different definitions of the nature
of a thing proposed – different definition suiting different purposes –
different propositional purposes
‘Now
since, as has been shown already in this Note, existence appertains to the
nature of substance, its definition must then of necessity involve existence,
and therefore from its mere definition its existence can be concluded.’
anything
proposed – exists as proposed –
if
‘substance’ is proposed – ‘substance’ exists as proposed –
and
if proposed – the proposal ‘substance’ – is open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain
if
‘substance’ is not proposed – it doesn’t exist
PROP. IX. The more
reality or being a thing has, the more attributes it will have.
Proof – This
is obvious from Def..4.
a ‘thing’ – is a proposal
–
the ‘reality’ or
‘being’ of a proposal – is the proposal put –
there is no ‘more’
to a proposal – than what is proposed
‘attributes’ – are
descriptions – propositional descriptions –
proposals are open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the more attributes
/ descriptions – of a proposal – the more uncertainty to be explored
PROP. X. Each
attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.
Proof. – An
attribute is that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting
its essence (Def. 4), therefore (Def. 3) it must be conceived through itself.
Note. –
Hence it appears that though two attributes are conceived really apart from
each other, that is, one is conceived without the aid of the other, we cannot
thence conclude that they form two entities or two different substances. For it
follows from the nature of substance that each of its attributes can be
conceived through itself: since all the attributes it ever had were in it at
the same time, nor could one of them be produced from another, but each of them
expresses the reality or being of the substance. Therefore it is far from right
to call it absurd to attribute several attributes to one substance; but on the
other hand, nothing is more clear than that each entity should be conceived
under the effects of some attribute, and the more reality or being it has, the
more attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity belong to it; so
that nothing can be clearer than that an entity must be defined as absolutely
infinite (as we defined it in Def. 6) which consists of infinite attributes, each
of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence. But if anyone still
asks by what sign we shall be able to know the difference of substances, let
him read the following Propositions, which shall show that in the nature of
things only one substance exist, and it is absolutely infinite, wherefore he
will ask for a sign in vain.
an ‘attribute’ – does not conceive itself
an attribute is conception / proposal – it
is not the conceiver / propositional actor
an attribute is a
propositional description / action
the ‘intellect’ is a
name for propositional action –
a ‘substance’ is a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘essence’ is
meant a propositional description that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and
certain – then there is no essence –
two attributes –
are two descriptions of the one proposal
different proposals
can be given the same description – and different proposals can be given
different descriptions / attributes
the more
descriptions put – the more propositional uncertainty to be explored –
a proposal is open
to question – open to doubt and uncertain
there is no logical
end to this process
no proposition is
put outside of time – though any proposal can be put without a reference to
time –
one proposal is
different to any other another
PROP. XI. God or a
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal
and infinite essence necessarily exists
‘God’ is a name
for the unknown –
the unknown has no
attributes
‘substance’ is a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any proposal put
and any propositional description put is a response to the unknown –
and any proposal /
propositional description put is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
for Spinoza ‘substance’
is a synonym for ‘God’ – and ‘God a description of his proposal ‘substance’
an ‘attribute’ – is
a propositional description
there is no logical
limit to the number of proposals that can be put in response to any subject
proposal
there is no logical
limit to the number of descriptions that can be put in response to a proposal
what exists is what
is proposed –
any proposal is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
existence is not
necessary – existence is uncertain
Proof. – If
you deny it, conceive it, if it to be possible, that God does not exist. Then
(Ax.7) his essence does nor involve existence. But this (Prop. 7) is absurd.
Therefore God necessarily exists. Q.e.d
‘God’ – is a name
for the unknown
Another Proof.
– A cause or reason ought to be assigned for each thing, why it exists or why
it does not. E.g., if a triangle exists, the reason or cause of its
existence should be granted; but if it does not exist, the reason or cause
should be granted which prevents it from existing or which takes its existence
from it. Now this reason or cause must be contained in the nature of the thing
or outside of it. E.g., the reason why a square circle does not exist is
shown by the very nature of the circle – clearly for it involves contradiction.
On the other hand, the existence of a substance follows from its nature alone,
for that involves existence (vide Prop.7). but the reason why a circle
or a triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from their
nature. From this likewise it should follow either that a triangle necessarily
exists or that it is impossible that it can now exist. But these are made
manifest through themselves. From which it follows that that must of necessity
exist concerning which no reason or cause could prevent its existence. If thus
no reason or cause can be granted which could prevent the existence of God or
take his existence from him, it must certainly be concluded that he does exist
of necessity. But if such a reason or cause be granted, it must be granted
either in the nature of God itself or outside of it, that is, in another
substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, thereby it
would be admitted that God is granted. But the substance of another nature has
nothing in common with God (Prop. 2), and therefore can neither can give him
existence or take it from him. And since the reason or cause which would take
existence from God cannot be granted outside divine nature, i.e., the nature of
God, it must of necessity be granted, if indeed God does not exist, in his own
nature, and this would involve a contradiction. But to assert this of a being
absolutely infinite and perfection all things is absurd: therefore neither
within God nor without him is any cause or reason granted which could take his
existence from him, and consequently God must necessarily exist. Q.e.d.
what exists is what
is proposed –
if a triangle
exists – it exists because it is proposed
if not proposed –
it doesn’t exist
the reason or cause
that something does not exist – is that it is not proposed
a proposal /
proposition that involves a contradiction – proposes nothing – is not a
proposal – it is a corruption of the proposal
if ‘substance’
exists – it exists because it is proposed
Spinoza’s ‘God’
exists because he has proposed it –
if his God does not
exist – the reason it does not exist – is that it has not been proposed –
no proposal or
propositional action is necessary – all propositional is contingent
any proposal put is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Another Proof.
– Inability to exist is a want of power, and on the other hand, ability to
exist is power (as is self-evident). If then that which now necessarily exists
consists only of finite things, hence finite things are more powerful than a
being absolutely infinite: and this, as is self-evident, is absurd. Therefore,
either nothing exists, or a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists. But
either in ourselves or in something else which exists of necessity, we also
exist (vide Ax. 1, and Propo.7). Therefore a being absolutely infinite, that is
(Def. 6) God, necessarily exists. Q.e.d.
that which does not
exist is that which is not proposed
a lack of power
– can only be proposed of that which does exist – of that proposed
there is no
‘lacking’ – in that which is not proposed – does not exist
furthermore –
proposal or existence – is not power
proposal or
existence is the ground or basis of power –
a proposal must
exist to have the possibility of power –
a proposal’s power
– rests in its use
power is a relative
propositional relation – between propositional actions
i.e. –propositional
action1 can be proposed as more powerful relative to propositional action 2 –
and any such
proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
no propositional
action is necessary – all propositional action is contingent – open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
if nothing exists –
nothing is proposed
we exist as
proposed – by ourselves – or by others –
‘a being absolutely
infinite’ – can be proposed –
and as with any
proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – In
this last proof, I wished to show the existence of God a posteriori so
that it might more easily be perceived, and not because the existence of God
does not follow a priori from the same basis of argument. For since
ability to exist is power, it follows that the more reality anything in nature
has, the more power it will have to exist; and accordingly a being absolutely
infinite, or God, has absolutely infinite power of existence from itself, and
on that account absolutely exists. Many, however, perhaps will not be able to
see the truth of this proof easily, because they are accustomed to look at and
consider things which flow from external causes and of these, those which are
quickly made, that is, which exist easily, they see perish easily; and on the
other
hand, they judge
those things to be harder to make, i.e., not existing so easily, to which
they find more attributes belong. But, in truth, to deliver them from these
prejudices I need
not show here in what manner or by what reason this statement “that which is
quickly made perishes easily”, is true, nor even, in considering the whole of
nature, whether all things are equally difficult or not; but it suffices to
note that I do not speak here of things that are made of external causes, but
of substances alone which cannot be produced from any external cause. For those
things which are made from external causes, whether they consist of many parts
or few, whatever perfection or reality they have, it is all there by reason of
their external cause, and therefore their existence arises merely from the
perfection of some external cause and not their own. On the other hand,
whatever perfection a substance may have is due to no external cause, wherefore
its existence must follow from its nature alone, which is nothing else than its
essence. Perfection, then, does not take existence from a thing, but on the
contrary, gives it existence; but imperfection, on the other hand, takes it away,
and so we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything than of a being
absolutely infinite or perfect, that is God. Now since his essence excludes all
imperfection, by that very fact it removes all cause of doubt concerning his
existence and makes it most certain: which will be manifest, I think, to such
as pay it the least attention.
an ‘external cause’
– is a proposal – a propositional explanation – open to question
–
existence – is
neither perfect or imperfect – existence is uncertain
this notion of
perfection – is a synonym for certainty – and is thus illogical –
as with ‘certainty’
– it is a propositional delusion
it has no relevance
to rational propositional action –
our proposals /
propositional actions are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain
it is only
ignorance that ‘removes doubt’
‘substance’ – is a proposal – and any
proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
an attribute is a description – a
propositional description of a proposal
that it is proposed that ‘substance’ can
described as ‘divided into parts’ – is a valid proposal – a legitimate critical
analysis –
just as the proposal can be described as not
divided into parts – so to the proposal can be described as divided into parts
if the proposal – or any descriptions of it
are not held open to question – open to doubt and regarded as uncertain – then
it is held illogically – it is held irrationally
Proof. – The parts into which
substance can be divided will either retain the nature of the substance or not.
In the first case, then (Prop. 8) each part must be infinite and (Prop. 6) its
own cause, and (Prop. 5) must possess different attributes: and so from one
substance several can be made, which (Prop. 6) is absurd. Again, the parts
would have nothing in common with the whole (Prop. 2), and the whole (Def. 4
Prop. 10) could exist and be conceived without the parts that go to make it,
which no one will doubt to be absurd. But in the second case, when the parts do
not retain the nature of the substance, then, when a substance is divided into
equal parts, it will lose the nature of the substance and will cease to be,
which (Prop. 7) is absurd.
in response to any proposal – any number of
proposals / propositional descriptions can be put –
and any such proposals / descriptions – are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XIII.
Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
‘substance’ – can
be described as ‘infinite’ and ‘indivisible’ –
such a
propositional description – is open to question
and a ‘substance’ /
proposal – can be described as ‘divisible’ –
and likewise – any such
a description – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
Proof. – If
it is divisible, the parts into which it is divided will either retain the
nature of the substance or will not. In the first case several substances would
be given having the same nature, which (Prop. 5) is absurd. In the second case, a substance absolutely
infinite could cease to be (as above by Prop. 7) which is also absurd (Prop.
II).
any proposal
subjected to critical analysis – can be changed by this logical process – or –
replaced with new propositional understandings –
and any new
proposals put – like the subject proposal – will be open to question
all proposals have
the same logical nature – they are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
two or more
proposals can be described as ‘infinite’ – have the ‘attribute’ of
infinity
Corollary. –
From this it follows that no substance, in so far as it is substance, can be
divided into parts.
any proposal can be
‘divided’ that is modified or reproposed in a critical propositional action
Note. – That
substance is indivisible can be seen more easily from this, that the nature of
substance cannot be conceived except as infinite, and that by a part of a
substance nothing else can be conceived than a finite substance, which (Prop.
8) involves an obvious contradiction.
if it is held that
substance can only be regarded as infinite – then of course a finite
substance is impossible
however – such a
proposal is dogmatic and therefore irrational
furthermore – it
may well be proposed that any ‘part’ of an infinity – is infinite –
this is the case
i.e. in some presentations of set theory – i.e. – the set of infinite sets
PROP. XIV. Except God no substance can be granted or
conceived.
‘God’ – is not a
‘substance’ – ‘God’ is a name for the unknown
‘substance’ – is a
proposal
what is being put
in Prop. XIV. – is that no other proposal can be put – can be accepted – or
indeed can be conceived
there are two
problems with this –
firstly – Prop.
XIV. – defies the fact of propositional reality –
we don’t as a
matter of fact – operate with one proposition
as an empirical
fact – other propositions are conceived / proposed – are put –
our lives are
propositional – our thoughts – our actions – our creations – are proposals /
propositions
secondly – the
claim of Prop. XIV. – is illogical –
we have in Prop.
XIV. – the pretence of certainty –
a proposal – any
proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
as presented –
Prop. XIV. – is not a proposal – a proposition – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Prop. IV. – is a
statement of prejudice
Proof. – As
God is a being absolutely infinite, to whom no attribute expressing the essence
of substance can be denied: (Def.6), and he necessarily exists (Prop. II), if
any other substance than God be given, it must be explained by some attribute
of God, and thus two substances would exist possessing the same attribute,
which (Prop. 5) is absurd; and so no other substance than God can be granted,
and consequently not even conceived. For if it can be conceived it must
necessarily be conceived as existing, and this by the first part of the proof
is absurd. Therefore except God no substance can be granted or conceived. Q.e.d.
the ‘argument’ here
is –
if any other
substance be given – it must be explained by some attribute of God – of the one
substance – and thus – two substances would exist with the same attribute – and
this is absurd
‘substance’ / (God)
– is a proposal –
and it is not the
only proposal we can entertain –
the world is the
infinity of propositions
an attribute is a
description –
a proposal can be
described in any number of ways – and what description is proposed – is used at
any time or place – is a contingent matter
so – it is quite
possible – that two proposals – be given the same attribute – the same
description
but this is not to
say that such a description – or for that matter – any description –
is exhaustive – or
– is what Spinoza would call ‘of the essence’ –
any description –
any attribute – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
let us be clear too
– ‘substance’ – exists – if proposed
–
what exists is what
is proposed
there is no limit
or stricture on what can be proposed – any proposal – as such – is logically
valid
our propositions
are responses to the unknown –
and it can be said
– they come from the unknown
Corollary I.
– Hence it distinctly follows that (1) God is one alone, i.e., there is
none like him, or in the nature of things only one substance can be granted,
and that it is absolutely infinite, as we intimated in the note of Prop. 10.
‘there is none like
him’ – any proposal is logically unique
‘only one substance
can be granted’ – is to say there is only one proposal – and to say this is
obviously and patently – absurd
as to – ‘absolutely
infinite’ – any proposal can be described in any number of ways –
there is no logical
limit to propositional description
Corollary II.
– It follows, in the second place, that extension and thought are either
attributes or modifications of attributes of God
we propose our
reality
we can propose our
reality as extension
and we can propose
our reality as thought
in the absence of
proposal – proposal of any kind – what we face – is the unknown –
we propose to make
known
any proposal put –
is open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
our reality –
propositional reality – is uncertain
our proposals – our
descriptions – be they termed ‘attributes’ or ‘modifications’ – or whatever –
are many and varied –
the possibility of
proposal – of description – is endless
the unknown is open
to all and any proposal
‘God’
– is a name for the unknown
all
proposal – propositional action – is a response to the unknown
what exists – is what is proposed –
no proposal is in another proposal
no one proposal – depends on another – for
its formation –
a proposal exists – if proposed –
human reality is propositional – what we
think – what we do – what we create – the world we live in – is what we propose
–
our reality is – the proposals put – and
logically speaking there is no limit to the number of propositions that can be
put
to suggest that there is only one proposal –
and that every other proposal is in that one proposal – defies
propositional reality – defies logic – defies experience
Proof. – Save God no substance is
granted or can be conceived (Prop. 14.) that is (Def. 3), a thing which is in
itself and through itself and through itself is conceived. But modifications
(Def. 5) cannot exist or be conceived without substance, wherefore these can
only exist in divine nature, and through that alone be conceived. But nothing
is granted save substances and their modifications (Ax. 1). Therefore nothing
can exist or be conceived without God. Q.e.d.
no proposal is ‘in itself’ – and proposals do
not conceive themselves –
a proposal has no ‘self’ –
propositional actors ‘conceive’ / propose –
proposals / propositions
a ’modification’ – is a proposal
we propose in relation to proposals put –
and we modify proposals put with
proposals
nothing is granted that is not proposed
Note. – There are some who think God
to be like a man in mind and body, and liable to all passions. Yet how far this
is from a true conception of God must be seen already from what has been
proved. But I will pass by these people; for those who have considered divine
nature in any manner have denied that God is corporeal; which they have
excellently proved from the fact that by body we understand a certain quantity
in length, breadth, and depth, with a certain shape, and what could be more
absurd than to say this of God, a being absolutely infinite? However, from
other arguments by which they try to prove this point, they show clearly that
they completely separate corporeal or extended substance from divine nature and
regard it as created by God. But from what divine power it could have been
created they know not, which shows they do not understand what they themselves
are saying. But I at least have proved with sufficient clearness, I think, that
no substance can be produced or created from another (vide Coroll., Prop. 6,
and Note 2, Prop. 8). Moreover (in Prop. 14) we have shown that save God no
substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we conclude that extended
substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. But for the better and
fuller explanation of this I shall refute the arguments of my opponents for all
these arguments seem to return to this point. In the first place, that
corporeal substance, as far as it is substance consists, they think, of parts:
consequently they deny that it can
be infinite and consequently appertain to
God. And this they illustrate with many
examples, from which I will select one or
two. If corporeal substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived as
divided into two parts; each part will be finite or infinite. If they are
finite, then the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If
they are infinite, then one thing is given as twice as infinite as the another,
which is absurd. Or again, if an infinite distance is measured in equal feet,
it would consist of an infinite number of these, or the same of it was measured
in inches; and so one infinite number would be twelve times larger than
another. And then if you would conceive an infinite number from any point, let
two lines be drawn as AB and AC, of a fixed length at first, but increasing to
infinity. It is certain that the distance between B and C will continue to
increase, and from being a determined and finite distance, it will become
immeasurable and infinite. They consider then that these absurdities follow
from the supposition of an infinity quantity, and thence conclude that
corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently cannot appertain to the
essence of God. The second argument also draws from the great perfection of
God. For God, say they, as a being perfect in all things, cannot be passive;
but corporeal substance, as it is divisible, can be passive. It follows then
that this cannot appertain to the essence of God. These are the arguments that
I find in the writings of many who would endeavour to prove that corporeal
substance is unworthy of divine nature and cannot appertain to it. But in truth
if anyone carefully attends to this, he will find that I have already answered
these arguments, since they are based on this: that they suppose corporeal
substance to be compose of parts, which I have shown in Prop. 12, to be absurd.
Thence if any wish to consider the matter rightly, they will see that all these
absurdities (if indeed they are all absurdities, for I am not disputing this
now), from which they wish to conclude that extended substance is finite, follow
not from the fact that an infinite quantity is supposed, but that they suppose
an infinite quantity to be measurable and composed of finite parts; and from
the absurdities which thence follow they cannot conclude anything else than
that an infinite quantity is not measurable or composed of finite parts. But
this is the same as we have already shown in Prop. 12. And so the arrow which
they intended for us they now direct against themselves. If, therefore, they
nevertheless wish to conclude from this absurdity of theirs that extended
substance is finite, they do nothing else in truth than what he would do who
supposed a circle to have the properties of a square, and thence concluded that
a circle did not have a centre from which all lines drawn to the circumference
are equal. For corporeal substance which can only be conceived as infinite,
without like and indivisible, they conceive, in order to prove it finite, to be
composed of finite parts, and to be multiplex and divisible. Thus also others,
having pretended that a line is composed of points, can find many arguments
wherewith to show that a line cannot be infinitely divided. And indeed it is no
less absurd to suppose that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts
than to suppose that a body is composed of surfaces, or surfaces of lines, and
lines of points. But this all must confess who know clear reason to be
infallible, and more especially those who deny the possibility of a vacuum. For
if corporeal substance could be divided so that its parts were distinct, why
could not one part be annihilated while the others remain united as before? and
why should they all be adjusted lest a vacuum be made? For clearly of things
which in reality are reciprocally distinct from each other, one can exist
without the other and can remain in the same condition. Since nature abhors a
vacuum (of which more is to be said), and all parts must so concur as to
prevent the formation of a vacuum, it follows that the parts of a corporeal
substance cannot really be distinguished one from the other, that is, corporeal
substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot be divided into parts. If
anyone should still ask why we are so
prone by nature to divide quantities, I would
make answer to him that, that quantity is
conceived by us in two manners, to wit,
abstractly and superficially, as an offspring of imagination or as a substance,
which is done by the intellect alone. If, then, we look at quantity as it is in
the imagination, which we often and very easily do, it will be found to be
finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we look at it as it is in the
intellect and conceive it, in so far as it is a substance, which is done with
great difficulty, then we have already sufficiently shown, it ill be found to
be infinite, without like and indivisible. This to all those who know how to
distinguish between the imagination and the intellect will be quite clear: for
especially if attention is paid to this, that matter is the same everywhere,
and its parts cannot be distinguished one from the other except in so far as we
conceive matter to be modified in different modes, whence its parts are
distinguished one from the other in mode but not in reality. E.g., we
can conceive water, in so far as it is water, to be divided and its parts
separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is a corporeal substance,
for then it is neither separated or divided. Again, water, in so far as it is
water, can be made and destroyed, but in so far as it is substance it can
neither be made or destroyed. And thus I think I have answered the second
argument, since it is also founded on this, that matter, in so far as it is
substance is divisible and composed of parts. And though this should not be so,
I know not why substance should be unworthy of the divine nature, for (Prop.
14) beyond God no substance can be given by which it would be affected.
Everything, I say, is in God, and all things which are made, are made by the
laws of the infinite nature of God, and necessarily follow from the necessity
of his essence (as I shall soon show). And therefore no reason can be given by
which it can be said that God is passive to anything else than himself, or that
extended substance is unworthy of divine nature, though it be supposed to be
divisible, as long as it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But I have said
enough of this at present.
‘There are some who
think God to be like a man in mind and body, and liable to all passions. Yet
how far this is from a true conception of God must be seen already from what
has been proved. But I will pass by these people; for
those who have considered divine nature in any manner have denied that God is
corporeal; which they have excellently proved from the fact that by body we
understand a certain quantity in length, breadth, and depth, with a certain
shape, and what could be more absurd than to say this of God, a being
absolutely infinite?’
‘There are some who think God to be like a
man in mind and body, and liable to all passions.’
Spinoza’s own argument – actually suggest
this –
if there is only one substance – God – and
everything is in God – then everything – including mind – body –
passions – is of God –
if extension is an attribute of God – and the
body is an extended thing – then is not God – an extended thing?
and is not ‘absolutely infinite’ – is not
‘infinite’ – as in ‘continuous’ – a form of measurement?
you can say God is a being absolutely
infinite – but really – is that a definition?
for surely a definition – by its nature marks
out limits – sets a boundary –
as I understand Spinoza – his ‘substance’ –
his ‘God’ – is limitless – without boundary
and if so – this ‘substance / God’ – is
literally – indefinable
indefinable – might suit mystics – but not
logicians –
for indefinable comes off as – incoherent and
meaningless
‘However, from other arguments by which they
try to prove this point, they show clearly that they completely separate
corporeal or extended substance from divine nature and regard it as created by
God. But from what divine power it could have been created they know not, which
shows they do not understand what they themselves are saying.’
Spinoza has a point here – how do those who
say God creates corporal or extended substance – explain it – what account do
they give?
however – it can also be asked – does Spinoza
explain the workings of his God – the eternal and infinite – perfect
substance –
or is it just that he proposes this God – and
dogmatically holds to this proposal – and then proceeds to elaborate it?
point being either God – Spinoza’s or the God
he argues against – when all is said and done – is without explanation
and if so Spinoza’s criticism – comes off as
something of a cheap shot
another point –
the view of God that Spinoza argues against
here – separates God and man – and is on the face it an argument for why God
does not have the characteristics of man –
and on the face of it – therefore – it seems
to me – a better argument than Spinoza’s to this conclusion
‘But I at least have proved with sufficient
clearness, I think, that no substance can be produced or created from another
(vide Coroll., Prop. 6, and Note 2, Prop. 8). Moreover (in Prop. 14) we have
shown that save God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we conclude
that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God.’
you could accept this argument – but still
hold – ‘God is like a man in mind and body’
for nothing exists – that is not God – and
therefore – any description of anything – is a description of God
‘But for the better and fuller explanation of
this I shall refute the arguments of my opponents for all these arguments seem
to return to this point. In the first place, that corporeal substance, as far
as it is substance consists, they think, of parts: consequently they deny that
it can be infinite and consequently appertain to God. And this they illustrate
with many examples, from which I will select one or two. If corporeal
substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived as divided into two parts;
each part will be finite or infinite. If they are finite, then the infinite is
composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If they are infinite, then one
thing is given as twice as infinite as the another, which is absurd.’
if corporeal substance is described as
infinite – can it be divided into parts?
division into parts will be – whatever the
nature of the substance – however the substance is described – a propositional
action
the fact is we perform this action – as it
can be useful – useful for operating with – dealing with whatever
is proposed
you could well accept that the reality is
infinite – and at the same time recognise that in order to deal with it –
division into parts can make practical sense
and if you take this view then the
description ‘infinity’ – effectively drops out of the calculation
it is not relevant
and so – the description ‘infinite’ – while
on a metaphysical level – may well be satisfying – on a functional level – is
effectively useless
so here we are talking about different
categories of description – different propositional uses
my general point here is that any
proposal – can be given any number of different descriptions – none of
which are essential or exhaustive –
different descriptions – have different
functions – different uses
and logically speaking – any such description
– and any proposal of relation between descriptions – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Or again, if an infinite distance is
measured in equal feet, it would consist of an infinite number of these, or the
same if it was measured in inches; and so one infinite number would be twelve
times larger than another. And then if you would conceive an infinite number
from any point, let two lines be drawn as AB and AC, of a fixed length at
first, but increasing to infinity. It is certain that the distance between B
and C will continue to increase, and from being a determined and finite
distance, it will become immeasurable and infinite. They consider then that
these absurdities follow from the supposition of an infinity quantity, and
thence conclude that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently
cannot appertain to the essence of God.’
‘one infinite number would be twelve times
larger than another’
it is rather that the numbers here – are
calculated in different terms – feet and inches
and really – calculating ‘infinite numbers’ –
is just a mathematical game –
and ironically – a way indeed of dividing
into parts
the very point of the proposal of infinity –
as usually understood – and I think understood by Spinoza – is that – that
which is infinite – is immeasurable – is beyond calculation
Spinoza describes ‘substance’ as infinite and
eternal – and he is arguing against those who describe ‘substance’ as finite
this description – ‘infinite’ – has a use in
a metaphysical context –
but it is not the only possible description –
the point being that to understand our
reality and to function in it – no one description will be sufficient – no one
description will address the propositional issues we are faced with
Spinoza’s proposal of an infinite substance
might be a good covering note for reality
but it is not an adequate description
‘The second argument also draws from the
great perfection of God. For God, say they, as a being perfect in all things,
cannot be passive; but corporeal substance, as it is divisible, can be passive.
It follows then that this cannot appertain to the essence of God.’
in Spinoza’s proposal ‘substance’ / ‘God – is
infinite and eternal – and anything that exists in God – is either an attribute
of substance or a mode of substance –
therefore – on this argument – corporality or
extension – is of God –
perhaps the argument from passivity – really
just comes from a failure to comprehend the physics and chemistry of corporeal
reality – and the failure to understand that nature – by its nature – is active
and the point to be noted here – is that this
is the case whether you propose / describe corporality as ‘infinite’ or
‘finite’
‘Thence if any wish to consider the matter
rightly, they will see that all these absurdities (if indeed they are all
absurdities, for I am not disputing this now), from which they wish to conclude
that extended substance is finite, follow not from the fact that an infinite
quantity is supposed, but that they suppose an infinite quantity to be
measurable and composed of finite parts; and from the absurdities which thence
follow they cannot conclude anything else than that an infinite quantity is not
measurable or composed of finite parts.’
the ‘infinite’ – by definition is
immeasurable –
if substance amounts to this –
immeasurability –
then it will be a concept that is of little
or no use to us –
in practical terms ‘immeasurability’ –
amounts to ‘useless’
‘But this all must confess who know clear
reason to be infallible, and more especially those who deny the possibility of
a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be divided so that its parts were
distinct, why could not one part be annihilated while the others remain united
as before? and why should they all be adjusted lest a vacuum be made? For
clearly of things which in reality are reciprocally distinct from each other,
one can exist without the other and can remain in the same condition. Since nature
abhors a vacuum (of which more is to be said), and all parts must so concur as
to prevent the formation of a vacuum, it follows that the parts of a corporeal
substance cannot really be distinguished one from the other, that is, corporeal
substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot be divided into parts.’
the claim that ‘nature abhors a vacuum’ – is
simply a reassertion – without argument – of Spinoza’s proposal that
corporeal substance cannot be divided into parts
in any case – how relevant is the ‘no vacuum’
claim here?
I would suggest that the idea of dividing
corporeal substance into parts – makes perfect sense even if you accept
Spinoza’s continuum argument / no vacuum claim
the fact is – we perform the propositional
action of division – because this action is useful to us –
and that is to say – you would divide things
– and distinguish things – even if you hold that corporeal substance is a
continuum – or you held that nature allows a vacuum
and it is no good saying this action is
illusory – it is what happens – it is what we do
Spinoza’s perspective is metaphysical – and I
have no problem with that – it is perfectly valid – however there is no obligation
to view the proposal of substance or corporeal substance in this way – no
obligation
the proposal is open to question – open to
interpretation –
and so – it can be approached – is any number
of ways – the possibilities – are effectively endless – and there is no one
approach that is comprehensive and complete
what I am suggesting here – is that it is
quite legitimate to see the matter in non-metaphysical terms – to see
the matter in very practical terms –
and this is the propositional reality I think
Spinoza fails to understand
the way to go in any rational discussion – is
to realise that there will be no propositional account that is beyond question
–
and so – as many perspectives as possible –
should be brought to bear – none of which are beyond question – beyond doubt or
certain
how we propose – how we describe – how we
understand – is an open matter – and remains open – regardless of any
propositional perspective or argument – we operate with – at any particular
time
which propositional perspective we go with –
which argument we prosecute – at any one time – will be determined by our
interests and our needs – and these are never fixed
so – in relation to the vacuum – the question
is – in what sense does a vacuum exist – and in what propositional contexts
does the notion of vacuum – or some form of it – function?
what Spinoza is really saying here – is that
the vacuum proposal has no place – has no function in his propositional
structure
the fact is though – there are other
metaphysical theories where the vacuum proposal does function
and that is the reality – no one proposal –
or theory – will fit all philosophical contexts
but this does not mean that any proposal can
be regarded as illegitimate –
and no one philosophical context – or theory
– will suit all purposes – will cover all bases
by the way – if by ‘substance’ – one was to
mean ‘space’ – if that was what is regarded as infinite and endless – the
notion of the vacuum as any empty space – a void – works perfectly well
and this all comes down to how you propose
‘substance’ –
and the logical reality is that any proposal
here – any description – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘If anyone should
still ask why we are so prone by nature to divide quantities, I would make
answer to him that, that quantity is conceived by us in two manners, to wit,
abstractly and superficially, as an offspring of imagination or as a substance,
which is done by the intellect alone. If, then, we look at quantity as it is in
the imagination, which we often and very easily do, it will be found to be
finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we look at it as it is in the
intellect and conceive it, in so far as it is a substance, which is done with
great difficulty, then we have already sufficiently shown, it will be found to
be infinite, without like and indivisible. This to
all those who know how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect
will be quite clear: for especially if attention is paid to this, that matter
is the same everywhere, and its parts cannot be distinguished one from the
other except in so far as we conceive matter to be modified in different modes,
whence its parts are distinguished one from the other in mode but not in
reality. E.g., we can conceive water, in so far as it is water, to be
divided and its parts separated one from the other;
but
not in so far as it is a corporeal substance, for then it is neither separated
or
‘If anyone should still ask why we are so
prone by nature to divide quantities, I would make answer to him that, that
quantity is conceived by us in two manners, to wit, abstractly and
superficially, as an offspring of imagination or as a substance, which is done
by the intellect alone. If, then, we look at quantity as it is in the
imagination, which we often and very easily do, it will be found to be finite,
divisible, and composed of parts; but if we look at it as it is in the
intellect and conceive it, in so far as it is a substance, which is done with
great difficulty, then we have already sufficiently shown, it will be found to
be infinite, without like and indivisible.’
there is no logical distinction between
‘intellect’ and ‘imagination’
‘intellect’ – is a name for
propositional action
‘imagination’ – is a name for
propositional action –
any propositional action – is open to
question – open to doubt -and uncertain
‘quantity’ – as with any proposal can be
variously interpreted
what Spinoza calls the ‘imaginative’
understanding of quantity – is the scientific understanding – that a quantity
is measurable – and divisible –
it is this understanding that we operate with
– because it is functional and useful
as to the idea that quantity is infinite and
indivisible –
such a ‘quantity’ is not measurable – and if
‘it’ is not measurable –
how is it a quantity?
‘This to all those who know how to
distinguish between the imagination and the intellect will be quite clear: for
especially if attention is paid to this, that matter is the same everywhere,
and its parts cannot be distinguished one from the other except in so far as we
conceive matter to be modified in different modes, whence its parts are
distinguished one from the other in mode but not in reality. E.g., we
can conceive water, in so far as it is water, to be divided and its parts
separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is a corporeal substance,
for then it is neither separated or divided. Again, water, in so far as it is
water, can be made and destroyed, but in so far as it is substance it can
neither be made or destroyed. And thus I think I have answered the second
argument, since it is also founded on this, that matter, in so far as it is
substance is divisible and composed of parts.’
‘its parts distinguished in mode but not in
reality’
on this view – natural science – which
distinguishes ‘parts’ of the natural world – ‘one
from the other’ – and critically investigates
these ‘natural parts’ – must be seen as ‘not in reality’
and as to the water argument – yes you can
divide or not divide – and what you do will all depend on how you want to use
the proposal ‘water’
‘And though this should not be so, I know not
why substance should be unworthy of the divine nature, for (Prop. 14) beyond
God no substance can be given by which it would be affected. Everything, I say,
is in God, and all things which are made, are made by the laws of the infinite
nature of God, and necessarily follow from the necessity of his essence (as I
shall soon show). And therefore no reason can be given by which it can be said
that God is passive to anything else than himself, or that extended substance
is unworthy of divine nature, though it be supposed to be divisible, as long as
it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But I have said enough of this at
present.’
if ‘everything is in God’ – then God /
‘everything’ – is passive
for there is nothing outside of God – to be
acted upon
and what is in God – ‘everything’ – is God
passive
and – if everything is in God – divisibility
is in God
PROP. XVI. Infinite things in infinite modes
(that is, all things which can fall under the heading of infinite intellect)
must necessarily follow from the necessity of divine nature.
things and modes are proposals
‘infinite’ here – is a descriptive proposal –
of things modes – and intellect
my question is whether the descriptive
proposal ‘infinite’ – actually describes anything at all
if a ‘thing’ is described as ‘infinite’ – how
is it a ‘thing’?
point being you would think – that a thing has
definition – i.e. – an exact limit – a boundary – is distinct and
determinate –
if a ‘thing’ is described as ‘infinite’ – it has
none of these properties
you can adopt the ‘infinite’ description –
but if so – you lose the ‘thing’
and this same argument applies to ‘mode’ and
‘intellect’
‘must necessarily follow from the necessity
of divine nature’
a proposition is said to be ‘necessary’ – if
it is certain –
this view of the proposition is illogical –
a proposition is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain –
uncertain – not necessary
in fact – the notion of a necessary
proposition – is a corruption of logic –
the notion of necessity is a logical
corruption
‘divine nature’ – is a proposal –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
no proposal follows from another
proposals are put to proposals – we
propose in relation to proposals –
proposals do not generate proposals
at best – the idea of necessity here – is
nothing more than a game – a language game – the syllogistic game
a game is a rule governed
propositional activity
the rule of the syllogistic game is that the
conclusion of an argument follows from the premises –
and in such a format – the conclusion is
contained in the premises –
there is no real ‘argument’ in a syllogism –
it is nothing but the major premise restated – reformulated – as the conclusion
–
and is therefore best seen as – a rhetorical
play with language
and this I think – in the end – will be the
fate of Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’
Proof. – This proposition must be
manifest to everyone who will but consider this, that from a given definition
of everything the intellect gathers certain properties, which in truth
necessarily follow from the definition (that is, the very essence of the thing),
and so the more reality the definition of a thing expresses. i.e., the more
reality the definition of a thing involves, the more properties the intellect
will gather. But as divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes, each of
which expresses an infinite essence of its kind, infinite things in infinite
modes (that is, all things that fall under the heading of infinite intellect)
must necessarily follow from its necessity, Q.e.d.
what is real is what is proposed
‘the more reality the definition of thing
expresses’ – is – the descriptive proposals put in relation to a subject
proposal –
the more descriptive proposals put – the more
avenues of uncertainty to be explored
infinite attributes – is ‘infinite
descriptions’
in logical terms – there is no end to the
number of descriptions that can be put in relation to a proposal –
but this is not to say that a proposal –
generates its own descriptions
in practical terms there will be an
operational / pragmatic limit to the number of descriptions that are put in
relation to a proposal –
we describe – in order to use a proposal – to
put proposal to work –
so – at some point in the critical
propositional activity – a decision will be made to cease the critical
discovery phase – and to move on to the propositional action phase – to putting
the description to use –
and any proposition put to use – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to the ‘infinite intellect’ –
the ‘intellect’ is a name for propositional
action
a propositional action is not endless – is
not indefinite – is not infinite
Corollary I. – Hence it follows that
God is the effecting cause of all things which can be perceived by infinite
intellect.
there is no ‘infinite intellect’ –
there is no infinite propositional action
Corollary II. – Hence it follows that
God is the cause through himself, and not indeed by accident.
‘God’ is a proposal –
a proposal does not propose / cause itself
and if you want to see the matter in terms of
necessity and accident – there is no necessity – therefore – only accident
Corollary III. – Hence it follows that
God is absolutely the first cause.
as to God as ‘first cause’ –
if you are going down this causal route – the
question is – what is the cause of God?
is not Spinoza’s God – an infinite causal
chain –
and if so – there is no first cause
and if you need a first cause to kick
off infinity –
that’s the end of infinity
PROP. XVII. God acts merely according to his
own laws, and is compelled by no one.
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
the unknown does not make laws – and is not
compelled
the reality we face – that we deal with – is
propositional –
‘laws’ are proposals – proposals – human
beings / propositional actors put – to order propositional
reality
‘law’ proposals – as with any proposal
– are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
laws are uncertain
a proposed law – does not compel –
anyone or anything
Proof. – That infinite things must
follow from the mere necessity of divine nature, or what is the same thing, by
the mere laws of divine nature, we have just shown (Prop. 16), and (Prop. 15)
we have shown that nothing can be conceived without God, but that everything
exists in God. Therefore nothing outside God can exist by which he could be
determined or compelled in his actions; and therefore God acts merely according
to the laws of his nature, and is compelled by no one. Q.e.d.
first up – there are no ‘infinite things’ – a
thing – if it is a ‘thing’ – has definition – limits – boundaries
the ‘infinite’ – just is the absence of
definition – of limits – of boundaries
hence – Spinoza’s ‘infinite thing’ – is a
contradiction
no proposition necessarily follows from
another proposition
propositions are simply put – and responded
to with propositions
and if you wish to argue that a proposal
follows from a proposal – that there is an implication relation – by all means
do so – just recognise that your proposal – is open
to question – open to doubt – and is
uncertain
not ‘necessary’ – uncertain –
as to ‘divine nature –
for Spinoza divine nature – is God – is
reality
reality is propositional –
there is no outside of propositional
reality – but the unknown – there is no inside of propositional reality
our reality just is – that which is –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
that is – reality is a proposition
a proposition does not compel
Corollary I. – Hence it follows that
no cause can be given except the perfection of God’s nature which extrinsically
or intrinsically incites him to action.
how is it that God’s nature extrinsically
incites him to act?
the usual understanding of ‘extrinsic’ – is –
that which is not part of the essential nature of someone or something – and
therefore that which is external to that nature
Spinoza’s God is all there is – there is
nothing else – and so nothing extrinsic to his nature – nothing external
to ‘his’ nature
so how does ‘extrinsic’ square with Spinoza’s
definition of God?
and if God needs to be ‘incited’ to action
i.e. – ‘he’ is not naturally or always active – then presumably – in the
absence of incitement – God is passive –
again – Spinoza asserts in a number of places
that God is not passive
human beings can be seen as active and
passive – and beings who can be incited –
is man a model for God?
in the note to Prop. XV. – Spinoza begins
with –
‘There are some who think God to be like man
in mind and body, and liable to passions’ –
and he then goes on to argue against this
view –
but if so – there is a problem with Spinoza’s
definition of God – for who is going to say that man’s nature is perfect?
and furthermore – wouldn’t you say that a
nature that can be incited –
is a nature that is passionate?
Corollary II. – Hence it follows that
God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists from the necessity of his own
nature (Prop. II and Coroll.1. Prop. 14) and by the mere necessity of his
nature he acts (prev. Prop.). And therefore (Def.7) he is the only free cause.
basically – Spinoza uses a causal argument to
explain reality – but comes to the point where causation runs out – and instead
of seeing that the argument of his metaphysics cannot be maintained –
that it is a failure – pretends that the
failure of his argument is in fact its success – and to rescue this notion of
cause here – he proposes the phrase ‘free cause’ – which means – no cause –
it is really at this point that Spinoza comes
up with the notion of infinity –
‘substance’ is infinite – reality is endless
if you take the view that God is infinite –
no problem with cause – you can effectively drop the causal argument –
that’s all very well – but a lot goes with it
for one – substance – God – everything – no
longer has definition – for to have definition – you have to have limit and
boundary
and limit and boundary – went out the window
with cause
we propose in relation to the unknown – we
propose to defy the unknown
our proposals – our proposition – are open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
which is to say we never stop facing the
unknown
different propositional structures provide us
with different proposals for a known reality
Spinoza’s metaphysics is one such proposal –
and it is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Note. – Others think that God is a
free cause because they think he can bring it to pass that those things which
we say follow from his nature, that is, which are in his power, should not be
made, or that they should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if
they said that God can bring it to pass that it should not follow from the
nature
of a triangle that its three angles are equal
to two right angles, or that from a given
cause no effect should follow, which is
absurd. For further on, without the aid of this
proposition, I shall show that intellect and
will do not appertain to the nature of God. I am well aware that there are many
who say they can show that the greatest intellect and free will appertain to
the nature of God: for they say they know nothing more perfect to attribute to
God than that which among us is the greatest perfection. Further, although they
conceive God’s intellect as having the greatest perception of things in action,
yet they do not believe he can bring about the existence of everything which
his intellect perceives in action: for they think they would thus destroy the
power of God. They say that if he was to create everything his intellect
perceives, he would not be able to create anything more, which they think
opposed to the omnipotence of God; and accordingly they prefer to state that
God is indifferent to all things, and creates nothing else than that which he
determines to create by his own free will. But I think I have sufficiently
shown (vide Prop.16) that from God’s supreme power or infinite nature, infinite
things in infinite modes, that is all things, necessarily flow, or always
follow from the necessity; in the same manner it also follows from the nature
of a triangle from eternity to eternity that the three angles will be equal to
two right angles. Wherefore God’s omnipotence was in action from eternity, and
will remain in the same state of action through all eternity. And in this
manner, in my opinion, the perfection of God’s omnipotence is asserted to be
far greater. Indeed, the opponents of this view seem to deny (to speak freely)
the omnipotence of God. For they are obliged to confess that God’s intellect
perceives many things that could be created which nevertheless he cannot ever
create. Because otherwise, if he created all that his intellect perceived, he
would, according them, exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect.
As, therefore, they say that God is perfect, they are reduced to state at the
same time that he cannot complete all those things to which his power extends;
and anything more absurd than this or more opposed to the omnipotence of God I
cannot imagine could be conceived. Moreover, (as I would like to say something
concerning the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to God), if
intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God, something far else
must be understood by these two attributes than what is commonly understood by
men. For intellect and will, which would constitute the essence of God, must
differ toto coelo from our will and intellect, nor can they agree in
anything except name, nor anymore than the dog, as a heavenly body, and the dog
as a barking animal, agree. This I shall show in the following manner. If
intellect appertains to divine nature, it cannot, as with our intellect, be
posterior (as many would have it) or even simultaneous in nature with the
things conceived by the intellect since (Coroll. 1, Prop. 16) God is prior in
cause alike in all things: but on the other hand, truth and the formal essence
of things are such, because they do so exist objectively in God’s intellect.
Wherefore the intellect of God, as far as it can be conceived to form his
essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of their essence and their
existence: which seems to have been noticed by those who have asserted that
God’s intellect, will, and power are one in the same thing. Now as God’s
intellect is the only cause of things, i.e., the cause of their essence
and their existence, it must necessarily differ from in respect to its essence
and in respect to its existence. For that which is caused differs from its
cause precisely in that which it has from its cause. E.g., a man is the cause
of existence but not the cause of essence of another man. (For the latter is an
eternal truth): and so they can certainly agree in essence, but in existence
they must differ, and on that account, if the existence of one of them perish,
that of the other does not consequently perish; but if the essence of one of
them could be destroyed or be made false, the essence of the other must also be
destroyed. On this account a thing that is the cause of the essence and
existence of any effect must
differ from that effect not in respect to its
essence and in respect to existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause of
the essence and existence of our intellect: and therefore God’s intellect, in
so far as it can be conceived to form part of his essence, differs from our
intellect both in respect to its essence and in respect to its existence, nor
in any other thing save name can agree with it, which we wish to prove. And the
argument concerning will would proceed in the same manner, as can easily be seen.
‘Others think that God is a free cause
because they think he can bring it to pass that those things which we say
follow from his nature, that is, which are in his power, should not be made, or
that they should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they said
that God can bring it to pass that it should not follow from the nature of a
triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles, or that from a
given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.’
the proposal that ‘God’ is a free cause – is
as with any proposal – is legitimate –
and is – as with any proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
Spinoza’s criticism of this proposal – I
think does not work
the triangle is a mathematical construction –
and as such a rule governed propositional game
the triangle was invented – the game was
proposed –
you can play the game or not play the game –
it is as with any other rule governed
propositional game – a human invention
as played – its rules are not open to
question
if the rules are questioned – are disputed –
there is no game
‘For further on, without the aid of this
proposition, I shall show that intellect and will do not appertain to the
nature of God. I am well aware that there are many who say they can show that
the greatest intellect and free will appertain to the nature of God: for they
say they know nothing more perfect to attribute to God than that which among us
is the greatest perfection.’
Spinoza argues that all is God – and all is
in God – therefore it would seem that if there is intellect and will – it is
in God
‘Further, although they conceive God’s
intellect as having the greatest perception of things in action, yet they do
not believe he can bring about the existence of everything which his intellect
perceives in action: for they think they would thus destroy the power of God.
They say that if he was to create everything his intellect perceives, he would
not be able to create anything more, which they think opposed to the
omnipotence of God; and accordingly they prefer to state that God is
indifferent to all things, and creates nothing else than that which he
determines to create by his own free will.’
‘God’ – is a name for unknown – the
unknown has no characteristics
there is no intellect – in the unknown
‘intellect’ – is a name for
propositional action
propositional actors engage in
propositional action –
what is ‘brought about’ is proposal /
propositional action
what exists – is what is proposed by
propositional actors
‘Wherefore God’s omnipotence was in action
from eternity, and will remain in the same state of action through all
eternity. And in this manner, in my opinion, the perfection of God’s
omnipotence is asserted to be far greater. Indeed, the opponents of this view
seem to deny (to speak freely) the omnipotence of God. For they are obliged to
confess that God’s intellect perceives many things that could be created which
nevertheless he cannot ever create. Because otherwise, if he created all that
his intellect perceived, he would, according them, exhaust his omnipotence and
render himself imperfect. As, therefore, they say that God is perfect, they are
reduced to state at the same time that he cannot complete all those things to
which his power extends; and anything more absurd than this or more opposed to
the omnipotence of God I cannot imagine could be conceived.’
whoever ‘they’ are – Spinoza is right here –
they do not understand the concept of omnipotence –
however – there is a question here for
Spinoza –
does his use of this concept of omnipotence –
actually support his argument concerning God?
if God’s omnipotence and creativity was in
action from eternity and remains in the same state – and is never exhausted –
then surely Spinoza must recognize the possibility – if not the reality of
other worlds – other realities – and an infinity of them?
and if so – he must see that we don’t know
all that there is – that our reality is just one of many possible realities –
Spinoza never took this step to possible
worlds
instead – he argued that this world – this
reality – is all that there is –
yes – it has infinite attributes – but this
reality is all there is
and if so – then it would seem – that it is
Spinoza that puts the brakes on his God
it must also be pointed out here – that
regardless of whether it is used correctly or incorrectly – this notion of
omnipotence is illogical –
there is no complete knowledge
any claim to knowledge – any claim of
knowledge – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – and therefore
– incomplete
this claim of omnipotence – is
epistemological rubbish – pretence of the most audacious kind
and furthermore – what sense can we make of
the idea of God / substance – reality itself knowing – having knowledge?
yes – there is knowledge in reality – in
nature – the proposals and propositional structures of human beings – of
propositional actors – but there is no evidence that knowledge exists in the
rest of nature
‘Moreover, (as I would like to say something
concerning the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to God), if
intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God, something far else
must be understood by these two attributes than what is commonly understood by
men. For intellect and will, which would constitute the essence of God, must
differ toto coelo from our will and intellect, nor can they agree in
anything except name, nor any more than the dog, as a heavenly body, and the
dog as a barking animal, agree.’
must differ toto coelo?
Spinoza argues – his God is everything – and
everything is in God –
in that everything is in and of God –
according to Spinoza – our intellect and will is in and of God
Spinoza says that our intellect and will must
differ entirely from God’s
why must it be the case that there is
a difference?
just asserting that it must be the
case – doesn’t mean it is the case
this use of ‘must’ here – is pure rhetoric
if this God’s intellect and will – is totally
different to human intellect and will – how would we know this?
and furthermore – how do we know that God’s
intellect and will even exists?
and if God’s intellect and will is different
– how is it different?
and if God’s intellect and will is totally
and completely different – what sense then can we give to the use of the terms
‘intellect and will’ in relation to God?
effectively we are talking about something we
have no knowledge of – and therefore cannot identify –
Spinoza says his God’s intellect and will and
our intellect and will agree only in name
ok – if so – then it could be argued that
‘God’s intellect and will’ is just another name for our intellect and
will
and furthermore – that his ‘God’ – is just
another name – nothing more
another name for the reality that we know and
experience
Spinoza wants to argue that God’s intellect
and will is greater than ours
even among human beings we find variation in
intellect and will – but no one would argue that these differences in intellect
and will – mean that intellects and wills are essentially different – are toto
coelo
‘This I shall show in the following manner.
If intellect appertains to divine nature, it cannot, as with our intellect, be
posterior (as many would have it) or even simultaneous in nature with the
things conceived by the intellect since (Coroll. 1, Prop. 16) God is prior in
cause alike in all things: but on the other hand, truth and the formal essence
of things are such, because they do so exist objectively in God’s intellect.
Wherefore the intellect of God, as far as it can be conceived to form his essence,
is in truth the cause of things, both of their essence and their existence:
which seems to have been noticed by those who have asserted that God’s
intellect, will, and power are one in the same thing. Now as God’s intellect is
the only cause of things, i.e., the cause of their essence and their
existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence and
in respect to its existence. For that which is caused differs from its cause
precisely in that which it has from its cause. E.g., a man is the cause of
existence but not the cause of essence of another man. (For the latter is an
eternal truth): and so they can certainly agree in essence, but in existence
they must differ, and on that account, if the existence of one of them perish,
that of the other does not consequently perish; but if the essence of one of
them could be destroyed or be made false, the essence of the other must also be
destroyed. On this account a thing that is the cause of the essence and
existence of any effect must differ from that effect not in respect to its
essence and in respect to existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause of
the essence and existence of our intellect: and therefore God’s intellect, in
so far as it can be conceived to form part of his essence, differs from our
intellect both in respect to its essence and in respect to its existence, nor
in any other thing save name can agree with it, which we wish to prove. And the
argument concerning will would proceed in the same manner, as can easily be seen.’
yes – in terms of cause and effect – we see
that that the cause is distinct from the effect – but cannot it not be said
that the effect is the expression of the cause –
in the same manner in which according to
Spinoza a mode – or modification – is an expression of substance?
and so – in so far as cause and effect are
seen as distinct – can it not be said this perception – is in fact a superficial
understanding of the relation?
and as to a man being the cause of another
man’s existence – but not the essence of another man –
if the essence of a man – is his existence –
then the existence of man – is his essence
and so – either ‘essence’ here adds nothing
to ‘existence’ – or ‘existence’ adds nothing to ‘essence’
in terms of Spinoza’s question of the
relation between God’s intellect and ours –
if there is a real relationship – then our
intellect is an expression of God’s intellect –
and any distinction between God and man – is therefore
– superficial
‘And the argument concerning will would
proceed in the same manner, as can easily be seen’
‘intellect’ and ‘will’ are names for human
propositional action
Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of
things.
Proof. – All things that are in God, and through God must be conceived
(Prop.15), and therefore (Prop. 16, Coroll.1) God is the cause of all things
which are in him: which is the first point. Again, beyond God no substance,
that is (Def. 3), a thing which outside God is in itself, can be granted (Prop.
14): which was the second point. Therefore God is the indwelling and not the
transient cause of all things.
‘God is a name for the unknown
the unknown is not the indwelling cause of anything
‘all things’ – are proposals –
to suggest that all proposals are in the
proposal ‘God’ – is to put that there is only one proposal –
such a suggestion is patently and obviously
false
Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal.
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
our proposals / propositional descriptions (attributes) are a response
to the unknown
no proposal / propositional description is eternal – is outside of time
–
all propositional action is in time
Proof. – God (Def. 6) is a substance, which (Prop.11) necessarily exists,
that is (Prop. 7), to whose nature existence appertains, or (what is the same
thing) from whose
definition existence itself follows: accordingly (Def. 8) it is eternal.
Again, by the attributes of God must be understood that which (Def. 4)
expresses the essence of divine substance, that is, that which appertains to
substance; that itself, I say, the attributes must involve. But eternity (as I
have shown from Prop. 7) appertains to the nature of substance. Therefore each
of the attributes must involve eternity, and therefore, they are all eternal. Q.e,d.
according to Spinoza – God is substance –
why?
why isn’t substance – just substance?
and one cannot help but think that equating
‘substance’ to ‘God’ – is a move designed to hold onto at least some aspects of
the traditional notion of God – i.e. – a God that is all powerful and all
knowing
substance just is – and on a bare
interpretation – just does what it does – and is neither omnipotent nor
omniscient –
if Spinoza had just stuck with substance –
there would be no reason to propose ‘God’
for Spinoza ‘God’ is an unnecessary
proposal
Note. – The proposition is also most clearly shown which I used to prove the
existence of God. From that proof, I say, it is certain that the existence of
God, that is, his essence, is an eternal truth. Again, in the principles of
Cartesian philosophy (Part1 Prop. 19) I proved the existence of God in another
way, but it is not necessary to repeat it here.
what exists is what is proposed
if Spinoza’s ‘God’ is proposed – his God
exists –
any proposal put – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is open to question – open
to doubt and uncertain
Proof. – God (prev. Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (Def.
8) each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of
God, which (Def 4) explain the eternal essence of God, explain at the same time
his existence, that is whatever forms the essence of God, forms also his
existence: therefore the essence and existence of God are one and the same
thing. Q.e.d.
Corollary I – Hence it follows that the existence of God, like his essence, is an
eternal truth.
Corollary II – Hence it follows that God and all his attributes are immutable. For
if they were changed with regard to existence. they must also (prev. Prop.) be
changed with regard to essence, that is (as is self-evident), falsehood would
be made from truth, which is absurd.
for Spinoza – God’s existence and
essence are one in the same
if ‘existence’ and ‘essence’ are one
in the same – what is the point of positing ‘essence’ –
what does it add to existence?
essence here – seems – at the very
least inessential –
if not entirely unnecessary and
irrelevant
it is as if Spinoza fears that
without ‘essence’ – existence comes off as – empty – as without substance
what exists – is what is proposed
Spinoza proposes ‘God’ – therefore –
his God exists –
however – such a proposal as with
any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
and let’s be clear – if by ‘essence’
– you mean an attribute – a description – that is beyond question – beyond
doubt – and certain –
logically speaking – there is no
such thing –
to propose such an ‘essence’ – is to
propose – ignorance
a true proposition – is one that is
affirmed – by whoever – for whatever reason –
no affirmation is eternal
God
and all his attributes are immutable?
is to
say that the Spinoza’s proposal ‘God’ – and any descriptions put in relation to
the proposal – are set in stone –
not
open to question – not open to doubt – and – certain
any
such proposal is irrational –
a
falsehood made from truth?
there
is nothing remarkable here –
a
proposal put – can be affirmed – and then on review – a critical review –
denied
any
proposal of affirmation – or any proposal of denial – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
the
truth or falsity of a proposition – is always – open to question –
no
proposition is self-evident
the
claim of self-evidence – is illogical and pretentious
PROP. XXI. All things which follow from the
absolute nature of any attribute of God must exist for ever and infinitely, or
must exist eternally and infinitely through that same attribute.
an attribute is a
proposal – a proposed description
an attribute of Spinoza’s
God – is a proposed description of his God –
we propose in
relation to proposal
no proposal – no
description – follows from another
a proposal – a
description can be put – in relation to another proposal –
and in a logical
sense – this activity of proposal put – in relation to proposal –
can go on
indefinitely
Again, that which follows from the necessity
of the nature of any attribute cannot have a fixed duration. If you deny this,
let something which follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute
be supposed to be granted in any attribute of God, e.g., the idea of God
in thought, and let it be supposed not to have existed at some past time, or to
cease to exist in some future time. But since thought is supposed
to be an attribute of God, it must of
necessity exist, and that immutably (Prop. 11, and Coroll.2, Prop. 20). Thence
it follows that outside the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for we
suppose it once not to have existed, or not to exist at some future time),
thought must exist without the idea of God: and this is contrary to the
hypothesis, for it is supposed that the idea of God necessarily follows from
the given thought. Therefore the idea of God in thought or anything that
follows of necessity from the absolute nature of any attribute of God cannot
have a fixed duration, but through the attribute itself is eternal: which was
the second point. Note that this can be asserted of anything which in any
attribute of God follows of necessity from the absolute nature of God.
‘Conceive, if it
can happen (if indeed you can deny it) that anything in any attribute of God
following from its absolute nature is finite and has a fixed existence or
duration, e.g., the idea of God in thought.’
an attribute of Spinoza’s
‘God’ is a description – a propositional description
it is a proposal
put in relation to his proposal ‘God’
a description is put
to a proposal – it doesn’t ‘follow from’ it –
a proposal – a
propositional description – does have a fixed existence or duration
it exists as long
as it is proposed considered and critically evaluated
‘In so far as it
has the idea of God, it is supposed to be finite. But (Def. 2) it cannot be
conceived finite unless it is limited by thought itself; but it cannot be
limited by thought in so far as it forms the idea of God, for then it would be
finite: so it must be limited by thought in so far as it does not form the idea
of God, and this idea nevertheless (Prop. 11) must exist necessarily.’
the duration of any
proposal is finite
and its duration is
finite whether ‘limited by’ another thought / proposal – or not –
as to ‘limited by
another thought’ – this can only mean that another proposal is put – which – as
put in relation to the subject proposal – and as a result – modifies the
subject proposal –
Spinoza’s idea of
‘God’ exists – only if proposed –
and if proposed –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘A thought is
therefore granted which does not form the idea of God, and therefore from its
nature, in so far as it is an absolute thought, the idea of God does not
necessarily follow: thought is then conceived as forming and not forming the
idea of God, which is contrary to the hypothesis.’
the idea that every
proposal – proposes Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is ridiculous
‘So if the idea of
God in thought or anything (whatever is assumed, for the proof is universal) in
any attribute of God follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that
attribute, it must necessarily be infinite: which is the first point.’
a ‘thought’ is a
proposal –
the idea here is
that thought is infinite – and therefore – any particular thought – is infinite
no particular
thought / proposal – exists indefinitely –
and any proposed
‘process of thought’ – is just another proposal – that is active as long as it
is considered
any proposal – is a
contingent fact –
thought is a
contingent fact –
that is the first
point
‘Again, that which
follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a fixed
duration. If you deny this, let something which follows from the necessity of
the nature of any attribute be supposed to be granted in any attribute of God, e.g.,
the idea of God in thought, and let it be supposed not to have existed at some
past time, or to cease to exist in some future time. But since thought is
supposed to be an attribute of God, it must of necessity exist, and that
immutably (Prop. 11, and Coroll.2, Prop. 20). Thence it follows that outside
the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for we suppose it once not to
have existed, or not to exist at some future time), thought must exist without
the idea of God: and this is contrary to the hypothesis, for it is supposed
that the idea of God necessarily follows from the given thought.’
an attribute is a
description – a proposed description –
the fact of the
matter is that the attribute / proposed description – will exist so long as it
is considered – and will cease to exist when it is no longer considered
and yes – the
proposal ‘thought’ indeed can exist – without the proposal of Spinoza’s ‘God’
‘Therefore the idea
of God in thought or anything that follows of necessity from the absolute
nature of any attribute of God cannot have a fixed duration, but through the
attribute itself is eternal: which was the second point. Note that this can be
asserted of anything which in any attribute of God follows of necessity from
the absolute nature of God.’
any proposal is
‘eternal’ – if it is not given a reference in time
and that is the
second point
PROP. XXII. Whatever follows from an attribute of God, in so far as it
is modified by such a modification as exists of necessity and infinitely
through the same, must also exist of necessity and infinitely.
Proof. – The proof of this proposition proceeds in the same manner as
the proof of the last proposition.
an ‘attribute’ – is proposal – a proposed description –
a proposed description of a ‘substance’ – or whatever other term is used
for the propositional object – i.e. – ‘God’ – ‘reality’ – ‘existence’ – etc.
nothing follows from an attribute / description –
you can propose – in relation to an attribute / description –
and that will be a supplementary description – a ‘modification’ – if you
like – of the attribute / description
but the supplementary description – will only exist – if proposed
modified by such a modification?
this is just to say that a modification / propositional description – is
proposed
such a description – is not ‘necessary’ – it is contingent – a proposal
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
further it does not exist ‘infinitely’ –
what would an infinite description be?
a description that doesn’t end?
a description that doesn’t end is a description that has no definition –
and without definition – a description – does not describe – is
not a description –
such a ‘description’ – will have no content – will be vacuous –
a proposition that proposes nothing
what this points to is that the notion of ‘infinity’ – is misapplied
in this context
‘infinity’ – makes sense in a mathematical context
mathematics as a rule-governed propositional game
the ‘infinite game’ – is a game where the rule is that the calculation –
i.e. – counting – is ongoing
a proposition – a propositional description – is not on-going – it is
definitive –
otherwise – there is no proposal – nothing is proposed
propositional logic is not a game – it is not
‘rule-governed’ – it is a critical exercise –
a critical exercise of question – of doubt – and the exploration of
propositional uncertainty
PROP. XXIII. Every mode which of necessity and
infinitely exists must of necessity have followed either from the absolute
nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a
modification which exists of necessity and infinitely.
a mode that exists of necessity?
here the ‘mode’ is a fixture – for one would think that in necessary
existence – there will be no variation – no change
and a necessary existence that follows from the absolute nature of some
attribute of Spinoza’s God –
the ‘absolute nature’ –
again – a nature that is fixed –
‘or from some attribute modified which exists of necessity and
infinitely’
Spinoza’s reality – absolute and necessary – is a closed and fixed
reality – one might say ‘infinitely’ – closed and fixed
there seems to be no movement is Spinoza’s world –
for where one thing ‘follows from’ another – we are not talking about an
actual dynamic – but rather a deductive argument – a deduction
very strange
a ‘mode’ – is a proposal – a descriptive propositional construction –
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
a propositional construction – is logically fluid – logically flexible –
it is not fixed –
from a logical point of view – it cannot be fixed
there is no absolute – there is only logical uncertainty
there is no necessity – there is only contingency
Proof. – Now mode is in something else through which is must be conceived
(Def. 5), and can only be conceived through God. If therefore, mode be
conceived to exist of necessity and to be infinite, its existence and infinity
must be concluded or perceived through some attribute of God, in so far as this
attribute is conceived to express infinity and necessity of existence, or (Def.
8) eternity, that is (Def. 6 and Prop 19) as far as it is considered
absolutely. Mode, therefore, which of necessity and infinitely exists, must
have followed from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, and that
either immediately (concerning which see Prop.21) or by means of some
modification which follows from the absolute nature of the attribute, that is
(prev. Prop.), which necessarily and infinitely exists. Q.e.d.
a mode is a proposal – a descriptive
propositional construction
no proposal is conceived / proposed –
‘through something else’ –
a proposal / proposition may be put in
relation to another proposal or proposals
a mode – is not infinite – a mode is finite –
a ‘mode’ – as with any proposal exists as
long as it is proposed – as long as it is considered
‘infinity’ is a game concept – a
propositional game – the rule of which is that a calculation is on-going
a proposal is open to question – open to
doubt – and logically uncertain –
it is logical uncertainty that leads to – is
the ground of – further proposal put in relation to a subject proposal
and there is no logical end to the critical
investigation of a proposal put – or the proposals that might be put in any
critical investigation
however – any such critical investigation is
not rule-governed
a proposal exists as an uncertainty – not a
necessity
there is no ‘necessity’ – necessity is a
false concept – it is a child of the delusion
‘certainty’
‘attribute’ – is a name for
propositional description
no proposal / proposition ‘follows from’ – a
propositional description
yes – you can play the deductive game – but
that is a game – a rule governed propositional game – it is not a
critical activity
the proposal ‘God’ – however further
proposed – however further described – however understood – as with any other
proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by
God does not involve existence.
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
the unknown does not produce – does not produce
the essence of things
if the essence of things does not involve
existence – then essence – does not exist –
and so – the term ‘essence’ as Spinoza uses it
– is empty – is meaningless
that which is proposed – exists
and any proposal – is open to question – open
to doubt and is uncertain –
proposal is uncertain – existence is uncertain
the ‘essence’ of any proposed existent – will
be a description proposed – and any such description – will be open to question
the description of a thing will be a
supplementary proposal to the proposal
you can propose – without putting a suppletory
description –
a so called ‘essential’ description – is
secondary to the proposal
and – paradoxically – or ironically – it is not
essential
Proof. – This is clear from Def.1. For that whose nature (considered in
itself) involves existence is its own cause, and exists merely by the necessity
of its own nature.
according to Spinoza –
Def. I. – that ‘cause of itself’ – involves
existence –
is not a ‘proof’ of Prop. XXIV. – that essence
of things produced by God does not involve existence
Spinoza’s God / substance – is – ‘cause of
itself’ –
so – what this God produces – is – what this God
is –
which is to say that for Spinoza – God produces
existence – for what else is Spinoza’s God but existence?
and if so – then Def. I. – contradicts Prop. XXIV.
and if so – then Def. I. – contradicts Prop. XXIV.
and how then do we understand ‘essence’ here?
‘essence’ – either doesn’t exist – of if it
does exist – it is irrelevant to existence –
and given those possibilities ‘essence’ comes
off as a useless notion
Corollary. – Hence it follows that God is not
only the cause that all things begin to exist, but also that they continue to
exist, or (to use a scholastic term) God is the cause of the being (causa
essendi) of things. For whether things exist or whether they do not, however
often we consider their essence, we will find it to involve neither existence
or duration: and their essence cannot be the cause of their existence or their
duration, but only God, to whose nature alone existence appertains (Coroll. 1.
Prop. 14).
Spinoza here – seems to want to separate
essence from existence –
and again – the result is – that he must regard
essence as not existing –
so – what is the point of essence?
the logical reality is that anything
proposed – exists –
the question then – is how do we understand
that proposed – that is understand the proposal?
the answer is – we propose description – and
critically evaluate any description
‘essence’ – if proposed – is a propositional
description – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘however often we consider their essence, we
will find it to involve neither existence or duration’
look – the point is – if you propose ‘essence’
– it exists – however it might be described
and its duration – is – the time it is under
consideration
‘but only God, to whose nature alone existence
appertains’
if you proposed Spinoza’s ‘God’ – exists –
as to this ‘God’s nature’ – that is a matter of
description – a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
the unknown does cause
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
any causal account of the existence of a thing – is an explanatory
proposal –
and any explanatory proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
if ‘essence’ is to mean anything here – it is a description of a
thing –
and any description put in relation to a proposal – is open to question
Proof. – If you deny it, then let God not be the cause of the essence of
things; therefore (Ax.4) the essence of things can be conceived without God.
But this (Prop. 15) is absurd. Therefore God is the cause of the essence of
things. Q.e.d,
of course – a thing – a proposed thing – can be described – without Spinoza’s
God
for Spinoza – ‘God’ is the final explanation – of all and everything
the logical reality is – there is no such thing as a final explanation –
any proposed explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
in logic – there is no finality
in ignorance and prejudice – you find finality
that is – claims that are not put to question – not put to doubt –
claims – the uncertainty of which – is not only – not explored – but
flat out denied
Note. – This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. 16. For it follows
from this, that from a given divine nature, the essence, as well as the
existence of things, must of necessity be concluded; and to express it shortly,
in that sense in which God is said to be his own cause, he must also be said to
be the cause of all things, which will be seen more clearly from the following
corollary.
Corollary. – Particular things are nothing else than modifications of attributes
of God, or modes by which attributes of God are expressed in a certain and
determined manner. The proof of this is clear from Prop. 15 and Def. 5.
a ‘particular thing’ – is a proposal – a proposition –
any proposed relation between propositions – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
the unknown does not determine anything
a ‘thing’ is a proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
any propositional determination – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – That through which things are said
to be determined for performing anything must necessarily be something positive
(as is self-evident): and therefore God, by the necessity of his nature, is the
effecting cause of the essence and existence of this (Prop. 25 and 16): which
was the first point. From which clearly follows that which was proposed in the
second place. For if a thing is not determined by God could determine itself,
the first part of this proof would be false: which is absurd, as we have shown.
Spinoza here introduces the concept
‘positive’ – without any elaboration – or explanation –
and he is quite happy to run the
‘self-evident’ claim here –
I assume – by ‘self-evident’ – he means a
claim that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain
Spinoza – for all the propositions – in his
‘Ethics’ – consistently and systematically defies the logic of the proposition
a proposition – is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking – nothing is –
self-evident
any claim of self-evidence – should be seem
for what it is – a stand for ignorance – and prejudice
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
no proposal is ‘necessary’ – or a cause –
‘effecting’ or otherwise
Proof. – This is obvious from the third axiom.
a thing that is determined – is determined –
really nothing more than a tautology
a ’thing’ is a proposal –
a proposal is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
and if uncertain – it is not determined –
rather undetermined
(another tautology)
PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or
whatever thing that is finite and has a determinate existence, cannot exist or
be determined for action unless it is determined for action and existence by
another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again,
this cause also cannot exist nor be determined for action unless it is
determined for existence and action by another cause which is also finite and
has a determinate existence: and so on to infinity.
yes – and ‘so on to
infinity’ –
is – ‘so on’ – to
indeterminacy
the causal argument
– here – does not have an end
does not have a
determination
and so – the
‘causal chain’ – does not chain anything
Proof. – Whatever is determined for
existence or action is so determined by God (Prop. 26, and Coroll., Prop. 24).
But that which is finite and has a determined existence cannot be produced from
the absolute nature of any attribute of God: for anything that follows from the
absolute nature of any attribute of God must be infinite and eternal (Prop.
21). It must have followed, therefore, from God or some attribute of his, in so
far as it is considered as modified in some mode: for save substance and modes
nothing is granted (Ax. 1, and Def. 3 and 5) and modes (Coroll., Prop. 25) are
nothing else than modifications of attributes of God. But it also cannot have
followed from God or any attribute of his, in so far as it is modified by some
modification which is eternal and infinite (Prop. 22). It follows, then, that
it must have been determined for existence or action by God or some attribute
of his, in so far as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a
determinate existence: which was the first point. Then again, this cause or mode (by the same reason by which we have
proved the first part) must also have been determined by another cause which is
also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, the latter (by the same
reason) must have been determined by another: and so on to infinity. Q.e.d.
‘Whatever is determined for existence or action is so determined by God
(Prop. 26, and Coroll., Prop. 24). But that which is finite and has a
determined existence cannot be produced from the absolute nature of any
attribute of God: for anything that follows from the absolute nature of any
attribute of God must be infinite and eternal (Prop. 21). It must have
followed, therefore, from God or some attribute of his, in so far as it is
considered as modified in some mode: for save substance and modes
nothing is granted (Ax. 1, and Def. 3 and 5) and modes (Coroll., Prop.
25) are nothing else than modifications of attributes of God. But it also
cannot have followed from God or any attribute of his, in so far as it is
modified by some modification which is eternal and infinite (Prop. 22). It
follows, then, that it must have been determined for existence or action by God
or some attribute of his, in so far as it is modified by a modification which
is finite and has a determinate existence: which was the first point.’
‘Whatever is determined is determined by God – but that which is finite
is not produced by any attribute of God – for what follows from any attribute
of God – must be finite.’
you would think that finite things – are either of God – or they are not
–
on the face of it then – Spinoza cannot account for what he calls
‘finite things’
and finite things contradict his claim that –
‘Whatever is determined for existence or action is so determined by God’
and if you accept the argument that a finite thing – is modified by a
modification of an attribute which is finite –
the confusion is not resolved
for we are left with the question – how can a modification of an
infinite attribute – be anything but infinite?
Spinoza here cannot account for finite things
just slotting them in as a modification of an infinite attribute –
doesn’t work
it is logically inconsistent
if you go with this ‘modified by a modification’ argument – then
Spinoza’s theory of God and finite things is in trouble –
for either his God is not connected to finite things –
or there are no finite things
‘Then again, this cause or mode (by the same reason by which we have
proved the first part) must also have been determined by another cause which is
also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, the latter (by the same
reason) must have been determined by another: and so on to infinity. Q.e.d.’
any explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and it is just the logical uncertainty of any proposed explanation –
that leads to further explanations – and explanations of explanations
logically speaking there is no end to this process
so here it seems that Spinoza wants to accommodate his ‘finite and
determinate existence’ to infinity – via the critical process of logical and
propositional uncertainty
this is a switch on Spinoza’s part
he begins with the idea of substantial infinity – (whatever that
is supposed to mean)
however – such an infinity cannot be applied to finite existents
–
hence – a reconfiguring of ‘infinity’ – to be the logical possibility
and process of continual propositional explanation
a critical propositional analysis – that in principle – is on-going – is
really all infinity can amount to
what we have then is what you might call propositional infinity – or
critical / logical infinity
is this really what Spinoza has in mind with his notion of substance /
God – as infinite?
I think there is something to this –
but I think he also wants infinity to be substantial – to be a
substantial reality
and I don’t think we can make sense of that
and so – Spinoza – is actually confused about infinity –
if he was to go with logical infinity – where is the substance?
and if substantial infinity – doesn’t that end up as critical / logical
infinity?
so even without the problem of accounting for finite existents – Spinoza
has a problem with infinity
the matter is resolved – once it is understood that ‘substance’ – is
nothing more than a proposal – a proposition – that like any other
proposition – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
Note. – As certain things must have been produced immediately by God, for
example, those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, by
means of these first causes, which nevertheless cannot exist nor even be
conceived without God, it follows that God is the proximate cause of those
things immediately produced by him, absolutely, not, as some would have it, in
his kind. For the effects of God cannot exist or be conceived without their
cause (Prop. 15, and Coroll., Prop. 24). It follows, again, that God cannot be
said in truth to be the remote cause of individual things which are
immediately produced by God, or which rather
follow from his absolute nature. For we understand by a remote cause one which
is in no wise connected with its effect. But all things which are, are in God,
and so depend on God that without him they can neither exist nor be conceived.
if all is of God – then all is of God’s nature
– sui causa –
which is to say – without cause
if God is the absolute cause of everything –
nothing – is caused
however – without ‘cause’ – what account – what
explanation – does Spinoza have of substance?
he tries to tie off causation – with ‘first
cause’ –
but again – ‘first cause’ – doesn’t stand up –
if God / substance – is sui causa – without cause –
a first cause – as with any other cause – is
resolved in – no cause
Spinoza’s God – is just what is – is just
whatever – is proposed –
and whatever is proposed – is open to question
– open to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. XXIX. In the nature of things nothing
contingent (contingens) is granted, but all things are determined by the
necessity of divine nature for existing and working in a certain way.
what exists is what
is proposed –
‘all things here’ –
is the universe – or reality – proposed
how the universe
works is open to question –
proposals put –
i.e. scientific hypotheses / explanations – are open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
any proposal /
proposition put – is contingent – that is open to question –
‘nature’ – is a
propositional complex – open to question –
as is any
propositional ‘determination’
our understanding
of nature – is uncertain – not necessary
Spinoza here
characterizes nature as ‘divine’
so how then are to
understand his ‘God or nature’ characterization’?
on the face if it
‘divine nature’ – is not ‘God or nature’
if nature is divine
– that is – our world is divine – as he says here –
why bother with
nature – with natural?
or – if ‘nature’ is
just what it is – then you would think ‘divine’ is out of the question – that
his proposed ‘God’ – is unnecessary
could he not have
run a ‘nature metaphysics’ – without his God?
I think so
that he doesn’t –
indicates – I suggest – that he holds on to a traditional Jewish conception of
God – albeit with a 17th century twist –
hence there is the
argument – if ‘God’ and ‘nature’ – are synonyms – one of them should go – one
of them is unnecessary –
keeping the ‘deus
sive natura’ notion – leaves his philosophy open to the charge of duplicity
so – ‘God’ or
‘nature’ – what’s it to be?
Proof. – Whatever is, is in God (Prop. 15). But God cannot be called a
contingent thing for (by Prop. 11) he exists of necessity and not contingently.
Again, the modes of divine nature do not follow from it contingently, but of
necessity (Prop. 16) and that either in so far as divine nature be considered
absolutely or as determined for certain action (Prop. 27). Now God is the cause
of these modes, not only in so far as they simply exist (Coroll., Prop, 24),
but also in so far as they are considered as determined for the working of
anything (Prop. 26). For if they are not determined by God it is impossible,
not contingent indeed, that they should determine themselves; and on the other
hand, if they are determined by God, it is impossible and in no wise contingent
for them to render themselves undetermined. Wherefore all things are determined
by the necessity of divine nature, not only for existing, but also for existing
and working after a certain manner, and nothing contingent is granted. Q.e.d.
‘But God cannot be called a contingent thing’
what exists – is what is proposed –
and whether or not an entity – a thing – is
proposed – is a contingent matter
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – may or may not – be proposed
–
if the proposal ‘God’ – is put – it is
contingent – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
any determination of propositional relations –
i.e. – between Spinoza’s proposal ‘God’
– and the proposal of ‘modes of existence’ – is
open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
Note. – Before proceeding I would wish to
explain, or rather remind you, what we must understand by active and passive
nature (natura naturans and natura naturata),
for I think that from the past propositions we shall be agreed that by
nature active we must understand that which is in itself and through itself is
conceived, or such attributes of substance that express eternal and divine
essence, that is (Coroll. 1, Prop.14 and Coroll. 2, Prop. 17), God, in so far
as he is considered a free cause. But by nature passive I understand all that
follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or any one of his attributes,
that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are
considered as things which are in God, and which cannot exist or be conceived
with God.
‘that which is in itself and conceived through itself’ –
a conception – does not conceive itself –
a proposition does not propose itself –
a proposition exists if proposed – by a
propositional actor
the fact of a proposition – is a contingent
fact
and this action of a proposition put in relation to proposition –
logically speaking can go on indefinitely
Spinoza’s proposal ‘God’ – is not a cause
as to passive nature – natura naturata
no proposition follows from another –
any proposal or propositional relation is a contingent fact
a proposal put – is a free action –
a mode is a proposal – a propositional
construction –
no proposal / propositional construction – is in
another proposal / propositional construction
proposals can be put in relation to other
proposals
all propositional relations are external
Spinoza’s natura naturans / natura
naturata distinction fails –
any proposal / proposition – is an action – is active
and all propositional
activity – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘intellect’ – is a name for
propositional action –
in propositional action we propose our
reality – and any proposal – or description (attribute / mode) is open to
question
propositional action is not determined –
there is no ‘must’ in propositional action
all proposals are open – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the proposal ‘God’ – or Spinoza’s ‘God’ –
however further described – is one proposal
our propositional reality – is not
the reality of one proposal – and ‘nothing else’
it is the infinity of human proposal – the
infinity of propositional action
any particular proposal – any particular
propositional action – exists as long as it is considered
there is no infinite consideration
Proof. – A true idea must agree with its ideal (Ax. 6), that is (as is
self-evident), that which is contained in the intellect objectively must of
necessity be granted in nature. But in nature (Coroll. 1, Prop. 14), only one
substance can be granted (Prop. 15) and that is God, and only such
modifications can be granted (Prop. 15) as are in God and (same Prop) cannot
exist or be conceived without God. Therefore, intellect finite or infinite in
actuality must comprehend the attributes and modifications of God and nothing
else. Q.e.d.
an ‘idea’ is a proposal – an ‘ideal’ is that
proposed
there is no logical distinction between an
‘idea’ and ‘its ideal’ –
just what ‘agreement’ amounts to – is open
to question
a proposal (‘idea’ / ‘ideal’) is true if
affirmed – false – if denied
any proposal of affirmation – or
denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
how we propose ‘nature’ – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘one substance’ – is one proposal –
propositional reality – is not the reality
of ‘one’ proposal –
propositional reality – is the reality of an
infinity of human proposal – an infinity of propositional action
PROP. XXXI. The intellect in actuality, whether
it be finite or infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc. must be referred not
to active, but passive nature.
active and passive nature?
according to Spinoza (Note – Prop. XXIX) – an
‘active nature’ is that which is in itself and through itself conceived – that
is God in so far as he is considered a free cause
if so – there is no ‘active nature’ – for a
proposal does not conceive itself – does not propose itself
a proposal does not propose
a proposal is proposed – by a human being – a
propositional actor
by ‘passive nature’ Spinoza means that which
follows from the necessity of the nature of God –
if so – there is no ‘passive nature’ –
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is a proposal
and nothing follows from any proposal –
there is no ‘necessity’ in propositional logic
proposals are put in relation to
proposals –
all proposal – is active
the ‘intellect’ – is a name for
propositional action
‘will’ – ‘desire’ – ‘love’ – are proposed
descriptive categories – of different propositional actions
Proof. – Now by intellect (which is self-evident) we do not understand
absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking which differs from other
modes, such as desire and love, etc., and therefore must (Def. 5) be conceived
through absolute
thought: moreover (Prop. 15 and Def. 6), it
must be so conceived through some
attribute of God which expresses eternal and
infinite essence of thought, that without it, it can neither exist or be
conceived. On this account (Note, Prop. 29), like the other modes of thinking,
the intellect must be referred not to active but passive nature. Q.e.d.
if by ‘absolute thought’ is meant a
propositional action that is not open to question – not open to doubt – and
certain
there is no ‘absolute thought’
what you have here masquerading as thought –
is prejudice – is ignorance
‘intellect’ – is a name for
propositional action –
‘desire and love etc.’ – are proposed
descriptive categories of different propositional actions –
any proposed descriptive category – is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
i.e. – we can ask –
do we separate our intellect from love and desire?
is not the intellect involved in love and desire?
and is not desire involved in love?
and may not love be proposed as a form of desire?
the point here is that no sharp distinction can be drawn between
propositional descriptive categories –
between propositional actions
what it comes down to is propositional use and propositional contexts –
i.e. in one context ‘love’ – will have a particular use and
understanding
in another propositional setting – it will have a different use and
different understanding
these are contingencies –
any use – any understanding – is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
all propositional action – however named or
described – is active
there is no passive propositional action
no proposal is ‘conceived through’ another –
each proposal is logically unique –
and no proposal expresses ‘an eternal and
infinite essence’ –
the ground of any proposal is logical
uncertainty
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – has no basis in logic – and
is in fact a denial of propositional logic – it is a philosophical pretence
Note – The reason why I speak of intellect in actuality is not that I
concede that intellect in potentiality can be granted, but that I wish to avoid
all confusion, and would not speak of anything save that so easily perceived by
us, that is understanding itself, for nothing is so clearly perceived by us as
this. For we can perceive nothing which does not lead to a greater
comprehension of understanding.
the ‘intellect’ is a
name for propositional action
propositional
action – is actual –
and there is
potential in propositional action – the potential of proposal – and critical
evaluation
any proposal /
propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘understanding’ is
not – ‘clearly perceived’ –
understanding is
the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of
propositional uncertainty
PROP. XXXII. Will can only be called a necessary cause, not a free one.
propositional action can be proposed as – explained as / described as –
‘will’
‘will’ is a name for propositional action –
such a description will suit certain purposes – and as with any proposal
– any propositional description – is open to question
as for it being a ‘necessary cause’ –
no proposal / propositional action – is the cause of another proposal –
a ‘causal analysis’ – is a pragmatic construction – which again
may serve certain purposes – have certain uses and functions in various
contexts
however – the logical reality is that any such construction – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
there is no necessity in propositional action –
all propositional action is free
Proof. – Will, like the intellect, is only a certain mode of thinking, and
therefore (Prop. 28) any single volition cannot exist or be determined for
action unless it be determined by some other cause, and this one again by
another, and so on to infinity. Now if will be supposed infinite, it must then
be determined for existence and action by God, in so far, not as he is the
infinite substance, but as he has an attribute expressing infinite and eternal
essence of thought (Prop. 23). So in whatever way it be conceived, whether as
finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined for existence
or action: and therefore (Def. 7) it cannot be said to be a free cause, but
only a necessary one. Q.e.d.
a ‘single volition’ – is a single proposal
–
a proposal exists – if proposed –
a proposal is not determined – it is a free
action –
a proposal – a ‘single volition’ – is finite
there is no ‘infinite proposal’ – the notion
makes no sense
any causal explanation of any proposal – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
furthermore – a proposal – can be put – and
dealt with critically – without explanation – causal or otherwise
Corollary I – Hence it follows that God does not act from freedom of will.
all action takes place in space and time –
and in so far as Spinoza ‘God’ – is infinite
and eternal – outside of space / time – there is the question – does this ‘God’
act at all?
Corollary II. – Hence it follows again that will and intellect hold the same place
in the nature of God as motion and rest, and that, absolutely, as with all
natural things which (Prop. 29) must be determined by God in a certain way for
existence and action. And although from a given will or intellect infinite
things follow, yet it cannot be said on that account that God acts from freedom
of will any more that it can be said that, infinite things follow from motion
and rest (for infinite things follow from these too), God acts from freedom of
motion and rest. Wherefore will does not appertain to the nature of God any
more than the rest of the things of nature, but holds the same place in God’s
nature as motion and rest, and all other things which we have shown to follow
from the necessity of divine nature, and to be determined by it for existence
and action in a certain way
82.
‘God’ is a name for the unknown –
the unknown does not act
for Spinoza – God’s will – follows ‘from the necessity of divine nature’
which is to say ‘God’s will’ – is no more than a synonym for necessity
there is no necessity –
all propositional actions are open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
which is to say all propositional action is contingent
‘will’ – is a name for propositional
action
‘intellect’ – a name for propositional
action
propositional action is not determined
there are no ‘infinite things’ –
a ‘thing’ is a proposal – and a proposal is
finite –
propositional action is finite
nothing ‘follows from’ a propositional action
proposals can be put in relation to a
propositional action
any proposal / propositional action is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been produced by God in any other
manner or order than that in which they were produced.
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
the unknown does not produce – anything
how any ‘thing’ / proposal – is ‘produced’ –
and the manner in which it is produced –
is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
furthermore – what could be the case –
is open to question open to doubt and uncertain
Proof. – All things must have followed of a necessity from a given nature of
God (Prop. 16), and they were determined for existence or action in a certain
way by the necessity
of divine nature (Prop. 29). And so if things could have been of another
nature or determined in another manner for action so that the order of
nature were
different, therefore, also, the nature of God could be different from
how it is now: then (Prop. 11) another nature of God must exist, and
consequently two or more Gods could be granted, and this (Coroll. 1 Prop. 14)
is absurd. Wherefore things could not have been produced in any other way or
order, etc. Q.e.d.
Spinoza’s argument is that if reality were to
be different then God’s nature would have to be different – and another nature
of God – would mean two or more Gods –
according to Spinoza – God / substance – is
an infinity of attributes of which we know two – extension and mind –
and that these two attributes constitute our
reality
so – what we know – is only two attributes –
and those two attributes constitute reality as we know it –
it does not follow that God / reality – could
not be otherwise – or that to propose that it could be – we would have to
postulate two or more Gods
all that follows – from his argument – is
that what we know of God – ‘God’s nature – is limited –
and further that beyond what we know – of God
– of God’s nature – is what we don’t know –
so perhaps – reality / God – is
different to how we know it?
or – God – is limited by two attributes – and
is not an infinity of attributes
and if so – God is just what we know – and
nothing more –
and if such is case – you might argue that
Spinoza’s concept of God – is unnecessary – is irrelevant –
Spinoza can’t have it both ways – either God
is more than what we know – or just and only what we know
what is it to be?
the point really is that the proposal ‘God’ –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
that our reality – our reality however
proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Note I. – Although I have shown more clearly than the sun at noonday that
there is absolutely nothing in things by which we can call them contingent, yet
I would wish to explain here in a few words what is the signification of
contingent (contingens); but first that of necessary (necessarium) and
impossible (impossibile). Anything is said to be necessary either by
reason of its essence or its cause. For the existence of anything
necessarily follows either from its very essence or definition, or from
a given effecting
cause. A thing is said to be impossible by reason of these same causes;
clearly for that its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or that no
external cause can be given determined for the production of such a thing. But
anything can in no wise be said to be contingent save in respect to the
imperfection of our knowledge. For when we are not aware that the essence of a
thing involves a contradiction, or when we are quite certain that it does not
involve a contradiction, and yet can affirm nothing with certainty concerning
its existence, as the order of causes has escaped us, such a thing can seem
neither necessary nor impossible to us: and therefore we call it either
contingent or possible.
‘For the existence of anything necessarily follows either from its very
essence or definition, of from a given effecting cause.’
a thing exists – if proposed
how it exists – what form or kind of existence it has – is a matter open
to question
the ‘essence’ of a thing – is a description of it – and any such
description – is open to question – is uncertain
a definition – is a propositional determination – and as with any
proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
and – any causal explanation of a thing – again is a proposal – open to
question
propositions do not follow from propositions – propositions are put in
relation to proposition
there is no necessity in propositional action
‘A thing is said to be impossible by reason of these same causes;
clearly for that its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or that no
external cause can be given determined for the production of such a thing.’
a contradiction – is not a proposal – is not a proposition – nothing is proposed
in a contradiction
‘But anything can in no wise be said to be contingent save in respect to
the imperfection of our knowledge.’
any proposed reality – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
our knowledge is contingent – our reality / realities – are contingent
‘an order of causes’ – is nothing more than a proposed explanation –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘and yet can affirm nothing with certainty’ –
such is the reality we face – and the reality we deal with – with
question – with doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –
any affirmation with certainty – is illogical
Note II.
It clearly follows from the preceding remarks that things were produced
by the consummate perfection of God, since they follow from a given most
perfect nature. Nor does this argue any imperfection in God, for his perfection
has forced us to assert this. And from the contrary of this proposition it
would have followed (as I have shown) that God was not consummately perfect, in
as much as if things were produced in any other way there must have been
attributed to God a nature different to that which we are forced to attribute
to him from consideration of a perfect being. I make no doubt however, but that
many will deride this opinion as absurd, nor will they agree to give up their
minds to the contemplation of it: and on no other account than that they are wont
to ascribe to God a freedom far different to that which has been propounded by
us (Def. 6). They attribute to him absolute will. Yet I make no doubt but that,
if they wish rightly to consider the matter and follow our series of
propositions, weighing well each of them, they will reject that freedom which
they now attribute to God, not only as futile, but also clearly as an obstacle
to knowledge. Nor is there any need for me to repeat what was said in the note
on Prop. 17. But for their benefit I shall show this much, that although it be
conceded that will appertains to the essence of God, yet it nevertheless
follows that things could not have been created in any other manner or order
than that in which they have been created; and this will be easy to show if we
first consider the very thing which they themselves grant, namely , that it
depends solely on the degree and will of God that each thing is what it is, for
otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. They grant further, that
all the decrees of God have been appointed by him and through all eternity: for
otherwise it would argue mutability and imperfection in God. But as in eternity
there are no such things as when, before, or after, hence
it follows merely from the perfection of God that he never can or could degree
anything else than what is decreed, or that God did not exist before his
decrees, nor without them could he exist. But they say that although we suppose
that God had made the nature of things different or had decreed otherwise concerning
nature and her order from eternity, it would not thence follow that God was
imperfect. Now if they say this, they must also admit that God can change his
decrees. For had God decreed otherwise than he had concerning nature and her
order, that is, had he willed and conceived anything else concerning nature, he
must necessarily have some other intellect and will than those he now has. And
if it is permitted to attribute to God another will and intellect than those
which he now has, without any change in his essence or perfection, what would
there be to prevent him from changing his decrees concerning things created,
and yet remaining perfect? For his intellect and will concerning things created
and their order is the same in respect to his essence and perfection, in
whatever manner they may be conceived. Furthermore, all the philosophers, I
have seen, concede that no such thing as potential intellect in God can be
granted, but only actual. But as they make no distinction between his intellect
and will and his essence, being all agreed in this, it follows then that if God
had another actual intellect and will, he must necessarily also have another
essence; and thence, as I concluded in the beginning, that, were things
produced in any other way than in which they were, God’s intellect and will,
that is, as has been granted, his essence, also must have been other than it
is, which is absurd.
Now since things could not have been produced in any other manner or
order than that in which they were, and since this follows from the consummate
perfection of God, there is no rational argument to persuade us to believe that
God did not wish to create all things which are in his intellect, and that in
the same perfection in which his intellect conceived them. But they say that in
things there is no such a thing as perfection or imperfection, but that which
causes us to call a thing perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on
the will of God; moreover that if God, had willed it he could have brought to
pass that what is now perfection might have been the greatest imperfection, and
vice versa. But else is this but to openly assert that God who
necessarily understands what he wishes, could bring to pass by his own will
that his intelligence could perceive things in another manner than they now do.
This (as I have just shown) is the height of absurdity. Wherefore I can turn
their argument against them in the following manner. All things depend on the
power of God. That things should be different from what they are would involve
a change in the will of God, and the will of God cannot change (as we have most
clearly shown from the perfection of God): therefore things could not be
otherwise than they are. I confess that the theory that subjects all things to
the will of an indifferent God and makes them dependent on his good will is far
nearer the truth than that which states that God acts in all things for the
furthering of good. For these seem to place something beyond God which does not
depend on God, and to which God looks in his actions as to an example or
strives after as an ultimate end. Now this nothing else than subjecting God to
fate, a greater absurdity of which it is difficult to assert of God, whom we
have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and
their existence. Wherefore let me not waste more time in refuting such idle
arguments.
‘It clearly follows from the preceding remarks that things were produced
by the consummate perfection of God, since they follow from a given most
perfect nature. Nor does this argue any imperfection in God, for his perfection
has forced us to assert this. And from the contrary of this proposition it
would have followed (as I have shown) that God was not consummately perfect, in
as much as if things were produced in any other way there must have been
attributed to God a nature different to that which we are forced to attribute
to him from consideration of a perfect being.’
in so far as Spinoza’s God – is the cause or
essence of all that is – Spinoza’s God is the cause or essence of imperfection
–
and for Spinoza – this leads to the
contradiction that God is both perfect and imperfect
a contradiction – cannot stand – nothing is
proposed in a contradiction
on this basis – Spinoza’s God cannot stand
the perfection argument is not an argument
against the view that reality could be other than what we know
perhaps God in his perfection – has created a
reality – through the infinity of his attributes – that is different to the
reality that we know?
and in so far as we don’t know the infinity
of attributes – Spinoza you would think has to accept that the matter is left –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘I make no doubt however, but that many will deride this opinion as
absurd, nor will they agree to give up their minds to the contemplation of it:
and on no other account than that they are wont to ascribe to God a freedom far
different to that which has been propounded by us (Def. 6). They attribute to
him absolute will. Yet I make no doubt but that, if they wish rightly to
consider the matter and follow our series of propositions, weighing well each
of them, they will reject that freedom which they now attribute to God, not
only as futile, but also clearly as an obstacle to knowledge. Nor is there any
need for me to repeat what was said in the note on Prop. 17. But for their
benefit I shall show this much, that although it be conceded that will
appertains to the essence of God, yet it nevertheless follows that things could
not have been created in any other manner or order than that in which they have
been created; and this will be easy to show if we first consider the very thing
which they themselves grant, namely , that it depends solely on the degree and
will of God that each thing is what it is, for otherwise God would not be the
cause of all things. They grant further, that all the decrees of God have been
appointed by him and through all eternity: for otherwise it would argue
mutability and imperfection in God. But as in eternity there are no such things
as when, before, or after, hence it follows merely from
the perfection of God that he never can or could degree anything else than what
is decreed, or that God did not exist before his decrees, nor without them
could he exist. But they say that although we suppose that God had made the
nature of things different or had decreed otherwise concerning nature and her
order from eternity, it would not thence follow that God was imperfect.’
surely everything in Spinoza’s God – is absolute –
and in so far as – everything that is in God – ‘will’ – will be in God
and absolute
if not – either God is not ‘absolute’ – or there is no will –
eternity as proposed by Spinoza is outside of time –
we can ask then – how does God – how does anything eternal – have any
relation to what exists in time?
so – it is not a question of whether things could have been produced
different to how they are – rather the issue is how God could have produced
anything all – in time?
there is the problem – then of how we account for time in Spinoza’s
metaphysics
for if all is in God – time is in God – and we can ask – how can time be
in the timeless?
these notions of ‘eternity’ and ‘time’ have been proposed by
propositional actors – because they have been useful to them in their
propositional activity
nevertheless – ‘eternity’ and ‘time’ – any proposed relation between
them – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Now if they say this, they must also admit that God can change his
decrees. For had God decreed otherwise than he had concerning nature and her
order, that is, had he willed and conceived anything else concerning nature, he
must necessarily have some other intellect and will than those he now has. And
if it is permitted to attribute to
God another will and intellect than those which he now has, without any
change in his essence or perfection, what would there be to prevent him from
changing his decrees concerning things created, and yet remaining perfect? For
his intellect and will concerning things created and their order is the same in
respect to his essence and perfection, in whatever manner they may be
conceived.’
according to Spinoza – what we know – is what we know of God –
he claims further that there is much that we do not know – i.e. God’s
infinity of attributes
what we don’t know is the problem for Spinoza –
for if we don’t know the full nature of God – his God – we cannot know
what this God is capable of –
we cannot know that his God – has not created other worlds – that are
just as actual as the world we know –
and we cannot know that he could have created our reality in a different
manner –
even should you accept Spinoza’s metaphysics – these matters are open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Furthermore, all the philosophers, I have seen, concede that no such
thing as potential intellect in God can be granted, but only actual. But as
they make no distinction between his intellect and will and his essence, being
all agreed in this, it follows then that if God had another actual intellect
and will, he must necessarily also have another essence; and thence, as I
concluded in the beginning, that, were things produced in any other way than in
which they were, God’s intellect and will, that is, as has been granted, his
essence, also must have been other than it is, which is absurd.’
to the question – of what is ‘actual’ for Spinoza’s God – we have no
answer – because we cannot know the full actuality of God – the full
intellect of God – the full essence of his God –
these matter – even from a Spinozistic point of view – must be open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Now since things could not have been produced in any other manner or
order than that in which they were, and since this follows from the consummate
perfection of God, there is no rational argument to persuade us to believe that
God did not wish to create all things which are in his intellect, and that in
the same perfection in which his intellect conceived them.’
God – according to Spinoza has an infinity of attributes –
Spinoza here is confining God’s intellect and his perfection to the two
attributes – extension and mind
given that we don’t know the full nature of God’s intellect – we cannot
say that God
created all things that are in his intellect –
and we cannot know if he could have created things differently
here too – we can ask – does this God create anything?
if as Spinoza claims – his God is eternal – infinite and unchanging –
what’s to create?
‘But they say that in things there is no such a thing as perfection or
imperfection, but that which causes us to call a thing perfect or imperfect,
good or bad, depends solely on the will of God; moreover that if God, had
willed it he could have brought to pass that what is now perfection might have
been the greatest imperfection, and vice versa.’
‘now perfect might have been the greatest imperfection and vice versa’ –
is really just to recognize that what is proposed – is open to question
– is open to doubt and is uncertain –
which is indeed to be rational – and open minded –
however – this it appears is just what Spinoza is arguing against
‘But else is this but to openly assert that God who necessarily
understands what he wishes, could bring to pass by his own will that his
intelligence could perceive things in another manner than they now do.’
perhaps – the intelligence of Spinoza’s God – is a critical
intelligence?
that is – an intelligence – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘This (as I have just shown) is the height of absurdity. Wherefore I can
turn their argument against them in the following manner. All things depend on
the power of God. That things should be different from what they are would
involve a change in the will of God, and the will of God cannot change (as we
have most clearly shown from the perfection of God): therefore things could not
be otherwise than they are.’
Spinoza’s God – it appears – is limited in his power – he cannot change
– what he has willed – and cannot change what he has done –
his perfection it seems – actually rests in his want of power –
it might well be put – that in so far as this God cannot change – he is
in fact impotent
it is Spinoza’s failure to see that his proposal ‘God’ – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain – that enables these criticisms –
Spinoza does not have an open mind on God
and according to him – God does not have an open mind either
‘I confess that the theory that subjects all things to the will of an
indifferent God and makes them dependent on his good will is far nearer the
truth than that which states that God acts in all things for the furthering of
good. For these seem to place something beyond God which does not depend on
God, and to which God looks in his actions as to an example or strives after as
an ultimate end. Now this is nothing else than subjecting God to fate, a
greater absurdity of which it is difficult to assert of God, whom we have shown
to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and their
existence. Wherefore let me not waste more time in refuting such idle
arguments.’
we are left with impression that Spinoza’s God – is irrelevant to the
affairs of men
and his proposal ‘God’ – is not subject to question – open to doubt –
and there is no uncertainty to be explored–
such a proposal – is irrational
PROP. XXXIV. The power of God is the same as his essence.
this proposition is uninformative –
it is just a word game – where ‘power’ –
whatever that amounts – can be substituted for ‘essence’ – whatever that
amounts to
Proof. – It follows from the mere necessity of the essence of God that
God is his own cause (Prop. 11), and (Prop.16 and its Coroll.) the cause of all
things. Therefore the power of God, by which he and all things are and act, is
the same as his essence. Q.e.d.
‘essence’ – for Spinoza – is effectively an empty concept –
it is a descriptive place – if you like – a propositional place or
category for other descriptions
the one in focus at the moment is ‘power’ –
again – we are not told what power is – Spinoza offers no explanation –
except to say it is – as with a lot of other concepts – essence
essence is power – power is essence
what we have here is a word game – a game of synonymy – which
might be fun to play – but it tells you nothing about the terms used
it is clear that Spinoza’s method is this –
he puts forward a concept – you are supposed to know what it means – if
you don’t know what it means – he will give you an ‘equivalent’ term – that you
are supposed to
know the meaning of – and this process of substitution goes on and on
and if you don’t get it – you don’t get – bad luck buster –
and you will get nowhere with Spinoza if you raise any questions –
doubts or uncertainties –
he doesn’t recognize them – he is without question – without doubt and
certain
and that is the problem –
propositional action is an action of critical elaboration –
where proposals are put in relation to proposals – as a result of
question – of doubt – and uncertainty
it is not a parlor game – a game of synonymy – a game of word
substitution –
it is the exploration of propositional uncertainty
so – what is the ground of Spinoza’s thinking?
well – those of a classical rationalist persuasion call it ‘intuition’ –
I call it high minded pretentious ignorance –
by all means have your intuitions – I have no problem with that at all
it is not intuition that is at issue – it is the failure to see that an
intuition is a proposal
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and most importantly –
uncertain
and as to this notion of ‘power’ – as with any proposal – it is open to
question – open to doubt – open to interpretation – and uncertain
it is a proposal that is used and will be used in many and varied
propositional contexts
and if assessed critically – will be used rationally
here – ‘power’ which in the previous
prop. XXXIV – was proposed as an ‘explanation’ of essence – is now put as an
‘explanation’ of existence
and by ‘explanation’ – I mean
effectively – substitution
power = existence – existence =
power
Spinoza seems to think that by
substituting terms – one for the other – in some way –
these terms are explicated – when
all you effectively have is a word game
the hard truth is – we have no idea
what ‘existence’ means for Spinoza – and we have no idea what ‘power’ is – from
Spinoza
all we have is a game of synonymy –
but it is not much of a game –
because we are given no reasons for why one word is synonymous with another
driving Spinoza’s argument in the
‘Ethics’ is a presumption of authority
he has chosen the geometric /
deductive format – I think – to give the impression of logical authority
and this approach really begs the
question – for all the geometric / deductive method amounts to is a particular
presentation –
it is effectively a language-game
the only ‘authority’ is authorship
– and the authorship of a proposal – of a proposition – is logically
irrelevant
we assess a proposal – not on the
basis of its authorship – who puts it – but rather on how it stands up
to question – to doubt – and to an exploration of its uncertainty
and – any assessment here – is of
course – open to question
Proof. – Now whatever is in the power of God must (prev. prop.) be so
comprehended in his essence that it follows necessarily from it, and so it
necessarily exists. Q.e.d.
firstly – Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
secondly any ‘comprehension’ of
power – is a matter open to question
thirdly – a thing exists – if
proposed – and there is no necessity in this – a proposal is a contingency –
existence is contingent
and finally – ‘power’ – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXXVI. Nothing exists from whose nature
some effect does not follow.
a thing exists – if proposed
a thing proposed – has an effect – if an
effect is proposed
and if an effect is proposed – the
proposed ‘thing’ – can be proposed as the cause of the effect
if no effect is proposed – there is no effect
Proof. – Whatever exists expresses in a certain and determined manner
(Coroll., Prop. 25) the nature or essence of God, that is (Prop. 34), whatever
exists expresses in a certain and determined way the power of God, which is the
cause of all things, and therefore (Prop. 16) from it some effect must follow. Q.e.d.
what any proposal expresses – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
APPENDIX
This appendix has four paragraphs to it.
Instead of presenting the appendix in one whole piece I will present each
paragraph separately and follow it with my remarks.
In these propositions I have explained the nature and properties of God:
that he necessarily exists: that he is one alone: that he exists and acts
merely from the necessity of his nature: that he is the free cause of all
things and in what manner: that all things are in God, and so depend on him
that without him that could neither exist or be conceived: and finally, that
all things were predetermined by God, not through his free will or good will,
but through his absolute nature or infinite power. I have endeavoured moreover,
whenever occasion prompted, to remove any misunderstandings which might impede
the good understanding of my propositions. Yet as many misunderstandings still
remain which. to a very large extent, have prevented and do prevent men from
embracing the concatenation of things in the manner in which I have explained
it, I have thought it worth while to call these into the scrutiny of reason.
Now since all these misunderstandings which I am undertaking to point out
depend upon this one point, that men commonly suppose that all natural things
act like themselves with an end in view, and since they assert with assurance
that God directs all things to a certain end ( for they say God made all things
for man, and man that he might worship God), I shall therefore consider this
one thing first, inquiring in the first place why so many fall into this error,
and why all are by nature so prone to embrace it; then I shall show its
falsity, and finally, how these misunderstandings have arisen concerning good
and evil, virtue and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and
ugliness, and other things of this kind. But this is not the place to deduce
these things from the nature of the human mind. It will suffice here for me to
take as a basis of argument what must be admitted by all: that is, that all men
are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have a desire of
acquiring what is useful; that they are conscious, moreover, of this. From
these premisses it follows then, in the first place, that men think themselves
free in as much as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and they
are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to wish and desire, and they
do not even dream of their existence. It follows, in the second place, that
mean do all things with and end in view, that is they seek what is useful.
Whence it comes to pass that they always seek out only the final causes of
things performed, and when they have divined these they
cease, for clearly then they have no cause of further doubt. If they are
unable to learn these causes from some one, nothing remains for them put to
turn to themselves and reflect what could induce them to personally bring about
such a thing, and thus necessarily estimate other natures by their own.
Furthermore, as they find in themselves and without themselves many things
which aid them not a little in their quest of things useful to themselves, as,
for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for mastication, vegetables and animals for
food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, they consider these
things like all natural things to be made for their use; and as they know that
they found these things as they were, and did not make themselves, herein they
have cause for believing that someone else prepared these things for their use.
Now having considered things as means, they cannot believe them to be
self-created; but they must conclude from the means which they are wont to
prepare for themselves, that there is some governor or governors, endowed with
human freedom, who takes care of all thing for them and makes all things for
their use. They most naturally form an estimate of the nature of these
governors from their own, for they receive no information as regards them: and
hence they come to say that the Gods direct all things for the use of men, that
men may be bound down to them and do them the highest honour. Whence it comes
about that each individual has devised a different manner in his own mind for
the worship of God, and that God may love him above the rest and direct the
whole of nature for the gratification of his blind cupidity and insatiable
avarice. This misconception became a superstition and fixed its roots deeply in
mind, and this was the reason why all diligently endeavoued to understand and
explain the final causes of things. But while they have sought to show that
nature does nothing in vain (that is nothing that is not of use to man), they
appear to have shown nothing else than nature, the Gods and men are all mad.
Behold now, I pray you, what this thing has become. Among so many conveniences
of nature they are bound to find some conveniences – storms, earthquakes, and
diseases, etc. – and they said these happened by reason of the anger of the
Gods aroused against men through some misdeed or omission in worship; and
although experience daily belied this, and showed with infinite examples that
conveniences and their contraries happen promiscuously to the pious and
impious, yet no even then did they turn from their inveterate prejudice. For it
was easier for them to place this among other unknown things whose use they
knew not, and thus retain their present and innate condition of ignorance than
to destroy the whole fabric of their philosophy and reconstruct it. So it came
to pass that they started with the greatest certainty that the judgements of
God far surpassed human comprehension: and this was the only cause that truth
might have lain hidden from the human race through all eternity, had not
mathematics, which deals not in the final causes, but the essence and
properties if things, offered to men another standard of truth. And besides
mathematics there are other causes (which need not be enumerated here) which
enabled men to take notice of these general prejudices and to be led to the
true knowledge of things.
Spinoza’s propositions concerning the nature
and properties of God – are valid proposals –
we have from Spinoza a brilliant and
comprehensive metaphysics –
however – his proposal – is only one of a
number of possible propositional responses to the unknown
and as with any proposal or propositional
framework – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
the certainty that he proposes – has no
logical basis –
for any proposal put – in any context – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
his certainty is nothing more than
philosophical prejudice
what exists is what is proposed – and any
proposal put is a contingency – not a necessity
as to ‘the free cause of all things’ –
if you accept a causal analysis – the causal
chain – is without end –
to come to an uncaused event – or a free
causal agent – you must abandon the causal argument –
and if you do this – then it is clear that
it is a self-defeating argument
Spinoza’s God is reality – is nature – and
for Spinoza – there is nothing else
and if you take this view as Spinoza holds
it – there is no alternative to it – it is not genuinely open to question –
open to doubt – or uncertain
and so – it is held illogically
our propositional existence – our
propositional reality – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
there is no predetermination
our world is as proposed – however –
whenever – wherever –
and any proposal put – is open to question –
is uncertain
infinity is best seen as a mathematical /
logical game –
in any other propositional context – the
notion of infinity is mis-placed – and misapplied
‘absolute’ – is a synonym – for ‘ignorance’
–
and ‘power’ – a relative measure of
propositional action.
Spinoza’s God – is not a ‘he’ – Spinoza’s
God is an ‘it’
‘It will suffice here for me to take as a basis of argument what must be
admitted by all: that is, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of
things, and that all have a desire of acquiring what is useful; that they are
conscious, moreover, of this. From these premisses it follows then, in the
first place, that men think themselves free in as much as they are conscious of
their volitions and desires, and they are ignorant of the causes by which they
are led to wish and desire, and they do not even dream of their existence.’
any proposal regarding ‘the cause of things’
– is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and any view – i.e. – Spinoza’s that the
cause of things can be known with certainty – is ignorant
even if you accept the proposition – that men
have a desire of acquiring what is useful to them – (and this view – as with
any – is open to question) – such a view raises the question – just what is
useful?
and I would put that just what is useful to
human beings – is an uncertain matter –
and further – that any person who considers
the question of utility – in a rational manner sees this clearly
our freedom does not come from being ignorant
of causes – or being able to pursue what we consider useful to us –
it comes out of understanding that any
explanation that we put regarding our nature – is open – open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘It follows, in the second place, that men do
all things with and end in view, that is they seek what is useful. Whence it
comes to pass that they always seek out only the final causes of things
performed, and when they have divined these they cease, for clearly then they
have no cause of further doubt.’
well does it follow that men do all things with
an end in view?
really – this is an empirical question – that
should be investigated and tested –
it is not good enough to just assert it
as to ‘final causes’ – again – it is an
empirical issue whether or not men always seek out final causes
my bet is – that this does not always happen –
and probably – not often at all –
I suspect people generally run with whatever
causal explanation works for them at the time – and that they are doubtful of
finding a final cause to their actions and behaviour
and in any case any proposed ‘final’ cause – is
open to question – and as soon as this is realized – the ‘finality’ –
disappears
and seeking out ‘final causes’ – actually – is
a sure road to doubt
‘If they are unable to learn these causes from
someone, nothing remains for them put to turn to themselves and reflect what
could induce them to personally bring about such a thing, and thus necessarily
estimate other natures by their own.’
the argument is that because I can’t know the
final cause of my wishes and desires – I regard myself as the final cause – and
that I see all other natures as being their own cause
perhaps there are people who take such a view –
but there are many who simply accept that they don’t – in any ‘final’ sense know
what is the cause of their wishes and desires – and further that actually
knowing a so-called final cause – is effectively irrelevant to the pursuit of
what they wish and desire
do we estimate other natures by our own?
this may or may not happen – there is no
‘necessity’ in this at all –
also – it would seem that ‘other natures’ – are
just that – other natures –
why would you assume that other natures
have the same nature – as your own?
and ironically – it might well be said that in
his argument that all is of God – that Spinoza himself argues that there is
only one nature – and if – so there is something to be said for – estimating
other natures by one’s own
that ‘someone else
prepared these things for their use’ – is a valid proposal –
and as with any
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Whence it comes about that each individual has
devised a different manner in his own mind for the worship of God, and that God
may love him above the rest and direct the whole course of nature for the
gratification of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice’
an individual who
devises a different manner for the worship of God –
presumably such an
individual has put the worship of God – and how it is practised in his
experience – to question – and come up with a different approach –
if so – on the face
of it – such a person has behaved rationally –
does such a person
thinks that God may love him above the rest and direct the whole
course of nature to
his use?
this does not
follow –
however – perhaps
there are people who think they are superior to others in God’s eyes – and that
God directs nature to the gratification of their desires –
if they hold such a
view – it should be put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty exposed
if they don’t
engage in this critical process – then they hold such an opinion – irrationally
‘This misconception became a superstition and
fixed its roots deeply in mind, and this was the reason why all diligently
endeavoued to understand and explain the final causes of things. But while they
have sought to show that nature does nothing in vain (that is nothing that is
not of use to man), they appear to have shown nothing else than nature, the
Gods and men are all mad.’
it will only be a ‘misconception’ to those who
hold a different view –
and only a ‘superstition’ – if not critically
evaluated –
Spinoza regards such a view as demonstrating
madness
which suggests that he has run out of reasons
to oppose it – and has decided instead to deride it –
Spinoza – it seems – cannot tolerate a
different conception of God
‘Behold now, I pray you, what this thing has
become. Among so many conveniences of nature they are bound to find some
inconveniences – storms, earthquakes, and diseases, etc. – and they said these
happened by reason of the anger of the Gods aroused against men through some
misdeed or omission in worship; and although experience daily belied this, and
showed with infinite examples that conveniences and their contraries happen
promiscuously to the pious and impious, yet not even then did they turn from their
inveterate prejudice. For it was easier for them to place this among other
unknown things whose use they knew not, and thus retain their present and
innate condition of ignorance than to destroy the whole fabric of their
philosophy and reconstruct it.’
this is a savage criticism –
and here we see Spinoza putting this view
of God and men to question – to doubt – and exploring its uncertainty – and
that is all to the good
and it stands in stark contrast to his failure
to put his own view to question – to doubt – and to explore its uncertainty
the unknown is not – and should not be used as
– a refuge for prejudice –
it is that to which all proposals are put
–
all knowledge is a reaction to and response to
the unknown
recognizing and understanding this – is wisdom
‘So it came to pass that they started with the
greatest certainty that the judgements of God far surpassed human
comprehension: and this was the only cause that truth might have lain hidden
from the human race through all eternity, had not mathematics, which deals not
in the final causes, but the essence and properties if things, offered to men
another standard of truth.’
again – Spinoza is quite right to challenge the
certainty of the view that he opposes –
however – he fails to see that his own
philosophy – falls to the same criticism
‘And besides mathematics there are other causes
(which need not be enumerated here) which enabled men to take notice of these
general prejudices and to be led to the true knowledge of things.’
as for mathematics saving the day – there is
nothing to this at all
mathematics is a rule governed propositional
game
there is no truth in a game – no ‘true
knowledge of things’ in mathematics – there is only the rules of game – and the
delight of the play
all knowledge is proposal – proposal – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
APPENDIX (CONTINUED)
(Paragraph 2)
Thus I have explained what I undertook in the
first place. It is scarcely necessary that I should show that nature has no
fixed aim in view, and that all final causes are merely fabrications of men.
For I think this is sufficiently clear from the bases and causes from which I
have traced the origin of this prejudice, from Prop, 16, and from the
corollaries of Prop. 32, and above all, from those propositions in which I have
shown that all things in nature proceed eternally from a necessity and with the
utmost perfection. I should add, however, this further point, that the
doctrine of final causes overthrows nature entirely. For that which in truth is
a cause it considers an effect, and vice versa, and so it makes that which is
first by nature to be last, and again, that which is highest and most perfect
it renders imperfect. As these two questions are obvious, let us pass them
over. It follows from Prop. 21, 22, and 23, that the effect that is produced
immediately from God is the most perfect, and that one is more imperfect
according as it requires more intermediating causes. But if those things which
are immediately produced by God are made by him for the attaining of some end,
then it necessarily follows that the ultimate things for whose sake these first
were made must transcend all others. Hence this doctrine destroys the
perfection of God: for if God seeks an end he necessarily seeks something that
he lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians make a distinction
between the end that is want and that which is assimilation, they confess that
God acts on his own account, and not for the sake of creating things; for
before the creation they can assign nothing save God
on whose account God acted, and so necessarily
they are obliged to confess that God lacked and desired those things for the
attainment of which he wished to prepare means, as is clear of itself. Nor must
I pass at this point that some of the adherents of this doctrine who have
wished to show their ingenuity in assigning final causes to things have
discovered a new manner of argument for the proving of this doctrine, to wit,
not a reduction to the impossible, but a reduction too ignorance, which shows
that they have no other mode of arguing their doctrine. For example, if a stone
falls from a roof on the head of a passer-by and kills him, they will show by
their method of argument that the stone was sent to fall and kill the man; for
if it had not fallen on him by God’s will, how could so many circumstances (for
often very many circumstances concur at the same time) concur by chance? You
will reply, perhaps: “That the wind was blowing, and that the man had to pass
that way, and hence it happened.” But they will retort: “Why was the wind
blowing at the time?” and why was the man going that way at that time?” If
again you reply: “That the wind had risen on account of the agitation of the
sea the day before, and the previous weather had been calm, and that the man
was going that way at the invitation of a friend”, the will again retort,
for there is no end to their questioning: “Why was the sea agitated, and
why was the man invited at that time?” And thus they will pursue you from cause
to cause until you are glad to take refuge in the will of God, that is, the
asylum of ignorance. Thus again, when they see the human body they are amazed,
and as they know not the cause of so much art, they conclude that it is made
not by mechanical art, but divine or supernatural art, and constructed in such
a manner that one part may not injure the other. And hence it comes about that
those who wish to seek out the causes of miracles, and who wish to understand
things of nature as learned men, and not stare at them in amazement like fools,
are soon deemed heretical and impious, and proclaimed such by those whom the
mob adore as the interpreters of nature and the Gods. For these know that once
ignorance is laid aside, that wonderment which is the only means of preserving
their authority would be taken away from them. But I now leave the point and
proceed to what I determined to discuss in the third place. ‘Thus I have
explained what I undertook in the first place. It is scarcely necessary that I
should show that nature has no fixed aim in view, and that all final causes are
merely fabrications of men.
‘Thus I have explained what I undertook in the
first place. It is scarcely necessary that I should show that nature has no
fixed aim in view, and that all final causes are merely fabrications of men.’
as to the
‘fabrications of men’ – what we have from men – is proposal – and a
proposal – of any kind – is not a ‘fabrication’ –
any proposal put is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a ‘final causes’
proposal – as with any other proposal – is open to question
Spinoza’s own
proposals – are open to question –
his proposal ‘God’
– is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘I should add, however, this further point,
that the doctrine of final causes overthrows nature entirely. For that which in
truth is a cause it considers an effect, and vice versa, and so it makes
that which is first by nature to be last, and again, that which is highest and
most perfect it renders imperfect.’
the ‘final cause’ –
is best described as a ‘final aim’
Spinoza argues that
if you hold to the final cause argument – you confuse cause and effect –
I think Spinoza is
confusing two different arguments here –
for you can have a
cause-and-effect analysis – without the idea of there being a final aim to any
causal action
or you can have a
causal analysis – and – as it were – supplement that analysis – with the idea
of a final aim
as to the claim that the final cause argument
renders the perfect imperfect
Spinoza is arguing that the idea of a final
cause – or aim – renders God or nature – imperfect – in that it suggests that
God or nature is fundamentally lacking – and hence strives for fulfillment
Spinoza asks – how can perfection be lacking? –
how can God or nature – be lacking?
‘
‘
in response to this perfection argument – it
might be put – that Spinoza’s perfection – in so far as it is not lacking – is
a dead perfection – a perfection – doing nothing and going nowhere –
and yet of course Spinoza holds that God or
nature is the cause – the free cause of all that exists
you could ask here – if perfection – is
completion – how can there be causation – for doesn’t the fact of causation
suggest – incompletion – and indeed a galloping incompletion – one might say – an
on-going incompletion?
perhaps God’s ‘perfection’ – nature’s
‘perfection’ – (if this term ‘perfection’ is to be used at all) – rests not in
some metaphysical stasis – but rather in on-going action – and on-going action
that is never complete?
and what then of ‘final cause’? –
well on this view – there is no final cause –
but it is different argument to that put by Spinoza
the final cause argument – logically speaking
is no different to any proposal put – it is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
perhaps it is best seen as a heuristic
hypothesis – used to advance discovery?
if seen is in this way – it can be seen to be
more than useful
‘As these two questions are obvious, let us
pass them over. It follows from Prop. 21, 22, and 23, that the effect that is
produced immediately from God is the most perfect, and that one is more
imperfect according as it requires more intermediating causes.
But if those things which are immediately
produced by God are made by him for the
attaining of some end, then it necessarily
follows that the ultimate things for whose sake these first were made must
transcend all others. Hence this doctrine destroys the perfection of God: for
if God seeks an end he necessarily seeks something that he lacks.’
‘that effect that is produced immediately from
God is the most perfect’
and if so – what do make of cause and effect
here?
if God / nature – is cause & effect – what
distinguishes cause and effect
does not the above statement undercut any
notion of cause and effect?
what we have – is God – is nature – and that is
all there is to it
God is not caused – nature is not caused – God
is not an effect – nature is not an effect
yes – you can use a causal analysis as a way
into God – into nature – but once you get there – it has no value
and as for ‘perfect’ – ‘perfect’ – here is what
is complete – and as such – proposed as beyond question – as beyond doubt – and
certain
as such – the notion of perfection is illogical
– just another instance of philosophical prejudice
there is no perfection – no ‘perfect’
proposition –
our proposals are open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
our world – our propositional world – is
uncertain – and it is out of this uncertainty – that our reality is created
‘And although theologians and metaphysicians
make a distinction between the end that is want and that which is assimilation,
they confess that God acts on his own account, and not for the sake of creating
things; for before the creation they can assign nothing save God on whose
account God acted, and so necessarily they are obliged to confess that God
lacked and desired those things for the attainment of which he wished to
prepare means, as is clear of itself.’
Spinoza’s God – his ‘perfect’ God – his certain
God – is a do-nothing God –
our reality is a proposition driven by
uncertainty
and it is out of this uncertainty – that God /
nature is proposed – and once proposed – explored –
and it is as a result of this uncertainty –
this exploration – that our reality is created – and continually created
‘Nor must I pass at this point that some of the
adherents of this doctrine who have wished to show their ingenuity in assigning
final causes to things have discovered a new manner of argument for the proving
of this doctrine, to wit, not a reduction to the impossible, but a reduction to
ignorance, which shows that they have no other mode of arguing their doctrine.
For example, if a stone falls from a roof on the head of a passer-by and kills
him, they will show by their method of argument that the stone was sent to fall
and kill the man; for if it had not fallen on him by God’s will, how could so
many circumstances (for often very many circumstances concur at the same time)
concur by chance? You will reply, perhaps: “That the wind was blowing, and that
the man had to pass that way, and hence it happened.” But they will retort:
“Why was the wind blowing at the time?” and why was the man going that way at
that time?” If again you reply: “That the wind had risen on account of the
agitation of the sea the day before, and the previous weather had been calm,
and that the man was going that way at the invitation of a friend”, the will
again retort, for there is no end to their questioning: “Why was the sea
agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?” And thus they will pursue
you from cause to cause until you are glad to take refuge in the will of God,
that is, the asylum of ignorance. Thus again, when they see the human body they
are amazed, and as they know not the cause of so much art, they conclude that
it is made not by mechanical art, but divine or supernatural art, and
constructed in such a manner that one part may not injure the other. And hence
it comes about that those who wish to seek out the causes of miracles, and who
wish to understand things of nature as learned men, and not stare at them in
amazement like fools, are soon deemed heretical and impious, and proclaimed
such by those whom the mob adore as the interpreters of nature and the Gods.
For these know that once ignorance is laid aside, that wonderment which is the
only means of preserving their authority would be taken away from them. But I
now leave the point and proceed to what I determined to discuss in the third
place.’
here it is clear that Spinoza has some
understanding of the argument that in a final sense we don’t know
he of course rejects this view entirely
any proposed event – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
and in response to this uncertainty – we are
invited to put forward proposals –
proposals which themselves are open to question
– open to doubt and uncertain
further proposals can be put – and logically
speaking – the matter is ongoing
there is no final proposal – there is only
continual propositional exploration
this is what we do – we explore – explore
propositional uncertainty
and yes – at some point in this process we
decide to proceed with a proposal – a propositional explanation – knowing full
well that it is open to question –
nevertheless – we make what use of it that we
can
‘And thus they will pursue you from cause to
cause until you are glad to take refuge in the will of God, that is, the asylum
of ignorance.’
it is not a pursuit of cause here – rather
propositional inquiry and exploration –
and if one is logical – and I think to be
logical – some courage is required – one will not seek refuge – in the will of
God – or in anything else for that matter
one will see that wherever one lands – whatever
position one comes to – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we never leave uncertainty – we only ever
explore it –
and at the back of all this exploration is the
realization that in any final sense – we don’t know
that what we face ultimately is the unknown –
and the unknown is silent – the unknown has no
one answer – the unknown is open to all answers – all proposals
as to miracles –
the proposal of miracles – is valid – but as
with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘For these know that once ignorance is laid
aside, that wonderment which is the only means of preserving their authority
would be taken away from them. But I now leave the point and proceed to what I
determined to discuss in the third place.’
Spinoza – it seems – has never had the
experience of wonder
to wonder is to approach reality with an open
mind and an open heart
APPENDIX (CONTINUED)
(Paragraph 3)
As soon as men had persuaded themselves that all things which were made,
were made for their sakes, they were bound to consider as the best quality in
everything that which was most useful to them, and to esteem that above all
things which brought them the most good. Hence they must have made for their
sakes, they were bound to consider as the best quality in everything that which
was most useful to them, and to esteem that above all things which brought them
the most good. Hence they must have formed these notions by which they explain
the things of nature, to wit, good, evil, order, confusion, hot, cold, beauty,
and ugliness, etc.; and as they deemed themselves free agents, the notions of
praise and blame, sin and merit, arose. The latter notions I will discuss when
I deal with human nature latter on, but the former are to be discussed now.
They call all that is conclusive of health and worship of God good, and all
that is conducive to the contrary, evil. And foreasmuch as those who do not
understand the things of nature are certain of nothing concerning those things,
but only imagine them and mistake their imagination for intellect, they firmly
believe there is order in things, and are ignorant of them and their own
nature. Now
when things are so disposed that when they are represented to us through
our senses
we can easily imagine and consequently easily remember them, we call
them well
ordered; and on the other hand, when we cannot do so, we call them
ill-ordered and
confused. Now forasmuch as those things, above all others, are pleasing
to us which
we can easily imagine, men accordingly prefer order to confusion, as if
order were anything in nature save in respect to our imagination; and they say
that God has created all things in order, and thus unwittingly they attribute
imagination to God, unless indeed they would have that God providing for human
imagination disposed all things in such a manner as would be most easy for our
imagination; nor would they then find it perhaps a stumbling block to their
theory that infinite things are found which are far beyond the reach of our
imagination, and many which confuse it through its weakness. But of this I have
said enough. The other notions are also nothing other than modes of imagining
in which imagination is affected in diverse manners, and yet they are
considered by the ignorant as very important attributes of things: for as we
have said, they think all things were made for them, and call their natures
good or bad, healthy or rotten, and corrupt, according as they are affected by
them. E.g., if motion, which the nerves receive by means of the eyes
from objects before us, is conducive to health, those objects by which it is
caused are called beautiful; if not, then the objects are called ugly. Such
things as affect the nerves by means of the nose are thus styled fragrant or
evil smelling; or when by means of the mouth, sweet or bitter, tasty or
insipid; when by means of touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc. And such
things as affect the ear are called noises, and form discord or harmony, the
last of which has delighted men to madness, so that they believe harmony
delights God. Nor have there been wanting philosophers who assert that the
movements of the heavenly spheres compose harmony. All of which sufficiently
show that each one judges things according to the disposition of his own mind,
or rather takes for things that which is really modifications of his
imagination. Wherefore it is not remarkable (as we may incidentally remark)
that so many controversies we find have arisen among men, and at last Skepticism.
For although human bodies agree in many points, yet in many others they differ,
and that which seems to one good yet to another evil; and to one order, yet to
another confusion; to one pleasing, yet to another displeasing, and so on, for
I need not treat further of these, as this is not the place to discuss them in
detail, and indeed they must be sufficiently obvious to all. For it is in
everyone’s mouth: “As many minds as men,” “Each is wise in his own manner,” “As
tastes differ, so do minds” – all of which proverbs show clearly enough that
men judge things according to the disposition of their minds, and had rather
imagine things than understand them. For if they understood things, my
arguments would convince them at least, just as mathematics, although they
might not attract them.’
‘As soon
as men had persuaded themselves that all things which were made, were made for
their sakes, they were bound to consider as the best quality in everything that
which was most useful to them, and to esteem that above all things which
brought them the most good. Hence they must have formed these
notions by which they explain the things of nature, to wit, good, evil, order,
confusion, hot, cold, beauty, and ugliness, etc.; and as they deemed themselves
free agents, the notions of praise and blame, sin and merit, arose. The latter
notions I will discuss when I deal with human nature latter on, but the former
are to be discussed now. They call all that is conclusive of health and worship
of God good, and all that is conducive to the contrary, evil.’
the proposal that
all things were made for man’s sake – is a valid proposal – and as with any
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
I can understand
that someone might find it useful to see the world in these terms –
but my first
question would be – how can you know that everything was made for
your use?
and who made all
the things for your use?
‘God’– you say? –
again – how is it
that you know this – and how do you know God made all things for your use?
and in any case –
do the facts of human experience – bear out the view that all things are made
for your use?
i.e. – how can you
say that the disasters of nature which afflict men and cause human suffering
and death – are of use to men?
a big stretch to
argue that one
all in all – such a
view comes across as very narrow and limited –
nevertheless – if
someone chooses to propose the world in this fashion – so long as they hold
their view open to question – open to doubt – and recognise its uncertainty
they hold the view
rationally
you are free to
propose the world anyway you wish
the only authority
is authorship
you can hold that
what is most useful to men – men consider to be good – and that which harms
them – they consider evil – without the claim that all things were made
for their use –
still – any
proposal – regarding what is useful to man – is open to question
and any theory – of
good and evil – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘And foreasmuch as those who do not understand
the things of nature are certain of nothing concerning those things, but only
imagine them and mistake their imagination for intellect, they firmly believe
there is order in things, and are ignorant of them and their own nature.
to understand – is to question – is to doubt –
is to be uncertain
those who do not question – do not doubt – and
claim to be certain – hide in ignorance and pretention
mistaking
imagination for intellect?
‘imagination’ – is
a name for propositional action
‘intellect’ – a
name for propositional action
logically speaking
– what we deal with is proposal / propositional action
and whatever is
proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
whether explain /
describe – your proposal – as of the ‘intellect’ – or explain / describe your
proposal – as of the ‘imagination’ – is little more than propositional
packaging –
however – presented
– however dressed up – your proposal is open to question – and is uncertain
and yes – in a
final sense – what we face is the unknown
‘Now when things are so disposed that when they
are represented to us through our senses we can easily imagine and consequently
easily remember them, we call them well ordered; and on the other hand, when we
cannot do so, we call them ill-ordered and confused.’
whatever we propose – and however we describe
what we propose – i.e. – ‘well ordered’ – or ‘confused’ – and however we
explain our proposal – i.e. – ‘through the senses’ –
our proposal – is open to question
‘through the senses’ – or whatever other
explanation is offered – again – from a logical point of view – is neither here
nor there –
what is relevant is that the proposal is
critically explored
empiricism and rationalism are attempts to
ground knowledge – one in experience – the other in reason
knowledge has no ground – knowledge has no
foundation
knowledge is proposal – knowledge is what is
proposed – and proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
these ‘theories of knowledge’ in their many
forms – have been and are – of use as ways of exploring propositional reality –
however in so far as they are proposed as final or definitive accounts of human
knowledge – they have missed the point entirely
‘Now forasmuch as those things, above all
others, are pleasing to us which we can easily imagine, men accordingly prefer
order to confusion, as if order were anything in nature save in respect to our
imagination; and they say that God has created all things in order, and thus
unwittingly they attribute imagination to God, unless indeed they would have
that God providing for human imagination disposed all things in such a manner
as would be most easy for our imagination; nor would they then find it perhaps
a stumbling block to their theory that infinite things are found which are far
beyond the reach of our imagination, and many which confuse it through its
weakness.’
‘and thus unwittingly they attribute
imagination to God’ –
here is just where Spinoza’s argument – his
metaphysics – falls apart
if – ‘all is of God’ – then ‘imagination’ – is
of God – and – human imagination – is – ‘of God’ – and – is – of
nature – is – a natural phenomenon
‘infinite things are found which are far beyond
the reach of our imagination’
and as for infinite things – there are no
infinite ‘things’ – a ‘thing’ – is not infinite
‘infinite’ – is a propositional game term – it
is a term that makes sense in the context of a game where the play is on-going
– be that in mathematics – or in some other game form
and look the notion of ‘infinite’ – is not one
‘far beyond the reach of our imagination’
if it was – the term would not exist
‘The other notions are also nothing other than
modes of imagining in which imagination is affected in diverse manners, and yet
they are considered by the ignorant as very important attributes of things: for
as we have said, they think all things were made for them, and call their
natures good or bad, healthy or rotten, and corrupt, according as they are
affected by them. E.g., if motion, which the nerves receive by means of
the eyes from objects before us, is conducive to health, those objects by which
it is caused are called beautiful; if not, then the objects are called ugly.
Such things as affect the nerves by means of the nose are thus styled fragrant
or evil smelling; or when by means of the mouth, sweet or bitter, tasty or
insipid; when by means of touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc. And such
things as affect the ear are called noises, and form discord or harmony, the
last of which has delighted men to madness, so that they believe harmony
delights God. Nor have there been wanting philosophers who assert that the
movements of the heavenly spheres compose harmony. All of which sufficiently
show that each one judges things according to the disposition of his own mind,
or rather takes for things that which is really modifications of his
imagination.’
yes – ‘each one judges things according to the
disposition of his own mind’ –
which is to say we are free to propose the
world – as we like – as we see it
and if we are rational about – we hold any
proposal we put – or others put – open to question – open to doubt – and we
recognize the uncertainty of any proposal put
‘Wherefore it is not remarkable (as we may
incidentally remark) that so many controversies we find have arisen among men,
and at last Skepticism. For although human bodies agree in many points, yet in
many others they differ, and that which seems to one good yet to another evil;
and to one order, yet to another confusion; to one pleasing, yet to another
displeasing, and so on, for I need not treat further of these, as this is not
the place to discuss them in detail, and indeed they must be sufficiently obvious
to all. For it is in everyone’s mouth: “As many minds as men,” “Each is wise in
his own manner,” “As tastes differ, so do minds” – all of which
proverbs show clearly enough that men judge
things according to the disposition of
their minds, and had rather imagine things than
understand them. For if they understood things, my arguments would convince
them at least, just as mathematics,
although they might not attract them.’
‘Wherefore it is not remarkable (as we may
incidentally remark) that so many controversies we find have arisen among men’
here we have a piece of philosophical realism
from Spinoza
‘and at last Skepticism’ –
I am reminded here of Giacoma Casonova’s
observation regarding Spinoza’s philosophy –
'The great
philosopher who believed, after studying nature, that he could claim victory by
recognizing GOD in it, died too soon. Had he lived a little longer, he would
have gone much further, and he would not have had far to go. Finding himself in
his maker, he could no longer have denied Him: He would have found him
inconceivable; but this would not have troubled him. Could God, the supreme
principle of all principles, who has no principle, ever conceive Himself, if in
order to conceive himself he needed to know his own principle? O blissful
ignorance! Spinoza, the virtuous Spinoza died before achieving such ignorance.'
The Story of My
Life. 1791.
it is clear that
Spinoza was well and truly aware of the possibility of skepticism –
and so – Casanova’s
observation that he died before he understood skepticism is not right
nevertheless –
Casanova – in my view – makes the valid point that in disregarding skepticism –
Spinoza missed a great philosophical opportunity
Spinoza here argues
that if his argument is understood – skepticism is avoided –
and he specifically mentions mathematics as an
argument against skepticism
Spinoza proposes a grand and brilliant
propositional construct – that – as with any other proposal or propositional
construct – is valid
however – he holds that his propositional
vision – is certain –
and in taking this view – he holds it
illogically and irrationally
his ‘certainty’ – is illogical and pretentious
– and amounts to a high-minded prejudice
as for mathematics saving the day for certainty
–
mathematics is a rule-governed sign game –
if you play the mathematics – game – you play
in accordance with its rules –
if you don’t play in accordance with its rules
– there is no game – there is no mathematics –
a game is neither true or false – games have no
truth value
you can put the rules of a mathematical game to
question – but that is not mathematics
putting propositions to question – to doubt –
exploring their uncertainty – is a critical activity
and the critical activity is grounded – not in
certainty – but uncertainty
in the absence of proposal – what we face –
what we deal with is the unknown
we propose to make known – and any proposal put
– is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
APPENDIX (CONTINUED)
(Paragraph 4)
We have thus seen that all arguments by which
the vulgar are won’t to explain nature are nothing else than modes of
imagination, and indicate the nature of nothing whatever, but only the
constitution of the imagination; I Call them entities, not of reality, but of
the imagination: and so all arguments directed against us from such notions can
easily be returned. For many are wont thus to argue: if all things have
followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, whence have so
many imperfections in nature arisen? For example, the corruption of things even
to rottenness, the ugliness of things which often nauseate, confusion, evil,
sin etc. But I have just said, these are easily confuted. For the perfection of
things is estimated solely from their nature and power; nor are things more or
less perfect according as they delight or disgust human senses, or according as
they are useful or useless to men. But to those who ask, “Why did not God
create all men in such a manner that they might be governed by reason alone?” I
make no answer but this: because material was not wanting to him for the
creating of all things from the highest to the lowest; or speaking more
accurately, because the laws of his nature were so comprehensive as to suffice
for the creation of everything that infinite intellect can conceive, as I have
shown in Prop. 16. These are the misunderstandings which I stopped here to
point out. If any of the same sort remain, they can easily be dispersed by
means of little reflection.
‘We have thus seen that all arguments by which
the vulgar are won’t to explain nature are nothing else than modes of
imagination, and indicate the nature of nothing whatever, but only the
constitution of the imagination; I Call them entities, not of reality, but of
the imagination: and so all arguments directed against us from such notions can
easily be returned.’
Spinoza puts forward his proposals – and holds
that his proposals have authority because they are products of the intellect –
when in fact the ‘intellect’ is nothing more than propositional action – that
as with the proposals it is meant to give authority to – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain –
the only authority is authorship – and beyond
that any claim of authority is pretentious
and he describes those proposals that don’t fit
his proposed reality that challenge is
proposed reality– as ‘vulgar’ – as ‘of the
imagination’ – when – in logical terms they are no different to his preferred
set of proposals – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza’s
propositions are logically valid – and he gives us a picture of reality that is
comprehensive and brilliant – but in so far as he holds that his propositions
are superior to those that give a different account of reality – he abandons
logic and reason and he shows himself to be authoritarian and elitist
‘For many are wont thus to argue: if all things
have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, whence have
so many imperfections in nature arisen? For example, the corruption of things
even to rottenness, the ugliness of things which often nauseate, confusion,
evil, sin etc. But I have just said, these are easily confuted.’
if Spinoza’s God is ‘of the most perfect
nature’ – and if ‘all is of God’ – then there are no imperfections – and if
there are no imperfections – then what Spinoza calls the propositions of the
imagination – are not imperfect – and not to be distinguished from others – in
terms of perfection
which in my terms is to say any proposal – any
proposition is valid – and equal –
and by ‘equal’ here I mean that any proposal is
logically equal to any other – in that it is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
‘For the perfection of things is estimated
solely from their nature and power; nor are things more or less perfect
according as they delight or disgust human senses, or according as they are
useful or useless to men. But to those who ask, “Why did not God create all men
in such a manner that they might be governed by reason alone?” I make no answer
but this: because material was not wanting to him for the creating of all
things from the highest to the lowest; or speaking more accurately, because the
laws of his nature were so comprehensive as to suffice for the creation of
everything that infinite intellect can conceive, as I have shown in Prop. 16.
These are the misunderstandings which I stopped here to point out. If any of
the same sort remain, they can easily be dispersed by means of little
reflection.’
here we have the argument that this perfect God
– created the imperfect – because he could – what do we say here?
the imperfect – is not imperfect – but rather
an expression of God’s perfection?
something has to give here – and I think its
perfection
or – the perfection of God – is not perfect –
and if so – God is not perfect
and something has to give here too – and I
think – it’s God
regardless of any proposed issues with Spinoza’s proposal
‘God’ – the proposal is as
valid as any other
and if held open to question – open to doubt – it is
rationally held
CONCERNING THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
PREFACE
I now wish to explain such things as follow
from the essence of God or of a being eternal and infinite: not all of them
indeed (for they must follow in infinite number and in infinite modes, as we
have shown in Part I., Prop. 16). but only such as can lead us by the hand (so
to speak) to the knowledge of the human mind and its consummate blessedness.
‘God’ is a name
for the unknown
the unknown has no
essence – and is not a being – eternal or infinite
nothing follows
from the unknown –
we propose in
response to the unknown
we propose to make
known –
knowledge is
proposal
and any proposal is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a proposal can be put
in relation to a subject proposal –
and a proposal put
in relation to the subsequent proposal –
there is no logical
end to this action of proposal put in relation to proposal
the proposals put –
and the propositional relations proposed – are open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
the ‘mind’ – is a
name for propositional action –
‘blessedness’ – is
rhetoric – not logic
DEFINITIONS
I. BY BODY (corpus)
I understand that mode which expresses in a certain
determined manner the essence of God in so far as he is considered as an
extended thing (vide part I., Prop. 25., Coroll.).
‘body’ is a
proposal – how ‘body’ is defined / described – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
a ‘mode’ is a
proposal – a propositional construct –
the body can be
proposed as a propositional construct –
the body can be
proposed / described as an ‘extended thing’ –
any proposed
description of ‘body’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
II. I say that
appertains to the essence of a thing which, when granted, necessarily involves
the granting of a thing, and which, when removed, necessarily involves the
removal of the thing; or that without which the thing, or on the other hand,
without which the thing can neither exist nor be conceived.
a ‘thing’ is a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a ‘thing’ is
‘granted’ – if proposed –
the ‘essence’ of a
thing – is a description of the thing
if by ‘essence’ is
meant a description – that is not open to question – not open to doubt – and
certain
there is no essence
–
a thing / proposal
– is not ‘removed’ – if a description / ‘essence’ is removed
a proposal is
‘removed’ – if dropped from consideration
III. By IDEA (idea)
I understand the conception of the mind which the mind forms by reason of its
being a thinking thing.
Explanation.
– I say conception rather than perception, for the name perception seems to
point out that the mind is passive to the object, while conception seems to
express an action of the mind.
an ‘idea’ – is a
proposal – a propositional action
the ‘mind’ is a
name for propositional action –
a ‘conception’ is a
propositional action
a ‘perception’ – is
propositional action
a perception is not
passive –
there are no
‘passive’ proposals –
all proposals /
propositions are actions
IV. By ADEQUATE
IDEA (idea adequate) I understand an idea which, if it is considered in
itself without respect to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks
of a true idea.
Explanation.
– I say intrinsic in order that I may exclude what is extrinsic, i.e., the
agreement between the idea and its ideal.
no idea / proposal –
is ‘conceived through itself’
an idea / proposal
– is conceived / proposed by a propositional actor
an ‘object’ is a
proposal –
an idea / proposal
– has no properties – but those proposed – and no intrinsic marks
a ‘true idea’ /
proposal – is a proposal affirmed –
affirmed by a
propositional actor
any proposal of
affirmation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘adequate
idea’ is meant an idea / a proposal that is not open to question – not open to
doubt – that is certain –
there are no
adequate ideas
an ‘idea’ – is a
proposal – an ‘ideal’ is that proposed –
there is no logical
distinction between an ‘idea’ and its ‘ideal’ –
a true proposal
(idea / ideal) is a proposal affirmed – for whatever reason
any proposal of
affirmation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a proposal – has no
intrinsic marks
V. DURATION (duratio)
is indefinite continuation of existing.
Explanation.
– I say indefinite because it can in no wise be determined by means of the
nature of an existing thing nor by an effecting cause, which necessarily
imposes existence on a thing but cannot take it away.
‘duration’ – is a
measure of propositional action in terms of time –
a proposal exists
as long as it is active – that is – as long as it is considered
duration is a
measurement of this consideration
‘the effecting
cause’ of any proposal / propositional action – is a propositional actor
a proposal /
propositional action may be taken up by other propositional actors –
and then by other
propositional actors again – and again
VI. REALITY and
PERFECTION (realitas et perfectis) I understand to be one and the same
thing.
‘reality’ – is a
proposal –
a proposal – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
reality is
uncertain
‘perfection’ is a
synonym for certainty –
there is no
propositional certainty
there is no
propositional perfection
VII. BY INDIVIDUAL
THINGS (res singulars) I understand things which are finite and have a
determined existence; but if several of them so concur in one action that they
are all at the same time the cause of one effect, I consider them all thus far
as one thing.
‘individual things’
are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
an ‘individual
thing’ / proposal – exists as long as it is considered
several proposals do
not concur in one proposal / propositional action
several proposals –
are different proposals – different propositional actions – different
things
the ‘cause’ of any
proposal – is the propositional actor who puts the proposal
AXIOMS
I. The essence of a
man does not involve necessary existence, that is, in the order of nature it
can easily happen that this or that man exists as that he does not.
‘a man’ – is a proposal
the ‘essence of a
man’ – is a proposed description – put in relation to the proposal ‘a
man’
any proposal /
propositional description – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
–
‘essence’ – is
uncertain
there is no
necessary existence – all proposal is contingent
II. Man thinks.
man proposes –
‘thinking’ – is a description
of propositional action
III. The modes of
thinking. such as love, desire, or any other name by which the emotions of the
mind may be designated, are not granted unless an idea in the same individual
is granted of the thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea can be granted although
no other mode of thinking be granted.
‘modes of thinking’
– are modes of proposal – descriptive categories of proposal / propositional
action
and a modal
proposal is a proposal put in relation to another proposal – the object
proposal
i.e. – I propose
love – and put my love proposal – in relation to another proposal – an ‘object
proposal’
and the ‘idea’ / proposal
– can be put without reference to any other modal proposal
which is to say the
proposal can be put uniquely
any proposal – and
any relational proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
as to the ‘emotions
of the mind’ –
the ‘mind’ – is a
name for propositional action
‘emotion’ – is a
name for propositional action
propositional
actions however named – however described – are open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
IV. We feel that a
certain body is affected in many ways
we can propose
that a certain body / proposal – can be described in many ways
V. We neither feel
nor perceive any individual things save bodies and modes of thinking. For
postulates, see after Prop. 13.
and any proposal put – or any proposal
described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘feeling’ and ‘perception’ – are
explanations / descriptions of propositional action –
‘bodies’ can be proposed – ‘modes of
thinking’ – can be proposed –
and some people propose things such as
‘souls’ and ‘spirits’ –
and these proposals – and any others put – are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. I. Thought (cognatio)
is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.
‘thought’ is a name
for propositional action
an ‘attribute’ is a propositional
description
God is a name – a
name for the unknown –
the unknown has no
attributes
the unknown is not a
thinking thing
Proof. –
Individual thoughts, or, this and that are individual mode which express in a
certain determined way the nature of God (Coroll., Prop. 25 Part I). So the
attribute whose conception all individual thoughts involve and through which
they are conceived, belongs to God (Def. 5, Part I). Thought, therefore, is one
of the infinite attributes of God which express the eternal and infinite
essence of God (vide Def. 6, Part I.), or God is a thinking thing.
what an individual
thought expresses – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
individual thoughts
are not ‘conceived through’ an attribute – that is – through a description
they are proposed /
‘conceived’ – by propositional actors –
description belongs
not to God – but to propositional actors
and according to
Spinoza – thought is one of the infinite number of attributes / descriptions
which express the eternal and infinite essence of his God
what we know is that
thought is a propositional action –
and any
propositional action – however described – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
Note. – This proposition is also clear from the fact that we can
conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more a
thinking being can think, the more reality or perfection we conceive to have.
Therefore a being which can think infinite things in
infinite modes is necessarily, as regards thinking, infinite. Since, therefore, from the mere consideration of thought we
can conceive an infinite being, therefore
necessarily (Defs. 4 and 6, Part I.) thought is one of the attributes of God,
as we wish to prove.
‘God’ – an infinite thinking being – is necessarily thinking
and infinite?
this is no argument – this is just a play with words –
it establishes nothing at all
and Spinoza’s conclusion – that thought is an attribute of
God
is just a restatement of the premise –
what we have here is a word game
PROP. II. Extension (extension) is an attribute of
God, or God is an extended thing.
Proof. – This proof proceeds in the same manner as
that of the previous proposition.
and if so – this ‘proof’ – is just another demonstration of tautological
word play
‘God’ is a name for
the unknown
nothing is
‘granted’ in the unknown
no proposal – is
‘necessarily granted’
a proposal is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – not necessary
‘the idea of his
essence’ – is a descriptive proposal – put in relation to the subject proposal
i.e. – ‘God’
any such
descriptive proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
‘the idea of all
things’ – is just a description of Spinoza’s ‘God’ –
the ‘God’ he
is proposing
nothing ‘follows
from’ any proposal –
proposal can be put
in relation to proposals –
and any proposal
put – is open to question – is uncertain
Proof. – God
can think infinite things in infinite modes (Prop. I, Part II.), or (what is
the same thing, by Prop. 16, Part I.) he can form an idea of his essence and of
all things which follow from it. Now all that is in the power of God
necessarily exist (Prop. 35, Part I.). Therefore such an idea is granted, and
that only in God (Prop. 15, Part I.). Q.e.d.
‘God is a name for
the unknown
the unknown does
not think – does not think infinite things in infinite modes – or form an idea
of its essence
nothing follows
from the unknown
nothing is granted
in the unknown
to think is to
propose
‘thinking’ – is propositional
action
propositional
actors / human beings – proposal / think –
the power of a
proposal rests in it use
no proposal
necessarily exists –
all proposals exist
– as long as they are considered
all proposals are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – The
generality of people understand by the power of God the free will of God and
his right over all things that are, and so these are commonly considered
contingent. For they say that God has the power of destroying everything and
reducing it to nothing. Moreover they often compare the power of God to that of
kings. But this is in Coroll. 1 and 2, Prop. 32, part I., we have refuted: and
in Prop. 16, Part I., we have showed that God acts by the same necessity by
which he understands himself: that is it follows from the necessity of divine
nature (as all will grant unanimously) that God understands himself, and from
the same necessity it follows that God performs infinite things in infinite
ways. Again, in Prop. 34, Part I., we showed that the power of God is nothing
else than the active essence of God: and accordingly it is impossible for us to
conceive God inactive as to conceive him non- existent. And if I may pursue
this matter further, I could furthermore point out that the power which the
generality attribute to God is not only human power (showing that they conceive
God to be a man or like one), but also involves a want of power. But I do not
wish to return to this subject so many times. I only ask that the reader again
and again to turn over in his mind once and again what I have written on this
subject in Part I., from Prop. 16 to the end. For no one can rightly perceive
what I wish to point out unless he takes the greatest care not to confound the
power of God with human power or right of kings.
‘God’ – is a name
for the unknown –
the unknown does
not have a will
the unknown does
not act
the unknown does
not understand itself
nothing follows
from the unknown
the unknown has no
power
human beings – and
other animals – act
‘will’ is a
description applied to sentient propositional action
we understand
ourselves when we critically evaluate our propositional actions
no proposition ‘follows
from’ another proposition
propositions are
put in relation to propositions –
power is a relative
measure of propositional action
human beings /
propositional actors propose in response to – in reaction to – the unknown
the unknown is
silent
if we act
rationally – we put our proposals to question – to doubt – and we explore their
uncertainty
PROP. IV. The idea of God from which infinite things in
infinite modes can follow can only be one.
Proof. – Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
attributes and modifications of God. (Prop. 30, Part I.). God is one (Coroll.
1, Prop. 14. Part I.). Therefore the idea of God from which infinite things in
infinite modes follow can only be one.
the idea of God – is a proposal – and a proposal
is one proposal
nothing follows from the idea / proposal ‘God’ – unless it
is proposed –
no descriptive proposal – follows from any proposal –
proposals are put to – proposals –
and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
as to ‘infinite things in infinite modes’ –
a ‘thing’ is a
proposal
and ‘modes’ – are proposals – descriptive category proposals
–
a proposal – if it is a proposal – is by definition limited
a so called ‘proposal’ – that is not ‘limited’ – is a
proposal without definition –
that is – a ‘proposal’ – that has no form – no formulation –
and therefore – has no sense – no value – and is of no use
Proof. – This
is obvious from Prop. 3 of this part. For there we concluded God can form an
idea of his essence and of all things that follow therefrom necessarily, and
from this alone that he is a thinking thing, and not from the fact that he is
the object of his idea. Wherefore the formal being of ideas acknowledges God
for its cause in so far as he is a thinking thing. But this can be shown in
another manner. The formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking (as is
self-evident), that is (Coroll., Prop. 25, Part I.), a mode which expresses in
a certain manner the nature of God in so far as he is a thinking thing, and
therefore (Prop. 10, Part I.) involves the conception of no other attribute of
God, and consequently (Ax. 4, Part I.) is the effect of no other attribute but
thought. Therefore the formal being of ideas acknowledges God as its cause only
in so far as he is a thinking thing, etc. Q.e.d.
‘the formal being of
ideas’?
an ‘idea’ is a
proposal – a proposal exists – has being – if proposed –
there is no ‘formal
being’ – there is only proposed being
a proposal as such –
does not ‘acknowledge’ –
propositional actors
‘acknowledge’ –
what we acknowledge
is what we propose
‘God’ – is a name
for the unknown – and nothing follows from the unknown
as to the cause of
ideas / proposals – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain –
and I would suggest
in terms of propositional activity – irrelevant
the unknown is the reason
for proposal – for propositional action
the unknown is not a
‘thinking thing’ – ‘God’ is not a thinking thing –
we can propose that
there are thinking things – in nature (or God – as Spinoza would say) –
the proposal that
all of nature is a thinking thing – that everything in the natural world thinks
– is a valid proposal –
however – there is
no evidence for this proposal and therefore no good reason to affirm it
a ‘thinking thing’
is a proposal – a proposal we can use to describe human beings – and perhaps
some other sentient creatures
‘thinking’ – is a
proposal – that can be used to describe propositional action
different proposals
/ different descriptions / attributes can be put against – or in response to –
the unknown
in our propositional
action we make the unknown – known –
though any proposed
‘knowledge’ here – is uncertain
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is
just a proposal – a name proposal – that can be variously interpreted /
described – in any number of ways – or in Spinoza’s terms – God has infinite
attributes
what Spinoza doesn’t
understand is that human beings put proposals –
and that any
proposal put – any description – any ‘attribute’ – is open to question – open
to doubt and is uncertain
PROP. VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for
their cause only in so far as he is considered through the attribute, and not
in so far as he considered through any other attribute.
the modes of any attribute are propositional categories –
descriptive categories – that human beings propose
‘God’ – in the absence of proposal – reality in the absence
of proposal – is the unknown
we propose to make known – and any proposal put – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
one propositional description – is not another
Proof. – Each attribute is conceived through itself
without the aid of another (Prop. 10, Part 1). Wherefore the modes of each
attribute involve the conception of their attribute and not that of another;
and so (Ax. 4, Part I) the modes of any attribute of God have God for their
causes only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so
far as he is considered through any other. Q.e.d.
each attribute conceived through itself without the aid of
another?
an attribute / a proposal – will be distinct –
nevertheless – it will – most likely be a response to another proposal
and indeed – can be a response to a different – to a another
– propositional category – to another mode
the point here is that modes – propositional categories are
not set in stone – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and any critical approach to any proposal – to any
propositional mode – is open – open to proposal from any other propositional
category – open to proposal from any other mode
as to the cause of a proposal – of a propositional
category – any ‘mode’ –
any causal proposal – is open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain
what we can say is that proposals / propositions – are put
by human beings
‘God’ is a name for the unknown – the unknown does not put
proposals
we put proposals to the unknown –
the unknown is variously proposed – is described in any
number of ways – in fact there is no restriction – no limit on how the unknown
can be proposed – can be described
Corollary. – Hence it follows that the formal being
of things which are not modes of thinking does not follow from divine nature
because it has first known the things: but things conceived follow and are
conclude from their attributes in the same manner and by the same necessity as
we have shown ideas to follow from their attribute of thought.
what exists is what is proposed –
‘things’ – are proposed – ‘ideas’ – are proposed –
and any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt and
is uncertain
there is no – as it were – automatic follow on
– from any proposal to another – no ‘necessity’ – in any propositional activity
proposals are put in relation to proposals
PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as
the order and connection of things.
there is no ‘order and connection’ of ideas as such – and no
‘order and connection’ of things – as such
any ‘order and connection’ – is a proposal – a
proposal – open to question –
such a proposal may be put as a way of organizing proposals
and as a way of seeing the world –
but any such proposal – again is – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
all we ever have is proposals put – and proposals
put in response to proposals –
there is no propositional order
as to the relation between proposed ideas and proposed
things –
look at it this way –
if ‘x’ is proposed – ‘x’ can be described – in any number of
ways –
i.e. – as an ‘idea’ – or – as a ‘thing’ – or in some other
manner
the proposal of ‘x’ – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
the proposal of ‘x’ is open to interpretation
in practise – the proposal of ‘x’ will come with a
description of ‘x’ – i.e. – ‘x’ as a
thing of some kind – or perhaps as an idea of some kind –
whatever the case – any proposal / description of ‘x’ is
open to question – i.e. – ‘x’
proposed as a ‘thing’ – may well be reinterpreted an ‘idea’
Proof. – This is clear from Ax. 4. Part I. For the
idea of everything that is caused depends on the knowledge of which it is an
effect.
a cause-and-effect analysis – is one response to a
proposal –
such a response is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
Corollary. – Hence it follows that God’s power of
thinking is equal to his actual power of acting: that is, whatever follows
formally from the infinite nature of God, follows also invariably objectively
from the idea of God in the same order and connection, in God.
‘God’ is a name for the unknown – the unknown has no power –
no power of thinking no power of acting
power – rests in propositional action
human beings propose – and our proposals are uncertain
our power is uncertain
our proposals do not follow an order – unless such an order
is proposed –
and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
the proposal of a propositional order – may well be regarded
as a useful propositional act
Note. – Before we proceed further, let us call to
mind what we have already shown above: that whatever can be perceived by
infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, invariably
appertains to one substance alone; and consequently thinking substance and
extended substance are one in the same substance. which is now comprehended
through this and now through that attribute. Thus also the mode of extension
and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two
manners, which certain of the Jews seemed to have perceived but confusedly, for
they said that God and his intellect and the things conceived by his intellect
were one and the same thing. For example a circle existing in nature and the
idea of an existing circle which is also in God is one and the same thing,
though explained through different attributes. And thus whether we consider
nature under the attribute of
extension or under the attribute of thought or under any
other attribute, we shall find one and the same order and one and the same
connection of causes: that is the same
things follow from one another. Nor did I say that God is
the cause of an idea of a
circle only in so far as he is a thinking thing, and of a
circle only in so far as he is an
extended thing, with any other reason than that the formal
idea of a circle can only be
perceived through some other mode of thought as its
proximate cause, and that again
through another, and so on to infinity: so that as long as
things are considered as
modes of thought we must explain by the mere attribute of
thought the order and
connection of causes of all nature; and in so far as things
are considered as modes of extension, the order also of the whole of nature
must be explained through the mere attribute of extension; and I understand the
same of other attributes. Wherefore of things as they
are in themselves, God is in truth the cause, forasmuch as he consists of
infinite attributes; nor can I explain this more clearly at the present.
‘Before we proceed further, let us call to mind what we have
already shown above: that whatever can be perceived by infinite intellect as
constituting the essence of substance, invariably appertains to one substance
alone; and consequently thinking substance and extended substance are one in
the same substance. which is now comprehended through this and now through that
attribute.’
what we perceive – is what we propose – there
is no infinite intellect –
propositions are put by human beings
‘substance’ – is a proposal – and as with any
proposal – if put – it can be variously further proposed – further described
human beings – and perhaps some other creatures – can
be characterised / described as thinking things and extended things
there is in no end to how any proposal can be further
proposed / described / characterized
‘Thus also the mode of extension and the idea of that mode
are one and the same thing, but expressed in two manners, which certain of the
Jews seemed to have perceived but confusedly, for they said that God and his
intellect and the things conceived by his intellect were one and the same
thing.’
different proposals – are not – ‘one in the same’ –
any proposal can be said to refer to the unknown
‘For example a circle existing in nature and the idea of an
existing circle which is also in God is one and the same thing, though
explained through different attributes.’
a proposed circle ‘that exists in nature’ – is not ’the same
thing’ – is a different proposal – to ‘the idea of a circle’ –
different proposals – different propositional contexts
different response to the unknown
‘And thus whether we
consider nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of
thought or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order and
one and the same connection of causes: that is the same things follow from one
another’
nothing – as such – follows from – any proposition –
you can propose order – you can propose connection – you can
propose cause – all of which is to say you can propose relations between
propositions –
however – any such proposal – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘Nor did I say that God is the cause of an idea of a circle
only in so far as he is a thinking thing, and of a circle only in so far as he
is an extended thing, with any other reason than that the formal idea of a
circle can only be perceived through some other mode of thought as its
proximate cause, and that again through another, and so on to infinity: so that
as long as things are considered as modes of thought we must explain by the
mere attribute of thought the order and connection of causes of all nature; and
in so far as things are considered as modes of extension, the order also of the
whole of nature must be explained through the mere attribute of extension; and
I understand the same of other attributes.’
this ‘formal idea of a circle’ – is just another proposal –
open to question
and yes – if put – it can be further described – further
proposed – and logically speaking there is no end to this propositional
activity –
‘God’ – or the unknown – is not the cause of propositional
activity
the unknown – it can be said – is the reason for
propositional activity
that is – we propose against the unknown – to make known –
and any proposal put – is open to question
there is no ‘must’ – in how we explain – any proposal
put
any proposal put is open – open to interpretation –
that is – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
which is to say that in any propositional investigation –
what is proposed may well be tackled from different perspectives –
i.e. – a proposed existing thing may well be considered from
an ideal perspective – as an idea – or a proposed ideal reality – may be put
against a proposed existing thing or state of affairs
we are not forced to consider any matter from just one
propositional perspective – any propositional perspective can go into the mix
‘Wherefore of things as they are in themselves, God is in
truth the cause, forasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes; nor can I
explain this more clearly at the present.’
‘God’ – the unknown – has no attributes
we propose attributes – that is descriptions – to
make known – and this propositional activity is open to all and any
further proposal – and logically speaking – is without end – and any proposal
put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is
uncertain
PROP. VIII. The ideas of individual things or modes which do
not exist must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God in the same way as
the formal essences of individual things or modes are contained in the
attributes of God.
an idea of an individual thing or mode that does not exist –
does not exist
if ‘comprehended’ – it is proposed – and if proposed
– it does exist –
as for the ‘infinite idea of God’ –
there is no ‘infinite idea’ – an ‘idea’ is a proposal – and
a proposal – is contingent – limited and uncertain
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
the unknown – is contentless
ideas are proposed to make the unknown – known – and any
proposed idea is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a ‘formal essence’ – does not exist – unless it is proposed
– and if proposed – as with any proposition – is open to question – is
uncertain
‘God’ – the unknown – has no attributes –
attributes are descriptive proposals – put by human beings –
to make the unknown – known
any proposed attribute is open to question – open to doubt –
and is logically speaking – uncertain
Proof. – This proposition is clear from the preceding note.
Corollary. – Hence it follows that as long as individual
things do not exist save in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes
of God, their objective being or ideas do not exist save in so far as the
infinite idea of God exists: and when individual things are said to exist not
only in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, but also in
so far as they are said to last, their idea also involve existence, through
which they are said to last.
‘comprehended in the infinite idea of God’ –
can only mean – we do not know what can or does exist
–
as to what lasts – what lasts is proposal –
a proposal that doesn’t last – is a proposal that is
dropped from consideration
a lasting proposal – is an existing proposal – and a
proposal ‘lasts’ – as long as it is considered
what exists – is what is proposed –
and any proposed existence – is open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
Note. – If anyone should ask for an example for the better
explanation of this thing, I shall in truth not eb able to give him one which
will explain it adequately, for it is unique. I will endeavour, however, as far
as possible to illustrate this. Now a circle is such by nature that if any
number of straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their
segments are equal to one another. Wherefore in a circle an infinite number of
rectangles are even can the idea of any one of these rectangles contained equal
to one another. Nevertheless none of these rectangles can be said to exist
except in so far as the circle exists; nor even can the idea of any one of
these rectangles be said to exist save in so far as it is comprehend in the
idea of a circle. let us conceive that out of the infinite lines two only
exist, to wit, E and D. Now the idea of these not only exist in so far as they
are comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also in so far as they involve
the existence of the rectangles: whence it comes about that they are
distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical
mode and the game mode
in the critical mode – proposals are put – they are open to
question – open to doubt – and their uncertainty explored
in the game mode – our propositional activity is rule-governed
–
when you play a propositional game of any kind – you follow
the rules of the game – you play in accordance with the rules of the game
if you don’t follow the rules – you don’t play the game
the rules of the game – are not open to question –
if the rules are put to question – and of course this can be
done – you are no longer in the game mode – no longer playing the game – you
have engaged the critical mode – and are now involved in a critical
propositional action
mathematics is rule-governed propositional activity –
geometry is a rule- governed propositional activity
if you perform mathematical operations – if you construct
and investigate geometrical models – you play these propositional games in
accordance with the rules of these games
mathematical and geometrical games are applied and played in
various propositional contexts where structure and order are required
what we have above – from Spinoza – in his illustration of
his metaphysics – is a propositional game –
Spinoza sets the rules within a geometrical construction –
and you play the game –
perhaps this is just what Spinoza’s metaphysics amounts to –
a game –
and as with any other rule-governed propositional activity –
as with any other game – if played – must be played in accordance with its
rules –
the logical reality – however – is that a game has no
truth value – a game is neither true nor false
for a propositional activity to have truth value – for a
proposition to be true or false – it must be held open to question – held open
to doubt – and held to be uncertain
a game – as played – is not open to question – not
open to doubt – and is certain –
this ‘game certainty’ has no logical value
PROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing
has God as its cause, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is
considered as affected by the idea of another individual thing actually
existing of which also God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another
third idea and so on to infinity.
God is the cause of the idea of an individual thing actually
existing?
is to say the unknown is the cause of an individual actually
existing
the unknown is not a cause
an ‘idea’ of any kind is a proposal –
the ‘cause’ of any idea – of any proposal – is open to
question
what is relevant is that the idea / proposal – is put to
question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored
we can of course speculate on the cause of a proposal / idea
–
and any speculation – is – if you like – a propositional
back story – and – is open to question –
for all intent and purpose – the propositional actor is the ‘cause’
of proposal / propositional action
Spinoza says his God is affected by the idea of
another individual thing actually existing – and by a third idea – and so on to
infinity –
I take from this that Spinoza is saying that these ideas are
– as it were – live – in God
this is to say that all ideas / proposals of
individual things existing are present or active in God
‘God’ is a name for the unknown – the unknown has no idea(s)
the logical reality is that propositional actors propose the
world of individual things actually existing –
and as proposed – they are open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
an ‘affective
proposal’ – is one that it can be said ‘affects’ propositional actors –
and any proposed
affect can be further described – and any further description – further
described – etc. – etc. -
any propositional
description is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – The idea of an individual thing actually
existing is an individual mode of thinking and distinct from all others
(Coroll. and Note, Prop. 8, Part II); and therefore (Prop. 6, Part II.) has
God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, for its cause. But not (Prop. 28,
Part I) in so far as he is a thinking absolutely, but in so far as he is
considered as affected by another mode of thinking, and again he is the cause
of this in so far as he is affected by a third, and so on to infinity. But the
order and connection of ideas is the same (Prop. 7, Part II) as the order and
connection of causes. Therefore the cause of one individual idea is another
idea of God in so far as he is considered as affected by the other idea; and of
this idea God is the cause in so far as he is affected by another idea, and so
on to infinity. Q.e.d.
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
the unknown does not think
the unknown is not a cause
there is no ‘order and connection of proposals’ – be they
put as ‘ideas’ or ‘causes’
proposal put and propositional relations put – are open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain – not ‘ordered’
a proposal does not cause another proposal
if the term ‘cause’ is to be used here – it is the
propositional actor who causes proposals – and the relations between proposals
Spinoza’s causal argument ‘to infinity’ –
if the causal chain is infinite – then there is no first
cause –
and if no first cause – the causal chain – falls apart
Corollary. – The knowledge of whatever happens in the
individual object of any idea is granted in God, but only in so far as he has
the idea of the object.
‘the individual object of any idea’ – is what is
proposed – is a proposal –
and whatever happens in the individual object of any idea –
is whatever is proposed – of any idea – of the subject
proposal
the subject proposal – and any proposals put in relation to
it – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
the unknown has no ideas
Proof. – Whatever happens in the object of any idea
has its idea in God (Prop. 3 Part II), not in so far as he is infinite, but
only in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual
thing (prev. Prop). but (Prop 7, Part II) the order and connection of ideas is
the same as the order and connection of things. Therefore the knowledge of that
which happens in any individual object is in God in so far only as he has the
idea of the object. Q.e.d.
‘the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order
and connection of things’?
the object of any ‘idea’/ proposal – is what is proposed –
i.e. – ‘the thing’
the ‘idea’ is the proposal and the ‘thing’ – that which is
proposed –
you can look at it this way – what we have is –
the action that is proposal (idea) – and the content (thing)
of the action
all we have is the proposal –
so – you can analyse or deconstruct the proposal into action
and content –
but we are not dealing with two separate entities or
existents – ‘ideas’ and ‘things’ –
and so – to propose an ‘order and connection between ideas
and things’ –
is to misrepresent propositional reality
PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the
essence of man, or, again, substance does not constitute the form (forma)
of man.
the being of substance does not appertain to the essence of
man?
therefore – you would think – the essence of man – the ‘form
of man’ – is not of the being of substance
is not of substance
and if so – is not this ‘essence of man’ – outside of
substance – outside of Spinoza’s God
on the face of it – Spinoza has a problem here – for he
argues that substance is all – and that ‘all is of God’
so – essence – is what?
you would have to say – essence – is not in his picture –
not in his God –
or – alternatively – Spinoza’s God – is not all there is
Proof. –The being of substance involves necessary
existence (Prop. 7. Part I). If therefore the being of substance appertains to
the essence of man, substance being granted, man also must be necessarily
granted (Def. 2, Part II.), and consequently man must necessarily exist, which
(Ax. I, Part II) is absurd. therefore, etc. Q.e.d.
again – it appears there is a gulf between Spinoza’s
substance – his ‘God’ – and man
for Spinoza the problem is – either man is in God – or he is
not
if he is in God – his existence is necessary – which Spinoza
say is ‘absurd’ –
or – if man is not in substance / God – then ‘substance’ is
not all there is –
Spinoza’s ‘God’ is not all there is –
Spinoza here wants the essence of man to be contingent – a
contingency in necessity?
it doesn’t work
Note. – This proposition may also be proved from
Prop. 5, Part I., to wit, that two substances cannot be granted having the same
nature. For as many men exist, therefore that which constitutes the form of man
is not the being of substance. Again, this proposition is manifest from the
other properties of substance, to wit, that substance is in its nature
infinite, immutable, indivisible, etc., as can easily be seen by all.
if the form of man is not in substance – where is it?
and if substance is infinite – then what is in
substance is infinite immutable – indivisible – to wit – man?
and this idea of man is one that Spinoza – for obvious
reasons rejects
but the wash up is –
if Spinoza wants to maintain his ‘God’ –
there is no place for man
and if he wants to have a philosophy of man –
then he must abandon his God
Corollary. – Hence it follows that the essence of man
is constituted by certain modifications of attributes of God. For the being of
substance (prev. Prop.) does not appertain to the essence of man. The latter is
therefore something that is in God and which cannot exist or be conceived
without God, whether it be a modification or mode that expresses the nature of
God in a certain determined manner.
the being of substance does not appertain to the essence of
man –
and yet the essence of man is something that is in God – the
being of substance
something that is in God (the essence of man) is not of the
being of substance – of Spinoza’s God
here we have a contradiction –
the essence of man cannot be in God / substance – and not
‘appertain’ – to the being of God / substance
you can’t have it both ways –
man is either in Spinoza’s God – or not in his God
again – Spinoza cannot account for man –
or – if he accounts for man – his God is not all it’s
cracked up to be
Note. – All surely must admit
that without God nothing can exist or be conceived. For it must be agreed in
the minds of all that God is the only cause of all things both of their essence
and of their existence, that is, God is not only the cause of things with
regard to their creation (secundum fieri), but also with regard to their
being (secundum esse). But at the same time
there are many who say that that appertains to the essence of anything without
which the thing cannot exist or be conceived: and therefore they believe either
that the nature of God appertains to the essence of things created, or that
things created can exist and be conceived without God, or, what is still more
certain, they cannot properly satisfy themselves what is the cause. The cause of this I think is that they have not observed
the order of philosophical argument. For divine nature, which they ought to
have considered before all things, for that it is prior in nature and knowledge
and nature, they have thought to be the last in the order of knowledge, and
things which are called the objects of the senses they have believed to be
prior to all things. Hence it has come to pass that, that while they considered
the things of nature, they paid no attention to divine nature, and then when at
last they directed their attention to divine nature, they could have no regard
for their first fabrications on which they had founded their knowledge of
natural things, in as much as these things give no help to the knowledge of
divine nature. No wonder, then. that they have contradicted themselves at all
points. But I will pass this by. For my intention
here was only to give a reason why I did not say that that appertains to the
essence of anything without which the thing can neither exist or be conceived
without God, and yet God does not appertain to their essence. But I said that
necessarily constitutes the essence of anything which being granted the thing
also is granted, which being removed, so also is the thing removed, or that
without which the thing, or, on the other hand, that which without the thing,
can neither exist or be conceived. Cf. Def.2.
‘All surely must admit that without God nothing can exist or
be conceived. For it must be agreed in the minds of all that God is the only
cause of all things both of their essence and of their existence, that is, God
is not only the cause of things with regard to their creation (secundum
fieri), but also with regard to their being (secundum esse).’
the ‘cause’ of anything – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘But at the same time there are many who say that that
appertains to the essence of anything without which the thing cannot exist or
be conceived: and therefore they believe either that the nature of God
appertains to the essence of things created, or that things created can exist
and be conceived without God, or, what is still more certain, they cannot
properly satisfy themselves what is the cause.’
if as Spinoza proposes ‘all is in and of his God –
then – ‘the nature of God does ‘appertain’ to the essence of
things created’
further – clearly – as a matter of fact – ‘things created
can exist and be conceived without God’
one is not obliged in any sense to see the world through
Spinoza’s eyes
our reality – is open to question – open to interpretation
and yes – it may well be that ‘they cannot properly satisfy
themselves what is the cause’
reason being – the proposal ‘cause’ – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
‘The cause of this I think is that they have not observed
the order of philosophical argument. For divine nature, which they ought to
have considered before all things, for that it is prior in nature and knowledge
and nature, they have thought to be the last in the order of knowledge, and
things which are called the objects of the senses they have believed to be
prior to all things. Hence it has come to pass that, that while they considered
the things of nature, they paid no attention to divine nature, and then when at
last they directed their attention to divine nature, they could have no regard
for their first fabrications on which they had founded their knowledge of
natural things, in as much as these things give no help to the knowledge of
divine nature. No wonder, then. that they have contradicted themselves at all
points. But I will pass this by.’
there is no order of philosophical argument
‘For my intention here was only to give a reason why I did
not say that that appertains to the essence of anything without which the thing
can neither exist or be conceived without God, and yet God does not appertain
to their essence.’
so what is the reason?
‘But I said that necessarily constitutes the essence of
anything which being granted the thing also is granted, which being removed, so
also is the thing removed, or that without which the thing, or, on the other
hand, that which without the thing, can neither exist or be conceived. Cf.
Def.2.’
so – if the essence – is granted – the thing is granted – and
if the essence is removed – so to the thing
Spinoza’s God is eternal – infinite – immutable
and – you assume – all that is in God – is likewise eternal
– infinite and immutable
so how is it that anything in Spinoza’s God – can cease to
be?
how can an essence be removed – and how is it that a thing
in God – can cease to exist?
Spinoza – does not account for contingency
or his God proposal collapses
PROP. XI. The first thing that constitutes the actual being
of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of an individual thing actually
existing.
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
an ‘idea – is a proposal
what we propose – is what exists
and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Proof. – The
essence of man (Coroll., prev. Prop) is constituted by certain modes of
attributes of God; that is (Ax. 2, Part II.), by certain modes of thinking, of
all which (Ax. 3, Part II.) the idea is prior in nature, and this idea being
granted the remaining modes (to wit. those which the idea is prior in nature)
must be in the same individual (Ax. 4, Part II). And therefore the idea is the
first thing that constitutes the being of the human mind. But not the idea of a
thing not existing: for then (Coroll., Prop, 8, Part II.) that very idea cannot
be said to exist. It must therefore be the idea of a thing actually existing.
But not of a thing infinite. For an infinite thing (Prop. 21 and 23, Part I.)
must always necessarily exist. But this (Ax. I, Part II) is absurd. Therefore
the first thing which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is the
idea of an individual thing actually existing. Q.e.d.
‘essence’ is a proposal – open to question –
if the term is used at all – it functions as a propositional
place for description
an ‘attribute’ – is a description – a propositional
description
‘God’ is a name for the unknown –
the unknown has no attributes
a ‘mode’ is a proposal – a propositional description /
construct
the ‘idea’ / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
the ‘idea’ / proposal – is open to description –
an ‘idea’ / proposal – is not in an individual – and
‘idea’ / proposal is put by an individual – by a propositional actor
that which does not exist – is that which is not proposed
the ‘idea’ of a ‘thing’ – is a proposal
there is no ‘infinite thing’ – a proposal / ‘thing’ – is
finite –
a proposal exists as long as it is considered –
a proposal put – actually exists
Corollary. – Hence it follows that the human mind is
a part of the infinite intellect of God, and thus when we say that the human
mind perceives this or that, we say nothing else than that God, not in so far
as he is infinite, but in so far as he is explained through the nature of the
human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has
this or that idea: and when we say that God has this or that idea only in so
far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but also in so far simultaneously
with the human mind as he also has the idea of another thing, then we say that
the human mind perceives the thing only in part or inadequately.
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
the unknown has no intellect –
human propositional actors have ‘intellect’
the ‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action
the unknown – has no idea
an idea is a proposal
the unknown does not constitute the essence of the human
mind
the ‘essence’ – if you wish to use this term – of the human
mind – is proposal / propositional action –
any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
if by ‘inadequate’ – is meant – uncertain
any proposal put can be regarded as inadequate
Note. – Here doubtless the readers will become
confused and will recollect many things which will bring them to a standstill:
and therefore I pray them to proceed gently with me and form no judgement
concerning these things until they have read all.
Spinoza’s proposal – or proposals – are open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
and any judgement regarding Spinoza’s proposals –
likewise – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XII. Whatever happens in the object of the idea
constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind, or the idea of
that thing must necessarily be found in the human mind: that is, if the object
of the idea constituting the human mind be the body, nothing can happen in the
body which is not perceived by the mind.
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
–
there is no necessity in propositional action –
propositional action is uncertain
‘the idea of that thing’ – is the proposal of that
thing
the human body – can be proposed as an action – can be
proposed as an object
and if posed as an object
that proposal / ‘body’ is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
nothing ‘happens’ in a proposal –
a proposal is put to question – put to doubt –
its uncertainty explored
‘perception’ – is a propositional action
what the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
perception – is propositional action –
and any ‘perception’ / propositional action – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Proof. – Now whatever happens in the object of any
idea, the knowledge of it is necessarily granted in God (Coroll., Prop. 9, Part
II) in so far as he is considered affected by the idea of that object, that is
(Prop. II. Part II.) in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything.
Therefore whatever happens in the object of an idea constituting the human
mind, knowledge of it must be granted in God in so far as he constitutes the
nature of the human mind, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II), the knowledge of
this thing will be necessarily in the mind or the mind will perceive it. Q.e.d.
Note. – This proposition is obvious and is still more
clearly understood from Note, Prop. 7, Part II., which [we can?] see.
the ‘object of any idea’ is what is proposed
nothing happens in a proposal –
a proposal can be critically evaluated
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
nothing is ‘granted’ in the unknown
the unknown does not ‘constitute’ anything
knowledge is proposal
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
perception is a propositional action
there is no necessity in propositional action –
propositional action is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
PROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human
mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing
else.
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
there is no ‘object constituting’ – propositional activity
we propose our reality
‘objects’ – are proposals
what actually exists – is what we propose
any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
Proof. – Now if the body is not the object of the
human mind the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in God
(Coroll., Prop. 9 Part II.) in so far as he constitutes our mind but the mind
of some other thing, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11. Part II.), the idea of the
modifications of the body would not be in our mind. But (Ax. 4 Part II) we have
idea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of the idea
constituting the human mind is the body, and that (Prop. 11 Part II) actually
existing. Further, if there were still another object of the mind besides the
body, then since (Prop. 36, Part I.) nothing can exist from which some effect
does not follow, therefore (Prop. 11, Part I) necessarily there would be in our
minds an idea of some effect of that object. But (Ax. 5, Part II) no idea of
this is found. Therefore the object of our mind is the existing body and
nothing else. Q.e.d.
the human body – is a name for propositional action
the ‘body’ – here – is proposed as an object
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
there is nothing in the unknown
any ‘idea of the modifications of the body’ – is a proposal
modifications of a proposal – are proposals / descriptions
put to the proposal ‘body’
there is no object constituting propositional activity
propositional activity ‘constitutes’ our reality
all propositional activity is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Corollary. – Hence it follows that man consists of
mind and body, and the human body exists according as we feel it.
what man ‘consists of’ – is open to question open to doubt
and uncertain
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –
‘body’ – is a name for propositional action
the human body exists as proposed
a ‘feeling’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Note. – From these we understand not only that the
human mind is united to the body, but also what must be understood by the union
of the mind and body. But in truth no one will be able to understand this
adequately or distinctly unless previously he is sufficiently acquainted with
the nature of our body. For these things which we have so far propounded have
been altogether general, and have not appertained more to man than to other
individual things which are all, though in various grades, animate (animate).
For of all things there must necessarily be granted an idea in God, of which
idea God is the cause, just as he is the cause of the idea of the human body;
and so whatever we say concerning the idea of the human body must necessarily
be said concerning the idea of any other thing. Nevertheless
we cannot deny that, like objects, ideas differ one from another, one
transcending another having more reality, according as the object of one idea
transcends the object of another or contains more reality than it. And so for the sake of determining in what the human mind
differs from other things, and in what it excels other things, we must know the
nature of its object, as we said, that is the human body. What the nature is, I
am unable to explain here, but that is not necessary for what I am going to
show. This, however, I will say in general, that according as a body is more
apt than others for performing many actions at the same time; and according as
the actions of a body depend more solely on itself, and according as fewer
other bodies concur with its action, so its mind is more apt for distinct
understanding. And thus we may recognise how one
mind is superior to others, and likewise see the cause why we have only a very
confused knowledge of our body, and many other things which I shall deduce from
these. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and prove more
accurately these statements, for which purpose I must premise a few statements
concerning the nature of bodies.
‘From these we
understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what
must be understood by the union of the mind and body.’
propositional actors
engage in propositional action
‘mind’ and ‘body’
are descriptions of the action of the person / of the propositional
actor
there is no question
then of a ‘union’ of ‘mind’ and ‘body’
the person /
propositional actor is not divided – is a unity –
and his / her
actions can be variously ‘explained’ or described
‘For these things
which we have so far propounded have been altogether general, and have not
appertained more to man than to other individual things which are all, though
in various grades, animate (animate). For of all things there must
necessarily be granted an idea in God, of which idea God is the cause, just as
he is the cause of the idea of the human body; and so whatever we say
concerning the idea of the human body must necessarily be said concerning the
idea of any other thing.’
‘God’ – is a
name for the unknown
the unknown has no
idea
the unknown is not a
cause
any proposal put
regarding the human body – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and whether any
proposal regarding the human body is relevant to other proposals of other
things – is open to question
there is no
necessity in propositional reality
‘Nevertheless we
cannot deny that, like objects, ideas differ one from another, one transcending
another having more reality, according as the object of one idea transcends the
object of another or contains more reality than it.
the reality of a
proposal – is what it proposes
reality is not a
quantity – reality is not ‘contained’ in a proposal
there is no
‘transcendence’ – all proposals have the same logical status
no proposal is less
real – or more real than another
reality is just what
is proposed
is not necessary for what I am going to
show. This, however, I will say in general, that according as a body is more
apt than others for performing many actions at the same time; and according as
the actions of a body depend more solely on itself, and according as fewer
other bodies concur with its action, so its mind is more apt for distinct
understanding.’
there is no distinction between the human
mind and the human body
the human being – is not divided into mind
and body –
the human being is an active unity
the human being is a propositional actor
propositional action is open to question –
open to description
‘mind’ – or ‘mental’ – is a description of
propositional action
body – or ‘physical’ – another – description
of propositional action
and there are any number of other ways to
describe propositional action –
and the reason for this that propositional
action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the focus of any description – is the
propositional actor – the person – the human being
Spinoza says here – the more apt the body is
and the more independent it is – the more apt the mind for understanding
understanding is not some supposed mind /
body issue
understanding is the critical activity
of putting our proposals and propositional action to question – to doubt – and
the exploring their uncertainty
‘And thus we may
recognise how one mind is superior to others, and likewise see the cause why we
have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and many other things which I
shall deduce from these. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and
prove more accurately these statements, for which purpose I must premise a few
statements concerning the nature of bodies.’
the ‘mind’ is a name
for propositional action –
no one propositional
action is superior to another
propositional
actions are different – one from the other
our knowledge is
what we propose
propositions
regarding the body – are not confused
propositions
regarding the body are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
AXIOM I. All bodies are either moving or stationary.
‘all bodies are either moving or they are not’ – or – ‘all
bodies are stationary or they are not’ –
this ‘proposal’ is a tautology –
tautologies are regarded as trivially true – which is to say
they are proposals without content – and – in a sense – constructed to be –
beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain
tautologies – therefore are not genuine propositions – they
are dummy propositions –
in my view they are to be disregarded as pretentious fakes
AXIOM II. Each body is moved now slowly now more fast
axiom II here – either a body moves slow – or it doesn’t –
(it moves fast)
again – a tautology
LEMMA I. Bodies are reciprocally distinguished with respect
to motion or rest, quickness or slowness, and not with respect to substance.
a ‘body’ can be proposed as an action – or an
object
if we need to distinguish bodies – we can do this with
different descriptions
and any description is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
‘substance’ – is a name for the unknown
the unknown does not distinguish anything
Proof. – The first part of this proposition I suppose
to be clear of itself. But that bodies should not be distinguished one from the
other with respect to substance is obvious both from Prop. 5 and Prop. 8, Part
I., and still more clearly from what was said in the Note on Prop. 15, Part I.
‘substance’ – the unknown – distinguishes nothing
bodies are proposals –
and any proposal of distinction – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
LEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects.
‘in certain respects’ – leaves the matter open – open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and that is as it should be
Proof. – all bodies agree in this, that the involve
the conception of one and the same attribute (Def. I, Part II): and again, that
they may be moved more quickly or more slowly or be absolutely in motion or
absolutely stationary.
one and the same attribute – is one and the same description
–
different proposals / bodies – have different descriptions
‘a body as that which can be moved or is absolutely
stationary’?
from one propositional perspective a body will be proposed
as being in motion –
from another propositional perspective the same body will be
at rest
‘motion’ and ‘rest’ – are propositional contexts –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined
for motion or rest by some other body, which likewise, this by a third, and so
on to infinity.
Proof. – Bodies (Def. 1 Part II) are individual
things, which (Lemma 1) are distinguished reciprocally with rest to motion or
rest: and therefore (Prop. 28, Part 1), each must necessarily be determined for
motion or rest by some other individual thing, that is (Prop. 6, Part II), by
another body, which (Ax.1) also is either in motion or rest. But this one also
by the same reason, cannot be in motion or at rest unless it was determined for
motion or rest by another body, and that again (by the same reason) by another,
and so on to infinity. Q.e.d.
any propositional explanation of motion or rest – is
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
there is no ‘necessary determination’ –
any ‘determination’ – is propositional – is contingent – is
uncertain
and the causal explanation – which back tracks to infinity –
is really no more than the proposal of a body’s motion or the proposal of a
body’s rest – endlessly reasserted
it explains nothing
and there is another problem with such an ‘explanation’ –
surely any casual chain begins with a first cause? – and if
so – the infinite causal chain – makes no sense
the practical reality is that we use and operate with
causal explanations in relation to proposals of motion and rest
however – the logical reality is that causal
explanations – useful as they may be – as accounts of motion and rest – and as
useful as they may be in many other propositional contexts – are no more than
proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Corollary. – Hence it follows that a moving body
continues in motion until it is determined for rest by another body: and that a
body at rest continues so until it is determined by another body for motion.
This is self-evident. For if I suppose a given body A to be at rest and pay not
attention to other moving bodies, I can say nothing concerning the body A save
that it is at rest. And if afterwards it comes about that the body A moves, it
clearly could not have been brought into motion by the fact that it was at
rest: for from this it could only follow that it should remain at rest. If on
the other hand, the body A be supposed in motion, as long as we only have
regard for the body A we can assert nothing concerning it save that it is in
motion. And if it subsequently comes to pass that the body A comes to rest, it
also clearly cannot have evolved from the motion that it had: far from this
nothing else can follow than that A should have been moved. It therefore comes to pass from something
that was not in A, that is, from an external cause, that it was determined for
rest.
the proposal ‘body’ – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
in different propositional contexts – ‘a body’ will have
different characteristics
I am sitting at my desk – at rest – I then get up and move –
do we say that my rest or my motion is determined by an
external cause?
a stone is at rest – I pick up the stone and throw it
here we may say the motion of the stone is a result of an
action external to the stone
however – you could propose a physics where all objects and
actions are of the one piece – expressions of single unity – and where the
concepts of internal and external – have no place
the point is that any physics – is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
AXIOM 1. All modes in which any body is affected by another
follow alike from the body affected and the body affecting: so that one in the
same body may be moved in various ways according to the variety of the natures
of the moving bodies, and, on the other hand, various bodies may be moved in
various manners by one and the same body.
AXIOM II. When a moving body impinges another body at rest
which cannot move, it recoils in order to continue to move: and the angle of
the line of recoiling motion with plane of the body at rest which it impinged
will be equal to the angle which the
line of motion of incidence made with the same plane.
Thus far we have been speaking of most singular bodies (corpora
simplicissima), which are distinguished reciprocally merely by motion or
rest, by swiftness of slowness: now we pass on to compound bodies (corpora
composita).
axiom I and axiom II here – are examples of rule governed propositional
games –
these game models may well be useful in certain
propositional contexts
Definition. – When a number of bodies of the same or
different size are driven so together that they remain united one with the
other, or if they are moved with the same or different rapidity so that they
communicate their motions one to another in a certain ratio, those bodies are
called reciprocally united bodies (corpora invicem unita), and we say
that they all form one body or individual, which is distinguished from the rest
with this union of bodies.
bodies ‘driven so together that they remain united?
united in what sense?
bodies moved in the same ratio – form one body?
well – it is an open question – whether we regard
‘reciprocally united bodies’ – as one body – or just bodies moving in a certain
ratio
this definition may well be of use in certain propositional
contexts – but as with any definition – it is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
AXIOM III. According as the parts of an individual or
compound body are united on a greater or less surface so the greater the
difficulty or facility with which they are
forced to change their position and, consequently, the
greater the difficulty or facility with which it is brought about that the
individual assumes another form. Hence bodies whose parts are united over a
small surface I shall call hard (dura), and those whose parts are united
over a small surface are called soft (mollia), and those whose parts are
in motion among each other are called fluid (fluida).
a greater or lesser surface is a propositional context
propositional contexts are open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
point being – how we see the relations between body
proposals – is not fixed –
and with any change in propositional context – it is likely
that there will be changes in how bodies are proposed
bodies proposed over a small surface (propositional context)
called hard?
what you ‘call’ such bodies – is how you propose such bodies
– and any proposal of bodies as – ‘hard’ – ‘soft’ – ‘fluid’ – or whatever – is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
in certain propositional contexts – for certain uses –
bodies will be proposed – as having certain characteristics –
in different contexts – with different uses in mind – the
same bodies may well be proposed with different attributes
LEMMA IV. If from a body or individual which is composed of
several bodies certain are removed, and at the same time the same number of
bodies of the same nature succeed to their place, the individual will retain
its nature as before without any change of its form.
yes – you can propose several bodies – as one body
and you can remove bodies from this ‘one’ – and refer to
what is left – as ‘one’
it is all a question of how you propose
and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
different proposals will be put in different circumstances –
for different reasons – different uses
the matter is entirely – logically flexible –
what is ‘one’ in a particular propositional construction –
may be regarded as ‘many’ in another
Proof. – Now bodies (Lemma 1) are not distinguished
with respect to substance. But that which constitutes the form of an individual
consists of a union of bodies (prev. Def.). But this union (by hypothesis),
although the change of bodies continue, is retained: the individual will
therefore retain as before its nature with respect to substance and mode. Q.e.d.
how bodies are ‘distinguished’ – is the matter of how they
are proposed –
how they are described
if you put that any proposal ‘body’ is to be defined
as substance – then bodies will not be distinguished in terms of substance –
but what does this definition ‘substance’ amount to?
does it amount to anything?
and we have to ask – what is the value – the actual –
practical value – of this notion of substance?
what difference does it make?
LEMMA V. If the parts composing an individual become larger
or smaller, but in such proportion that they preserve between themselves with
respect to motion and rest the same ratio as before, the individual will retain
its nature as before without any change of form.
Proof. – This is the same as that of the previous
lemma.
yes – you can propose this – but the opposite view is just
as valid
LEMMA VI. If certain bodies composing an individual are
forced to change their motion which they had in one direction into another, but
in such a manner that they can continue their motion and preserve one with the
other the same ratio with respect to motion and rest as before, the individual
will retain its nature without any change of form.
Proof. – This is self-evident. For it is supposed to
retain all that which in its definition we said constituted its form.
that there is no change of form – is up for question
clearly there are changes – and it will all depend on how the
form is proposed
and I wonder again just how relevant and how useful this
notion of form is – if it covers all and any change
in practise it strikes me that ‘form’ – would have no actual
– usable – function
like ‘substance’ – it comes off as useless concept
LEMMA VII. Moreover, the individual thus composed retains
its nature whether as a whole it be moved or remain at rest, whether it be
moved in this or that direction, provided that each part retains its motion and
communicates it as before to the other parts.
Proof. – This is clear from its definition (the
definition of an individual) which see before, Lemma 4.
this is an example of a rule-governed propositional
statement
the rule is that each part retains its motion and relation
to other parts
where that rule is applied ‘the individual thus composed
retains its nature’
(which is to say the individual thus proposed)
the point being what we have here is a game proposal – that
is – a rule-governed propositional game
rule governed propositional games are applied in many
propositional contexts –
the point of such games is to provide propositional
structure –
and out of such propositional structure – propositional
systems can be developed – which are regarded as useful in certain contexts –
and in relation to certain propositional problems
Note. – From these examples we see in what manner a
composite individual can be affected in many ways and, despite this, preserve
its nature. But thus far we have conceived an individual as composed only of
bodies that are distinguished one from the other merely by motion or rest,
rapidity or slowness, that is, as composed of the most simple bodies. But if we now conceive of some other individual composed of
many individuals of a different nature, we shall find that it can be affected
in many other ways, preserving its nature notwithstanding. For since each
part of it is composed of numerous bodies, each part will therefore (prev.
Lemma) be able without any change in its nature to be moved now slower now
faster, and consequently communicate its motions to the others with varying
speeds. If we conceive a third class of individuals
composed of these second ones, we shall find that this one can be affected in
many other ways without any change of its form. And if thus further we proceed
to infinity, we can easily conceive that all nature is one individual whose
parts, that is all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change of the
individual as a whole. If it were my purpose to lecture on the body, I
should explain and prove this in greater detail, but I have already said that
this is not my intention, nor have I stayed at this point save that from these
things I can more easily prove what I have before me.
‘But if we now conceive of some other individual composed of
many individuals of a different nature, we shall find that it can be affected
in many other ways, preserving its nature notwithstanding.’
the proposal here is that even in the case of ‘many
individuals of a different nature’ – ‘affected in many different ways’ – we can
still regard such a composite as a unity
ok – that is the proposal – and it is a proposal that may
well have some function and some use
nevertheless – it is only a proposal – and the
logical reality is that – this proposal is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
i.e. - ‘many individuals of a different nature affected in
many different ways’ – may well be proposed – as just that – without the notion
of a ‘composite individual’
‘If we conceive a third class of individuals composed of
these second ones, we shall find that this one can be affected in many other
ways without any change of its form. And if thus further we proceed to
infinity, we can easily conceive that all nature is one individual whose parts,
that is all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change of the individual
as a whole.’
the fact is you don’t have to ‘proceed to infinity’
(whatever that is supposed to mean) – to propose that there is ‘no change of
the individual as a whole’
all you have to do is put the proposal – and operate with it
– if that is what you want to do
you can drop the whole baggage of infinity – as irrelevant –
and of no use at all
the question is – what is the actual value of the proposal
that there is ‘no change of the individual as a whole’?
is it going to play any part in the actual critical
evaluation of ‘individuals’ and their relations?
it seems to be just an irrelevant metaphysical overlay –
that would have no critical or experimental value
it could even be the case that if such a view was taken
seriously – and somehow affected critical evaluation – that it might well
hamper open and rational investigation
POSTULATES
I. The human body (corpus humanum) is composed of
many individuals (of different nature), each of which is composed of many
parts.
the human body may be proposed in this manner –
however – it can also be proposed as a whole – as a
singularity
how the human body is proposed – how it is viewed and
understood – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘the human body’ – is a name for propositional action
II. The individuals of which the human body is composed are
some fluid, some soft, and some hard.
‘fluid’ – ‘soft’ – and ‘hard’ – are proposals – descriptions
and in terms of today’s science – very primitive description
any description of the human body is valid –
and any description – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
III. The individuals composing the human body, and
consequently the human body itself is affected in many ways by external bodies.
‘the human body’ is a proposal – ‘external bodies’ –
is a proposal
any proposed investigation of relation between the
human body proposal and the external bodies proposal – that is – of the affects
on the human body – is an investigation of propositional action
how we propose the human body – how we understand the human
body is open to question
the many ways it is affected by external bodies – is one way
of proposing the human body – is one way of critically investigating the human
body
however – it is not the only approach
we can also investigate the human body from the point of
view of its internal
strengths and weaknesses
IV. The human body needs for its preservation many other
bodies from which it is, so to speak, regenerated.
what counts as regeneration – and what counts as
degeneration – is open to question – is uncertain
V. When the fluid part of the human body is so determined by
an external body that it impinges frequently on another part which is soft, it
changes its surface and imprints such marks on it as the traces of an external
impelling body.
yes – an affect – if it is an affect – will leave a trace –
this goes without saying
one question will be – how lasting is any trace?
that is – perhaps in time any initial trace disappears?
the matter is open to question
VI. The human body can move external bodies in many ways,
and dispose them in many ways.
‘dispose them in many ways’?
I understand this to mean ‘move and arrange them in many
ways’ –
this is one way of describing human action
PROP. XIV. The human mind is apt to perceive many things,
and more so as its body can be disposed in more ways.
Proof. – Now the human body (Post 3 and 6) is affected by
external bodies in many ways and disposed to affect external bodies in many
ways. But the human mind must perceive all things which happen in the human
body. Therefore the human mind is apt to perceive many things, and more so.
etc. Q.e.d.
that ‘the human mind is apt to perceive many things’ – is
effectively to say – perception is an open matter
‘and more so as the body can be disposed in more ways’ –
consider the case of someone who is a paraplegic – and that
his paraplegia only affects his physical functions – is such an individual
therefore mentally disadvantaged?
granted physical limitations may in certain cases effect
mental capacity – but it is not always the case
‘But the human mind must perceive all things which happen in
the human body’
the ‘human mind’ is a name for propositional action
the ‘human body’ is a name for propositional action
we can for all intents and purposes drop the ‘mind’
reference – and drop the ‘body’
reference – and just refer to propositional action
‘mind’ and ‘body’ – different descriptions of
propositional action
where the proposal ‘body’ – its action – is the focus of
question – of doubt – and uncertainty –
proposals will be put – and critically investigated –
no one proposal – or any number of proposals – will be – all
possible proposals that could be put
our propositional action – is uncertain – is
limited –
so – the idea that ‘human mind’ must perceive all
things which happen in the human body – is fanciful –
we do not – cannot – propose ‘everything’ that can happen in
relation to the body – or any other proposed object
PROP. XV. The idea which constitutes the formal being of the
human mind is not simple, but composed of many ideas.
the ‘human mind’ is a name for propositional
action
propositional action is the ‘being’ of the ‘human mind’ –
propositional action ‘is composed of’ many proposals
Proof. – The idea which constitutes the formal idea of the
human mind is the idea of the body (Prop. 13, Part II), which (Post. I) is
composed of many individuals, each composed of many parts. But the idea of each
individual composing the body is necessarily granted in God (Coroll., Prop. 8,
Part II.) Therefore (Prop. 7 Part II) the idea of the
human body is composed of many ideas of the component parts.
Spinoza argues that
the ‘idea of the body’ – ‘constitute the formal idea of the mind’ –
that is to say – the
body constitutes the mind – the mind is constituted by the body
so – what are we
dealing with here – the body or the mind?
or – if one is the
other – and there is no distinction – why continue to refer to body and mind?
the ‘human mind’ is a
name for propositional action –
the ‘human body’ is
a name for propositional action
‘body’ and ‘mind’
are different descriptions of the unity – that is propositional action
where ‘human body’ – is proposed as an
object for critical investigation –
its proposed actions – will be the focus of
question – of doubt – and uncertainty –
proposals will be put – and critically
investigated –
‘God’ is a
name for the unknown –
nothing is granted
in the unknown –
the unknown has no
idea
PROP. XVI. The idea of every mode in which the human body is
affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at
the same time the nature of the external body.
‘affects’ – are proposals –
an ‘external body’ is a proposal
where a propositional relation is proposed between an affect
– and a proposed ‘external body’ –
that propositional relation is open to critical
investigation
Proof. – All modes in which the human body is
affected follow from the nature of the body affected, and at the same time from
the nature of the affecting body (Ax. 1 after Coroll., Lemma 3). Wherefore the
idea of them (Ax 4, Part I.) must involve necessarily the nature of each body.
Therefore the idea of each mode in which the human body affected by an external
body involves the nature of the nature of the human body and that of the
external body. Q.e.d.
a proposed relation – involves the different proposals
related
and any proposed relation is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Corollary I. – Hence it follows in the first place
that the human mind can perceive the nature of many bodies at the same time as
the nature of its own body.
the ‘human mind’ – is a name for human propositional
action
we can propose the nature of many bodies – and propose the
nature of the human body – and give consideration – critical consideration – to
these proposals – when
they are put
any such critical consideration – is an investigation of propositional
action
Corollary II. – It follows in the second place that
the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate rather the disposition of
our body than the nature of the external bodies, which I explained in the
appendix of Part I, with many examples.
the ‘ideas’ we have of the external bodies – are proposals
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
that such ideas / proposals ‘indicate rather the disposition
of our body than the nature of the external bodies’ – is a valid proposal –
and as with any proposal it is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
i.e. – it can be put that our ideas / proposals of external
bodies do in fact ‘indicate’ the nature of external bodies –
a good deal of science is based on this proposal
PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected by a mode which
involves the nature of any external body, the human mind regards that external
body as actually existing, or is present to itself until the body is affected
by a modification which cuts off the existence or presence of that body.
what we propose – is what exists
if for whatever reason – a proposal is dropped from
consideration – it does not exist
Proof. – This is clear. For as long as the human body
is thus affected, so long does the human mind regard this modification of the
body (Prop. 12. Part II.); that is (prev. Prop.), it has the idea of the mode
actually existing, and the idea involves the nature of the external body, that
is, it has an idea which does not cut off the existence or presence of the
nature of the external, but imposes it. Therefore the mind regards (Coroll. 1,
Prev. Prop.) the external body as actually existing or present, until it is
affected, etc. Q.e.d.
the ‘affect’ – here – is explained – as a relation
between the human body and an external body –
that is a relation between proposals
the proposal of the modification of the body / the affect –
exists as long as it considered
the proposal ‘external object’ – exists – as long as it is
considered
and the proposed relation – the explanation of the
affect – exists as long as it is considered –
what exists is what is proposed
and that proposed – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
i.e. – we can ask – are all ‘affects’ to be explained by a
proposed ‘external body’?
might not an affect occur as a result of question – of doubt
– and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
and how are we to understand this proposal of the ‘external
body’?
it might well be put that the proposal ‘external body’ – is really
just a catch-all phrase for an uncertain ‘external cause’ proposal?
i.e. – how is the external body to be defined?
these questions – raise doubts about the proposed
explanation
Corollary. – The mind can regard external bodies by
which the human body was once affected, although they do not exist, nor are
present, as if they were present.
an ‘external body’ proposed – is an ‘external body’ –
existing
a proposal does not exist – unless it is proposed
what is present – is what is proposed
and how that is understood – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – When external bodies so determine the fluid
parts of the human body that they often impinge the soft parts, they change the
surface of them (Post. 5). Whence it comes about (Ax. 2 after Coroll., Lemma 3)
that they are reflected thence in a different manner than before, and as
afterwards they impinge on new surfaces by their spontaneous movement, they are
reflected in the same manner as if they ere driven towards those surfaces by
external bodies, and consequently while they continue to be reflected they will
affect the human body in the same manner, and the human mind will (Prop. 12
Part II) again think of external bodies, that is (Prop. 17, Part II.), the
human mind will regard the external body as present, and that as long as the
fluid parts of the human body impinge on the same surfaces by their spontaneous
motion. Wherefore although the external bodies by which the human mind was once
affected no longer exist, the mind nevertheless regards them as present as
often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.e.d.
propositional action – for all intents and purposes – is
spontaneous
however – for Spinoza – the claim of spontaneous motion – is
in direct conflict with his view that all action is causal
what is ‘present’ – is what is proposed
Note. – We thus see that it come to pass that we
regard those things which are not existing as present, and this often happens.
And it can happen that this comes to pass through other causes. But it will
suffice me just as much to show one here by means of which I can so explain
what I want, as if I was to show it by means of the true cause. Nor do I think
I have wandered far from the truth, since all the postulates I have assumed
scarcely contain anything that is not borne out by experience, which we may not
doubt after having shown that the human body as we feel it exists (Coroll.
after Prop. 13. Part II). Moreover (prev. Coroll and Coroll. 2, Prop.16. Part
II) we clearly understand what is the difference, e.g., the idea of Peter which
constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter, and the idea of Peter as it
exists in the mind of another, say, Paul. The first directly explains the
essence of the body of Peter, nor does it involve existence save as long as
Peter exists; but the second idea indicates rather the disposition of Paul’s
body than the nature of Peter, and so long as this disposition of Paul’s body
lasts his mind will regard Peter though he no longer exists as if he was
nevertheless present to him. Again, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications
of the human body, the ideas which represent to us external bodies as if they
were present, we shall call the images of things, although they do not recall
the figures of things; and when the mind regards bodies in this manner we say
it imagines them. And here, so that I may begin to point out where lies error,
I would have you note that the imaginations of the mind, regarded in
themselves, contain no error, or that the mind does not err from that which it
imagines, but only in so far as it is considered wanting the idea which cuts
off the existence of those things which it imagines as present to itself. For
the mind if it imagines things not existing as present to itself knew at the
same time that these things did not in truth exist, it would attribute this
power of the imagination to an advantage of its nature not a defect, more
especially if this faculty of imagining depends on its own nature alone, that
is (Def.7. Part 1.), if the mind’s faculty of imagining be free.
‘Nor do I think I have wandered far from the truth, since
all the postulates I have assumed scarcely contain anything that is not borne
out by experience, which we may not doubt after having shown that the human
body as we feel it exists. (Coroll. after Prop. 13. Part II).’
‘the human body as we feel it exists’?
yes – but ‘as we feel it’ – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
furthermore – the human body exists – even when we don’t
feel it –
if you experience paralysis – you don’t feel your body –
still it exists
or when we have died – we don’t feel – anything – and yet
the human body exists
‘Moreover (prev. Coroll and Coroll. 2, Prop.16. Part II) we
clearly understand what is the difference, e.g., the idea of Peter which
constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter, and the idea of Peter as it
exists in the mind of another, say, Paul. The first
directly explains the essence of the body of Peter, nor does
it involve existence save as long as Peter exists; but the second idea
indicates rather the disposition of Paul’s body than the nature of Peter, and
so long as this disposition of Paul’s body lasts his mind will regard Peter
though he no longer exists as if he was nevertheless present to him.’
‘the idea of peter which constitutes the essence of the mind
of Peter’?
as I understand it – this means ‘consciousness’
‘consciousness’ – is a name for propositional
action
‘the idea of Peter as it exists in the mind of another, say,
Paul’?
Paul proposes Peter
‘The first directly explains the essence of the body of
Peter, nor does it involve existence save as long as Peter exists;’?
the ‘essence’ of the body of Peter?
does the body have an essence – what is an essence?
it strikes me that the idea of essence is really just a
logical dead end
for if you decide on an essence – then there will be no
further question – no further doubt – no uncertainty –
certainty is illogical –
for any proposal – any proposition – if it is held logically
– is held open to question – open to doubt – and held to be uncertain
‘but the second idea indicates rather the disposition of
Paul’s body than the nature of Peter, and so long as this disposition of Paul’s
body lasts his mind will regard Peter though he no longer exists as if he was
nevertheless present to him.’
what the second ‘indicates’ – is a proposal
and the proposal will exist – as long as it is entertained –
when it is not present – it does not exist
‘Again, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications
of the human body, the ideas which represent to us external bodies as if they
were present, we shall call the images of things, although
they do not recall the figures of things; and when the mind regards bodies
in this manner we say it imagines them.’
‘images’ as ideas which represent to us external bodies as
if they were present’ – are proposals
‘images’ are proposals – and whether the external body is
present or not – is from a critical point of view – irrelevant
‘although they do not recall the figures of things’?
does the ‘figure of things’ – mean the number of
things?
if ‘external bodies’ (plural) – are proposed – then is there
not a calculation of the number of bodies – either proposed or presumed?
‘we say it imagines them’ –
look – what you have here is a proposal – and yes you
may wish to distinguish it from other proposals – by further proposing it as
‘an image’ – and all that might go with that –
however – the logical reality is that the proposal – however
further proposed – however further described – is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain
‘And here, so that I may begin to point out where lies
error, I would have you note that the imaginations of the mind, regarded in
themselves, contain no error, or that the mind does not err from that which it
imagines, but only in so far as it is considered wanting the idea which cuts
off the existence of those things which it imagines as present to itself.’
the ‘imaginations of the mind’ – are proposals /
propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘the mind does not err from what it imagines but only in so
far as it is considered wanting the idea which cuts off the existence of those
things which it imagines as present to itself’
the mind does not err from what it imagines’?
if what it imagined / proposed – is not put to
question – not put to doubt – and regarded as certain
the issue here is not ‘error’ – but uncertainty
‘the idea which cuts off the existence of those things’ – is
a different proposal – a different understanding of ‘the existence of those
things’
‘existence’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain –
which means ‘existence’ can be given different
interpretations – and any interpretation is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘For the mind if it imagines things not existing as present
to itself knew at the same time that these things did not in truth exist, it
would attribute this power of the imagination to an advantage of its nature not
a defect, more especially if this faculty of imagining depends on its own
nature alone, that is (Def.7. Part 1.), if the mind’s
faculty of imagining be free.’
‘that these things did not in truth exist’ –
‘these things’ – exist – as proposed –
and how that is understood – how it is explained – how it is
further proposed – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘it would attribute this power of the imagination to an
advantage of its nature not a defect’
there is no ‘power’ here – no advantage – no defect –
there is just proposal – proposal put –
proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected at the
same time by two or more bodies, when the mind afterwards remembers any one of
them it will straightaway remember the others.
whether this happens or not is really an empirical /
experimental issue – and as such – open to question –
i.e. – memory can be defective – memory can be unreliable –
memory can false –
the point being – any memory proposal – is open to question
– open to doubt – and is uncertain
Proof. – The mind (prev.
Coroll) imagines any body for this reason, that the human body is affected and
disposed by impressions of an external body in the same way as it is affected
when certain parts of it are affected by the same body. But (by the
hypothesis) the body was then so disposed that the mind imagined two bodies at
once. Therefore it will imagine two bodies at the same
time, and the mind when it imagines one of them will straightaway recall the
other. Q.e.d.
‘The mind (prev. Coroll) imagines any body for this reason,
that the human body is affected and disposed by impressions of an external body
in the same way as it is affected when certain parts of it are affected by the
same body’
the ’mind’ proposes – is propositional action
and what is here proposed is that – ‘the human body
is affected and disposed by impressions of an external body’
‘impressions of an external body’ – are proposals put /
propositions – put
‘But (by the hypothesis) the body was then so disposed that
the mind imagined two bodies at once’ –
the proposal is – that two bodies affect at the same
time –
that is two proposals put at the same time –
I don’t think so – there will always be a time difference
between proposals put
now when one of these body proposals is again put – can we
say for sure that the other body proposal will ‘straightaway’ be recalled –
that is – be re-proposed?
this may well happen – but equally – it may not –
the second body proposal – may now be in some way different
– or may in fact have been forgotten –
again – what happens – is an empirical question
and any proposal in this connection – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – Hence we clearly understand what is memory (memoria).
For it is nothing else than a certain concatenation of ideas involving the
nature of things which are outside the human body, and this takes place in the
mind according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human
body. I say then in the first place that it is a concatenation of those ideas
only which involve the nature of things which are outside the human body and of
external bodies. I say in the second place that this concatenation of things
takes place according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of
human body in order to distinguish it from the concatenation of the ideas which
takes place according to the order of the intellect through which the mind perceives
things through their first causes and which is the same in all men. And hence
we can clearly understand why the mind from the thought of one thing should
immediately fall upon the thought of another which has no likeness to the
first, e.g., from the thought of the word pomum a Roman immediately
began to think about fruit, which has no likeness to the articulate sound nor
anything in common, save that the body of that man was affected by these two,
that is the man frequently heard the word pomum while looking at the fruit: and
thus one passes from the thought of one thing to the thought of another
according as his habit arranged the images in his body. For a soldier, e.g.,
when he sees the footmarks of a horse in the sand passes from the thought of
the horse to the thought of the horseman, and thence to the thought of war,
etc. But a countryman from the thought of a horse would pass to the thought of
a plough, field, etc., and thus each one according to whether he is accustomed
to unite the images of things in this or that way passes from the thought of
one thing to the thought of another.
‘Hence we clearly understand what is memory (memoria).
For it is nothing else than a certain concatenation of ideas involving the
nature of things which are outside the human body, and this takes place in the
mind according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human
body.’
here we have a proposal – an explanation of the proposal
‘memory’ –
‘a concatenation of ideas’? – is a concatenation of
proposals –
‘involving the nature of things’? – that is proposing the
nature of things –
and these ideas / proposals ‘take place in the mind’
the ‘mind’ is propositional action – it is not a
‘place’
‘according to the order and concatenation of the
modifications of the human body’?
this is to effectively propose that ‘memory’ is a function
of the human body
now just exactly what this amounts to – this propositional
relation between memory proposals and the human body proposal is of course a
matter – open to question
I think most would think that by definition – ‘memory’ has
reference to the past – yet in this explanation of memory from Spinoza – there
is no such reference
so – my question here is – if the past is not in the picture
– how is the propositional action of ‘memory’ – in any way different from any
other propositional action?
this is a question for Spinoza
any proposal
– however ‘explained’ – or described – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain –
that is where we
start – that is where we end
‘and this takes place in the mind according to the order and
concatenation of the modifications of the human body.’
now here I think Spinoza is proposing that the body / brain holds
memories –
a proposal exists for as long as it is actually
entertained –
and therefore – memory proposals exist as long as they are
entertained –
that propositions do not exist before they are put – or
after they have ceased to be entertained
‘I say in the second place that this concatenation of things
takes place according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of
human body in order to distinguish it from the concatenation of the ideas which
takes place according to the order of the intellect through which the mind
perceives things through their first causes and which is the same in all men.’
here Spinoza clearly distinguishes body and mind – as
different ‘concatenations’
in so far as Spinoza uses the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – and
regards them as significant – and informative – he maintains a dualism – within
a proposed monism
how can that be – how can that work?
his idea is that the body is ‘the formal essence of the
mind’ –
which is to say – he places the body in the mind –
if ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are different places – how can two
different places be the one place?
and if ‘mind’ and ‘body’ one place – there is no distinction
mind and bodies are not ‘places’ –
‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –
‘body’ is a name for proposition action –
and once this is understood – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – disappear
–
the focus is not ‘mind’ or ‘body’ – rather the propositional
actor
and finally – if ‘essence’ – is to mean anything here – the
essence of the human being – is propositional action
‘And hence we can clearly understand why the mind from the
thought of one thing should immediately fall upon the thought of another which
has no likeness to the first, e.g., from the thought of the word pomum a
Roman immediately began to think about fruit, which has no likeness to the
articulate sound nor anything in common, save that the body of that man was
affected by these two, that is the man frequently heard the word pomum
while looking at the fruit: and thus one passes from the thought of one thing to
the thought of another according as his habit arranged the images in his body.’
the word ‘pomum’ is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
that the proposal ‘pomum’ – is put to mean ‘a fruit’ – is to
propose a meaning
and this ‘meaning’ proposal – is open to question
i.e. – perhaps there is a propositional context in which
‘pomum’ is not proposed as ‘a fruit’?
now you can further put that the proposals ‘pomum’ and ‘a
fruit’ – are related in terms of the images proposed by the propositional actor
however – to propose this is not to settle any matter
of explanation –
for an ‘image’ is a proposal – as with the proposal it is
put to explain – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
by all means go with the image explanation – if it suits
your purpose – but make no mistake – it is open to question
in logic we operate without a net – and without a ground
beneath the net
‘For a soldier, e.g., when he sees the footmarks of a horse
in the sand passes from the thought of the horse to the thought of the
horseman, and thence to the thought of war, etc. But a countryman from the
thought of a horse would pass to the thought of a plough, field, etc., and thus
each one according to whether he is accustomed to unite the images of things in
this or that way passes from the thought of one thing to the thought of
another.’
what this points to is different propositional contexts –
different propositional contexts in which a proposal will be
understood differently
this occurs because any proposal – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is logically uncertain
PROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the human
body, nor does it know it to exist, save through ideas of modifications by
which the body is affected.
propositional action – whether described as of the
‘body’ or of the ‘mind’ – is knowledge – is the knowledge of the propositional
actor
and our knowledge / proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – The human mind is the very idea or knowledge
of the human body (Prop. 13, Part II), which (Prop. 9, Part II) is in God in so
far as he is considered affected by another idea of an individual thing: or
because (Post. 4) the human body needs many bodies from which it is continually
regenerated, so to speak, and the order and connection of idea is (Prop. 7,
Part II.) the same as the order and connection of causes this idea will be in
God in so far as he is considered as affected by the ideas of several things.
God therefore has the idea of the human body, or has a knowledge of the human
body, in so far as he is considered as affected by many other ideas and is not
in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, that is (Coroll.,
Prop 11, Part II), the human mind has no knowledge of the human body. But the
idea of the modification are in in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature
of the human mind, or the human mind perceives those modifications (Prop. 12.
Part II), and consequently (Prop. 16, Part II) the human body itself, and that
(Prop. 17, Part II.) as actually existing. The human mind, therefore, perceives
only thus far the human body. Q.e.d.
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
knowledge is not in the unknown
mind and body are not two parallel places that
have the same order and connection –
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action – ‘the human
body’ – is a name for propositional action –
the human being is a propositional actor –
once this is understood – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are seen as
names for the one activity – that is the action of the propositional actor –
there is no order and connection in the unknown
the unknown has no idea
the unknown does not constitute anything
‘perceived modifications’ – are propositional actions
the ‘human body’ can be put as a propositional object – as a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘the human body as actually existing’ – is a description
of propositional action
PROP. XX. The idea of the human mind is granted in God and
follows in God, and is referred to him in the same manner as the idea of
knowledge of the human body.
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
nothing is granted in the unknown – or ‘follows’ in the
unknown
‘the unknown’ – is not an ‘he’ – the unknown has no gender
‘the human mind’ – is a name for propositional action
‘the human body’ – is a name for propositional action
knowledge is proposal – is propositional action
propositional action is a response – the propositional actor’s
response – to the unknown
Proof. – Thought is an attribute of God (Prop.1. Part
II.), and therefore (Prop. 3, Part II.) the idea of this and all modifications,
and consequently of the human mind (Prop. ii, Part II,), must necessarily be
granted in God. Now this idea or knowledge of the human mind is not granted in
God in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing (Prop.
9, Part II.). But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order
and connection causes (Prop. 7. Part II.). It follows, therefore, that this
idea or knowledge of the human mind is in God and is referred to God in the
same manner as the knowledge or idea of the human body.
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown – the unknown has no
attributes
‘thought’ – is a proposal put – thought is propositional
action –
‘modifications’ are propositional actions
nothing is granted in the unknown –
ideas are proposal – causes are proposals
there is no order and connection of proposals –
all propositional action is a response to the unknown
PROP. XXI. The idea of the mind is united to the mind in the
same manner as the mind is united to the body.
Proof. – That the mind is united to the body we have
shown from the fact that the body is the object of the mind (Prop. 12 and 13,
Part II): and therefore by that same reason the idea of the mind is united to
its object, that is the mind itself, in the same manner as the mind is united
to the body, Q.e.d.
the body as object of the mind?
the ‘human body’ – as with anything else – can be
proposed as the object of propositional action
the idea of the mind?
what this amounts to – is how the mind is proposed
any proposal here – is a propositional action –
the mind is not a substance – the body not a substance
mind and body are not substances ‘united’ – or attributes
united
‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are names for propositional action
propositional action – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Note. – The proposition can be understood far more
easily from what has been said in the note on Prop. 7. Part II. For there we
showed that the idea of the body and the body itself, that is (Prop.13, Part
II.) the mind and body, are one in the same individual, which is conceived now
under the attribute of thought, and now under the attribute of extension.
Wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one in the same thing
and are conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea
of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself follow from the same necessity in
God and from the same power of necessity. For in truth the idea of the mind,
that is the idea of an idea, is nothing else than the form (forma) of an
idea in so far as it is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to
its object: for if a man knows anything, by that very
fact he knows he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he
knows it, and so on to infinity. But of this more again.
‘For there we showed that the idea of the body and the body
itself, that is (Prop.13, Part II.) the mind and body, are one in the same
individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, and now
under the attribute of extension.’
‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are not one and the same individual
‘mind’ and ‘body’ are names for propositional action
‘for if a man knows anything, by that very fact he knows he
knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on
to infinity.’
‘and so to infinity’ – this is no more than mindless
rhetorical duplication
what we know is what we propose – and what we
propose is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
our knowledge is uncertain – our knowing is uncertain
to propose that you know that you know – is to propose that
you propose
and doing this is quite pointless
PROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the
modifications of the body, but also the idea of these modifications.
an ‘idea’ – is a proposal / propositional action
modifications of the body – are descriptions of
propositional action
the ‘idea’ of these modifications – is the propositional
action that is the modification
all we really have here from Spinoza is a statement of the fact
of propositional activity – as it can or might relate to the proposal ‘body’
Proof. – The ideas of the ideas of modifications
follow in God in the same way and are referred to him in the same way as the
ideas of modifications, which is proved in the same manner as Prop. 20 Part.
But the ideas of modifications of the body are in the human mind (Prop. 12,
Part II.), that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II), in God in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind. Therefore, the ideas of these ideas
are in God, in so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind, that
is (Prop. 21. Part II.) in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not
only modifications of the human body but also the ideas of them. Q.e.d.
an idea of an idea – is a proposal – proposed –
which is to say – a proposal put –
you can engage in the mindless proposal of proposal – of
proposed etc – as if to infinity –
but to do so – is simply to engage in a duplication game –
which has no logical value
‘modifications of the body’ – are proposals – propositional
actions
‘in the human mind’ –
the ‘human mind’ is not a place – it is propositional
action
‘in God in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human
mind’ –
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
and the unknown – does not ‘constitute’ –
‘the ideas of these ideas’ – is just a proposal – proposed
and this proposal is not in ‘God’ / the unknown –
any such proposal – is put against the unknown – or in
reaction to it
we propose – to make known
our knowledge is proposal – is propositional –
and any proposal put – in defiance of the unknown –
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. XXIII. The mind has no knowledge of itself save in so
far as it perceives the idea of the modifications of the body.
Proof. – The idea or knowledge of the mind (Prop. 20
part II) follows in God, and is referred to him in the same manner as the idea
or knowledge of the body. But since (Prop. 19. Part II)
the human mind does not know the human body, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part
II) since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God in so far as
he constitutes the nature of the human mind, therefore neither is the knowledge
of the mind referred to God in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
human mind, and therefore (same Coroll, Prop.11, Part II) the human mind has no
knowledge of itself. Then again the ideas of the
modifications of which the body is affected involve the nature of the human
mind itself (Prop. 16. Part II), that is (Prop. 13, Part II), they agree with
nature of the mind. Wherefore the knowledge of these
ideas necessarily involves the knowledge of the mind. But (prev. Prop.) the
knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself. Therefore the human mind
has only thus far a knowledge of itself. Q.e.d.
‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
‘knowledge’ – is proposal / propositional action – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘modifications of the body’ – are proposals / propositional
actions
we can propose that we propose – ad infinitum –
this is a useless game
the point is that our knowledge of ourselves – of our
propositional actions –– just is our propositional activity
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
the unknown has no knowledge
the unknown has no idea
knowledge of the human body – is proposal put – and
critically investigated
‘knowledge of the human mind’ – is proposal put and
critically investigated
the essence of the unknown – is that it is unknown
the unknown does not ‘constitute’ anything
‘knowledge of the human mind’ – is propositional activity –
put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored
PROP. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate
knowledge of the component parts of the human body.
if by ‘adequate knowledge’ – is meant ‘certain knowledge’ –
there is no ‘adequate’ knowledge
knowledge is proposal – and proposal – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if ‘adequate knowledge’ – is understood to be ‘uncertain
knowledge’ – then all knowledge is ‘adequate’ –
any proposed ‘knowledge’ of the ‘component parts of the
human body’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Proof. – The parts composing the human body do not
appertain to the essence of that body save in so far as they reciprocally
communicate their motions in a certain ratio (vide Def. after Coroll.,
lemma 3), and not in so far as they may be considered as individuals without
relation to the human body. For the parts of the human body (Post. 1) are
individuals very complex, the parts of which (Lemma 4) can be taken
away from the human body without harm to the nature or form
of it, and can communicate their motions (Ax. I after Lemma3) to other bodies
in another ratio. And therefore (Prop. 3 Part II.) the idea or knowledge of
each part will be in God in so far as (Prop. 9, Part II.) he is considered as
affected by another idea of an individual thing which is prior in the order of
nature to that part (Prop. 7. Part II.). This also can be said of any part of
the individual component of the human body, and therefore the knowledge of each
component part of the human body is in God in so far as he is affected by many
ideas of things, and not in so far as he has only an idea of the human body,
that is (Prop. 13, Part II.) the idea which constitutes the nature of the human
mind. And therefore (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II) the human mind does not
involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human body. Q.e.d.
‘The parts composing the human body do not appertain to the
essence of that body save in so far as they reciprocally communicate their
motions in a certain ratio (vide Def. after Coroll., lemma 3), and not
in so far as they may be considered as individuals without relation to the
human body.’
‘the parts composing body do not appertain to the essence of
that body’
from a logical point of view there is no essence – of the
human body – or for that matter of anything else
any claim of ‘essence’ is a claim of definitive or certain
characterization of a thing
‘essence’ – to my mind – only makes sense as a heuristic
endeavour that unlocks propositional uncertainty – and leads to more and more
avenues of critical inquiry
any characterization of anything – is a descriptive proposal
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to ‘the parts composing the human body’ –
the ‘human body’ – is a proposal – open to question –
and it is just because it is a proposal – open to question –
that the proposal / description – ‘parts of the human body’ – is possible
‘parts of the human body’ – are descriptive proposals
– put in response to the proposal ‘human body’ –
‘in so far as they reciprocally communicate their motions in
a certain ratio’
here is a relational proposal – that is a proposal –
as to the relation between proposed parts of the human body
this proposal – as with the proposal it is a response to –
is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘and not in so far as they may be considered as individuals
without relation to the human body’
who is going to consider a part of the human body – as not a
part of the human body?
‘For the parts of the human body (Post. 1) are individuals
very complex, the parts of which (Lemma 4) can be taken away from the human
body without harm to the nature or form of it, and can communicate their
motions (Ax. I after Lemma3) to other bodies in another ratio’
parts can be taken away from the human body – without harm
to the nature or form of it?
this strikes me as plainly wrong
ask anyone who has lost a limb – if the nature or form of
their body has not suffered
the proposal that parts taken away from the human body can
communicate their motions to other bodies in the same ratio – is to my mind – a
fantastical proposal
a severed leg – ‘communicating its motions’ – I don’t think
so – unless we are talking Edgar Allan Poe
on the other hand – would we not say that a human heart
taken from a deceased body and transplanted to another could be made to
communicate ‘its motions’ – to the other?
‘And therefore (Prop. 3 Part II.) the idea or knowledge of
each part will be in God in so far as (Prop. 9, Part II.) he is considered as
affected by another idea of an individual thing which is prior in the order of
nature to that part (Prop. 7. Part II.). This also can be said of any part of
the individual component of the human body, and therefore the knowledge of each
component part of the human body is in God in so far as he is affected by many
ideas of things, and not in so far as he has only an idea of the human body,
that is (Prop. 13, Part II.) the idea which constitutes the nature of the human
mind.’
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
the unknown has no knowledge – no idea –
human propositional actors have knowledge – put proposals
and critically investigate them –
the unknown is not a propositional actor
‘And therefore (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II) the human mind
does not involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human
body. Q.e.d.’
all knowledge is proposal – and proposal is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘inadequate’ – is understood ‘uncertain’ – then all
knowledge is ‘inadequate’ –
if all we have is uncertain knowledge – then there is a
sense in which that knowledge is ‘adequate’ for our purposes – adequate for our
uncertain reality
any proposal that divides the body into component parts will
be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
in the history of the sciences of the human body we have
many such proposals – and with those proposals – different and exciting lines
of critical inquiry
any such proposal will increase the scope of propositional
question – doubt and uncertainty –
and as such increase our critical knowledge of the human
body
PROP. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body
does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
an idea of a modification of the human body – is a proposal
put in relation to the proposal of the human body
all knowledge is proposal – a proposal is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
knowledge is uncertain –
and given this – we are best to drop this adequate /
inadequate distinction
what is ‘adequate’ – is uncertain – what is inadequate – is
uncertain
Proof. – We have shown (Prop. 16, Part II.) that the
idea of the modification of the human body involves the nature of the external
body in so far as the external body determines the human body in a certain way.
But in so far as the external body is an individual which has no reference to
the human body, its idea or knowledge is in God (Prop. 9, Part II.) in so far
as God is considered as affected by the idea of the other thing which (Prop. 7,
Part II.) is by nature prior to the external body. Therefore adequate knowledge
of the external body is not in God in so far as he has the idea of the
modification of the human body, or the idea of the modification of the human
body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body.
‘We have shown (Prop. 16, Part II.) that the idea of the
modification of the human body involves the nature of the external body in so
far as the external body determines the human body in a certain way.’
the ‘human body’ – is a proposal –
the ‘external body’ – is a proposal
a relation can be proposed between the human body proposal
and the external body proposal
any such propositional relation is open to question –
open to doubt and uncertain
no one proposal determines another
the external body proposal does not determine the human body
a relation between the human body and the external body can
be proposed
and that propositional relation – is open to question – open
to doubt and uncertain
‘But in so far as the external body is an individual which
has no reference to the human body, its idea or knowledge is in God (Prop. 9,
Part II.) in so far as God is considered as affected by the idea of the other
thing which (Prop. 7, Part II.) is by nature prior to the external body.’
the external body is a proposal – put by a propositional
actor – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
God is a name for the unknown
the unknown has no knowledge
PROP. XXVI. The human mind perceives no external body as
actually existing save through ideas of modifications of its body.
the ‘human mind’ is a name for propositional
action
the ‘human body’ is a name for propositional
action
‘perception’ is a name for propositional action
the ‘external body’ is proposed in propositional action
the ‘external body’ exists if proposed – and as proposed
the proposal ‘external object’ – is open to question – open
to doubt and uncertain
Proof. – If the human mind is affected in no way by
any external body, then (Prop. 7 Part II. ) neither is the idea of the human
body, that is (Prop. 13, Part II.), the
human mind, affected in any way wise by the idea of the existence of the
external body, or, in other words, it does not perceive in any way the
existence of the external body. But in so far as the human body is affected in
any way by the external body, thus far (Prop. 16, Part II., and its Coroll.) it
perceives the external body. Q.e.d.
if there is no propositional relation proposed between the
external body and the propositional actor –
the propositional actor is not ‘affected’ by the external
body
if a relation is proposed between the propositional actor
and the external body –
the propositional actor perceives the relation
Corollary. – In so far as the human mind imagines an
external body, thus far it has no adequate knowledge of it.
‘imagination’ is a name for propositional action
–
if by ‘adequate knowledge’ is meant ‘certain knowledge’ –
there is no adequate knowledge –
‘knowledge’ is proposal / propositional action
propositional action – however named or described – is open
to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Proof. – When the human mind regards external bodies
through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say it imagines
(Note on Prop. 17, Part II.): nor can the human mind in any other way imagine
(prev. Prop) external bodies as actually existing. And therefore (Prop. 25, Part
II.) in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has no adequate
knowledge of them. Q.e.d.
when the propositional actor ‘imagines’ ‘external bodies’ we
say – he / she – proposes
that which is proposed – is that which exists –
any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
all ‘knowledge’ is proposal – all proposal uncertain
PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body
does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
a ‘modification of the human body’ – is a propositional
action
all ‘knowledge’ – is proposal –
if by ‘adequate knowledge’ is meant certain knowledge
– there is no adequate knowledge
all proposal / knowledge – is uncertain
any propositional action – put by a propositional actor – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – Any idea of the
modification of the human body involves the nature of the nature of the human
body in so far as the human body itself is considered to be affected in a
certain manner (Prop. 16, Part II). But in so far as
the human body is an individual which can be affected in many other ways, the
idea of the modifications,
etc. (vide Proof of Prop. 25 Part II).
the ‘human body’ put
as an object proposal –
‘any idea of the
modification of the human body’ – is a proposal / propositional action – put
to – the proposal ‘human body’
and the ‘human body’
proposal – is modified by the action
the human body
proposal can be modified in many ways –
which is to say –
any number of modification proposals can be put to the human body proposal
proposal /
propositional action – is knowledge –
knowledge / proposal
/ propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
knowledge of the
human body is not certain – i.e. – ‘adequate’
knowledge of the
human body is uncertain
PROP. XXVIII. The idea of the modifications of the human
body, in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone, are not clear and
distinct but confused.
so called – ‘modifications of the human body’ – are propositional
actions
any propositional action affects the propositional
actor –
how that affect is explained / described – is open to
question
the propositional actor is not divided into ‘mind’
and ‘body’
‘mind’ and ‘body’ are not different places / spaces /
entities
logically speaking – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are outmoded
descriptions of the propositional actor – of propositional actions
however – these notions – can function as foci for detailed
investigation of critical propositional issues – i.e. a physician may describe
his propositional activity as ‘of the body’ – and a psychologist may describe his
activity ‘of the mind’
‘mind’ and ‘body’ here are different propositional descriptions
of propositional action
logically speaking – no proposal or propositional action is
‘clear and distinct’
and by the same token no proposal or propositional action is
‘confused’
proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – The ideas of the modifications of the human
body involve both the nature of the external bodies and that of the human body
itself (Prop. 16. Part II): and not only must they involve the nature of the
human body, but also that of its parts. For modifications are modes (Post. 3)
in which parts of the human body, and consequently the whole body is affected. But (Prop. 24 and 25, Part II) adequate knowledge of
external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God
in so far as he is considered as affected by the human mind, but in so far as
he is considered affected by other ideas. These ideas of modifications, in
so far as they have reference to the human mind alone, are like consequences
without premises, that is (as is self-evident) confused ideas. Q.e.d.
‘ideas of the modifications of the human body’ – are propositional
actions
any such propositional action ‘involves’ / affects the propositional
actor
how such actions are further proposed and described – is
open to question
an ‘external body’ is a proposal – open to question
there is no ‘adequate knowledge’ of external bodies
there is no’ adequate knowledge’ of propositional action
all such knowledge is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
there is no knowledge in the unknown
the unknown is not ‘affected’
no ‘modification’ – that is no propositional action – has
reference to ‘the mind alone’
any modification / propositional action affects the propositional
actor –
the propositional actor as such – is not divided into ‘mind’
and ‘body’
any such description – undermines the unity that is
the propositional actor
and logically speaking – presents a distorted and incoherent
picture of the propositional actor –
however – as noted above – these notions of ‘mind’ and
‘body’ – are used as names for specific critical foci and investigation
.
Note. – The idea which constitutes the nature of the
human mind is shown in the same manner when considered in itself not to be
clear and distinct; also the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas
of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference to the
human mind alone, which everyone can easily see.
logically speaking – there is no reference ‘to the human
mind alone’ –
or if there is – it represents a failed understanding of the
propositional actor – of the unity of the propositional actor –
however – the ‘mind alone’ may function as a name for a
specific propositional focus and investigation – i.e. the focus and
investigation of the psychologist
logically speaking – no idea / proposal / propositional
action – is ‘clear and distinct’
any idea / proposal / propositional action – is open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
and this – not everyone can easily see
PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each
modification of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human
mind.
‘the idea of the idea of each modification’ –
is the proposal of the proposal of each proposal –
a proposal – is just that – any proposal of the proposal –
is repetition – is duplication – and of no logical value
in any case no proposal / propositional action – is adequate
knowledge – if by adequate knowledge is meant ‘certain knowledge’
any proposal / propositional action – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – The idea of the modifications of the human
body (Prop. 27 Part II.) does not involve adequate knowledge of the body, or in
other words, does not express its nature adequately, that is (Prop.13, Part
II), it does not agree adequately with the nature of the mind. And therefore
(Ax. 6, Part I) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of
the human mind, or does not involve adequate knowledge of it. Q.e.d.
there is no agreement – or disagreement – between the ‘mind’
and the ‘body’
the ‘mind’ and the’ body’ are different names for the
propositional action of the propositional actor
if by adequate knowledge is meant ‘certain’ knowledge –
there is no adequate knowledge
knowledge is proposal – is propositional action
propositional action – is open to doubt and is uncertain
–
‘the idea of this idea’ – is the proposal of this proposal –
propositional repetition and duplication – is empty and has
no logical value
Corollary. – Hence it follows that the human mind,
whenever it perceives a thing in the common order of nature, has no adequate
knowledge of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, but only a
confused and mutilated knowledge thereof. For the mind knows not itself save in
so far as it perceives ideas of modification of the body (Prop. 23, Part II).
But it does not perceive its body save through the ideas of modification,
through which it also perceives external bodies. And therefore in so far as it has
these ideas it has no adequate knowledge of itself (Prop. 29, Part II.), nor of
its body (Prop. 27, Part II.), but only (Prop. 28 and Note, Part II.) a
confused and mutilated one. Q.e.d.
‘perception’ – is a propositional action
a ‘thing’ – is a proposal
the ‘common order of nature’ is a proposal
the proposal ‘a thing’ – can be put in relation to
the proposal ‘common order of nature’
the propositional actor – perceives a thing in the
common of nature
the ‘human mind’ – is a name for propositional action
it is not the ‘mind’ that knows itself –
the ‘mind’ is not an entity
the propositional actor knows him / herself – through his /
her propositional action
the ‘human body’ is a name for propositional
action –
‘external bodies’ are proposals
the propositional actor perceives / proposes
‘external bodies’ –
the perception of the propositional actor – is a propositional
action
if by adequate knowledge is meant ‘certain knowledge’ –
there is no adequate knowledge
knowledge is proposal / propositional action
proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
Note – I say expressly that the mind has no adequate
but only confused knowledge of itself, of its body, and of all external bodies,
when it perceives a thing in the common order of nature, that is when it is
determined externally, that is by fortuitous circumstances, to contemplate this
or that, and not when it is determined internally, that is by the fact that it
regards many things at one, to understand their agreements, differences and
oppositions on to the another. For whenever it is disposed in this or any other
way from within, then it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I shall show
further on.
if by ‘adequate knowledge’ is meant ‘certain’ knowledge –
there is no certain knowledge
the propositional actor has no ‘adequate knowledge’ of him /
her self –
the propositional actor’s knowledge of him / her self – is
uncertain
when the propositional actor perceives / proposes a
relation between a ‘thing’ and the proposal ‘common order of nature’ – the
propositional actor’s knowledge – is uncertain
the propositional actor is not determined – the
propositional actor determines
the propositional actor does not regard many things at once
– the propositional proposes propositional relations between proposals – and
puts propositional relations to question – to doubt – and explores their
uncertainties
the propositional actor’s understanding is not ‘clear and
distinct’ – it is uncertain
PROP. XXX. We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of
the duration of our body.
the duration of the propositional actor – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – The duration of the body does not depend on
its essence (Ax. 1, Part II), nor on the absolute nature of God (Prop. 21, Part
I) but (Prop. 28, Part I) it is determined for existence and action by certain
causes, which are in their turn determined for existing and acting in a certain
determined ratio by other causes, and these by others, and so on to infinity.
Therefore the duration of our body depends on the common order of nature and
the disposition of things. But there is in God an
adequate knowledge of the reason why things are disposed in any particular way,
in so far as he has idea of all things, and not in so far as he has only a
knowledge of the human body (Coroll., Prop. 9, Part II). Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is very
inadequate in God in so far as he is considered as constituting only the nature
of the human mind, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.), this knowledge is
inadequate in our mind. Q.e.d.
one might argue that the duration of the propositional actor
– just is the duration of his / her essence
‘God’ is a name for the unknown – nothing
depends on the unknown
as to ‘causes’ –
an infinite causal chain is incoherent
for such – by definition – is without a first cause
if you take Spinoza’s view – that his ‘God’ – is the first
cause – then the causal chain is not ‘infinite’ –
and if you were to stick with infinite causal chain – his
‘God’ – can only be one link in the chain –
the chain that is chained to nothing
the infinite argument – is nothing more than pointless
propositional repetition
the duration of the propositional actor – is a matter open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
duration is uncertain
there is no knowledge in the unknown – ‘adequate’ or
otherwise
how things are disposed – is open to question – open
to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
our knowledge – is uncertain –
that is to say our proposals / our propositional actions –
are uncertain
PROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of
individual things which are outside us.
an ‘individual thing’ – is a proposal
no proposal is determined by another
all propositional action – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
the duration of any proposed ‘thing’ – is uncertain
Corollary. – Hence it follows that all individual things are
contingent and corruptible. For we can have no adequate knowledge concerning
their duration (prev. Prop.), and
this is what must be understood by the contingency of things
and their liability to corruption (vide Note 1, Prop. 33, Part I.). For (Prop.
29, Part I), save this, nothing is granted to be contingent.
all proposal – is contingent – that is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they have reference to
God are true.
an ‘idea’ – is a proposal
‘God’ is a name of the unknown
all proposals have the unknown as ‘object’
any propositional action is a response or reaction to the
unknown
an ‘idea’ / proposal – is ‘true’ – if affirmed by a
propositional actor – for whatever reason – ‘false’ – if denied by a
propositional actor – for whatever reason
any proposal of affirmation / denial – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
Proof. – Now all ideas which are in God, must
entirely agree with their ideals (Coroll., Prop. 7, Part II): and therefore
(Ax, 6, Part I) they are true. Q.e.d.
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
the unknown has no ideas
an idea is a proposal – an ‘ideal’ – that proposed
there is no logical distinction between idea and ideal –
any distinction is grammatical
an idea / proposal – is ‘true’ – if affirmed – ‘false’ is
denied
any proposal of affirmation or denial is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, wherefore
they could be called false.
Proof. – If you deny this, conceive, if possible, a
positive mode of thinking which could constitute the form of error of falsity.
This mode of thinking cannot be in God (prev. Prop.), and outside God it cannot
exist or be conceived (Prop. 15. Part I.). Therefore there is nothing positive
in ideas, wherefore they could be called false. Q.e.d.
for Spinoza – ‘positive’ here – is a synonym for ‘true’ –
and therefore – there can be no positive mode of thinking –
that is false
‘positive’ defined as ‘true’ – ‘true’ defined as ‘positive’
therefore – no ‘false’ positive
all we have is a word game – and no actual definition of
‘true’ or ‘false’
and furthermore – in a dogmatic way he shunts these issues
back to his ‘God’ –
i.e. – there can be no error in God
an ‘idea’ is a proposal –
a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
a ‘true’ – ‘idea’ / proposal / proposition / propositional
action – is one affirmed – for whatever reason – by a propositional
actor
a ‘false’ – ‘idea’ / proposal / proposition / propositional
action – is one denied – for whatever reason – by a propositional actor
proposals of affirmation and denial – are open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain –
‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ – are not properties of propositions
‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ – are propositional actions – proposals
of affirmation or denial – put in relation to subject proposals
Proof. – When we say that an adequate idea and a perfect
idea is granted in us, we say nothing else than that (Coroll., Prop. 11. Part
II) there is granted in God an adequate and perfect idea in so far as he
constitutes the essence of our mind, and consequently (Prop.32. Part II.) we
say nothing else than that such an idea is true. Q.e.d.
there are no ideas that are ‘absolute’ – ‘adequate’ – or
‘perfect’ –
an ‘idea’ is a proposal – and any proposal – put by a
propositional actor –is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
an idea / proposal – is ‘true’ – if affirmed by a
propositional actor – ‘false’ – if denied by a propositional actor
any proposal of affirmation or denial – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
no idea / proposal ‘is granted in us’ – a proposal is put
– by a propositional actor
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
nothing ‘is granted in’ the unknown
the unknown does not ‘constitute’ anything
PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in privation of knowledge which
is involved by inadequate or mutilated and confused ideas.
‘knowledge’ – is proposal – proposal – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain –
what we deal with is not the ‘privation’ of knowledge – but
the uncertainty of knowledge
a false proposition – is a proposal that – for whatever
reason – is denied
so just what counts as ‘falsity’ – a reason for denial
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘ideas’ are proposals – proposals are not ‘inadequate’ –
‘mutilated’ – or ‘confused’ –
‘ideas’ / proposals – are open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Proof. – Nothing positive is granted in ideas which
could constitute the form of falsity (Prop. 33, Part II). But falsity cannot consist in mere privation (for minds,
not bodies, are said to err and be mistaken), nor in mere ignorance: for
ignorance and error are two different things. Wherefore it consists in the
privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate knowledge or confused
ideas. Q.e.d.
‘nothing positive is granted in ideas which could constitute
their falsity’
for Spinoza ‘positive’ – is a synonym for true –
so – no truth in an idea constitutes a form of falsity
which is to say – no truth is false –
again – all we get here from Spinoza – is a convoluted word
game – that tells us nothing
an ‘idea’ – is a proposal / a proposition
truth and falsity are not properties of propositions
truth and falsity – are propositional actions
an idea / proposition is true – if – for whatever reason –
it is affirmed – an idea / proposition is false – if – for whatever
reason it is denied
just how a propositional actor will judge a proposal as true
or false – that is what criteria he / she will use to affirm or deny – is a
matter open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
and any proposal of affirmation or any proposal of denial –
likewise – is open to question
for Spinoza – his ‘adequate’ ideas – are certain – and true
and it is in ‘inadequate’ idea – that we find falsity
so – no adequate idea is false –
and all inadequate ideas – are false
so – for Spinoza – it is not the case that any
proposition is either true or false
only ‘adequate’ ideas / propositions are true – and only
‘inadequate’ ideas / propositions are false
one problem for this lobsided theory of truth is that
Spinoza’s adequate ideas – his certain truths – cannot be established
any proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
and it is only propositional uncertainty that allows the
possibility of truth or falsity –
if a proposition cannot be false – there is the argument
that it cannot be true
Spinoza’s certain propositions – his adequate ideas – on
this view – actually have no truth value
Note. – In the note on Prop. 17 of this Part I
explained for what reason error consists in the privation of knowledge. For
further explanation, however, I shall give an example.
For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; and this opinion
consists in this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant
of the causes by which they are determined. This, therefore, is their idea
of liberty, that they should know no cause of their actions. For that which
they say, that human actions depend on the will, are words they do not fathom.
For none of them know what is will and how it moves the body; those who boast
of this and feign dwellings and habitations of the soul, provoke either
laughter or disgust. Thus when we look at the sun we
imagine that it is only some two hundred feet distant from us: which error does
not consist in that imagination alone, but in the fact that while we thus
imagined
it we were ignorant
of the causes of this imagination and the true distance. For though we may
afterwards learn that the sun is some six hundred times the earth’s diameter
distance from us, we imagine it nevertheless to be near to us: for we do not
imagine the sun to be nearer because we are ignorant of the true distance, but
because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun in so far
as the body is affected by it.
‘For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free;
and this opinion consists in this alone, that they are conscious of their
actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This,
therefore, is their idea of liberty, that they should know no cause of their
actions. For that which they say, that human actions depend on the will, are
words they do not fathom. For none of them know what is will and how it moves
the body; those who boast of this and feign dwellings and habitations of the
soul, provoke either laughter or disgust.’
to be conscious of your actions – is to propose your actions
–
‘consciousness’ – is a description of propositional action
‘will’ – is a description of propositional action –
that propositional actors may have different understandings
of ‘will’
is no reason to ridicule them
any propositional action – however described – is open to
question
any proposed ‘cause’ of one’s actions / proposals – is a
matter open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
our freedom – is logical
we are free to the extent that we critically evaluate
our proposals / propositions / propositional actions –
we are free to the extent that we question – doubt – and explore
propositional uncertainty
‘Thus when we look at the sun we imagine that it is only
some two hundred feet distant from us: which error does not consist in that
imagination alone, but in the fact that while we thus imagined it we were
ignorant of the causes of this imagination and the true distance. For though we
may afterwards learn that the sun is some six hundred times the earth’s
diameter distance from us, we imagine it nevertheless to be near to us: for we
do not imagine the sun to be nearer because we are ignorant of the true distance,
but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun in so
far as the body is affected by it.’
any proposal as to the distance of the sun from us – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
you can propose that the sun is only two hundred feet from
us
this is a valid proposal – and as with any proposal – open
to question –
and it is a result of putting such a proposal to question – to
doubt – that alternative – different proposals – like those of current
scientific thinking have emerged
there is no ‘error’ in any proposal – what you deal with is
not error – but logical uncertainty
‘error’ has to do with rhetoric – not logic
whether you describe a proposal – a proposition as
‘imaginative’ – or not – is logically irrelevant
a proposition – however described – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
it is clear here that Spinoza uses the concept of
imagination to discredit and discount proposals / propositions that don’t suit
his world view –
a world view I might add that he believes is certain –
and as such – a world view that has no basis in
propositional logic
PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow from the
same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
there is no ‘necessity’ – any proposed propositional
relation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any ‘idea’ / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
for Spinoza an adequate idea is a ‘certain’ –
there is no logical basis to certainty –
Spinoza’s certain / adequate ideas are – are baseless
proposals / propositions are not ‘clear and distinct’ – or
‘confused’ – they are uncertain
Proof. – All ideas are in God (Prop. 15, Part I.),
and in so far as they have reference to God, they are true (Prop. 32, Part II.)
and (Coroll., Prop. 7. Part II.) adequate; and therefore
none are inadequate or confused save in so far as they have reference to the
individual mind of anyone. On this point, vide Prop. 24 and 25, Part
II. And therefore all ideas, both adequate and inadequate, follow from the same
necessity (Coroll., Prop. Part II.) Q.e.d.
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
there are no ideas – adequate or inadequate in the unknown –
propositional actors propose –
any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – is
uncertain
‘And therefore all ideas, both adequate and inadequate,
follow from the same necessity
for Spinoza – this necessity is his ‘God’
and on this view his God is both adequate and inadequate –
both certain and confused –
Spinoza’s God is a contradiction
PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (see Lemma 2), and
that which is equally in part and in the whole, do not constitute the essence
of an individual thing.
if by ‘essence’ – is meant that which is distinctive – then
that which is common will not be that which is distinctive
Proof. – If you deny this, conceive, if it can be,
that it does constitute the essence of a thing, namely the essence of B. Then
(def. 2, Part II.) it cannot be conceived nor exist without B. And this is
contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to the essence of
B, nor can it constitute the essence of any other thing, Q.e.d.
Spinoza argues here –
that if you say that that which is common to all things is
the essence of B – then it (the essence) cannot exist if B does not exist
however – B does exist –
therefore – that which is common – does not appertain to the
essence of B
this is a spurious argument
for if B does not exist – it does not follow that there is
no essence – to that which does exist
now if essence – however it is proposed – is something
other than existence –
then whether B exists or not – or whether anything else
exists or not – is not relevant to essence –
essence – on this view – in some sense – stands alone
however – this does not work – for presumably –
essence – exists – if talk of essence is meaningful
on the other hand – is essence – existence?
if so – how can essence be that which is distinctive of an
individual thing – for existence is common to all?
and if ‘essence’ is existence – then what is the point of
this notion of essence?
is it not an unnecessary – irrelevant concept?
I think essence has had its day – it is a confused concept –
it is not a useful proposal
‘individual things – are proposals
we do distinguish proposals – with proposals
however – any ‘distinguishing’ proposal – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we can make distinction – while recognizing commonality –
and we recognise that any proposed distinction – as with any proposed
commonality – is uncertain
PROP. XXXVIII. Those things which are common to all, and
which are equally in part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.
any proposal of commonality – those things which are common
to all – equally in part and whole – is open to question – open to doubt and is
uncertain
logically speaking – uncertain propositions are all we have
–
in that sense they are ‘adequate’
but if by ‘adequate’ – is meant – complete or certain –
logically speaking – no proposition is adequate
‘certainty’ is a rhetorical notion – it has no basis in
logic
Proof. – Let A be something
that is common to all bodies, and which is equally in one part of any body and
in the whole. Then I say A can only be conceived adequately. For its idea (Coroll., Prop. 7, Part II.) will necessarily
be adequate in God which is so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in
so far as he has the idea of its modifications, which (Prop. 16, 25 and 27,
part II.) involves in part both the nature of the human body and that of
external bodies, that is (Prop. 12 and 13, Part II.), this idea will
necessarily be adequate in God in so far as he constitutes the human mind or in
so far as he has ideas which are in the human mind. Therefore the mind
(Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II) necessarily adequately perceives A, and both in so
far as it perceives itself and its own or external body: nor can A be conceived
in any other manner. Q.e.d.
‘Let A be something that is common to all bodies, and
which is equally in one part of any body and in the whole. Then I say A can
only be conceived adequately.’
whatever A amounts to – A – will be open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘conceiving A’ – is proposing A – A once put – once proposed
– is open to question
just proposing A – does not make A – beyond question –
beyond doubt – or certain
‘this idea will necessarily be adequate in God in so far as
he constitutes the human mind or in so far as he has ideas which are in the
human mind.’
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
there are no ideas – adequate or inadequate in the unknown –
the unknown does not constitute – anything
propositional actors – propose – and their proposals are
actions
the ‘human mind’ – is a name for propositional action
–
propositional action is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
if by an ‘adequate’ idea – is understood a ‘complete’ and /
or ‘certain’ idea – logically speaking – there is no adequate idea
on the other hand –
any idea is adequate – if understood as
uncertain
Corollary. – hence it follows that certain ideas or
notions are granted common to all men. For (Lemma 2) all bodies agree in
certain things which (prev. Prop.) must adequately or clearly and distinctly be
perceived by all.
‘common ideas’ – are common proposals –
the proposal of ‘common ideas’ – is far enough –
however – it is just a proposal that may or may not be put
where it has been put – it has proved to be a useful
proposal – and the more useful – the more it has been investigated – critically
examined – and explored
but just what such a proposal amounts to – what the ground
of any proposed ‘common idea’ is – and – just what these common ideas /
proposals are – is a matter
that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
in logic – nothing is ‘granted’
logically speaking there is no adequate / clear and distinct
perception
‘perception’ is a name for propositional action – and
any propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
perception is uncertain –
and who can possibly say with any confidence – what is
perceived by all?
PROP. XXXIX. That which is common to and property of the
human body, and certain external bodies by which the human body is used to be
affected, and which is equally in part and whole of these, has an adequate idea
in the mind.
any proposed common property of the human body and external
bodies by which the body is affected – is a proposal open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
the mind is a name for the propositional action of
the propositional actor
if by ‘adequate’ you mean ‘certain’ – there are no certain
‘ideas’ / proposals –
all proposals / propositional actions – are open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – Let A be that which is common to and a
property of the human body and certain external bodies, and which is equally in
the human body and in the external bodies, and which is equally in the human
body and in the external bodies, and which is equally in a part and the whole
of each human body. There will be in God and adequate idea of A (Coroll., Prop.
7, Part II.), both in so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in so
far as he has ideas of given external bodies. Then let it be granted that the
human body is affected by an external one and through which it has in common
with it, namely, A. The idea of this modification involves the property A
(Prop.16, Part II.): and therefore (Coroll., Prop.7, Part II) the idea of this
modification, in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God
in so far as he is affected by the idea of the human body, that is (Prop. 13,
Part II.), in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind (Prop.13.
Part II.). And therefore (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.) this idea is also
adequate in the human mind. Q.e.d.
the property A – as common to the human body and certain
external bodies – can well be proposed – but it is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and this is the case – whatever A is referred to – i.e. – to
‘God’ – to man – or whatever else
the proposal of A – as a working hypothesis – can be useful
– but will only be useful –
will only have heuristic value – if it is understood as open
to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
as a proposal – that is held to be ‘adequate’ – that is
beyond question – beyond doubt and certain – it will have no logical value –
its only ‘value’ will be rhetorical –
which is to say –
it will be no more than an advertisement for pretentious
ignorance
‘The idea of this modification involves the property A
(Prop.16, Part II.): and therefore (Coroll., Prop.7, Part II) the idea of this
modification, in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God
in so far as he is affected by the idea of the human body, that is (Prop. 13,
Part II.), in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind (Prop.13.
Part II.). And therefore (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.) this idea is also
adequate in the human mind. Q.e.d.’
‘the idea of this modification’ – is a just the
proposal of this modification
the ‘modification’ – is a proposal – open to question – open
to doubt and uncertain
the idea of this modification – is from a logical point of
view – uncertain – and in Spinoza’s terms – inadequate
this proposal – ‘the idea of this modification’ – is not
in God / the unknown –
the unknown is not ‘affected’ – the unknown does not
‘constitute’
‘this idea’ – is a proposal – the ‘human mind’ – is a
proposal –
a proposal put by a propositional actor –
proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain –
and if you like – therefore – inadequate
Corollary. – Hence it follows that the mind is more
apt to perceive many things adequately, the more its body has things in common
with other bodies.
all perception / proposal is uncertain / inadequate –
regardless of any proposed commonality between the number of bodies proposed /
perceived
PROP. XL. Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which
are adequate in the mind, are also adequate.
an ‘idea’ is a proposal / propositional action –
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
‘ideas’/ proposals do not ‘follow in the mind’ –
there is no magical follow on from one proposition to
another
proposals are put in relation to each other –
and the putting of propositional relations is a propositional
action
propositional actions are the work of the propositional
actors
if by ‘adequate ideas’ – is meant ideas / proposals that are
not open to question – open to doubt – and are certain
these ideas – are not proposals – they are prejudices –
any proposal / propositional action – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – This is clear. For when we say that in the
mind ideas follow from other ideas which are adequate in the mind, we say
nothing else than (Coroll., Prop. 11 Part II) that an idea is granted in the
divine intellect itself whose cause is God, not in so far as he is infinite nor
in so far as he is affected by the ideas of many individual things, but in so
far only as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.
this ‘spin-out’ to the ‘divine intellect’ – is really just
an obfuscation and no more than a denial of propositional logic
for even should we accept this notion of divine intellect –
logically speaking – nothing changes –
ideas / proposals – wherever they are ‘located’ – are open
to question – open to doubt and uncertain
as for ‘the cause is God’ –
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
the unknown does not cause – or constitute – anything
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is just a metaphysical graveyard for his
failed philosophical theories
Note 1 – In these propositions I have explained the
cause of notions which are called common, and which are the fundamental
principles of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms
or notions which, would be advantageous to explain by
this method of ours. For from these it could be concluded
which notions are more useful than others, and which are scarcely of any value;
and, again, which are common to all, which are clear and distinct to those
alone who do not labour under misconceptions, and finally, which are
ill-founded. Then again, it would be concluded whence these notions are called
secondary, and consequently when the axioms which are founded on them, derive
their origin, and other points over which I meditated for some time. But as I
have decided to make another treatise of this, and as I am afraid of wearying
the reader by too much prolixity, I have decided to pass this over here.
Nevertheless, lest I should omit anything that is necessary to be known, I
shall briefly add the causes from which the terms called transcendental have
taken their origin, such as being, thing, something. These terms have arisen
from the fact that the human body, since it is limited, is only capable of
distinctly forming in itself a number of images (I have explained what is an
image in Note on Prop. 17. Part II): and if more than this number are formed,
the images begin to be confused; and if this number of images of which the body
is capable of forming in itself be much exceeded, all will become entirely
confused one with the other. Since this is so, it is clear from Coroll., Prop.
17 and Prop. 18, Part II., that the mind can imagine distinctly as many bodies
as images can be formed in its body at the same time. But when images become
quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly
without any distinction, and, so to speak, comprehends all under one attribute,
that is under the attribute of being, of thing, etc. This can also be deduced
from the fact that images are not always equally clear, and from other causes
analogous to this which it is not necessary to explain here; and for the
purpose which we wish to attain it suffices to consider one only. For all may
be reduced to this, that these terms signify idea extremely confused. And from
similar causes have arisen these notions which are called universal or general,
such as man, dog horse, etc. I mean so many images arise in the human body.
e.g., so many images of men are formed at the same time, that they overcome the
power of imagining, not altogether indeed, but to such an extent that the mind
cannot imagine small differences between individuals (e.g., colour, size, etc.)
and their fixed number, and only that in which all agree in so far as the body
is affected by them is distinctly imagined: for in that was the body most
affected by each individual, and this the mind expresses by the name of man,
and predicates concerning an infinite number of individuals. For as we have
said, it cannot imagine a fixed number of individuals. But it must be noted
that these notions are not formed by all in the same manner, but vary with each
individual according to the variation of the thing by which the body was most
often affected, and which the mind imagines or remembers the most easily. For
example those who have most admired men for their stature, by the name of man
will understand an animal of erect stature; those who are wont to regard men in
another way will form another common image of men, namely a laughing animal, or
a featherless biped animal, a reasoning animal, and each one will form
concerning the other things universal images of things according to the
disposition of his body. Wherefore it is not surprising that so many
controversies should have arisen among philosopher who wish to explain things
of nature merely by images of things.
‘In these propositions I have explained the cause of notions
which are called common, and which are the fundamental principles of our
ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions which,
would be advantageous to explain by this method of ours. For from these it
could be concluded which notions are more useful than others, and which are
scarcely of any value; and, again, which are common to all, which are clear and
distinct to those alone who do not labour under misconceptions,
and finally, which are ill-founded. Then again, it would be
concluded whence these notions are called secondary, and consequently when the
axioms which are founded on them, derive their origin, and other points over
which I meditated for some time. But as I have decided to make another treatise
of this, and as I am afraid of wearying the reader by too much prolixity, I
have decided to pass this over here.’
as far as I can see – the ‘explanation’ Spinoza gives of
‘the cause of those notions which are called common’ – is adequacy – and
adequacy has its cause in God –
it seems from the above – that Spinoza senses the
‘inadequacy’ of such an explanation
at least he seems to doubt that it is the whole truth
the logical reality is that we put such proposals – that the
putting of such proposals – is natural to human beings –
and fair enough that we might look to explain this –
but any explanation – as with such a proposal – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Nevertheless, lest I should omit anything that is necessary
to be known, I shall briefly add the causes from which the terms called
transcendental have taken their origin, such as being, thing, something. These
terms have arisen from the fact that the human body, since it is limited, is
only capable of distinctly forming in itself a number of images (I have
explained what is an image in Note on Prop. 17. Part II): and if more than this
number are formed, the images begin to be confused; and if this number of
images of which the body is capable of forming in itself be much exceeded, all
will become entirely confused one with the other.’
so according to Spinoza – these general notions /
transcendental terms – come about because of the limitation of the mind – with
respect to the number of images it can form – and the result is confusion
‘Since this is so, it is clear from Coroll., Prop. 17 and
Prop. 18, Part II., that the mind can imagine distinctly as many bodies as
images can be formed in its body at the same time. But when images become quite
confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any
distinction, and, so to speak, comprehends all under one attribute, that is
under the attribute of being, of thing, etc.’
and from this confusion of individual images – the mind – as
it were – jumps to transcendental terms such as ‘being’ and ‘thing’ –
which then become ‘catch all terms’ – for the confusion
we can ask how does this ‘jump’ from particular to general
take place?
Spinoza has no answer here – no explanation
interesting too – that Spinoza does not include in his
analysis here – his own principle transcendental terms – ‘attribute’ – ‘mode’ –
‘God’ –
for on this analysis – his ‘God’ – is just the metaphysical
dumping ground for confusion
be that as it may – Spinoza does not here successfully
distinguish particular and universal terms –
from a logical point of view – any term – is a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
so – on my view this universal / particular distinction has
no basis in logic
I think it is a matter of propositional focus – and propositional
utility –
I would suggest that – just as a matter of fact – as a
working fact of human propositional activity – we operate with different
propositional foci – a particular propositional focus and a general
propositional focus –
and that we have these propositional foci – because they are
useful – useful to us in negotiating of propositional reality
now my ‘explanation’ here – as with Spinoza’s explanation –
is of course – a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not
always equally clear, and from other causes analogous to this which it is not
necessary to explain here; and for the purpose which we wish to attain it
suffices to consider one only. For all may be reduced to this, that these terms
signify ideas extremely confused. And from similar causes have arisen these
notions which are called universal or general, such as man, dog horse, etc. I
mean so many images arise in the human body. e.g., so many images of men are
formed at the same time, that they overcome the power of imagining, not
altogether indeed, but to such an extent that the mind cannot imagine small
differences between individuals (e.g., colour, size, etc.) and their fixed
number, and only that in which all agree in so far as the body is affected by
them is distinctly imagined: for in that was the body
most affected by each individual, and this the mind expresses by the name of
man, and predicates concerning an infinite number of individuals.’
‘images’ – are proposals – proposals – open to question –
open to doubt and uncertain
we are not dealing with confusion – what we deal with is uncertainty
and it is not that ‘so many images of men are formed at the
same time… that the mind cannot imagine small differences between individuals…
and their fixed number’
we do not put ‘so many’ proposals – at the same time
what happens is – a proposal is put – and it is put
to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty is explored-
it is in the exploration of propositional uncertainty – that
other proposals are put – alternative proposals are put – ‘small differences’ –
are proposed – ‘number’ – is calculated
‘for in that was the body most affected by each individual,
and this the mind expresses by the name of man, and predicates concerning an
infinite number of individuals.’
‘an infinite number of individuals’?
if by ‘number’ – you mean a sign system for calculating /
counting – then an ‘infinite number’ – represents a propositional action that
by definition cannot be completed – effectively cannot be actually calculated –
cannot be counted –
in that sense there is no ‘infinite number’ –
it is theoretically possible to calculate the number of men
– existing – and even – those who have existed –
and whatever the number is – it is not this so called
‘infinite number’
as to – the proposal ‘man’ –
just what it represents – what it means – is open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘For as we have said, it cannot imagine a
fixed number of individuals. But
it must be noted that these notions are not formed by all in the same manner,
but vary with each individual according to the variation of the thing by which
the body was most often affected, and which the mind imagines or remembers the
most easily. For example those who have most
admired men for their stature, by the name of man will understand an animal of
erect stature; those who are wont to regard men in another way will form another
common image of men, namely a laughing animal, or a featherless biped animal, a
reasoning animal, and each one will form concerning the other things universal
images of things according to the disposition of his body. Wherefore it is
not surprising that so many controversies should have arisen among philosopher
who wish to explain things of nature merely by images of things.’
‘For as we have said, it cannot imagine a fixed number of
individuals.’
well – it can be a fixed number – it has to be a ‘fixed
number’ – if it is a number at all
‘But it must be noted that these notions are not formed by
all in the same manner, but vary with each individual according to the
variation of the thing by which the body was most often affected, and which the
mind imagines or remembers the most easily.’
in saying this – Spinoza is effectively recognizing ‘these
notions’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain
‘For example those who have most admired men for their
stature, by the name of man will understand an animal of erect stature; those
who are wont to regard men in another way will form another common image of
men, namely a laughing animal, or a featherless biped animal, a reasoning
animal, and each one will form concerning the other things universal images of
things according to the disposition of his body.’
yes – the term ‘man’ the proposal ‘man’ – the definition
of man – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Note II. – From all that has been said above it is
now clearly apparent that we perceive many things and form universal notions,
first, from individual things represented to our intellect mutilated, confused,
and without order (Coroll. Prop. 29, Part II), and therefore we are wont to
call such perceptions knowledge from vague or casual experience (cognitio ab
experientia vaga); second from signs, e.g., from the fact that we remember
certain things through having read or heard certain words and from certain ideas
of them similar to those through which we imagine things (Note, Prop. 18, Part
II.) Both these ways of regarding things I shall call hereafter knowledge of
the first kind (cognitio primi generis), opinion (opinio), or
imagination (imaginatio). Third, from the fact that we have common
notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (Coroll., Prop. 38,
Coroll. and Prop. 39 and Prop, 40, Part II.). And I shall call this reason (ratio)
and knowledge of the second kind (cognitio secondi generis). Besides
these two kinds of knowledge there is a third, as I shall show in what follows,
which we shall call intuition (scientia intuitiva). Now this kind of
knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain
attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I shall
illustrate these by one example. Let three numbers be given to find the fourth,
which is in the same proportion to the third as the second is to the
first. Tradesmen without hesitation
multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first: either
because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from the school
master without any proof, or because they have often tried it with very small
numbers, or by conviction of the proof of Prop. 19, Book VII., of Euclid’s
elements, namely the common property of proportional. But in very small numbers
there is no need of this, for when the numbers 1, 2, 3, are given, who is there
who could not see the fourth proportional is 6? and this is much clearer
because we conclude the fourth number from the same ratio which intuitively we
see the first bears to the second.
‘From all that has been said above it is now clearly
apparent that we perceive many things and form universal notions, first, from
individual things represented to our intellect mutilated, confused, and without
order (Coroll. Prop. 29, Part II), and therefore we are wont to call such
perceptions knowledge from vague or casual experience (cognitio ab
experientia vaga); second from signs, e.g., from the fact that we remember
certain things through having read or heard certain words and from certain
ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine things (Note, Prop. 18,
Part II.)’
our world – is propositional – we propose our reality
‘individual things’ – are proposals – ‘universal notions’ –
are proposals – ‘signs’ are proposals
as to the nature – basis – origin – explanation – of
proposal – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Both these ways of regarding things I shall call hereafter
knowledge of the first kind (cognitio primi generis), opinion (opinio),
or imagination (imaginatio). Third, from the fact that we have common
notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (Coroll., Prop. 38,
Coroll. and Prop. 39 and Prop, 40, Part II.). And I shall call this reason (ratio)
and knowledge of the second kind (cognitio secondi generis). Besides
these two kinds of knowledge there is a third, as I shall show in what follows,
which we shall call intuition (scientia intuitiva).’
there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge – knowledge – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
with Spinoza’s first and second kinds of knowledge – we have
a categorization of propositional knowledge
such propositional categorization – might be a useful way of
organizing propositional activity
however any such categorization – is open to question
‘Now this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes
of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I shall
illustrate these by one example. Let three numbers be given to find the fourth,
which is in the same proportion to the third as the second is to the
first. Tradesmen without hesitation
multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first: either
because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from the school
master without any proof, or because they have often tried it with very small
numbers, or by conviction of the proof of Prop. 19, Book VII., of Euclid’s
elements, namely the common property of proportionals. But in very small
numbers there is no need of this, for when the numbers 1, 2, 3, are given, who
is there who could not see the fourth proportional is 6? and this is much
clearer because we conclude the fourth number from the same ratio which
intuitively we see the first bears to the second.’
there are two modes of propositional action –
firstly – the critical mode – in which propositions are put
to question – put to doubt and their uncertainty explored –
and secondly – the game mode – where the propositional
action is rule-governed
in a rule governed propositional action – the rule(s) are not
put to question – the rules are followed
to play the game you play in accordance with the rules –
if you don’t play in accordance with the rules – there is no
game
mathematics – mathematical calculation – is a rule-governed
propositional action –
mathematics is a rule-governed game –
if you play this game – you play in accordance with its
rules
in the example given here by Spinoza of a numbers game – the
rule is that the fourth number is in the same proportion to the third as the
second is to the first –
you find the fourth number if you follow this rule
Euclid’s ‘proof’ – is simply a restatement of the rule –
namely ‘the common property of proportionals’
there is no intuition here – there is only an
understanding of the rule – and action in accordance with the rule
Spinoza’s third kind of ‘knowledge’ – is a propositional
game –
his – ‘adequate idea of the formal essence of certain
attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ – is a propositional
game
Spinoza’s ‘adequate idea’ – is a propositional game
all you ‘know’ when you ‘know’ a game – is the play
in accordance with its rules –
if we are going to talk in terms of ‘highest’ and ‘lowest’ –
this kind of ‘knowledge’ is not the ‘highest’ form of knowledge – it is – if
anything – the very lowest –
for it is propositional action without question – without
doubt – and without the exploration of uncertainty –
and as such is not in fact knowledge – rather it is
best described as play –
it is not knowing – it is playing
nevertheless – play is a principal mode of human action –
I suspect that we play games and do enjoy playing
games simply because they provide us with relief from the business of
knowledge – from critical propositional activity –
and it should be noted too – that we make games because they
provide useful models for organizing propositional action –
and in this respect – the game of games – is mathematics
human beings make games – human beings play games –
God does not make games – God does not play games – God is
not a game –
God is the unknown
PROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of
falsity; knowledge of the second and third kind is necessarily true.
Proof. – We said in the preceding note that all those
ideas which are inadequate and confused appertain to knowledge of the first
kind: and therefore (Prop. 35, Part II) this knowledge is the only cause of
falsity. Then as for knowledge of the second and third kinds, we said that
those ideas which are adequate appertain to it; therefore (Prop. 34, Part II.)
it is necessarily true, Q.e.d.
knowledge is proposal –
and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
truth and falsity are not properties of a proposition –
truth and falsity are propositional responses to a
subject proposal / proposition
you might say a ‘truth response’ – is a positive
response – and a ‘falsity response’ – a negative response
and as to – the nature of these responses – how they are to
be accounted for – how they are to be explained – how they are to be further
described
these matters are open to question – open to doubt – and are
uncertain
a proposal / proposition is true – if assented to –
false if dissented from
I take the view that we assent to a proposition – if
we believe we can proceed with it
and that we dissent from a proposition if our
assessment is that it has no actionable value
any proposed affirmation – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
and any proposed denial – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
we proceed – or not – in uncertainty
there is no necessity in propositional activity –
propositional activity – in whatever form it takes – is pure
contingency
against a standard of certainty – no proposal – no
proposition – is ‘adequate’
if adequacy equates to uncertainty – than any proposal /
proposition – held open to question – is ‘adequate’
however – once it is understood that logically speaking any
proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
we can ask – what logical value does this adequate /
inadequate distinction have?
PROP. XLII. Knowledge if the second kind and third kinds and
not of the first kind teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.
there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any organization of proposals – i.e. – propositions dealing
with opinion – propositions dealing with common notions – and intuitive
propositions – may have a use –
however – such a categorization does not bear
on the issue of truth and falsity – or the logical status of any proposition
‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ – are not properties of propositions –
however they are organized or categorized
there are no true or false propositions
truth and falsity are dispositional responses to a
proposal / proposition
what is termed a ‘true proposition’ – is that
proposition that I am – for whatever reason disposed to endorse or affirm
and this propositional response – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
what is termed a ‘false proposition’ – is that proposition I
am – for whatever reason disposed to reject or deny
and this propositional response is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
we can respond positively – or negatively to any proposal – any
proposition – however it is categorized
where there is a positive response – the proposition will be
entertained – and most likely proceeded with
where a negative response – the proposition will not be
entertained – or proceeded with
any propositional response is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
so – it is quite possible that what is regarded as a true
proposition under certain circumstances – will be viewed as false in a change
of circumstance –
and a proposition regarded as false in certain circumstances
– may well be endorsed in a different propositional context
whatever the propositional response – and whenever the
propositional response – that response – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ – are markers of uncertainty
Proof. – This proposition is clear of itself. For he
who would distinguish the true idea from the false must have an adequate idea
of what is true and false, that is (Note 2, Prop. 40 Part II.) must know the
true and false by the second and third kinds of knowledge.
the proposition may well be ‘clear’ – but it is not beyond
question – beyond doubt – and not certain
any ‘idea’ – that is any proposal – regarding ‘what
is true and false’ – cannot be determined a priori
what is ‘true and false’ – is an empirical matter –
you have to see how a proposition is responded to
– to see if it is held to be true or false –
that is see if it is affirmed or denied
propositions of the ‘second and third kinds of knowledge’ –
that is proposals that put forward ‘common notions’ – and propositions that are
proposed as ‘intuitive’ – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
a so called ‘adequate idea’ – as with any proposal –
is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain
PROP. XLIII. He who has a true idea, knows at the same time
that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt concerning the truth of the thing.
if you give your assent to proposal – you know you
have assented to it –
if you affirm a proposal – you know you affirm it
any proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
any proposal of assent – or dissent – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – A true idea in us is that which is adequate
in God (Coroll., Prop. 11) in so far as he is explained through the nature of
the human mind. let us suppose, them, that there is in God, in so far as he is
explained through the nature of the human mind, an adequate idea A. The idea of
this idea must necessarily be granted in God, and it refers to God in the same
manner as the idea A (Prop. 20, Part II, whose proof is universal in its
application). But the idea A is supposed to refer to God in so far as he is
explained through the nature of the human mind: therefore also the idea A must
refer to God in the same manner, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II), the
adequate idea of the idea A will be in the same mind as the adequate idea A:
and therefore he who has an adequate idea or (Prop. 34, Part II) who knows a
thing truly must at the same time have an adequate idea of his knowledge or a
true knowledge, that is (as is self-evident), he must at the same time be
certain. Q.e.d.
with this ‘idea of the idea’ – what is being proposed here –
is that the idea is an idea in God – and therefore ‘adequate’
now if the idea is adequate – why the ‘idea of the idea’?
why not just the idea is adequate – in God – and therefore
in man?
an ‘idea of an idea’ – is a ‘proposal of a proposal’ –
the propositional act – is not duplicated – it stands on its
own
this ‘idea of an idea’ makes no sense – and for Spinoza – I
think – clogs up the works – with rhetoric
does Spinoza want to say that ‘adequacy’ equates to
uncertainty?
quite clearly not – for he concludes here that ‘true
knowledge … must at the same time be certain’
knowledge – is anything but certain
and – ‘he who has a true idea’ – is he who has affirmed a
proposal – and obviously knows he has affirmed it –
he also knows that the proposal he has affirmed – is open to
question
and he knows his proposal of affirmation – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
knowledge is proposal –
and any proposal / knowledge – is uncertain
Note. – In the note of Prop.
21 of this part I explained what was the idea of an idea, but it must be noted
that the foregoing proposition is sufficiently manifest of itself. For no on
who has a true idea can be ignorant of the fact that a true idea involves the
greatest certainty. For to have a true idea means nothing else than to know
something perfectly or best; nor can one doubt of this unless he thinks that an
idea is something mute like a picture on a painting canvas and not a mode of
thinking, namely understanding itself. And who, I ask,
can know that he understands anything unless he first understands the thing
itself? I mean, who can know that he is certain of anything unless he be first
certain of that thing? What then can be more clear or more certain than a true
idea to be a standard of truth? Clearly, just as light shows itself and
darkness also, so truth is a standard of itself and falsity. And thus I think I
have sufficiently answered these questions: namely,
that if a true idea, in so far as it is said only to agree with its ideal, be
distinguished from a false idea, then it will have no more reality or
perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished by their intrinsic
names) and consequently not even a man who has a true idea has any advantage
over one who only has false one. Then how does it
come to pass that men have false ideas? And again how can any one be certain
that he has ideas which agree with their ideals? thus I think I have
answered these questions. For as to the difference
between a true idea and a false idea, it can be seen in Prop, 35 of this part,
that one bears the same relation to the other as being bears to non-being:
the causes or sources of falsity I have most clearly shown in Prop, 19 to 35,
with the note on that proposition. And from these it is also apparent what is
the distinction between a man who has a true idea and one who has false ideas,
as to what refers to the last question, namely, in what way can a man know that
he has an idea which agrees with its ideal. I have shown more than sufficiently
well that it arises from this alone, that he has an
idea which agrees with its ideal, or that truth is its own
standard. add to these that the mind, in so far as it truly perceives a thing,
is a part of the infinite intellect of God (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II): and therefore it is as necessary that the clear and
distinct ideas of the mind are true as it is that those of God are true.
‘In the note of Prop. 21 of this part I explained what was
the idea of an idea, but it must be noted that the foregoing proposition is
sufficiently manifest of itself. For no
on who has a true idea can be ignorant of the fact that a true idea involves
the greatest certainty.’
yes – the ‘foregoing proposition is sufficiently manifest of
itself’ – and this notion of ’idea of an idea’ – only confuses the matter with
unnecessary duplication
we don’t propose a ‘proposal of a proposal’ – we just put
the proposal
and as for ‘knowing’ – ‘with the greatest certainty’ – this
is just rhetoric –
rhetoric designed to promote the absurd epistemology of
certainty
‘And who, I ask, can
know that he understands anything unless he first understands the thing itself?
I mean, who can know that he is certain of anything unless he be first certain
of that thing? What then can be more clear or more certain than a true idea to
be a standard of truth?’
what an argument!
‘understanding the thing itself’ – just is to recognise that
the ‘thing’ / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is
uncertain
‘a true idea to be the standard of truth’ –
you’ve got to be kidding –
a circular argument – if ever there was one
the ‘standard of truth’ – is whatever grounds are proposed
by a propositional actor for the affirmation of a proposition –
and that ‘standard’ of course – is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
and anyone – of any intelligence will be aware of this –
when they affirm (or dissent from) a proposition
truth is a matter of doubt –
truth is uncertain
‘that if a true idea, in so far as it is said only to agree
with its ideal, be distinguished from a false idea, then it will have no more
reality or perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished by their
intrinsic names) and consequently not even a man who has a true idea has any
advantage over one who only has false one.’
is there any advantage in affirming a proposition – as
against denying it?
prime facie – no
affirmed or denied – the proposition – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
and how is ‘advantage’ to be determined?
surely – a matter – open to question
‘Then how does it come to pass that men have false ideas?
And again how can anyone be certain that he has ideas which agree with their
ideals?’
well – it is not that someone ‘has false ideas’ –
one’s ideas – that is one’s proposals / propositions – are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
one’s ideas are uncertain
as to why someone denies a proposition – well that is
effectively an empirical matter – ask them
how can anyone ‘be certain that he has ideas that agree with
their ideal’?
the short answer is – from a logical point of view – one
cannot be certain
certainty – is illogical –
a claim of certainty is a stand for prejudice and ignorance
one’s ‘idea’ is what one proposes
and that proposed is the ‘ideal’
there is no logical distinction between idea and ideal
all that we operate with is the proposal –
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘For as to the difference between a true idea and a false
idea, it can be seen in Prop, 35 of this part, that one bears the same relation
to the other as being bears to non-being:’
a proposal / proposition that is denied – is not a
non-existent proposition –
to be denied – it has to exist
it might not – under the circumstances – be put to use –
however – the proposition does not cease to exist because it
has been denied
‘and therefore it is as necessary that the clear and
distinct ideas of the mind are true as it is that those of God are true.’
by all means put forward ‘clear and distinct ideas’ –
but any idea – so called – ‘clear and distinct’ – or
– indeed unclear and indistinct – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
the unknown has no idea – clear – distinct – or confused
PROP. XLIV. It is not the nature of reason to regard things
as contingent but necessary.
it is the nature of reason to critically evaluate
propositions / propositional actions–
to put proposals / propositional actions – to question – to
doubt – and to explore their uncertainty
which is to say any proposal in this regard – will be – from
a logical point of view – uncertain – that is – contingent
‘things’ are proposals –
any proposal is open to question
that which is ‘necessary’ – can only be that which is
‘protected’ from criticism
‘necessity’ – has no logical basis – it is at best – a
rhetorical notion – at worst – plain dumb ignorance
Proof. – It is the nature of reason to perceive
things truly (Prop. 41, Part II), namely (Ax 6, Part I.), as they are in
themselves, that is (Prop. 29, Part I.), not as contingent but necessary.
reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and
the exploration of uncertainty
a proposal – a proposition is true – if assented to – false
if dissented from
any proposal of assent or dissent – is open to question
a ‘thing’ – is a proposal –
a proposal can be considered independently of a
propositional context – or it can be considered in a propositional context –
however considered – it is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
there is no necessity in propositional reality
propositional reality – is uncertain – is contingent
propositions can be
placed in context
past – present – future – are propositional contexts –
however – a proposition can also be considered – as it were
– in itself – without context
whether considered in a context or not – a proposition is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and whether a proposition is described as ‘imaginary’ – or
not –
the proposition is – logically speaking – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
all propositions are uncertain – all propositions are
contingencies
Note. – In what manner this comes about I shall
explain in a few words. we have shown above (Prop. 17, Part II., and its
Coroll.) that the mind imagines things as present always to itself, though they
may not exist, unless causes arose which cut off their present existence. Then
(Prop. 18, Part II) we showed that if the human body has once been affected at
the same time by two external bodies, whenever the mind subsequently recalled
one of them it would immediately recall the other, that is, it would regard
both as present to itself unless causes arose which cut off their present
existence. Moreover, no one doubts but that we imagine time from the very fact
that we imagine some bodies to be moved slower or faster than others, or
equally fast. Let us then suppose a boy who yesterday
first of all saw Peter in the morning, at mid-day Paul, and in the evening
Simon, and to-day again saw Peter in the evening. From Prop. 18 this part it is
clear that as soon as he sees the morning light he will imagine the sun to run
the same course as it did the day before, and will imagine a whole day: with
the morning he will imagine Peter, with noon Paul, and with the evening Simon;
that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon with relation to
future time: and, on the other hand, if in the evening hour he sees Simon, he
will refer Peter and Paul to past time by imagining them at the same time as he
does past time, and the more often he sees them in this order the more certain
will his imaginings be. But if at any time it comes
to pass that instead of Simon he sees James, then the next morning he will
imagine with the evening time now Simon and now James, but not both at once,
for he is not supposed to have seen the two at the same time in the evening,
but one of them. And so his imaginings will waver,
and with the future evening time he
will imagine now
this one and now that one, that is, he will regard them in the future
neither as certain,
but both as contingent. And this wavering of the imagination will be the same
if the imagination be of things which we regard in the same manner with
reference to the past or present time, and consequently we imagine things as
contingent whether they relate to present, past, or future time.
‘In what manner
this comes about I shall explain in a few words. we have shown above (Prop. 17,
Part II., and its Coroll.) that the mind imagines things as present always to
itself, though they may not exist, unless causes arose which cut off their
present existence.’
‘the mind imagines
things as present to itself’ –
this is to say –
proposals / propositions – are put
‘mind’ – is a
name for propositional action
that which is
proposed – is that which exists –
we propose
existence –
any proposal – any
proposed ‘existence’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –
any proposal is
open to further proposal – is open to further description
as for ‘the mind
imagines’ –
this is to say a
proposal is put – and further described as ‘imaginary’
that a ‘present
existence’ is ‘cut off’ – is to say – the proposal is dropped from
consideration
‘Then (Prop. 18,
Part II) we showed that if the human body has once been affected at the same
time by two external bodies, whenever the mind subsequently recalled one of
them it would immediately recall the other, that is, it would regard both as
present to itself unless causes arose which cut off their present existence.’
the propositional
actor is affected by proposals / propositions put
an external body is
a proposal
the propositional
actor is not affected by two proposals / propositions ‘at the same time’
one proposal will
follow another in time – one affect will follow another
proposals are put –
whether ‘recalled’ or not – and what their relation to other proposals is – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
a proposals
existence is ‘cut off’ – if it is dropped from consideration
‘Moreover, no one
doubts but that we imagine time from the very fact that we imagine some bodies
to be moved slower or faster than others, or equally fast.’
‘time’ – here – is
a propositional game – a measurement game –
we can play this
game to distinguish propositions and to calculate their relations –
‘Let us then
suppose a boy who yesterday first of all saw Peter in the morning, at mid-day
Paul, and in the evening Simon, and to-day again saw Peter in the evening. From
Prop. 18 this part it is clear that as soon as he sees the morning light he
will imagine the sun to run the same course as it did the day before, and will
imagine a whole day: with the morning he will imagine Peter, with noon Paul,
and with the evening Simon; that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and
Simon with relation to future time: and, on the other hand, if in the evening
hour he sees Simon, he will refer Peter and Paul to past time by imagining them
at the same time as he does past time, and the more often he sees them in this
order the more certain will his imaginings be.’
when the boy sees
the morning light – he may propose ‘Peter’ – ‘Paul’ – ‘Simon’ – as he
did previously –
but there is no
necessity here –
if he does – it
will be a coincidence –
and of course –
when he sees the morning sun – he may propose a whole different set of
propositions
the real point here
– is that we don’t know – what propositional reality – the morning light
will bring –
the matter is open
to question – is uncertain
past – present –
and future – are useful propositional categories – that we employ to order to
organise our proposals – to order our propositional life
his ‘seeing them’
in this order – is proposing them in this order –
proposing and
re-proposing – does not amount to certainty
it is only propositional
duplication
‘But if at any time
it comes to pass that instead of Simon he sees James, then the next morning he
will imagine with the evening time now Simon and now James, but not both at
once, for he is not supposed to have seen the two at the same time in the evening,
but one of them.’
again – he may
imagine / propose the evening time with Simon and now James – or he may not –
the matter is not
predictable – it is uncertain
i.e. – out of the
blue – for some reason – Andrew might drop in –
or perhaps – no one
is proposed – no one is there – and he just contemplates / proposes the stars
Spinoza’s theory of
imagination here – it seems – lacks imagination
‘And so his
imaginings will waver, and with the future evening time he will imagine now
this one and now that one, that is, he will regard them
in the future neither as certain, but both as contingent. And this wavering
of the imagination will be the same if the imagination be of things which we
regard in the same manner with reference to the past or present time, and
consequently we imagine things as contingent whether they relate to present,
past, or future time.’
it is not that
‘imaginings will waver’ – rather that different proposals can be
entertained – simply because propositional reality – is uncertain
a proposal – a
proposition – in any context – however described – however classified – is open
to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Corollary II. – It is the nature of reason to
perceive things under a certain species of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis
specie).
regardless of any proposed context in which it is placed –
or any proposed circumstance in which it is put – a proposition stands open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – It is the nature of reason to regard things
not as contingent, but as necessary (prev. Prop.). It perceives this necessity
of things (Prop. 41. Part II.) truly, that is Ax. 6, Part I.). as it is in
itself. But (Prop. 16, Part I.) this necessity of things is the necessity
itself of the eternal nature of God. Therefore it is the nature of reason to
regard things under this species of eternity. Add to this that the bases of
reason are notions (Prop. 38, Part II.) which explain these things which are common
to all, and which (Prop. 37, Part II.) explain the essence of no individual
thing: and which therefore must be conceived without any relation of time,
under a certain species of eternity. Q.e.d.
‘things’ are proposals – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘things’ – are uncertain – not necessary
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
‘eternity’ – is a term for the absence of temporal context –
the logic of a proposal / proposition – is that it can be
assessed – that is – put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty
explored – in the absence of any context
reason – is the critical activity – of question – of
doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
with regard to ‘things common to all’ –
any proposal as to what is common to all – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XLV. Every idea of every body or individual thing
actually existing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.
an idea – is a proposal –
what exists is what is proposed – by a
propositional actor
and what is proposed / exists – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
existence is uncertain
logically speaking – there is no ‘propositional necessity’ –
there is only – propositional uncertainty
as to ‘the eternal and infinite essence of God’ –
‘eternity’ – is the absence of temporal context –
an ‘infinite essence’ – is an undefined essence –
and an undefined essence – is meaningless
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
we propose against the unknown – to make known –
we put proposals / ideas – to dispel the unknown
and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain
Proof. – The idea of an individual thing existing
necessarily involves the essence of that thing and its existence (Coroll.,
Prop. 8. Part II). But individual things (Prop. 15. Part I) cannot be conceived
without God: and foreasmuch as (Prop.6. Part II) they have God for a cause in
so far as he is considered under the attribute, of which these things are
modes, their ideas must necessarily (Ax. 4, Part I) involve the conception of
their attribute, that is (Def. 6, Part I.) they must involve the eternal and infinite
essence of God. Q.e.d.
the idea of an individual thing existing – is the
proposal of an individual thing
as to its essence –
any proposed ‘essence’ – is a proposed description – and any
description – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
cannot be conceived without God?
God is a name for the unknown – we propose in response to
the unknown
as to the ‘cause’ of any proposal –
the propositional actor is the cause of any proposal /
propositional action
an ‘attribute’ is a description – a proposed description
of a thing proposed
an ‘attribute’ – is open to question
‘infinite essence of God’ –
‘essence’ – is a proposed description –
an ‘infinite description’ – would be a description – that
has no end –
any description – if it is to be formed – must come to an
end – otherwise there is no description
so – there cannot be an infinite description
however – you may well say that the unknown – is open to endless
proposal – endless possible description
Note. – By existence I do not mean here duration,
that is existence in so far as it is conceived abstractly and as a certain form
of quantity. I speak of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to
individual things by reason of the fact that they follow from the eternal
necessity of the nature of God, infinite in number and in infinite ways (vide
Prop. 16, Part I). I speak, I say, of the very existence of things in so far as
they are in God. For although each one is determined by another individual thing
for existing in a certain manner, yet the force wherewith each of them persists
in existing follows form the eternal necessity of the nature of God. Concerning
which see Coroll., Prop. 24, Part I.
what exists is what is proposed –
a proposition exists – for as long as it is entertained –
a proposal is not an abstraction – a proposal is an action
a proposal is not a ‘quantity’ –
a ‘quantity’ – is that which can be measured –
‘measurement’ – is a rule-governed propositional game
a propositional game is rule governed –
as played – it is not open to question – open to
doubt – or uncertain
a proposal is not rule-governed – a proposal is not
a game –
a proposal – is an action – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
nothing ‘follows from’ the unknown
nothing is in the unknown
a ‘thing’ is a proposal –
a proposal is not determined by another proposal
propositional action is undetermined –
proposals do not ‘persist’ – proposals are put – and as put
– exist
the existence of a proposal – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite
essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect.
knowledge is proposal –
any proposal / knowledge – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘adequate’ – is meant ‘certain’ – there is no
‘adequate’ knowledge
as for ‘perfect’ – this is just a synonym for ‘certain’ –
‘perfect’ – has no logical value – its only value is rhetorical
‘the eternal and infinite essence of God’ – is a proposal –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘God’ is a name for the unknown –
the unknown has no properties
‘the eternal’ – is the absence of temporal reference –
Proof. – The proof of the previous proposition is of
universal application, and whether the thing be considered as a part or a
whole, its idea, whether considered as a part or a whole (prev. Prop.) involves
the eternal and infinite essence of God. Wherefore that which gives knowledge
of the eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, and equally in
part as in whole (Prop. 38. Part II.) this knowledge will be adequate.
a ‘thing’ – is a proposal –
an ‘idea’ – is a proposal –
whether a proposal is considered as a part or a whole –
it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘God is a name for the unknown
the unknown has no properties
logically speaking - what is common to all – to all
proposals – is that proposal / propositional action – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
knowledge is proposal –
knowledge is uncertain
PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
eternal and infinite essence of God.
the ‘human mind’ – is a name for propositional action
‘knowledge’ – is proposal – is propositional
action
all knowledge / proposal – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
from a logical point of view ‘adequate knowledge’ is –
‘uncertain knowledge’
‘God’ is a name for the unknown –
the unknown has no essence
the unknown has no characteristics
Proof. – The human mind has ideas (Prop. 22, Part
II.) from which (Prop. 23, Part II.) it perceives itself and its bodies (Prop.
19, Part II.) and (Coroll, Prop. 16 and 17, Part II.) external bodies as
actually existing; and therefore (Prop. 45 and46, Part II.) it has adequate
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.e.d.
‘ideas’ are proposals
propositional actors have ideas – that is put proposals
a proposal – is knowledge
the propositional actor knows he / she is putting a proposal
what exists is what is proposed
an ‘external body’ – is a proposal
‘God’ is a name for the unknown –
the unknown has no essence
‘Hence we see that the infinite essence of God and
his eternity are known to all.’
nothing ‘follows’ here –
what we can say is that ‘infinite essence’ – amounts to
‘undefined essence’ – which is to say – no essence
and ‘eternity’ – is a term for the absence of temporal
context –
as to what is ‘known to all’ – this is a ridiculous notion
what is known is what is proposed
‘known to all’ – would be that which is proposed by all –
it is an empirical question – as to what people propose –
and the idea that they all put the one proposition – is
absurd
‘But as all things are in God, and through him are
conceived, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge many things which
we may adequately know and therefore form that third kind of knowledge of which
we spoke in Note 2, Prop, 40, Part II., and of the excellence and use of which
we shall occasion \to speak in the fifth part.’
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
nothing follows from the unknown – and there can be no
deductions from the unknown –
any knowledge – any ‘kind’ of knowledge – is proposal –
and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
if by ‘adequate’ – is meant ‘uncertain’
then all knowledge is ‘adequate’
‘But that men have knowledge not so clear of God as they
have of common notions arises from the fact that they cannot imagine God as
they do bodies, and that they affix the name of God to images of things which
they are accustomed to see, and this men can scarcely avoid, for they are
continually affected by external bodies.’
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
the unknown is the absence of image
‘Now many errors consist of this alone, that we do not apply
names rightly to things. For when one says that lines which are drawn from the
centre of a circle to the circumference are unequal, he means at least at the
time, something different by circle than mathematicians’
any name – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
there is no ‘right’ application of any proposal
mathematics is a rule-governed propositional game –
if you don’t play the game in accordance with its rules –
you don’t play the game – there is no game
anyone who says that lines drawn from the centre of a circle
to the circumference are unequal – doesn’t understand the rules of the circle
game –
they just don’t know how to play the game
‘Thus when men make mistakes in calculation they have
different numbers in their heads than those on paper. Wherefore if you could
see their minds they do not err; they seem to err, however, because we think
they have the same numbers in their minds as on the paper. If this were not so
we should not believe that they made
mistakes any more than I thought a man in error whom I heard
the other day shouting that his hall had flown into his neighbour’s chicken,
for his mind seemed sufficiently clear on the subject.’
calculation is a rule-governed propositional game –
you either play according to the rules of this game – or you
don’t
if you don’t follow the rules – you don’t calculate
as to the man shouting in the hall etc. –
he is not playing a rule-governed propositional game –
he is putting a proposal –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘And hence have arisen very many controversies, for men
either do not explain their own minds, or do not rightly interpret the minds of
others. For, in truth, while they flatly contradict themselves, they think now
one thing, now another, so that there may not be found in them the errors and
absurdities which they find in others.’
well – I think men can and do explain their own proposals –
and of course they interpret the proposals of others –
the hard logical reality is that my explanations of my
proposals – as with my interpretations of the proposals of others – are
proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we do not deal with ‘errors’ – we deal with uncertainties
PROP. XLVIII. There is in no mind absolute or free will. but
the mind is determined for willing this or that by a cause which is determined
in its turn by another cause, and this one again by another and so on to
infinity.
Proof. – The mind is a fixed and determined mode of
thinking (Prop. 11. Part II.), and therefore (Coroll. 2. Prop. 17, Part I.)
cannot be the free cause of its actions, or it cannot have the absolute faculty
of willing and unwilling: but for willing this or that it must be determined
(Prop, 28, Part I.) by a cause which is determined (prop. 28, Part I.) by a
cause which is determined by another, and this again by another, etc. Q.e.d.
this causal argument is a self-defeating – it collapses on
itself –
for the ‘end result’ – infinity – means there is no cause –
and all you have with the infinity argument is mindless
propositional repetition
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –
mindless propositional repetition is not propositional
action –
it’s wheels spinning in a gravel road’
‘will’ – is a name for propositional action
our freedom consists in our capacity for critical evaluation
–
the propositional actor is free to the extent that he / she
puts his / her proposals / propositional actions to question – to doubt – and
to the extent propositional uncertainty is explored
propositional action is only fixed – if it is not critically
evaluated
Note. – In the
same manner it may be shown that there cannot be found in the mind an absolute
faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. Whence it follows that these
and such like faculties are either entirely fictitious, or nothing else than
metaphysical or general entities, which we are wont to form from individual
things: therefore intellect or will have reference in the same manner to this
or that idea, or to this or that volition as “stoneness” to this or that stone,
or man to Peter and Paul. But the reason why men think themselves free I have
explained in the appendix of Part I. But before I go any further, let this be
noted, that I understand by will the faculty by which the mind affirms or
denies what is true or false, and not the desire by which the mind takes a
liking or an aversion to anything. Now after we have shown that these faculties
are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from the individual things
from which we formed them, we must then inquire whether these volitions are anything
else than the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there can be
found in the mind any affirmation or negation save that which the idea, in so
far as it is an idea, involves, on which subject see the following proposition
and Def.3. Part II., lest the thought of pictures should occur. For I do not
understand by ideas, images which are formed at the back of the eye, if you
will, in the centre of the brain, but conceptions of thought.
‘In the same manner it may be shown that there cannot be
found in the mind an absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc.
Whence it follows that these and such like faculties are either entirely
fictitious, or nothing else than metaphysical or general entities, which we are
wont to form from individual things:’
understanding –
understanding rests in the critical evaluation of proposal /
propositional action
desiring – loving etc – are different names of – different
descriptions of –
propositional action
‘therefore intellect or will have reference in the same
manner to this or that idea, or to this or that volition as “stoneness” to this
or that stone, or man to Peter and Paul.’
‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action
‘will’ is a name for propositional action
propositional action
220.
an ‘idea’ – is a proposal / propositional action
‘stoneness’ – a description of the proposal ‘stone’
‘peter’ and ‘paul’ – names of propositional actors
‘But the reason why men think
themselves free I have explained in the appendix of Part I. But before I go
any further, let this be noted, that I understand by will the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is
true or false, and not the desire by which the mind takes a liking or an
aversion to anything.’
men are free –
we are free to question – free to doubt – free to explore
propositional uncertainty
our freedom rest in propositional uncertainty
‘the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is
true or false, and not the desire by which the mind takes a liking or an
aversion to anything.’
a proposition is true if affirmed
a proposition is
false – if denied –
any proposal of affirmation – or denial – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and any proposed explanation of affirmation or denial
– is open to question
here Spinoza gives the name ‘will’ – to proposed
explanations of affirmation and denial – though he wants to exclude ‘liking’
and ‘aversion’ as explanations
‘liking’ and ‘aversion’ are just different names for
affirmation and denial
the logical reality is that one can affirm or deny a
proposition – for whatever reason
and any proposal of affirmation or denial is open to
question – open to doubt and is uncertain
‘Now after we have shown that these faculties are general
notions, which cannot be distinguished from the individual things from which we
formed them, we must then inquire whether these volitions are anything else
than the ideas of things.’
a question for Spinoza here –
if these general notions cannot be distinguished from
individual things – then are they not just individual things?
on the face of it – this doesn’t make sense – for as a
matter of fact we propose individual things – and we propose general
notions –
that is – we make two different proposals and recognise the
difference
are general ideas – ideas of things?
‘general ideas’ – are proposals – that function as organisational
proposals
and they are – as with any proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
‘We must inquire, I say, whether there can be found in the
mind any affirmation or negation save that which the idea, in so far as it is
an idea, involves, on which subject see the following proposition and Def.3.
Part II., lest the thought of pictures should occur. For I do not understand by
ideas, images which are formed at the back of the eye, if you will, in the
centre of the brain, but conceptions of thought.’
what we deal with logically speaking is proposals –
a proposal affirmed – is true – a proposal denied is false –
any proposal of affirmation or denial – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
yes – you can describe proposals as ‘ideas’ – but the
description – as with any description – is just dressing for ‘proposal’
as to ‘pictures and images’ –
a ‘picture’ is a proposal – an ‘image’ – is a proposal –
proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
proposals that can be affirmed – that can be denied –
a ‘conception of thought’ – is a proposal – open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation
and negation save that which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves.
the mind is a name for propositional action
affirmation and negation – are the propositional actions –
a proposal can be assented to or dissent from – for whatever
reason –
assent or dissent are propositional action put in relation
to a subject proposal –
propositional actions of assent or dissent – as with the
subject proposal – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘volition’ – is a name for propositional action
Proof. – There is not in the mind (prev. Prop.) an absolute faculty
of willing and unwilling, but only individual volitions such as this or
that affirmation and this or that negation. Let
us conceive then the individual volition, namely the mode of thinking, whereby
the mind affirms that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
The affirmation involves the conception or idea of the triangle, that is
without the idea of the triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same
when I say that A involves the conception of B. Then this affirmation (Ax. 3
Part II. cannot be without the idea of the triangle. Therefore this affirmation
cannot exist or be conceived without the idea of the triangle. Moreover, this
idea of the triangle must involve the same affirmation, namely that its three
angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore, vice versa also, this
idea of the triangle cannot exist or be conceived without this affirmation: and
therefore (Def. 2 Part II.) this affirmation appertains to the essence of the
idea of the triangle, nor is anything else than that. And
what we have said of this volition (for it was selected at random) can be said
of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q.e.d.
‘Let us conceive then the individual volition, namely the
mode of thinking, whereby the mind affirms that three angles of a triangle are
equal to two right angles. The affirmation involves the conception or idea of
the triangle, that is without the idea of the triangle
it cannot be conceived.’
Spinoza has this all wrong
firstly – there are two modes of propositional activity –
the critical mode – and the game mode
in the critical mode proposals – propositions are put to
question – put to doubt – and their uncertainty – explored
in the game made – we deal with rule governed constructions
–
when you play a rule-governed propositional game – you do
not put the rules of the game to question – to doubt – the rules as such are
not uncertain
if you play the game – you play in accordance with the rules
–
if you don’t play in accordance with the rules – there is no
game
mathematics and geometry are rule governed propositional
games
the triangle is a rule governed propositional game
that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right
angles – is a calculation rule within the rule of the triangle
affirmation – or denial are propositional responses within
the critical mode of propositional action
there is no affirmation or denial with respect to
propositional games
a game is neither true – nor false – a game is played – or
not played –
if played – played – in accordance with its rule
furthermore – in relation to the critical mode – the
affirmation does not involve the conception of the proposal
the proposal is neither true nor false as put –
the proposal is open – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
whether it is true or false – affirmed or denied – is a
separate – distinct – propositional action
this ‘volition’ –
that is ‘such as this or that affirmation and this or that negation’ –
is a proposal
of affirmation or negation
and this ‘volition’
is not relevant to propositional games –
however – in the
critical context – what can be said of this ‘volition’ / proposal – can be said
of any other ‘volition’ – namely that it is a proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
‘that is without the idea of the triangle it cannot be
conceived.’
the idea – is the conception of the triangle – that is the
conception of a rule governed propositional game –
a game within the complex of games and rules that make up
the game and rules of mathematics
Corollary. – Will and intellect are one and the same
thing.
Proof. – Will and intellect are nothing but
individual volitions and ideas (Prop. 48. Part II., and Note thereon). But an
individual volition and idea (prev. Prop.,) are one and the same thing.
Therefore will and intellect are one and the same thing. Q.e.d.
‘will’ and ‘intellect’ are different names for propositional
action
[The following is a long note – I will write my commentary
as we go through it – rather than at the end of it.]
Note. – We have thus removed the cause to which error
is commonly attributed. For we have shown above that falsity consists solely in
the privation of knowledge involved in mutilated and confused ideas. Wherefore a false idea, in so far as it is false, does not
involve certainty. Thus when we say a man acquiesces in what is false,
and that he has no
doubts concerning it, we do not say that he is certain but merely that he does
not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false because there are no reasons
which might cause his imagination to waver. On this subject, see Prop.
44 Part II. Thus although a man is supposed to adhere to what is false, yet we
never say that he is certain. For by certainty we understand something positive
(Prop. 43, Part II., and its Note), not a privation of doubt. By the privation
of certainty we understand falsity. But for the further explanation of the
preceding proposition there are several warnings yet to be made. Next, it
remains for me to answer any objections which may be made to this our doctrine.
And finally to remove any scruples I have though it worth while to point out
some of the advantages of this doctrine: I say some, for they will be better
understood from what we shall say in the fifth part.
‘For we have shown above that falsity consists solely in the
privation of knowledge involved in mutilated and confused ideas.’
‘falsity’ – as the ‘privation of knowledge’?
this argument shows that Spinoza has no grip on truth and
falsity –
for if there is no knowledge – there is nothing that is true
– nothing that is false
as to ‘mutilated and confused ideas’ –
‘mutilated’ – is over-doing it – and ‘confused’ – begs
analysis
an ‘idea’ is a proposal – a proposal – described as ‘idea’ –
for whatever reason
any proposal is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain –
the exploration of propositional uncertainty – may result in
‘confusion’ – but any so called ‘confusion’ – is a door to propositional
exploration
‘Wherefore a false idea, in so far as it is false, does not
involve certainty. Thus when we say a man acquiesces in what is false, and that
he has no doubts concerning it, we do not say that he is certain but merely
that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false because there
are no reasons which might cause his imagination to waver.’
‘Wherefore a false idea, in so far as it is false, does not
involve certainty.’
a false idea / proposal – is a proposal that is denied –
any proposal of denial – is open to question – open to doubt
– and is uncertain
if you dissent from a proposition – deny it – you do not
‘acquiesce’ – in it
you discount it
[Note continued]
I begin then with the first point, and warn readers to make
an accurate distinction between idea, or a conception of the mind, and the
images of things which we imagine. Then it is necessary to distinguish between
ideas and words by which we
point out things. For these three, namely images, words and
ideas, are by most people either entirely confused or not distinguished with
sufficient accuracy or care, and hence they are entirely ignorant of the fact
that too know this doctrine of the will is highly necessary both for
philosophic speculation and for the wise ordering of life. Those who think that
idea consist of images which are formed in us by the concourse of bodies,
persuade themselves that those ideas of things like which we can form no image
in the mind are not ideas, but fabrications which we invent by our own free
will; they therefore regard ideas a lifeless pictures on a board, and
preoccupied thus with this misconception they do not see that idea, in so far
as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Then those who confuse
words with ideas, or with the affirmation that the idea involves, think that
they can wish something contrary to what they feel. Anyone can easily rid
himself of these misconceptions if he pays attention to the nature of thought
which least involves the conception of extension; and therefore he will clearly
understand that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) does not consist in
the image of anything nor in words. For the essence of words and images is constituted
solely by bodily motions which least involve the conception of thought
‘I begin then with the first point, and warn readers to make
an accurate distinction between idea, or a conception of the mind, and the
images of things which we imagine. Then it is necessary to distinguish between
ideas and words by which we point out things. For these three, namely images,
words and ideas, are by most people either entirely confused or not
distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence they are entirely
ignorant of the fact that too know this doctrine of the will is highly necessary
both for philosophic speculation and for the wise ordering of life.’
we propose – and we describe or characterize our proposals –
one such description / characterization is ‘idea’
‘a conception of the mind’ – is a further characterization
of the proposal ‘idea’
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional activity
another description / characterization of a proposal is
‘image’
an image is a proposal
as to words – words are proposals
propositional reality – as a matter of fact – throws up
different descriptions / characterizations of the proposal
these descriptions / characterizations have different uses –
serve different propositions functions –
and in different propositional structures – i.e. –
philosophic theories – they are given further precise and distinctive
description and characterization
any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain –
which means any description / characterization – is open to
question –
and this remains the case regardless of how these different
descriptions / characterizations are configured
‘Those who think that idea consist of images which are
formed in us by the concourse of bodies, persuade themselves that those ideas
of things like which we can form no image in the mind are not ideas, but
fabrications which we invent by our own free will; they therefore regard ideas
as lifeless pictures on a board, and preoccupied thus with this misconception
they do not see that idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves affirmation or
negation.’
an ‘idea’ is a proposal –
an ‘image’ is a proposal –
a proposal does not ‘involve’ affirmation or negation
affirmation and denial are not properties of proposals – of
propositions
affirmation and denial are proposals – proposals put in
relation to a subject proposal
a proposal can be affirmed – can be denied –
any proposal of affirmation or denial – like the subject
proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
‘fabrications which we in invent by our own free will’ –
will simply be proposals we put – proposal open to question
– open to doubt and uncertain
‘free will’ – here can only refer to the fact of putting
proposals – of putting propositions –
and in so far as the basis or ground of this action – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – it is – ‘free’
our freedom rests in propositional uncertainty
(Note continued)
The first of these
is that they take it as an axiom that the will can be further extended than the
intellect, and is therefore different from it. But the reason why they think
the will can be further extended than the intellect is, they say, that they find
that we do not need a greater faculty of assenting or of affirming and denying
than we have now in order to assent to infinite things which we do not
perceive, but that we need a greater faculty of understanding. The will is then
thus distinguished from the intellect, that the latter is finite and the former
infinite. The second objection to us is that experience seems to teach
us nothing more clearly than that we can suspend judgment in order not to
assent to things which we perceive: that this confirmed by the fact that
no one is said to be deceived in so far as he perceives
anything, but in so far as he
assents or dissents to it. For example, he who feigns a
winged horse does not thereby grant that there is such a thing as a winged
horse, that is, he is not thereby deceived unless he admits at the same time
that there is such a thing as a winged horse. Therefore experience seems to
teach nothing more clearly than that will, or the faculty of assenting, is
free, and different from the faculty of understanding. The third objection is
that one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another, that
is, we do not seem to need more power to affirm what is true than to affirm
what is false to be true. But we have seen that on idea contains more reality
or perfection than another; for as some objects are more excellent than others,
so are some ideas more perfect than others: and from this also may be inferred
the difference between will and intellect. The fourth objection is: if man does
not act from free will, what happens if he remains in equilibrium between
incentives to action, like Buriden’s ass? Will he perish of hunger or thirst?
If I admit that he will, I shall seem to have in my mind an ass or the statue
of a man rather than an actual man: but if I deny it, he would then determine
himself, and consequently would have the faculty of going and doing whatever he
wished. Besides these, other objections may be raised; but as I am not obliged
to make a demonstration of whatever anyone can dream, I shall take the trouble
of answering these objections only, and with the greatest possible brevity.
As for the first point, I concede that the will can be
further extended than the intellect, if by intellect they only understand clear
and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will can be further extended than the
perceptions or the faculty of conceiving.
Nor do I see how the faculty of conceiving should be called infinite
before the faculty of feeling, for just as we can by that faculty of willing
affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm
an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we by the faculty of feeling,
feel or perceive an infinite number of bodies (one after the other). Then if
they say that there are an infinite number of bodies which we cannot perceive,
I retort that we cannot attain to that number by any manner of thought, and by
any manner of thought, and consequently by any manner of willing; but if they
say that God wished to bring it to pass that we should perceive these things,
he would have to give us a greater faculty of perceiving but not a greater
faculty of willing than he gave us. This the same as if they said that God
wished to bring it to pass that we should understand an infinite number of
other entities, that it would be necessary that that he should give us a
greater intellect but not a more general idea of entity than he gave us before,
in order to grasp such infinite entities. For we have shown that the will is a
general being or idea whereby we explain all individual volitions. Since then
they believe that this common or general idea of all volitions is a faculty, it
is not to be wondered at if they say that that this faculty is extended beyond
the limits of the intellect to infinity; for what is universal or general can
be said alike of one, of many, and of infinite individuals. I answer the second
objection by denying that we have free power to suspend judgment. For when we
say that one suspends his judgment, we say nothing else than that he sees that
he does not perceive the thing adequately. Therefore a suspension of judgment
is in truth a perception and not a free will. To make this more clear, conceive
a boy imagining a winged horse and perceiving nothing else. Inasmuch as this
imagination involves the existence of the horse (Coroll., Prop. 17, Part II.),
and the boy does not perceive anything that could take away from the horse its
existence; he will necessarily regard the horse as present, nor will he have
any doubts about its existence, although he may not be certain of it. We have
daily experience of this in dreams, and I do not think that there is anyone who
thinks that while he sleeps he has the free power of suspending judgment
concerning what he dreams, and of bringing it to pass that he
should not dream what he dreams he sees; and yet it happens
in dreams also that we
can suspend our judgments, namely when we dream that we
dream. Further, I grant no one is deceived in so far as he perceives, that is,
I grant that the imaginations of the mind considered in themselves involve no
error (Note, Prop. 17, Part II.); but I deny that a man affirms nothing in so
far as he perceives. For what else is it to perceive a winged horse than to
affirm wings on a horse? For if the mind perceives nothing else save a winged
horse, it will regard it as present to itself; nor will it have any reason for
doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissenting, unless the imagination
of the of a winged horse be joined to an idea which removes existence from the
horse, or unless he perceives that the idea of a winged horse that he has is
inadequate, and then he will necessarily deny the existence of the said horse
or necessarily doubt it. And thus I think I have also managed to answer the
third objection, namely that the will is something general, which is predicated
of all ideas, and which only signifies that which is common to all ideas,
namely an affirmation whose adequate essence therefore, in so far as it is
conceived abstractly, must be in each idea, and the same in all in this respect
only; but not in so far as it is considered to constitute the idea’s essence:
thus far individual affirmations differ one from the other equally as much as
ideas. E.g., the affirmation that is involved by the idea of the circle differs
from the idea of a triangle just as the idea of circle differs from the idea of
triangle. Then again, I absolutely deny that we need equal power of thought for
affirming that what is true is true, than for affirming what is false is true.
For these two affirmations, if we look to the mind, have the same reciprocal
relation as a being to a non-being; for there is nothing positive in ideas
which can constitute the form of falsity (vide Prop. 35, Part II., with its
Note, and Note on Prop. 47, Part II.). It must therefore be noted how easily we
are deceived when we confuse general entities with individual one, and abstract
entities and those of reason with realities. As for the fourth objection, I
confess that I am prepared to admit that a man placed in such a position of
equilibrium (namely that he perceives nothing save hunger and thirst, a certain
food and a certain drink equally distant from him), will perish of hunger and
thirst, If they ask whether I do not
consider that such a man should rather be regarded as an ass than a man, I
answer that I do not know, as also I do not know how a man should be regarded
who hangs himself, or how children, fools, or madmen are to be considered.
any so called ‘clear and distinct idea’ – is a proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the ‘intellect’ –.is a name for propositional action
the ‘will’ – is a name for propositional action
‘intellect’ and ‘will’ are different descriptions of propositional
action
propositional action is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
and it is out of such critical investigation of
propositional action that different descriptions emerge
no propositional action is infinite
an ‘infinite propositional action’ is one that cannot be
defined – because it has no end point – and really no starting point
and in such a case there is no proposal / proposition and
there is no action
infinite propositional action is a fantasy
all propositional action is finite
affirming proposals – however they are described – ‘one
after the other’ – is not affirming an infinite number –
it is to be engaged in a process that will have a natural
end – however long the process goes on for –
and this is acknowledged by Spinoza
the notion of an infinite number of entities is a fraud –
there is no ‘infinite number’ – of anything –
an infinite number cannot be counted –
and therefore – is not a number
a so called ‘infinite sequence of numbers’ – is an unfinished
sequence –
it is not a genuine mathematical game – for it has no
resolution –
the truth is you can’t play a so called ‘infinite game’ –
a so called ‘infinite game’ is one you have to step away
from – for it has no conclusion
and a game without conclusion is a ‘game’ – that cannot be
played – is not a game
the ‘will’ – is not a ‘general being’ – the will is a proposed
description of propositional action
‘individual volitions’ – are proposals / propositional
actions
‘the common or general idea of all volitions’ – is simply –
the proposal
any perception / proposal – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
it is not a question of deception – rather of uncertainty –
if you propose a ‘winged horse’ – your proposal is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to assenting – any proposal of assent – is open to
question –
and any proposed ‘understanding’ – likewise – is open
– open to question
there is no adequate – as in certain – perception
any perception – is open to question –
therefore – logically speaking – suspension of judgment – is
rational –
existence is open to question –
the existence of a winged horse – is open to question
that the boy may not be certain of it – is all that needs to
be said
dreams are proposals put –
critical evaluation of any proposal – comes after a
proposal is put –
can you question your dream – in your dream?
if you have experienced lucid dreaming – I think the answer
is yes
proposals described as ‘imaginations’ – are not in error –
but they are uncertain
to ‘perceive’ a winged horse – is to put a proposal – a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
affirmation or denial of any proposal – is not ‘contained
in’ the proposal –
affirmation and denial are separate propositional response
to a proposal –
if you act logically – you will see that any proposal you
put – is uncertain
and whether you call that ‘adequate’ or ‘inadequate’ – is
beside the point
an ‘idea’ is a proposal – and any ‘idea’ can be investigated
– put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored –
it is not that one proposal has more reality than other –
it is rather that each ‘idea’ / proposal – is open to
exploration –
and the extent to which an idea is critically explored – is
a contingent matter
talk of ‘perfection’ and ‘excellence’ – is rhetoric – plain
and simple
there is no difference between one proposal and the next in
terms of the possibility of critical exploration
‘will’ is a particular characterization of propositional
action –
what is in each proposal / idea – is the logical possibility
of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
there is no affirmation ‘in’ any proposal / idea
affirmation is a propositional action in response to
a subject proposal
there is no ‘essence’ – to an idea / proposal
or put it this way – any proposed ‘essence’ – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
circles and triangles do not ‘involve’ affirmation –
circles and triangle are rule governed propositional games –
to understand a circle or a triangle – to be able to use a
circle or a triangle – is a matter of understanding and following the rules of
their respective games
a proposal that is denied – is not a proposal that doesn’t
exist
if there is no proposal – there is nothing to affirm or deny
our reality is propositional – and propositional action can
be – is open to – different descriptions
propositional reality is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
the case of Buriden’s ass?
any choice involves uncertainty – nevertheless we make
choices – choices that are uncertain –
that is – we take action – propositional action – that is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to how a man who hangs himself – or how children – fools
– or madmen – are to be considered –
the actions of these people should be regarded with an open
mind –
and as with the actions of any other propositional actor –
critically evaluated
(Note continued)
It remains I should point out how much this doctrine confers
on us advantage for the regulating of life which we shall easily perceive from
the following points: I. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to
the decree of God and to the partakers of the divine nature, the more according
as our actions are more perfect and more and more understand God. The doctrine,
therefore, besides bringing complete peace to the mind, has this advantage
also, blessedness, namely, in the knowledge of God, by which we are induced to
do those things which love and piety persuade us. Whence we clearly understand
how far those are astray from a true estimation of virtue who expect for their
virtue and best actions, as if it were the greatest slavery, that God will adorn
them with the greatest rewards; as if virtue and serving God were not the
happiness itself and the greatest liberty. II. Insomuch as it teaches us in
what
manner we should act with regard to the affairs of fortune
or those which are not in
our own power, that is, with regard to those things which do
not follow from our nature: namely, that we should expect and bare both faces
of fortune with an equal mind; for all things follow by the eternal decree of
God in the same necessity that it follows from the essence of a triangle are
equal to two right angles. III. This doctrine confers advantages on social
life, inasmuch as it teaches us not to despise, hate, or ridicule any one: to
be angry or to envy no one. Further, it teaches us that each one should be
satisfied with what he has and ready to help his neighbour, not from effeminate
pity or partiality or superstition, but by mere guidance of reason, according
as the time or thing demands, as I shall show in the third part. IV. Then this
doctrine confers advantages on the state in common, inasmuch as it teaches us
in what manner citizens should be governed, namely, that they should not be
slaves, but should do what is best. Thus I have fulfilled what I promised at
the beginning of this note, and now come to the end of the second part, in
which I think I have explained the nature of the human mind and its properties
at sufficient length, having regard to the difficulty of the subject, and that
I have brought with me many things which from which excellent conclusions of
great use and most necessary to be known may be drawn, as will be seen in part
from what follows.
‘I. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
decree of God and to the partakers of the divine nature, the more according as
our actions are more perfect and more and more understand God. The doctrine,
therefore, besides bringing complete peace to the mind, has this advantage
also, blessedness, namely, in the knowledge of God, by which we are induced to
do those things which love and piety persuade us. Whence we clearly understand
how far those are astray from a true estimation of virtue who expect for their
virtue and best actions, as if it were the greatest slavery, that God will
adorn them with the greatest rewards; as if virtue and serving God were not the
happiness itself and the greatest liberty.’
the ‘doctrine’ is to act in accordance to the degree of God
in so far as – for Spinoza – ‘all is of God’ – and God is
all – we cannot in Spinoza’s terms act in any other way
and any action taken – therefore is consistent – with this
so called ‘decree’ of this God –
and so – our actions cannot be ‘more perfect’ – than they
are – the more we understand this God – according to Spinoza – the more we
understand our reality
which means in fact – however we understand reality
as to peace of mind –
peace of mind – as with any propositional state is uncertain
– and furthermore – open to question – open to doubt
‘blessedness’ comes off as being – any state of the
mind – any propositional state
love and piety – are descriptions of human propositional
behaviour
in a reality in which there is no determination except what
does happen and what can happen – love and piety – are logically no
different to any other propositional state
if love and piety are preferred by a propositional actor –
so be it
but equally if hate and impiety are preferred – so be it
in Spinoza’s system whatever persuades us – in one way – has
the same logical status – as whatever persuades us in another
‘true virtue’ – is anyone’s guess – anyone’s decision
how to behave – and any rewards you receive from your
behaviour – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
in Spinoza’s terms – you have no choice but to be what you
are – and whatever you become
his argument for blessedness – for virtue – has no basis at
all –
unless you want to say everything – everyone does is blessed
– and virtuous
Spinoza it seems wants to maintain the moral authority and
dictates of the personal God –
while holding that there is no such God
what we are left with from Spinoza is platitude and rhetoric
‘II. Insomuch as it teaches us in what manner we should act
with regard to the affairs of fortune or those which are not in our own power,
that is, with regard to those things which do not follow from our nature:
namely, that we should expect and bare both faces of fortune with an equal
mind; for all things follow by the eternal decree of
God in the same necessity that it follows from the essence of a triangle are
equal to two right angles.’
‘those things that do not follow from our nature’?
there is nothing that human beings do – that does not of their
nature
‘for all things follow by the eternal decree of God in the
same necessity that it follows from the essence of a triangle are equal to two
right angles.’
if all things follow from the eternal decree of God – then
what follows from our nature – all and everything that human beings do –
follows from the eternal decree of God
the ‘essence’ of a triangle is the rule-governed
propositional game –
Spinoza’s necessity – is nothing but a game
human beings construct and play rule-governed games – for
their use and pleasure
Spinoza’s God – ‘infinite an eternal’ – comes out as – the
unknown
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
the unknown does not ‘decree’ – it makes no rules
‘III. This doctrine confers advantages on social life,
inasmuch as it teaches us not to despise, hate, or ridicule any one: to be
angry or to envy no one. Further, it teaches us that each one should be
satisfied with what he has and ready to help his neighbour, not from effeminate
pity or partiality or superstition, but by mere guidance of reason, according
as the time or thing demands, as I shall show in the third part.’
what Spinoza’s ‘doctrine’ – his philosophy – shows us is
that that to despise – hate – ridicule – be angry – or to envy – are – as with
their opposites – propositional behaviours that are of our nature –
as to the morality of any human behaviour – Spinoza’s
doctrine teaches us nothing
Spinoza might think – ‘imagine’ – that he has put forward an
ethic based on his metaphysics – but no such ethic is forthcoming –
there is nothing in Spinoza’s metaphysics to distinguish
being satisfied with what you have from being dissatisfied – there is nothing
to distinguish ‘helping your neighbour’ from sabotaging your neighbour –
pity – (which by the way – is not exclusively feminine) –
partiality and superstition – are as much a part of human nature as reason or
rationality
reason is the activity of question – of doubt and the
exploration of uncertainty –
unreason – or irrationality – is characterized by dogmatism
– prejudice – and pretence
human beings are both rational and irrational –
as to rationality and irrationality – there is nothing in
Spinoza’s metaphysics – in his God – in his reality – that gives more weight to
one than to the other
‘IV. Then this doctrine confers advantages on the state in
common, inasmuch as it teaches us in what manner citizens should be governed,
namely, that they should not be slaves, but should do what is best’
I find this to be an extraordinary statement coming from
Spinoza –
he would have it that no human action is undetermined – that
we are expressions of the necessity of his ‘God’ – and yet we should not be
slaves
my question for Spinoza is – given his metaphysics – what
else can we be?
THIRD PART
CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
Most who have written on the emotions, the manner of human
life, seem to have dealt not with natural things which follow from the general
laws of nature, but with things that are outside the sphere of nature: they
seem to have conceived man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they
believe that man disturbs rather than follows the course of nature, and that he
has absolute power in his actions, and is not determined in them by anything
else but himself. They attribute the cause of human weakness and inconstancy
not to the ordinary power of nature, but to some defect or other in human
nature, wherefore they deplore, ridicule, despise. or, what is most common of
all, abuse it: and he that can carp in the most eloquent or acute manner at the
weakness of the human mind is held by his fellows as almost divine. Yet
excellent men have not been wanting (to whose labour and industry I feel myself
much indebted) who have written excellently in great quantity on the right
manner of life, and left to men counsels full of wisdom: yet no one has yet
determined, as far as I know, the nature and force of the emotions and what the
mind can do in opposition to them for their constraint. I know that the most
illustrious Descartes, although he also believed that the human mind had
absolute power in its actions, endeavoured to explain the human emotions
through their first causes, and to show at the same time the way in which the
mind could have complete control over the emotions: but in my opinion, he
showed nothing but the greatness and ingenuity of his intellect, as I shall
show in its proper place. For I wish to revert to those who wish to abuse and
ridicule the emotions and actions of men than to understand them. It will
doubtless seem most strange to these that I should attempt to treat on the
vices and failings of men in a geometrical manner, and should wish to
demonstrate with accurate reasoning those things which they cry out against as
opposed to reason, as vain, absurd and disgusting. This however is my plan. Nothing
happens in nature which can be attributed to a defect of it: for nature is
always the same and one everywhere, and its ability and power of acting, that
is, the laws and rules of nature according to which all things are made and
changed from one form into another, are everywhere and always the same, and
therefore one and the same manner must there be of understanding the nature of
all things, that is, by means of the universal laws and rules of nature. For
such emotions as hate, wrath, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from
the same necessity and ability of nature as other individual things; and
therefore they acknowledge certain causes through which they are understood,
and have certain properties equally worthy of our knowledge as the properties
of any other thing, the contemplation alone of which delights us. And so I
shall treat of the nature and force of the emotions, and the power of the mind
over them, in the same manner as I treat of God and the mind in the previous
parts, and I shall regard human actions and desires exactly as if I were
dealing with lines, planes, and bodies.
‘Most who have written on the emotions, the manner of human
life, seem to have dealt not with natural things which follow from the general
laws of nature, but with things that are outside the sphere of nature: they
seem to have conceived man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom.’
‘a kingdom within a kingdom’ – is a nature within nature?
‘For they believe that man disturbs rather than follows the
course of nature, and that he has absolute power in his actions, and is not
determined in them by anything else but himself.’
man’s natural actions – will effect his natural
environment –
whether you call any such a ‘disturbance’ – is really just
rhetoric
‘not determined by anything but himself’ –
if man is regarded as ‘of nature’ – then the actions that he
‘determines’ – will be natural – will be of nature
is anyone actually arguing that man is not a part of nature?
if the argument is that man is supernatural or that man has
a supernatural dimension – then Spinoza will simply discount such a view
– as incomprehensible
‘They attribute the cause of human weakness and inconstancy
not to the ordinary power of nature, but to some defect or other in human
nature, wherefore they deplore, ridicule, despise. or, what is most common of
all, abuse it: and he that can carp in the most eloquent or acute manner at the
weakness of the human mind is held by his fellows as almost divine.’
if you accept Spinoza’s perspective – that all human actions
– are one with any other nature event – then there is no ‘weakness’ or
‘inconstancy’ – there is simply what happens
in terms of Spinoza’s metaphysics – ‘weakness’ and
‘inconstancy’ are mistaken and inappropriate descriptions of natural events or
natural states – and should be seen as rhetorical expressions – as indeed
should ridiculing – despising and abusing
it seems though that Spinoza is quite happy to ‘argue’
against this rhetorical game
while at the same time playing it himself
‘Yet excellent men have not been wanting (to whose labour
and industry I feel myself much indebted) who have written excellently in great
quantity on the right manner of life, and left to men counsels full of wisdom:
yet no one has yet determined, as far as I know, the nature and force of the
emotions and what the mind can do in opposition to them for their constraint.’
‘for their constraint’?
where does this idea of ‘constraining’ natural states come
from?
is Spinoza suggesting that nature constrains itself?
isn’t it rather that nature expresses itself?
I would think it is only those who hold that there is
something above and beyond nature – who can argue that there are constraints on
nature
it seems that Spinoza wants to argue against a non-natural
reality – but he wants to hold on to the idea that in some sense nature can be
constrained
‘I know that the most illustrious Descartes, although he
also believed that the human mind had absolute power in its actions,
endeavoured to explain the human emotions through their first causes, and to
show at the same time the way in which the mind could have complete control
over the emotions: but in my opinion, he showed nothing but the greatness and
ingenuity of his intellect, as I shall show in its proper place.’
Descartes held that the mind was a distinct and different
substance to the body –
and in a sense Descartes offers a different perspective on
just what ‘nature’ is –
in relation to Spinoza’s view – you can say that Descartes
raises the question – just how are to define nature?
for the ‘nature of nature’ – is a matter – open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain – is an on-going critical issue –
as indeed is the question of the ‘nature’ of human nature –
to simply say that man acts according to nature – or
according to his nature – tells us nothing –
these are empty statements –
for what ‘nature’ amounts to is a matter for further
proposal – further description
and any description of ‘nature’ – or of the ‘nature’ of man
– is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
these issues – logically speaking – are never finalized
and this is a logical reality – that has escaped both
Descartes and Spinoza – who both opt for the delusion of certainty
and a result both Spinoza and Descartes’ perspectives fail
dismally
‘For I wish to revert to those who wish to abuse and
ridicule the emotions and actions of men than to understand them. It will
doubtless seem most strange to these that I should attempt to treat on the
vices and failings of men in a geometrical manner, and should wish to
demonstrate with accurate reasoning those things which they cry out against as
opposed to reason, as vain, absurd and disgusting.’
given Spinoza’s view that nothing human beings do – is
unnatural – then – ‘abuse and ridicule’ – are natural reactions and responses –
in nature
he concludes that those who abuse and ridicule are vain
absurd and disgusting –
and Spinoza’s reaction – must be seen as logically no
different to the responses he is reacting to
‘This however is my plan. Nothing happens in nature which
can be attributed to a defect of it: for nature is always the same and one
everywhere, and its ability and power of acting, that is, the laws and rules of
nature according to which all things are made and changed from one form into
another, are everywhere and always the same, and therefore one and the same
manner must there be of understanding the nature of all things, that is, by
means of the universal laws and rules of nature
if there is no defect in nature – and man is a natural
phenomenon – then there are no defects in man
‘For such emotions as hate, wrath, envy, etc., considered in
themselves, follow from the same necessity and ability of nature as other
individual things; and therefore they acknowledge certain causes through which
they are understood, and have certain properties equally worthy of our
knowledge as the properties of any other thing, the contemplation alone of
which delights us.’
hate wrath envy etc – are – in Spinoza’s terms – natural
affectations – natural states – and natural responses –
the real issue however is to understand that any description
of an emotional state – is a proposal – a proposal open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
furthermore – these terms ‘wrath’ and ‘envy’ – as with –
‘abuse’ – ‘ridicule’ – ‘vain’ and ‘disgusting’ – etc. – in common propositional
practise – are evaluative terms
it appears that Spinoza’s plan is to explain evaluative
responses – in terms of their causes in nature
for – it seems that for Spinoza – evaluation – determining
what is acceptable – and what is not acceptable – what is to be praised – and
what is to be condemned – what is right – and what is wrong – must be and can
only be a naturalistic argument causally explained
is there any place for ‘should’ in Spinoza’s ethics?
Spinoza’s ‘should’ – can only be a natural response – that
is to be accounted for causally
there is no moral imperative here – there is only
natural reactions – and rhetorical descriptions
and so moral judgments and statements – are simply vehicles
of persuasion –
I want you to see the world in this way – so I describe your
view as wrong – hoping that will result in you – coming across to my way of
seeing things –
I would argue that ‘morality’ for Spinoza – is nothing more
than rhetorical pressure – and the battle for dominance – in nature –
‘should’ – for Spinoza – is a term of persuasion – ‘should’
– is rhetorical
as a matter of propositional fact – we put ‘should’
proposals – and proposals expressing what we regard as ‘good’ – or ‘evil’ – and
proposals regarding what we regard as the right way to live – or the wrong way
to live
and the logical reality is – that any such proposal – as
with any other proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
our moral reality – is an uncertain reality
and it is in this uncertain propositional reality that we
operate and we proceed
‘And so I shall treat of the nature and force of the
emotions, and the power of the mind over them, in the same manner as I treat of
God and the mind in the previous parts, and I shall regard human actions and
desires exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies.’
again – ‘the power of the mind over them’ –
as far as I can see – ‘power’ – in Spinoza’s terms – is just
the state of nature – the reality of nature
to suggest that the mind has a power over the emotions – is
to give the mind a special status within nature – that is to say – the mind
here – comes off as – surprise surprise – the kingdom within the kingdom
as to ‘dealing with lines, planes, and bodies’
here Spinoza adopts a mathematical model –
mathematics is a rule governed propositional game –
if you play such a game – its rules are not open to question
– open to doubt – or uncertain
you play in accordance with the rules – or there is no game
played
this model will be of no use in understanding the emotions –
that is – propositional action described as ‘emotional’ –
human emotional activity – is not a rule-governed game
human emotional activity is propositional action – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
DEFINITIONS
I. I call that an ADEQUATE CAUSE (adequata causa)
whose effect can clearly and distinctly be perceived through it. I call that
one INADEQUATE or PARTIAL (inadaequata seu partialis) whose effect
cannot be perceived through itself.
a causal proposal – is open to question
that is to say any proposed cause – or proposed effect – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and any claim of clear and distinct perception – is likewise
open to question – is uncertain
if by adequate cause – is meant a causal proposal that is
not open to question – then there is no adequate cause
a so called ‘inadequate or partial cause’ – is a causal
proposal that has been opened up to question – to doubt – its uncertainty
explored –
and if an effect / proposal cannot be perceived – then there
is no basis for claiming there is a cause
no proposal – is ‘perceived through itself’ –
if a proposal is dealt with rational – it is put to question
– its uncertainty explored
II. I say that we act or are active when something takes
place within us or outside of us whose adequate cause we are, that is (prev.
Def.), when from our nature anything follows in us or outside us which can be
clearly and distinctly understood through that alone. On the other hand, I say
we suffer or are passive when something takes place in us or follows from our
nature of which we are only the partial cause.
we act or are active – when we propose – when
we put a proposal
anything that ‘takes place within us or outside of us’ – is a
proposal – open to question
if by ‘adequate cause’ here – is meant a ‘cause’ – not open
to question – not open to doubt – and certain –
there is no ‘adequate cause’
any proposed ‘cause’ – is open to question – is uncertain
we don’t need a causal analysis here –
what we can say is that the propositional actor – puts
proposals – and engages in propositional action
and that any proposal put – that is any proposal enacted –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘understanding’ – is not ‘clear and distinct’ –
understanding is uncertain
to understand anything through ‘that alone’ – is to
understand nothing –
we understand when we critically evaluate our
proposals / propositional actions –
that is – when we put proposals / propositional actions to
question to doubt – and explore their uncertainty
and that is to say – we understand when we explore
propositional possibility
‘On the other hand, I say we suffer or are passive when
something takes place in us or follows from our nature of which we are only the
partial cause.’
logically speaking – the propositional reality is an active
reality – an active state of affairs
a passive state of affairs is a non-critical state of
affairs –
in so far as we are passive – we are ignorant
‘where’ a proposal takes place – is logically irrelevant –
and as to ‘suffering’ –
whether a propositional action results in suffering – or joy
– is logically speaking –
open to question open to doubt and uncertain
and in fact – what counts as ‘suffering’ – or its opposite –
is never certain
suffering and joy – as with any propositional state – are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
i.e. – there are those who hold that it is through suffering
that one attains enlightenment –
and so – for those mystics and ascetics who hold to some
form of this view – the question is – are they suffering – or is their so
called ‘suffering’ – actually a practise best described as ‘joyous’?
clearly the matter is open to question
it is reported that Spinoza himself had abstemious habits –
as to whether these habits were a source of joy or suffering
– or neither – the matter – I would say – for Spinoza – would have been – open
to question
III. By EMOTION (affectus) I understand the
modifications of the body by which the power of action in the body is increased
or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the idea of these
modifications.
any propositional action will have an effect – and an affect
a propositional action will have an affect – on the
propositional actor who initiates the action – and on other actors affected by
the action
a propositional affect is an emotion – is a propositional
action
any ‘emotion’ / propositional affect – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
for Spinoza – the affect / emotion – modifies the body and
the mind
which is only to say that the propositional actor is
affected –
we can – instead of couching the matter in terms of body and
mind – simply refer to the propositional actor –
and – how that affect is explained is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
the division of the propositional actor into body and mind –
is unnecessary
‘body’ – is a name for propositional action –
‘mind’ – a name for propositional action –
which is to say – an affect – is propositional action
–
and again – how that is explained – is open to question
and – whether or not a propositional actor is enhanced or
diminished – aided or restrained by a propositional affect –
likewise – will be open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
Explanation. – Thus if we can be the adequate cause
of these modifications, then by the emotion I understand an ACTION (actio),
if otherwise a PASSION (passio).
‘adequate cause’ – in Spinoza’s terms – is ‘clear and
distinct’ understanding
logically speaking – there is no clear and distinct
understanding – and no ‘adequate cause’ –
any causal proposal / explanation – is open to question – and
is uncertain
and we do not need a causal explanation to see that a
propositional actor puts proposals / engages in propositional
action
or to understand that any proposal put – any propositional
action initiated – is open to question - open to doubt – and uncertain
there is no distinction between action and passion
‘passion’ is a name for propositional action
propositional activity – however named or described – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
POSTULATES
I. The human body can be affected in many ways whereby its
power of acting is increased or diminished, and again in others which neither
increase nor diminish its power of action.
Thus postulate or axiom is dependent on Post.1 and Lemmas 5
and 7, which see. post Prop. 13, Part II.
the focus is not the ‘the human body’ as some object –
the focus is the propositional actor – undivided –
un-partitioned
the ‘human body’ – is a name for propositional
action
any proposal put – any propositional action initiated –
by a propositional actor – will affect that propositional actor –
and may well affect other propositional actors –
how that affect is understood – whether the propositional
actor – is enhanced – diminished – or there is no enhancement or diminution –
is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the same applies to any other propositional actors affected
by the action
II. The human body can suffer many changes and yet retain
the impressions or traces of objects (Post. 5. Part II.), and
consequently the same images of things (Note, Prop. 17, Part II.).
the human propositional actor can undergo many changes
‘yet retain the
impressions or traces of objects’
‘the same images of
things’ –
an image – is a
proposal – or a description of – a proposal
a ‘thing’ can be
proposed as an image
a proposal –
‘impression’ / ‘image’ – is ‘retained’ – for as long as it is entertained
a proposal put at
one place and time – is logically distinct from a proposal put at another place
and time
proposals /
propositions – do not leave a ‘trace’ –
if a proposal
ceases to be entertained – it ceases to be
PROPOSITIONS
PROP.1. Our mind acts certain things and suffers others:
namely in so far as it has adequate ideas, thus far it necessarily acts certain
things, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, thus far it necessarily
suffers certain things.
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
the propositional actor – acts
any proposal put is a propositional action
a so called ‘adequate idea’ – is a proposal – that is
regarded as certain
logically speaking – no proposal / proposition is ‘certain’
–
a proposal / proposition is open to question – open tot
doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘inadequate ideas’ – is meant proposals – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain –
then all ideas / proposals / propositions – are inadequate
for Spinoza – suffering is passivity –
all suffering is active –
whether we suffer or not – we are passive to the extent that
we do not critically evaluate our proposals / propositional actions /
propositional states
our reality and our experience – is uncertain –
and it is in this lived uncertainty that we experience
suffering and we experience joy
Proof. – The ideas of every
human mind are some adequate and some mutilated and confused. (Note, Prop. 40,
Part II.). But the ideas which are adequate in the mind of any one are adequate
in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of that mind (Coroll., Prop.
11, Part II.) and those again which are inadequate in the mind of anyone are
also in God but adequate (same Coroll.), not in so far as he contains in
himself the essence of the given mind, but in so far as he contains the minds
of other things at the same time. Again, from any given idea some effect must
necessarily follow (Prop. 36, Part I.), and of this affect God is the adequate
cause (Def. 1, Part III.), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he
is considered as affected by that given idea (Prop. 9. Part II.). But of that
effect of which God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by an idea which
is adequate in the mind of someone, that same mind is the adequate cause
(Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.), Therefore our mind (Def. 2 Part III.), in so far
as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts certain things: which was the first
point. Then whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in God, not in so
far as he has in himself the mind of one man only, but in so far as he has in
himself the minds of other things at the same time as the mind of this man, of
that effect (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II, the mind of that man is not the
adequate but merely the partial cause. And so (Def. 2, Part II.) the mind, in
so far as it has inadequate ideas, necessarily suffers certain things: which
was the second point. Therefore our mind, etc.
‘The ideas of every human mind are some adequate and some
mutilated and confused.’
from a logical point of view the ideas of every human mind
are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
this ’adequate / inadequate’ distinction – is logically
irrelevant
‘But the ideas which are adequate in the mind of any one are
adequate in God in so far as he constitutes the essence of that mind (Coroll.,
Prop, 11, Part II.), and those again which are inadequate in the mind of any
one are also in God, but adequate (same Coroll.), not in so far as he contains
in himself the essence of the given mind, but in so far as he contains the
minds of other things at the same time.’
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
the unknown has no ideas
the unknown does not constitute anything
the unknown ‘contains’ – nothing
Spinoza’s view is that an inadequate idea – is adequate – in
God – in so far as ‘God contains’ – other minds – at the same time –
which is to say other ideas / proposals – at the same time
is this to say that the God ‘containing’ – other –
inadequate ideas – renders any one’s inadequate ideas – adequate – in God?
how can an inadequate idea be made adequate – by more
inadequacy?
Spinoza’s problem is how to explain inadequacy – given that
God – is adequate – and is the source of all ideas
for if God has inadequate ideas – God is inadequate
Spinoza’s solution here seems to be that all the inadequate
ideas ‘add up’ to adequacy – for God –
and ‘inadequacy’ seems to come down to partiality –
God’s ideas are adequate – but the ideas of individual minds
– only share in part of the adequacy – and are therefore inadequate
so then how can Spinoza then claim that individual minds
have adequate ideas – when by definition – an individual mind is only part of
‘God’s mind’?
should not all the ideas of an individual mind therefore be
inadequate?
and if so – then at the human level – adequacy collapses –
and you might draw from this – that therefore God for all
his adequacy – has no effect or place in human affairs
‘Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily
follow (Prop. 36, Part I.), and of this affect God is the adequate cause (Def.
1, Part III.), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is
considered as affected by that given idea (Prop. 9. Part II.). But of that
effect of which God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by an idea which
is adequate in the mind of someone, that same mind is the adequate cause
(Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.)’
God – here – is the adequate cause of an idea –
because he is affected by the idea
strange argument – for it completely torpedoes the cause /
effect distinction – renders it – incomprehensible
‘But of that effect of which God is the cause, in so far as
he is affected by an idea which is adequate in the mind of someone, that same
mind is the adequate cause (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.).’
if God – as the cause of the effect – is affected by an
adequate idea in an individual mind – then the individual mind – is the
adequate cause
so again – God is the cause of an adequate idea – and the
individual mind which has the adequate idea – is also the cause – (and God is
affected)
two causes?
I think Spinoza has finally pushed his causal argument over
the cliff
‘Therefore our mind (Def. 2 Part III.), in so far as it has
adequate ideas, necessarily acts certain things: which was the first point.’
if action is reliant on adequacy – there is no action – full
stop.
we act when we propose – and our propositional actions – are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Then whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in
God, not in so far as he has in himself the mind of one man only, but in so far
as he has in himself the minds of other things at the same time as the mind of
this man, of that effect (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II, the mind of that man is
not the adequate but merely the partial cause.’
the question is – how is it that ‘the mind of man’ – is a
partial cause – that is an inadequate cause – of an idea which is adequate in
God?
if the idea is adequate in God – it is adequate in man – or
if it is inadequate (a ‘partial cause’) in man – how can this idea be anything
but inadequate in God – for it ‘follows from’ – an idea in God?
the point is that this adequate / inadequate distinction –
is a statement of the problem in Spinoza’s thinking – not the solution
if – ‘all is of God’ – and God is
‘adequate’ – then – all – is adequate
if man has inadequate ideas – and
God is adequate – then all is not of God – or – alternatively – ‘all is of God’
– and God is inadequate
in any case we have a division in
Spinoza – which puts to question his central idea that ‘all is of God’
the logical reality is that ‘God’
is a name – a name for the unknown
and the unknown is neither
adequate or inadequate – it is unknown.
‘And so (Def. 2, Part III.) the
mind, in so far as it has inadequate ideas, necessarily suffers certain things:
which was the second point. Therefore our mind, etc. Q.e.d.
our ideas / proposals – are open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
suffering is not necessary –
suffering is a contingency –
propositional uncertainty may lead
to suffering – or it may not – propositional uncertainty may lead to joy – or
it may not –
our experiences of suffering – and our experiences of joy –
are propositional – and as such – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
much depends on how one proposes one’s self – and the world
–
i.e. – if you propose yourself as a victim – or others
propose you as a victim – and you accept their proposal – it is likely that you
will suffer –
however – any such proposal – is open to question –
the point is we are critically empowered to change how we
are affected
it may well be that propositional change is complex and
difficult
nevertheless – it is possible – it is doable
in general – we can say that to maintain emotional health
– one needs to be critically engaged
Corollary. – Hence it follows that the mind is more
or less subject to passions according as it has more or less inadequate ideas,
and on the other hand, to more action the more adequate ideas it has.
the propositional actor – can be described as ‘passionate’
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
‘passion’ – is a name for –
or description of – action – of propositional action
‘passionate’ or ‘dispassionate’ –
our actions are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
so called ‘adequate ideas’ – in so
far as they are not open to question – open to doubt – and certain – are
logically dead –
‘inadequate ideas’ / proposals /
propositional actions – however further described – in so far as they express
uncertainty – are active
PROP. II. The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor
the mind the body to maintain in motion, or at rest, or in any other state (if
there be any other).
the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
‘thinking’ – is the critical activity of the propositional
actor
critical propositional activity – is not determined
propositional action of any description – is not determined
all propositional is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
the propositional actor is not determined
Proof. – All modes of
thinking have God for their cause, in so far as he is a thinking thing and not
in so far as he is explained through another attribute (Prop. 6, Part II). Therefore that which determines the mind to think is a
mode of thinking and not of extension, that is (Def. 1, Part II). it is not a
body: which was the first point. Again, the motion
and rest of a body must arise from another body, and absolutely everything
which arises in a body must have arisen from God in so far as he is
considered as
affected by some mode of extension and not some mode of thinking
(Prop, 6, Part. II.) that is, it cannot arise
from the mind which (Prop. 11, Part II) is a mode of thinking: which is the
second point. Therefore the body cannot, etc. Q.e.d.
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
the unknown is not a cause of anything
the unknown does not think
the unknown does not determine
nothing arises from the unknown
the unknown is not affected – nor does it effect
‘All modes of thinking have God for their cause, in so far
as he is a thinking thing and not in so far as he is explained through another
attribute.’
it is clear here that Spinoza’s ‘God’ is no more than a reformulation
or restatement of his attribute proposal
he would have it that his God explains the attribute of
thought – when in fact all his ‘God’ amounts to is a restatement of the
idea / proposal
it seems that for Spinoza ‘explanation’ comes down to
restatement and reformulation
a proposal can be put – and it can be restated and
reformulated –
effectively nothing changes – there is no real advance in
restatement and reformulation
all you have here is a word game
‘explanation’ for Spinoza – comes off as non-critical
propositional repetition
‘Therefore that which determines the mind to think is a mode
of thinking and not of extension, that is (Def. 1, Part II). it is not a body:
which was the first point.’
‘thinking’ – is a name for propositional activity –
the hard logical reality is that the ground – basis –
‘cause’ – if you like – of propositional activity – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain –
and I would suggest quite obviously so
Spinoza’s proposal here – is fair enough – but it is only
one of many possible proposals regarding the basis or origin of propositional
activity
we have materialist / physicalist proposals regarding the
‘mind’ and ‘thought’ – regarding that is – propositional activity – i.e. – the
mind-brain identity thesis –
in my view the different accounts of the ‘mind’ – of
‘thinking’ – of propositional activity – have a place – to the extent
that they have a use in various and different propositional contexts
‘Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from
another body, and absolutely everything which arises in a body must have arisen
from God in so far as he is considered as affected by
some mode of extension and not some mode of thinking (Prop, 6, Part. II.)
that is, it cannot arise from the mind which (Prop. 11, Part II) is a mode of
thinking: which is the second point.’
again – here in respect of the ‘body’ – ‘God’ – ‘in so far
as he is considered as affected by some mode of extension and not some mode of
thinking’ is nothing but a restatement of Spinoza’s extension attribute
proposal –
and he thinks that because he gives it a different
description – a different name (‘God’) – therefore he has an explanation of it
– an account of it–
when really – all it is in fact – is a proposal – like any
other – hanging in uncertainty –
and of course – there are in this area of philosophy
different account of the nature of the ‘body’ –
and Spinoza knows this – i.e. – for he is well aware of
Descartes’ interactionism
Spinoza’s proposal here – is valid – but as with any
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and it is his failure to recognize propositional uncertainty
that turns his philosophy into pretence and dogmatism
the same can be said of Descartes –
and the same can be said of many other western philosophers
–
in fact – the majority of western philosophers –
and by the way eastern philosophers have not fared any
better
we have created a world of competing dogmas – and competing
pretences
I think much human suffering could be avoided if human
beings put their propositional actions to question – put them to doubt – and
explored their uncertainty
Note. – These points might be more clearly understood
from what is said in the Note on Prop. 7. Part II, namely, that the mind and
the body are one in the same thing, which, now under the attribute of thought,
now under the attribute of extension, is conceived. Where it comes about that
the order and concatenation of things is one, or
nature is conceived now under this, now under that
attribute, and consequently that
the order of the actions and passions of our body are
simultaneous in nature with the order and actions and passions of the mind.
This also is clear from the manner in which we proved Prop. 12, Part II. And
although these things are so determined that no reason of doubt can remain, yet
I scarcely believe, unless I prove the matter by experience, that men can be
induced to consider this with a well-balanced mind: so firmly are they
persuaded that the body is moved by the mere will o0f the mind, or kept at rest,
and that it performs many things which merely depend on the will or ingenuity
of the mind. No one has thus far determined what the body can do, or no one has
yet been taught by experience what the body can do merely by the laws of
nature, in so far as nature is considered merely as corporeal or extended, and
what it cannot do, save when determined by the mind. For no one has yet had a
sufficiently accurate knowledge of the construction of the human body as to be
able to explain all its functions: in addition to which there are many things
observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity, and many things which
sleep walkers do which they would not dare, were they awake: all of which
sufficiently shows that the body can do many things by the laws of its nature
alone at which the mind is amazed. Again, no one knows in what manner, or by
what means the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can give
to the body, nor with what speed it can move it. Whence it follows that when
men say that this or that action arises from the power of the mind over the
body, they know not what they say, or confess with specious words that they are
ignorant of the cause of the said action, and have no wonderment in it. But
they will say, whether they know or not, how the mind moves the body, that they
have found by experience that unless the mind is apt for thinking the body
remains inert: again, that it is in the power of the mi9nd alone to speak or be
silent, and many other things they therefore believe to depend on the decision
of the mind. But as for the first point, I ask them whether experience has not
also taught them that that when the body is inert the mind likewise is inert
for thinking? For when the body is asleep, the mind, at the same time, remains unconscious,
and has not the power of thinking that it has when awake. Again, I think all
have discovered by experience that the mind is not at all times equally apt for
thinking out its subject: but according as the body is more apt, so that the
image of this or that object may be excited in it, so the mind is more apt for
regarding the object. But they will say it cannot come to pass that from the
law of nature alone, in so far as nature is regarded as extended, that the
causes of buildings, pictures, and things of this kind, which are made by human
skill alone, can be deduced, nor can the human body, save if it be determined
and led thereto by the mind, build a temple, for example. But I have already
shown that they know not what a body can do, or what can be deduced from mere
contemplation of its nature, and that they have known of many things which
happen merely by reason of the laws of nature, which they would never have
believed to happened save by the direction of the mind, as those things which
sleep-walkers do at which they would be surprised were they awake; and I may
here draw attention to the fabric of the human body, which far surpasses any
piece of work made by human art, to say nothing of what I have already shown,
namely, that from nature, considered under whatsoever attribute, infinite
things follow. As for their second point, surely human affairs would be far
happier if the power in men to be silent were the same as that to speak. But
experience more than sufficiently teaches that men govern nothing with more
difficulty than their tongues, and can moderate their desires more easily than
their words. Whence it comes about that many believe that we are free in
respect only to those things which we desire only moderately, for then we can
restrain our desires for those things by the recollection of something else
which we frequently recollect: and with respect to those
things which we desire with such affection that nothing can
obliterate them from the
mind we are by no mean free. But in truth, if they did not
experience that we do many things for which we are sorry afterwards, and that
very often we strive with adverse emotions we “se the better, yet follow the
worse,” there would be nothing to prevent them from believing that we do all
things freely. Thus an infant thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry
child thinks that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child thinks that it
freely choses flight. Again, a drunken man thinks that he speaks from the free
will of the mind those things which, were he sober, he would keep to himself.
Thus a madman, a talkative woman, a child, and people of such kind, think they
speak by the free decision of the mind, when, in truth, they cannot put a stop
to the desire to talk, just as experience teaches us as clearly as reason that
men think themselves on account of this alone, that they are conscious of their
actions and ignorant of the causes of them; and moreover that the decisions of
the mind are nothing save their desires, which are various according to various
dispositions of the body. For each one moderates all his actions according to
his emotions, and thus those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not
what they want; those who are assailed by none are easily driven to one or the
other. Now all these things clearly show that the decision of the mind and the
desire and determination of the body are simultaneous in nature, or rather one
and the same thing, which when considered under the attribute of thought and
explained through the same we call decision (decretum), and when
considered under the attribute of extension ad deduced from the laws of motion
and rest we call determination (determinatio), which will appear more
clearly from what will be said on the subject. For there is another point which
I wish to be noted specially here, namely, that we can do nothing by a decision
of the mind unless we recollect having done so before, e.g., we cannot speak a
word unless we recollect having done so. Again, it is not within the free power
of the mind to recollect or forget anything. Wherefore it must only be thought
within the free power of the mind in so far as we can keep to ourselves or
speak according to the decision of the mind the thing we recollect. But when we
dream that we speak, we think that we speak from the free decision of the mind,
yet we do not speak, or if we do, it is due to a spontaneous motion of the
body. We dream again that we conceal something from men, and think that we do
so by the same decision of the mind as that by which, when we are awake, we are
silent concerning what we know. In the third place, we dream that we do certain
things by a decision of the mind which were we awake we would dare not; and
therefore I should like to know whether there are in the mind two sorts of
decision, fantastic and free? But if our folly is not so great as that, we must
necessarily admit that the decision of the mind, which is thought to be free,
cannot be distinguished from imagination or memory, nor is it anything than the
affirmation which an idea, in so far as it is an idea, necessarily involves
(Prop. 49, Part II.). And therefore these decrees of the mind arise in the mind
from the same necessity as the idea of things actually existing. Those therefore,
who believe that they speak, are silent, or do anything from the free decision
of the mind, dream with their eyes open.
‘These points might be more clearly understood from what is
said in the Note on Prop. 7. Part II, namely, that the mind and the body are
one in the same thing, which, now under the attribute of thought, now under the
attribute of extension, is conceived.’
‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are different names for propositional
action
‘Where it comes about that the order and concatenation of
things is one, or nature is
conceived now under this, now under that attribute, and
consequently that the order
of the actions and passions of our body are simultaneous in
nature with the order and actions and passions of the mind.’
the logical focus is not ‘mind’ or ‘body’ – but the propositional
actor –
the propositional actor – uncompromised – undivided
‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are names for propositional action
propositional action is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
any ‘ordering’ of propositional action – is a proposal –
open to question
Spinoza’s focus on ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – despite his view that
they are one and the same – misses the unity that is the propositional actor
we need to begin and end with the propositional actor
and once this is understood and appreciated – the so-called
mind / body problem – disappears
it has only ever emerged due to the failure to see the
essential unity that is the propositional actor – and to begin with that
unity
it’s the failure to see the tree for the forest
‘And although these things are so determined that no reason
of doubt can remain, yet I scarcely believe, unless I
prove the matter by experience, that men can be induced to consider this with a
well-balanced mind: so firmly are they persuaded
that the body is moved by the mere will of the mind, or kept at rest, and that
it performs many things which merely depend on the will or ingenuity of the
mind. No one has thus far determined what the body
can do, or no one has yet been taught by experience what the body can do merely
by the laws of nature, in so far as nature is considered merely as corporeal or
extended, and what it cannot do, save when determined by the mind.’
‘no reason of doubt can remain’ –
this is no more than pretentious rhetoric – and Spinoza full
well knows that on this matter – and indeed any philosophical matter – there is
as matter of course – the possibility of genuine doubt
if Spinoza’s idea is to knock out doubt – then he is living
in alternative reality
‘yet I scarcely believe, unless I prove the matter by
experience, that men can be induced to consider this with a well-balanced mind’
there is ‘no proof by experience’ –
any proposal – described as based on experience – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘proof’ – is a rhetorical notion –
it is the pretention people come to when they stop
questioning – stop doubting – and rest in the ignorance of certainty
‘so firmly are they persuaded that the body is moved by the
mere will of the mind, or kept at rest, and that it performs many things which
merely depend on the will or ingenuity of the mind’
human beings should not be ‘firmly persuaded’ of anything –
any proposal – at any time – is open to question – is uncertain
as to the proposal that the body is moved by the will of the
mind’ etc. –
all we need to understand here is that the propositional
actor – acts –
and any so-called – ‘mind / body explanation’ – confounds –
what is a straightforward matter
philosophers love rabbit holes – and it seems – and some
never come out of them
‘No one has thus far determined what the body can do, or no
one has yet been taught by experience what the body can do merely by the laws
of nature, in so far as nature is considered merely as corporeal or extended,
and what it cannot do, save when determined by the mind.’
yes – exactly – ‘no one has determined’ – the propositional
actor
the point here is that any proposal described as ‘of the
body’ – is – and always will be – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain – if we proceed logically
and as to what is ‘determined by the mind’ –
any proposal described as ‘of the mind’ – is likewise open
to question –
you can forget ‘of the body’ – ‘of the mind’ – and go
straight to the propositional actor – and propositional action
‘Whence it follows that when men say that this or that
action arises from the power of the mind over the body, they know not what they
say, or confess with specious words that they are ignorant of the cause of the
said action, and have no wonderment in it.’
well – they do know what they say –
but what they say – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
and as for – ‘being ignorant of the cause of said action’ –
if by that is meant that they have open minds on the matter
– then they are proceeding logically
wonderment –
yes – wonderment is the door to critical evaluation
does Spinoza experience wonderment here?
I doubt it
‘But they will say, whether they know or not, how the mind
moves the body, that they have found by experience that unless the mind is apt
for thinking the body remains inert: again, that it is in the power of the mind
alone to speak or be silent, and many other things they therefore believe to
depend on the decision of the mind.’
what we know – is what we propose – and what
we propose is open to question – is uncertain
as is any ‘experiential’ – proposal
I should note – it is all very well for Spinoza to rail
against the intransigence of others
he seems though to have no understanding of his own
dogmatism
‘But as for the first point, I ask them whether experience
has not also taught them that that when the body is inert the mind likewise is
inert for thinking? For when the body is asleep, the mind, at the same time,
remains unconscious, and has not the power of thinking that it has when awake.’
‘the power of thinking’ – when asleep – is different to the
‘power of thinking’ – when awake – and the power of action (of the ‘body’) is
of a different kind when asleep to when we are awake –
which is to say our propositional activity when asleep – is in
a different setting or propositional context to propositional activity when we
are awake –
we can and do critically evaluate the propositional actions
described as ‘of the mind’ – and actions described as ‘of the body’ – be they
when awake or when asleep –
further – science – physical and behavioural – takes great
interest in both
‘Again, I think all have discovered by experience that the
mind is not at all times equally apt for thinking out its subject: but
according as the body is more apt, so that the image of this or that object may
be excited in it, so the mind is more apt for regarding the object. But they will say it cannot come to pass that from the law
of nature alone, in so far as nature is regarded as extended, that the causes
of buildings, pictures, and things of this kind, which are made by human skill
alone, can be deduced, nor can the human body, save if it be determined and led
thereto by the mind, build a temple, for example.’
Spinoza needed to find a way for image and imagination –
which he regards as inferior ‘knowledge’ – to not be ‘of the mind’ – and to
make the mind the home of only rational thinking –
his idea is to put that image and imagination – are in fact
not of the mind at all – but rather ‘of the body’ – ‘but according as the body
is more apt, so that the image of this
or that may be excited in it’ –
the obvious problem here is that an image – perhaps ‘excited
by the body’ – nevertheless – would be described by most as a mental entity – a
proposition – described as ‘of the mind’
for Spinoza the question is – would there be image – if
there was no mind?
if you understand that all we deal with here is propositional
action – open to question – Spinoza’s mind / body problem does not arise –
and neither does his ‘image problem’
‘But they will say it cannot come to pass that from the law
of nature alone, in so far as nature is regarded as extended, that the causes
of buildings, pictures, and things of this kind, which are made by human skill
alone, can be deduced, nor can the human body, save if it be determined and led
thereto by the mind, build a temple, for example.’
the propositional reality is that anything can be variously
described – i.e. – you can describe a building as coming into being as a result
of a proposal described as an ‘idea’
and you can describe the existence of a building – in terms
of a physical proposal – i.e. – give it a causal explanation
the point is – we face and deal with propositional
uncertainty – and it is out of this uncertainty – that different proposals arise
– and different propositional explanations arise
‘But I have already shown that they know not what a body can
do, or what can be deduced from mere contemplation of its nature, and that they
have known of many things which happen merely by reason of the laws of nature,
which they would never have believed to happened save by the direction of the
mind, as those things which sleep-walkers do at which they would be surprised
were they awake; and I may here draw attention to the fabric of the human body,
which far surpasses any piece of work made by human art, to say nothing of what
I have already shown, namely, that from nature, considered under whatsoever
attribute, infinite things follow.’
any proposed object – the ‘human body’ included – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
nature too – of course – is open to question –
as to ‘infinite things follow’
no proposal / proposition ‘follows’ another
proposals / propositions can be put in relation – to each the
other
any proposal regarding ‘nature’ – is open to question – and
logically speaking there is no end to the propositional possibilities that may
result from critical endeavour
as to ‘infinite things’ – a thing if it is a ‘thing’ – has
definition – albeit – uncertain
an ‘infinite thing’ can only mean an undefined thing – which
of course is not a ‘thing’ at all
‘As for their second point, surely human affairs would be
far happier if the power in men to be silent were the same as that to speak.’
on what does Spinoza base this claim?
and really is there a lack of power when it comes to being
silent –
I doubt it
this strikes me as Spinoza – simply having a personal
preference for silence –
I am of much the same persuasion –
however – I think we have to recognise that people are
different – and try at times to enjoy that difference
‘But experience more than sufficiently teaches that men
govern nothing with more difficulty than their tongues, and can moderate their
desires more easily than their words.’
this is a weak argument – put really to bolster Spinoza’s
own prejudice in this matter
one man’s experience – is not another’s
and as far as men moderating desires – well let’s be
realistic here – who can make a firm call here?
sometimes we moderate – sometimes we don’t – there are
people who are practised in moderation – and others who celebrate lack of
moderation
I myself have experience of both
just a personal opinion here – but I think moderating
desires is way more difficult than moderating words
‘Whence it comes about that many believe that we are free in
respect only to those things which we desire only moderately, for then we can
restrain our desires for those things by the recollection of something else
which we frequently recollect: and with respect to those things which we desire
with such affection that nothing can obliterate them from the mind we are by no
means free. But in truth, if they did not experience that we do many things for
which we are sorry afterwards, and that very often we strive with adverse
emotions we “see the better, yet follow the worse,” there would be nothing to
prevent them from believing that we do all things freely.’
our actions are proposals – open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
and it is propositional uncertainty that is the ground of
our freedom
how we interpret / evaluate our action – logically speaking
– is open to question – and
open to doubt
i.e. – we might look back on ourselves – as we were –
operating in a particular propositional context – and from the standpoint of
our current propositional setting – regard our past actions in a negative light
–
or we may reinterpret those actions at a later date – in a
different propositional context – and see them in a positive light
our freedom rests in – the logical capacity – of question –
of doubt and the exploration of uncertainty
‘Thus an infant thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry
child thinks that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child thinks that it
freely choses flight. Again, a drunken man thinks that he speaks from the free
will of the mind those things which, were he sober, he would keep to himself.
does an infant think it freely desires milk? –
does an angry child think it freely desires vengeance? – does a
timid child think it freely choses flight? does a drunken man
think he speaks from the free will of the mind?
my point is – how much thinking is going on in these
cases?
peoples’ actions – their propositional actions and reactions
– do not necessarily involve thinking
to think – is to put it to question – put to doubt and
explore propositional possibilities
we are free to the extent that we engage in this logical
activity
when we don’t – it is not that we are unfree – or determined
–
when we don’t engage in the critical evaluation of our
propositional actions – we act in ignorance
‘Thus a madman, a talkative woman, a child, and people of
such kind, think they speak by the free decision of the mind, when, in truth,
they cannot put a stop to the desire to talk, just as experience teaches us as
clearly as reason that men think themselves on account of this alone, that they
are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes of them; and moreover
that the decisions of the mind are nothing save their desires, which are
various according to various dispositions of the body.’
freedom – does not rest in a so called ‘free decision of the
mind’ – freedom rests in the critical appraisal of proposals / propositions put
freedom – does not rest in consciousness – you can – of
course be conscious of your proposals – of your propositional actions – without
putting them to question
‘desires’ – are descriptions of proposals put and
proposals put into action
how such proposals are explained – i.e. – as ‘various
dispositions of the body’ – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
propositional explanation in any context – is back story –
the issue – front and centre – is the critical evaluation of
proposals – however they are described –
and as for women being talkative – for those who are – more
power to them –
on the other hand – I have known many women who are measured
and discrete in their speech and use of language
I don’t think anyone has a problem with being able to stop
talking –
and the fact that some talk more than others – so what?
you don’t have to listen – you don’t have to engage – if it
doesn’t suit you to do so
it’s pretty clear Spinoza has it in for women –
I guess – he just never came across the right one – or
perhaps he did – and it didn’t work out for him –
in his philosophy regarding the nature of man – there is no
basis for his negative view of women
I get the impression of a man who was deeply wounded by a
female –
the above statement as regards women – would be in his terms
– ‘emotional’ – not rational
‘For each one moderates all his actions according to his
emotions, and thus those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what
they want; those who are assailed by none are easily driven to one or the
other.’
any moderation of action – is a result of a critical
evaluation of the action in question
‘emotions’ are propositions – proposals / propositional
actions – so described –
propositions do not as such moderate propositions – or
propositional actions –
question doubt – the exploration of propositional
uncertainty – is how proposals / actions / emotions are ‘moderated’
being ‘assailed by conflicting emotions’ – is to find
yourself in a critical state of affairs – where how to proceed – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
engaging in question – doubt – and uncertainty – is to
proceed rationally –
we make decisions on how to proceed – and any such decision
– is open to question –
logically speaking there is no final resolution to any
critical state – be that described as emotional or otherwise –
we proceed in uncertainty
as to those who are ‘assailed by none’ – a logical calm
before the critical storm
it is not a matter of being ‘driven’ to this or that –
it is rather a matter of having an open mind – and exploring
one’s propositional landscape
‘Now all these things clearly show that the decision of the
mind and the desire and determination of the body are simultaneous in nature,
or rather one and the same thing, which when considered under the attribute of
thought and explained through the same we call decision (decretum), and
when considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of
motion and rest we call determination (determinatio), which will appear
more clearly from what will be said on the subject.’
all proposals – all propositional actions – are open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
‘the decision of the mind’ – and ‘the desire and
determination of the body’ – are different descriptions of a propositional
action
different descriptions – open to question
and the ‘attribute of thought’ – and the ‘attribute of
extension’ – are propositional explanations of the different
descriptions
propositional explanations – open to question
‘For there is another point which I wish to be noted
specially here, namely, that we can do nothing by a decision of the mind unless
we recollect having done so before, e.g., we cannot speak a word unless we
recollect having done so.’
a surprising statement from Spinoza –
for it says we can do nothing that we have not already done
–
and this means – that in his view – there can be nothing new
–
no new ideas – no new theories – no new proposals –
which of course is plainly wrong
as to not being able to speak a word unless we recollect
doing so – again – wrong
when I look for a meaning in a dictionary – I may well come
upon a word I have never used before
a poet – may well make up a word – that has never been used
before –
as indeed – may a scientist –
and possibly even a ‘talkative woman’ – God forbid
‘Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to
recollect or forget anything’
who hasn’t been stuck for a name to put to a face – and
after some propositional concentration – come up with the name?
purposeful forgetting – is perhaps more complex – but there
is the psychological phenomenon of a buried memory – and a whole area of
psychology devoted to uncovering such memories
‘Wherefore it must only be thought within the free power of
the mind in so far as we can keep to ourselves or speak according to the
decision of the mind the thing we recollect’
we can propose not only what we have proposed in the past –
but we can put forward new proposals – proposals that have never been put
before –
a case in point is Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’
‘But when we dream that we speak, we think that we speak
from the free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or if we do, it is due
to a spontaneous motion of the body’
when we dream – we propose –
and it is possible to question within a dream – to doubt
within a dream – and to be aware of the propositional uncertainty we experience
in the dream state
in any case it is quite common to question – to doubt – and
to deal with the uncertainty of dreams – or dreams proposals – when we are
awake
and as to the nature of dreams – that is a matter open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘We dream again that we conceal something from men, and
think that we do so by the same decision of the mind as that by which, when we
are awake, we are silent concerning what we know’
it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
whether the reason for concealing during a dream – would be the same as the
reason for concealing when we are awake
‘In the third place, we dream that we do certain things by a
decision of the mind which were we awake we would dare not; and therefore I
should like to know whether there are in the mind two sorts of decision,
fantastic and free?’
perhaps there are
‘But if our folly is not so great as that, we must
necessarily admit that the decision of the mind, which is thought to be free,
cannot be distinguished from imagination or memory, nor is it anything than the
affirmation which an idea, in so far as it is an idea, necessarily involves’
‘decisions of the mind’ or decisions of the ‘imagination or
memory’ – are propositional explanations of proposals put –
point being – regardless of any propositional description or
explanation – from a logical point of view – we are always dealing with proposals
– proposals open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘And therefore these decrees of the mind arise in the mind
from the same necessity as the idea of things actually existing. Those
therefore, who believe that they speak, are silent, or do anything from the
free decision of the mind, dream with their eyes open.’
what exists – is what is proposed – and what is proposed /
exists – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘arising in the mind’ – is no more than an a propositional
explanation of the proposal
and an explanation – open to question
whether you speak or are silent – a so called ‘decision of
the mind’ – is no more than – a proposals put –
our ‘freedom’ – is logical – it rests in the capacity to put
our proposals – our propositions – to question – to put them to doubt – and to
explore their uncertainty
when you dream – eyes open or shut – you put proposals –
proposals – open to question
PROP. III. The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas
alone, but passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.
any proposal put – can be variously described – and any
description proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
an ‘action of the mind’ – is a simply a proposal – a
propositional action – described as ‘of the mind’ –
this description holds up because it has proved to be useful
across propositional contexts
an ‘idea ‘is a proposal –
any idea / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain
if by ‘adequate’ is meant – beyond question – beyond doubt
and certain – then there are no ‘adequate’ ideas / proposals –
and so – in Spinoza’s terms – it must follow – that all
ideas / proposals – are passionate
in my view – an ‘inadequate idea’ – if it means anything –
is any proposal that is not put to question – is not put to doubt – its
uncertainty – unexplored
nevertheless – once it is understood that any idea /
proposal – is open to question –
this adequate / inadequate distinction falls by the way as
of no use
Proof. – The first thing that constitutes the essence
of the mind is nothing else than the idea of the body actually existing (Prop,
11 and 13, Part II.), which (Prop. 15, Part II) is composed of many other ideas
of which (Coroll., Prop. 38, Part II) certain are adequate and certain
(Coroll., Prop. 29, Part II.) inadequate. Therefore whatever follows from the
nature of the mind is the proximate cause through which it must be understood,
must necessarily follow from an idea adequate or inadequate. But in so far as
the mind (Prop. 1. Part III) has inadequate ideas, thus far it is necessarily
passive. Therefore the actions of the mind follow from adequate idea alone, and
the mind is passive therefore merely because it has inadequate ideas. Q.e.d.
‘the mind’ –is a name for propositional action
‘the body’ – is a name for propositional action
once this understood ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are no longer
relevant
what is relevant – and primary in consideration – is the propositional
actor
all propositional action is open to\ question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
what exists is what is proposed –
and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
if by ‘adequate idea’ is meant a proposal that is beyond
question – that is certain
logically speaking – there is no ‘adequate idea’ –
any proposal is an action
passivity is the failure to critically evaluate proposals /
propositional activity
that is – the failure to question – to doubt – and to
explore propositional uncertainty
there is no necessity in propositional reality
Note. – We see thus that
passions have no reference to the mind in so far as it has something which
involves negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature which
through itself and without others cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived;
and by this system of argument I could show that the
passions are referred to
individual things in the same manner as they are referred to
the mind, nor can they be perceived in any other manner. But it is my purpose
to treat of the human mind alone.
‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional action
passions – are propositional actions –
and as with any propositional action – however described –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any proposal can be affirmed or negated – and any proposal
of affirmation or negation – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
logically speaking there is no clear and distinct perception
–
all perceptual proposals – are open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘clear and distinct’ – is a rhetorical notion
what any proposal / propositional action refers to – is open
to question
‘We see thus that passions have no reference to the mind …’.
on the face of it – this is a strange statement
if you are going to pursue a mind / body dualism – most
would think – that passions do have reference to the mind – and – to the body
Spinoza’s statement comes out of his failure to see that
passions are propositional actions – and his closet dualism –
and by implication – this is confirmed in his final
statement here –
‘But it is my purpose to treat of the human mind alone’
one gets the impression – that Spinoza wants to completely
dismiss passions – and passionate action
is Spinoza saying – he is not interested in passions – or is
he in effect saying that he has nothing to say regarding passions?
it looks like he has thrown the baby out with the bath water
in any case – he has backed himself into a corner by trying
to write off passions as inadequate ideas – as passive – as non-active
all ideas / proposals – are actions –
propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain –
and if you were to say that a ’passionate’ action is a
logically uncertain action – open to question – open to doubt –
then any proposal – any propositional description or
explanation – can be regarded as – can be described as –
passionate
and just by the way –
what is active about a so called ‘adequate idea’ – that is
not open to question – not open to doubt – and dead – in its pretence of
certainty?
PROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed save by an external
cause.
as to an ‘external cause’ –
if ‘all is of God’ – as Spinoza maintains – then if there is
causation – all causation is internal to God – and if so – there is no
external cause –
and therefore – nothing can be destroyed by an external
cause –
does Spinoza still want to say that something can be
destroyed?
if so – in his terms – it must be an ‘internal cause’ that
destroys –
and if he holds that an internal cause cannot destroy a
thing –
then nothing is destroyed –
and therefore – the above proposition – is effectively
contradicted
what exists is what is proposed –
propositions are not ‘created or destroyed’ –
propositions are put – or not put –
to say they are ‘created or destroyed’ – is to embellish the
logic with rhetoric
propositions can be critically evaluated – and as a result
may be proceeded with – or not proceeded with –
and as to why a proposal is proceeded with – or why it is
dropped –
the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
and a proposal can – as a result of critical evaluation – be
modified and reformulated –
and any such modification or reformulation will be open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
and a proposal may be dropped from consideration
Proof. – The proposition is self-evident. For the
definition of anything affirms its essence and does not deny it: or it imposes
the essence of a thing and does not take it away. And so while we regard the
thing alone, and not the external cause, we can find nothing in it which can
destroy it
no proposition is self-evident –
this notion of ‘self-evidence’ – is nothing but pretentious
rhetoric –
a definition is a proposal – a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
a proposal /definition – does not ‘affirm’ itself – or
‘deny’ itself –
a proposal / definition is put –
affirmation and denial are propositional responses to
a proposal put –
responses – that like the proposal put – are open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to ‘essence’ –
if by essence is meant – a description of a proposal – that
is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain –
then – there is no essence
what we deal with is proposals
‘the thing alone’ – is a proposal
as to the ‘cause’ – or origin – or basis of any proposal –
that is a matter open to question
there is nothing in a proposal as such – that can ‘destroy’
it – and there is nothing external to a proposal that can ‘destroy’ it
a proposal is put – or it is not put –
if it is not proposed – it is not there –
if it is put – and then dropped from consideration – then it
is not there
a proposal may have a currency of use – and it may be
modified – reformulated – or indeed – just dropped from use altogether –
whatever the case in terms of use – the proposal put – is
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
PROP. V. Things are contrary by nature, that is, that is
they cannot exist in the same subject in so far as one can destroy the other.
this is a vague statement from Spinoza –
the logical reality is that a proposal – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
the point being – that how a proposition is interpreted – is
open to question
i.e. – how one person interprets a proposal could well be
‘contrary’ to another person’s interpretation
and any such propositional conflict – or contrariness – only
points to the very logical nature and reality of the proposition
Proof. – If they could agree one with the other, or
exist at the same time in the same subject, then something could be found in
the subject which could destroy it, which (prev. Prop.) is absurd. Therefore a
thing, etc. Q.e.d.
different interpretations of a proposal – do not ‘destroy’ a
proposition –
to the contrary – it brings it to life
PROP. VI. Everything in so far as it is in itself endeavours
to persist in its own being.
if ‘x’ is in itself – then ‘itself’ – that
which ‘x’ is in – is something other than ‘x’ –
and if so ‘x’ is not itself
we don’t need to need to get tied up with this contradiction
we can quite happily proceed with ‘x’ – as proposed
a proposal does not ‘endeavour to persist in its own
being’ –
for if it did – this would mean that a proposal proposes
itself –
and proposes itself as ‘that which endeavours to persist in
its own being’
the idea of a ‘proposal proposing itself’ – is ridiculous
a proposal is put by a propositional actor – not by ‘itself’
–
a proposal put – of whatever form – exists as long as it is
entertained by a propositional actor
Proof. – Individual things are modes in which the attributes of God
are expressed in a determined manner (Coroll., Prop. 25, Part I), that is
(Prop. 34, Part I.) they are things which express in a certain determined
manner the power of God whereby he is an acts. Nor
can a thing have anything within itself whereby it can be destroyed, or which
takes its existence from it (Prop. 4 Part III.); but on the other hand, it is
opposed to everything that could take its existence away (prev. Prop.).
Therefore as much as it can, and is within itself, it endeavours to persist in
its being. Q.e.d.
‘Individual things
are modes in which the attributes of God are expressed in a determined manner
(Coroll., Prop. 25, Part I), that is (Prop. 34, Part I.) they are things which
express in a certain determined manner the power of God whereby he is an acts.’
‘whereby he is’ –
so the individual thing – is – God
which raises the
question – why is there a distinction between ‘God’ – and the ‘individual
thing’ at all?
for Spinoza – ‘God’
– as in ‘everything’ – cannot be destroyed – or have ‘its’ existence taken away
from ‘it’
in the absence
of proposal – reality is unknown –
‘God’ – is a name
for the unknown
we put proposals in
response to the unknown – we put proposal to make known
our proposals – which include proposals of ‘individual
things’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Nor can a thing have anything within itself whereby it can
be destroyed, or which takes its existence from it (Prop. 4 Part III.); but on
the other hand, it is opposed to everything that could take its existence away’
the proposal doesn’t create itself – maintain itself – or
destroy itself –
there is no ‘self’ – to a proposal –
a proposal does not ‘propose itself’–
proposals are put by propositional actors – and proposals
are dropped from use – by propositional actors
a proposal – a proposition – from a logical point of view –
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
a proposition’s ‘existence’ – is uncertain –
nevertheless – in our propositional lives – we proceed – and
we proceed in uncertainty
PROP. VII. The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to
persist in its being is nothing else than the actual essence of the thing.
the ‘thing’ – as such – is a proposal –
a proposal does not ‘endeavour’ –
for a proposal ‘to endeavour’ – the proposal would have to
propose itself – and propose itself as an endeavour
to suggest that a proposal ‘proposes itself’ – is ridiculous
proposals are put by propositional actors
to suggest that a ‘proposal proposes itself’ – is to confuse
the action with the actor
it is to conflate the two – and it is to fail to distinguish
the proposer and that proposed
the ‘essence’ of any proposal – can only be a proposed
description of the proposal
a propositional description – as with the proposal itself –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – From the given essence of a thing certain
things necessarily follow (Prop. 36, Part I.) nor can things do anything else
than that which follows necessarily from their determined nature. (Prop. 29,
Part. I.). Wherefore the power or endeavour of anything by which it does, or
endeavours to do, anything, either alone or with others, that is, the power or
endeavour by which it endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else
than the given or actual essence of that given thing. Q.e.d.
‘From the given essence of a thing certain things
necessarily follow (Prop. 36, Part I.) nor can things do anything else than
that which follows necessarily from their determined nature. (Prop. 29, Part.
I.).’
there is no ‘given’ essence of a thing
a ‘thing’ is a proposal – and any so called ‘essence’
can only be a proposed description of the thing / proposal
a proposed description – as with the proposal described – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if your idea of an ‘essence’ – is that which is beyond
question – beyond doubt – and certain – there is no essence
nothing ‘necessarily follows’ from anything –
if anything follows from a proposal – then it is proposed
that it follows –
and any such ‘follows on’ proposal – is open to question
our proposals are all contingent – which is to say – uncertain
any determination – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘Wherefore the power or endeavour of anything by which it
does, or endeavours to do, anything, either alone or with others, that is, the
power or endeavour by which it endeavours to persist in its own being, is
nothing else than the given or actual essence of that given thing.’
a ‘thing’ is a proposal
a proposal – as such – is not ‘powerful’ – does not
‘endeavour’ –
for a proposal to ‘power’ or ‘endeavour’ – it would have to
propose itself – and then describe itself as ‘powerful’ or ‘endeavouring’–
which is absurd
proposals do not propose themselves
a propositional actor puts a proposal – and can further
describes it – e.g. – describes its action as ‘powerful’ or ‘endeavouring’ –
any such propositional description – is – as with any
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if we understand ‘essence’ as a propositional description
–
a propositional description – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
then – however ‘essence’ is proposed – it is – from a
logical point of view – open to question – open to doubt and – uncertain
if so – the so called – ‘given or actual essence of that
given thing’ – however proposed – is uncertain
PROP. VIII. The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to
persist in its own being involves no finite time but an indefinite time.
Proof. – If it involves a limited time which must
determine the duration of the thing, then it would follow from the power alone
by which the thing exists, that the thing after that limited time could exist
no longer, but must be destroyed. But this (Prop. 4, Part III.) is absurd.
Therefore the endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to exist involves no
definite time; but on the other hand, if (Prop. 4 Part III.) it is destroyed by
no external cause, by the same power by which it now exists it will continue to
exist for ever: therefore this endeavour involves no definite time. Q.e.d.
that which exists – is that which is proposed –
a ‘thing’ – is a proposal – a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a proposal does not ‘endeavour’ –
for a proposal to ‘endeavour’ – it would have to propose
it itself – and – describe itself – as an endeavour – which
is absurd
therefore – the idea that a proposal endeavours to exist for
a finite time or an indefinite time – is likewise – absurd
proposals are put by propositional actors
as to finite and indefinite time –
‘time’ – is a calculation of duration – it is the
calculation ‘duration’ –
a ‘calculation’ is a rule governed propositional game
–
the rule of any calculation game is that the calculation can
be made –
which is to say that the calculation – if it is a
calculation – is definite
if not – there is no calculation
therefore – there is no ‘indefinite calculation’ –
a so called ‘indefinite calculation’ – is no calculation at
all –
the idea of an ‘indefinite calculation’ – is a misuse and
misunderstanding of calculation
a proposal put – exists as long as it is entertained – by
propositional actors
and we can apply the calculation game to the question
of how long a proposal is entertained –
and if we do so – any result – will be definite – which is
to say – finite
and let’s be clear – there is no ‘indefinite’ – or infinite
number
further – any game of calculation is a finite propositional
action
PROP. IX. The mind, in so far as it has both clear and
distinct and confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its being for an
indefinite period, and is conscious of this its endeavour.
‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional action
propositional action – is not ‘clear and distinct’ –
propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
an idea / propositional action – does not ‘endeavour to
persist in its being’
for a propositional action to ‘endeavour to persist in its
own being’ – it would have to propose itself – and – and further – describe
itself as ‘a persistent endeavour’ – which is plainly ridiculous
proposals are put by propositional actors – and described by
propositional actors
an ‘indefinite period’?
there is no ‘indefinite’ period – a ‘period’ – is definite
‘conscious of its endeavour’
a propositional actor is conscious – is aware of his / her
proposals – his / her propositional actions
‘consciousness’ is a proposal –
the proposal ‘consciousness’ is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
that is to say – how we account for consciousness – for
awareness – is open to question
Proof. – The essence of the mind is constituted of
adequate and inadequate ideas (as we showed in prop. 3, Part III.), and
therefore (Prop. 7, Part III.), inasmuch as it has the first and second, it
endeavours to persist in its being, and that for an indefinite period (prop. 8
Part III.). But since the mind (Prop. 23 Part II.) is necessarily conscious of
itself through ideas of the modification of the body, so the mind (Prop.7. Part
III) is conscious of its own endeavour. Q.e.d.
the ’mind’ – is a name for propositional activity
it is ‘constituted of’ – proposal –
proposals – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
the distinction ‘adequate / inadequate’ – is strictly
speaking irrelevant here – as all proposals are uncertain
call uncertainty ‘adequate’ or ‘inadequate’ – it doesn’t
matter
a proposal does not ‘endeavour to persist in its being’ –
a proposal exists as long as it is entertained by a
propositional actor
there is no ‘indefinite period’ –
if there is a ‘period’ – if a period is calculated – it is
by definition – definite
a proposal is not conscious of itself – that is absurd
a proposal – i.e. – the proposal of mind – is a conscious
action of a propositional actor
‘consciousness’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Note. – This endeavour, when it has reference to the
mind alone, is called will (voluntas); but when it refers simultaneously
to the mind and body it is called appetite (appetitus), which therefore
is nothing else than the essence of man, from the nature of which all things
which help in its preservation necessarily follow; and therefore man is
determined for acting these things. Now between appetite and desire (cupidatis)
there is no difference but this, that desire usually has reference to men in so
far as they are conscious of their appetite; and therefore it may be defined as
appetite with consciousness thereof. It may be gathered from this, then, that
we endeavour, wish, desire, or long for nothing because we deem it good; but on
the other hand, we deem a thing good because we endeavour, wish for, desire, or
long for it.
‘will’ – is a name for propositional action –
the action of a propositional actor –
the propositional actor is not determined – propositional
action is not determined
‘appetite’ – is a propositional explanation of propositional
action –
appetite is propositional action
and as with any propositional explanation – open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
as for desire –
desire is a description of propositional action –
desire is propositional action
the thing is good if we desire it – wish for it – long for
it?
what is ‘good’ – is whatever propositional actors propose
as good
and whatever is proposed as ‘good’ – for whatever
reason – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. X. The idea which cuts off the existence of our body
cannot be given in our mind, but is contrary thereto.
the ‘idea’ – that is the proposal – that ‘cuts off’ –
or ends – the propositional actor’s existence – is a proposal that is natural
to human beings
who doesn’t think of death?
and let’s be clear – the proposal of the death of the
propositional actor – is – and always has been – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
as to ‘given in our mind’ –
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
what is ‘given’ in propositional life – is whatever is
proposed
Proof. – Whatever can destroy
our body cannot be granted in the same (Prop. 5. Part III.). therefore the idea of the thing cannot be granted in God
in so far as he has the idea of our body (Coroll., Prop. 9, Part II.), that
is (Prop.11 and 13, Part II.) the idea of the thing cannot be granted in the
mind; but on the other hand since (Prop. 11 and 13, Part II) the first thing that forms the essence of the mind is the
idea of the body actually existing, the first and principal endeavour of
our mind is to affirm (Prop. 7. Part III.) the existence of our body. And
therefore the idea which denies the existence of our body is opposed to the
mind, etc. Q.e.d.
‘Whatever can destroy our body cannot be granted in the same
(Prop. 5. Part III.).’
‘Whatever can destroy our body cannot be granted in the same
(Prop. 5. Part III.).’
the proposal that the propositional actor’s health will
dimmish over time – due to natural degeneration – and will end with death – is
a commonly put proposal
and this proposal – as with any other dealing with the
health of the propositional actor – is a matter open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
there is no mind opposed to body here
the propositional actor exists as long as he / she – acts
‘therefore the idea of the thing cannot be granted in God in
so far as he has the idea of our body’
‘God’ is a name for the unknown – the unknown has no ideas /
proposals
‘ideas’ / proposals – are put in response to – and in
reaction to – the unknown
‘the first thing that forms the essence of the mind is the
idea of the body actually existing’
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action
propositional action exists as the expression of the propositional
actor
the ‘essence’ – if you wish to use this term – of the
propositional actor – is propositional action
‘the first and principal endeavour of our mind is to affirm
(Prop. 7. Part III.) the existence of our body’
any endeavour of the propositional actor – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. XI. Whatever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders
the power of action of our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes,
helps or hinders the power of thinking or our mind.
‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
‘body’ is a name for propositional action
so – the focus is propositional action
we are not dealing here with a duality of mind and body
our focus is the undivided unity that is the propositional
actor
whether a propositional action helps or hinders a
propositional actor –
is a matter clearly open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
and what counts as a ‘help’ or ‘hinder’?
to one propositional actor – what is a ‘help’ – to another
may be regarded as a hindrance
the point being that these proposals of ‘help’ and
‘hinder’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – This proposition is clear from Prop. 7, Part
II. or even from Prop. 14, Part II.
Note. – We see then that the mind can suffer great
changes, and can pass now to a state of greater or lesser perfection; these
passions explain to us the emotions of pleasure (laeitiza) and pain (tristitia).
In the following propositions I shall understand by pleasure the passion by
which the mind passes to a higher state of perfection, and by pain the passion
by which it passes to a lower state of perfection. Again,
the emotion of pleasure relating simultaneously to the mind and the body I
shall call titillation or excitement (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas);
the emotions of pain, however, grief (dolor) or melancholy (melancholia).
But it must be noted that
titillation and
grief have refence to man when one part above the rest is affected; but
merriment or
melancholy when all parts are equally affected. Now
what was desire I have explained in the Note of a Prop. 9, Part III., and
besides these I do not acknowledge any primary emotion, for I shall show that
all others follow from these in the following propositions. but before
proceeding any further I must more concisely explain Prop. 10 of this part, so
that it may be more clearly understood in what manner one idea can be contrary
to another.
‘greater or lesser
perfection’ – is a confused notion
perfection – I
would think by definition – is not a relative notion –
for if it is – you
have imperfect perfection – and perfection that exceeds perfection – which
doesn’t make any sense at all
‘In the following
propositions I shall understand by pleasure the passion by which the mind
passes to a higher state of perfection, and by pain the passion by which it
passes to a lower state of perfection.’
so – Spinoza’s
analysis of pleasure and pain is based on his incoherent concept of relative
perfection
and as for ‘higher’
and ‘lower’ – I see no reason to see pleasure and pain in these terms
‘higher’ and
‘lower’ – make sense in a geometrical context – but not in the context of
sensation and experience
furthermore – and
most importantly – just how we describe the proposals – ‘pleasure’ – and ‘pain’
– and how we distinguish them – are matters – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
‘Again, the emotion
of pleasure relating simultaneously to the mind and the body I shall call
titillation or excitement (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas);
the emotions of pain, however, grief (dolor) or melancholy (melancholia).’
‘simultaneously to
the mind and body’
if mind and body
are one – as Spinoza proposes – there is no simultaneity
there is just the
affect on the person / propositional actor – that is the person / propositional
actor as an undivided unity
and given this –
then the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are philosophically irrelevant
‘But it must be
noted that titillation and grief have refence to man when one part above the
rest is affected; but merriment or melancholy when all parts are equally
affected.’
titillation – grief
– merriment and melancholy are descriptions of propositional states –
descriptions – and
though quite useful – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
i.e. – are
titillation and grief – descriptions that apply ‘to man when one part above the
rest is affected?
can you really talk
here in terms of ‘parts’ being affected?
would it not be the
case that the whole person is affected?
and isn’t this
division into parts – whatever they are supposed to be – if you are going to go
that way – logically speaking – quite arbitrary?
and just an
observation – but from what I have seen – grief can be all consuming – as
indeed can be excitement or titillation
strictly speaking
there is nothing against Spinoza’s proposal here – or for that matter any other
proposal on the subject –
but the logical
reality is that any proposal – any description or account of emotional states –
is open to question
‘Now what was
desire I have explained in the Note of a Prop. 9, Part III., and besides these
I do not acknowledge any primary emotion, for I shall show that all others
follow from these in the following propositions. but before proceeding any
further I must more concisely explain Prop. 10 of this part, so that it may be
more clearly understood in what manner one idea can be contrary to another.’
what we desire – is
what we propose – to ourselves or others –
and so ‘desire’ –
is a description of propositional action – of propositional behaviour –
and as such – open to question
Spinoza’s analysis
of pleasure and pain – is based on his incoherent notion of perfection
he may well wish to
explain ‘all other’ emotions – in terms of pleasure and pain – but in so doing
he just extends the incoherence to ‘all other’ emotions –
not a good result
(Note continued)
In the Note on Prop. 17, Part II., we showed that the idea
which constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body as
long as the body exists. Again, it follows from what we showed in Coroll.,
Prop. 8, Part II., and its Note, that the present existence of our minds
depends on this alone, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.
Then we showed that the power of the mind by which it imagines and remembers
things depends (Prop. 17 and 18, Part II., and its Note) on this, that the mind
involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows that the present
existence of the mind and its power of imagining is taken away as soon as
the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body.
But the cause on account of which the mind ceases to affirm the existence of
the body, cannot be the mind itself (Prop. 4, Part III.), nor the fact that the
body ceases to exist. For (Prop. 6, Part
II.) the cause on account of which the mind affirms the
existence of the body is not that the body begins to exists, wherefore by the
same argument it cannot cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the
body ceases to exist; but (Prop. 8, Part II.) this arises from another idea
which cuts of the existence of our body, and consequently of our mind, and
which, therefore, is contrary to the idea which constitutes the essence of our
mind.
‘In the Note on Prop. 17, Part II., we showed that the idea
which constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body as
long as the body exists. Again, it follows from what we showed in Coroll.,
Prop. 8, Part II., and its Note, that the present existence of our minds
depends on this alone, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.’
‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional activity –
‘the body’ is a name for propositional activity –
the present existence of the propositional actor –
‘involves’ propositional activity
‘Then we showed that the power of the mind by which it
imagines and remembers things depends (Prop. 17 and 18, Part II., and its Note)
on this, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it
follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining is
taken away as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the
body.’
‘imagination’ and ‘memory’ are descriptions of propositional
actions
actions of the propositional actor
these propositional actions are possible / exist – as long
as the propositional actor – is propositionally active –
PROP. XII. The mind, as much as it can, endeavours to
imagine these things which increase or help the power of acting.
‘the mind … as much as it can’
‘as much as it can’ – basically leaves the matter uncertain
that is the first point here –
secondly – how do we know propositional action will increase
the power of acting?
there is no certainty there
thirdly – as to what the end of any action is –
is not this a matter that is – logically and existentially –
a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain?
finally – it is not at all clear to me – that human
propositional action is always directed to the end of increasing the power of
action
the fact – the brute fact is – we propose – that is the
bottom line
and as to ends and goals – will yes – we do propose such –
however – I would put that a good deal of propositional
action – is not goal directed –
it is rather just propositional action – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
and in the end – what is ‘power’ – but any propositional
action?
yes – you can boost your propositional action with rhetoric
– or down play it with rhetoric – but all that this amounts to – is pretension
and hyperbole
Proof. – As long as the human
body is affected in a mode which involves the nature of an external body, so
long the human mind regards the same body as present (Prop. 17, Part II.); and
consequently (Prop, 7. Part II.), as long as the human mind regards any external
body as present, that is (Note on that Prop.), as long as it imagines, so long
the human mind is affected in a mode which involves the nature of the external
body. And therefore as long as the human mind
imagines those things which increase or help the power of acting of our body,
so long the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of
acting (Post. 1, Part III.), and consequently (Prop. 11, Part III.) so long the
power of thinking in the mind is increased or helped. And therefore (Prop. 6 or
9, Part III.) the mind as much as it can endeavours to imagines those things. Q.e.d.
‘As long as the human body is affected in a mode which
involves the nature of an external body, so long the human mind regards the
same body as present (Prop. 17, Part II.); and consequently (Prop, 7. Part
II.), as long as the human mind regards any external body as present, that is
(Note on that Prop.), as long as it imagines, so long
the human mind is affected in a mode which involves the nature of the external
body.’
firstly – an ‘external’ body is a proposal –
a proposal put by a propositional actor
and what exists – is what is proposed –
and exists – as long as the proposal is entertained
‘And therefore as long as the human mind imagines those
things which increase or help the power of acting of our body, so long the body
is affected in modes which increase or help its power of acting (Post. 1, Part
III.), and consequently (Prop. 11, Part III.) so long the power of thinking in
the mind is increased or helped. And therefore (Prop. 6 or 9, Part III.) the
mind as much as it can endeavours to imagines those things. Q.e.d.’
our power rests in critical activity –
that is – in putting our proposals / propositional actions
to question to doubt – and in exploring propositional uncertainty
PROP. XIII. When the mind imagines things which diminish or
hinder the power of acting of the body, it endeavours as much as it can to
remember things which will cut off their existence.
that which diminishes or hinders the propositional actor’s
power of acting – is non-critical thinking
the rational propositional actor will – will endeavour to
avoid the trap of non-critical thinking
Proof – As long as the mind imagines any such thing,
so long the power of the mind and the body is diminished or hindered (as we
have shown in the prev. Prop), and, nevertheless, it will imagine it until the
mind recalls some other thing which cuts off its present existence (Prop. 17
Part II.), that is (as we have just shown), the power of the mind and body is
decreased or diminished until the mind imagines some other thing which cuts off
its existence, which, therefore the mind (Prop. 9, Part III.) as much as
possible endeavours to imagine or recall. Q.e.d.
we don’t have from Spinoza – an account of just what
‘diminish’ or ‘hinder’ amounts to –
what I regard as a hindrance to my action – may well be seen
in a different light by another
i.e. – what I regard as a hindrance – may be proposed as an
opportunity by another –
and therefore – be proposed in a positive light
and I may even come to this view – on reflection – that is –
critical reflection
so – my point is that – how we describe our propositional
action – is at base – uncertain
and it is this uncertainty that enables us to proceed
rationally – in whatever propositional circumstance we find ourselves
recalling ‘some other thing’ which cuts off its existence –
is to say no more than that – if we are to behave rationally – we will behave
critically
but logically speaking – it is not as simple as Spinoza
makes out –
for recalling ‘some other thing which cuts of its existence’
– may in Spinoza’s terms – not improve the situation – however that is assessed
our critical approach to propositional action – logically
speaking – is an on-going process
at some point in any evaluation – we adopt a view – an
interpretation of our propositional state
even so – the matter is still open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Corollary. – Hence it follows that the mind is averse
to imagining those things which diminish or hinder its power and that of the
body.
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action – the ‘body’
is a name for propositional action –
there is no power of one propositional action over another
propositional actions – however described – are open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – From this we clearly understand what is love
(amor) and what hatred (odium),
namely, that love is nothing else than pleasure accompanied
by the idea of an external cause; and hate pain accompanied by the idea of an
external cause. we see again that he who loves necessarily endeavours to keep
present and preserve that which he loves; and, on the other hand, he who hates
endeavours to remove and destroy the thing he hates. But concerning these there
are will be more to say later on.
‘love’ and ‘hate’ are proposals open are open to interpretation
‘love’ and ‘hate’ are proposals – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
an external cause is a proposal – open to question and
uncertain
a lover may endeavour to keep present and preserve that
which he loves – however it is possible that he decides to let it go
and one may hate – without endeavouring to remove or destroy
PROP. XIV. If the mind were once affected at the same time
by two emotions, when afterwards it is affected by one of them it will also be
affected by the other.
this is an argument for machines – for robots –
as in – rule-governed – propositional games – in the form of
functioning mechanisms
if applied to human beings – it is misapplied
firstly – the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity –
which is to say the ‘mind’ – is any proposal put
and ‘emotion’ – a description of – or category of – propositional
activity
it is a description – that has become entrenched in
our propositional behaviour – presumably because it is useful
but the point is – any so called ‘emotion’ – is a proposal –
a proposition put –
if we experience an ‘emotion’ – we have put a proposal –
which we describe as ‘emotion’ –
secondly – a proposal put – is not two proposals put
–
we do not put – or experience – two proposals at the same
time –
one proposal may follow another – but there is no such thing
– as proposals put simultaneously –
and of course – there is no guarantee that if P1 is followed
by P2 at T1 – that P2 will follow P1 at T2 –
no one can predict future propositional activity
and furthermore – there is no necessity regarding what
happens in propositional reality
propositional activity is contingent – which is to say –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – If the human body was affected once by two
bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines one of them it will
immediately recall the other (Prop. 18, Part II.). But the imaginations of our
mind indicate rather the modifications of our body than the nature of external
bodies (Coroll, 2, Prop. 16 Part II.). Therefore if the
body, and consequently the mind (Def. 3, Part II.), was once affected by two
emotions, when afterwards it may be affected by one it will also be affected by
the other. Q.e.d.
‘But the imaginations of our mind indicate rather the
modifications of our body than the nature of external bodies’
the ‘imaginations of our mind’ – are simply proposal puts –
described – classified as ‘imaginations’
and what they indicate – what any proposal
‘indicates’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the ‘nature’ – of anything – is no more than a proposal
described – and as such – open to question
‘external bodies’ – is a proposal – open to question
in any case – what we are dealing with here is different
proposals – different propositional descriptions – different ‘propositional
categories’ – and therefore – what we have – is a clear-cut critical state
of affairs –
and that state of affairs – from a logical point of view –
is on-going – that is – never finally resolved
‘Therefore if the body, and consequently the mind (Def. 3,
Part II.), was once affected by two emotions, when afterwards it may be
affected by one it will also be affected by the other. Q.e.d.’
the body is a name for propositional action
the mind is a name for propositional action
‘mind’ and ‘body’ are cancelled out here –
and what is left – what we have – and what we deal with is –
propositional action
it does not follow if the propositional actor is affected by
an emotion / propositional action (E1) – and then by another emotion /
propositional action put (E2) – that afterwards – when affected by E1 – he will
be affected by E2 – or vice versa –
the propositional actor is not a machine
propositional action is uncertain – propositional experience
– is uncertain
one cannot predict future propositional activity
PROP. XV. Anything can accidentally be the cause of
pleasure, pain or desire.
the experience of pleasure – is the proposal of
pleasure – the experience of pain – the proposal of pain – the
experience of desire – the proposal of desire
as to the ‘cause’ of these proposals – of these experiences
–
the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
logically speaking – it is not a matter of accident – rather
– uncertainty
Proof. – Let us suppose the mind simultaneously
affected by two emotions, by which one neither increases or diminishes the
power of acting, and the other which increases or diminishes it (Post. 1, Part
III.). It is clear from the previous proposition that when the mind is
afterwards affected by that one through its true cause which neither increases
(by hypothesis) nor diminishes through itself the power of thinking, it will be
affected at the same time by the other which increase or diminishes its power
of thought, that is (Note, Prop. II, Part III.), it will be affected by
pleasure or pain; and therefore the former, not through itself, but
accidentally, will be the cause of pleasure or pain. And in this way it may
easily be shown that that thing could accidentally be the cause of desire. Q.e.d.
the propositional actor affected by two emotions
simultaneously –
is to say that two proposals are put simultaneously –
one proposition may follow another – but two at the same
time – makes no sense –
and the supposed proposal / emotion – which Spinoza says
comes from a ‘true’ cause – is one that has no effect – which means – it is a
proposition that has no effect –
and a proposition that has no effect – is not a proposition
put – is not a proposition
and Spinoza makes the odd and I would say ridiculous claim
that this supposed proposition – which has no effect – can in fact be the cause
of the proposition / emotion which does have effect – which increases or
diminishes the power of thinking
and that this ‘proposition’ of no effect – will be – can be
– the cause of pleasure or pain
and therefore could ‘accidentally’ cause desire
this is such a shambles – it is hard to know where to start
the propositional reality is that our emotions are what we
propose –
and as to the cause of our propositions – described as
‘emotional’ – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we just do – experience pleasure and pain –
and saying this – is to just state a fact about human beings
– and indeed other animals
how we account for this fact – is open to question
but the idea that these emotional proposals – come out of a
so called ‘non-emotional’ proposal – a proposal that has no effect – makes no
sense
for any proposal – any emotional proposal – has effect –
if there is no effect – there is no proposal – and where
there is no proposal – there is no emotion
Corollary. – From the fact alone that we have
regarded something with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though it were not the
effecting cause, we can love or hate that thing.
yes – we can love or hate that thing – but love or
hate are not the only propositional / emotional options
we can – i.e. – regard it with rational disinterest –
‘that thing’ – as with any proposal – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is – uncertain
and – any description of it – i.e. – in terms of ‘love’ – in
terms of ‘hate’ – will be open to question
and – if one should go for ‘love’ or ‘hate’ – these
proposals – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain.
as a natural fact we propose / experience pleasure and pain
– and how we interpret – understand – and explain these proposals / emotions –
is open to question
there is no necessity in any of this –
and that I think is no more than common sense
Proof. – From this alone it comes to pass (Prop. 14,
Part III.) that the mind, after imagining the said thing, is affected by the emotion of pleasure or pain, that
is (Note, Prop, 11, Part III.), that the power of the mind or body is increased
or diminished: and consequently (Prop. 12, Part III.) that the mind is desirous
of, or averse to, imagining it. (Coroll., Prop. 13, Part III.), that is (Note,
Prop. 13, Part III.). that it loves or hates it. Q.e.d.
‘the mind after imagining the said thing is affected by the
emotion of pleasure or pain,’
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity
‘imagination’ is a name for propositional activity
what we ‘imagine’ – is what we propose
‘the emotion of pleasure or pain’ – is the proposal of
pleasure or pain
and the only ‘power’ here – is just the fact of proposal
– and it its critical evaluation
propositional power – is rational power
just how the proposals of pain and pleasure are understood –
is no straightforward matter –
‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’ – are proposals – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain –
just as – what we love and hate – and how we understand
‘love’ and ‘hate’ – are matters – that from a rational point of view – are open
to question – and are uncertain
Note. – Hence we understand how it comes to pass that
we love or hate certain things without having any known cause for it, but only
what they call sympathy (sympathia), and antipathy (antipathia). To
this we should also refer those objects which affect us with pleasure or pain
merely owing to the fact that that they have something in common with something
that is wont to affect us with pleasure or pain, as I shall show in the
following proposition. I know that certain writers who first introduced these
terms, sympathy and antipathy, wished to signify thereby certain occult
qualities; but nevertheless I think we may by the same terms understand known
or manifest qualities.
‘Hence we understand how it comes to pass that we love or
hate certain things without having any known cause for it, but only what they
call sympathy (sympathia), and antipathy (antipathia).’
yes – the cause of why we hate or love anything is unknown
in a final sense
in practise we can and do propose causal explanations –
explanations – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and we proceed with such explanations – if they serve a
proposed purpose – and we proceed in propositional uncertainty
the proposal put by Spinoza as to how we come to love or
hate certain things – is fair enough in itself – it is as good as any other
such proposal
his argument for it is logically confused – but nevertheless
– the idea that we love what gives us pleasure – and hate what causes us pain –
prime facie – has sense to it
my point is not that this view of the matter is wrong – but
rather that it is a proposal that is open to question – open to doubt – and is
uncertain
Spinoza cannot accept this propositional reality – he holds
that his proposal has the imprimatur of certainty – that it follows from
premises that are certain
the argument fails at every step
PROP. XVI. From the fact alone that we imagine anything
which has something similar to an object which is wont to affect the mind with
pleasure or pain, although that in which the thing is similar to the object be
not the effecting cause of these emotions, nevertheless we shall hate or love
it accordingly.
there is no guarantee that one’s propositional reaction in
one circumstance – will be the same in a different circumstance –
why should it be?
the propositional reality here – is uncertain
‘we will hate or love it accordingly’ –
only if we have no critical capacity –
which is to say – only if we cannot think –
that is – cannot recognise – discriminate and evaluate –
different propositional circumstances
Spinoza seems to think – that what he calls the ‘mind’ – has
no critical capacity –
and so – we can ask – well – what in his view does the
‘mind’ – do?
Proof. – We have regarded that which is similar to
the object itself (by hypothesis) with the emotion of pleasure or pain; and
therefore (Prop. 14, Part III.) when the mind is affected with its image, at
the same time it is also affected with this or that emotion,
and consequently a thing which we see to have this will be
(Prop. 15, Part III.)
accidentally the cause of pleasure or pain. And therefore
(prev. Coroll.), although that
in which it is similar to the object is not the affecting
cause of these emotions, we nevertheless will love or hate. Q.e.d.
‘image’ – is a description of a proposal
and ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –
and a proposal put – effects – has an effect in
propositional reality
pleasure and pain are propositional descriptions of propositional
effects / affects
whether a proposal has the effect of pleasure – pain – or
the absence of either – is an uncertain matter
and any propositional effect / affect – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
we don’t necessarily love what gives us pleasure – or hate
what gives us pain
the propositional descriptions ‘love’ and ‘hate’ – are open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a so called ‘similar’ thing – is a different thing –
both may give me pleasure – but I may love one – and not the
other –
or not love either
prime facie – to
hate and love a thing at the same time – is to be involved in a contradiction
a contradiction is
not a proposal – a contradiction does not assert – a contradiction does not
propose
a contraction in so
far as it is put forward as a valid or meaningful proposition – is a logical
fraud –
we do not love and
hate – at the same time
we may propose love
– and in the next instant propose hate
love may follow
hate – hate may follow love
even in the moments
of passion – we can critically evaluate our propositional responses –
we put our
propositional responses to question – to doubt – and we explore their
uncertainty
and if we do not
critically evaluate our emotional propositions – we act irrationally
Proof. –
This thing (by hypothesis) is through itself a cause of pain, and (Note, Prop.
15, Part III.) in so far as we imagine with that emotion we hate it; and in so
far as we imagine it to have something similar to another thing which is wont
to affect equally with an emotion of pleasure, we love it equally with an
impulse of love (pre. Prop.). And therefore we hate and love it at the same
time. Q.e.d.
‘This thing (by
hypothesis) is through itself a cause of pain’
‘the thing’ – is a
proposal
pain – is a
proposal – a propositional response to it – or more generally – to a
propositional circumstance
the cause of any
such response is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
pain is uncertain
if we hate a
‘thing’ – but love ‘something similar’ – we hate one thing – and love another –
even if it is ‘similar’
there is no – ‘it
at the same time’ –
what you have – and
I would have thought this is obvious – is different ‘its’ – different proposals
– and different propositional responses to these proposals
Note. – The
disposition of the mind, which arise from two contrary emotions, is called
wavering of the mind (animi fluctuatio), and it has the same relation to
the emotions as doubt has to imagination (Note, Prop. 44, Part II.); nor is
doubt any difference between wavering of the mind and doubt save that of
magnitude. But it must be noted that I have deduced in the previous propositions
these waverings of the mind from causes which cause one emotion through itself
and of the other accidentally. I did that in order that they might the more
easily be deduced from those which went before; and not because I deny that the
waverings of the mind generally arise from an object which is the affecting
cause of either emotion. For the human body (Post. 1, Part II.) is composed of
many individuals of different nature, and therefore (Ax. 1, after Lemma 3,
which see after Prop. 13, Part II.) it may be affected by one and the same body
in many different modes; and, on the other hand, because one and the same thing
can be affected in many modes, therefore it can affect one and the same part of
the body in different ways. From which we can easily conceive that one and the
same object can be the cause of contrary emotions.
‘The disposition of
the mind, which arise from two contrary emotions, is called wavering of the
mind (animi fluctuatio), and it has the same relation to the emotions as
doubt has to imagination (Note, Prop. 44, Part II.); nor is doubt any
difference between wavering of the mind and doubt save that of magnitude’
a propositional action
described as an ‘emotion’ – may be followed by a contrary propositional action
describe as an emotion
this will occur
when the uncertainty of the first propositional response – is explored –
or when – in the
absence of critical exploration – we behave irrationally
these different
propositional responses do not occur simultaneously
what Spinoza refers
to as ‘wavering of the mind’ – is uncertainty
uncertainty is
logical and natural
proposals –
described as ‘of the imagination’ – as with any proposal – are open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
‘doubt’ – is the
door to the exploration of propositional uncertainty
if ‘wavering of the
mind’ – is to have any teeth – it means the exploration of propositional
uncertainty
in logical
behaviour – there is no ‘magnitude of doubt’ – there is only the logical fact
of doubt – and its exploration
‘But it must be
noted that I have deduced in the previous propositions these waverings of the
mind from causes which cause one emotion through itself and of the other
accidentally. I did that in order that they might the more easily be deduced
from those which went before; and not because I deny that the waverings of the
mind generally arise from an object which is the affecting cause of either
emotion.’
‘more easily
deduced from those that went before’ –
here Spinoza –
effectively – shows us that he cannot maintain his ‘simultaneous’ fiction
an object as the
affecting cause of either emotion?
an object is a
proposal –
an object /
proposal – critically explored will reveal its uncertainty –
in response to
propositional uncertainty – we propose – we put forward different proposals
‘For the human body
(Post. 1, Part II.) is composed of many individuals of different nature, and
therefore (Ax. 1, after Lemma 3, which see after Prop. 13, Part II.) it may be
affected by one and the same body in many different modes; and, on the other hand,
because one and the same thing can be affected in many modes, therefore it can
affect one and the same part of the body in different ways. From which we can
easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of contrary
emotions.’
the human body is a
name for propositional action –
propositional action
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any propositional
action – can be seen as an endless domain of propositional contexts – of
explorations of uncertainty
propositions – are
a result of critical logical activity – question – doubt – and the
exploration of logical uncertainty
‘one and the same
thing’ – that is a proposal – can be given any number of propositional
interpretations –
all of which are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XVIII. A man
is affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a thing
past or future as from the image of a thing present.
as a ‘necessary’
proposition (as with all such propositions) – this is plainly false
any proposal –
described as ‘of pleasure or pain’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is
uncertain
in plain terms –
circumstances change – what was regarded with pleasure or pain in the past –
may not be so regarded in the present – or in the future –
in fact – the idea
that there cannot be any change in what gives us pleasure or pain – confounds
common sense
this might sound
harsh – but I have to say –
Spinoza’s ethics –
his psychology – if anything it is a denial of human emotions
Proof. – As
long as a man is affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the
image of a thing, he regards the thing as present, although it may not exist
(Prop. 17, Part II., with its Coroll.), nor will he regard it as past or future
save in so far as its image is connected with the image of time past or future
(Note, Prop. 44. Part II.), Wherefore the image of the thing considered in
itself is the same whether it refers to time present, past, or future, that is
(Coroll.2 Prop. 16, Part II.), the disposition of the body or the same whether
the image of the thing be present, past or future. And so the emotion of
pleasure or pain is the same whether the image of the thing be present,
past, or future. Q.e.d.
‘As long as a man
is affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a
thing, he regards the thing as present, although it may not exist (Prop. 17,
Part II., with its Coroll.), nor will he regard it as past or future save in so
far as its image is connected with the image of time past or future (Note,
Prop. 44. Part II.)’
‘the same emotion
of pleasure or pain’?
it will not be the
same emotion of pleasure or pain –
here we are dealing
with different proposals – different emotional propositions –
in practise they
may fall under the same description – and this is not unknown in day- to-day
language use – e.g. – the colour grey – apparently fifty shades – at least –
there are many different
greys – and yet we commonly use the one term ‘grey’ to cover all variations
critical analysis
will show that while the same description is often convenient and useful – it
is not logically precise
different
circumstances – different times and different places – mean different proposals
– different descriptions – different propositional contexts –
‘Wherefore the
image of the thing considered in itself is the same whether it refers to time
present, past, or future, that is (Coroll.2 Prop. 16, Part II.), the
disposition of the body or the same whether the image of the thing be present,
past or future. And so the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same whether the
image of the thing be present,
past, or future,’
this ‘image
considered in itself’ – is a philosophical fiction
no image / proposal
– is separate to its propositional context –
and any
propositional context is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
quite clearly past
present and future are different propositional contexts – and should be
recognised as such
Note I – I
call a thing past or future in so far as we were or shall be affected by it. E.g.,
in so far as we saw it, it refreshed us or shall refresh us, it hurt us or
shall hurt us, etc. For in so far as we imagine it in this manner, thus far we
affirm its existence, that is, a body is affected by no emotion which excludes
the existence of the thing; and therefore (Prop. 17, Part II.) the body is
affected by the image the thing in the same manner as if it were present. But
in truth as it often happens that those we have great experience waver when
they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt as to the event
of it (see Note, Prop. 44, Part II.), hence it comes about that emotions which
arise from similar images of things are not constant, but are usually disturbed
by the images of other things, until men become assured of the issue of the
thing.
‘I call a thing
past or future in so far as we were or shall be affected by it. E.g., in
so far as we saw it, it refreshed us or shall refresh us, it hurt us or shall
hurt us, etc.’
‘in so far as we
were or shall be’ –
a past proposal –
is a remembered proposal – a remembered propositional state
a future proposal –
is an expected proposal – and expected propositional state
such proposals are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘For in so far as
we imagine it in this manner, thus far we affirm its existence, that is, a body
is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing; and
therefore (Prop. 17, Part II.) the body is affected by the image the thing in
the same manner as if it were present’
what exists is what
is proposed – what is proposed – is what exists
what does not exist
– is not proposed –
a remembered
proposal / image – has a different propositional context to an expected
proposal / image – or to a proposal put that does not have a memory context –
or to a proposal put that is not based in a context of anticipation
these propositions
are the same – only in so far as they are open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘But in truth as it
often happens that those we have great experience waver when they regard a
thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt as to the event of it (see
Note, Prop. 44, Part II.), hence it comes about that emotions which arise from
similar images of things are not constant, but are usually disturbed by the
images of other things, until men become assured of the issue of the thing.’
what Spinoza calls
‘wavering’ here – is uncertainty
uncertainty is the
ground of all propositional activity
whether ‘disturbed
by the images of other things’ – (that is – other proposals) – or not
any proposal put –
in any propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain –
‘until men become
assured of the issue of the thing’
‘the issue of the
thing’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
logically speaking
there is no assurance
assurance – is
pretention
we proceed with a
proposition – if we think it will be useful – or more useful than other
propositions put
this decision to
proceed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we proceed in
uncertainty
Note II. –
Now from what has been said we understand what is hope (spes), fear (metus),
confidence (securitas), despair (desparito), joy (gaudium)
and disappointment (conscientiae morsus). For hope is nothing else but
an inconstant pleasure arisen from the image of a thing future or past, or
whose even we are in doubt; fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant sadness
arisen from the image of a doubtful thing. Again, if doubt be removed from
these emotions, hope becomes confidence, and fear despair, that is, pleasure or
pain arisen from the image of a thing which we fear or hope. Joy, again, is
pleasure arisen from the image of a thing past, of whose event we were in
doubt. Disappointment is this with pain substituted for pleasure.
hope – is grounded
in propositional uncertainty – as is fear –
‘if doubt is
removed from these emotion’?
in so far as
confidence – is without doubt – and despair is without doubt –
these emotions –
these propositional states – are pretensions
human beings are
pretentious – and it seems – need to be –
which is just
another way of saying we are rational and irrational animals
joy and disappointment
– as with any propositional / emotional state – are open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
I think there is a
lot to be said for Spinoza’s view that sadness is a loss of power – that is –
of propositional power – and that we experience joy when we are propositionally
empowered
in my view – pain
is a result of propositional blockage – or ‘bondage’ – to use a Spinozistic
term – and pleasure – a result of an absence of propositional restraint – of
propositional freedom
our propositional /
emotional experience – is open to different propositional descriptions – i.e. –
‘hope’ – ‘fear’ – ‘confidence’ – ‘despair’ – ‘sadness’ – ‘joy’ – ‘painful’ –
‘pleasurable’ –
these propositional
descriptions have proven useful in our attempt to map and navigate or emotional
lives – and in propositional use – they are descriptions which have been shown
to have staying power
however – at base
they are proposals – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
PROP. XIX. He will be saddened who imagines that which he
loves to be destroyed; if he imagines it to be preserved he is rejoiced.
perhaps he will be saddened
however – he may have a different perspective – a different
propositional response
he may take the view that he has had the use of that which
he loves – but accepts that when it is gone – so be it
so – no sadness here – rather something of a stoic
equanimity
or he could be actually pleased to see it go – loved as it
was – it had become a burden for whatever reason
Spinoza’s attempt to strait-jacket emotional responses –
just does not accord with the fact of human emotional action and responses
when it comes to how we propose our emotional responses – it
is just not the case that one size fits all
Spinoza’s psychology is naïve – simplistic – dogmatic – and
false
Proof. – The mind in so far as it can, tries to
imagine those things which increase or help the power of acting of the body
(Prop. 12, Part III.), that is (Note, Prop. 13), those things which it loves. But the imagination is aided by those things which impose
existence on a thing, and, on the other hand, hindered by those things which
cut off existence from a thing (Prop. 17, Part II.). Therefore
the images of things which impose the existence of a thing that is loved, help
the endeavour of the mind wherewith it endeavours to imagine the thing that is
loved, that is (Note, Prop.11, Part III.), they affect the mind with pleasure;
and, on the other hand, those things which cut off the existence of a thing
that is loved, hinder the endeavour of the mind, that is (same Note), they
affect the mind with pain. And so he will be saddened who imagines that
which he loves to be destroyed. etc. Q.e.d.
‘The mind in so far as it can, tries to imagine those things
which increase or help the power of acting of the body (Prop. 12, Part III.),
that is (Note, Prop. 13), those things which it loves.’
‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional activity
–
power – is the ability to put our proposals to question – to
doubt – and to explore their uncertainty
the propositional actor critically engaged – is exercises
his / her propositional power
‘those things it loves’ – are – as with anything else – open
to question – open to doubt and uncertain
love – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘But the imagination is aided by those things which impose
existence on a thing, and, on the other hand, hindered by those things which
cut off existence from a thing.’
what exists is what is proposed – whether that which is
proposed – is described as ‘of the imagination’ – or not
‘those things which cut off existence from a thing’ –
this is a rather crude statement
what doesn’t exist is what is not proposed –
existence is a propositional uncertainty
‘a thing’ – is a proposal – a proposal is put – and if put
exists – nothing ‘cuts it off’ –
the proposal is put – or it is not – it is considered – or
it is not –
if not considered – it drops out of the propositional
picture
‘Therefore the images of things which impose the existence
of a thing that is loved, help the endeavour of the mind wherewith it
endeavours to imagine the thing that is loved, that is (Note, Prop.11, Part
III.), they affect the mind with pleasure; and, on the other hand, those things
which cut off the existence of a thing that is loved, hinder the endeavour of
the mind, that is (same Note), they affect the mind with pain.’
my proposal is that pleasure is a result of propositional
flow – of propositional freedom –
and pain – a result of propositional blockage – of
propositional restraint –
and this proposal – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
PROP. XX. He will be rejoiced who imagines what he hates to
be destroyed.
in the Note to Prop. 13, Part III, hatred is defined as pain
accompanied by the idea of an external cause
now we can go with this – but it must be pointed out that
this definition of hatred – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
i.e. – I may well experience pain – and propose an external
cause for the pain – but not hate that which I regard as the external
cause
I may just see the external cause as a natural fact – that
is to be neither loved or hated – approved of or disapproved of –
and so – regard it with acceptance and tolerance
just what hatred is – is not a straightforward matter –
‘hatred’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
you will find different definitions of hated – different
understandings –
and from a logical point of view – that is as it is – and –
is as it should be
a person may rejoice in the destruction of what causes his
pain – but he may not –
i.e. – his enemy – who has caused him pain – dies – however
he doesn’t ‘rejoice’ in the others demise – perhaps he wishes they could have
found some resolution to their differences before his death – and so – he
suffers because of the death
and that is just one possible response –
there are any number of other propositional /emotional
responses in such a situation – as is the case in any propositional situation
and any response – is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
Proof. – the mind (Prop. 13, Part III.) endeavours to
imagine those things which cut off the existence of
other things by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or hindered.
that is (Note on same Prop.), it endeavours to imagine those things which cut
off the existence of such things as it hates. And therefore the image of a
thing which cuts off the existence of that which the mind hates, helps that
endeavour of the mind, that is (Note, Prop. 11. Part III.), affects the mind
with joy. And so he will be rejoiced who imagines the destruction of that which
he hates. Q.e.d.
the ‘mind’ – is propositional activity
we know – both from a logical point of view – and
empirically – that propositional activity is multifarious
so yes – the propositional actor – may –
‘imagine those things which cut off the existence of other
things by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or hindered. that is
(Note on same Prop.), it endeavours to imagine those things which cut off the
existence of such things as it hates’ –
but there is no necessity in this –
the basic fact is we don’t know – how any
propositional actor will propose / imagine – until they do –
objectively speaking the possibilities are endless –
what we do know is that propositional activity – cannot be
forecast – cannot be predicted with any certainty
and what we do know is that any propositional action
– is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
however – I want to say that the strategy of avoiding
propositional action which is deemed to diminish or hinder – our propositional
activity – makes perfect sense to me
and I came to this view after reading Spinoza
why burden yourself with proposals that will not enable you
to proceed in a positive manner?
bear in mind I am talking about a propositional /
psychological strategy here –
and I am not arguing that it has any certainty about it –
on balance I think it is a rational way to proceed – however
– as with any propositional strategy – it is open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain –
and we do know as a matter of empirical fact that it is not
a strategy that is universally employed –
we know that propositional actors adopt different strategies
–
you will find arguments – for exactly the opposite
perspective – and you will find the opposite perspective practised – i.e. –
there are those who see pain and suffering as the ground of knowledge and
wisdom
I do not take this view – and like Spinoza – I would argue
against it –
unlike Spinoza though – I do not think that his view is all
there is to propositional possibility – to propositional activity – to
propositional life –
or as Aristotle put it in the Nicomachean Ethics (1098a 18)
-
‘one swallow does not a summer make’
PROP. XXI. He who imagines that which he loves to be
affected by pleasure or pain, will also be affected by pleasure or pain: and these will be greater or lesser in the lover according
as they are greater or lesser in the thing loved.
‘that which he loves’ –
we propose love – and any such proposal – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
which is to say – we love without any certainty – without
any certainty as to what the proposal of love amounts to –
‘love’ – is a propositional exploration
nevertheless – we love – and propose love in relation to
other proposals
‘He who imagines that which he loves to be affected by
pleasure or pain, will also be affected by pleasure or pain’
this is quite wrong – as it stands –
yes – I may feel / propose pleasure when i.e. – someone I
love feels pleasure – but just easily – I may not –
i.e. – I may regard their proposed pleasure – as based on a
failure to really understand their circumstance – and so regard it as something
to be pitied
would I always be pained by another’s pain?
what if I saw their pain as being a means to the end of them
achieving better understanding?
my point here is that Spinoza’s ‘analysis’ – is fatally
simplistic and rigid
we cannot predict – emotional responses –
the best we can do is map out possible propositional
responses – and even then – keep an open mind –
Spinoza wants to strait-jacket human propositional responses
–
the propositional reality – the empirical reality – is that any
such attempt is false from the start
‘and these will be greater or lesser in the lover according
as they are greater or lesser in the thing loved.’
not necessarily so –
one’s propositional response to the ‘thing loved’ – could
well be one of rational disinterest – that is – without pleasure or pain
Proof. – The images of things
(as we showed in Prop. 19, Part III.) which impose existence on the thing
loved, help the mental endeavour by which it tries to imagine the thing loved. But
pleasure imposes existence on the thing feeling pleasure, and the more so
according as the emotion of pleasure is greater, for it is a transition to a
greater state of perfection (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.). Therefore the image of
pleasure in the thing loved helps the mental effort of the lover, that is
(Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) it affects the lover with pleasure, and the more so
according as this emotion was greater in the thing loved: which was the first
point. Then in so far as the thing is affected with pain. thus far it is
destroyed, the more so according to the greatness of the affecting pain (same
Note, Prop. 11. Part III.): and therefore (Prop. 19, Part III.) he that
imagines what he loves to be affected with pain will also be affected with
pain, and the more so according as the emotion was great in the object loved. Q.e.d.
‘The images of things (as we showed in Prop. 19, Part III.)
which impose existence on the thing loved, help the mental endeavour by which
it tries to imagine the thing loved.’
the thing loved – is a proposal – images are proposals –
existence is proposed – that which exists is that which is
proposed –
‘the mental endeavour’ – if it is logical – is the action of
putting our propositional actions – to question – to doubt – an is the
exploration of propositional uncertainty
‘tries to imagine the thing loved’ –
there is no ‘tries to imagine’ – you imagine / propose – or
you don’t
‘But pleasure imposes existence on the thing feeling
pleasure, and the more so according as the emotion of pleasure is greater, for
it is a transition to a greater state of perfection (Note, Prop. 11, Part
III.).’
one’s pleasure – is a propositional response – to the
that loved
and love – a propositional response – to a proposal
pleasure as with any proposal is open to question – open to
description –
what is ‘greater pleasure’?
presumably – it is a relative proposal
as to – ‘a greater state of perfection’ – ‘perfection’ – is
a synonym for certainty
there is no certainty – there is no perfection
these notions of ‘perfection’ and certainty – are
pretentious – and cynical
they show a contempt for the propositional world
‘Therefore the image of pleasure in the thing loved helps
the mental effort of the lover, that is (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) it affects
the lover with pleasure, and the more so according as this emotion was greater
in the thing loved: which was the first point.’
‘the image of the pleasure in the thing loved’
the thing loved – is a proposal – the image of pleasure – is
a proposed description of the proposal
it doesn’t ‘help’ the mental effort of the lover – it is the
‘mental effort’ – that is the propositional action of the ‘lover’ – the
propositional actor
the emotion – is not the ‘thing loved’ – the emotion – is
the propositional action of the propositional actor
pleasure is pleasure – in different circumstance – pleasure
will have different descriptions
‘Then in so far as the thing is affected with pain. thus far
it is destroyed, the more so according to the greatness of the affecting pain
(same Note, Prop. 11. Part III.): and therefore (Prop. 19, Part III.) he that
imagines what he loves to be affected with pain will also be affected with
pain, and the more so according as the emotion was great in the object loved’
pain – as a propositional response to a proposal – does not
‘destroy’ the proposal –
and as for the ‘more so here’ – if – a thing is destroyed –
it is destroyed – there is no ‘more so’
and again – the emotion is not the object / proposal – loved
–
the emotion is the propositional response to the
object / proposal
.
PROP. XXII. If we imagine anything to affect with pleasure
what we love, we are affected with love towards it: and on the other hand, if
we imagine anything to affect it with pain, we are affected with hatred towards
it.
I may be
involved in a relationship with someone – and that relationship – does not give
me any pleasure – nevertheless I love that person –
and – the
relationship may cause me pain – but I don’t hate that person
how we
propose love – and how we propose hate – and how we propose the relationships
of pleasure and pain – love and hate – are clearly – obviously – matters of
circumstance – matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza it
seems – wants to reduce propositional / emotional action to a propositional
rule governed game – where the rule is i.e. – x = y – and that is
the end of the matter
in so doing
– sadly – he shows he has no understanding of propositional reality and no
understanding of the nature of the emotions –
his black
and white view of these matters is not only wrong – it is – in my opinion –
dangerous –
it takes
all the humanity out of human beings – out of propositional reality
the human
being is not a machine
Proof. – He who affects a thing we love with pleasure
or pain, likewise affects us with pleasure or pain, that is, if we imagine that
the object loved is affected with pleasure or pain (prev. Prop.). But this
pleasure or pain is supposed to be given in us accompanied by the idea of an
external cause. therefore (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), if we imagine anything
to affect what we love with pleasure or pain, we are affected with love or
hatred towards it. Q.e.d.
‘this pleasure or pain is supposed to be given in us
accompanied by the idea of an external cause’
any proposal – is ‘given in us’ – if by that is meant – is
proposed by us –
as to ‘by an external cause’ –
it is likely that we propose an external cause – but it can
be that we experience pleasure or pain – without proposing an external cause
and further – any proposed ‘external cause’ – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Note. – Prop. 21 explains to us what is pity (commiseratio),
which we may define as pain arisen from the hurt of another. But from what name
to call pleasure arisen from another’s good I know not. Then
again, we call the love we bear towards him who benefits another, favour (favor),
and, on the other hand, the hatred of him who misuses another, indignation (indignatio).
It must also be noted that we pity not only a thing that we have loved (as
we showed in Prop. 21). but also one which we have regarded hitherto without
emotion, merely because we judge it similar to ourselves (as I shall show later
on): and so we favour him who benefits something
similar to ourselves, and, on the other hand, are angry with him who works it
evil.
‘But from what name to call pleasure arisen from another’s
good I know not’ –
how about ‘joy’?
‘Then again, we call the love we bear towards him who
benefits another, favour (favor), and, on the other hand, the hatred of
him who misuses another, indignation (indignatio).’
yes – you can call it that
‘It must also be noted that we pity not only a thing that we
have loved (as we showed in Prop. 21). but also one which we have regarded
hitherto without emotion, merely because we judge it similar to ourselves (as I
shall show later on)’
what can ‘similar to ourselves’ – actually mean?
similar to our own emotional reaction?
if so – you would think that it is not regarded ‘without
emotion’
‘and so we favour him who benefits something similar to
ourselves, and, on the other hand, are angry with him who works it evil’?
we favour him who has a positive reaction – and celebrates –
something we value – and on the other hand – we are angry with him who has a
negative reaction – and who denigrates it
that might be the case –
however – it could also be the case that we don’t – for
whatever reason – favour he who celebrates what we value – or – indeed – are
not angered by he who denigrates what we value –
we just might not be interested in what the other thinks on
these matters –
and so have neither a positive or negative reaction to him –
that is – we have an open mind on these matters
Spinoza doesn’t get that it is not necessary to be approving
or disapproving or another’s emotional / propositional reaction –.
you can observe a propositional / emotional state of affairs
– with rational disinterest –
you are not obliged to get into the ring
just a note here –
in the George Eliot translation of the ‘Ethics’ – the last
part of this note goes as follows –
‘we shall also feel approbation towards one who does good to
his fellow, and on the contrary indignation toward one who does him harm’
we can ask here – just what is to count as good’ – and what
is to count as ‘harm’?
i.e. – one may regard giving to a beggar – a good act – in
that it helps someone in distress –
and another may see it as perpetuating a hopeless dependency
– and as such – a harmful act
the point being – what is good – and what is harmful – are
matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
I am reminded here – of Nietzsche’s view on the question of
beggars in ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’ –
‘Truly, it annoys one to give to them and it annoys one not
to give to them’
PROP. XXIII. He will be rejoiced who imagines that which he
hates to be affected with pain; if, on the other hand, he imagines it to be
affected with pleasure, he will be saddened: and these emotions will be greater
or less according as the contrary emotions were greater or less in the things
hated.
not necessarily –
i.e. – seeing someone he hates in pain – he might pity that
person – and seeing the person in pain – may cease to hate him –
it’s possible
and seeing him experiencing pleasure – may not sadden him –
but rather leave him – nonplussed – again – it is possible
what Spinoza does not understand is possibility –
psychological possibility – emotional possibility – ethical possibility
his philosophy is deterministic – and as such is unrealistic
– simplistic –
and pretentious
Proof. – In so far as a
hateful thing is affected with pain, thus far it is destroyed, and the more so
as according it is affected with more pain (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.).
Who, therefore (Prop. 20, Part III.) imagines a thing that he hates to be
affected with Pain, is inversely affected with pleasure, and the more so
according as he imagines the thing hated to be affected with greater pain.: which
is the first point. Again, pleasure imposes existence
of the thing affected with pleasure (same Note, Prop. 11. Part III.), and
the more so according as more pleasure is conceived. If any one imagines that
which he hates to be affected with pleasure, this imagination (Prop. 13, Part
III.) will hinder his endeavour, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), he who hates
will be affected with pain, etc. Q.e.d.
‘In so far as a hateful thing is affected with pain, thus
far it is destroyed, and the more so as according it is affected with more
pain’
‘Again, pleasure imposes existence of the thing affected
with pleasure’
a thing is a proposal –
proposals put in relation to a thing / proposal –
such as ‘affected with pain’ or ‘affected with pleasure’ – don’t ‘destroy it’
or ‘impose existence’ on it – they describe it – they elucidate it
they are descriptive proposals – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
pain may depilate – and pleasure strengthen –
but there is no necessity here –
it is conceivable that pain could be a sustaining and even
invigorating force – regardless of love or hate
and that pleasure – could in certain circumstances – have a
depilating and destructive impact – regardless of love or hate
the reality is – we cannot say with any certainty what the
impact of any emotional response will be
and even when we have an idea – any proposal put in this
regard – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – This pleasure can scarcely be found complete,
and without any conflict of mind. For (as I shall soon show in Prop. 27, Part
III.) a man is saddened in so far as he imagines a thing similar to himself to
be affected with pain: and, on the other hand, he is rejoiced if he imagines it
to be affected with pleasure. But here we are regarding only hatred.
‘This pleasure can scarcely be found complete, and without
any conflict of mind.’
a slip-up from Spinoza –
here – for the first time – Spinoza acknowledges uncertainty
–
no propositional response – in any context – is ever
‘complete’ –
and what Spinoza here refers to as ‘conflict’ – is question
– doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –
that is the logical activity that is propositional reality
PROP. XXIV. If we imagine anyone to affect a thing we hate
with pleasure, we are affected with hatred towards that person. If, on the
other hand, we imagine him to affect it with pain, we are affected with love
towards him.
the argument is – if a person causes pleasure to someone we
hate – we will hate that person as well – and if that person causes pain to
someone we hate – we will love that person
the picture we get here of human beings from Spinoza – is
that of people with unreflective – uncritical – emotional reactions –
these human beings are at the bottom of the emotional barrel
– they are literally brutes
and Spinoza wants to champion such people as exemplars of
human behaviour – when in fact what they represent is ignorance and stupidity
Spinoza’s view of human beings is entirely unrealistic –
people are not robots with predetermined emotional /
psychological reactions –
people are free agents – able to critically evaluate their
propositional responses – to put them to question – to doubt – and to explore
their uncertainty
here’s a question for Spinoza –
if someone doesn’t react in the manner he prescribes – what
is he going to say?
will he say they are wrong?
Spinoza’s problem is that reality – propositional reality
defies his psychological / emotional determinism –
yes – there may be some poor bastards in his emotional
strait jacket – but even they have the means to be free of his bondage
Proof. – This proposition is proved in the same
manner as Prop. 22, Part III., which we see.
Note. – These and such emotions as hatred have
reference to envy (invidia), which therefore nothing else than hatred
itself, in so far as it is regarded as so disposing man
that he rejoices at the pain of another, and is saddened at
the pleasure of another.
Spinoza’s view that you hate that which causes you pain – or
love that which gives you pleasure – is I think naïve and simplistic
‘love’ and ‘hate’ – as with any proposals – are open to
question – open to doubt – they are uncertain concepts
someone or something may cause you pain – do you necessarily
hate them?
is hate – your response?
likewise – we don’t always equate love with pleasure –
someone may give you pleasure – would you then say – you
love them?
Spinoza’s psychological / emotional equations here – may
well apply with some propositional actors – in some propositional contexts –
but to suggest that in all circumstances they apply – does not accord with
reality – with propositional / emotional reality
you might say that Spinoza has a biblical – view of human
beings – and their interactions – Spinoza as an Old Testament prophet?
what we get from Spinoza is a prescriptive ethic –
not a descriptive ethic
and as with any prescription – worth a look – but then you
move on to deal with the complexities it hides
and we can ask – why should you or I adopt Spinoza’s
prescription as universally applicable?
because it’s naive – simplistic – and dogmatic?
as for envy and hate – I might well envy another’s success –
but not hate them –
i.e. – I might just wish that I was that lucky
‘envy’ – is an open and fluid concept –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
PROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves or
what we love, everything that we imagine to affect what we love or ourselves
with pleasure; and on the other hand, we endeavour to deny, concerning
ourselves and the object loved, everything that we imagine to affect us or the
object loved with pain.
how we propose ourselves – and how we propose others or
other things – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we propose ourselves in many and varied ways – in many and
varied propositional contexts –
if we are rational – we do not ‘endeavour’ to propose or
affirm ourselves in any one way –
yes – pleasure will be sought – but not in all circumstances
–
and love proposed – is open to question –
which is to say – in reality – in practise – love is put to
question – is put to doubt – its uncertainty explored
we may endeavour to deny pain – but there will be
circumstances when pain is not denied – but rather faced – explored and dealt
with
Proof. – What we imagine to
affect a loved thing with pleasure or pain affects us also with pleasure or
pain (Prop. 21, Part III,). But the mind (Prop.12,
Part III.) endeavours to imagine as much as it can these things that affect us
with pleasure, that is (Prop. 17, Part II, and its Coroll.), to regard it as
present; and on the other hand (prop. 13, Part III), to cut off the existence
of those things which affect us with pain. Therefore we endeavour to
affirm, concerning ourselves or the thing loved, what we imagine will affect us
or the thing loved with pleasure, and contrariwise. Q.e.d.
‘What we imagine to affect a loved thing with pleasure or
pain affects us also with pleasure or pain’
perhaps – but not necessarily so –
we may love someone – see that they are experiencing
pleasure – but not feel pleasure – if i.e. – we think that their experience of
pleasure will not advantage them – i.e. – we might propose that it will lead
them down the wrong path
and again – seeing someone we love in pain – it might well
be that we think their experience of pain – is to their advantage – i.e. – in a
case where they are in denial regarding an illness – and when they experience
the pain – they begin to face facts – and then seek appropriate medical
attention
‘But the mind (Prop.12, Part III.) endeavours to imagine as
much as it can these things that affect us with pleasure, that is (Prop. 17,
Part II, and its Coroll.), to regard it as present; and on the other hand
(prop. 13, Part III), to cut off the existence of those things which affect us
with pain.’
this strikes me as an overblown view of the value of
pleasure – and of the significance of pain – in people’s lives –
it suggests we always seek pleasure – and always avoid pain
–
yes – we enjoy what gives us pleasure – but it is not always
what we seek
and yes – we do try to avoid pain – but we are not always
trying to avoid pain
this pain / pleasure dichotomy of Spinoza’s – is just too
limited a view of human endeavour
people may put a premium on seeking and acquiring knowledge
– and yes – there may be pleasure and pain along the way – but the end is
knowledge
and also – there are those who think that the best way to
live – is to achieve a state of consciousness that transcends pleasure and pain
altogether
how human beings live – their relationship to the experience
of pleasure and pain – and the psychological – emotional – and ethical ends
that they operate with – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
and I think that in these matters – uncertainty is always at
the heart of propositional experience
PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to
affirm, concerning a thing that we hate, that which we imagine will affect it
with pain, and on the contrary, to deny all that we imagine will affect it with
pleasure.
Proof. – This proposition follows from Prop. 23, as
the last one follows Prop. 21.
Note. – From this we see that it may easily come to
pass that a man may think too highly of himself or an object of his love, and
contrariwise concerning a thing hated. This imagination, when it refers to a
man’s thinking too highly of himself, is called pride (superbia), and is
a kind of madness wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can
do all things which he achieves only in imagination, and which therefore he
regards as real, and exults in them as long as he cannot imagine those things
which cut off their existence and determines his own power of action. Pride is
therefore pleasure arising from a man’s thinking too highly of himself.
Pleasure which arise from a man’s thinking too highly of another is called
over-esteem or partiality (existimatio): and that is called disdain (despectus)which
arises from the fact that he thinks too lowly of another.
firstly – for Spinoza – hate = pain – pain = hate = love =
pleasure = pleasure = love
what we have here from Spinoza is a rule governed
propositional game –
and what we get in this section of the ‘Ethics’ – is
variations of the play – variations only within the rules of this psychological
ethical game
Spinoza’s ethics is a game just as dominoes is a game just as
chess is a game –
every move is governed by the pleasure-love – pain-hate
equations
if you think there is or could be more to love than pleasure
– or more to hate than pain – you are not playing the game – and Spinoza has
nothing to offer you
Spinoza has got psychology and ethics all wrong
how we deal with emotional reality is not a game – not a
game with set rules – set equations
our emotional reality is a matter of question – of doubt –
and of the exploration of uncertainty
our emotional reality is propositional – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
as to Prop. XXVI and its Note –
ok – let’s accept this proposition on face value – i.e. –
someone you hate – you would like to see suffer – and you don’t want to see
them experiencing pleasure
what has that got to with someone thinking too highly of
himself – or ‘too lowly’ of another?
there is no connection that I can see
and here we have a pretty dodgy account of pride
why is ‘pride’ – thinking too highly of yourself?
what if I put that pride is having something like a balanced
view of yourself – a realistic view – where you recognise your abilities and
recognize your failings?
but the real question for Spinoza here – how does one
determine what he calls ‘thinking too highly of yourself’?
who makes the call – and on what grounds?
how we regard ourselves – our sense of identity – is a
matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
uncertain – is the key point here
in an absolute or final sense – we don’t know how to regard
ourselves – or others – for that matter –
in practise we operate with uncertain conceptions /
proposals – which experience tells us will change over time –
our propositional / emotional reality – is a moving feast –
moving in an uncertain propositional reality
PROP. XXVII. By
the fact that we imagine a thing that is like ourselves, and which we have not
regarded with any emotion to be affected with any emotion, we are also affected
with a like emotion.
what this proposition puts – is that if someone – to which
we have had no emotional response to – has an emotional response – we will have
that emotional response – because we are like them –
this may be so if you were talking about humans who are
identical and have no critical capacity
firstly – human beings are not identical with each other –
and secondly – we do not react to the experiences of others without thought and
consideration
any emotional proposal put by ourselves or others – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and it is this uncertainty – that is the ground and basis of
difference –
and the ground and basis of the possibility of an
undetermined propositional / emotional response
Proof. – The images of things are modifications of
the human body the idea of which represent to us external bodies as present
(Note, Prop. 17, Part II.), that is (Prop. 16, Part II,), the ideas of which
represent the nature of our body and at the same time the nature of the
external body as present. If, therefore, the nature of the external body is
similar to that of our own, then the idea of the external body which we imagine
will involve a modification of our body similar to the modification of the
external body: and consequently if we imagine anyone similar to ourselves to be
affected with any emotion, this imagination will express a modification of our
body similar to that emotion, And therefore from the fact that we imagine a
thing similar to ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are affected in
company with it by that emotion, And if we hate a thing similar to ourselves,
we shall to that extent (Prop. 23, Part III.) be affected with it by a contrary
emotion not a similar one. Q.e.d.
‘If, therefore, the nature of the external body is similar
to that of our own, then the idea of the external body which we imagine will
involve a modification of our body similar to the modification of the external
body’
Spinoza is here saying what happens in another will happen
in us – because the other is similar to us
what is clear here is that Spinoza is about trashing
individuality – on the notion of similarity
his ‘similarity’ can only mean ‘identical’
human beings are not identical – the idea is monstrous – we
are not clones
and if Spinoza’s ‘similarity’ means anything less than
‘identical’ – he must make room for dissimilarity – and if he was to do that –
his argument falls apart
yes – we can propose similarity between individuals – but at
the same time we must account for dissimilarity – for difference
and the reality – the logical and empirical reality – is
that how one human being reacts to another – is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain –
our emotions are uncertain – and reactions – that is our
emotional proposals put in relation to others – are uncertain
uncertainty is at the heart of the emotions
Note I. – This imitation of emotions when it refers
to pain, is called compassion (commiseratio) (see Note, Prop. 22, Part
III.); when it has reference to desire it is called emulation (aemulation),
which then is nothing else than the desire of anything engendered in us by the
fact that we imagined others similar to us to have that desire.
you don’t need to experience another’s pain and suffering to
recognize it or understand it and respond to it
how one responds to another’s pain – is open to question –
is uncertain
compassion is a positive response to another’s pain –
and just what that positive response amounts to – will
depend of the people involved and the circumstances –
in general – we can say – if you are compassionate – you
will recognize the other’s suffering – have some understanding of what it means
for them – and do whatever you can to help them
and further – genuine compassion – is not an imitation of
another’s pain –
imitation here – is false compassion
does my desire spring from another’s desire?
any such desire will involve thought – and critical thought
at that – it will come from me – not another
and whether my desire is ‘similar to’ another’s – will be
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
desire is not an emulation
a so called ‘emulated desire’ – is a fake desire
Corollary I. – If we imagine any one, whom we have
regarded hitherto with no emotion whatever, to affect a thing similar to
ourselves with pleasure, we are affected with pleasure towards that person, If,
on the other hand, we imagine him to affect it with pain, we are affected with
hatred towards him.
‘a thing similar to ourselves’ – if it is to mean anything –
can only mean – ‘another human being’
it is possible that when I see a human being affected
with pleasure by another – that I regard the other (who – it appears – is the
source of that pleasure) – favourably
it is just as possible that I regard him in a disinterested
manner – or indeed – for whatever reason – unfavourably
and if I see another – affected with pain – then I may regard
with hatred – the one who it seems causes that affect – (though ‘hatred’ here
seems a little strong) –
but once again – I may not –
i.e. – not knowing the other – his motives and intentions –
I may well be uncertain as to how regard his action – and so suspend
judgment – and therefore view him without pleasure or pain
Proof. – This is shown from the prev. Prop. in the
same manner as Prop. 22 from Prop. 21.
Corollary II. – We cannot hate a thing which we pity
because its misery affects us with pain.
I think it is possible to ‘pity’ – someone you hate – if by
‘pity’ is meant – acknowledging another’s pain and having some understanding
of it – while hating them – or at least – regarding them negatively
if pity is thought to be the ‘taking on’ of another’s pain –
as if it is your own – then pity is a pretence –
an emotional pretence –
this I think is what Spinoza’s view comes to
Proof. – For if we could hate it, then (Prop. 23,
Part III.) we should be rejoiced at its pain, which is contrary to the
hypothesis.
a sadist may well hate another and rejoice in another’s pain
–
Spinoza’s ‘hypothesis’ – is frankly – too limited
Corollary III. – We endeavour as much as we are able
to liberate a thing we pity from its misery.
some do – and some don’t
Proof. – That which affects a thing we pity with
pain, affects us also with a similar pain (Pre. Prop.); and therefore we
endeavour to recollect everything that can take away its existence or which
would destroy it (Prop. 13, Part III), that is (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.) we
desire to destroy it or we are determined for its destruction; and therefore we
try to liberate a thing we pity from its misery. Q.e.d.
I imagine most people would agree with this on first sight
however – when the matter is put to question – put to doubt
– and seen in a particular propositional context – it may not be that
straightforward –
e.g. – I may ‘pity’ – a mass murderer incarcerated for life
– as in – ‘recognise and have some understanding of his suffering’ – but not
have any desire to liberate him from his suffering
and here is the difference between pity and compassion –
a compassionate person recognizes – understands – and
acts to alleviate another’s suffering
one who just ‘pities’ another – while recognizing their pain
– and having some understanding of it – does not act to alleviate it
pity is a form of psychological / moral inaction –
pity is a moral dead end
Note II. –The will or appetite of working good which
arises from the fact that we pity the thing to which we wish to do good, is
called benevolence (benevolentia), which is nothing else than the desire
arisen from pity. Concerning love and hatred towards him who worked for good or
evil to what we imagined similar to ourselves, see Note, Prop. 22, Part III.
‘pity’– in Spinoza’s terms – is a pretence
and tying benevolence to a pretence is all wrong
i.e. – I may see another suffering – acknowledge it – and
work to relieve their suffering – not because I experience their pain – and
‘pity’ them – but rather because I think the world would be a better place
without that suffering –
here you have benevolence without pity
‘benevolence’ – as with any proposal – any proposal of
virtue – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
finally – our emotional propositional responses – from a
logical point of view – are not ‘the taking on’ of another’s pleasure or pain –
for this we cannot do –
rather our emotional propositional responses are based on – recognizing
the other’s emotional / propositional action or state – critically
evaluating it – and on the basis of such an evaluation – proposing a
course of action
any evaluation of the other’s emotional state – and any
response to it – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to promote the being of
everything that we imagine conducive to pleasure; but what we find repugnant to
it or conducive to pain we endeavour to remove or destroy.
if I see someone who I regard as beautiful – and their
beauty gives me pleasure – do I promote their being?
I don’t think so – I recognize their being – and appreciate
it –
and really what would promoting their being amount to?
and if I see someone who I regard as ugly and repugnant –
and watching them in action is painful – do I try to remove or destroy them?
no – I leave them alone – and I move on
once again – Spinoza’s pleasure / pain analysis – is shown
to be inadequate and limited – not to mention – small-minded
there is more to our propositional lives than this
simplistic pleasure / pain calculus –
how we propose what we experience – is always open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
we may assess a beautiful person or thing – or an ugly
person or thing in any number of ways –
from any number of different propositional perspectives –
perhaps I see the beautiful person or thing – or the ugly
and repugnant person or thing – not in terms of my own pleasure – or pain – but
rather as expressions of the great variety in the natural world
pleasure and pain are part of the propositional picture –
but they do not represent the whole propositional landscape
we are conscious – and self-conscious beings with critical
capacity –
we are not pleasure / pain automatons
Proof. – We
endeavour to imagine as much as possible what we imagine to be conducive to
pleasure (Prop. 12, Part III.), that is, (Prop. 17, Part II.), we endeavour as
much as possible to regard it as present or actually existing. But the mind’s endeavour or its power of thinking is equal
and simultaneous in nature with the body’s endeavour or power in acting (as
clearly follows from Coroll., Prop. 7, and Coroll., prop.11, Part II.);
therefore we endeavour absolutely to bring about its existence, or (what is the
same Note., Prop. 9, Part II.) we desire and strive for it: which was the first
point. Again, if that which we think to be the cause of pain. that is
(Note, Prop.13. Part II.), that which we hate, we imagine to be destroyed, we
are rejoiced (Prop.20, Part III); and therefore (Prop. 11, Part III.) remove it
from us, lest we should regard it as present: which was the second point.
Therefore everything that is conducive to pleasure, etc. Q.e.d
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action
there is no ‘simultaneous’ propositional action
there is only the propositional action of the
propositional actor – however that is further described
and if there is endeavour – it is the endeavour of the propositional
actor
the question is – does the propositional actor endeavour
as much as possible to bring about a state of pleasure – and endeavour
as much as possible to remove or avoid anything that results in pain and
suffering
is this what we do?
no one would deny that there are circumstances when we do
just that –
but Spinoza is saying this endeavour – is all we do – that
it is the sum of our thought and action
and as an empirical fact – this is not the case
not all my actions – are an ‘endeavour’ – and not all my
endeavours are directed at maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain
our propositional activities – are far more diverse and
complex than Spinoza proposes – and I think – that he understands –
he wishes to discipline human beings to a way of thinking
and acting which he regards as natural and morally appropriate
and in in this respect he is no different to any other
idealogue who attempts to pin down reality – and in so doing misses it
completely
the big picture – is complex and varied – and most
importantly – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza’s philosophy is an attempt to close down this
reality
PROP. XXIX. We also endeavour to do everything which we
imagine men (let it be understood in this and the following propositions that
we mean men for whom we have no particular emotion) to regard with pleasure,
and, on the other hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men turn
away from.
I fail to see how the definition here of ‘men’ – as those to
whom we have no particular emotion – is relevant – makes any difference – to
the argument here
for if the idea is that we endeavour to do everything we
imagine men to regard with pleasure and we are averse to doing what we imagine
men turn away from – you would think that that would apply to men – whether or
not we have any particular emotion towards them
and then the question – do we do this?
if Spinoza’s idea in this section of the ‘Ethics’ – is to
propose an outline of what men actually do – that is provide a naturalistic
description of propositional behaviour – which is what many commentators have
thought – then he has missed the target by a long shot – for as a matter of
fact – of observation – it is clear that not all propositional action –
propositional behaviour is in fact directed at increasing pleasure and
minimizing pain –
we can and do relate to others in many and varied ways –
and our propositional actions in relation to others may have
nothing to do with maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain
i.e. – our relations with others – our concern – may be
epistemological – what they know – and in turn their interest in us may be what
we know
here it might be put – well – that maximizes pleasure – or
minimizes pain etc. – and yes – that kind of reductive argument can always be
put – but in the case as I am putting – this not what is actually happening
– it is not what the propositional action of either party is in fact
directed at
any reductive analysis of human propositional behaviour is
philosophically seductive – just because it is so simplistic – just because it
leaves out all other possibilities –
it is time philosophers got away from this trap – though I
am not confident we will ever see it –
we need to be open to different possibilities – to the great
range of possible propositional perspectives – if we wish to genuinely describe
‘natural’ propositional behaviour
and the only way we can do this with any confidence – is if
we recognize the fundamental uncertainty that is at the heart of propositional
behaviour
the point is – any ‘fixed’ analysis fails on logical grounds
Proof. – From the fact that we imagine men to love or
hate something, we shall love or hate the same thing (Prop. 27, Part III.),
i.e., we are rejoiced or saddened at the presence of that thing (Note, Prop.
13, Part III.); and therefore (prev. Prop.) we endeavour to do everything which
we imagine men to love and to regard with pleasure.
I may love or hate what I imagine others love or hate
– but just as equally I may not
Note. – This endeavour of doing or leaving out
something, merely because we may thus please men, is called ambition (ambitio)
especially when we try so eagerly to please the mob that we do or omit
something to the hurt of ourselves or someone else. Otherwise it is called
philanthropy (humanitas). Again the pleasure wherewith we imagine the
action of another by which he endeavoured to please us I call praise (laus);
but the pain wherewith we turn away from his action I call blame (vituperium)
so – to the definition of ambition –
this is a very limited view of ambition –
it fails to take account of the fact that I may have an
ambition which has nothing to do with pleasing others
I think here – of this very work of Spinoza’s – the ‘Ethics’
–
a most ambitious and excellent undertaking –
and I think just from the fact that he did not publish it in
his life time – that he had questions and doubts – was uncertain about how it
would be received –
the history of the ‘Ethics’ – backs this up
I think Spinoza was ambitious for the ‘Ethics’ because he
believed it was a statement of truth – and that is why he completed it –
would Spinoza have been concerned if it turned out that
nobody read his work –
maybe – maybe not
‘truth’ – I think was his ambition – not a desire to
‘eagerly please the mob’ –
was the ‘Ethics’ – and act of philanthropy – I would say so
–
and as to praise – I may well praise another not
because he has pleased me – but because what he has done – I consider to be –
good in itself –
and I may ‘blame’ another for his action – not
because it is painful to me – but because I think he is responsible for the act
–
my point here is that how the terms ‘praise’ and ‘blame’ are
used – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
there will be different uses – different meanings – of these
terms – in different propositional contexts
PROP. XXX. If anyone has done
anything which he imagines to affect others with pleasure, he will be affected
with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as the cause, or he will
regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which
he imagines to affect others with pain, he regards himself then with pain.
Proof. – He who imagines that he has affected others
with pleasure or pain is himself affected with pleasure or pain (Prop. 27, Part
III.). But as a man (Prop.19 and 22, Part II.) is conscious of himself by
modifications by which he is determined for action, whoever has done anything
which he imagines to affect others with pleasure, will be affected with
pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, or he will regard himself
with pleasure, and, on the other hand, the contrary follows. Q.e.d.
I may imagine that I have done something that affects
another with pleasure – but it may not be the case that what I have proposed
explains another’s pleasure –
it may appear that way at first sight – but it may turn out
that their apparent pleasure has a different source –
or it could be that I have misconstrued the effect of my
action altogether –
or indeed that their apparent pleasure is a pretence
and any pleasure that I feel – that I propose in relation to
myself – as a result of my actions in relation to another – as with any
proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
the same applies – in the case of pain
Note. – As love (Note, Prop.
13, Part III.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and
hatred pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause, therefore this
pleasure or pain will be a species of love or hatred. But as love or hatred have reference to external objects,
we shall signify these emotions by other names. We
shall call pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external (internal?) cause (gloria),
and the contrary emotion of pain shame (pudor) – be it understood when
this pleasure
or pain arises from
the fact that a man thinks himself praised or blamed; otherwise I
shall call the
pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external (internal?) cause
self-complacency (acquiescentia in seipso), but the contrary emotion of
pain I shall call repentance (poenitentia). Again, as it may happen that (Coroll., Prop. 17, Part II.)
the pleasure with which anyone imagines he affects others is only imaginary,
and (Prop. 25, Part III.) as everyone endeavours to imagine concerning himself
that which he imagines to affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass
that a vain man may become proud and imagine himself pleasing to all when he is
in reality a universal nuisance.
‘As love (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) is pleasure accompanied
by the idea of an external cause, and hatred pain accompanied by the idea of an
external cause, therefore this pleasure or pain will be a species of love or
hatred.’
love is whatever it is proposed to be – hate is whatever it
is proposed to be –
and any proposal regarding love or hate – any proposal at
all – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
as to the proposals that love is pleasure or pain
accompanied by a proposed external cause –
such an explanation of love is clearly open to question
firstly – such a proposal – as a generalization – prohibits
different conceptions of love – i.e. – that love can occur without an external
cause – where its basis is ‘internal’ –
it might be put that love is a natural human response
to others or other things under certain conditions – or propositional
contexts
the same applies to
hate –
our use and understanding of the proposal of love and of the
proposal of hate – can take many and varied forms – and all our expressions of
love and hate are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
secondly – we can ask too – whether love is always a matter
of pleasure –
experience tells us this is not always the case
and likewise hate – there are those who hate with pleasure –
not with pain
and thirdly – do we always have and operate with an
explanation – of love or hate?
I don’t find it difficult to understand that propositional
actors can and do operate with these proposals – without knowing or claiming to
know – their origin or nature
Spinoza does say –
‘this pleasure or pain will be a species of love and hate’ –
and this reference to ‘species’ of love or hate – might
suggest some flexibility in his view of the nature of love and hate
though straight after this statement – he goes right back to
the external cause idea –
‘But as love or hatred have reference to external objects,
we shall signify these emotions by other names.’ –
so – it is not clear – what the point is – of the ‘species’
qualification
and as he proceeds there is a further complication –
he says –
‘We shall call pleasure accompanied by the idea of an
external (internal?) cause (gloria), and the contrary emotion of pain
shame (pudor) – be it understood when this pleasure or pain arises from
the fact that a man thinks himself praised or blamed; otherwise I shall call
the pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external (internal?) cause
self-complacency (acquiescentia in seipso), but the contrary emotion of
pain I shall call repentance (poenitentia).’
here he raises the possibility of internal cause –
which I think is fair enough in itself – but it leaves his
theories of love and hate – ambiguous – if not confused –
some uncertainty here?
people do feel praised or blamed by others at certain times
–
but do I feel praised or blamed without a second thought –
without question – doubt or uncertainty?
and who but a fool can be ‘complacent’ without doubt?
as for repentance – I think that too – is a propositional
state that one is not likely to experience without question or doubt –
without some uncertainty
‘Again, as it may happen that (Coroll., Prop. 17, Part II.)
the pleasure with which anyone imagines he affects others is only imaginary,
and (Prop. 25, Part III.) as everyone endeavours to imagine concerning himself
that which he imagines to affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass
that a vain man may become proud and imagine himself pleasing to all when he is
in reality a universal nuisance.’
it is not so much that – ‘the pleasure with which anyone
imagines he affects others is only imaginary ‘
really what we have here is someone who does not regard his
propositional actions critically – that is – does not consider the
possibility that he is not pleasing to all – or possibly not pleasing to anyone
is he nuisance to all?
perhaps he is – perhaps not
who is to say how the ‘all’ – the others – will regard him?
and as to vanity – is it a positive – or a negative?
I don’t think we can say with any certainty – everything
depends on circumstance – and circumstance is uncertain
PROP. XXXI. If we imagine anyone to
love, desire, or hate anything which we ourselves love, hate, or desire, by
that very fact we shall love, hate or desire it the more. But on the other hand, if we imagine that what we love is
avoided by someone then we undergo a wavering of the mind.
‘If we imagine anyone to love, desire, or hate anything
which we ourselves love, hate, or desire, by that very fact we shall love, hate
or desire it the more.’
what this assumes is that you can quantify love – that you
can quantify emotions –
that they are measurable quantities – that we can talk
sensibly about more or less love – more or less hate etc. –
our emotions are not quantities – they are better described
as qualities – propositional qualities
granted people sometimes speak about their emotions as if
they are quantities – but there is no logical basis for this – it is just loose
talk –
and to those who might still say that the emotion of love is
measurable – my question is –
ok – how do you measure it?
the logical reality is that measurement is a rule-governed –
propositional game –
here we have to ask – in relation to emotions – what are the
rules?
if there are no rules – then there is no game – there is no
measurement
you might be able to measure – i.e. – a rise or fall in some
physical process – like say blood pressure – but are you then going to say that
changes in blood pressure are a measurement love?
can you measure the effort someone puts into a loving
relationship?
possibly – but then all you measure is effort
the quality of their love – relative to another – for
whom there is no effort – will be a matter open to question –
if we imagine others to love – desire – hate – what we do –
then what we are doing is proposing that others have
the same response to what we desire – love – or hate
such a proposal is open to question – open to doubt and is
uncertain
‘But on the other hand, if we imagine that what we love is
avoided by someone then we undergo a wavering of the mind.’
that someone else does not love what I love etc – may have
no impact whatsoever on my love for the object of my love
as for this ‘wavering of mind’ – what Spinoza is referencing
here – though he is not going straight to it is – uncertainty –
a propositional uncertainty that is the logical reality of
any proposal –
any propositional action – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – From the very fact
that we imagine
anyone to love anything, we shall also love it ourselves (Prop. 27, Part III). But
we suppose ourselves to love it without this; there is then brought to play a
new cause of love whereby our emotion is fostered: and therefore that which we
love we shall love with more emotion. Again, from the fact that we imagine
anyone to turn away from anything, we shall also turn away from it (Prop. 27,
Part III.). But if we suppose that we love it at the same time, then at the
same time we shall love and turn away from a thing, or (Note, Prop. 17, Part
III.) we shall undergo a wavering of the mind. Q.e.d.
‘From the very fact that we imagine anyone to love anything,
we shall also love it ourselves (Prop. 27, Part III).’
this is just plainly wrong –
anyone who thinks their propositional reality is simply
determined by the propositional reality of others – suffers from idiocy –
we might be influenced by another’s proposal – but that
influence will – in most cases – be critically reviewed – and reviewed in
relation to our own propositional response
‘But we suppose ourselves to love it without this; there is
then brought to play a new cause of love whereby our emotion is fostered: and
therefore that which we love we shall love with more emotion’
‘we shall love with more emotion’ –
again – our emotion – in this case love – is not
quantifiable – love is not a quantity – and therefore cannot be measured –
love – and hate – can be put to question – put to doubt –
their uncertainty – critically explored
Corollary. – Hence, and from Prop. 28, Part III., it
follows that everyone endeavours as much as he can to cause everyone to love
what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates: as in the words of
the poet, “As lovers let us hope and fear alike: of
iron is he who loves what the other leaves”, (Ovidii Amores, lib.2,
eleg.19, vv, 4 and 5).
everyone does not endeavour as much as he can
to cause everyone to love what he himself loves
and furthermore – anyone on that path would have to regarded
as delusional
as to the Ovid quote – ‘As lovers let us hope and fear
alike’ –
lovers who hope and fear alike – suffer from co-dependency
healthy love – and love between healthy lovers – is not some
attempt at mutual imitation –
healthy lovers will be prepared to put their love for each
other to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty –
for it is only through such exploration that lovers will
come to terms with their differences and difficulties – and find a way forward
‘of iron is he who loves what the other leaves’
this suggests to me that Ovid is saying – those who stick to
their guns – even when rejected – those who are not imitators and pretenders –
are the ones of real moral strength
however – Ovid is wrong here too – for being obstinate in
your view – is ignorant and pretentious
if we operate logically and rationally – we have – or – strive
to have – an open mind – on how we propose our relations with others – on how
we propose the world
Note. – This endeavour of
bringing to pass that every one should approve of what anyone loves and hates
is in truth ambition (Note, Prop. 29. Part III.); and
therefore we see that each one desires that all should live according to his
disposition. When this is equally desired by all,
they all oppose each other, and while all wish to be praised or loved, they
hate each other.
‘This endeavour of bringing to pass that every one should
approve of what anyone loves and hates is in truth ambition.’
any endeavour – can be seen as ambition –
however – this endeavour – of bringing about that
everyone should approve of what anyone loves and hates – is fanciful and
ridiculous
for a start – we cannot know what everyone loves and
hates
and as to when we do know what another loves and
hates – that is – the other proposes to us what he / she loves and hates –
whether we should endeavour to bring that about – will be a
matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘and therefore we see that each one desires that all should
live according to his disposition’ –
this may be the case for an ignorant person – but even here
– I have my doubts –
anyone with basic intelligence – of any understanding – and who
has experience of others – recognizes individual difference –
and will therefore not expect others to live in accordance
with his / her disposition
‘When this is equally desired by all, they all oppose each
other, and while all wish to be praised or loved, they hate each other.’
this doesn’t happen –
for in reality – it is not ‘equally desired by all’ –
I suspect – it is not in fact – desired by anyone
PROP. XXXII. If we imagine anyone to enjoy anything which
only one can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it to pass that he does not
possess it.
is Spinoza really saying that this is how everyone acts?
yes – this is exactly what he is saying –
if he was to say some people act in this way – react
in this way – one would think that he can have a point –
however – his generalization is ridiculous –
he cannot know how everyone acts or reacts –
and further – experience will show that there are people who
simply don’t act – and react – in this manner
I would count myself among this number
Proof. – From the fact alone that we imagine anyone
to enjoy anything (Prop. 27, Part III., and its Coroll, 1), we shall love that
thing and desire to enjoy it. But (by hypothesis) we imagine there to be an
obstacle to this pleasure inasmuch as another may possess it: we shall
therefore endeavour to bring it to pass that another should not possess it.
Q.e.d.
just because someone enjoys something – it just does not
follow that ‘we’ – presumably – everyone – will love that thing – or desire to
enjoy it –
I can enjoy the fact that someone else enjoys something –
and indeed – hope that they will continue to enjoy it
there may well be someone who wishes to possess what the
other enjoys – and who endeavours to bring it to pass that they lose possession
of it –
but to suggest that this is how everyone is so disposed – is
without foundation
Note – We thus
see that it is equally the case with most men that their nature is so
constituted that they pity those who fare badly and envy those who fare well,
and (pre. Prop.) with a hatred proportionate to the love we bear to the thing
which we imagine some one else to possess. We see, again, that from the same
property of human nature from which it follows that men are pitiful we find
they are also envious and ambitious. Now if we would wish to consult
experience, we find that she teaches us all this, more especially if we pay
attention to the early years of our life. For that we find that children,
inasmuch as their bodies are, so to
speak, in equilibrium, will laugh and cry merely because they see others laugh
or cry; and whatever they see any one do they immediately desire to imitate,
and they desire all things for themselves which they see give pleasure to
others: clearly because the images of things, as we said, are they very
modifications of the human body or modes in which the human body is affected by
external causes and disposed for this or that.
‘We thus see that it is equally the case with most men that
their nature is so constituted that they pity those who fare badly and envy
those who fare well, and (pre. Prop.) with a hatred proportionate to the love
we bear to the thing which we imagine some one else to possess’
Spinoza qualifies here – he goes from ‘all’ to ‘most’ –
and really there goes the argument of Prop. XXXII.
‘We see, again, that from the same property of human nature
from which it follows that men are pitiful we find they are also envious and
ambitious.’
just how we describe people’s behaviour – in any
propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
how these terms ‘envious’ and ‘ambitious’ – are defined –
are used – if in fact they are used – is a matter – open to question
different propositional actors – in different propositional
contexts – will invariably define their terms – their usages – in different
ways
and any definition – any usage – in any propositional
context – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Now if we would wish to consult experience, we find that
she teaches us all this, more especially if we pay attention to the early years
of our life. For that we find that children, inasmuch as their bodies are, so to speak, in
equilibrium, will laugh and cry merely because they see others laugh or cry;
and whatever they see any one do they
immediately desire to imitate, and they desire all things
for themselves which they see
give pleasure to others: clearly because the images of
things, as we said, are they very modifications of the human body or modes in
which the human body is affected by external causes and disposed for this or
that.’
even if what Spinoza says about how children behave is so –
the idea that children’s behaviour can function as a model for all human
behaviour – is naïve – and simplistic
further – it does not follow that because some children may
behave as Spinoza here suggests – that therefore all children do so behave –
if the argument here is from experience – then quite clearly
– we must keep an open mind – for experience – in all its manifestations – is
uncertain
and any ‘image’ – however further explained – from a logical
point of view – is a proposal –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
PROP. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we
endeavour as much as possible to bring it about that it should also love us.
this can be so – but it can also be – that it is not so
one may love another – knowing full well that they will not
be able to return that love – for whatever reason –
i.e. – they may love another – and in that relationship
their love is exclusive
in such a case – the lover here – may well just accept
– that his / her love cannot be returned
Proof. – We endeavour to
imagine a thing that we love as much as we can above all others (Prop. 12,
Part III,). If, therefore, the thing is similar to us, we shall endeavour to
affect it with joy above the rest (Prop. 29, Part III.), or
we shall endeavour as much as possible to bring it about that the thing loved
should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is
(Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), that it should love us. Q.e.d.
‘We endeavour to imagine a thing that we love as much as we
can above all others.’
‘above all others’?
we will propose love of others – in different ways – in
different propositional contexts
and it is not that one love will be above others – rather
that our proposals of love will be different
and strictly speaking ‘above’ – is a geometrical notion –
and one not applicable to understanding emotional propositional states
‘or we shall endeavour as much as possible to bring it about
that the thing loved should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea
of ourselves, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), that it should love us.’
again – this can be so – but it may not be so – i.e. – I may
love another – and for whatever reason – not expect – or endeavour to bring
about – reciprocity
how we propose love for another – and what we expect of such
a proposal – will be a matter of propositional context –
and even within any propositional context – any such
proposal – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we imagine a
thing loved to be affected towards us, the greater will be our vain-glory.
any proposal put – and any proposal to us – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
what this means – in the context of this proposition – is
that how we react to what is put to us – is not determined – and is not
determined by the propositional actor who puts the proposal to us
we may feel flattered by another’s emotional response to
something or someone we love –
but equally – we may regard such a response in other ways –
i.e. – we may see it as well meaning – but overblown – or we
could see it as an attempt at ingratiation
it is quite possible that we don’t give it any thought at
all
as to ‘vain-glory’ –
if you are given a positive response – and you accept it – I
don’t see why you wouldn’t enjoy it and feel affirmed
it is possible to make too much of such a response – to lose
perspective – this happens
however – you always have the possibility of critically
evaluating how you have responded to another’s proposal
Proof. – We endeavour to imagine a thing that we love
as much as we can to make the thing loved love us in return, that is (Note,
Prop. 13, Part III.), to bring it about that the thing loved should be affected
with pleasure accompanied with the idea of
ourselves. And so the more pleasure
with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected on our account, the more
this endeavour is assisted, that is (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note), the
more we are affected with pleasure. But when we are pleased with the fact
that we affect another thing similar to ourselves with pleasure, then we regard
ourselves with pleasure (Prop. 30, Part III.). Therefore
the greater the pleasure with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected
on our account, the greater the pleasure with which we regard ourselves, or
(Note, Prop. 30, Part III.) the more self-complacent or vain we become. Q.e.d.
‘We endeavour to imagine a thing that we love as much as we
can to make the thing loved love us in return, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part
III.), to bring it about that the thing loved should be affected with pleasure
accompanied with the idea of ourselves.’
well – we may do this – but we may not –
someone may love another – and not expect that love to be
returned – or endeavour to have it returned
and there can be many different reasons for any such
response
also – does Spinoza understand that there are people who are
more than happy to show love for others – to help others – and remain
anonymous?
‘And so the more pleasure with which we imagine the thing
loved to be affected on our account, the more this endeavour is assisted, that
is (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note), the more we are affected with
pleasure.’
the ‘more’ here is irrelevant – ‘more’ here is just a piece
of rhetorical dressing –
yes – one may be affected with pleasure – because another
experiences pleasure –
but again – this may not be the case –
i.e. – one may regard another’s pleasure – without pleasure
– i.e. – in a rational – disinterested manner
‘Therefore the greater the pleasure with which we imagine
the thing loved to be affected on our account, the greater the pleasure with
which we regard ourselves, or (Note, Prop. 30, Part III.) the more
self-complacent or vain we become.’
I don’t see why experiencing pleasure because another
experiences pleasure – is to be self-complacent – or vain
Spinoza speaks here of ‘the greater the pleasure’ –
I don’t think pleasure is quantifiable – pleasure is not a
quantity – and is not measurable
the question for Spinoza here is – ok – how do you –
determine what is a greater pleasure – as against a lesser pleasure?
we have nothing at all from Spinoza on this matter –
I don’t think he even recognizes that it is an issue – and
an issue central to his argument
PROP.
XXXV. If anyone imagines that the thing loved is joined to another than himself
with the same or faster bond of love than that which binds it to him, he will
be affected with hatred towards the object loved, and envy towards the other.
‘the
same or faster bond of love’ –
‘faster’
– here is irrelevant rhetoric –
the
‘speed’ at which someone loves something or someone – is logically irrelevant
what
is relevant is only that a proposal of love is put –
at
best – this notion of a ‘faster bond of love’ – is poetic
and
as for the ‘same’ – how would you know that one person’s proposal of love – is
the same – as another’s?
what
you could know – is that another proposes love –
but
just what that proposal amounts to – and how it might relate to your own
proposal of love – is clearly a matter open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
the
argument is that if person A proposes loves of an object or person – and finds
that another – person B – also proposes love of that object or person – that
person A will then hate the object or person – and envy person B –
why
would you hate the thing that you supposedly love – just because another also
loves it?
and
if you both love the same thing – what ground for envy?
‘love’
– here – for Spinoza – is confused with ‘possession’
I
might love another – but it makes no sense to say therefore that they are my
possession
one
does not ‘possess’ another object or person
love
for Spinoza – is basically pleasure given or received
you
love that which gives you pleasure – but you don’t therefore possess the thing
loved –
so
– I think here – Spinoza is confused –
the
logic of the matter is this –
‘objects’
are proposals – and we propose in relation to proposals
love
– however it is further described – is a proposal put – in relation to
an object / person proposal –
and
any proposal put – or any proposed relation – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
which
is to say any propositional state – is uncertain –
and
any propositional determination – is logically open – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
our
reality is the reality of propositional possibility –
Spinoza
– it seems – has no concept of propositional possibility
‘reality’
for Spinoza – is a rule-governed deductive game
our
reality – is not a deductive game – our reality is the reality of proposal – of
propositional actional – and as such it is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Proof.
– The greater the love towards himself with which the thing loved is affected,
the greater his self-complacency (prev. Prop.), that is the greater his
pleasure (Note, Prop. 30, Part III.); and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he
will endeavour to imagine as much as possible thing loved to be bound to him in
the tightest bond of love, and this endeavour or appetite will increase if he
imagines any one else to desire the same for himself (Prop. 28, Part III.). But
this endeavour or appetite is supposed to be hindered by the image of the thing
loved, accompanied by the image of him the thing loved has joined to itself.
Therefore (Note, Prop. 11, Part III) he will be affected with pain accompanied
by the idea of the thing loved as the cause, and at the same time the image of
the other, that is (Note Prop. 15, Part III.), which by reason (Prop. 23, Part
III) that he enjoys the object loved, he will envy. Q.e.d.
‘The
greater the love towards himself with which the thing loved is affected, the
greater his self-complacency (prev. Prop.), that is the greater his pleasure.’
this
is to say – the more you feel loved – the greater the pleasure you take in
yourself
perhaps
–
or
could it be that you have your love – affirmed and endorsed – and
naturally you take pleasure in this
and
as for ‘self-complacency’ – just what that amounts to is open to question
it
suggests to me – someone who does not critically evaluate their propositional
reality
does
not question – doubt – or explore their uncertainty
someone
who is logically asleep
the
simple point here is that how you respond to another’s proposal of love – and
how
you
propose yourself – in response to the other’s proposal of love – is open to
interpretation – interpretation that will likely be different – at least can be
different – depending on circumstance – depending on propositional context
‘and
therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he will endeavour to imagine as much as
possible thing loved to be bound to him in the tightest bond of love, and this
endeavour or appetite will increase if he imagines any one else to desire the
same for himself’
this
is possible – but it is just one possible response to being loved
and
the problem with Spinoza’s conception here – is that he does not take into
account – does not consider the fact of circumstance – the fact of propositional
context
propositional
context just does not figure in his analysis of how people behave –
and
for that reason – his analysis – never hits pay dirt
because
I am loved – it just may be that given who I am – and given who – the person
who loves me is – there is quite a different outcome to the one suggested by
Spinoza
it
may well be that I am not ‘bound in the tightest bond of love’ – but rather
that I simply appreciate the other’s love – and do so without the
pretence of exaggeration and rhetoric – or bondage
and
that another may propose love of someone that I propose love to – may have no
affect on the nature of my proposal
‘But
this endeavour or appetite is supposed to be hindered by the image of the thing
loved, accompanied by the image of him the thing loved has joined to itself.’
the
point is that there may be no hindrance at all – no negative impact at all
‘Therefore
(Note, Prop. 11, Part III) he will be affected with pain accompanied by the
idea of the thing loved as the cause, and at the same time the image of the
other, that is (Note Prop. 15, Part III.), which by reason (Prop. 23, Part III)
that he enjoys the object loved, he will envy.’
the
picture we get here from Spinoza is of someone who regards love as possession
you
do not possess another if you love them –
for
one – you can’t possess another – you can only relate to another
and
if you think you are possessing another – that the other is your possession –
then you completely misconstrue the nature of the other – and indeed of
yourself –
there
is no love in such a relationship –
any
such relationship with the other – or with yourself – can only be destructive –
for it is logically corrupt
Note –
This hatred towards an object loved together with the envy of another is called
jealousy (zelotypia), which therefore is nothing else than a wavering of
the soul caused by love and hate at the same time accompanied with the idea of
a rival who is envied. Further this hate towards the object loved will be
greater according to the joy with which the jealous man was wont to be affected
from the reciprocated love of the thing loved, and also according to the
emotion with which he was affected towards him who now, he imagines, joins the
thing loved to himself. For if he hated this person, by that very fact he will
hate the object loved (Prop. 24, Part III.), for that he imagines it to affect
with pleasure what he himself hates, and also (Coroll., Prop.15. Part 111.)
from the fact that he is forced to join the image of the thing loved to that of
whom he hates: this state of affairs generally comes about when a man loves a
woman. For he imagines that a woman he loves prostitutes herself to another, is
not only saddened by the fact that his own desire is hindered, but also, as he
is forced to unite the image of the thing loved with parts of shame and excreta
of his rival, he is turned from her. To this also must be added that the
jealous man is not received with the same countenance with which the thing
loved was wont to greet him, on which account as a lover he will be saddened,
as I shall soon show.
‘This
hatred towards an object loved together with the envy of another is called
jealousy (zelotypia), which therefore is nothing else than a wavering of
the soul caused by love and hate at the same time accompanied with the idea of
a rival who is envied.’
‘love
and hate at the same time’?
this
makes no sense – it is to propose a contradiction
yes
– you might love someone – and then hate them – or hate them and then
love them
but
you cannot propose love and hate simultaneously-
Spinoza’s
definition of jealousy – fails because it is based on a contradiction
‘wavering
of the soul’ –
if
this means uncertainty – propositional uncertainty – a ‘wavering of the soul’ –
is understandable – is logical
and
here we are talking about a situation where one is uncertain how to regard the
other –
but
again – this is not love and hate – ‘at the same time’
is
the other a ‘rival’ and is the other ‘envied’? –
well
– the other may be regarded this way –
however
– if one – actually accepts that the lover – no longer loves – if one is at
were at peace with that – is the ‘other’ a rival – and a rival to be envied?
it
could also be that the lost lover – was more trouble than he or she was worth –
and
in that case their new partner – is not a rival – and not to be envied
‘Further
this hate towards the object loved will be greater according to the joy with
which the jealous man was wont to be affected from the reciprocated love of the
thing loved, and also according to the emotion with which he was affected
towards him who now, he imagines, joins the thing loved to himself.’
the
hate towards the object loved?
there
may be hate towards someone – who was once loved – but is no longer
loved –
and
– there may be no hate at all – again – for whatever reason one might not hate
–
one
might still love – and accept the change of circumstance –
or
one might simply accept the change of circumstance without love or hate
as
to the hate being ‘greater’ according to the joy once received from the other –
I
think this idea that you can ‘measure’ love and hate – is without foundation –
and the claim that you can is best seen as rhetorical –
yes
– you may hate the other – but you may have a different response
love
and hate are not absolutes –
love
and hate are propositional states –
love
and hate are proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
whatever
the circumstances in which they are proposed
I
would suggest that lovers know this – and that haters know this – but it seems
Spinoza does not
‘For
if he hated this person, by that very fact he will hate the object loved (Prop.
24, Part III.), for that he imagines it to affect with pleasure what he himself
hates, and also (Coroll., Prop.15. Part 111.) from the fact that he is forced
to join the image of the thing loved to that of whom he hates: this state of
affairs generally comes about when a man loves a woman.’
it
just does not follow that if you hate the new lover of the one you loved – you
will hate the one you loved
you
may still love your ex-lover – or you may neither love or hate them –
it
all depends on the people involved – the circumstances in which they find
themselves
so
– there is really no point at all in even attempting a generalization –
the
best you can do is lay out possible propositional responses
I
think whether it is hate or love that you propose – in reality – you will put
your proposal to question – to doubt – you will explore its uncertainty
that
is to say – if you behave rationally – you will be uncertain
‘this
state of affairs generally comes about when a man loves a woman.’-
this
state affairs can also come about when a woman loves a man – or a man
loves a man – or a woman loves a woman –
really
– logically speaking – the correct term here is neither ‘man’ or ‘woman’ – it
is ‘propositional actor’
‘For
he imagines that a woman he loves prostitutes herself to another, is not only
saddened by the fact that his own desire is hindered, but also, as he is forced
to unite the image of the thing loved with parts of shame and excreta of his
rival, he is turned from her.’
from
this it is clear that Spinoza regards a woman loved as a possession of the
lover –
he
doesn’t understand or accept that a woman can freely choose who she loves – and
freely choose who she unites with
and
he thinks a woman who chooses another partner should be termed a prostitute
interesting
that he does not consider the reverse situation – that is when a man leaves a
woman for another woman
has
the woman left – lost a possession?
is
the man who leaves a prostitute?
apparently
not
I
think it is fair to say here that Spinoza was a misogynist –
and
the real shame of this is that his prejudice against women – really undercuts
his metaphysics
for
from a metaphysical point of view – in Spinoza’s philosophy – there are not
male and female modifications and modes of God
metaphysically
speaking gender is irrelevant
when
it comes to women – Spinoza loses the plot –
he
is not the first – and he won’t be last –
and
of course – there are women who have lost the plot over men
I
get the impression that Spinoza’s experience with Clara Maria – who as a young
man he loved and lost – hit hard – and perhaps he never recovered from that
experience –
also
– his dealings with his sister Rebecca – over their inheritance – would not
have left him over joyed
having
your desire hindered – may well result in sadness – however that is not
necessarily the case –
on
reflection – one may i.e. – decide that all things considered – for whatever
reasons – one is – or can be – better off – without that desire –
but
here of course one must put one’s desire to question – to doubt – and explore
its uncertainty
that
is – one needs to be open and rational –
and
it is not that difficult to be so
‘but
also, as he is forced to unite the image of the thing loved with parts of shame
and excreta of his rival, he is turned from her.’
this
is some statement! – where to begin?
if
you want any indication of Spinoza’s bitterness in relation to lost romantic /
sexual love – it’s right here
the
parts of shame?
presumably
genitalia – but why is any part of the human body – male or female to be
regarded as a ‘part of shame’?
I
think Spinoza’s reason here is clouded and derailed by pain experienced
in
any case – this statement – just doesn’t fit with his metaphysics of the body –
the human body as a mode of extension
the
‘excreta of his rival’ –
I
had to check out ‘excreta’ in the Oxford dictionary – just to make sure I had
this right –
‘waste
expelled from the body’
Spinoza
is saying – that any man who has lost a lover to another – would ‘unite’ the
image of the one loved with the rival’s genitalia and his shit –
a
sick and perverse view
the
logical reality is that we cannot know how anyone will react in such a
situation – or for that matter any propositional situation –
and
any proposal put – as to how someone does or will act or react – is open to
question – open to doubt and is uncertain
‘To
this also must be added that the jealous man is not received with the same
countenance with which the thing loved was wont to greet him, on which account
as a lover he will be saddened, as I shall soon show.’
what
if he was greeted ‘with the same countenance’ by his former lover?
it
is possible –
would
he no longer be saddened?
the
point here is that all we have here from Spinoza is speculation –
and
any speculation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza
conception of jealousy rests on the proposal that one can love and hate at the
same time
this
is to propose a contradiction – and therefore – this conception of jealousy –
is at best – illogical and therefore – irrational
could
we take it from this that Spinoza sees jealousy as irrational?
I
don’t think so – if anything he believes that jealousy and his understanding of
it – is logical within his deductive system
another
question is – can one be jealous without hate of the ‘rival’ – and hate of the
one – once loved?
yes
– I think so –
one
could see the loss of one’s lover to another – as a misfortune – and the
‘rival’ as being advantaged – by the misfortune –
and
therefore – one would be ‘jealous’ – as in – wish for oneself the good
fortune of the 'rival'
as
to the one loved – are they advantaged or disadvantaged by their change of
partner?
a
good question
PROP. XXXVI. He who recollects a thing he once enjoyed,
desires to possess it under the same circumstances as those which he first
enjoyed it.
I could recollect / propose a thing enjoyed – but not desire
to possess it under the same circumstances as those in which I first enjoyed it
–
in my current propositional reality – I may regard the thing
enjoyed – that is the proposal that I enjoy the thing – as a proposal I would
not put
I may see that the circumstances – that is – the
propositional context – in which I enjoyed something – as a context that at
present – I would not wish to be involved in
Proof. – Whatever a man sees in conjunction with a
thing which has delighted him will be accidentally to him a cause of pleasure
(Prop. 15, Part III), and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III) he will desire to
possess it at the same time as the thing which delights him, or he will desire
to possess the thing under the same circumstances as when he first enjoyed it. Q.e.d.
what is seen in conjunction with a thing that has delighted
– might in a different propositional context – lead one to question – to doubt
– to be uncertain – regarding that thing – that proposal – that once delighted
someone might desire to possess – but such a desire
is illogical and foolhardy
we don’t possess – we propose – and our proposals are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
further one propositional context is not the same as another
–
propositional contexts are logically different
Corollary. – A lover will be saddened if he finds one
of those attendant circumstances to be wanting.
the lover may – on reflection – not give much weight
at all – to an ‘attendant circumstance’ that is ‘lacking’ – and may in fact
regard it as insignificant – and thus not be saddened by its lacking
Proof. – Now in so far as he finds one circumstance
to be wanting, thus far he imagines something which cuts of its existence. But
as he is assumed as a lover to be desirous of that one thing or circumstance
(pre. Prop.) therefore (Prop. 19, Part III.) in so far as he imagines it to be
wanting he is saddened. Q.e.d.
he may not be desirous of that one thing or
circumstance – but still love
Note. – This sadness, in so far as it refers to the
absence of that which we love, is called regret (desiderium).
I may have loved someone who has passed away
do I regret their absence?
I may wish they were still alive – yes
on the other hand – instead of wishing they were still alive
– I might remember the person and my love as it was – recognizing that to wish
for what was – is not to face facts – but rather to propose a fantasy
is not regret – just this – the proposing of a fantasy?
is it not to wish that what was – was not – and what
happened – didn’t happen?
people do regret – people do propose regret –
people propose fantasies
and as with any proposal – a proposed regret – a proposed
fantasy – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. XXXVII. The desire which
arises by reason of sadness, joy, hatred, or love, is greater according as the
emotion is greater.
the desire is greater if the emotion is greater?
for this to be the case as stated – it must be possible to
measure emotion and to measure desire – and the relation between emotion and
desire
measurement is a rule-governed propositional game
what rules are there for the calculation of emotion and
desire?
clearly – the notion of measurement is misapplied in
relation to emotion and desire
still – we have in common usage such phrases as ‘a great
love’ – ‘a great’ (as in ‘all-consuming’) desire
what such phrases and the like amount to – what they mean –
are matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and who is to say what a ‘great love’ amounts to?
a ‘true’ love – an ‘intense’ love – a ‘pure’ love? etc. etc.
–
and then what does ‘true’ here – come down to?
what do we make of ‘intense’ – or ‘pure’ in this context?
and as for ‘desire’ – desire is a proposal
any proposal of desire – will be open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
and so – as it stands – what are to make of PROP. XXXVII?
Spinoza makes no attempt to elucidate ‘greater’
I suspect it never occurred to him that there was any need
to do so
the result is that PROP. XXXVII. – is little more than a
throw-away line
Proof. – Sadness diminishes or hinders a man’s power
of action, that is (Prop. 7, Part III), it diminishes or hinders the endeavour
with which a man endeavours to persist in his being, and therefore (Prop. 5,
Part III.) it is contrary to this endeavour, and whatever the power of man
affected by pain is, is directed to remove that pain. But (def. pain) the
greater the pain the greater it must be opposed to the man’s power of acting.
Therefore the greater the pain the more the man endeavour by his power of acting
to remove it, that is (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.), the more the desire or
appetite with which he will endeavour to remove it. Again,
since pleasure (Note, Prop. 11, Part III. increases or helps a man’s power of
acting, it can easily be shown in that way that a man affected by pleasure
desires nothing else than to preserve that pleasure, and that with the greater
desire according as the pleasure is greater. Then
since love and hatred are emotions of pleasure and pain, it follows in the same
manner that the endeavour, appetite, or desire which arises by reason of love
or hatred will be greater according to the love or hatred. Q.e.d.
‘Sadness diminishes or hinders a man’s power of action, that
is (Prop. 7, Part III), it diminishes or hinders the endeavour with which a man
endeavours to persist in his being, and therefore (Prop. 5, Part III.) it is
contrary to this endeavour, and whatever the power of man affected by pain is,
is directed to remove that pain. Therefore the greater the pain the more the
man endeavour by his power of acting to remove it, that is (Note, Prop. 9, Part
III.), the more the desire or appetite with which he will endeavour to remove
it.’
does sadness diminish or hinder a man’s power of action –
his propositional power – and his endeavour to persist?
well – it may do –
but on the other hand – it may have the effect of
motivating him to achieve a different emotional state – and as a result –
increase his resolve to persist
also – while it is true that we endeavour to remove pain –
there can be circumstances where pain cannot be removed –
and circumstances where the experience of pain is explored
and knowledge is gained from that exploration
and this will be the case – however we determine / describe
pain – i.e. – as ‘greater’ – as ‘lesser’
sadness and pain are propositional states that are open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Again, since pleasure (Note, Prop. 11, Part III. increases
or helps a man’s power of acting, it can easily be shown in that way that a man
affected by pleasure desires nothing else than to preserve that pleasure, and
that with the greater desire according as the pleasure is greater.’
pleasure – does not always – in all propositional
circumstances – increase a man’s power of acting –
in a state of pleasure – I might well be less inclined to
act
or the experience of pleasure might cloud my judgment – and
hence hinder my power of action
a man affected with pleasure desires nothing else that to
preserve that pleasure?
not so –
a man may desire a break from the experience of pleasure –
because he has had enough
or because – he feels the need to see the world from a
different perspective
the experience of pleasure – the propositional state of
pleasure – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Then since love and hatred are emotions of pleasure and
pain, it follows in the same manner that the endeavour, appetite, or desire
which arises by reason of love or hatred will be greater according to the love
or hatred.’
love and hatred – emotions of pleasure and pain?
this is way too simplistic –
it fails to take into account that someone can love – and
their love is – for whatever reason – painful
and hatred – there are those whose hatred gives them
pleasure
and as for the ‘desire which arises by reason of love or
hatred’ –
just what form any such desire takes will be a function of
circumstance – propositional circumstance
objectively speaking – the best you can do here is propose
or outline possible propositional scenarios –
the hard reality is – you just have to see what happens –
and let’s be clear here – ‘desire’ – is a proposal –
and a proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
as indeed is any proposed relation between proposals of love
and hate – and the proposal of desire
Spinoza – with his ‘greater’ – here – is proposing a
rule-governed propositional game
it is as if he sees the relation between the emotions and
endeavour as mathematically measurable – as a calculation –
human emotions are not rule governed – human emotions are
not a game
human emotions are expressions of propositional uncertainty
PROP. XXXVIII. If anyone begins to hate a thing loved so
that his love for it is clearly laid aside, he will bear greater hatred towards
it on that very account than if he had never loved it, and the more so
according as his former love was greater.
Spinoza’s opinions on love and hate – are no more than that
– opinions –
and as with any opinion – open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
he shuns uncertainty – as if by doing so he has established
certainty –
in so doing – all he does is burrow down into ignorance and
prejudice
one’s love for someone or something may be ‘clearly laid
aside’ – without hate –
and ‘hate’ – as far as I can understand it – is nothing but
an ignorant prejudice –
any emotional proposal – is – as a matter of logic – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
a negative response to someone or something – as with a
positive response – cannot – logically speaking – be certain
in so far as hate or love – are held to be certainties –
they are prejudices – and thus – irrational
even so – in the case where someone does hold a prejudice of
hate – does it follow that because they once held a prejudice of love – that
their hate will be greater?
what would ‘greater’ mean here?
I think a prejudice rooted in in the delusion of certainty –
would – if it continues – be unchanged
for if it changed or altered in any respect – it would have
been put to question – and if so – logically speaking – no longer would it be a
prejudice –
we would no longer be talking about hate
if one puts one’s negative emotional response to question –
we have the possibility of a different propositional outcome to that suggested
by Spinoza
it is quite possible that the ex-lover puts his original
love to question – and realises he was mistaken in his love – and therefore
does not regard the other negatively
the ex-lover – may ‘lay aside’ his or her love – and simply
accept that it has its day – and in so doing be prepared to deal with the new
reality – without negativity
Proof. – Now
if one begins to hate a thing, more of his appetites are hindered than if he
had not loved it. For love is a pleasure (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) which man,
as much as he can (Prop. 28, Part III.) endeavours to preserve by regarding the
thing loved as present (same Note), and affecting it with pleasure as much as
he can (Prop. 21, Part III.); his endeavour is greater according as (prev.
Prop.) his love is greater, and so is his endeavour to bring it to pass that
the thing loved should love him in return (Prop. 33, Part III). But these
endeavours are hindered by hatred towards the thing loved (Coroll. Prop. 13 and
Prop. 23, Part III.). Therefore the lover (Note, Prop.
11, Part III.) will be affected with sadness on this account, and the more so
according as his love was greater, that is, besides the pain whose cause is
hatred there is also another cause, namely, that he loved the thing; and
consequently he will regard the thing loved with a greater emotion of pain,
that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), he will regard it with more hatred than if
he had never loved it, and the more so according as his former love was greater.
Q.e.d.
‘Now if one begins to hate a thing, more of his appetites
are hindered than if he had not loved it.’
could you hate something – without first having loved it?
hate for Spinoza is the consequence of pain – you hate that
which cause you pain –
and you love that which gives you pleasure
could you experience pain in relation something – without
first experiencing pleasure in relation to it
I think it is pretty clear that this is possible
one might be pained by another’s suffering – without having
taken pleasure in them – without having loved them –
and of course – without hating them
would your appetites be hindered by such pain?
not necessarily – the experience of pain might sharpen or
broaden your appetites
‘For love is a pleasure (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) which
man, as much as he can (Prop. 28, Part III.) endeavours to preserve by
regarding the thing loved as present (same Note), and affecting it with
pleasure as much as he can (Prop. 21, Part III.); his
endeavour is greater according as (prev. Prop.) his love is
greater, and so is his endeavour to bring it to pass that the thing loved
should love him in return (Prop. 33, Part III).’
any pleasure proposed – is open to question
do we endeavour to maintain pleasure as much as possible?
I think not
pleasure comes and pleasure goes – and I think we all
understand that it is not – in any propositional context – a permanent state
desiring it as a permanent state – proposing it as a
permanent state is delusional
and yes – one may endeavour to bring about that the
love / pleasure given – is reciprocated –
this would be quite natural – but it may not be the case
one may love and not expect one’s love to be returned
‘Therefore the lover (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) will be
affected with sadness on this account, and the more so according as his love
was greater, that is, besides the pain whose cause is hatred there is also
another cause, namely, that he loved the thing; and consequently he will regard
the thing loved with a greater emotion of pain, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part
III.), he will regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and
the more so according as his former love was greater. Q.e.d.
‘beside the pain whose cause is hatred’?
up unto this point – my understanding has been that Spinoza
is arguing that love is a form of pleasure – and hatred a form of pain
here we have it that pain is caused by hatred –
so – the question is – is pain caused by hatred – or hatred
caused by pain?
prime facie – the experience of pain – is not the same as
the experience of hatred
pain and hatred – are different propositions – different
propositional states
yes – they may well be related – but they are different states
–
they are not equivalent
and to suggest that they are – or to conflate the two –
results in propositional confusion
the basic problem here is that Spinoza – in his analysis or
definition of hatred – has avoided really dealing with the nature of hatred –
and has gone the quick and easy path – and simply defined hatred as pain
the result being – we really don’t have an analysis of
hatred from Spinoza – just a quick and easy equivalence
and it also means – that we don’t get any real analysis of
pain –
where it looks like analysis is needed – he just conflates
pain with hatred
and in any case – we have to ask – is hatred always
associated with pain?
are there not those who take pleasure in hatred?
and are there not those who suffer in love?
the central concepts of Spinoza’s psychology – pleasure –
pain – love – hatred – are not given anything like an adequate account –
furthermore – as presented – they are confused
his psychology is naïve and simplistic – and simply fails to
produce anything like a comprehensive account of human propositional behaviour
the best you can say here is that Spinoza has given voice to
his own perceptions and prejudices
if that had been all that he had set out to do – he would
have been eminently successful
however – in fact what he claimed to be doing – was
outlining a universal theory –
there is no such thing
at the best we have different propositional perspectives on
human behaviour – and any perspective – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
PROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him
harm unless he fears to receive greater harm from him; and on the other hand,
he who loves someone will by the same law endeavour to do him good.
Proof. – To hate anyone is the same (Note, Prop. 13,
Part III.) as to imagine him the cause of pain, and therefore (Prop. 28, Part
III.) he who hates anything will endeavour to remove or destroy it. But if
thence he fears something more painful, or, what is the same thing, something
worse, and thinks that he can avoid it by not inflicting that evil which he
intended on the person he hates, he will desire to abstain from inflicting evil
(Prop. 28, Part III.), and that (Prop. 37, Part III.) with a greater endeavour
than that with which he intended to inflict evil, and
therefore this error will prevail. The second part of the proof proceeds in
the same manner as this. Therefore he who hates, etc. Q.e.d.
here Spinoza effectively defines hate as that emotional
state where the hater ‘endeavours to do harm to the hated’
is it not conceivable that someone may hate another – and not
endeavour to do them harm?
i.e. – one might hate another – and simply decide not to
have anything to do with them
and could it not be the case that if one fears ‘greater harm
from him’ – that one would endeavour to do more harm to him?
furthermore – one may love another – without endeavouring to
do him good –
i.e. – one might see one’s love for another as being a
sufficient good in itself
in the NOTE Spinoza writes –
‘… and therefore this error will prevail’
which is to say that even if he refrains from inflicting
pain on the other – because of the threat of more pain – his motive to do so –
will remain –
again – this may be the case – but it may not
with the prospect of more pain from the other – one may drop
one’s original intention to inflict pain on him –
and we can ask – why is it an ‘error’?
the nature of hate and of love – are matters open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
it is this uncertainty that Spinoza cannot face – and
therefore cannot deal with
as a result – all we get from Spinoza is one view of
what hate is – and one view of what love is –
he has no understanding of the possible complexities
involved in these emotions
it is worth pointing out yet again that human beings are not
rule governed propositional systems –
human beings are not structured as propositional
games – human beings are not machines
and what this points to is that Spinoza’s geometric
deductive methodology – is entirely misapplied when it comes to human beings
and the understanding of human emotions
deduction is a game that human beings can play –
however – the understanding of human beings – is a critical
process – an exploration of propositional uncertainty
Note. – By good (bonum) I understand here all
kinds of pleasure and whatever may be conducive to it, and more especially that
which satisfies our more fervent desires, whatever they may be; by bad (malum)
all kinds of pain, and especially that which frustrates our desires. We have
shown above (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.) that we do not desire anything because
we think it is good, but that we think that it is good because we desire it:
and consequently that from which we turn we call evil or bad. Wherefore each one judges or estimates according to his
own emotion what is good or bad, better or worse, best or worst. Thus a miser considers an abundance of money for the best,
and penury the worst. An ambitious man, on the other hand, holds nothing before
honour, and turns away from nothing like shame. To an envious man nothing is
more pleasing than another’s misfortune, and nothing more pleasing than his
good fortune: and thus each one judge according to his emotion whether a thing
is good or bad, useful or hurtful. As for that
emotion through which a man is so disposed that he does not want what he wants,
or wants what he does not want, it is called fearfulness (timor), which
therefore is nothing else than fear whereby wherein a man is disposed to
encounter a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater one which threatens him in
the future (see Prop. 28, Part III.). But if the evil he fears be shame,
then the fearfulness is called bashfulness (verecundia). Finally, if the desire to avoid a future
evil be hindered by the fear of another, so that the person know not what to
do, then the fear is called consternation (consternation), especially if
both evils feared are very great.
‘By good (bonum) I understand here all kinds of
pleasure and whatever may be conducive to it, and more especially that which
satisfies our more fervent desires, whatever they may be; by bad (malum)
all kinds of pain, and especially that which frustrates our desires.’
we use terms such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ – and these terms – as
with any other term – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain _
can anyone say with certainty what ‘good’ means?
the fact is – the logical reality is – we can’t –
and so – any proposal as to the meaning of ‘good’ – is
uncertain
it is in the face of this logical reality that human beings
propose different accounts of ‘good’ –
and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
in practice – what this means is that we do operate
with different propositional accounts of ‘good’ –
and what is behind this differential use – is like the
accounts themselves – open to question –
one might propose that with changes in circumstances –
changes in propositional contexts – one account against another – for whatever
reason – comes into play
it might also be that one quite consciously changes one view
of what is good – as a result of critical analysis
and indeed – one may adopt a new view of what is good –
without knowing why
Spinoza’s definition of ‘good’ – is fair enough
what we have to ask though – is does such a definition –
cover all uses of ‘good’?
Spinoza would probably agree that it doesn’t – but would
argue that all this means is that any other use – any different definition – is
invalid –
Spinoza view is ‘one definition fits all propositional
contexts’ – and he is not alone in this –
however – any such view is logically flawed – and its
only value is rhetorical –
the empirical reality is that we have different
understandings of good – at different times – and in different propositional
contexts – for different reasons –
our understandings of ‘good’ – are an exploration of
propositional possibility – an exploration of propositional uncertainty –
the psychological / ethical life is the on-going discovery
of different understandings
‘We have shown above (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.) that we do
not desire anything because we think it is good, but that we think that it is
good because we desire it: and consequently that from which we turn we call
evil or bad.’
yes – we may think that what we desire is what is good –
however – this view takes no account of the fact that humans
can desire something –they regard as evil or bad
if we only desire what is good – how then evil and bad?
if what is evil and bad has no connection with desire – how
does it come about?
does it just come out of nowhere?
‘Wherefore each one judges or estimates according to his own
emotion what is good or bad, better or worse, best or worst.’
what Spinoza fails to understand here is that judgment –
is a critical process – a process of question – of doubt – and the exploration
of uncertainty
‘Thus a miser considers an abundance of money for the best,
and penury the worst. An ambitious man, on the other hand, holds nothing before
honour, and turns away from nothing like shame. To an envious man nothing is
more pleasing than another’s misfortune, and nothing more pleasing than his
good fortune: and thus each one judge according to his emotion whether a thing
is good or bad, useful or hurtful.’
perhaps a miser regards an abundance of money as a good in
his circumstance – but does not regard poverty as an evil as such
one may be ambitious – and have no real regard for honour –
and so – not be threatened by shame
and I think one can be envious – without wishing for
another’s misfortune
what is good bad useful or hurtful – is not set in stone –
these matters are open to question – to doubt – and are uncertain
‘As for that emotion through which a man is so disposed that
he does not want what he wants, or wants what he does not want, it is called
fearfulness (timor), which therefore is nothing else than fear whereby
wherein a man is disposed to encounter a lesser evil in order to avoid a
greater one which threatens him in the future (see Prop. 28, Part III.).’
if a man does not want what he wants – he does not
want it
to be fearful – is to in some way to feel threatened –
fear is a natural and rational response to threat
and could one take a view that encountering a lesser threat
– is a way of avoiding a greater threat?
well – it would all depend on the circumstances involved –
the lesser of two evils may well be a rational choice in
some circumstances –
but just what is the lesser will always be open to question
‘But if the evil he fears be shame, then the fearfulness is
called bashfulness (verecundia).’
I don’t think this follows at all
there are different responses to the prospect of shame –
one may bury one’s head in the sand – and wait for what
seems to be inevitable –
or one may take some action designed to mitigate the
prospect – or take action which avoids it altogether
‘Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil be hindered
by the fear of another, so that the person know not what to do, then the fear
is called consternation (consternatio), especially if both evils feared
are very great.’
whether in the face of fear or not – we can find ourselves
not knowing what to do
this is a perfectly natural logical state
what Spinoza calls ‘consternation’ is in fact uncertainty
–
one way or another – we are always in a state of uncertainty
–
and it is in response to uncertainty that we put forward
proposals in order to proceed
at the end of any day – we act as we act – and any action
taken – is uncertain
PROP. XL. He who imagines himself to be hated by another,
and believes he has given the no cause for hatred, will hate that person in
return.
I may not hate the other at all –
I may instead regard him as quite simply – mistaken – and in
line with that view – dissociate myself from him – and as it were – move on
alternatively – I may engage with him – and to try and
understand why he hates me – with the idea of making clear to him – that as far
I know – he has no cause to hate me
and it is also possible that as a result of such an
engagement – I come to see that in fact I have offended him without realising
it –
in which case – it is I who have been mistaken –
and if so – an apology from me would be appropriate
it is possible too – that the whole matter comes down to a misunderstanding
– and one that can be amicably resolved
or indeed it could be that nothing gets resolved – and the
matter is left hanging
as to simply hating him as Spinoza proposes –
that is possible – but it strikes me as ignorant and stupid
–
and by and large – unrealistic
because I suspect that most people in this situation – would
put the matter to question – to doubt – and engage with the uncertainty of it
all
Proof. – He who imagines any
one to be affected with hatred will also be affected with hatred (Prop. 27,
Part III.), that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III), with
sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But he (according to
the hypothesis) imagines no cause of this pain save the person who hates him.
Therefore from the fact that he imagines himself to be hated by anyone, he will
be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of the person who hates him, or
(by the same Note) he will hate that person. Q.e.d.
‘He who imagines any one to be affected with hatred will
also be affected with hatred that is with sadness accompanied by the idea of an
external cause’
I see someone who it appears is animated by hatred –
does it follow that I will feel hatred too – or is it that I
may simply recognise the hatred in the other?
and is that recognition – an affect?
if you have too broad a definition of affect – i.e. – it
covers everything from awareness to feeling – and then your definition of
affect – loses its effect
I can be aware of another’s emotional state without being in
that state
here it seems Spinoza is defining hatred as ‘sadness
accompanied by an external cause’
are we to equate hatred with sadness?
this I think is a strange definition of hatred – and frankly
one that just doesn’t work
and in any case – it just does not follow that if I am aware
of someone who it seems is full of hatred – that I will be sad –
I may be saddened by this – but equally I may have other
emotional reactions –
i.e. – I may just be surprised – I may be dismissive etc. –
hatred is different to sadness – sadness different to hatred
–
in George Eliot’s translation of this sentence – we have
‘pain’ instead of ‘sadness’ –
‘pain’ does fit with Prop XXII. Part III –
‘If we imagine anything to affect with pleasure what we
love, we are affected with love towards it: and, on the other hand, if we
imagine anything to affect it with pain, we are affected with hatred towards
it’
but again – it just does not follow that I will be in pain –
because someone else is full of hatred
it is possible that I may be entirely disinterested – i.e. –
feel nothing
pain does not account for hatred – and sadness – misses the
boat altogether
the result is that Spinoza’s definition of hatred fails
‘But he (according to the hypothesis) imagines no cause of
this pain save the person who hates him’
well – if so – he lacks imagination – or more to the point –
seems to have no critical capacity – for surely one would question the basis of
a perceived hatred – and in so doing consider different possibilities
just saying ‘it’s the person’ – is dumb – it goes nowhere –
it is not an explanation
I may not know why someone hates me – and in that case – the
matter stays open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Therefore from the fact that he imagines himself to be
hated by anyone, he will be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of the
person who hates him, or (by the same Note) he will hate that person.’
if I think someone hates me – I would be more curious than
anything else – but that’s just me
one might be saddened yes – but sadness is not the only
possible emotional propositional response
and as for hating someone because they hate you – I would
think that such `hate’ would be pretty hollow – and more rhetorical than
logical
Note I. – He who thinks he has given some just cause
for hatred will (Prop, 30, Part III., and its Note) be affected with shame. But
this (Prop. 25, Part III.) rarely happens. Moreover, this reciprocation of
hatred can also arise from the fact that hatred follows the endeavour to
inflict evil on him who we hate (Prop. 39, Part III.) He, therefore, who
imagines he is hated by anyone, will imagine the other as the cause of some
evil or pain, and therefore will be affected with sadness or fear accompanied
by the idea of him who hates as the cause, that is, he will be affected with
hatred against him.
‘He who thinks he has given some just cause for hatred will
(Prop, 30, Part III., and its Note) be affected with shame’
he who thinks he has given just cause for hatred may be
affected with shame –
it depends on the circumstance
and can Spinoza say with justification that this ‘rarely
happens’?
how often it ‘happens’ is an empirical matter – where is his
evidence for it happening rarely?
alternative to the same argument – one may be hated – and
regard the other’s hate as a vindication of his actions
and – of course – one may be hated – and not care less
‘Moreover, this reciprocation of hatred can also arise from
the fact that hatred follows the endeavour to inflict evil on him who we hate’
here we have hatred following an act of hatred –
the act is the act of hatred – it doesn’t really make
sense to say hatred follows hatred
‘He, therefore, who imagines he is hated by anyone, will
imagine the other as the cause of some evil or pain, and therefore will be
affected with sadness or fear accompanied by the idea of him who hates as the
cause, that is, he will be affected with hatred against him.’
he may think the other is the cause of some evil or pain
or he may think the other – in hating him – is mistaken –
got it all wrong
sadness – fear – and hate are possible affects – but not the
only ones –
one might – in a given circumstance – laugh it off – or
indeed – just simply dismiss it
the point is – any emotional affect – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Corollary I – He who imagines that one who he loves
hates him, is prey to the conflicting passions of love and hatred; for in so
far as he imagines himself to be hated by any one, he is determined also to
hate him (prev. Prop.). But (by the hypothesis he loves him nevertheless.
Therefore he is prey to the conflicting passions of love and hatred.
‘conflicting passions of love and hatred’ – is emotional /
propositional uncertainty –
which is the natural / logical reality of any emotional
state – of any propositional state
and this propositional uncertainty is the ground for
question – for doubt
it is not a ground for determinism – quite the opposite
Corollary II. – If anyone imagines that an ill has
been inflicted on him by a person whom he bore no good or evil before, he will
immediately endeavour to repay that evil to the person in question.
he may instead decide to investigate why the evil has been
inflicted on him
Proof. – He who imagines any one to be affected with
hatred towards himself will hate that person in turn (prev. Prop.), and (Prop.
26, Part III.) he will endeavour to remember everything that can affect him
with pain, and will endeavour, moreover, to inflict this injury on the person
(Prop. 30, Part III.). But (by the hypothesis) the first evil he recalls is
that one done to himself. Therefore he immediately endeavours to inflict that
one in return. Q.e.d.
he may not hate the person – instead he may try to
understand that person
as to remembering everything that can inflict him with pain
– so as to inflict injury –
this is possible –
but again – it is not the only possible response –
i.e. – he may decide there is no value to him in retribution
–
and that the evil inflicted on him is something he can live
with – he can write off
Note II. – The endeavour to inflict evil on him whom
we hate is called anger (ira): but the endeavour to inflict in return
the evil done to us is called revenge (vindicta).
one can be angry without endeavouring to inflict evil
revenge can be the endeavour to inflict the evil done
to us
however – revenge can be much more sophisticated than that –
i.e. – one may take the view that in not responding in kind
– one actually wins the day
these matters cannot be settled by fiat –
different circumstances will elicit different responses –
and any response is open to question – open to doubt
– and is uncertain
PROP. XLI. If anyone imagines himself to be loved by someone
else, and does not believe that he has given any cause for this love (which in
view of Coroll. Prop.15, and Prop. 16, Part III, can come to pass), he shall
love that person in return.
it does not follow that if love is put to you – that you
will propose love to the one who has proposed it to you
you may regard the love proposed to you – for whatever
reason – as love you cannot return
as to a ‘cause’ for love –
any explanation – any account – or analysis of love given or
received – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and as to ‘imagining’ being loved –
well – if another person puts that they love you –
that is a propositional reality – not an imagination –
and whether the proposition is described as imaginary or
real – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – The proof of this proposition proceeds in
the same manner as that of the previous one: see also its note.
Note I. – If he believes he has given just cause for love,
he will exult in it (Prop. 30, Part III, and its Note): that is what most
frequently happens (Prop. 2, Part III.); and the contrary of this we said
happens when anyone imagines that someone hates him (see Note, prev. Prop.).
This reciprocal love, and consequently (Prop. 30, Part III.) the endeavour of
working good to him who loves us, and who (Prop. 39, Part III.) endeavours to
do us good, is called gratitude (gratia seu gratitudo). It is thus apparent
that men are far more ready to take revenge than repay a benefit.
what is a ‘just cause for love’?
anything and everything?
if someone has a positive response to your proposal of love
(however that came about) you would most likely be pleased
but as to the basis of their response – that is open to
question –
probably a question you will leave to another time
are we grateful when someone responds positively to our
proposal of love?
more relieved than grateful – I would think
if someone endeavours to do us good – and it is for us a
good – then yes – we will be grateful
but it can also be the case that the way to hell is paved
with good intentions –
and so – it could turn out – depending on the circumstances
– that what was proposed as a good – turns out not to be
what counts as a good – is open to question – open to doubt
– and is uncertain
‘It is thus apparent that men are far more ready to take
revenge than repay a benefit.’
really this is an empirical issue – and in so far as we are
presumably talking about all men – and presumably all women –
there really is no way you could say one way or the other – you just can’t know
–
Spinoza’s statement here is just rhetoric
Corollary. – He who imagines he is loved by one whom
he hates is prey to the conflicting emotions of hatred and love. This shown in
the same way as was the corollary of the previous proposition.
if by ‘one he hates’ – is meant – someone who has given him
pain – will the love proposed – that is the pleasure proposed – as it were –
cancel out the pain?
that is possible –
and if so – where are you at?
some kind of emotional neutrality?
it is also possible that the proposed love has no effect
whatever the case – ‘he who imagines he is loved’ – whether
he ‘hates’ the other or not – will – if he is rational – put the proposed love
to question – and indeed the proposed hate –
for any emotional proposal or propositional / emotional
state – is from a logical point of view – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Note II. – If hatred prevails over love, he will
endeavour to inflict evil on the person who loves, and this is called cruelty (crudelitas),
more especially if he who loves is thought to have given no special cause for
hatred.
cruelty may have nothing to do with the person who
loves
the cruel person may neither love nor hate the object
of his cruelty – but inflict pain for no reason – except perhaps to gain
pleasure from the act
how we understand cruelty – as with any emotional /
propositional state – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. XLII. He who confers a benefit on anyone, if moved by
love, or by the hope of honour, will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is
received with ingratitude.
if the one proposing the benefit – moved by love or the hope
of honour – recognizes the uncertainty inherent in any proposal of love – or in
any hope – he may not be saddened if the benefit is received with ingratitude
i.e. – a parent may see that the benefit he proposes to a
child – may not be understood – and in fact may be misunderstood – and he may
regard the child’s ingratitude – as ignorance that in time hopefully will be
replaced with understanding –
and so – he will not be saddened – rather pleased that there
will be – as a result of the benefit given – an opportunity for the education
of the child
Proof. – He who loves something similar to himself
endeavours as much as possible to bring it about that he is loved in turn by
that thing (Prop. 23, Part III.). Therefore anyone who confers a benefit on
anyone through love, does so with the desire which
holds him to be loved in return, that is (Prop. 34, Part
III), by the hope of honour or (Note. Prop. 30, Part III.) of pleasure: and
therefore (Prop. 12. Part III.) he will endeavour as much as possible to
imagine this cause of honour, or regard it as actually existing. But (by the
hypothesis) he imagines something that cuts off the cause of its existence.
Therefore by that very fact he will be saddened. Q.e.d.
‘He who loves something similar to himself endeavours as
much as possible to bring it about that he is loved in turn by that thing’
just what loving amounts to – what it involves – how it is
proposed – is open to question
people can love in different ways – with different
perspectives
what Spinoza puts here is one perspective on the
matter – but it is not the only one
there is such a thing as a love without expectation of
return
i.e. – you love another because you see it as the right
thing to do –
or you love another because it gives you pleasure
PROP. XLIII. Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and,
on the other hand, can be destroyed by love.
hatred is a proposal – a proposed emotional state
emotional states are not measurable – and so it makes no
logical sense to say that an emotional state is increased – or decreased
measurement is a rule-governed propositional game –
emotional states are not rule-governed
any statement to the effect that emotional states are
measurable – is to be regarded as rhetorical
emotional states are proposals –
proposals are not destroyed – proposals are either put or
not put
one emotional propositional state can be replaced by another
– one proposal replaced with another
as to the what happens when this occurs – how it is
explained or accounted for – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
Proof. – He who imagines that one whom he hates is
affected with hatred towards him will feel to arise in himself a new hatred
(Prop. 41, Part III.) while the first hatred
still remains. But if, on the contrary, he imagines that one
whom he hates is affected with love towards him, in so far as he imagines this
he will regard himself with pleasure (Prop. 30, Part III.) and (Prop. 29, Part
III.) will endeavour to please the object of his hatred, that is (Prop. 40,
Part III.) he will endeavour not hate him and not to affect him with pain: and
this endeavour will be greater or less according to the emotion from which it
arises (Prop. 37, Part III.). And so if it be greater than that which arose
from hatred, and through which he endeavoured to affect the thing which he
hated with pain (Prop. 26, Part III.). it will prevail and remove hatred from
his mind.
‘He who imagines that one whom he hates is affected with
hatred towards him will feel to arise in himself a new hatred (Prop. 41, Part
III.) while the first hatred still remains.’
it is pretentious to presume how anyone will
react to any emotional circumstance
one needs to see what happens – and even then – to
have a critical eye to the matter
Spinoza’s psychology / ethics – is pretension writ large
if someone you hate hates you back – there are any number of
emotional responses possible –
i.e. – their hating you back may serve as a justification of
you hating them
or you may simply see that their hating you – as fair enough
– given that you hate them
you could even decide – enough is enough – and the time for
hating is over
‘But if, on the contrary, he imagines that one whom he hates
is affected with love towards him, in so far as he imagines this he will regard
himself with pleasure (Prop. 30, Part III.) and (Prop. 29, Part III.) will
endeavour to please the object of his hatred, that is (Prop. 40, Part III.) he
will endeavour not hate him and not to affect him with pain: and this endeavour
will be greater or less according to the emotion from which it arises (Prop.
37, Part III.).’
someone you hate starts to love you –
perhaps you take pleasure in this – or perhaps you regard
their proposed love as odd – and really out of place
will their proposed love make any difference to how you
regard them?
maybe – maybe not
‘And so if it be greater than that which arose from hatred,
and through which he endeavoured to affect the thing which he hated with pain
(Prop. 26, Part III.). it will prevail and remove hatred from his mind.’
how we explain a change in emotional response – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
human beings are propositional – open to question – and
uncertain
human beings are not rule-governed geometric structures –
to present them as such – as Spinoza does – is at base –
illogical –
and therefore – a misrepresentation of human nature
PROP. XLIV. Hatred which is entirely conquered by love
passes into love, and love on that account is greater than if it had not been
preceded by hate.
logically speaking – there is no ‘conquering’ of
propositional / emotional states – and one state does not ‘pass into’ another –
emotional states are propositional –
where there is a change from one state to another – what you
have is one proposal – one propositional state being replaced by another
which is to say one proposal is discarded and another is put
–
the reason for any such change – is a matter open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘conquering’ and ‘passing into’ – are rhetorical
descriptions of the logical action of question – doubt – and the
exploration of uncertainty
emotional / propositional states are not measurable –
measurement is a rule governed propositional game
when it comes to the emotions there are no rules
for a rule to be – for a rule to function – it must be
objectively established and agreed to –
this does not happen in the emotional life of propositional
actors –
any so called ‘measurement’ of propositional / emotional
states – is not logical – rather it is rhetorical
all we have from Spinoza in Prop. XLIV. – is rhetoric –
plain and simple
it is quite clear that there are all kinds of differences
in emotional states that go by the same name – i.e. – ‘love’ – ‘hate’ –
etc.
which is only to say – that one’s experience of any
emotional state is open to description
and further – that any proposed description is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Proof. – The proof proceeds in the same manner as
that of Prop. 38, Part III. For he who begins to love a thing which he hated,
or which he was wont to regard with pain, by the very fact that he loves will
rejoice: and to this pleasure which love involves (def., Note, Prop. 13, Part
III.) is added that which arises from the fact that the endeavour to remove
pain which hatred involves (as we showed in Prop. 37, Part III.) is aided,
accompanied by the idea of him whom he hated as cause.
‘hated’ – or ‘want to regard with pain’ –
aren’t these the same thing according Spinoza – so why the
disjunction?
if you love what you once hated – and you are behaving
rationally – presumably you have subjected your hate to a critical analysis –
and a result of this process – changed your mind on the matter
perhaps – you regard ‘him whom you hated’ as the cause – or
perhaps not
after a critical consideration of the matter – you may come
to the view that he was not the cause
i.e. – perhaps it was misunderstanding or prejudice on your
part?
these matters are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
Note. – Though this is so, none will endeavour to
hate anything or be affected with pain in order to enjoy this increased
pleasure, that is, no one desires to work evil to himself with the hope of
recovering from this evil, nor desires to be ill for the sake of recovering.
For each one will endeavour to preserve his being and remove as much as
possible all pain. But if the contrary is conceived, that a man can desire to
hate some one in order to love him subsequently with greater love, he will
always desire to hate him. For the greater the hatred may be, the greater the
subsequent love, and therefore he will always desire that his hatred should
become more and more; and by the same system of reasoning, a man would wish to
become more and more ill in order to enjoy more pleasure from the subsequent
convalescence, and therefore he would always desire to be ill, which is absurd
(Prop. 6, Part III.).
‘Though this is so, none will endeavour to hate anything or
be affected with pain in order to enjoy this increased pleasure, that is, no
one desires to work evil to himself with the hope of recovering from this evil,
nor desires to be ill for the sake of recovering.’
yes – you would think this so – but what of the case of
religious zealots who subject themselves to all kinds of privation – and even
self-harm – with a view to obtaining a ‘higher consciousness’?
and are there not be medical procedures which are painful
which people are prepared to undergo – because they hold out the hope of
recovery from an illness?
‘For each one will endeavour to preserve his being and
remove as much as possible all pain.’
it is not the case that ‘each one will endeavour to preserve
his being’ –
there are those who decide to end their lives – for whatever
reason –
and a common reason for this is to ‘remove’ pain
and furthermore – there are those – mainly of a religious
bent – who regard pain and suffering as a way to knowledge and enlightenment
‘But if the contrary is conceived, that a man can desire to
hate some one in order to love him subsequently with greater love, he will
always desire to hate him.’
so – all we are talking about here is someone who hates
another –
if you hate someone – you don’t love them
love and hate need not be confused
‘and by the same system of reasoning, a man would wish to
become more and more ill in order to enjoy more pleasure from the subsequent
convalescence, and therefore he would always desire to be ill, which is absurd
(Prop. 6, Part III.).’
masochists gain pleasure from inflicting pain on themselves
and there are those who desire to be ill –
they are regarded as psychiatrically disturbed
unusual – yes – but not absurd
Spinoza’s psychology / ethics fails – simply because he
fails to see the obvious – the great variety of propositional / emotional
responses –
and this because he fails to understand propositional logic
–
any proposal – and any proposal regarding human behaviour –
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. XLV. If one imagines that anyone similar to himself is
affected with hatred towards another thing similar to himself whom he himself
loves, then he will hate the first of these two.
if someone hates someone I love – it does not follow
necessarily that I will hate the person who hates the one I love –
i.e. – it may be that I regard the hater’s reaction – as
having nothing to do with me – or my emotional response
and it could be that when the situation is critically
investigated – I take the view that the hater – for his or her reasons – is
justified in his emotional response to the one I love
or – it might turn out – that I regard the hater’s response
as mistaken – and without any basis
the point here is that any emotional action or response is a
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
emotionally – we operate in and with uncertainty
Proof. – The thing loved has reciprocal hatred
towards him who hates it (Prop. 40, Part III.), And therefore the lover who
imagines that anyone who the thing he loves, by that very fact imagines the
thing beloved to affected by hatred, that is (Note, Prop, 13, Part III,), by
pain: and consequently (Prop. 21, Part III.) he will be saddened, and that
accompanied by the idea of him who hates the thing beloved as the cause, that
is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), he will hate that person.
‘the idea of him who hates the beloved as the cause’ –
the hater is the propositional vehicle of the hatred – but
is the hater the cause of the pain?
any proposal regarding propositional cause – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
i.e. – could it be that the hater’s emotional state – is
best explained by his propositional back ground?
and if so – we could be looking at many and varied ‘causes’
– all open to question –
the notion of cause – is simplistic – and generally used to
shut down critical consideration
cause may appear to have a logical basis – but in truth –
its function is rhetorical
any emotional state – including hate – if dealt with
rationally – is put to question – put to doubt and its uncertainty explored
PROP. XLVI. If anyone has been affected with pleasure or
pain by another person or a class or nation different to his own, and that
accompanied by the idea of that person under the general name of that class or
nation as the cause of the pleasure or pain, he will love or hate not only that
person but all of that class or nation.
Proof. – the proof of this is clear from Prop.16,
Part III.
this is nothing more than an argument for prejudice –
in a sense it is a clear statement of all that has come
before in Part III of the Ethics – and I suspect a declaration of what is to
come
it is an argument for class and national prejudice
he does not mention race here – but presumably that would
fall under nation
furthermore – it is plainly wrong that all people who
experience pain – and hate of an individual will therefore hate the class or
nation of that individual
bigots and racists – yes – but not reasonable – thinking
human beings
this argument for bigotry and prejudice – is a direct
outcome of Spinoza’s refusal to acknowledge that emotional propositions –
emotional states – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
I find it hard to believe that he doesn’t see this
propositional reality –
it strikes me that he has decided to argue against it – in
his attempt to secure a dogmatic metaphysics –
and in so doing – he shows himself to be blind to
propositional reality and the emotional reality of human beings
there are those who regard the psychology / ethics of Part
III as naturalistic – as a statement of what is the case as distinct from a
statement of what ought to be the case
what is the case – is always open to question – this
something Spinoza does not get
and if you think these matters are better dealt in the
terminology of ought – and whatever goes with that – the same applies
what ought to be the case – as with what is the case – is
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
and once this is understood – you can dispense with the is /
ought distinction – as indicating little more than a difference in
propositional orientation – or indeed – language use –
rational naturalism – is being open – open to
question – open to doubt – and open to the exploration of propositional
uncertainty
‘Spinoza’s naturalism’ – is no more than a detailed
well-constructed prejudice – wrapped up in a pretence of logic and rationality
the best you could say of it is that it is just another
piece of rhetoric
PROP. XLVII. Joy which arises from the fact that we imagine
a thing that we hate to be destroyed or affected by some evil never arises
without some pain to us.
I see no reason to assume that if joy arises ‘from
the fact we imagine a thing that we hate to be destroyed’ – this joy is always
accompanied by some pain
perhaps in some cases it is –
however – I can well imagine someone simply rejoicing – and
not experiencing any pain at all –
and further – it is quite possible that joy is not what is
experienced –
joy is possible – but just as equally someone may simply be
relieved –
we cannot determine or predict with certainty – any
emotional / propositional response
it is not a matter of rationalistic fiat –
what we are dealing with is propositional contingency –
you have to see what occurs – as a first step
and then recognise that any propositional / emotional
occurrence – is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain
Proof. – This is clear from prop. 27, Part III. For
in so far as we imagine a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain
we are saddened.
Note. – This proposition can also be shown from the
Coroll., Prop. 17. Part II. For as often as we recall a thing. although it may
not actually exist, we still regard it as present, and the body is affected in
the same manner. Wherefore so far as the memory of that thing is strong, man is
determined to regard it with pain, which determination, while the image of this
thing lasts, is hindered by the recollection of those things which cut off its
existence, but it is not removed. And therefore the man is only rejoiced in so
far as this determination is hindered; and hence it comes about that this
pleasure which arises from the evil suffered by the thing which we hate is
repeated as often as we recall the thing, it determines the man to regard it
with the same pain with which he was wont to regard it when it existed. But
inasmuch as he joins the images of other things to the image of this thing, and
these things cut off its existence, so this determination to be affected with
pain is hindered at once, and the man rejoices again, and this as often as the
repetition takes place. And this the very reason why men rejoice as often as
they recall past evils suffered by any one, and why they delight to relate
perils from which they have escaped. For when they imagine any peril, they
regard the same as future and are determined to fear it; but this determination
is coerced by the idea of freedom, which they annexed to the idea of this peril
when they were delivered from it, and which renders them secure again: and once
more they are rejoiced.
‘And therefore the man is only rejoiced in so far as this
determination is hindered; and
hence it comes about that this pleasure which arises from
the evil suffered by the thing which we hate is repeated as often as we recall
the thing, it determines the man to regard it with the same pain with which he
was wont to regard it when it existed.
the argument here is that in so far as we recall an evil –
we will experience the pain of that evil – even if we rejoice in it is absence
that I recall the experience of pain – does not mean
that I re-experience the pain –
I may recall the fact of the pain without being in
pain
can the recollection be painful? – maybe so –
and if so – this experience of pain – that is the
recollection – is a different experience to original experience of pain
what we are dealing with here is two different propositional
states
with any emotional issue – in any emotional situation –
there is always the question – how are we to respond?
in this context we can ask – do we respond with joy or do we
respond with pain?
this is to put our emotional response to question – to doubt
– and explore the uncertainty –
this is quite rational
however – to suggest – as I think Spinoza does – that we
experience some kind of mishmash of joy and pain – is to cancel out both joy
and pain – and to propose an emotional state that is neither one thing or the
other – that is in fact – a logical confusion –
this – I would think – was not Spinoza’s intention – but it
is the result
‘But inasmuch as he joins the images of other things to the
image of this thing, and these things cut off its existence, so this
determination to be affected with pain is hindered at once, and the man
rejoices again, and this as often as the then repetition takes place.’
when we ‘rejoice again’ – we are in a different place
and time – and the ‘experience’ of rejoicing again – is a different
experience
and really do we actually keep rejoicing – every time we
remember?
I think that is unlikely –
I think it more accurate to simply say that we remember rejoicing
–
and if we express and demonstrate this memory – we are
‘acting out’ how we remember rejoicing at the time –
and you could say that this ‘acting out’ – is a form of
rejoicing – but again – this joy is not the joy originally experienced
‘And this the very reason why men rejoice as often as they
recall past evils suffered by any one, and why they delight to relate perils
from which they have escaped. For when they imagine any peril, they regard the
same as future and are determined to fear it; but this determination is coerced
by the idea of freedom, which they annexed to the idea of this peril when they
were delivered from it, and which renders them secure again: and once more they
are rejoiced.’
do men always rejoice as often as they recall the
peril escaped?
I doubt it – I think perhaps after a while – the rejoicing
wears thin – and in any case – it is a remembered joy – not the joy itself as
first experienced
bear in mind too – any memory – any proposed memory –
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
and as to regarding ‘the same as future’ and being
‘determined to fear it’ – perhaps yes – perhaps no
as a result of the evil being ‘destroyed’ – one may cease to
fear it –
and as to the future – rationally speaking – who can say?
we are better to leave it as an unknown
‘but this determination is coerced by the idea of freedom,
which they annexed to the idea of this peril when they were delivered from it,
and which renders them secure again: and once more they are rejoiced’
yes – if you are free of it – you may rejoice at the time –
but on the other hand – you might simply be relieved
and I don’t think you are likely to experience any pain from
being free of it –
and in recalling it – you may very well see clearly that the
matter is in the past – and be content to leave it there – and move on
PROP. XLVIII. Love and hatred, for example, towards Peter,
are destroyed, if the pain which the latter involves, and the pleasure which
the former involves, are connected to the idea of another thing as a cause; and
each of them will be distinguished in so far as we imagine Peter not to be the
only cause of either.
Proof. –
This is obvious from the mere definition of love and hatred, which are in the
Note on Prop. 13, Part III. For pleasure is called love towards Peter, and pain
hatred towards him merely on this account, that he is regarded as the cause of
this or that effect. When this then is either wholly or partly removed, the
emotion towards Peter is either wholly or partly removed.
on the face of it
there is a contradiction here –
Spinoza begins here
by saying that – if love or hatred towards Peter are connected to ‘another
thing as cause’ – they are ‘destroyed’
and then goes on to
say ‘wholly or partly removed’
‘wholly or partly
removed’ – is not ‘destroyed’ –
‘wholly or partly’
– leaves the matter uncertain
the cause of love
or hatred towards Peter can be differently understood –
as any proposal of
‘cause’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
but it does not
follow that the love or hatred is therefore removed –
it may be – or it
may not be –
the good news here
is that Spinoza seems to have realised that the so called ‘cause’ of love or
hatred – is a critical matter –
that is – open to
question – open to doubt –
he doesn’t go so
far as to say ‘uncertain’ –
however – that is
the only logical conclusion that can be drawn from a genuinely critical
consideration
one gets the
impression that Spinoza’s tightly wound dogmatic line may be starting to fray
PROP. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing which we imagine
to be free must be greater than the love or hatred towards a necessary thing,
provided both are subject to the same cause.
Proof. – A thing which we imagine to be free must
(Def. 7, Part I) must be perceived through itself without any others. If
therefore we imagine it to be the cause of the aforesaid pleasure or pain, by
that very fact (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) we shall love or hate it, and that
(prev. Prop.) which the greatest love or hatred that can arise from the given
emotion. But if we imagine the thing which is the cause of the given effect to
be necessary then (Def. 7 Part I.) we shall imagine it not alone, but together
with other things, to be the cause of the given effect and therefore (pre.
Prop.) our love or hatred towards it will be less. Q.e.d.
Note. – Hence it follows that men, inasmuch as they
consider themselves free, prosecute with greater reciprocal love or hatred than
other things: to this is added the imitation of emotions, of which see Prop.
27, 34, 40, and 43, Part III.
a thing – is a proposal –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘necessary’ here – is a synonym for ‘certain’
all propositional actors are ‘free’ – all propositional
action is ‘free’
and – any so called ‘cause’ – is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘greater love or hatred’ –
‘greater’ – presumes that love and hatred – are measurable
‘measurement’ – is a rule-governed propositional /
logical game
there are no ‘emotional rules’ – logically speaking – and so
– there is no emotional game – therefore – emotions are not measurable
any such statement as – ‘greater love or hatred’ – is rhetorical
rhetorical propositions play a part in our propositional
lives –
I would suggest they play a far greater (excuse the rhetoric
here) part than do logical proposals –
however – rhetoric is not logic – and is no substitute for
it
logic is critical evaluation –
that is – we put it to question – put it to doubt – and
explore its uncertainty
and as to emotional proposals – any love or hatred that you
propose – in relation to a proposed thing – is open to question – open
to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. L. Anything can be accidentally the cause of hope or
fear.
Proof. – This proposition is shown in the same way as
Prop. 15, Part III, which see, together with the note on Prop. 18, Part III.
Note. – Things which are accidentally the cause of
hope or fear are called good or bad omens (bona aut mala omina). Now in
so far as these omens are the cause of hope or fear they are (see def. hope and
fear, Note 2, Prop. 18, Part III.) they are cause of pleasure or pain, and
consequently (Coroll., Prop. 15, Part III.) thus far we love or hate them, and
(Prop. 28, Part III.) we endeavour to attract them as means to obtain that
which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear. Moreover,
it follows from Prop. 25, Part III., that we are so constituted by nature that
we easily believe what we hope, but with difficulty what we fear, and that we
form too high or too low estimates of these things. From this has arisen
superstition, by which men are assailed on all sides. However I do not think it
worthwhile to point out here the
waverings of the mind which arise from hope or fear, since
it follows merely from the definitions of these emotions that fear cannot be
granted without hope nor hope without fear (as I shall explain in more detail
in its proper place), and since in so far as we hope or fear anything we love
or hate it. And therefore whatever we have said concerning love and hatred any
one can apply to hope or fear.
hope and fear are grounded in propositional uncertainty
to hope is to propose a state of affairs that will be to our
advantage
to fear is to propose a state of affairs that will be to our
disadvantage
do we hope in relation to the past? – I don’t think so –
and what we fear is not what has occurred – but what we
imagine could or will occur
however – what will occur is unknown
and so – hope and fear are really propositional projections
against the unknown
what Spinoza refers to as ‘waverings of the mind’ – is
propositional uncertainty
in the absence of a critical approach to hope and fear – we
are in the realm of the irrational – and that is where ‘omens’ come in
an omen is some kind of reification of the hope or fear –
and it is seen to be the cause of an individual’s hope or
fear
for those who believe in omens – is it necessary that they
love good omens – and hate bad omens?
I don’t think so –
one could simply recognize an omen – without love or
hate
Spinoza argues omens are a form of superstition
however – my point would be that even superstitions such as
omens – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
irrational proposals are an ever-present reality and
possibility in our propositional lives
however – a proposal is only irrational – if not critically
evaluated – if not put to question – not put to doubt – and its uncertainty
left unexplored
(it should be noted too that philosophical theories – such
as Spinoza’s – if not held open to question – if not open to doubt – and if
their uncertainty is left unexplored – when all is said and done – are no more
than sophisticated superstitions)
the fact is we don’t need to propose omens to explain hope
and fear
hope and fear are natural propositional responses to the
future
and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
Spinoza says here that ‘that fear cannot be granted without
hope nor hope without fear’
here as always – we are dealing with propositional
circumstance –
under some circumstances – yes – we may fear an outcome –
and hope that it will not come to pass
and there will be circumstances where we hope for a certain
outcome – but fear that it will not come to pass
however – I think it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that
one can hope for a better future – without fearing that it will not be so
and likewise with fear –
I may fear and outcome and be without hope that it will not
come to pass
finally –
‘And therefore whatever we have said concerning love and
hatred any one can apply to hope or fear.’
the point here is that love and hatred – as with hope and
fear – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. LI. Different men can be affected by one and the same
object in different manners, and one and the same man can be affected by one
and the same object in different ways at different times.
an object is a proposal –
different men may propose an object in different ways
any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
therefore – an object proposal can be understood differently
– that is – can be proposed and critically evaluated differently – at different
times
Proof. – The human body (Post. 3 Part II.) is
affected by external bodies in many ways, Therefore two men can be affected in
different ways at the same time, and therefore (Ax. 1 after lemma 3, after
Prop, 13, Part II.) they can be affected in various
ways by one and the same object. Again (Post. 3 Part II.),
the human body can be affected now in this mode and now in that, and
consequently (same axiom) it can be affected by one and the same object at
different times in different ways.
the propositional actor – propose objects
a proposal put – can be differently understood by different
men at the same time –
as any such proposal – logically speaking is open to
question – open to doubt and is uncertain
Note. – We thus see that it can come to pass that
what one loves another hates: and what one fears another fears not; and that
one and the same man may now love what before he hated, and now dares what he
feared before, etc. Again, inasmuch as each forms an opinion according to his
emotion as to what is good or bad, or what is better or worse (see Note, Note
Prop. 30, Part III.) it follows that men
can vary both in opinion and in emotion (this can be although the human mind is
a part of the divine intellect, as we have shown in the Note on Prop. 13, Part
II.); and hence it comes about that when we compare some people with others, we
distinguish them by the difference of their emotions, and that we call
intrepid, some timid, and some by some other name. E.g., I call that intrepid (intrepidus)
who despises danger who I am wont to fear; and moreover, if I pay attention to
the fact that his desire to work evil to him who he hates, and good to him who
he loves, is not hindered by fear of the danger which is great enough to
restrain me, I call him daring (audax). Then, again, he appears to me
timid (timidus) who fears some danger which I am wont to despise; and if
I pay more attention to this, that his desire is hindered by the fear which
cannot restrain me, I call him pusillanimous (pusillanimis), and thus
all will pass judgment. Again, from this nature of men and instability of
judgment, namely that man often forms opinion of things merely from his
emotion, and that the things which he thinks make for pleasure or pain, and
which therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he endeavours to promote into happening
or remove, are often only imaginary, to say nothing of the other points I
showed in Part. II., on the uncertainty of things, we can easily conceive that
man can easily be the cause both that he is rejoiced or saddened, or, in other
words, he can be affected with pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of
himself as the cause. And therefore we can easily understand what repentance
and self-complacency are, namely that repentance is pain accompanied by the
idea of oneself as cause, and self-complacency is pleasure accompanied by the
idea of oneself as cause: and these emotions are most strong because men think
themselves free (vide Prop. 49, Part III.).
‘We thus see that it can come to pass that what one loves
another hates: and what one fears another fears not; and that one and the same
man may now love what before he hated, and now dares what he feared before,
etc. Again, inasmuch as each forms an opinion according to his emotion as to
what is good or bad, or what is better or worse (see Note, Note Prop. 30, Part
III.) it follows that men can vary both
in opinion and in emotion (this can be although the human mind is a part of the
divine intellect, as we have shown in the Note on Prop. 13, Part II.); and
hence it comes about that when we compare some people with others, we
distinguish them by the difference of their emotions …’
love and hate are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
–
and hence what one loves – another may hate
and likewise – what is good and what is bad – is open to
question
propositional uncertainty – is the ground of diversity and
difference
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
the unknown – has no intellect
‘when we compare people with others’ –
any comparison – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘and that we call intrepid, some timid, and some by some
other name. E.g., I call that intrepid (intrepidus) who despises danger
who I am wont to fear; and moreover, if I pay attention to the fact that his
desire to work evil to him who he hates, and good to him who he loves, is not
hindered by fear of the danger which is great enough to restrain me, I call him
daring (audax). Then, again, he appears to me timid (timidus) who
fears some danger which I am wont to despise; and if I pay more attention to
this, that his desire is hindered by the fear which cannot restrain me, I call
him pusillanimous (pusillanimis), and thus all will pass judgment.’
these terms / proposals – ‘intrepid’ – ‘timid’ – ‘daring’ –
‘pusillanimous’ etc. – are descriptions of behaviour – and as with any
propositional description – they are open to question
any non-contextual definition or understanding – can only be
an indication of meaning – an uncertain guide to meaning
any judgment as to what is ‘intrepid’ or ‘timid’ etc. – in
actual practise – will be a function of propositional context – and even then –
will be open to question
‘Again, from this nature of men and instability of judgment,
namely that man often forms opinion of things merely from his emotion, and that
the things which he thinks make for pleasure or pain, and which therefore
(Prop. 28, Part III.) he endeavours to promote into happening or remove, are
often only imaginary, to say nothing of the other points I showed in Part. II.,
on the uncertainty of things, we can easily conceive that man can easily be the
cause both that he is rejoiced or saddened, or, in other words, he can be
affected with pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of himself as the
cause.’
‘things which he thinks make for pleasure or pain’ –
clearly – here – Spinoza finally recognizes – that pain and
pleasure – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
as to ‘imaginary’ pleasure and pain – again – this just
points to the fact that any proposal of pleasure or pain – is open to question
as to this – ‘uncertainty of things’ –
it is rather – the uncertainty of proposals
for any proposal – in any propositional
context – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –
Spinoza concedes uncertainty here – however his greatest and
most fundamental failure is not recognizing the uncertainty of his metaphysical
system
‘And therefore we can easily understand what repentance and
self-complacency are, namely that repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of
oneself as cause, and self-complacency is pleasure accompanied by the idea of
oneself as cause: and these emotions are most strong because men think
themselves free (vide Prop. 49, Part III.).’
‘repentance as pain accompanied by the idea of oneself as
cause’?
if you propose that you are cause of your own pain – do you
necessarily repent or regret it?
I don’t think so –
you may do so – but it all does depend on context –
propositional context
for we can imagine that someone may regard the pain they
have caused themselves – as a ‘wake-up call’ – so to speak – which leads them
to reform – and to live a better life – and therefore it will not be something
they repent or regret
as to self-complacency –
perhaps complacency does come about when you see yourself as
the cause of your pleasure –
but really – what it indicates is the absence of a critical
intelligence
‘and these emotions are most strong because men think
themselves free’
men are free –
and our freedom consists in our critical capacity to
question – to doubt and to explore propositional uncertainty
PROP. LII. We cannot regard an object which we have seen
before together with others, or which we imagine to have nothing that is not
common to many, as long as one which we imagine to have something singular
about it.
Proof. – As long as we imagine the object we have
seen with others, we immediately recall the others (Prop. 18, Part II., with
its Note), and thus from regarding one we immediately pass to the regarding of
another. And this is the case with an object
which we imagine to have nothing that is not common to many.
For we suppose by that very fact that we are regarding in it nothing that we
have not seen in the others. But when we suppose that we imagine something
singular in any object, something that we have never seen before, we say
nothing else than that the mind, while it regards that object, has nothing else
in itself to the regarding of which it may pass from the regarding of this
object. And therefore it is determined for the regarding of that alone.
any proposed object is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
we may propose an object in relation to other proposed
objects –
or propose it – without any propositional relations
these options exist because any proposal – is open to
question –
and however proposed the ‘object’ is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – This modification of the mind or admiration
of an individual thing is called, in so far as it happens in the mind alone,
wonder (admiratio); but if called up by an object which we fear it is
said to be consternation (consternatio), for wonderment at something
evil holds man suspended in regarding it, that he cannot think of other things
by means of which he may liberate himself from it. But if that at which we
wonder be the prudence, industry or anything of this kind of any man, inasmuch
as we regard that man as excelling by far in this, then the wonder is called
veneration (veneratio), otherwise horror (horror), if we wonder
at a man’s rage, envy, etc. Again, if we admire the prudence, etc., of a man
whom we love, our love by that very fact will become greater (Prop. 12, Part
III.), and this love joined to wonder we call devotion (devotio). And in
a like manner we may conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and other emotions
joined to wonder; and thus we could deduce more emotions than could be deduced
in our ordinary vocabulary. hence it is apparent that the names of the emotions
are taken rather from vulgar use than from the accurate knowledge of them.
‘This modification of the mind or admiration of an
individual thing is called, in so far as it happens in the mind alone, wonder
(admiratio)’
‘in so far as it happens in the mind alone’?
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
‘body’ – is a name for propositional action
that is – the propositional action – of the propositional
actor
nothing happens in the ‘mind alone’
if – as Spinoza argues – the mind and body are two aspects
of the one substance – that nothing happens in the mind that does not occur in
the body – that is not reflected in the body – and visa versa – what sense then
can we make of this idea of the ‘mind alone’?
with Descartes’ dual substances – yes – but not Spinoza’s
monism
furthermore – ‘this modification of the mind’ – is at base a
propositional option
proposes object – ‘an individual thing’ – without admiring
it –
we experience wonder when we are faced – fair and
square – with the unknown –
and it is in response to this that we critically explore the
possibilities for understanding
To wonder is opposed [to] contempt (contemptus), of
which this for the most part is the cause, namely, that inasmuch as we see some
wonder at, love, or fear something, or something seems at first sight similar
to things which we wonder at, love, or fear (Prop. 15, with its note, and Prop.
27, Part III.) we are determined to wonder at, to love or fear that thing etc.
But if from the presence or accurate scrutiny of that thing we are forced to
deny all that concerning the same thing which could be the cause of wonder,
fear or love etc., then the mind remains determined to think rather of those
things which are not in the thing than of those which are in it. Now as
devotion arises from the wonder at the thing which we love, so derision (irrisio)
arises from the contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and disdain (dedignatio)
arises from the contempt of foolishness, just as veneration arise from the
wonder of prudence. We can, moreover, conceive love, hope, honour, and other
emotions joined to contempt, and thence deduce other emotions which we are wont
to know by particular names.
firstly – this idea that the contempt is opposed to wonder I
find to be very strange –
I would think that the opposite of ‘wonder’ – would be –
i.e. – ‘disinterest’ or ‘apathy’
so – at the outset I think Spinoza has got this wrong
to wonder – is to recognise – to experience – the unknown
the ‘cause’ of wonder – is not knowing
and the cause of any propositional response to wonder – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what we wonder at – is what we don’t know –
devotion – derision and disdain – may arise – as responses
to what we do know – what we do propose –
not to what we don’t know
and veneration – may be a response to prudence – but there
may be any number of other responses to prudence
‘We can, moreover, conceive love, hope, honour, and other
emotions joined to contempt, and thence deduce other emotions which we are wont
to know by particular names’
love – hope – honour – may be viewed with contempt – but
just as equally – they may not
deduction is a rule-governed propositional game –
the rule of the game is that the proposal / proposition
‘deduced’ – is presupposed – ‘contained’ – in its premises
all you get from the deduction game – is the application –
the playing out – of its rule
deduction is a word game
‘particular names’ – are proposals – proposals – open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
which is to say any emotion – named – is open to question
open to doubt and uncertain
PROP. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its power of
acting it is rejoiced, and the more so, the more distinctly it imagines itself
and its power of acting
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
the ‘power of the mind’ – is the power of propositional
action
yes – you can rejoice – if that is your thing –
however – logically speaking – propositional action is just
that – action plain and simple – with no bells and whistles –
‘imagination’ is a name for propositional action
‘the mind imagining itself and its power of action’ – just
is propositional action
Proof. – Man does not know himself save through the
modifications of his body, and the ideas of these modifications (Props. 19 and
23, Part II). Therefore when it happens that that mind can regard itself, it is
assumed by that very fact to pass to a greater state of perfection, that is
(Note, Prop. II, Part III.), to be affected with pleasure, and the more so
according as it can imagine itself and its power of acting more distinctly. Q.e.d.
‘the mind regarding itself’ – is a propositional actor
speculating on the ground or basis of propositional action –
there is no ‘pass to a greater state of perfection’ – there
is just a propositional speculation –
and propositional speculation is no different to any other
propositional action –
as for pleasure – yes – I suppose some regard such
propositional action as pleasurable
logically speaking it is just run in the mill
there is no ‘distinct’ imagining –
all ‘imaginings’ are propositional actions – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
uncertain – not ‘distinct’
Corollary. – The pleasure is more and more fostered
the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others, the greater, by that
very fact, the pleasure with which he imagines other to be affected, and that
accompanied by the idea of himself as cause (Note, Prop. 29, Part III). And
therefore (Prop.27, Part III.) the greater will be the joy accompanied by an
idea of himself with which he is affected. Q.e.d.
the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others –
the more stupid he is –
what a rational man should be doing – is not basking in
imagined praise – but rather – putting himself – his proposals – to question –
to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty
PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to imagine those things only
which impose its power of action on it.
‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional action
propositional action is not an ‘endeavour’ –
propositional action is natural human activity
to ‘imagine’ – is to propose
propositional actors propose whatever they propose
the ‘power of action’ – is propositional action
Proof. – The endeavour or power of the mind is the
same as the essence of the mind (Prop. 7 Part III.), But the essence of the
mind (as is self-manifest) only affirms that which the mind is and can do; and
not that which it is not and cannot do. And therefore it endeavours to imagine
only that which affirms its power of acting. Q.e.d.
the ‘endeavour or power of the mind’ – is propositional
action
the ‘essence of the mind’ – is propositional action
what the mind can and cannot do –
what we do is propose – what we cannot do – is
propositionally irrelevant – it is not in the picture
propositional action does not ‘affirm’ itself –
a propositional actor can affirm – deny – or leave undecided
– any proposal put
and any truth value given to a proposal – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. LV. When the mind imagines its want of power it is
saddened by the fact.
‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
a functioning human being will not lack the ‘power’ to
propose
if – due to illness one is unable to function
propositionally in the manner they expect – one may be saddened by this
fact
however – if someone is able to accept this
diminution – they may not be saddened
Proof. – The essence of the mind affirms only that
which is and can do, or it is the nature of the mind only to imagine those
things which impose its power of acting (prev. Prop.). When therefore we say
that the mind, while regarding itself, imagines its weakness, we say nothing
else than that, while the mind endeavours to imagine something which imposes
its power of acting, that endeavour is hindered or (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.)
that it is saddened.
‘the essence of the mind’ – is propositional action
propositions are affirmed – denied – or left undecided – by
propositional actors
any truth value ascribed to a proposition – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘imagination’ – is a propositional activity –
‘the power of acting’ – is propositional activity
propositional power – is human beings acting –
there is no weakness in propositional activity – only
diversity –
any proposal / proposition is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
in a functional human there is no ‘hindrance’ to
propositional activity
as to sadness –
one may be saddened when one’s proposals – one’s
propositional action – does not deliver as expected
sadness – as with any emotional experience – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
sadness when experienced needs to be critically investigated
Corollary. – This pain or sadness is fostered more
and more if one imagines himself to be reviled by others, which can be proved
in the same manner as Coroll., Prop. 53. Part III.
you might not be saddened by being ‘reviled by others’ –
i.e. – you might feel vindicated – or you might not care
less
it will all depend on the circumstances involved –
which is to say any attempt at a generalization here – is
foolhardy
and if you are saddened – you can always put that
reaction to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty
Note. – This pain, accompanied by the idea of our
weakness, is called humility (humilitas); the pleasure, on the other
hand, the pleasure on the other hand which arise from the contemplation of
one-self is called self- love (philautia) or self-complacency. And as
this is repeated as often as a man regards his virtues his power of acting, it
therefore comes to pass that everyone is fond of relating his own exploits and
displaying the strength of his body and his mind, and that men on this account
are a nuisance one to the other. From which it likewise follows that men are
naturally envious (see Note, Prop. 24, and Note, Prop. 32, Part III.), or, in
other words, prone to rejoice at the weakness of their equals and to be
saddened at their strength. For as often as one imagines his actions he is
affected with pleasure (Prop. 53, Part III.), and the more so according as he
imagines them more distinctly or to express more perfection, that is (by what
was said in Note 1, Prop. 40, Part II.) according as he can the better
distinguish them from others and regard them as singular. Wherefore each person
will derive the greatest pleasure from the contemplation of himself when he
regards something in himself which he denies in others. But if that which he
affirms in himself has reference to the general idea of man and beast, he will
not be so greatly pleased; and on the other hand, he will be saddened if he
imagines his actions, when compared to those of others, to be weaker, which
sadness (Prop. 28, Part III.) he will endeavour to remove by wrongly
interpreting the actions of others, or by adorning his own as much as possible.
It is therefore apparent that men have a natural proclivity to hatred and envy,
which moreover, is aided by their education. For parents are want to encourage
their children to virtue solely by the promise of honour or the fostering of
envy. Yet perhaps some will hesitate at this point, saying very often we wonder
at the virtues of men and venerate them. In order to remove this scruple, I
shall add this corollary.
‘This pain, accompanied by the idea of our weakness, is
called humility (humilitas); the pleasure, on the other hand, the
pleasure on the other hand which arise from the contemplation of one-self is
called self-love (philautia) or self-complacency.’
there is no propositional weakness
humility – as with any term – is open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
Spinoza’s definition of here – is one possible use of
the term ‘humility’
another proposal – and one that does not involve ‘weakness’
and ‘pain’ – is that humility describes an emotional state where one is
unpretentious
this ‘self-love’ – which Spinoza equates to
‘self-complacency’ – is an emotional state where one views oneself uncritically
an uncritical view of oneself – is not rational
‘And as this is repeated as often as a man regards his
virtues his power of acting, it therefore comes to pass that everyone is fond
of relating his own exploits and displaying the strength of his body and his
mind, and that men on this account are a nuisance one to the other’
not everyone is – ‘fond of relating his own exploits
and displaying the strength of his body and his mind’
and some who do – may well be entertaining and engaging –
and not a nuisance to others
‘From which it likewise follows that men are naturally
envious (see Note, Prop. 24, and Note, Prop. 32, Part III.), or, in other
words, prone to rejoice at the weakness of their equals and to be saddened at
their strength. For as often as one imagines his actions he is affected with
pleasure (Prop. 53, Part III.), and the more so according as he imagines them
more distinctly or to express more perfection, that is (by what was said in
Note 1, Prop. 40, Part II.) according as he can the better distinguish them
from others and regard them as singular.’
seeing another as weak – to my mind – is really a failure of
understanding
others are different – and there is no need for a
pecking order
and in any case – if the other is an equal –
how then are they ‘weaker’ – or ‘stronger’?
any pleasure at another’s supposed inferiority – or
pain – at their supposed superiority – is indicative of failure to
appreciate and understand the other – as well as a failure to appreciate and
understand oneself
every individual is singular
‘Wherefore each person will derive the greatest pleasure
from the contemplation of himself when he regards something in himself which he
denies in others’
such a person is vain and pretentious –
such a person is one who pretends a superiority to others –
and who takes pleasure in the pretence
pretension is the mark of ignorance
the real point here is that it is just not the case –
that everyone who sees something in themselves – that is not in others –
will be pretentious and take pleasure in their pretension
many will simply appreciate the difference
‘But if that which he affirms in himself has reference to
the general idea of man and beast, he will not be so greatly pleased; and on
the other hand, he will be saddened if he imagines his actions, when compared
to those of others, to be weaker, which sadness (Prop. 28, Part III.) he will
endeavour to remove by wrongly interpreting the actions of others, or by
adorning his own as much as possible.
yes – a description of a vain and pretentious person
–
the point is not strength or weakness – but difference –
‘strength’ and ‘weakness’ – in this context – are rhetorical
terms
as to this – ‘general idea of man’ – any such idea is open
to question
man is a propositional actor –
and any propositional activity of men – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
as to sadness – it is rational – if put to question –
irrational – if not
there are no wrong interpretations of the actions of
others – there is only proposals / propositions – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘It is therefore apparent that men have a natural proclivity
to hatred and envy, which moreover, is aided by their education. For parents
are want to encourage their children to virtue solely by the promise of honour
or the fostering of envy. Yet perhaps some will hesitate at this point, saying
very often we wonder at the virtues of men and venerate them. In order to
remove this scruple, I shall add this corollary.’
you can ascribe ‘a natural proclivity’ to anything humans do
– or other animals do
this ‘natural proclivity’ – explains nothing
in fact – an ‘explanation’ – of anything – is nothing more
than a restatement of the proposal ‘to be explained’ – and as with the
proposal to be explained – it is open to question
humans do what they – and what they do is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
as for what parents do – it is not logically sound to even
attempt a generalization
we do see – ‘the promise of honour and the fostering of
envy’
and yes – people do in fact – wonder at the virtues of men –
and venerate them –
if understood and appreciated rationally – propositional
behaviour – in all its difference – in all its variety – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
Corollary II. – No one envies the virtue of any one
save his enemy.
Proof. – Envy is hatred itself (see Note, Prop. 24,
Part III.) or (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) sadness, that is (Note, Prop. 11,
Part III.), a modification by which a man’s power of acting or endeavour is
hindered. But man (Note, Prop. 9. Part III.) endeavours or desires to do
nothing save what can follow from his given nature. Therefore man desires to
attribute to himself no power of acting or what is the same thing) no virtue
which is proper to another nature and alien to his own. And therefore his
desire cannot be hindered nor he himself saddened by the fact he regards some
virtue in someone dissimilar to himself, and consequently he cannot envy him:
but he can envy his equal who is supposed to be of the same nature as himself. Q.e.d.
‘envy is hatred itself’?
‘envy’ – as with any description of an emotional state is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
i.e. – could I not envy another – without hating them?
that is – might I not wish for another’s good fortune –
without any ill feeling towards them?
I think so
and do we envy an ‘equal’?
the idea that we do – makes no sense to me
as I see it – you would only envy another – if you believe
the other has some advantage that you do not have –
and he who has an advantage that I do not have – is not my
equal
of course – whether or not in fact – the other has an
advantage I do not have – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
as to ‘the same nature’ –
we have the ‘same nature’ only in the sense that – we are
propositional actors – and our actions – our proposals – are open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – When
we said in the Note on Prop. 52, Part III., that we venerate a man by reason of
the fact that we wonder at his prudence, courage etc., we meant that comes
about (as can be seen of the Prop. itself) because we imagine those virtues to
be possessed by that person alone and not common to nature; and therefore we do
not envy them any more than we envy height in a tree or courage in a lion, etc.
it is not about appealing to ‘what is common in nature’ –
that will always be open to question –
it is rather about seeing and appreciating individual
difference – as and when it occurs
and finally – someone might wish that he or she had the
courage of a lion – and if i.e. – one is short in stature – who knows – one
might envy the height of a tree?
PROP. LVI. There are as many species of pleasure, pain,
desire, and consequently any emotion that is composed of these, such as
wavering of the mind, or which is derived from these, such as love, fear, hope,
hate, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.
this ‘many species of pleasure, pain, desire’ – are
proposals – different proposals
an ‘emotion’ is a propositional action –
and what Spinoza calls ‘wavering of the mind’ – is
propositional uncertainty
an ‘object’ – is a proposal –
‘species of objects’ – are proposals – of various
descriptions
at the beginning – and at the end – of the ontological /
epistemological / metaphysical day – all there is – is the proposal –
and any proposal of any description is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – Pleasure and pain, and consequently the
emotions which are composed or derived from these, are passions (Note, Prop.
11, Part III.); we also are passive in so far as we have inadequate ideas
(Prop. I, Part III.), and in so far as we have them alone are we passive (Prop.
3, Part III.), that is (see Note1, Prop. 40, Part II.), we are only necessarily
passive in so far as we imagine, or (see Prop. 17, Part II., with its Note) in
so far as we are affected by an emotion which involves the nature of our body
and the nature of an external body. The nature
therefore, of each passion must so be explained necessarily that the nature of
the object by which we are affected may be expressed. The pleasure which arises
from the object, e.g. A, involves the nature of
the object A, and
the pleasure which arise from the object B involves the nature of that object
B: and therefore these two pleasures are of different nature because they arise
from causes of different nature. Thus also the emotion of sadness which arises
from one object is different in nature from the sadness that arises from a
different cause, which also must be understood of love, hate, hope, fear,
wavering of the mind, etc.: and therefore there are as many species of
pleasure, pain. love, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are
affected. But desire is the is the essence or
nature of everyone in so far as it is conceived as determined from any given
disposition of the person to do anything (see Note, Prop. 9, Part III.).
Therefore, according as each one is affected by external causes with this or
that kind of pleasure, pain. love, hatred, that is, according as his nature is
constituted in this or that manner, so will his desire be this or that, and the
nature of one desire necessarily different to the nature of another as much as
the emotions from which each one has arisen, differ one from the other.
Therefore there are as many species of desires and there are species of
pleasure, pain, love, etc., and consequently (from what has already been shown)
as there are species of objects by which we are affected. Q.e.d.
‘Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions which are
composed or derived from these, are passions (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.); we
also are passive in so far as we have inadequate ideas (Prop. I, Part III.),
and in so far as we have them alone are we passive (Prop. 3, Part III.), that
is (see Note1, Prop. 40, Part II.), we are only necessarily passive in so far
as we imagine, or (see Prop. 17, Part II., with its Note) in so far as we are
affected by an emotion which involves the nature of our body and the nature of
an external body.’
pleasure and pain – are propositional states –
an emotion here – is a propositional action – in
response to – the propositional states of pleasure or pain
the logic of it is that we have propositional responses to
propositional states
a proposal – is an action
a propositional response to proposals – is an action
a propositional state – is an active state of affairs
–
any propositional activity is active – not passive –
‘passion’ – is a description of – an explanation of
propositional action –
a passion – is an action
as to ‘inadequate ideas’ –
if by ‘inadequate ideas’ – is meant ideas / proposals – open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – then all ‘ideas’ – are inadequate
it is only in the notion of ‘adequate idea’ – that is an
idea for which certainty is claimed – an idea – not open to question – not open
to doubt – and not – uncertain – that there is no activity – only
passivity
the adequate idea is passive – and furthermore –
logically dead – and useless – except in the service of ignorance – prejudice –
and pretence
what we deal with is proposals – and propositional relations
‘the human body’ – is a name for propositional
action
an ‘external body’ – is a proposal
‘The nature therefore, of each passion must so be explained
necessarily that the nature of the object by which we are affected may be
expressed. The pleasure which arises from the object, e.g. A, involves
the nature of the object A, and the pleasure which arise from the object B
involves the nature of that object B: and therefore these two pleasures are of
different nature because they arise from causes of different nature. Thus also
the emotion of sadness which arises from one object is different in nature from
the sadness that arises from a different cause, which also must be understood
of love, hate, hope, fear, wavering of the mind, etc.: and therefore there are
as many species of pleasure, pain. love, etc., as there are species of objects
by which we are affected.’
the nature of any proposal – of any ‘propositional state’ –
is open to question
the propositional states of pleasure – or sadness – are
likewise – open to question
(do we contrast ‘pleasure’ with ‘sadness’ – or rather
‘pleasure’ with ‘pain’ – and ‘sadness’ with ‘joy’?)
pleasure is a propositional state – an ‘object’ is a
proposal –
it is fair enough to propose a relation between the two –
however – any proposed relation is open to question – open
to doubt and uncertain
pleasures of a different nature?
we might use the same general term (‘pleasure’) for both –
however – regardless of the question of cause – the logical
reality is that we are dealing with different propositional circumstances
–
and the pleasure in circumstance A – is not the pleasure of
circumstance B
and the same applies to sadness
it is not that different objects – decide the issue –
it is rather the difference in propositional circumstance or
context – which distinguishes propositional states
‘and therefore there are many species of pleasure, pain.
love, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.’
it is not a question of species of pleasure etc. – and
species of objects
it is rather that any proposed pleasure – and any proposal
relating the proposed pleasure to a proposed object – is a matter that is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘But desire is the is the essence or nature of everyone in
so far as it is conceived as determined from any given disposition of the
person to do anything (see Note, Prop. 9, Part III.). Therefore, according as
each one is affected by external causes with this or that kind of pleasure,
pain. love, hatred, that is, according as his nature is constituted in this or
that manner, so will his desire be this or that, and the nature of one desire
necessarily different to the nature of another as much as the emotions from
which each one has arisen, differ one from the other. Therefore there are as
many species of desires and there are species of pleasure, pain, love, etc.,
and consequently (from what has already been shown) as there are species of
objects by which we are affected. Q.e.d.’
‘desire’ here functions as a name for propositional
action
yes – there are different propositional actions – and
different proposals of pleasure – pain – love etc. – and there will be
different object proposals
propositional actions – different as they are in different
propositional contexts – are – regardless of context – open to question – open
to doubt and uncertain
in any critical analysis of pleasure – pain – love etc – an
object may be proposed –
however – its relation to these ‘emotions’ – these proposals
– is a matter open to question –
i.e. – perhaps the object is best understood as not the
cause of the pleasure – but rather as the focus of the pleasure?
in any case – any causal proposal – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – Among the species of
emotions which (prev. Prop.) are of great number, the best known are luxury (luxuria),
drunkenness (ebrietas) and ambition (ambitio), which are only
varieties of love or desire: which explain the nature of this or that emotion
according to the objects to which they refer. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust,
avarice, and ambition we understand nothing else than an immoderate love or desire
for feasting, drinking, lechery, riches and honour. Moreover,
these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the
objects to which they refer, have no opposites. For temperance, sobriety,
chastity, which we are wont to contrast with luxury, drunkenness, lust, etc.
are not emotions or passions, but indicate strength of mind which moderates
these emotions. The remaining species of emotions I
cannot explain here (for there are as many as there are objects), nor, if I
could, would it be necessary. For it suffices for what we have in view, namely,
to determine the strength of the emotions and the power of the mind in
moderating them, to have a definition of each emotion of universal application.
It suffices, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the emotions
and the mind, so that we may be able to determine
of what kind of
quantity is the power of mind in moderating and checking the emotions. And so,
although there is a great difference between this and that emotion of love,
hate, desire, e.g.., as the love of children and the love for a wife, it is not
our place to take note of these differences or inquire any further into the
origin and nature of the emotions.
‘Among the species
of emotions which (prev. Prop.) are of great number, the best known are luxury
(luxuria), drunkenness (ebrietas) and ambition (ambitio),
which are only varieties of love or desire: which explain the nature of this or
that emotion according to the objects to which they refer. For by luxury,
drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition we understand nothing else than an
immoderate love or desire for feasting, drinking, lechery, riches and honour.’
who decides what is
moderate and immoderate?
what for one might
be moderate – for another – immoderate
these matters are
relative and uncertain
i.e. – what one
counts as luxury in one propositional context – may in a different context be
regarded as a necessity
also – drunkenness
may have a physiological cause – and have nothing to do with so called
‘immoderate’ love or desire
and ambition – I
would think is quite natural – not ‘immoderate’ – in any number of
propositional contexts –
we can ask – is
‘luxury’ an emotion – or is it just a pretence? –
and consider too
that drunkenness may be the result of an emotional state – and lead to
emotional states – but is it an ‘emotion’? –
and ‘ambition’ –
too – is it best described as an emotion – or is it in fact a conduit of
emotional states?
‘Moreover, these
emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects to
which they refer, have no opposites. For temperance, sobriety, chastity, which
we are wont to contrast with luxury, drunkenness, lust, etc. are not emotions or
passions, but indicate strength of mind which moderates these emotions’
I would suggest
that anyone in pursuit of a so-called luxury item – is not as it were a victim
of that item – and that as much as the proposed item ‘attracts’ them – they
will put it to question – to doubt – and so deal with the uncertainty of
acquiring it
and it can be the
case that one thinks critically about whether to get drunk or not
lust too – is not
without its uncertainties
temperance and sobriety
– like luxury – drunkenness and lust – are open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
‘strength of mind’
– rests in critical capacity and action – the ability to put any proposal – any
‘emotional’ proposal – to question – to doubt and explore its uncertainty
‘The remaining
species of emotions I cannot explain here (for there are as many as there are
objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary. For it suffices for what we
have in view, namely, to determine the strength of the emotions and the power
of the mind in moderating them, to have a definition of each emotion of
universal application. It suffices, I say, for us to understand the common
properties of the emotions and the mind, so that we may be able to determine of
what kind of quantity is the power of mind in moderating and checking the
emotions. And so, although there is a great difference between this and that
emotion of love, hate, desire, e.g.., as the love of children and the love for
a wife, it is not our place to take note of these differences or inquire any
further into the origin and nature of the emotions.’
logically speaking
– we are not dealing with ‘strength’ and ‘quantity of power’ –
the issue with any
emotional proposal – is critical –
is the matter of
putting our emotions – our proposals – however described or explained – to
question – to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty
this ‘strength’ and
‘quantities of power’ – simply miss the point –
focus on ‘strength
and ‘quantities of power – will only lead to confusion
reading Spinoza here – I get echoes of Quakerism – and
traditional / conservative –Judaic- Christian psychological perspectives –
nothing wrong with that per se –
and be that as it may – my problem with Spinoza here – is
his failure to put his psychology / ethics to the critical test – to put it to
question – to doubt – and to explore its uncertainty
PROP. LVII. Any emotion of every individual differs from the
emotion of another only in so far as the essence of one differs from the
essence of another.
firstly – this notion of ‘essence’ –
in so far as it is supposed to be some fixed identifier – of
whatever –
we can dispense with it immediately
any notion – is open to question – open to doubt and is – uncertain
‘essence’ – if it is to play any sort of role in our
propositional lives – must be seen as uncertain
as regards Prop. LVII –
we can ask – is the ‘essence’ of one – different from the
essence of another?
in terms of Spinoza’s metaphysics – you might well say –
“no” –
for on his view everything and anything is a manifestation
of his God –
and there is a sense that if this so – nothing can be essentially
differentiated from anything else
Spinoza’s ‘essence’ argument here – looks like a last-ditch
attempt to rescue differentiation and individuation from his metaphysics – and
it fails
and in a very real sense his whole house of cards collapses
at this point
what differentiates one individual from another – is not
essence – but rather propositional context
one’s emotional propositional state will be a function of
one’s whole propositional context at the time
no two individuals occupy the same propositional space
–
no two individuals have the same propositional context
Proof. – This Prop. is clear from Ax. 1, which see
after Lemma 1, Note, Prop. 13, Part II. But nevertheless we shall prove it from
the definitions of the three primary emotions.
All emotions have reference to desire, pleasure or pain, as
the definitions which we gave them show. But desire is the nature and essence
of everything (see its def. in Note, prop. 9 Part III,): therefore the desire
of one individual differs from the desire of another only inasmuch as the
essence of one differs from the essence or nature of the other. Pleasure and
pain are passions by which the power or endeavour of every person to persist in
his own being is increased or diminished, aided or hindered (Prop. 11, Part
III., and its Note). But by endeavouring to persist in its being, in so far as
it refers to the mind and body at the same time, we understand appetite and
desire (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.); therefore pleasure and pain are desire
itself, or appetite, in so far as it is increased or diminished by external
causes, help or hindered, that (same Note), they are the nature of everyone.
And therefore the pleasure or pain of one person differs from the pleasure or
pain of another; and consequently any emotion of an individual. etc. Q.e.d.
‘But desire is the nature and essence of everything’
the claim that human beings desire – is fair enough
but do have evidence that all things – everything
– desires?
on the face of it – no
is there any evidence that the inanimate world desires?
we see that inanimate entities persist – and as long as they
do – this we can observe
but do we observe desire in the inanimate world?
no
of course – if you regard any persistence as desire – if you
define ‘persistence’ as ‘desire’ –
then yes – there is desire in the inanimate world –
but this conclusion is definitional – not observational –
and here we can ask why define persistence as desire?
why not just leave ‘persistence’ – as persistence – that at
least can be observationally verified –
and then we come to the question of just how to understand
natural persistence
well – that is a matter for science – and any theory
advanced to explain or account for natural persistence – will be open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘therefore the desire of one individual differs from the
desire of another only inasmuch as the essence of one differs from the essence
or nature of the other’
if ‘desire’ – is the essence of every thing
then there can be no distinction between any thing – in
terms of desire –
or in terms of ‘essence’ – unless there are different
essences
and really if there are different ‘essences’ – what is the
use of the term ‘essence?
‘different essences’ – really – amounts to different
characteristics
you can drop the notion of ‘essence’ altogether –
so what we end up with is different desires –
essence doesn’t account for difference – or different
desires
how then are we to explain different desires?
firstly then – what is a desire?
as I see it ‘desire’ – is a name for propositional action –
and – one propositional action is distinguished from another
in terms of its propositional context
one propositional context is not the same as another
and any propositional action – and any propositional context
– is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Pleasure and pain are passions by which the power or
endeavour of every person to persist in his own being is increased or
diminished, aided or hindered (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note)’
‘the power or endeavour of every person to persist in his
own being?’
yes – human beings endeavour to persist – but the endeavour
may or may not be relevant to how long we persist
and it is the case that we don’t know how long we will live
/ persist?
so – endeavour or not – the nature of persistence – is an
unknown –
and any explanation or account of natural persistence – is a
matter for science
and here we will have theories – theories / proposals – open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
pleasure and pain are passions – which aid or hinder human
persistence?
whether pleasure and pain – aid or assist persistence – is
really an empirical question
there are people who have very painful lives – who live long
lives
there are those who have very pleasurable lives – and die
young
the effect of pleasure or pain on persistence on longevity –
is uncertain
‘But by endeavouring to persist in its being, in so far as
it refers to the mind and body at the same time, we understand appetite and
desire (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.); therefore pleasure and pain are desire
itself, or appetite, in so far as it is increased or diminished by external
causes, help or hindered, that (same Note), they are the nature of everyone.’
pleasure and pain – desire itself?
desire – as propositional activity – may result in pleasure
– or pain – or neither –
but desire itself – is not pleasure – desire – is not pain
and is anyone going to say that desire is pleasure and
pain?
that just does not make sense at all
and pleasure and pain – increased or diminished – is the nature
of everyone?
this is very confused –
we do experience pleasure and pain – but do such experiences
account for our nature?
such a view is a very limited view of human beings –
and it really doesn’t fit with Spinoza’s grand theory of the
nature of everything –
in any case – it is a view that is well and truly – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
it seems to me that Spinoza here – has got rather sloppy
with his concepts desire – pleasure – pain –
his reduction of pleasure and pain to desire –
suggests a conceptual collapse
‘And therefore the pleasure or pain of one person differs
from the pleasure or pain of another; and consequently any emotion of an
individual. etc. Q.e.d.’
yes – there are emotional differences between individuals –
but these differences are the differences in propositional
context
Note. – Hence it follows that the emotions of
animals, which are called irrational (for we can in no wise doubt that brutes
feel now we know the origin of the mind), differ only from the emotions of man
inasmuch as their nature differs from the nature of man. Horse and man are
filled with the desire for procreation; the desire of the former is equine,
while that of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of insects,
fish and birds must vary. Thus although each individual lives content and rejoices
in the nature he has, yet the life in which each is content and rejoices is
nothing else than the idea or soul of that individual; and therefore the joy of
one only differs in nature from the joy of another in so far as the essence of
one differs from the essence of another. Again, it follows from the previous
proposition that there is a considerable difference between the joy of e.g., a
drunkard and that which possesses a philosopher: which I wished to mention here
by the way. This is what I have to say of the emotions which refer to man in so
far as he is passive. It remains that I should add a few points which refer to
him in so far as he is active.
‘Hence it follows that the emotions of animals, which are
called irrational (for we can in no wise doubt that brutes feel now we know the
origin of the mind), differ only from the emotions of man inasmuch as their
nature differs from the nature of man.’
do animals have a critical capacity?
perhaps – I have observed my cat lily – it seems – deciding
whether to have food or go outside – some sort of question – some sort of doubt
– looks to be involved
and some sort of decision seems to get made
or perhaps – that is not the case – I don’t know –
I keep an open mind on lily –
as for other animals – I couldn’t say
I suspect that there is some kind of critical capacity in
any functioning consciousness – but that is really an open question
be that as it may – the important thing to recognize here is
that Spinoza is making the point that animals and humans do not differ
emotionally – the difference is a difference of species
and so – it would seem he makes – by implication – an early
statement of what many now term ‘animal rights’ –
in our time – a philosophy of animals – was most notably
introduced to the public by the utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer in his
book – ‘Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals’
Singer’s work in this area has been revolutionary
‘Thus although each individual lives content and rejoices in
the nature he has, yet the life in which each is content and rejoices is
nothing else than the idea or soul of that individual; and therefore the joy of
one only differs in nature from the joy of another in so far as the essence of
one differs from the essence of another.’
is Spinoza just talking about humans here – or is this a
follow on from his discussion of animals – insects – fish – and birds?
anyway – do we humans rejoice in ourselves – in the
‘idea’ of ourselves – which Spinoza here terms the ‘soul’?
well – we can do
‘Again, it follows from the previous proposition that there
is a considerable difference between the joy of e.g., a drunkard and that which
possesses a philosopher: which I wished to mention here by the way’
I wonder what prompted him to mention this – ‘by the way’?
perhaps he had a premonition of Russell’s comment that he –
Spinoza – was a ‘God intoxicated man’?
PROP. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are
passions, there are other emotions of pleasure and desire which refer to us in
so far as we are active.
in so far as any passion – is regarded critically – that is
– put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored – we are active
we are passive – if we do not put our proposals passions to
question – to doubt – and if we fall into the delusion of certainty
Proof. – When the mind conceives itself and its power
of acting it rejoices (Prop. 53, Part III.). But the mind necessarily regards
itself when it conceives a true or adequate idea (Prop. 43, Part II.). But the
mind conceives certain adequate ideas (Note 2, Prop.
40, Part II.). Therefore it will also rejoice in so far it
conceives adequate idea, that is (Prop. 1, Part III.), in so far as it is
active. Again, the mind endeavours to persist in its being (Prop. 9, Part III.)
in so far as it has both clear and distinct ideas and confused ones. But by
endeavour we understand desire (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.). Therefore desire
also has reference to us in so far as we understand, or (Prop. 1, Part III.) in
so far as we are active. Q.e.d.
‘When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting it
rejoices (Prop. 53, Part III.).’
this is to say – that when we propose that our propositional
activity – is powerful – we rejoice
if this happens – we are proposing self-aggrandisement –
which is a form of vanity
and really – the ‘power’ of propositional activity – is just
the activity itself – a natural fact of human beings –
we do not need to dress it up as ‘powerful’ –
and – do we rejoice in just being?
we can – but the real issue is critical – that is –
putting our proposals / our propositions to question – to doubt – and exploring
their uncertainty
there is some ‘power’ I guess in this – the power of
rational / logical thinking –
but in so far as rational / logical thinking is the meat and
potatoes of living – any rejoicing is really just rhetoric
‘But the mind necessarily regards itself when it conceives a
true or adequate idea’
this ‘the mind regards itself’ – is not what this is about
we propose and we critically evaluate our proposals
a true ‘idea’ – is simply a proposal – that we assent to –
nothing to get too excited about
and any proposal of assent – or for that matter – dissent –
is open to question
as for ‘adequate idea’ –
an idea is a proposal – and in a sense any proposal is
‘adequate’ – but no proposal – if regarded rationally is beyond question –
beyond doubt – or certain
our ideas / proposals – are logically – uncertain
this is just a logical fact – nothing to rejoice about
‘Again, the mind endeavours to persist in its being (Prop.
9, Part III.) in so far as it has both clear and distinct ideas and confused
ones.’
the reality is – we propose – and we deal with our
propositional realities critically
there is some endeavour in this – but it is not the
‘endeavour to persist in being’
we can be propositionally active – because we have being –
because we exist
as for ‘clear and distinct ideas’ –
any ‘clear and distinct idea’ – is only a proposal – a
proposition that has not been critically examined – its uncertainty unexplored
and a ‘confused idea’ – is a proposal that begs for critical
appraisal
‘But by endeavour we understand desire (Note, Prop. 9, Part
III.). Therefore desire also has reference to us in so far as we understand, or
(Prop. 1, Part III.) in so far as we are active’
we understand to the extent that we recognise the
uncertainty of our proposals
‘desire’ – as in the ‘endeavour’ to understand our
propositional reality – comes down to – propositional activity
and we understand – our propositional activity – in so far
as we put it to question – to doubt – and deal with its uncertainty
PROP. LIX. Among all the emotions that have reference to the
mind, in so far as it is active, there are none which have not reference to
pleasure or desire.
‘that have reference to the mind’ – this is vague
Spinoza claims not to be dualist – and yet his argument here
– on the face of it – implies a dualism
if he had said ‘in reference to the person’ or ‘in reference
to the propositional actor’– instead of ‘in reference to the mind’ – his
statement – would be consistent with his monism
it looks like he thinks he can have the best of both worlds
– when in fact – all he really does here – is undermine his metaphysics –
‘in so far as it [the mind] is active’
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity
it is not – ‘in so far as’ – rather – the mind is propositional
activity –
and when the ‘mind’ is critically active – proposals
/ propositions – are put to question – put to doubt – and their uncertainty is
explored
all emotions – propositional activity – ‘has reference to’ –
pleasure or desire?
‘desire’ – is a name for propositional
activity – and any propositional activity can be described as a form
of desire –
furthermore – any propositional activity can be described as
‘emotional’
as for ‘pleasure’ – and – or ‘pain’ –
pleasure and pain – are possible propositional
consequences of propositional activity
however – not all propositional activity will result in
pleasure or pain
propositional activity can be neutral with respect to
pleasure and pain – and much of our propositional activity is pleasure / pain
neutral
Proof. – All emotions have reference to pleasure pain
or desire, as the definitions er gave of them show. But we understand by pain
that the mind’s power of thinking is diminished or hindered (Prop. 11, Part
III., and its Note), and therefore the mind in so far as it is saddened has its
power of understanding, that is, its power of acting (Prop. 1, Part III.),
diminished or hindered. And therefore no emotion of pain can be referred to the
mind in so far as it is active, but only emotions of pleasure or desire which
(prev. Prop.) thus far have reference to the mind.
the ‘mind’s power’ – is propositional action –
pleasure and pain are possible consequences of
propositional activity –
pleasure and pain are not the ground of propositional
activity
propositional activity may or may not be enhanced by
pleasure – and may or may not be diminished by pain
the ‘mind’ / the propositional actor – is active – whether
or not the consequence of its / his / her activity is pleasure or is pain
sadness – may be a consequence of propositional activity
the mind’s activity – that is propositional activity
– may or may not be diminished by sadness
the proper reference for pleasure or pain – joy or sadness –
is not the ‘mind’ – but the propositional
actor
Note. – All actions which follow from the emotions
which have reference to the mind, in so far as it is active or understands, I
refer to fortitude (fortitdudo). which I distinguish into two parts,
courage or magnanimity (anomosoitas) and nobility (generositas).
For I understand by courage the desire by which each endeavours to preserve
what is his own according to the dictate of reason alone. By nobility I
understand the desire by which endeavours according to the dictate of reason
alone to help and join to himself in friendship all other men. And so I refer
those emotions
which work out the good of the agent to courage, and those
which work out the good of others to nobility, Therefore temperance, sobriety,
and presence of mind in danger, etc., are all species of courage; but modesty,
clemency etc., are species of nobility. And thus I think I have explained and
shown through their primary causes the principle emotions and waverings of the
mind which arise from the composition of the three primary emotions, namely
pleasure, pain, and desire. And it is apparent from these propositions that we
are driven about by external causes in many manners, and that we, like waves
driven about by contrary winds, waver and are unconscious of the issue and of
our fate. But I have said I have shown not all that can be given, but only the
principle contradictions of the mind. For proceeding in the same way as above,
we can easily show that love is united to repentance, disdain and shame, etc.
But I think it will be clear to all from the preceding propositions that the
emotions can be compounded one with the another in so many ways, and so many
variations can arise from these combinations, that it were impossible to
express them by any number. But for my purposes it suffices to have enumerated
the principle ones; for the rest which I have omitted would be to satisfy the
curious, not those who seek the profit of this. It remains, however, to be
noted concerning love what very often happens while we are enjoying the thing
we desired, that the body from the enjoyment acquires a new disposition, by which
it is determined in another way, and these images of things are aroused in it,
and at the same time the mid begins to imagine and desire other things. E.g.,
when we imagine something that is wont to delight us with its flavour, we
desire to enjoy it, that is, to eat it. But as soon as we enjoy it the stomach
is filled and the body’s desire is turned in another direction. But if while
the body is in this condition the image of this food, inasmuch as it is
present, be stimulated, the new condition of the body will feel disgust of the
food which before we desired will now be odious to us, and this what we call
satiety or weariness (fastidium aut taedium). For the rest, I have
neglected the external modifications of the body which are observable in
emotions such as tremor, pallor, sobbing, and laughter, because they refer to
the body without any relation to the mind. Again, as definitions of the emotions,
I shall repeat them in this order, with such notes as I think necessary
.
yes – ‘according to the dictates of reason’ –
on the face of it here ‘according to the dictate of reason’
– means nothing
‘according to the dictates of reason’ – here – is just
rhetoric
reason does not ‘dictate’ – reason questions – doubts – and
explores propositional uncertainty
and so – these terms ‘courage’ – ‘magnanimity’ – ‘nobility’
– are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and as for whether temperance – sobriety – presence of mind
are species of courage –
and modesty and clemency – are species of nobility –
these claims are open to question –
any definition – is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
‘And thus I think I have explained and shown through their
primary causes the principle emotions and waverings of the mind which arise
from the composition of the three primary emotions, namely pleasure, pain, and
desire
.
nothing of the sort has been shown
any propositional action can be described in
terms of desire –
any emotional / propositional activity – is active
pleasure and pain are possible propositional consequences
of propositional activity
and furthermore –
not every emotional / propositional action will have
pleasure or pain as a consequence
there are propositional consequences that are neutral with
respect to pleasure or pain –
i.e. – a propositional consequence might be described as
‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’
‘And it is apparent from these propositions that we are
driven about by external causes in many manners, and that we, like waves driven
about by contrary winds, waver and are unconscious of the issue and of our
fate. But I have said I have shown not all that can be given, but only the
principle contradictions of the mind.’
‘internal’ and ‘external’ – are proposals – propositional
categories – proposals – that are useful in mapping propositional
activity
however – what we are ‘driven about by’ is propositional
conflict –
what we are ‘driven about by’ is uncertainty
this propositional uncertainty is what we live with – is
what we deal with
and we deal with it through question and doubt – and the
exploration of the uncertainty
decisions get made – and we proceed – and proceed in
uncertainty
we are not ‘unconscious’ of the issue – the very conflict –
the propositional conflict – is our consciousness – is the issue
and as for ‘fate’ – fate is a supposed predetermined state
of affairs –
our propositional reality is not determined – is not
predetermined – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
it might be countered here – is not the death of the
propositional actor predetermined?
death is not a necessity – it is a contingency
it is conceivable that science could overcome death
‘For proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show
that love is united to repentance, disdain and shame, etc. But I think it will
be clear to all from the preceding propositions that the emotions can be
compounded one with the another in so many ways, and so many variations can
arise from these combinations, that it were impossible to express them by any
number.’
here – what Spinoza is talking about is propositional
relations – and the fact that any number of proposals – of propositions –
can be related one to the other –
propositional life is just this
‘It remains, however, to be noted concerning love what very
often happens while we are enjoying the thing we desired, that the body from
the enjoyment acquires a new disposition, by which it is determined in another
way, and these images of things are aroused in it, and at the same time the
mind begins to imagine and desire other things.
here once again we have Spinoza’s dualism of mind and body –
if his monism is genuine – then the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’
should be dropped – should have no place
the fact that he cannot find a way of explaining his monism
without resorting to dualism – suggests – at the very least that his monism is
not workable
the best we could say here – if we were sticking to
Spinoza’s monism is that it is the person / propositional actor that
enjoys – and that with any propositional enjoyment there is ‘personal’
propositional affect and effect
‘E.g., when we imagine something that is wont to
delight us with its flavour, we desire to enjoy it, that is, to eat it. But as
soon as we enjoy it the stomach is filled and the body’s desire is turned in
another direction. But if while the body is in this condition the image of this
food, inasmuch as it is present, be stimulated, the new condition of the body
will feel disgust of the food which before we desired will now be odious to us,
and this what we call satiety or weariness (fastidium aut taedium).’
when we desire to eat – we propose to eat
‘disgust’ – and ‘odious’ – is overdoing it here –
it is more likely that most would look upon food – similar
to that just consumed – with disinterest –
and again – Spinoza – if he was to maintain his monism –
needed to find language that expresses it without reference to ‘mind and
body’
i.e. – the propositional actor is satisfied after
eating his or her fill – and yes – other proposals will come in to play
‘For the rest, I have neglected the external modifications
of the body which are observable in emotions such as tremor, pallor, sobbing,
and laughter, because they refer to the body without any relation to the mind.
Again, as definitions of the emotions, I shall repeat them in this order, with
such notes as I think necessary.’
‘refers to the body without any relation to the mind’ –
well – there goes the neighbourhood
DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS
I. Desire (cupiditas) is the very essence of man in
so far as it is conceived as determined to do something by some given
modification of itself.
‘the very essence of man’?
any claim of ‘essence’ – is a proposal – a proposal open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘determined to do something by some given modification of
itself’?
determined to do something – effectively means
‘anything’ –
so – the essence of man is – whatever man does –
and whatever man does – is whatever man proposes – is –
human propositional action
what we propose – and our propositional action – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
it is not ‘determined’
we can drop talk of ‘essence’ altogether –
what we are dealing with is propositional actors – and their
proposals – their propositional actions
as for ‘desire’ –
yes – you can describe human activity – in terms of ‘desire’
– but really what is the point?
the description – ‘propositional action’ – is logically
superior – simply because it is not wedded to emotionalism
and thus – it allows for – gives space to – different
descriptions – let us say non-emotional perspectives to have a place
Explanation. – We said above in the Note on Prop. 9,
Part III., that desire was appetite with a consciousness of itself: and that
appetite was the very essence of man in so far as it is determined to do such
things as will serve for its preservation. But in the
same note I also gave warning that in truth I recognize no difference between
human appetite and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or
whether he be not, his appetite remains the same notwithstanding; and
therefore, lest I seem guilty of a tautology, I do not want to explain desire
by means of appetite, but I endeavoured at the same time to define it in such a way
that I might comprehend in one and all the endeavours of human nature which we
signify by the name of appetite, will desire, or impulse. I might
indeed have said that desire is the very essence of man in so far as it is
conceived as to do something; but from this definition (Prop. 23, Part II.) it
would follow that the mind could be conscious of its appetite or desire. Therefore,
in order to involve the cause of its consciousness, it was necessary to add
(same Prop.), in so far as it is conceived as determined by a modification of
itself. For by modification of human nature we understand any disposition of
that nature, whether it be innate, or whether it be conceived under the
attribute of thought or extension alone, or whether it have reference to both
at the same time. Hence by the nature of desire I understand any
endeavours, impulses, appetites, or volitions, which are various, according to
the various dispositions of the said man, and often opposed one to the other as
a man is drawn in different directions and knows not wither to turn.
‘But in the same note I also gave warning that in truth I
recognize no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man be
conscious of his appetite or whether he be not, his appetite remains the same
notwithstanding;’
conscious and unconscious?
this so called ‘unconscious’ – is really one of the great
logical frauds –
for we can only propose it – once we are conscious of it –
and then it is not an ‘unconscious’ –
and if instead of ‘unconscious’ – you propose
‘non-conscious’ – the same applies
the ‘unconscious’ is a determinist ploy – basically a trick
to pretend a foundation to propositional life
the logical reality is that there is no foundation to
propositional activity – but propositional activity itself –
so – forget ‘foundation’ –
all we have – is proposals – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘and therefore, lest I seem guilty of a tautology, I do not
want to explain desire by means of appetite, but I endeavoured at the same time
to define it in such a way that I might comprehend in one and all the
endeavours of human nature which we signify by the name of appetite, but I
endeavoured at the same time to define it in such a way that I might comprehend
in one and all the endeavours of human nature which we signify by the name of
appetite, will desire, or impulse.’
appetite and desire?
Spinoza’s problem here is that he realises that ‘desire’
really doesn’t do the job that he wants it to do –
for he wants it to cover appetite – and on the face of it
desire and appetite are different
might I not desire a particular food – but not have an
appetite for it?
he puts his problem in terms of avoiding a tautology
for if a tautology – then really you have no definition –
just a pleonasm
to get around this problem of desire / appetite – he ends up
going for an unrestricted definition of ‘desire’ –
‘but I endeavoured at the same time to define it in such a
way that I might comprehend in one and all the endeavours of human nature which
we signify by the name of appetite, will desire, or impulse’
and one could argue here that whatever meaning ‘desire’ had
or might have had – is now lost
in any case it is clear that though Spinoza sees a problem
with his use of desire – he carries on regardless
‘I might indeed have said that desire is the very essence of
man in so far as it is conceived as to do something; but from this definition
(Prop. 23, Part II.) it would follow that the mind could be conscious of its
appetite or desire. Therefore, in order to involve the cause of its
consciousness, it was necessary to add (same Prop.), in so far as it is
conceived as determined by a modification of itself. For by modification of
human nature we understand any disposition of that nature, whether it be innate,
or whether it be conceived under the attribute of thought or extension alone,
or whether it have reference to both at the same time. ‘
the so called ‘cause of its consciousness’ – that is the
‘cause’ of propositional activity is a critical propositional matter –
that is to say – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘For by modification of human nature we understand any
disposition of that nature’ –
that is any propositional action –
any propositional action – whatever its propositional
explanation
‘Hence by the nature of desire I understand any endeavours,
impulses, appetites, or volitions, which are various, according to the various
dispositions of the said man, and often opposed one to the other as a man is
drawn in different directions and knows not wither to turn.
‘desire’ as – any endeavour – impulses – appetites –
volitions –
that is – proposal and propositional action –
‘and often opposed to one another as a man is drawn in
different directions and knows not wither to turn’ –
that is to say – ‘man’ – the propositional actor –
puts proposals – and takes propositional action – proposals and propositional
actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we live with and in logical uncertainty – and we act in
response to logical uncertainty
and any action we take – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
II. Pleasure (Laetitia) is man’s transition from a
less state of perfection to a greater.
‘pleasure’ – is a possible propositional consequence or
affect/ effect of a proposal – of propositional action –
and the experience of pleasure – as with any propositional
experience – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to this ‘transition from a lesser state of perfection to
a greater’
Spinoza’s idea of perfection is a total confusion
if we take ‘perfection’ on face value – it is quite clearly not
a relative notion – it is an absolute – so there is no ‘lesser’ or ‘greater’
and as an ‘absolute’ – it makes no logical sense –
‘perfection’ – as with any concept – is a proposal – and as
such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the notion of perfection is best dispensed with as a
throw-back to authoritarian and dogmatic metaphysics
III. Pain (tristitia) is man’s transition from a
greater state of perfection to a lesser.
pain is a possible propositional consequence or affect / effect
of propositional action
there is no perfection or imperfection in propositional
action or the possible effects of propositional action
proposal / propositional action is either rational or
irrational –
if rational – it is held open to question – open to doubt –
and understood as uncertain
if irrational – it is not put to question – not put to doubt
– and regarded as certain
pleasure and pain are possible natural affects / effects
of propositional action –
and are proposals – open to question
Explanation. – I say transition, for pleasure is not
perfection itself; for if a man was born with the perfection to which he
passes, he would possess it without the emotion of pleasure; and the contrary
of this makes it still more apparent. For that pain consists in a transition
from a greater to a lesser perfection, and not that of less perfection itself,
no one can deny, since man cannot thus far be saddened in so far as he
participates in any perfection. Nor can we say that pain consists in the
privation of a greater perfection, for privation is nothing. But the emotion of
sadness or pain is an action (actus), which therefore cannot be anything
else than the action of passing to a lesser state of perfection, that is, an
action by which the power of action of a man is lessened or hindered (see Note,
Prop. II, Part III.). As for the definitions of laughter, giggling, melancholy,
and grief, I omit them inasmuch as they have reference rather to the body, and
are only species of pleasure or pain.
human beings do not participate in perfection
human beings participate in propositional uncertainty
‘But the emotion of sadness or pain’
as to whether sadness is pain – and pain sadness –
this is a matter open to question
I think you can be sad without being in pain – and be in
pain without being sad
pleasure and pain – are not transition to higher or lower
states of perfection
higher or lower of states of perfection – makes no sense
pleasure and pain are possible propositional consequences –
possible propositional affect / effects
Spinoza defines pleasure and pain as emotions
it should be noted that these proposals are open to question
–
i.e. – some would define pleasure and pain – not as emotions
per se – but as sensations
‘As for the definitions of laughter, giggling, melancholy,
and grief, I omit them inasmuch as they have reference rather to the body, and
are only species of pleasure or pain.’
this statement is a total capitulation to dualism –
I would have thought that if Spinoza was a genuine monist –
he would have analysed laughter – giggling – melancholy and grief as
simultaneous expressions of the mind and body
i.e. – there is no laughter without a mental dimension
can there be any emotional reaction that does not involve what
for Spinoza is a ‘mental process’?
Spinoza I would say has a very shallow view and
understanding of grief
IV. Wonder (admiratio) is the imagination of anything, in
which the mind accordingly remains without motion because imagination of this
particular thing has no connection with the rest (see Prop. 52, with its Note).
‘wonder’ – is a proposal – a propositional state – where
what is proposed – is unknown
‘no connection with the rest’ –
‘the rest’ – here – is any propositional context
in the propositional moment of wonder – the unknown will be
the focus
however as soon as wonder is put to question – put to doubt
– its uncertainty explored
relations between other proposals and propositional contexts
will be put forward
wonder is often where we start – and sometimes – where we
end –
for any propositional activity will come out of and return
to the unknown
Explanation. – In the Note on Prop. 18, Part II, we
showed that what was the reason that the mind from contemplation of one thing
passes at once to the contemplation of another, namely, because the images of
those things were so intertwined and so arranged that one followed the another,
which therefore cannot be conceived if the image be new; but the mind will
remain transfixed in the contemplation of that thing until it is determined by
other causes for thinking of other things. The imagination of a new thing,
therefore, considered in itself, is of the same nature as other imaginations,
and on that account I do not count wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why
I should do so, since this distraction of the mind arises from no positive
reason which attracts the mind from other things, but only from the fact that
the cause is wanting why the mind, from the regarding of one thing, should pass
to the thinking of others. I recognise, therefore (as I intimated in the Note
of Prop. 11, Part III.), only three primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain
and desire; nor have I spoken of wonder for any other reason than that it is
customary to speak of certain emotions which arise from the three primary ones
by other names when they have reference to objects which we wonder at; and this
same reason moves me to put forward also a definition of contempt (contentus).
‘we showed that what was the reason that the mind from
contemplation of one thing passes at once to the contemplation of another,
namely, because the images of those things were so intertwined and so arranged
that one followed the another, which therefore cannot be conceived if the image
be new’
how one proposal leads to another – is a matter open to
question – open to doubt and is uncertain
‘wonder’ – is a propositional state – where what is proposed
– is unknown
the proposal – as proposed – will not be in a relation with
another proposal – or other – proposals
‘but the mind will remain transfixed in the contemplation of
that thing until it is determined by other causes for thinking of other things’
all this means is that our propositional action will not be
fixed – that we move from one proposal to another
the ground or basis for this propositional movement or
motion – is not determined or fixed – but is rather a matter – open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
‘The imagination of a new thing, therefore, considered in
itself, is of the same nature as other imaginations, and on that account I do
not count wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should do so’ since
this distraction of the mind arises from no positive reason which attracts the
mind from other things, but only from the fact that the cause is wanting why
the mind, from the regarding of one thing, should pass to the thinking of
others’
an ‘imagination’ is a proposal – a propositional
action
any proposal / propositional action will have an affect
an affect – is an emotion – therefore ‘wonder’ – is an
emotion – or an emotional state
‘since this distraction of the mind arises from no positive
reason which attracts the mind from other things, but only from the fact that
the cause is wanting why the mind, from the regarding of one thing, should pass
to the thinking of others’
‘the cause’ – is always wanting ‘why the mind, from the
regard of one thing, should pass to thinking of other things’ –
this is just to say – why one proposal leads to another – is
a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘propositional motion’ – propositional activity – is uncertain
‘only three primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain and
desire; nor have I spoken of wonder for any other reason than that it is
customary to speak of certain emotions which arise from the three primary ones
by other names when they have reference to objects which we wonder at’
any propositional affect – is an emotion – an
emotional / propositional state
and any ‘classification’ of the emotions – in the final
analysis – is purely arbitrary
pleasure and pain are possible propositional consequences –
or affects / effects
a propositional effect will have affect – and as such
– be an emotional state
pleasure and pain are propositional affects / effects
–
as for desire – ‘desire’ is simply a name Spinoza has given
to propositional activity
any propositional activity will be affective and
effective
as to the argument that there are primary emotions –
and that all other emotions ‘arise from’ the three primary emotions –
Spinoza is here proposing a foundation to the emotions – and
a relation between emotions and the proposed foundation
the emotions – however described – however classified – are
proposals – proposals open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
the ‘ground’ or ‘foundation’ – (if we are to continue use
these terms) – of emotional / propositional life – is uncertainty
Spinoza’s description / classification / explanation of the
emotions is as good as any other such proposal –
and as with any such proposal – or indeed any
proposal in any propositional context – it is open – open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
V. Contempt is the imagination of anything which touches the
mind so little that the mind is moved by the presence of that thing to think
rather of things which are not contained in the thing than those which are
contained in it (see Note, Prop. 52, Part III.).
contempt here – is therefore – firstly – denial –
denial of what something or someone is –
and secondly – it is to regard what it is not – or what is
‘not contained in it’ – as what it is – or – what is ‘contained
in it’ –
in logical terms – it is to contradict – a thing or person
a contradiction is a pretend or dummy proposition – for – in
fact in a contradiction – nothing is proposed
therefore – on this definition – I would say – contempt is
illogical
and so – the one who ‘holds another in contempt’ – is doing
no more than demonstrating (their) irrationality
the one who is contemptuous has fallen into a pit of
ignorance
‘The definitions of veneration and scorn I pass over here,
for I know not any emotions which arise therefrom.’
what emotion arises from what emotion – is nothing more than
speculation
I would think that to venerate is at the very least – is to
hold in high regard –
and thus – you might say it is an expression of approval?
and scorn – to vehemently disparage?
and as to disparagement – would it not come down to
disapproval?
and then to whatever account you might give of disapproval?
these so-called emotions of contempt – veneration and scorn
– are no different to any other propositional action or behaviour they are
proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
VI. Love (amor) is pleasure accompanied by the idea
of an external cause.
‘love’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open
to doubt – and is uncertain
‘the idea of an external cause’?
love – can be proposed as a propositional relation
A loves B –
is a relation between proposals – between propositions –
between propositional actors – or a propositional actor and a sentient creature
– or proposed object
and the relation – as with the propositions related – is
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
as indeed is any so-called ‘cause’ – causal argument
‘pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause’?
we can reasonably ask here – does pleasure accompanied by
the idea of an external cause equal love?
or is it just – pleasure?
and does anyone with a critical mind think that all there is
to love is pleasure?
and also – it seems Spinoza has no concept of love without
pleasure –
there are circumstances where one may love another – but
there is no pleasure to be had – where indeed the prevailing emotion is pain
now is Spinoza prepared to say that in such circumstance –
there is no love?
and if he is to concede love in such circumstance – how does
he explain that in terms of his definition of love?
tying love to pleasure – has only resulted in an extremely
narrow and ultimately very unsatisfactory understanding of love
Spinoza’s definition of love fails
the hard truth is that love is whatever it is proposed to be
–
and – any proposal of love – is open to question –
love is uncertain
Explanation. – This definition sufficiently explains
the definition of love. That one given by authors who define that love is the
wish of the lover to unite himself to the object loved, does not explain the
essence of love, but a property thereof; and as the essence of love has not
been perceived sufficiently by the authors in question, they accordingly have
neither a clear conception of its property, and accordingly their definition is
considered by all to be extremely obscure. But let it be remarked that when I
say that it is a property of the essence of love that the lover wishes to be
united to the object of his love, I do not understand by will or wish, consent,
deliberation, or free decision (for this we have shown to be fictitious in
Prop. 48, Part II), nor even the wish of the lover to be united with the object
of his love when it is absent, nor of continuing in its presence when it is
present (for love can be conceived without either of these desires); but by
wish I understand the satisfaction which is in the love by reason of the
presence of the object loved, by which the pleasure of the lover is maintained,
or at least cherished.
‘This definition sufficiently explains the definition of
love.’
any so-called ‘explanation’ must be more than a statement
a genuine explanation puts a proposal to question – puts it
to doubt – an explores its uncertainty
and logically speaking – an ‘explanation’ is never final
‘That one given by authors who define that love is the wish
of the lover to unite himself to the object loved, does not explain the essence
of love, but a property thereof; and as the essence of love has not been
perceived sufficiently by the authors in question, they accordingly have
neither a clear conception of its property, and accordingly their definition is
considered by all to be extremely obscure
the essence of any proposal – of any proposition – is
logical uncertainty
as to ‘property’ –
a ‘property’ – is a propositional description –
a description – open to question
that ‘love is the wish of the lover to unite himself to the
object love’ –
is to my mind a perfectly reasonable as a proposal regarding
the nature of love –
and it is one of many possible ways of proposing and
understanding the nature of love
and it is clear – not obscure
‘But let it be remarked that when I say that it is a
property of the essence of love that the lover wishes to be united to the
object of his love, I do not understand by will or wish, consent, deliberation,
or free decision (for this we have shown to be fictitious in Prop. 48, Part
II),’
in trying to avoid this alternative view of love – and
defend his own definition – Spinoza is claiming that there is no will – or wish
– or consent – deliberation – or free decision involved in love
which is to say there is no proposal involved in love
–
for ‘will’ – ‘wish’ – ‘consent’ – deliberation’ – ‘free
decision’ – are all propositional forms –
the logical reality is that any human action however
described – is propositional –
to deny this is – in relation to ‘love ‘– or any other
proposal – is to engage in illogicity
and to end up in absurdity
‘nor even the wish of the lover to be united with the object
of his love when it is absent, nor of continuing in its presence when it is
present (for love can be conceived without either of these desires); but by
wish I understand the satisfaction which is in the love by reason of the
presence of the object loved, by which the pleasure of the lover is maintained,
or at least cherished.’
here Spinoza redefines ‘wish’ as ‘satisfaction’ – in the
presence of the object loved
a wish – however you understand it – is not satisfaction
satisfaction – you might say – is the object of the
wish
a wish is a proposal for satisfaction –
and clearly a proposal that is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
and satisfaction – is a propositional state – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
quite clearly Spinoza’s view of love – at the best – is
extremely limited –
and one gets the impression from the above ‘Explanation’ –
that he senses this – and has felt the need to try and put his misgivings to
rest –
all he has done though is trample on and misconstrue a
perfectly reasonable alternative proposal
VII. Hatred (odium) is pain accompanied by the idea
of an external cause
Explanation. – what must be noted here can easily be
perceived from what was said in the explanation of the previous definition (see
moreover, Note, Prop. 13, Part III.).
the one who hates may take pleasure in his or her
hatred – and the one hated – may not be pained by being hated –
i.e. – they may be surprised and without rancour – or even dismissive
and as for an ‘external cause’
the cause of any emotional state – is a matter open to
question –
and even if we accept this internal / external distinction –
is it not possible that one’s hatred for another – may come from one’s own
self-loathing – and thus be of an ‘internal cause’?
the point here is that we must give up on this notion of
definition – as some kind of final account of a proposal – or propositional
state – i.e. – an ‘emotional state’ –
no ‘definition’ –
will be beyond question – beyond doubt – or certain
a ‘definition’ is nothing more than a proposal – a critical
starting point – for question – for doubt – and for the exploration of
uncertainty
VIII. Inclination (propensio) is pleasure accompanied
by the idea of anything which by accident is the cause of pleasure.
an ‘inclination’ is a proposal – a proposal – the
uncertainty of which is apparent before its form is decided
pleasure may be an affect or effect of such a
proposal – pain may be an affect or effect of such a proposal – or there
may be no pleasure or pain involved at all –
there is no ‘necessary’ ground to any proposal – and
therefore – any proposal is ‘accidental’
IX. Aversion (aversio) is pain accompanied by the
idea of anything which is accidentally the cause of that pain (see Note, prop,
15, Part III).
‘aversion’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
the point being – just what aversion is – in any
propositional context – is not a matter that can be determined out of context –
and even in context there will be questions – doubts –
uncertainties
aversion may have a painful affect / effect – but it may not
i.e. – one may ‘turn away’ from a proposal – because it is
not useful – or indeed – because it is regarded as irrational – without any
pain involved
this too goes to the question of pain – specifically –
Spinoza’s analysis of pain
now Spinoza defines pain – as a loss of power –
I would have thought that ‘turning away’ from a proposal
deemed unacceptable for whatever reason – is in fact a positive action – which
in Spinoza’s terms – can only be regarded as powerful
X. Devotion (devotio) is love towards him when we
admire or wonder at.
one may be devoted – not out of love – admiration –
or wonder – but from other motives
i.e. – one may be devoted out of duty – from a moral
imperative – in which there is no love – admiration – or wonder
Explanation. – That wonder arises from the novelty of
a thing we showed in Prop. 52, Part III. If, therefore, it comes to pass that
we often imagine that which we wonder at, then we shall cease to wonder: and
thus we see that devotion can easily degenerate into simple love.
wonder is a primary propositional response to the unknown
I don’t think there is necessarily any time limit on wonder
one’s devotion – may ‘degenerate’ into ‘simple love’
– but if so – we have a propositional shift
and propositional shifts are the natural order of the day
XI. Derision (irrisio) is pleasure arisen from the
fact that we imagine what we despise to be present in what we hate.
despising and hating – what’s the difference?
and if we hate something – according to Spinoza – hate
arises from pain –
so – on his definition of hate – there can be no pleasure –
only pain in relation to hate
if we accept what Spinoza says here regarding derision –
that it has the affect / effect of pleasure – then his psychological / ethical
theory collapses
in any case – need there be any pleasure in derision?
there may be – but just as equally – there may not be –
derision – might be – in certain circumstances – just a form
of dismissal
Explanation. – In so far as we despise a thing which
we hate, thus far we deny its existence (Note, Prop, 52, Part III.), and thus
we rejoice (Prop. 20, Part III.). But as we suppose that man hates what he
derides, it follows that this joy is not very stable.
this ‘explanation’ – makes no logical sense –
firstly – just because you hate something – doesn’t mean it
doesn’t exist
on the other hand – if we deny a thing’s existence – how do
we rejoice in – ‘its’ – non-existence?
joy can only be a propositional response – to a positional
reality – that exists –
is Spinoza prepared to say we can have joy – from nothing?
however – the final point – the conclusion? – to this
‘argument’ – is logically correct
‘joy’ – as with any proposal – any propositional state – is
logically ‘unstable’ – for any proposal – any propositional state – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
XII. Hope (spes) is an uncertain pleasure arisen from the
idea of a thing past or future, the event of which we still doubt somewhat (see
Note 2, Prop. 18. part III.)
‘hope’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
in this respect it is no different to any other proposal
what distinguishes hope is that its uncertainty is manifest
as to being a pleasure –
pleasure may be a propositional affect or effect of a
proposal of hope –
however – one can hope – without an expectation of pleasure
or pain
one may just hope for an outcome – and be uncertain
as to whether it will deliver pleasure – pain – or neither
Spinoza says hope is an idea that arises from a past or
future event
clearly – hope is an expectation for a future state
of affairs
the expectation is present – any propositional act is
present
XII. Fear. (metus) is an uncertain pain arisen from
the idea of something past or future of whose event we doubt somewhat (see Note
2. Prop. 18. Part III.).
fear as with hope – is a proposal open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
while we can – in emotional terms – describe hope as
a positive uncertainty – fear is a negative uncertainty
hope and fear represent the emotional range of
propositional uncertainty
in hope and fear we come face to face with uncertainty –
which in turn means – we come face to face with the unknown
Explanation. – It follows from these definitions that
fear cannot be without hope nor hope without fear. For he that depends on hope
and doubts the event of a thing, is supposed to imagine something which cuts
off the existence of that thing in the future: and therefore thus far he is
pained (Prop. 19, Part III.), and consequently, while he depends on hope he has
fears as to the event of the thing. He, on the other hand, that is in fear,
that is, who doubts concerning the event of the thing which he hates, imagines
also something which cuts off the existence of the thing: and therefore (Prop.
20, Part III.) he rejoices, and consequently thus has hope that it will not
come to pass.
this is really only to say that the success or failure of a
proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
you can describe emotional / propositional
uncertainty in terms of hope and fear – or – as the relation between – hope and
fear
‘For he that depends on hope and doubts the event of a
thing, is supposed to imagine something which cuts off the existence of that
thing in the future: and therefore thus far he is pained’
what we hope for is uncertain – and whether or not
something will occur that thwarts our hope – is uncertain
to feel pain on the possibility of having one’s hope
thwarted – is putting the cart before the horse – and is not sensible
and if one’s hope is thwarted – one may be pained –
but this is not the only possible propositional response –
i.e. – one may have something of a stoic acceptance of
the result
‘He, on the other hand, that is in fear, that is, who doubts
concerning the event of the thing which he hates, imagines also something which
cuts off the existence of the thing: and therefore (Prop. 20, Part III.) he
rejoices, and consequently thus has hope that it will not come to pass.’
imagining that – which might give one hope – is only to
propose a successful outcome
and any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
any pleasure felt at the prospect of a hopeful outcome – is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
XIV. Confidence (securitas) is pleasure arisen from
the idea of a past or future thing of which the cause of doubt is overborne.
confidence is pleasure?
pleasure may be a propositional affect or effect of
confidence –
however – I would think that genuine confidence has a
rational basis –
if we are confident in our proposal – this will be because
we have subjected it to critical analysis –
that is – we have put it to question – put it to doubt –
explored its uncertainty – and as a result of this rational process – we have
decided to proceed with it –
we decide to proceed with it knowing that it will be open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
it is this knowledge – this knowledge of the critical
process – that is the source of rational confidence
any confidence – rational confidence we have – arises not
from the past or the future – but rather the present
that is the critical activity we engage in – in the present
if doubt is overborne – i.e. – overcome – then doubt has
been overcome by ignorance and prejudice
logically – rationally – speaking – any proposal –
any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
XV. Despair
(desperation) is pain arisen from the idea of a thing past or future of which
all cause of doubt is removed.
any idea of a thing
past – is a present idea / proposal
any idea of a thing
future – is a present idea / proposal
despair is an
emotional / propositional state – open to question
its explanation –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking
– ‘all cause of doubt’ – that is – doubt – is never removed
regardless of how
‘despair’ is defined – how it is described and further elaborated on – the
logical reality is that we are dealing with a proposal – a propositional state
– open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
in any
propositional state – question – doubt – uncertainty – will naturally ‘arise’
any denial of doubt
– is irrational and false
where one feels
that all hope is lost – that there is no way forward – I think this is likely
due to physical and / or mental exhaustion – or – finding oneself in a
circumstance that one cannot negotiate oneself out of – i.e. – a death sentence
however – if there
is life – there is question – there is doubt – and there is uncertainty – even
where and when one’s prospects appear to be beyond redemption
Explanation. – Confidence therefore arises from hope,
and despair from fear, when all cause of doubt as to the event is removed,
which takes place because a man imagines a thing past or future to be present,
or because he imagines other things which cut off the existence of those things
which brought about his doubt to him. For although we may never be certain as
to the event of individual things (Note Prop. 31. Part II.), it can
nevertheless come to pass that we have no doubt concerning their event. For we
have shown that it is a different thing not to doubt concerning a thing (see
Note, Prop. 49, Part II.) and to be certain about it: and therefore it may come
to pass that we are affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the
image of a thing present, as we showed in Prop. 18, Part II., which see,
together with its second note.
‘Confidence therefore arises from hope, and despair from
fear, when all cause of doubt as to the event is removed, which takes place
because a man imagines a thing past or future to be present, or because he
imagines other things which cut off the existence of those things which brought
about his doubt to him.’
confidence does not arise from hope –
confidence arises from engaging in the rational process of
critical activity
does despair arise from fear?
if anything – despair – is an emotional state – that in some
sense – is beyond hope – and beyond fear –
it can – I think – be described as a state of emotional
desolation
and what it ‘arises from’ – how it comes about – is a matter
open to question
bear in mind though – one can – despair – and engage
in question – doubt – and uncertainty
despair can be dealt with rationally
‘For although we may never be certain as to the event of
individual things (Note Prop. 31. Part II.), it can nevertheless come to pass
that we have no doubt concerning their event.’
this is just a statement of contradiction
for if you can never be certain – you will doubt
‘For we have shown that it is a different thing not to doubt
concerning a thing (see Note, Prop. 49, Part II.) and to be certain about it’
not doubting – is
to not question – to not explore uncertainty – it is to presume certainty
and to be certain –
or to presume certainty – is to be ignorant
‘and therefore it may come to pass that we are affected with
the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a thing present’
the image of the thing past – or the image of the thing
future – is a proposal put – in the present
‘the image of the thing present’ – is a proposal put
–
and a proposal put – may have a propositional affect
– or effect – of pleasure – of pain – or the absence of both –
you just have to wait and see –
and whatever the propositional effect – it will be open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
XVI. Joy (gaudium) is pleasure accompanied by the
idea of a past thing which surpassed our hope in its event.
.
‘the idea of a past thing which surpassed our hope in its
event’ – is a present propositional state
if Spinoza – is trying here to confine joy to the
remembrance of past events and their effects – he has a strange idea of joy –
for it is to say – you do not – or cannot – immediately and
directly experience joy
it is to say that joy is only a backstory to past events
in effect this means – at best – your immediate experience
must be joyless
such a view is odd indeed – and quite simply flies in the
face of human / propositional experience
and yes – joy is a pleasure –
however – this only raises the question of the nature of
pleasure –
is any pleasure – a joy?
if so – why this term ‘joy’?
presumably therefore joy is not just a synonym for pleasure
– and if so – how is it to be further explained?
tying it to past experience ‘that surpassed our hope’ – will
not do the job –
such a strategy – effectively – takes joy out of our direct
experience –
the last thing we need
finally – it should be noted that the questions that need to
be asked in relation to Spinoza’s concept of pleasure – apply equally to his
concept of pain
XVII. Disappointment (conscientiae morsus) is pain
accompanied by the idea of past thing which surpassed our hope in its event
again – we have from Spinoza – a propositional / emotional
state that is tied to the past
whenever I am disappointed – I am disappointed – now
if I experience disappointment as a result of memory – I am
disappointed now
our propositional / emotional states are present
as to pain here –
is ‘pain’ or ’painful’ – the right description for a
disappointment?
and in any case – I may be disappointed – but as it were –
‘take it on the chin’ – accepting it as just another matter to deal with –
but what exactly counts as pain for Spinoza?
i.e. – we all understand physical pain – but is a
psychological set-back – pain?
and do we count any circumstance that does not conform with
our expectation – as ‘painful’?
‘pain’ – as with any proposal is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
the real problem with Spinoza – is that there is no hint of
question – of doubt – or uncertainty – with his notion of pain –
and as a result – of course there is no thorough-going
exploration of the notion –
and this lack of critical analysis – I think really weakens
his position
XVIII. Pity (commiseratio) is pain accompanied by the
idea of an ill which happened to another whom we imagine similar to oneself
(see Note, Prop. 22, and Note, Prop. 27, Part III.).
I pity what is happening to another –
and yes – I may be aware of what has happened to them – but
my pity is a present emotional / propositional state
and – what is ‘pity’?
I would say it is the recognition of another’s
suffering
and I don’t see recognition as ‘pain’ – or ‘painful’
as to – ‘another whom we imagine similar to oneself’ –
this is weak – similar in what respect? – will any
respect do?
you recognise another’s suffering –
‘similarity’ – is neither here nor there –
it is the suffering that is psychologically /
ethically relevant
Explanation. – Between pity and compassion (misericordia)
there seems to no difference save perhaps this, that pity has reference to a
particular emotion while compassion to a habit.
I think pity is recognition of another’s suffering – whereas
compassion – is recognition plus empathy
XIX. Favour (favor) is love towards someone who has
benefited another.
do you love someone you favour?
here it depends – of course on how you define ‘love’ –
and ‘love’ – like any other proposal – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
and do you only favour someone who has benefited another?
you may indeed favour one who has benefited another –
but there will be many who confer their favour on those who
are simply disadvantaged – with the hope of giving them a leg up
and of course – you may favour another – for other reasons
i.e. – you might simply like the way they conduct themselves
–
and you might bestow a favour on someone just because it
makes you feel good to do so
Spinoza’s definition of favour – as with the preceding
definitions – is limited and inadequate
XX. Indignation (indignatio) is hatred towards someone
who has maltreated another.
yes – perhaps –
still ‘hatred’ might be overdoing it in most cases –
‘indignation’ –
I don’t think that it is sensible to seriously think you can
pin a term – or concept down to any one meaning or usage
in practise ‘indignation’ can be used to describe – an
emotional response to any number of propositional circumstances
could I not be indignant about how an election has played
out?
could I not be indignant about a change in the weather?
in such cases – there is no ‘maltreatment of another’
and – really – no maltreatment at all
Explanation. – I know that these names, according to
common usage, have other meanings, but it is my purpose not to explain the
meanings of the words, but the nature of the things, and to explain them in
such words whose meanings, according to current use, are not entirely different
from the meaning which I wish to attach to them: this warning should suffice
once for all. As for the cause of these emotions, see Coroll. 1, Prop. 27, and
Coroll., Prop. 22, Part III.
one gets the impression from this ‘Explanation’ – that
Spinoza actually sees the inadequacy of his approach on these matters – but has
decided to push on regardless
as to this argument regarding ‘the nature of things’ –
as with ‘names’ – ‘common usage’ – and ‘meanings’ – ‘the
nature of things’ – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
Spinoza cannot save himself from propositional uncertainty
however – it is as if he feels an obligation to defy it at
all costs
XXI. Partiality (existimatio) is estimating something
too highly by reason of love.
too high – too low – just right? –
these judgments will be made in terms of the circumstances
one finds oneself in –
and any estimation will be uncertain –
that is open to question – open to doubt – and open to
revision
‘by reason of love’?
can love lead to an overestimation?
yes – you might – as they say – be blinded by love –
however – even here – there will be question – doubt – and
uncertainty
XXII. Disparagement (despectus) is estimating
something too lowly by reason of hatred.
Explanation. – Partiality is therefore an effect or
property of love, while disparagement is an effect of property of hate: and
therefore partiality may also be defined as love in so far as it thus affects
man so that he estimates a thing too highly. and on the other hand,
disparagement as hatred in so far as it thus affects man that he underestimates
him whom he hates (see on this point Note, Prop. 26, Part III.).
perhaps your hatred of another – does lead you to
underestimate him or her –
but equally – your estimation might be the same – even if
you didn’t hate
any ‘estimation’ – is a proposal – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
XXIII. Envy (invidia) is hatred in so far as it so
affects man that he is pained at the good fortune and rejoiced at the evil
fortune of another.
Explanation. – Envy is commonly opposed or contrasted
with compassion (misericordia), which therefore may be thus defined the
usual meaning of the word.
I think there are two kinds of envy
the envy of the man who is pained at the good fortune of the
other – and who rejoices in the downfall of the other –
this is Spinoza’s envy – the envy of the XXIII.
however – I think you can be envious of another’s good
fortune – celebrate it – while at the same time wishing that you too had that
good fortune
that is an envy based on a joyous celebration of the good
fortune of the other
Spinoza is aware of this –
but he has no term to describe it –
and he is not prepared to say that there can be a positive
form of envy as well as the negative form of envy –
and so – he has tried to get out of this problem by
cannibalizing compassion
it doesn’t work – for compassion – as commonly understood –
is an emotional / propositional response – not to one’s good fortune – but
rather to its opposite – one’s misfortune and suffering
XXIV. Compassion (misericordia) is love in so far as
it so affects man that he rejoices at the good fortune of another and is
saddened at his evil fortune.
Explanation. – For the rest concerning envy, see
Note, Prop.14, and Note, Prop. 32, Part III. These are emotions of pleasure and
pain which are accompanied by the idea of an external thing as cause, either
through itself or by accident. I pass now on to those emotions which the idea
of a thing internal accompany as a cause.
‘compassion’ as with any term – any idea – any concept – is
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
and consequently – we should be open to different
definitions – different understandings
Spinoza here – has an unusual definition of compassion –
the key question is – do we feel compassion for the good
fortune of another?
most I think would say – recognizing or celebrating the good
fortune of another – is not what they would understand as compassion
Spinoza gives no explanation – in his ‘Explanation’ above –
of this usage – and is obviously keen to move on
the fact is – his definition of envy is limited – and as
such fails
perhaps he was hoping for compassion here
XXV. Self-complacency (acquiescentia in seipso) is
pleasure arising from the fact that man regards himself and his power of
acting.
regarding one’s power of acting –
if you regard it logically – you put it to question – put it
to doubt – and explore its uncertainty
this is a logical activity – whether it gives you pleasure
or not – is irrelevant
being self-satisfied – is harmless enough – if it is no more
than a moment’s reflection –
however – there is a thin line between self-satisfaction on
the one hand and logical laziness and ignorance on the other
XXVI. Humility (humilitas) is pain arising from the
fact that man regards his want of power or weakness.
Explanation. – Self-complacency is opposed to
humility in so far as by it we understand pleasure which arises from the fact
we regard our power of acting; but in so far as we understand it by pleasure
accompanied by the idea of some deed which we think we have done by the free
decision of the mind, it is opposed to repentance, which can be defined by us
as:
is humility a painful experience? –
if it comes out of sense of weakness – perhaps – yes
but there is another sense of humility – which I would
suggest is not negative –
and here I have in mind someone – who neither has an
inflated sense of himself – or regards himself as diminished – but is rather –
accepting of his limitations and positive – though unpretentious – with regard
to his achievements
such is a positive form of humility
Spinoza’s self-complacency – is not opposed
to this positive humility – but yes – it is opposed to his (negative)
view of humility
self-complacency – or self-satisfaction – as I have argued
above – has to do with logical laziness and ignorance
and as such – self-complacency is opposed to any form
of critical propositional / emotional activity
it is clear that Spinoza here gives no real ‘explanation’ of
humility – that his concern is to revisit self-complacency – with a view to
using it in his explanation of repentance –
it’s a quick turnover – and it suggests that he was not
confident about his proposed contrast of self-complacency with humility – which
in turn suggests he may have felt the limitation of his view of humility
‘but in so far as we understand it by pleasure accompanied
by the idea of some deed which we think we have done by the free decision of
the mind, it is opposed to repentance’
is Spinoza suggesting that if we ‘perform some deed which we
think we have done by the free power of the mind’ – that such is to be regarded
as ‘self-complacent’?
I fail to see how a perceived free act – need have anything
to do with self-complacency
in any case – the idea that the opposite of self-complacency
is repentance – suggests that we should repent the pleasure of our
self-complacent perceived free action – as if such an act and perception is
akin to something like sin
there is just a hint of philosophical desperation here –
and in any case Spinoza’s notion of self-complacency does
not mesh with repentance
presenting self-complacency and repentance as opposites –
does nothing for either concept – and in fact leaves both concepts in confusion
and his implied view that pleasure combined with the idea of
freedom – is something we should repent – is strange to say the least
any decision of the mind is a proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain –
uncertainty is the ground of logic – uncertainty is the
ground of freedom –
to repent freedom is to ‘repent’ logic –
it is in effect to deny logic
and in my view Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’ – is just that – a denial
and argument against logic and against rationality –
and an argument for the ‘certainty’ of ignorance and
prejudice –
it is an argument for the irrational cloaked in a deductive
format
XXVII. Repentance (poenitentia) is pain accompanied
by the idea of some deed which we think we have done by the free decision of
the mind.
repentance is pain with the idea of a free action?
any propositional action – is ‘free’ – that is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
pain is a possible affect / effect of propositional
action –
what Spinoza’s definition here amounts to – is that we
‘repent’ – any action that has the consequence of pain
we repent pain?
the important thing to note here – is that from this
‘definition’ – we have no account of what repentance is – or what it is to
repent
this ‘definition’ – only tells us what to
repent
any action with a consequence of pain?
there will be acts where pain is an unintentional
consequence – do we repent such actions?
and there will be actions where a painful consequence – in
turn has a consequence that is positive or beneficial – do we repent such
actions?
Spinoza has no answer – as he has no account of what
repentance is
and so – we can only conclude that Spinoza’s use of
‘repentance’ – is without definition –
and for this reason – his notion of repentance is empty – is
meaningless
in common parlance to repent is to regret or to be contrite
we may regret a painful consequence – and we may
be contrite regarding a painful consequence – or we may not –
it will depend on circumstance –
and any propositional action of regret – or contrition –
will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Explanation. – We have shown the causes of these
emotions in Note, Prop, 51, 53, 54, 55, and its Note, Part III. Concerning the
free decision of the mind, however, see Note, Prop. 35. Part II. But here,
moreover, this notable point arises, that it is not
wonderful that pain should follow all those actions which
according to custom are called wicked (pravus), and those which are
called right (rectus) should be followed by pleasure. For we can
understand from what has been said above that this most certainly depends upon
education. Parents, by reprobating wicked actions and reproving their children
on the committal of them, and on the other hand, by persuading to and praising
good or right actions, have brought it about that the former should be
associated with pain and the latter with pleasure. This also is proved by
experience. For custom and religion are not the same to all; but on the
contrary, what is sacred to some is profane to others, and what is honourable
to some is dishonourable to others. Therefore, according as each has been
educated, so he repents or glories in his actions.
‘But here, moreover, this notable point arises, that it is
not wonderful that pain should follow all those actions which according to
custom are called wicked (pravus), and those which are called right (rectus)
should be followed by pleasure.’
pain doesn’t always follow all those actions which
according to custom are wicked –
so-called wicked acts are for some – a source of pleasure
and pleasure doesn’t always follow from those actions
which according to custom are called ‘right’
so-called ‘right’ acts can have painful consequences
what is wicked and what is right – regardless of custom – is
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
and whether the consequence of a so called ‘wicked’ act – is
pleasure or pain – and whether the consequence of a so called ‘right’ act – is
pleasure or pain – is uncertain
‘For we can understand from what has been said above that
this most certainly depends upon education. Parents, by reprobating wicked
actions and reproving their children on the committal of them, and on the other
hand, by persuading to and praising good or right actions, have brought it
about that the former should be associated with pain and the latter with
pleasure. This also is proved by experience
how people are educated or trained does not cancel out
propositional / logical uncertainty –
and this is also ‘proved’ by experience
‘For custom and religion are not the same to all; but on the
contrary, what is sacred to some is profane to others, and what is honourable
to some is dishonourable to others. Therefore, according as each has been
educated, so he repents or glories in his actions’
yes – what is sacred and what is profane – what is
honourable and what is dishonourable – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
what you might glory in – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
and still – we have no explanation or account of repentance
from Spinoza
what we can say is that whatever repentance is proposed to
be – it will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
XXVIII. Pride (superbia) is over-estimation of
oneself by reason of self-love.
according to definition VI. above – ‘love’ – is pleasure
accompanied by the idea of an external cause
in terms of this definition – there is a question – as to
whether the notion of self-love makes any sense at all –
self-love – is love of the self – by the self – where is the
external cause?
and as to ‘over-estimation’ –
‘over-estimation’ – presumes measurement –
measurement is a rule-governed propositional game –
what are the rules here?
in this context – this emotional context – there is no
rule-governed propositional game
there is no measurement –
love is not measurable
Explanation. – Pride is different from partiality,
for the latter has reference to the over-estimation of an external cause,
whereas the former has reference to self-over- estimation. However, as
partiality is the effect or property of love, so pride is that of self-love (philautia),
which therefore may be defined as love of self, or self-complacency, in so far
as it thus affects man so as to overestimate himself (see Note Prop, 26, Part
III.). There is no contrary to this emotion. For no one under-estimates himself
in so far as he imagines that he cannot do this or that. For whatever a man
imagines that he cannot do, he imagines it necessarily, and by that very
imagination he is so disposed that in truth he cannot do what he imagines he
cannot do. For so long as he imagines that he cannot do this or that, so log as
he is determined not to do it: and consequently, so long as it is impossible to
him that he should do it. However if we pay attention to these things, which
depend solely on opinion, we shall be able to conceive that it is possible that
a man should under-estimate himself. For it can well come to pass that any one,
while sadly regarding his weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all,
and that while other men are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. A
man moreover may underestimate himself if he deny himself something in the
present with relation to future time of which he is uncertain: as, for example,
if he should deny that he can conceive anything certain, or desire to do anything
save what is wicked and disgraceful, etc. We could, moreover, say that anyone
under-estimates himself when we see that he dares not do certain things from
too great a fear of shame which others who are his equals do
without any fear. We can therefore oppose this emotion to pride; I shall call
it self-despising or dejection (abjecto). For self-complacency arises
from pride, so self-despising arises from humility: and this therefore may be
defined:
‘Pride is different from partiality, for the latter has
reference to the over-estimation of an external cause, whereas the former has
reference to self-over- estimation. However, as partiality is the effect or
property of love, so pride is that of self-love (philautia), which
therefore may be defined as love of self, or self-complacency, in so far as it
thus affects man so as to overestimate himself (see Note Prop, 26, Part III.).’
any estimation – if it is not a genuine measurement – that
is a rule governed – propositional exercise – is uncertain – is open to
question – open to doubt
pride – is – self-love – ‘in so far as it thus affects man
so as to overestimate himself’
but what if pride doesn’t ‘affect man so as to
overestimate himself’?
in that case – Spinoza actually has no definition of ‘pride’
for his definition is just that pride is an
overestimation of oneself by reason of self-love
there is – on this definition – no other kind of pride
in any case – as mentioned above – given Spinoza’s
definition of love – there is no ‘self-love’ – for love is pleasure accompanied
by the idea of an external cause – and the ‘self’ – is not an external
cause
so – therefore – there can be no question of estimation – or
‘over-estimation’ –
Spinoza’s notion of pride – collapses on every count
‘pride’ as with any proposal – is open to question – open to
interpretation – the concept is logically speaking – uncertain
which is to say in practise – there are various uses of the
term ‘pride’
i.e. – I can take pride in my work – which is to say I
regard what I have done as competent and worthwhile –
any propositional evaluation is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
I will – if I am rational – be open to re-evaluation – and
further re-evaluations –
so – I may at some point take the view that the original
valuation is wrong – that the work has less value than first thought – or I may
regard it as being of higher value than first thought
and any of these evaluations may be revised
it may be said of someone that they are ‘too proud’
this is not an over-estimation by reason of self-love – it
is likely rather a description of one who has not put his actions to question –
to doubt – and has not explored their uncertainty –
someone who prefers to avoid the question – or in fact –
does not recognise it
as to ‘self-love’ –
as I see it – if to ‘love oneself’ means anything – it is to
embrace one’s uncertainty – and to explore the possibilities of one’s
propositional life with an open and critical mind
‘There is no contrary to this emotion. For no one
under-estimates himself in so far as he imagines that he cannot do this or
that. For whatever a man imagines that he cannot do, he imagines it
necessarily, and by that very imagination he is so disposed that in truth he
cannot do what he imagines he cannot do. For so long as he imagines that he
cannot do this or that, so long as he is determined not to do it: and
consequently, so long as it is impossible to him that he should do it’
one can in assessing one’s propositional actions –
under-estimate their value –
but this will only occur relative to an accurate estimation
– or an over-estimation
‘under-estimation’ – ‘over-estimation’ – ‘estimation’ – are
best seen as relative terms
estimation – if it is not measurement – that is a
rule-governed activity – is propositional – and is uncertain
an ‘imagination’ – is a proposal – open to question – open
to doubt – uncertain –
uncertain – not ‘necessary’
there is no ‘imagining necessarily’ – there is no necessity
in propositional life
what we imagine we cannot do – is open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
‘However if we pay attention to these things, which depend
solely on opinion, we shall be able to conceive that it is possible that a man
should under-estimate himself. For it can well come to pass that any one, while
sadly regarding his weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all, and
that while other men are thinking of nothing less than of despising him’
so – from – ‘For no one under-estimates himself’ – we go to
– ‘it is possible that a man should under-estimate himself’
one gets the impression that Spinoza has had second thoughts
here – either that or he is in a tangle
‘sadly regarding his weakness, should imagine that he is
despised by all, and that while other men are thinking of nothing less than of
despising him’
perhaps ‘sadly regarding a weakness’ – is not
under-estimating oneself at all – perhaps it is just being realistic with a
little sadness thrown in for good or bad measure
and whether or not others despise you or not – is not the
issue
Spinoza’s argument for ‘under-estimation’ – is at the very
least – doubtful
‘A man moreover may underestimate himself if he deny himself
something in the present with relation to future time of which he is uncertain:
as, for example, if he should deny that he can conceive anything certain, or
desire to do anything save what is wicked and disgraceful, etc.’
any estimation is uncertain – past – present – future
recognizing uncertainty – the uncertainty of propositional
life – is to live logically and rationally
if one thinks one can only desire that which is wicked or
disgraceful –
one is not dealing with one’s desire in a rational or
critical manner
desire is the gateway to propositional freedom and
possibility
‘We could, moreover, say that anyone under-estimates himself
when we see that he dares not do certain things from too great a fear of shame
which others who are his equals do without any fear. We can therefore oppose
this emotion to pride; I shall call it self-despising or dejection (abjecto).
For self-complacency arises from pride, so self-despising arises from humility:
and this therefore may be defined:’
‘too great a fear of shame’
and what is ‘too great’ – a fear of shame? –
‘fear of shame’ is neither too great – or not great enough –
but is just fear – plain and simple
I may fear shame – that is to say – fear that others will
see me in a negative light – (which might be on the money) –
however – estimation of oneself – is a different matter to
the fear of another’s perception
and I don’t under-estimate myself – or am shamed – because I
fear something others do not fear
my fear here might well be rational
we have seen that on Spinoza’s own definition of love –
‘self-love’ – makes no sense – therefore – as it stands – we have no definition
of pride from Spinoza
self-complacency – occurs with a non-critical view of one’s
action
one may be proud – as I see pride – without being
self-complacent – that is one may value one’s activity – and have a critical
attitude to it
and as for humility –
to be humble is to be unpretentious – to regard one’s
activities as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
humility – as I see it – is rational
as to ‘self-despising’ –
if you have committed a vile act – then ‘despising yourself’
might be appropriate –
but this is not to be humble
and it is not to under-estimate yourself
XXIX. Self-despising or dejection (abjectio) is an
underestimating oneself by reason of pain
‘self-despising’ or ‘dejection’ – are proposals – open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
Explanation. – We are wont, nevertheless to contrast
pride with humility, but then more when we regard their effects than their
nature. For we are wont to call him proud who praises himself too much (see
Note, Prop. 30, Part III.), who relates only his own great deeds and only the
evil ones of others, and who lives with a gravity and adornment which is
natural to those who are far above him in rank. On the other hand we call him
humble who often blushes, who confesses his faults, and who relates the virtues
and great deeds of others, who yields to all, who walks with a bowed head, and
neglects to take upon himself any adornment of dress. But these emotions of
humility and self-despising are very rare, for human nature considered in
itself strives as much as possible against them (see prop. 15 and 54, Part
III); and therefore those who are believed to be most abject and humble are
usually most ambitious and envious.
there is no reference to pain in this ‘explanation’ – and it
would seem from the definition that pain is key to self-despising
if by ‘self-despising’ is meant something like a low opinion
of oneself – one can have a ‘low opinion of oneself’ due to one’s view of
oneself in terms of one’s place in some social hierarchy or class system
such a view may not involve any pain at all – one may
simply accept one’s perceived place – and live happily ever after – with no
hint of self-despising
so – what is clear is that the term ‘self-despising’ – is
open to question – is uncertain
to the ‘explanation’ –.
‘We are wont, nevertheless to contrast pride with humility,
but then more when we regard their effects than their nature.’
so – from their being no ‘contrary’ to pride – we now have a
‘contrast’ –
what is the difference?
to now talk of a contrast – suggests – yet again – that
Spinoza – hasn’t really got a handle on pride
Spinoza says the contrast has not to do with the nature of
the emotions – but rather with their effect –
if you run with this nature / effects idea – then surely an
effect reflects the nature –
which means there is no real distinction to be made
but Spinoza wants to make such a distinction – to try and
salvage his definition of pride –
it doesn’t work
‘For we are wont to call him proud who praises himself too
much (see Note, Prop. 30, Part III.), who relates only his own great deeds and
only the evil ones of others, and who lives with a gravity and adornment which
is natural to those who are far above him in rank.’
‘one who praises himself too much’ –
is ‘praising oneself too much’ – an ‘overestimation of
oneself’ –
it could be –
but a question here – who decides what is ‘too much’ – what
is an ‘over-estimation’?
consider one who states to others just what he honestly
believes he has achieved –
others may see that as ‘too much’ – an ‘over-estimation’ –
so – the matter is open to question – just whether the
person is proud or honest –
and whether the perception of the others is accurate – or
indeed – perhaps an example of jealousy or disdain
‘who relates only his own great deeds and only the evil ones
of others, and who lives with a gravity and adornment which is natural to those
who are far above him in rank.’
‘relating only the evil deeds of others’ –
how is that an overestimation of oneself?
‘who lives with a gravity and adornment’ – that is above his
rank
so pride is a matter of class distinction?
‘On the other hand we call him humble who often blushes, who
confesses his faults, and who relates the virtues and great deeds of others,
who yields to all, who walks with a bowed head, and neglects to take upon
himself any adornment of dress
humility – as with any proposed emotional / propositional
state – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and what we have here from Spinoza – is one proposal as to
how to define or understand humility
and what we have here is a dispositional or behavioural
characterization –
which may or may not apply to humble people –
so – it really is not much use – it is just one
characterization – among many other possible descriptions
and that is ok – because what all this gets back to is that
any emotion or emotional state – is open to question – open to doubt – open to
interpretation and description – and uncertain
‘But these emotions of humility and self-despising are very
rare, for human nature considered in itself strives as much as possible against
them (see prop. 15 and 54, Part III); and those who are believed to be most
abject and humble are usually most ambitious and envious’
how would Spinoza know that these emotions are very rare?
on what does he base this claim?
he offers no evidence for his view
and as for the claim that ‘human nature strives against
them’ –
again – on what is this claim based on?
where is the evidence for it?
‘and those who are believed to be most abject and humble are
usually most ambitious and envious’
at best this just speculation
it is all very well for Spinoza to ditch his ‘nature of the
emotions’ argument’ – for a dispositional / behavioural argument –
the problem is – if you are going to go empirical – you have
to have evidence for your proposals – your hypotheses –
I think Spinoza thought he could skip this step –
and as a result – all he has ended up with is common and
garden observation – in the mask of ‘explanation’
XXX. Honour or glory (gloria) is pleasure accompanied
by the idea of some action of our own which we imagine others to praise
you would think the praise need be actual – not imagined
and could one be honoured – experience the pleasure of
praise – where others believe one has performed an action – when in fact the
action was not performed?
that is – could one be honoured in the event of a mistake or
a deception?
XXXI. Shame (pudor) is pain accompanied by the idea of some
action of our own which we imagine others to blame
again – you would think the blame need be actual – not
imagined
and could one be shamed – feel pain – when in fact one has
not performed the action for which one is blamed?
Explanation – Concerning these see Note, Prop. 30,
Part III. But this difference must be noted, namely the difference between
shame and bashfulness (verecundia). For shame is pain that follows the
deed of which we are ashamed; but bashfulness is the fear or dread of shame by
which a man is prevented from committing a shameful action. To bashfulness
prudence is usually opposed, which in truth is not an emotion, as I shall show
in its place; but the names of emotions (as I have already pointed out) have
more reference to use than nature. And thus I have completed what I proposed to
explain, namely the emotions which arise from pleasure or pain, I now proceed
to those which I refer to desire.
not an explanation of shame – rather a description of
bashfulness
‘bashfulness’ – is open to question – open to doubt – its
use and meaning is uncertain
and so – Spinoza’s description here – logically speaking is
as good as any – as far as it goes
a bashful person may have a dread of shame –
however – ‘dread of shame’ – is a narrow view of bashfulness
the point being – one may be bashful – where there is no
dread of shame
a bashful person may just be shy
and as for opposing prudence to bashful – a person may be
bashful and prudent –
Spinoza says here – prudence is not an emotion – and if so –
how is it opposed to an emotion?
Spinoza’s analysis of bashfulness – is unsatisfactory – and ad
hoc
regret – is open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
in this definition
– regret is the desire to possess something remembered – while at the same time
remembering whatever it was that hindered the possession of that thing
firstly – we can’t
have two different memory proposals at the same time –
if there are two
memories – one follows the other –
in Spinoza’s terms
here – the desire – and the desire thwarted
and so – regret is
the propositional / emotional state that results from the conflict
between the two
secondly – the above definition strikes me as a very
limited delineation of regret
there seems no place here for the regret of action or
lack of action –
i.e. – I remember some action I took – or something that I
might have said – which I wish I hadn’t done or said –
or I remember an omission – something I didn’t do – didn’t
say – which I now wish that I had done or said
these I would have thought are common forms of regret
one reflects on – and re-evaluates – one’s propositional
actions –
and wishes that they were not taken at the time – or that
certain actions were taken at the time –
and in re-evaluating them – sees them in a negative light
any propositional action – or lack of action – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
open to re-evaluation
and the action or lack of action regretted – seen in a
negative light – may in turn be re-evaluated – and as a result of the
re-evaluation – not seen in a negative light – and so not regretted –
or at another time – re-evaluated – and once again –
regretted
the point being – regret – is uncertain
and so – the moral of the story is – keep an open mind on
regret
Explanation. –
When we remember anything, as I have already said often, we are so
disposed by that act of remembering that we regard it with the same emotion as
if it were present; but the disposition or endeavour, while we are awake, is
very often hindered by the images of things which cut off the existence of that
thing which we remember. When, therefore, we remember something which affects
us with a kind of pleasure, by that very fact we endeavour to regard it as
present with the same emotion of pleasure; but this endeavour is immediately
checked by the recollection of things which cut off its existence. Wherefore
regret is in truth pain which is opposed to that pleasure which arises from the
absence of that thing which we hate, concerning which see Note, Prop. 47, Part
III. But as the name regret seems to have reference to desire, I have therefore
referred this emotion to emotions arising from desire.
‘When, therefore, we remember something which affects us
with a kind of pleasure, by that very fact we endeavour to regard it as present
with the same emotion of pleasure; but this endeavour is immediately checked by
the recollection of things which cut off its existence’
any proposal is present – but this not to say that in a
remembered proposal – the past is no longer the past – but is present
the remembered proposal or propositional situation or state
– is cut off by time –
if it wasn’t – there would be no remembering
and when we remember – we know this
so – there is no ‘endeavour to regard it as present’ –
and as to this ‘immediate check by the recollection of
things which cut off its existence’ –
if you understand that you are remembering – you know that
that remembered is not present
and so – there is no ‘immediate’ check ‘by recollection of
things which cut off its existence
its existence is cut off by time – and you know this as a
condition of memory
‘Wherefore regret is in truth pain which is opposed to that
pleasure which arises from the absence of that thing which we hate, concerning
which see Note, Prop. 47, Part III. But as the name regret seems to have
reference to desire, I have therefore referred this emotion to emotions arising
from desire.’
regret as pain – that is opposed to the pleasure – that
arises from the absence of something we hate?
a thing hated is absent – and we take pleasure in this?
pain is opposed to this pleasure – how ‘opposed’?
do we feel pain then because the thing hated – the absence
of which – gave us pleasure – is now present – present – presumably in memory?
so – this is regret – as it were – to be faced with the
thing hated – as no longer absent
and therefore – a source of pain
regret as remembering the thing hated?
recognising that a thing hated is absent – may not be
a source of pleasure
it may just be a straight-out recognition of the fact –
and remembering the thing hated – may not be a
source of pain –
we may remember the pain we experience – but not be in pain
because of the memory
and in any case – where is the regret here?
things in or out of existence – is not what we regret
if we regret – we regret proposals made – or not made –
propositional actions taken – or not taken
and furthermore – there may not be any hate involved in any
of this
I don’t know what Spinoza was trying to do here – but
whatever it was – it has nothing to do with regret
regret as a form of desire?
regret is a propositional focus on the past – desire – a
propositional focus on the future
regret is not desire
if I regret a proposal – I have re-evaluated it – subjected
it to question – to doubt – and explored its uncertainty – and come to the view
that it would have been better if it had not been put
or I may remember and re-evaluate a propositional situation
– where I take the view that I should have put a proposal – or should have
taken a propositional action – when I didn’t
regret then is a re-evaluation of past proposals and
propositional situations
and – any evaluation or re-evaluation – is open to question
– open to doubt and uncertain
regret is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
XXXIII. Emulation (aemulation) is the desire of
anything which is engendered in us from the fact that we imagine others to
desire it also.
any such imagination – is a proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
emulation – however described – is uncertain
Explanation. – He that runs away because he sees
others do so, or who is afraid because he sees that others are, or also he who,
because he sees some other burning his hand, draws his hand towards him and
moves his body as if his open hand were burnt, is said to imitate the emotions
of any other, but not to emulate him; not because we know any difference
between the cause of imitation and the cause of emulation, but because it has
become customary to call him who imitates what we think to be honourable, useful,
or pleasant, emulous. As for the rest concerning the cause of emulation, see
Prop. 27, Part III., with its Note. The reason why envy is generally united to
this emotion can be seen from Prop. 32, Part III., with its Note.
Spinoza here distinguishes imitation from emulation –
an imitation that is honourable useful and pleasant – is
emulous
whereas an imitation is not honourable useful or pleasant –
it is not emulous
it follows from this that imitation is not honourable useful
or pleasant
as I see it an imitation is just a copy – whether perceived
to be honourable etc – or not
and by the same token – could not an emulation be perceived
to be dishonourable etc?
so – this attempt by Spinoza to distinguish imitation and
emulation fails – badly
according to the above definition – emulation is where we
desire because others desire
imitation as such – on the other hand – would not
necessarily involve desire
to imitate is to copy
you can copy what another does without desiring what they
desire – or taking what you imagine they desire into account
but even if you do put desire into the equation – propose to
‘desire’ what the other desires – you are proposing a copy – you are
imitating
emulation is a form of imitation –
as to desire –
‘desire’ – is a description of propositional action
so – when I ‘desire’ what the other desires – I propose to
imitate his propositional action – which means to duplicate it
any proposed imitation / duplication – is of course – open
to question – open to doubt and uncertain
XXXIV. Gratefulness or gratitude (gratia seu gratitudo)
is the desire or zeal for love by which we endeavour to benefit him who has
benefited us from a similar emotion of love (see prop, 39, with the Note on
prop, 41, Part III).
could I not be grateful to someone who has benefited me –
even though their action did not come from love?
XXXV. Benevolence (benevolentia) is desire of
benefiting those whom we pity (see Note, Prop. 27, Part III.).
pity is defined as ‘pain arisen from the hurt of another’
(Note, Prop. 23 Part III)
to benefit another who is in pain – is to exercise
benevolence
however – I think you can be benevolent to others – not
because they are hurt or in pain –
but because you think that their circumstances can be
improved by your benefit
this is to be benevolent not from pity – but perhaps from
something like a sense of social justice
XXXVI. Anger (ira) is the desire whereby through
hatred we are incited to work evil to him who we hate (see Prop. 39, Part III).
this is a very limited definition of anger – and therefore
unsatisfactory
one can be angry at oneself –
one can be angry – as they say – ‘at the world’
one can be angry at another – but not be incited to work
evil
and one can be angry at someone – you don’t hate
you can be angry at someone you love
is anger a desire – that is a propositional action –
or is best seen as a propositional reaction?
in any case – how we understand ‘anger’ – is a matter open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
XXXVII. Vengeance (vindicta) or revenge is the desire
by which we are incited through reciprocated hatred to work evil to him who has
worked evil to us from a similar emotion (see Coroll.2 Pro. 40, Part III., with
its Note).
I think one could take vengeance on one who hates you – by
not doing evil to them – but rather by outsmarting them or disarming them with
a gesture of good will –
somewhat Machiavellian yes –
but I know from experience that this can work – and the
result is revenge and peace and goodwill all round
so – the nature of vengeance – is open to question
XXXVIII. Cruelty or savageness (crudelitas seu saevitas)
is the desire whereby any one is incited to work evil to whom they love or whom
they pity
once again – a limited and unsatisfactory definition
yes – one can be cruel to those whom one loves or cruel to
one whom one pities
I have witnessed where a person has committed a cruel act
against someone they had no connection to – someone they didn’t know –
still the question – what is cruelty?
we use the term – but can we give a precise meaning?
I don’t think so –
cruelty as with any proposal – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
my own view is that cruelty occurs when one acts in such a
way as to cause harm to another – for the pure pleasure of witnessing the other
in pain
Explanation. –
Cruelty is opposed to clemency (clementia), which is not a
passion, but a power of the mind wherewith man moderates his desire for anger
and revenge.
one could moderate one’s desire for anger and revenge – and
still be cruel
XXXIX. Timidity (timor) is the desire of avoiding a
greater evil which we fear by encountering a lesser one (see Note, Prop. 39
Part III).
why encountering a lesser one?
timidity is a form of fearfulness
granted a person who is fearful would seek to avoid what he
regards as a greater evil
but why would a fearful person prefer to encounter another –
‘lesser’ – evil at all?
one would think that if you are fearful – you would wish to
avoid any evil
so – this definition from Spinoza is problematic
a timid person is fearful – and not just of evil – greater
or lesser
a timid person may be fearful of any number of things –
i.e. – fearful of new places or situations – fearful of
making decisions – fearful of the unknown
that Spinoza doesn’t see this – makes his understanding of
timidity – unsatisfactory
one’s fears – as real and as crippling as they can be – are
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
if you begin with uncertainty – and embrace it – you give
yourself emotional possibilities –
that is different ways of seeing – of understanding your
fears –
and with those different possibilities – ways forward –
if you put your fear to the question – to the doubt –
explore its uncertainty
you deal with your fear in a rational manner
XL. Daring (audacia) is the desire whereby anyone is
incited to do anything with a danger which his equals dare not encounter
daring may well be a desire whereby one is incited to
perform a dangerous act
but not all daring involves dangerous acts –
i.e. – there is creative daring – the daring of the artist –
who creates something unique
the daring of the politician who proposes transformative
legislation
the daring of the boy who declares his love to the girl
we can find examples of daring in any number of
propositional contexts
Spinoza’s definition of daring is limited and unsatisfactory
XLI. Cowardice (pusillanimitas) belongs to him whose
desire is hindered by the fear or dread of a danger which his equals dare to
undergo.
the key phrase here is ‘which his equals dare to undergo’ –
first up – forget about ‘equals’ here –
this notion of ‘equal’ – only makes sense in mathematics –
and what it comes down to is substitution –
human beings cannot be ‘substituted’ one for the other – for
no two propositional actors are identical –
to suggest such is to perpetrate a philosophical fraud
secondly – cowardice here comes down to an individual being
intimidated by others – and accepting the intimidation
fear or dread of danger – is not a weakness
feeling inadequate because you wish to avoid a danger that
others are to embark on – is to succumb to peer pressure – and to be morally
weak
in such a case the so-called ‘coward’ – in falling into this
intimidation – fails to question – and fails to doubt – the proposed actions of
his peers – the uncertain action of his peers
the ‘coward’ – simply behaves irrationally
Explanation. – Cowardice therefore is nothing else
than the fear of some evil which many are not want to fear: wherefore I do not
refer it to the emotions of desire. I wished, however to explain it here,
because in so far as we regard desire it is really opposed to the emotion of
daring.
it could be said that if one defies the pressure to conform
– then one is being daring
cowardice – is clearly – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Spinoza’s failure to engage with this uncertainty – has
rendered his definition of cowardice inadequate
XLII. Consternation (consternatio) belongs to him
whose desire of avoiding evil is hindered by his wonderment at the evil which
he fears.
wonderment (at the fear of evil) – doesn’t really capture
the psychological paralysis characteristic of a moment of consternation –
and furthermore – consternation is not confined to ‘fear of
evil’
one may i.e. – experience consternation when faced with an
unexpected state of affairs – that is neither good or evil – just unexpected
consternation – in common usage – has a more general meaning
than that proposed by Spinoza
Spinoza’s failure to explore the uncertainty of
‘consternation’ – renders his ‘definition’ – inadequate
Explanation. Consternation is therefore a species of
cowardice. But as consternation arises from a double fear, it can more
conveniently defined as fear which holds a man stupefied or hesitating in such
a manner that he cannot remove the difficulty in his way. I say stupefied in so
far as we understand his desire of removing his evil to be hindered by wonder;
I say hesitating on the other hand, in so far as we conceive that desire to be
hindered by the fear of another evil which equally torments him: so that it
comes about that he knows not which of the two to avoid. On this see Note,
Prop. 39, and Note, Prop. 52, Part III. As for cowardice and daring, see Note,
Prop. 51, Part III.
‘Consternation is therefore a species of cowardice’
‘consternation’ – is not a species of cowardice –
‘consternation’ – is a species of anxiety
‘But as consternation arises from a double fear, it can more
conveniently defined as fear which holds a man stupefied or hesitating in such
a manner that he cannot remove the difficulty in his way.’
there may be fear involved in consternation – but
consternation as such is not a fear
stupefied or hesitating in such a manner that he cannot
remove the difficulty?
one does not stay stupefied – forever – and difficulties
don’t remain – forever
granted you might be stuck – and not see a way forward –
but it is just at such a moment that it is necessary to
question – to doubt – and to explore that uncertainty that you face –
that is – get logical – and get going
‘I say stupefied in so far as we understand his desire of
removing his evil to be hindered by wonder; I say hesitating on the other hand,
in so far as we conceive that desire to be hindered by the fear of another evil
which equally torments him: so that it comes about that he knows not which of
the two to avoid.’
the introduction of a ‘another evil’ – is not necessary to
Spinoza’s definition
stupefaction and hesitancy – is enough
consternation is an instance of anxiety – and anxiety a form
or expression of uncertainty –
uncertainty is the logical ground of our propositional lives
XLIII. Politeness or modesty (humanitas seu modestia)
is the desire of doing such things as please men and omitting such as do not.
here Spinoza argues that politeness is about pleasing others
I suppose someone who pleases others is unlikely to be
accused of impoliteness –
however – I don’t think one needs to be pleasing another
to be polite –
one may not be interested in pleasing another – and still be
polite –
and by ‘polite’ here – I mean not doing anything that
embarrasses the other – or in any other way disparages them
‘omitting such as do not’ – again – may not be about ‘not
pleasing them’ – but rather about treating them with respect
and I would put that politeness is an expression of respect
Spinoza’s ‘pleasing the other’ – is to my mind a different
matter to being polite
if you are setting out to please another – then you are
primarily being benevolent – and perhaps – seeking approval form the other
‘being polite’ – is not I think about being benevolent – or
is it seeking the other’s approval
I think Spinoza’s has misconstrued politeness
and we can ask is politeness equivalent to modesty?
my sense is that politeness may be a characteristic of
modesty
but that modesty involves more than politeness
however – this is
just one view of the matter
these notions of ‘politeness’ and ‘modesty’ – are proposals
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
I think Spinoza’s account of politeness mistakes politeness
for benevolence –
and his account of modesty – confuses modesty with
politeness – and is too narrow
XLIV. Ambition (ambitio) is the immodest desire or
glory or honour
Explanation. – Ambition is the desire by which all
the emotions (prop.31 and 27, Part III) are fostered and encouraged: and thus
this emotion can scarcely be overcome. For as long as man is held by any
desire, he is also held by this. “The very best men”, says Cicero (pro
Archia, cp. 2; cf. Tuscul. disput. I., cap 15), “are especially
guided by glory. Philosopher, who write on the despising of glory, affix their
names to their books,” etc.
‘ambition’ – the desire by which all emotions are fostered
and encouraged?
any propositional action can be described as
an emotion
propositional action can be described in terms of
ambition –
ambition is a striving for distinction or success
however – not all propositional action is ambitious
propositional actions can be variously described
‘ambitious’ is just one description
as for Cicero –
I would suggest that if you use the description ‘best men’ –
or for that matter ‘worst men’ – or indeed any other such value laden
classification – all you are doing is giving voice to your own moral prejudices –
and who is to say what any man is guided by?
what guides men – is a matter open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
and as for signing your name to your book –
444.
no big deal to my mind –
readers do want to know who wrote it
as to being ‘guided by glory’ –
being ‘guided by glory’ – I would say – is being guided by
pretention
XLV. Luxury (luxuria) is an immoderate desire or even
love of feasting’
what is moderate to one man – may be immoderate to another –
and as for love of feasting – one could love feasting in a
moderate way
and what is a luxury to one – may not be to another
‘luxury’ as with any proposal – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
XLVI. Drunkenness (ebrietas) is the immoderate desire
and love of drinking.
again – what is moderate to one – may be immoderate to
another
and in any case – intoxication – will depend on one’s
chemistry –
someone with a low tolerance of alcohol – may drink – what
they and others regarded as ‘moderately’ – and be intoxicated
and whether ‘love’ comes into it – is open to question –
someone addicted to alcohol – may not love drinking – but in
fact may hate it
Spinoza’s definition here is simplistic – and I would say –
clearly – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
XLVII. Avarice (avaritia) is the immoderate desire
and love of riches
‘immoderate’ – ‘moderate’ – these terms will only make any
sense in propositional context – and even then – they are open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
and what to one man are riches – to another will be seen as
necessities
‘avarice’ – is open to question
XLVIII. Lust (libido) is desire and love of sexual
intercourse
is all desire for sex lustful?
Spinoza defines it so –
one view of lust is that a lustful person is one who seeks
sex purely for its pleasure – and for no other end
what of those who see sex as a means to procreation?
or those who regard sexual release as important for one’s
emotional / psychological health?
and there are those who regard sex as a means to spiritual
enlightenment
and of course – many would describe the sexual act as an act
of love
are these people ‘lustful’ – or is it that they see sexual
pleasure as a means to another end – or – relative to pleasure – a so called
‘higher’ end?
Spinoza’s definition of lust – as the love of sexual
intercourse – is limited and inadequate
‘lust’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
Explanation. – Whether this desire for sexual
intercourse be moderate or not, it is wont to be called lust. Moreover, these
last five emotions (as I gave notice in the Note, Prop. 56, Part III,) have no
contraries. For modesty is a species of ambition (see Note, Prop. 29, Part
III.). I also gave warning that temperance (temperantia), sobriety (sobrietas)
and chastity (casititas) indicate strength of mind, and are not
passions. It may, however, come to pass that that an avaricious man or an
ambitious or timid one may refrain from over-eating, over-drinking, or sexual
intercourse, yet avarice drunkenness and timidity are not contrary to luxury,
drunkenness and chastity. For an avaricious man would wish to gorge himself on
the meat and drink of another; an ambitious man will moderate himself in
nothing provided that he think his excess is secret; and if he live among
people drunken and lustful, the fact the he is ambitious will make him more
prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid man does what he does not wish to do. For
although an avaricious man will throw all his wealth into the sea for the
purpose of saving his life, he remains nevertheless avaricious; and if a
lustful man is pained in such a way that he cannot indulge himself as usual, he
does not thereby cease to be lustful. So that, to put it absolutely, these
emotions have not so great regard for the acts themselves of feasting,
drinking, etc., as for the desire or love for them. Nothing, therefore, can be
opposed to these emotions save nobility and magnanimity (generositas et
animositas), of which I shall speak presently..
‘Moreover, these last five emotions (as I gave notice in the
Note, Prop. 56, Part III,) have no contraries. For modesty is a species of
ambition (see Note, Prop. 29, Part III.).’
I would think that the contrary of modesty – is immodesty
Spinoza defines ‘ambition’ as ‘the
immoderate desire of glory or honour’
so – the contrary –
a moderate desire for glory or honour?
or – indeed the absence
of desire for glory or honour?
as for luxury –
Spinoza defines it as the immoderate desire for feasting –
I would have thought – the immoderate love of feasting –
might better be termed ‘gluttony’
and further that luxury – is better defined as the desire
for expensive things
as to a contrary –
there are those who shun luxury and wish only for the basics
of life –
and there are religious people of various persuasions who
believe in poverty (of material things) as means to spiritual purity
the contrary of drunkenness – is sobriety
Spinoza says sobriety is not an emotion – but indicates
‘strength of mind’
there might be something in this if you are already a drunk
–
however – there are those who do not partake because it just
doesn’t interest them –
so – no ‘strength of mind’ required
Spinoza defines avarice as the immoderate desire or love of
riches
the contrary of avarice – as Spinoza has defined it – would
be a moderate desire or love of riches
Spinoza’s view that there are no contraries to modesty –
ambition – luxury – drunkenness and avarice – goes against common usage and
understandings –
and at the very least it is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
‘I also gave warning that temperance (temperantia),
sobriety (sobrietas) and chastity (casititas) indicate strength
of mind, and are not passions.’
temperance – sobriety – and chastity – are propositional
behaviours – that like any other – are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
for Spinoza – emotion or passion – is a ‘confused idea’ – or
an inadequate idea –
an ‘idea’ is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
‘passion’ – is a description of propositional action
a ‘passionate’ act – is a propositional action –
so described –
and as with any propositional action – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
for Spinoza – ‘strength of mind’ – is no more than a cover
for the absence of question – the absence of doubt – and the failure to explore
uncertainty
‘It may, however, come to pass that that an avaricious man
or an ambitious or timid one may refrain from over-eating, over-drinking, or
sexual intercourse, yet avarice drunkenness and timidity are not contrary to
luxury, drunkenness and chastity’
‘yet avarice drunkenness and timidity are not contrary to
luxury, drunkenness and chastity
drunkenness is obviously not contrary to drunkenness
to straighten this out – I think the above quote should
read:
‘It may, however, come to pass that an avaricious man or an
ambitious or timid one may refrain from over-eating, over-drinking, or sexual
intercourse, yet avarice ambition and timidity are not
contrary to luxury, drunkenness and chastity.’
here I substitute the first ‘drunkenness’ with ‘ambition’
so – avarice – ambition and timidity – are not contrary to
luxury, drunkenness and chastity
ps.
the translation I have been using is the ‘Everyman’ edition
translated by Andrew Boyle 1910.
the George Eliot translation 2020 has the same mistake
the mistake is corrected in the ‘Everyman’ edition
translated by Andrew Boyle and revised by G. H. R. Parkinson. 1989.
‘For an avaricious man would wish to gorge himself on the
meat and drink of another; an ambitious man will moderate himself in nothing
provided that he think his excess is secret; and if he live among people
drunken and lustful, the fact the he is ambitious will make him more prone to
those vices. Lastly, a timid man does what he does not wish to do. For although
an avaricious man will throw all his wealth into the sea for the purpose of
saving his life, he remains nevertheless avaricious; and if a lustful man is
pained in such a way that he cannot indulge himself as usual, he does not
thereby cease to be lustful.’
so – ‘an avaricious man’ – ‘an ambitious man’ – ‘a timid
man’ – ‘a lustful man’ –
it looks as if – once you have been tagged by Spinoza – as
such and such a man – that’s it – no reprieve
any description of anyone’s propositional activity is open
to question – open to doubt and uncertain
what is regarded as an ambitious proposal by one – may be
seen as anything but by another
and that someone behaves in a certain way on a day – does
not warrant that they be so described at all other times
of course – you can be closed minded and prejudiced – and so
a label will suit
if we are to be rational here – we give ourselves and others
the benefit of the doubt –
and regard any description – as open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘So that, to put it absolutely, these emotions have not so
great regard for the acts themselves of feasting, drinking, etc., as for the
desire or love for them.’
‘the desire or love for them’ – is not an ‘absolute’ –
one gets the impression that for Spinoza one’s character –
is fixed –
when in fact we know that human beings can and do change how
they act – can and do change what they love
in any case ‘the acts themselves’ – are open to
interpretation – open to question – open to doubt –
any description applied is uncertain
‘Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these emotions save
nobility and magnanimity (generositas et animositas), of which I shall
speak presently.’
here we have Spinoza’s ‘distinction’ between ‘strength of
mind’ and passions
for Spinoza – a ‘passion’ is passiveness –
any proposal – propositional action – any propositional
state – is active
passion – is active – is an action
emotion – is active – is propositional action
any propositional action / emotion – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
nobility and magnanimity – are descriptions of
propositional states
any propositional state can be described as an emotion – and
any propositional state – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and as for ‘strength of mind’ – real strength of mind is
logical strength – the ability to question – to doubt – and explore uncertainty
‘The definition of jealousy (zelotypia) and other
waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, for they arise from emotions
which we have already described, and many of the them have no names, which
shows that for ordinary use it suffices to know them in general.’
if it has no name – it is not a proposal – it does not exist
‘It follows, however. from the definitions of the emotions
which I have explained, that they all have arises from desire, pleasure, or
pain, or rather only these three exist, each of which is wont to be called by
various names, by reason of its various relations and extrinsic marks. If,
therefore, we regard these three primary emotions and what we said above
concerning the nature of the mind, we can thus define the emotions in so far as
they have reference to the mind itself.’
‘desire’ – is a description of propositional
action –
pleasure and pain are possible consequences of propositional
action
furthermore – there are emotional / propositional states
that are neither pleasurable or painful
‘The definitions of jealousy (zelotypia) and the other
waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, for they arise from emotions
which we have already described, and many of them have no names, which shows
that for ordinary use it suffices to know them in general. It follows, however,
from the definitions of the emotions which I have explained, that they all have
arisen from desire, pleasure or pain, or rather only these three exist, each of
which is wont to be called by various names, by reason of its various relations
and extrinsic marks, If therefore, we regard these three primary emotions and
what we said above concerning the nature of the mind, we can thus define the
emotions in so far as they have reference to the mind itself.’
Spinoza’s claim that ‘many of them have no names which shows
that for ordinary use it suffices to know them in general’ –
only points to the inadequacy of his analysis
he seems to think that some generalization (based on what?)
– will ‘cover’ what his theory fails to explain –
and he is on safe ground here – because he says ‘many of
them have no names’ –
so – we can’t say what is left out of his analysis –
but just in case anything is – it will fall under some
‘generalization’
as to his generalizations – desire – pleasure and pain –
‘desire’ – is a description of propositional activity – any
propositional activity –
pleasure and pain are possible consequences of propositional
action
pleasure and pain are not the ground – but the
(possible) consequences of propositional / emotional action
ground and consequence
the ground of any propositional / emotional action – is
uncertainty
GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS
Emotion, which is called passiveness of the soul (pathema
animi), is a confused idea wherewith the mind affirms a greater or lesser
power of existing (vis existenda) of its body or any part of it than
before, and which being granted, the mind is thereby determined to think of one
thing rather than another.
an emotion – or emotional state – is a proposal – or
propositional state – a propositional action – open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –
the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action
the propositional actor is the focus of propositional action
in logical terms – ‘power of existing’ – is the critical
power – of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
‘a greater or less power of existing’ – will be a function
of one’s critical capacity
it is not a so called ‘mind / body issue’ – it is rather a
matter of propositional actors – critically evaluating proposals put – in an
on-going manner
we are not determined in what we think – rather we have the
freedom to critically evaluate our proposals – and explore propositional
possibilities
Explanation. – I say, in the first place, that
emotions, or passions of the soul, is a “confused idea”. For we have shown that
the mind only thus far suffers or is passive (see Prop.5, Part III,) in so far
as it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say again, wherewith the mind affirms
a greater or lesser power of existing of its body or any part of it than
before, for all the ideas of bodies which we have, indicate rather the actual
disposition of our own body (Coroll. 2, Prop. 16, Part III.) than the nature of
the external body; but this idea, which constitutes the form (forma) of
the emotion, must indicate or express the disposition of the body, or of some
part of it which the body or that part possesses by reason of the fact that its
power of acting or existing is
increased or diminished, aided or hindered. But it must be
noted that when I say “a
greater or lesser power of existing than before,” that I do
not understand that the
mind compares the present condition of the body with the
past, but that the idea which constitutes the form of the emotion affirms
something concerning the body whereby more or less reality is really involved
than before. And inasmuch as the essence of the mind involves this (Prop. 11
and 13, Part II.), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and as we
understand by perfection the very essence of the thing, it follows, therefore,
that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens to
affirm something concerning its body, or some part of it, which involves more
or less reality than before. When, therefore, I said above that the mind’s
power of thinking was increased or diminished, I wished nothing else to be
understood than that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or some part of
it, which expressed more or less reality than it had affirmed concerning its
body. For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thinking is estimated
from the excellence of the object. I added, moreover, “and which being granted,
the mind is thereby determined to think this or that,” in order that, besides
the nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition
explains, I might also express the nature of desire.
‘I say, in the first place, that emotions, or passions of
the soul, is a “confused idea”. For we have shown that the mind only thus far
suffers or is passive (see Prop.5, Part III,) in so far as it has inadequate or
confused ideas.’
is Spinoza saying here that ‘emotion’ – any emotion – is an
inadequate idea – and is thus the source of suffering?
that emotion is a synonym for suffering?
it would seem so
what then of emotions that give pleasure?
this seems to be a one-sided view of the emotions – and a
view that does not accord with experience
any ‘idea’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
whether an emotion (inadequate idea) has the consequence of
pleasure or pain – is uncertain
‘I say again, wherewith the mind affirms a greater or lesser
power of existing of its body or any part of it than before, for all the ideas
of bodies which we have, indicate rather the actual disposition of our own body
(Coroll. 2, Prop. 16, Part III.) than the nature of the external body; but this
idea, which constitutes the form (forma) of the
emotion, must indicate or express the disposition of the
body, or of some part of it which the body or that part possesses by reason of
the fact that its power of acting or existing is increased or diminished, aided
or hindered.”
so – the mind affirms the power of existing of the body –
all ideas indicate the ‘actual disposition’ of the body
and this idea constitutes the form of the emotion
which is to say – the emotion – expresses the disposition of
the body – whether the body’s power of existing is increased or decreased
we can ask – how do we know whether the power of the
propositional actor is increased or decreased?
presumably Spinoza would say pain indicates a decrease in
the propositional actor’s power of existing – pleasure – an increase
the fundamental question here is – why would this be so?
and this comes back to just what ‘power of existing’ amounts
to –
I don’t think we have an answer to this from Spinoza
‘But it must be noted that when I say “a greater or lesser
power of existing than before,” that I do not understand that the mind compares
the present condition of the body with the past, but that the idea which
constitutes the form of the emotion affirms something concerning the body
whereby more or less reality is really involved than before.’
well – even if we accept this idea of ‘more or less reality’
than before – I can’t see that ‘before’ can mean anything other than the
past
‘more or less’ – will be an assessment – a calculation – in
time – and so the ‘past’ cannot be avoided
we can also ask here – how can there be ‘more’ reality or
‘less’ reality’?
for Spinoza – reality is existence – and existence is
substance – eternal and infinite
how can there be more or less eternity – more or less
infinity?
‘And inasmuch as the essence of the mind involves this
(Prop. 11 and 13, Part II.), that it affirms the actual existence of its body,
and as we understand by perfection the very essence of the thing, it follows,
therefore, that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it
happens to affirm something concerning its body, or some part of it, which
involves more or less reality than before.’
‘more or less reality than before’
‘reality’ is not increased or decreased
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
‘body’ – a name for propositional action
the propositional actor is the source of
propositional action
propositional action – is the putting of proposal – and the
critical evaluation of proposal
‘more or less reality’ – if it means anything – means more
or less propositional action
‘than before’ – will mean an increase or decrease of
propositional action – relative to a time past
‘When, therefore, I said above that the mind’s power of
thinking was increased or diminished, I wished nothing else to be understood
than that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or some part of it, which
expressed more or less reality than it had affirmed concerning its body.’
when it comes to ‘power of thinking’ – what we are dealing
with is the critical power of the propositional actor
‘For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of
thinking is estimated from the excellence of the object. I added, moreover,
“and which being granted, the mind is thereby determined to think this or
that,” in order that, besides the nature of pleasure and pain, which the first
part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.’
“and which being
granted, the mind is thereby determined to think this or that,” –
we are propositional actors
we propose against the unknown – and any proposal put is
open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
propositional uncertainty is the ground of possibility
FOURTH PART
ON HUMAN SERVITUDE, OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS
PREFACE
Human lack of power in moderating and checking the emotions
I call servitude. For a man who is submissive to his emotions is not in power
over himself, but in the hands of fortune to such an extent that he is often
constrained, although he may see what is better for him, to follow what is
worse (see Ovid, Meiam., VII. 20). I purpose accordingly in this part to show
the reason for this, and what there is good and bad in the emotions. But before
I begin I must preface something concerning perfection and imperfection, and
then good and bad.
our ‘emotions’ are propositional states – open to question –
open to doubt and uncertain
therefore – if we are to check or change an emotion in a
rational manner – we put it to question – put it to doubt and explore its
uncertainty
human beings do not lack the power to do this –
‘servitude’ – if it is to mean anything here – will be the
failure to proceed critically in relation to our emotional states
‘servitude’ – is irrationality –
‘although he may see what is better for him, to follow what
is worse’
we are all – always in the ‘hands of fortune’ – which is to
say we face and deal with the unknown
our relation to the unknown is propositional
that is – we propose against the unknown or in relation to
it –
with our proposals – our propositions – we make known
our knowledge – that is – our propositions – are open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the issue is not what is ‘better or worse’ (whatever that is
to be) – but rather what is rational and what is irrational
if you behave rationally – you put your proposal – your
propositional states / emotions – to question – to doubt – and you explore
their uncertainty
if you act irrationally – you do not question – you do not
doubt – you act with the illusion of certainty
He that determines to do anything,
and finishes it, calls it perfect, and that not only himself, but anyone else
who rightly knows, or thinks he knows, the mind of the author of that work or
his design. For example, if anyone sees some work (which I suppose not yet
finished), and knows that the design of the author of that work is to build a
house, he will call that house imperfect, and on the contrary, perfect as soon
as he sees it brought to the finish which its author determined to give it. But
if anyone sees some piece of work the like of which he had never seen, and does
not know the mind of the artificer, he clearly will not know whether the work
be perfect or not. This seems to have been the first meaning of these words. But afterwards, when we began to form general ideas and to
think out general notions for houses, buildings, towers etc., and to prefer
certain notions to ithers, it came to pass that everyone called that perfect
which he saw to agree with the general notion which he had formed of that sort
of thing, and on the contrary, imperfect what he saw less agree with the
general notion, although in the opinion of the artificer it might be correct. There seems to be no other reason that men should call
natural things which are not made with human hands perfect or imperfect: for
men are wont to form general notions of natural as well as artificial things,
which they regard as models to which nature looks to for guidance (for they
think she does nothing without some end in view). When,
therefore, they see something to take place in nature which less agrees with
the exemplary notion which they have of that kind of thing, they think that
nature has been guilty of error and has gone astray to have left that thing
imperfect. We see thus that men have wont to call things of nature perfect or
imperfect from prejudice rather than from true knowledge, for we showed in the
appendix of the first part that nature does not act with an end in view: for that eternal and infinite being that we call God or
nature acts by the same necessity as that by which it exists, for we showed
that it acts from the same necessity of its nature as that by which it exists
(see Prop. 16, Part I). Therefore the reason or
cause by which God or nature acts, or why they exist is one and the same;
therefor as God exists with no end in view, he cannot act with any end in view,
but has no beginning or end either in existing or acting. A cause, then,
that is called final is nothing save human appetite itself in so far as it is
considered as the beginning or primary cause of anything. E.g., when we
say that habitation is the final cause of this or that house, we understand
nothing else than this, that man had a desire of building a house from his
imagining the convenience of domestic life. Wherefore habitation, in so far as
it is considered a final cause, is nothing save this individual appetite (or
desire), which is truth is the effecting cause which is considered as primary
because men are commonly ignorant of their appetites. For
they are, as I have already said, conscious of their actions and appetites, but
ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to desire anything. The
common saying of the vulgar, that nature is sometimes guilty of error and goes
astray and produces imperfect things, I count among the false beliefs which I
dealt with in the appendix of Part I. Therefore
perfection and imperfection are in truth only modes of thinking, namely
notions, which we are wont to invent owing to the fact that we compare
reciprocally individuals of the same species or kind. And on that account
(see above, Def.6, Part II.) I said that by reality and
perfection I understood the same thing. For we are wont to refer all
individuals of nature to one class which we call general, namely, to the notion
of being which appertains absolutely to all individuals of nature. In so far as
we refer the individuals of nature to this one class, and compare them
reciprocally, and find that some have more reality or perfection than others,
thus far we call some more perfect than others; and in so far as we attribute
to them something which involves negation, as term, end, weakness, etc., thus
far we call them imperfect, inasmuch as they do not affect our mind as those
which we call perfect, and not because there is
something wanting
in them which is part of their nature, or that nature has gone
astray. For nothing
belongs to the nature of anything except that which follows from the necessity
of the effecting cause, and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature
of the effecting cause, necessarily happens.
‘He that determines to do anything, and finishes it, calls
it perfect, and that not only himself, but anyone else who rightly knows, or
thinks he knows, the mind of the author of that work or his design.’
this is an empirical claim – and we have no evidence for it
from Spinoza
furthermore – we finish many projects – but don’t call the
finished project ‘perfect’ – we call it ‘finished’ – and most likely – we are cognisant
of its imperfections
cognisant or not – any propositional action – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘perfection’ – is meant that which is beyond question
– beyond doubt – and certain – there is no perfection – such a notion is
logically false and delusional
and any propositional action – is imperfect – in that – it
is logically uncertain
‘But afterwards, when we began to form general ideas and to
think out general notions for houses, buildings, towers etc., and to prefer
certain notions to others, it came to pass that everyone called that perfect
which he saw to agree with the general notion which he had formed of that sort
of thing, and on the contrary, imperfect what he saw less agree with the
general notion, although in the opinion of the artificer it might be correct.’
these ‘general notions’ are proposals – proposals – open to
question
and whether or not – a propositional action agrees with a
‘general notion’ / proposal – is open to question
‘There seems to be no other reason that men should call
natural things which are not made with human hands perfect or imperfect: for
men are wont to form general notions of natural as well as artificial things,
which they regard as models to which nature looks to for guidance (for they
think she does nothing without some end in view).’
again – an empirical claim –
is it a fact that men form general notions / models – to
which nature looks to for guidance – ‘for they think she does nothing without
some end in view.’?
and we can ask – what evidence does Spinoza have for this
claim?
‘When, therefore, they see something to take place in nature
which less agrees with the exemplary notion which they have of that kind of
thing, they think that nature has been guilty of error and has gone astray to
have left that thing imperfect. We see thus
that men have wont to call things of nature perfect or
imperfect from prejudice rather than from true knowledge, for we showed in the
appendix of the first part that nature does not act with an end in view’
nature – guilty of an error –
I suspect it is most unlikely that there are many people in
our day and age that would think this
in fact – at present – with the world-wide focus on the
issue of global warming – it is more likely that men think they have committed
the error against nature
in any case – logically speaking – there are no errors –
there are only uncertainties
‘for that eternal and infinite being that we call God or
nature acts by the same necessity as that by which it exists, for we showed
that it acts from the same necessity of its nature as that by which it exists
(see Prop. 16, Part I).
‘God’ or nature’?
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
‘nature’ – is a name for that proposed
the unknown is not that proposed – is not proposed reality –
is not the world as proposed
‘that proposed’ – is a response to the unknown
–
and however proposed – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Spinoza’s ‘God or nature’ – is a failed equivalence
‘Therefore the reason or cause by which God or nature acts,
or why they exist is one and the same; therefor as God exists with no end in
view, he cannot act with any end in view, but has no beginning or end either in
existing or acting.’
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
‘nature’ – is a name for ‘that proposed’
propositional actors – propose – and propose propositional
actions
any ‘end in view’ – is a proposal –
that as with any proposal – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
what exists is what is proposed
proposals are put by propositional actors
any proposal put exists as long as it is entertained
‘For they are, as I have already said, conscious of their
actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined
to desire anything.’
yes – we are conscious of our actions and appetites – and
our actions and appetites are propositional – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
any casual proposal – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘Therefore perfection and imperfection are in truth only
modes of thinking, namely notions, which we are wont to invent owing to the
fact that we compare reciprocally individuals of the same species or kind.’
‘only modes of thinking’ – only proposals
‘I said that by reality and perfection I understood the same
thing. For we are wont to refer all individuals of nature to one class which we
call general, namely, to the notion of being which appertains absolutely to all
individuals of nature.’
reality – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘perfect’ is a synonym for ‘certain’
there is no propositional certainty
what exists – is what is proposed –
‘being’ – is a proposal – open to question – being is
uncertain – is not an ’absolute’
‘In so far as we refer the individuals of nature to this one
class, and compare them reciprocally, and find that some have more reality or
perfection than others, thus far we call some more perfect than others; and in
so far as we attribute to them something which involves negation, as term, end,
weakness, etc., thus far we call them imperfect, inasmuch as they do not affect
our mind as those which we call perfect, and not because there is something
wanting in them which is part of their nature, or that nature has gone astray.
For nothing belongs to the nature of anything except that which follows from
the necessity of the effecting cause, and whatever follows from the necessity
of the nature of the effecting cause, necessarily happens.’
‘more reality – means what?
Spinoza – gives us no answer to this question
it looks to me – that this ‘more reality’ notion – is a
dummy proposal designed as a substitute for differentiation
and it really is unnecessary – if you understand that any
proposal regarding ‘things’ – individual things’ – is different –
that is the difference is propositional –
and the point of this is that if you understand difference –
propositional difference – there is no logical basis for what Spinoza refers to
as ‘term, end, weakness etc.’
and as a consequence – we can jettison his failed notions of
perfection and imperfection
‘the necessity of the effecting cause’?
any casual explanation is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
and there is no necessity in what ‘happens’ –
yes – what happens – is what is proposed – and what happens
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
and any causal proposal / explanation – is open to question
As for the term good and bad, they also mean nothing
positive in things considered in themselves, nor are they anything else than
modes of thought, or notions, which we form from the comparison of things
mutually. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good, bad and
indifferent. E,g., music is good to the melancholy, bad to those who
morn, and neither good nor bad to the deaf. Although this be so, these words
must be retained by us. For inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
type of human nature to which we may look, we must retain these words for our
use in the sense I have spoken of. Therefore, in the following propositions I
shall understand by good what we certainly know to be a means of our attaining
that type of human nature which we have set before us; and by bad, that which
we know certainly prevents us from attaining this type. Again we shall call men
more perfect or imperfect in so far as they approach or are distant from this
type, For most specially must it be noted that when I say a man passes from a
less to a greater perfection, and on the contrary, that I do not understand
that he has changed from one essence or form to another, e.g., a horse
would be equally destroyed if it were changed into a man as if it were changed
into an insect; but that this power of acting, in so far as this is understood
by his nature, we conceive to be increased or diminished. Finally, by
perfection in general I shall understand, as I said, reality, that is, essence
of anything, in so far as it exists and operates in a certain manner, without
any consideration of time. For no individual thing can be said to be more
perfect because it has remained in existence longer: the duration of things
cannot be determined by their essence, since the essence of things does not
involve a certain and determined time of existing: but everything, whether it
be more or less perfect, shall persist in existing with the same force with
which it began to exist, so that in this all things are equal.
‘As for the term good and bad, they also mean nothing
positive in things considered in themselves, nor are they anything else than
modes of thought, or notions, which we form from the comparison of things
mutually.’
‘good’ is a description of affirmation – ‘bad’
a description of denial
when faced with the question of what propositional action to
take – we are faced with uncertainty
where we decide in favour of one course of action – we can
describe that action as ‘good’
where we decide against a course of action – we can describe
that action as ‘bad’
any decision as to good or bad – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘Therefore, in the following propositions I shall understand
by good what we certainly know to be a means of our attaining that type of
human nature which we have set before us; and by bad, that which we know
certainly prevents us from attaining this type.’
we don’t ‘certainly know’ anything –
our knowledge is propositional – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘that type of human nature we have set before us’ – will be
a proposal – and one open to question
invariably – at different times we operate with different
proposals as to the type of human nature we wish to affirm or deny
‘Again we shall call men more perfect or imperfect in so far
as they approach or are distant from this type, For most specially must it be
noted that when I say a man passes from a less to a greater perfection, and on
the contrary, that I do not understand that he has changed from one essence or
form to another, e.g., a horse would be equally destroyed if it were
changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect; but that this power of
acting, in so far as this is understood by his nature, we conceive to be
increased or diminished.’
again – Spinoza is pushing his discredited notion of
perfection –
men do not pass from less to greater perfection
human beings deal with propositional uncertainty – and live
out propositional uncertainty
one’s ‘power of acting’ – is one’s critical activity –
we increase our power of acting – if we question – doubt –
and explore propositional uncertainty
we dimmish our power of acting – when we are non-critical
‘Finally, by perfection in general I shall understand, as I
said, reality, that is, essence of anything, in so far as it exists and
operates in a certain manner, without any consideration of time. For no
individual thing can be said to be more perfect because it has remained in
existence longer: the duration of things cannot be determined by their essence,
since the essence of things does not involve a certain and determined time of
existing: but everything, whether it be more or less perfect, shall persist in
existing with the same force with which it began to exist, so that in this all
things are equal.’
if we are to use the term ‘essence’ – the ‘essence’ of
anything – of any proposal – is uncertainty –
no ‘thing’ exists – outside of time –
what exists is what is proposed
things / proposals exist – as long as they are entertained /
proposed –
existence is uncertain
any proposal – logically speaking – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
DEFINITIONS
I. By GOOD (bonum) I understand that which we
certainly know to be useful to us.
our knowledge is what we propose – and our proposals – our
propositions are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
there is no certain knowledge
and are we going to say that what is ‘good’ – is what is useful?
what if – what is useful to me – is to act in such a way –
that others are disadvantaged
and what if it is useful to me to cause pain to others?
is Spinoza OK with this?
it would seem so
II. But by BAD (malum) I understand that which we
certainly know will prevent us from partaking in any good.
Concerning these definitions, see the foregoing preface
towards the end.
we don’t ‘certainly know’ anything – all knowledge is uncertain
therefore – whether an action – a propositional action is
good or bad – is uncertain
as to the definitions in the foregoing preface
first up –
‘As for the terms good and bad, they mean nothing positive
in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thought, or notions,
which we form from the comparison of things’ –.
I may propose an action as ‘good’ – without any comparison –
or an action as ‘bad’ without any comparison involved
and if a good act is not a positive act – what is it?
and if a bad act is not a negative act – what is it?
secondly –
‘Therefore, in the following propositions I shall understand
by good what we certainly know to be a means of attaining that type of human
nature which we have set before us; and by bad, that which we know certainly
prevents us from attaining the said type’
again – we don’t know anything with certainty –
and furthermore – ‘the type of human nature we have set
before us’ –
may not be – useful to us –
and in fact – may be detrimental to ourselves and others –
‘good’ and ‘bad’ – as ‘the means of attaining the said type
of human nature’ –
are undefined
we are given three different definitions of ‘good and bad’ –
notions involved in the comparison of things – a means of attaining a said type
of human nature – and that which is useful to us
there are holes in all these ‘definitions’ – and together
they do not give us a consistent or coherent account of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ –
what we are left with is a mishmash of ideas
all up – Spinoza has failed to define ‘good’ and ‘bad’
III. I call individual things CONTINGENT (contingentes)
in so far as while we regard there essence alone, we find nothing which imposes
existence necessarily, or which necessarily excludes it.
an ‘individual thing’ – is a proposal –
a proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘contingent’ – is a name for uncertainty
what exists is what is proposed
in propositional reality – there is no necessity – only
uncertainty
IV. I call the same individual things POSSIBLE (possibiles)
in so far as we regard the causes by which they must be produced, we know not
whether they are determined to produce them.
uncertainty is the ground of possibility
any proposed causal explanation – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘In the Note 1, Prop, 13, Part I, I made no distinction
between possible and contingent, because it was not necessary to distinguish
them accurately there.’
any proposal is contingent – that is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
uncertainty is the ground of possibility
V. In the following propositions I shall understand by
CONTRARY EMOTIONS (affectus contraris) those which draw a man in
different directions, although they may be of the same kind, as luxury and
avarice, which are species of love, and are contrary not by nature but by
accident.
an emotion is a propositional action –
how an emotion / propositional action is classified –
is described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and any proposed relation between emotions – is open
to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
Spinoza’s ‘contrary’ emotions – are different emotions
– different propositional actions regardless of how their relation is
classified / described
on Spinoza’s definitions – luxury is an immoderate desire or
love of feasting – and avarice an immoderate desire or love of riches
we can question these definitions – i.e. – isn’t the
immoderate desire for feasting – gluttony? –
and isn’t luxury better described as the desire for riches –
and if so – how does luxury differ from avarice?
and another question – who decides what is moderate and what
is immoderate?
VI. What I understand by emotion toward a thing future,
present, or past, I have explained in Notes 1 and 2, Prop. 18, Part III., which
we see.
But it is the place here to note that we can only distinctly
imagine distance of time, like that of space, up to a certain limit, that is,
just as those things which are beyond two hundred paces from us, or whose
distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly
imagine, we are wont to imagine equally distant from us and as if they were in
the plane, so also objects whose time of existing we imagine to be distant from
the present by a longer interval than that which we are accustomed to imagine,
we imagine all to be equally distant from the present, and refer them all to
one moment of time.
a proposal put – is not put in the past or in the future
a proposal put is present
VII. By END (finis) with which in view we do
anything, I understand as desire.
I would have thought that desire is a means to an end – not
the end itself
and as for ‘desire’ – I see it as a name or description of
propositional action
and – in fact – not all propositional action has an end
in view –
where it does – the ‘end’ – is a proposal – and a proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
VIII. By VIRTUE (virtus) and POWER (potentia)
I understand the same thing, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), virtue, in so far as
it has reference to man, is essence or nature in so far as he has the power of
effecting something which can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
virtue = power = essence
what we get from Spinoza here is a word game
or a philosophical version of the three-cup magic trick –
only there is no ball under any cup
power is not defined – or explained by Spinoza – it is just
asserted
likewise – with ‘essence’
and so – ‘virtue’ here – is an empty notion
‘power’ – is a proposal – and as with any proposal – is open
to question
‘power’ – therefore – is logical – is propositional
as I see it – power is the critical capacity to put our
proposals / propositions to question – to doubt – and to explore their
uncertainty
where we exercise that critical capacity – we act rationally
–
where we do not exercise it – we act irrationally
‘essence’ – if this word is to be used – and to have a
meaning – is ‘uncertainty’
man is a propositional animal – and propositions are
uncertain
characteristically a ‘virtue’ is seen to be a particular
moral or intellectual excellence –i.e. – temperance – prudence – justice –
fortitude –
a ‘virtue’ therefore is a proposal / description – and as
with any proposal / description – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
AXIOM. There is no individual thing in nature than which
there is none more powerful and stronger; but whatever is given, there is also
something stronger given by which that given thing can be destroyed.
the claim that there is always something stronger or more
powerful –
and the claim that there is always something stronger or
more powerful that can destroy a given thing – are empirical claims –
and as with any empirical claim – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
PROPOSITIONS
PROP. I. Nothing positive, which a false idea has, is
removed by the presence of what is true in so far as it is true.
there is nothing in a proposition that is true –
there is nothing in a proposition that is false
‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ – are propositional actions
taken in relation to a proposal – a proposition
a proposition is true – if affirmed – is assented to – for
whatever reason – false – if denied – if dissented from – for whatever reason
any propositional action of assent – or denial – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Proof. – Falsity consists solely of the privation of
knowledge which is involved by inadequate ideas (Prop. 35, Part II.). Nor do
these have anything positive, by reason of which they are called false (Prop,
33, Part II.); but on the contrary, in so far as they have reference to God,
they are true (Prop, 32. Part II.), If, therefore, that which is positive,
possessed by a false idea, were removed by the presence of what is true so far
as it is true, then a true idea would be removed by itself, which (Prop. 4,
Part III) is absurd. Therefore nothing positive etc. etc. Q.e.d.
knowledge is proposal – proposal – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
there is no privation – or lack of knowledge – there is only
proposal / knowledge – open to question
all ‘ideas’ / proposals – are open to question – open to
doubt – uncertain and therefore – ‘inadequate’ –
as to – ‘they have reference to God’ –
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
any proposal is a response / reference to the unknown –
in putting proposals – we make known –
our proposals – our knowledge – is open to question – open
to doubt and uncertain
Note. – The proposition is understood more clearly
from Coroll. 2, Prop. 16. Part II. For imagination is an idea which indicates
rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of an external
body, not indeed distinctly, but confusedly: whence it comes about that the
mind is said to err. E.g., when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be
about two hundred paces distant from us, in which we are deceived as long as we
are ignorant of the true distance. When the distance is known the error is removed,
but not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun which explains its nature
in so far only as the body is affected by it; and therefore, although we know
the real distance, nevertheless we imagine that we are close to it. For as I
said in the Note, Prop. 35, Part II., we do not think that the sun is near to
us because we are ignorant of the true distance, but because mind imagines the
magnitude of the sun in so far as the body is affected by it. Thus when the
rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected to our eyes, then
we imagine it as if it were in the water, although we know its proper place.
And thus other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they
indicate the natural disposition of the body or whether that its power of
acting is increased or decreased, are not contrary to what is true, nor do they
vanish at its presence. It happens indeed that when we falsely fear some evil,
that the fear vanishes when we hear the true account; but the contrary also
happens when we fear an evil that is certain to come, and our fear vanishes
when we hear a false account. And therefore these imaginations do not vanish at
the presence of truth in so far as it is true, but because other imaginations
stronger than these arrive and cut off the present existence of the things
which we imagine, as we showed in Prop. 17, Part II.
‘For imagination is an idea which indicates rather the
present disposition of the human body than the nature of an external body, not
indeed distinctly, but confusedly: whence it comes about that the mind is said
to err.’
we are not dealing here with imagination – we are dealing
with perception
perceptual proposals / propositions – are not confused –
they are uncertain
and the mind does not err –
the ‘mind’ explores propositional uncertainty – the mind
explores propositional difference
‘when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two
hundred paces distant from us, in which we are deceived as long as we are
ignorant of the true distance.’
here – we have different proposals regarding distance – and
they come out of different propositional contexts –
the first proposal – out of a natural perceptual context –
the second proposal out of a scientific / explanatory context
the second proposal – and indeed – its context – can be seen
to have its origin in the question – doubt and uncertainty of the first
proposal and context
different proposals in different contexts
if the question put is – how far does the sun appear
to be from us – then the very question excludes a scientific / physicalist
answer
and if the question is – how far is the sun from us –
the question itself – excludes the perceptual context
we don’t here – have two questions dealing with the same
issue – or the same propositional context
these are different questions in response to different
contexts
‘When the distance is known the error is removed, but not
the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun which explains its nature in so
far only as the body is affected by it; and therefore, although we know the
real distance, nevertheless we imagine that we are close to it.’
logically speaking there is no error –
or if there is an error – it is the error of conflating
different proposals and different propositional contexts
what Spinoza calls the ‘real distance’ – is a scientific /
explanatory proposal – not in the perceptual context – but in the physicalist /
scientific context
different propositional contexts
‘For as I said in the Note, Prop. 35, Part II., we do not
think that the sun is near to us because we are ignorant of the true distance,
but because mind imagines the magnitude of the sun in so far as the body is
affected by it.’
here Spinoza recognizes propositional and contextual
difference
what he doesn’t understand is that there is no over-riding
truth
for the fact is – if I understand the different
propositional contexts – I can assent to both the perceptual and scientific
proposals – without contradiction –
‘And thus other imaginations by which the mind is deceived,
whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body or whether that its
power of acting is increased or decreased, are not contrary to what is true,
nor do they vanish at its presence.’
the argument from illusion – really comes about when
propositional contextual difference is not understood
there is no illusion or deception – only difference –
different proposals in different propositional contexts
‘It happens indeed that when we falsely fear some evil, that
the fear vanishes when we hear the true account; but the contrary also happens
when we fear an evil that is certain to come, and our fear vanishes when we
hear a false account.
it is not that the fear vanishes when we hear ‘the
true account’ –
the fear vanishes if we assent to an account of the
situation which we do not fear
nothing is ‘certain to come’
our fear doesn’t vanish when we hear a false account
–
our fear vanishes when we assent to an account of the
situation which we do not fear
any proposal we give our assent to (or any proposal we
dissent from) – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘And therefore these imaginations do not vanish at the
presence of truth in so far as it is true, but because other imaginations
stronger than these arrive and cut off the present existence of the things
which we imagine, as we showed in Prop. 17, Part II.’
what Spinoza here calls ‘the presence of truth’ – is no more
than an alternative proposal
as to why one proposal / proposition is accepted / affirmed
and another rejected / denied– is always open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
PROP. II. We are passive in so far as we are part of nature
which cannot be conceived through itself without others
we are passive – or we suffer – in so far as we are part of
nature?
our reality – however further described – i.e. – as ‘part of
nature’ – is propositional –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the ground of human experience is logical uncertainty
we suffer uncertainty – yes
and – uncertainty is the ground of our joy
Proof. – We are said to be passive when something
takes place in us of which we are only the partial cause (Def. 2, Part III.),
that is (Def. 1, Part III.), that is something that cannot be deduced solely
from the laws of our nature. We are passive, therefore, in so far as we are
part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without other parts.
Q.e.d.
any account of suffering – any explanation of
suffering – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. III. The force with which persists in existing is
limited, and is far surpassed by the power of external causes.
existence is propositional – that is – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – This is clear from the axiom of this part.
For with a given man there is given something, say A, stronger than he, and
given A, there is given something, say B, stronger than A, and so on to
infinity. And therefore the power of man is limited by the power of some other
thing, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.e.d.
A may be physically stronger than B – more powerful – and
yet – for whatever reason B survives A
saying that one thing is more powerful than another – to
infinity – tells us nothing about what actually occurs on the ground
and what actually occurs – is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain
existence is uncertain
PROP. IV. It cannot happen that a man should not be a part
of nature, and that he should be able not to suffer changes, save those which
can be understood through his nature alone, and of which he is the adequate
cause.
propositional reality – is the reality of change
proposals are put – put to question – put to doubt – their
uncertainty explored –
it is the uncertainty of propositional reality that is the
ground of change
Proof. – The power with which individual things, and
consequently man, preserves his being is the very power of God or nature
(Coroll., Prop. 24. Part I.) not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as
he can be explained through actual human essence (Prop. 7, Part III.).
Therefore the power of man, in so far as it is explained through his actual
essence, is part of the infinite power of God or nature, that is, of his
essence (Prop. 34, Part I): which was the first point. Again, if it can come to
pass that man can suffer no changes save those that can be understood through
the nature alone of that man, it would follow (Prop. 4 and 6, Part III.) that
he cannot perish, and that he will live of necessity forever. But this must
follow from a cause whose power is finite or infinite, namely from the mere
power of man, that he would be able to remove changes which arise from external
causes from him, or from the infinite power of nature by which all individual
things are so directed that man can suffer no other changes than those which
serve for his preservation. But the first point (from the prev. Prop, whose
application is universal) is absurd. Therefore, if it could come to pass that
man should suffer no changes save those that can be understood through the mere
nature of man himself, and consequently, as we have already shown, that he
should exist for ever, this would have to follow from the infinite power of
God. Consequently (Prop. 16, Part I) the order of the whole of nature would
have to be deduced in so far as it is considered under the attributes of
thought and extension from the necessity of divine nature, in so far as it is
considered as affected by the idea of some man. And therefore (Prop. 21, Part
I.) it would follow that man was infinite, which (by the first part of this
proof) is absurd. It cannot therefore happen that a man should suffer no
changes save those of which he is the adequate cause. Q.e.d.
‘The power with which individual things, and consequently
man, preserves his being is the very power of God or nature (Coroll., Prop. 24.
Part I.) not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained
through actual human essence (Prop. 7, Part III.). Therefore the power of man,
in so far as it is explained through his actual essence, is part of the
infinite power of God or nature, that is, of his essence (Prop. 34, Part I):
which was the first point.’
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
the unknown – is without power
the ‘power of man’ – rest in man’s critical capacity
‘nature’ is a name for that proposed
that proposed it is not the unknown – ‘that proposed’ – is
what is known –
and any proposed knowledge – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza’s ‘God or nature’ – succinctly represents his
failure to understand ‘God’ and his failure to understand ‘nature’
‘Again, if it can come to pass that man can suffer no
changes save those that can be understood through the nature alone of that man,
it would follow (Prop. 4 and 6, Part III.) that he cannot perish, and that he
will live of necessity forever.’
it doesn’t follow – that man will live forever
– that he cannot perish
what ‘follows’ here – is that what exists (i.e. –
man) – exists in some form forever –
infinity – as I see it – is nothing more than a
propositional game –
a game – the rule of which is that there is no end point to
the play
it has no application in this context
‘But this must follow from a cause whose power is finite or
infinite, namely from the mere power of man, that he would be able to remove
changes which arise from external causes from him, or from the infinite power
of nature by which all individual things are so directed that man can suffer no
other changes than those which serve for his preservation. But the first point
(from the prev. Prop, whose application is universal) is absurd.’
man cannot remove the uncertainty in his propositional
existence –
he can only pretend the absence of uncertainty
‘Therefore, if it could come to pass that man should suffer
no changes save those that can be understood through the mere nature of man
himself, and consequently, as we have already shown, that he should exist for
ever, this would have to follow from the infinite power of God’
if you hold with Spinoza’s idea of God and his idea of the
‘infinite power of God’ – then nothing ceases to exist – while everything that
does exist – undergoes change
‘Consequently (Prop. 16, Part I) the order of the whole of
nature would have to be deduced in so far as it is considered under the
attributes of thought and extension from the necessity of divine nature, in so
far as it is considered as affected by the idea of some man.’
an idea of God and ‘the order of the whole of nature’– just
is – the ‘idea of some man’
‘And therefore (Prop. 21, Part I.) it would follow that man
was infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It cannot
therefore happen that a man should suffer no changes save those of which he is
the adequate cause. Q.e.d.’
any change – ‘man should suffer’ – is open to question –
open to doubt and uncertain
Corollary. – Hence it follows that man is always
necessarily liable to passions, that he always follows the common order of
nature and obeys it, and that he accommodates himself to it as much as the
nature of things demands.
man’s passions – are proposals – propositional actions –
open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
man proposes the ‘nature of things’ – and his proposals are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. V. – The force and increase of any passion, and its
persistence in existing, are not defined by the power whereby we endeavour to
persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared to our own.
a passion – is a proposal / propositional action
a proposal will persist – as long as it is
entertained –
a propositional action will persist as long as it is enacted
I understand the force of a passion to be a function of
non-critical propositional action in relation to it
the ‘increase’ of any passion / proposal – will be a
function of non-critical activity in relation to it –
and any so called ‘measurement’ (presumed by ‘increase’) –
will not be a genuine measurement – that is a rule-governed propositional game
– rather it will be purely speculative and likely – rhetorical
we can propose an ‘external cause’ –
however – what we are dealing with is a propositional
relation – a relation between proposals – the heart of which is –
uncertainty
passion is propositional uncertainty
Proof. – The essence of passion, cannot be explained
merely through essence (Def. 1 and 2 Part III), that is, (Prop. 7, Part III.),
the power of passion cannot be defined by the power in which we endeavour to
persist in our being; but (as in Prop. 16. Part II., as was shown) it must
necessarily be defined by the power of some external cause compared with our
own. Q.e.d.
the ’essence’ of passion – is propositional uncertainty
if we are to use the term ‘essence’ – then the ‘essence’ –
is uncertainty
our being is propositional –
we don’t ‘endeavour’ to propose – we propose –
our existence is propositional
we can propose an external cause – but the reality is that
all we are doing is proposing
a propositional relation
‘internal’ and ‘external’ – are proposals – propositional
categories –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can so surpass
the rest of the actions or the power of a man that emotion adheres obstinately
to him.
when you adhere obstinately to any proposal / proposition /
passion – you behave illogically and irrationally
if you put your passion to question – to doubt – and
understand its uncertainty – its power as an irrational force dissipates
Proof. – The force and increase of any passion, and
its persistence in existing, is defined by the power of an external cause
compared to our (prev. Prop.): and therefore (Prop. 3. Part IV.) it can surpass
a man’s power, etc. Q.e.d.
the force and increase of any passion – is not defined by an
external cause – rather by a non-critical / illogical / irrational
propositional response
man’s power rests in his critical capacity
VII. An emotion can neither be hindered nor removed save by
a contrary emotion and one stronger in checking emotion.
an emotion is propositional – a proposal – a propositional
state – a propositional action
and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
a proposal is ‘hindered’ – if put to question – put to doubt
– its uncertainty explored
it is ‘removed’ – if no longer entertained
in a critical process – different propositions / emotions
will be proposed and explored
it is not a question of ‘strength’ – rather a question of critical
activity
Proof. – An emotion, in so far as it has reference to
the mind, is an idea wherewith the mind affirms a greater or less force of
existing of its body than before (General Definition of the Emotions which will
be found towards the end of the third part). When, therefore, the mind is
assailed by any emotion, the body is affected at the same
time by a modification whereby its power of acting is
increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body (Prop. 5, Part IV.)
receives from its cause the force for
persisting in its being, which therefore can neither be
restrained nor removed save by a
bodily cause (Prop. 4, Part III.) which affects the body
with a modification contrary to that one (Prop. 5 Part III.) and stronger than
it (Ax., Part IV.). And therefore (Prop. 12, Part II.) the mind is affected by
the idea of a modification stronger and contrary
to the previous one, that is (Gen. Def. Emo,) the mind will
be affected by an emotion
stronger and contrary to the former which cuts off the
existence of or takes away the former: and thus the emotion can neither be
checked nor removed save by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.e.d.
‘An emotion, in so far as it has reference to the mind, is
an idea wherewith the mind affirms a greater or less force of existing of its
body than before (General Definition of the Emotions which will be found
towards the end of the third part).’
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
–
‘body’ – is a name for – a propositional action –
propositional action – however named or described – is the
action of the propositional actor
and an ‘emotion’ – is propositional action – of the propositional
actor
if as Spinoza says that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are the same – we
can ask – the same what?
and if the answer is – ‘the same modification of substance’
– why two terms – for the ‘one’ modification?
one is not the other – mind and body in Spinoza are presented
as different realities –
different realities that leave man fundamentally divided –
and his proposed unity in his ‘substance’ – in his ‘God’ –
is no answer
for it just begs the question – if his ‘substance’ / ‘God’
is a unity – why two attributes / descriptions – for the one ‘substance’?
and if there is no ‘substantial’ differentiation in his
substance – then the two ‘attributes’ – have no ‘substance’ – and ‘mind’ and
‘body’ – are no more than a word substitution game –
and a word substitution game – designed to deceive –
to peddle the deception that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are
substantially different –
and yet – not so –
if his ‘substance’ – his ‘God’ – is one – then there
is no differentiation –
and if there is a differentiation then this ‘substance’ is
not one – is not a unity
his ‘substance’ collapses –
and his ‘God’ is a name for the differentiation – for
division –
for the absence of unity
‘When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the
body is affected at the same time by a modification whereby its power of acting
is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body (Prop. 5, Part
IV.) receives from its cause the force for persisting in its being, which
therefore can neither be restrained nor removed save by a bodily cause (Prop.
4, Part III.) which affects the body with a modification contrary to that one
(Prop. 5 Part III.) and stronger than it (Ax., Part IV.).’
we are not ‘assailed’ by any emotion – our emotions are
proposals put – propositional states
any proposal has both a propositional affect and a
propositional effect –
a propositional affect (or effect) – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
what counts as an ‘increase’ – or a ‘diminishing’ – of
propositional action – is open to question
our ‘power’ with respect to any propositional affect – is
logical –
we can exercise our critical capacity in relation to any
affect / emotion – or not
if put to question – an emotion / propositional affect – the
emotion can be modified
and furthermore – can replaced by different propositional
emotional responses –
a proposal of any kind can be abandoned – as a result of
critical activity
our ‘strength’ lies in our critical activity
‘And therefore (Prop. 12, Part II.) the mind is affected by
the idea of a modification stronger and contrary to the previous one, that is
(Gen. Def. Emo,) the mind will be affected by an emotion stronger and contrary
to the former which cuts off the existence of or takes away the former: and
thus the emotion can neither be checked nor removed save by a contrary and
stronger emotion. Q.e.d.’
emotional / propositional states – when put to question –
put to doubt – their uncertainty explored – will be checked or removed – not by
a ‘stronger emotion’ – but rather an alternative propositional response
– which will have an alternative propositional affect
Corollary – An emotion, in so far as it has reference
to the mind, can neither be hindered nor destroyed save through the idea of a
contrary modification of the body and one stronger than the modification which
we suffer. For the emotion which we suffer cannot be checked or removed save by
an emotion stronger than it and contrary to it (prev. Prop.), that is (Gen.
Def. Emo.). save through the idea of a modification of the body stronger than
and contrary to the modification we suffer.
again – it is not a question of a ‘stronger emotion’ – but
rather of a critical / logical response
PROP. VIII. The knowledge of good or evil is nothing else
than the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious of it.
our knowledge is propositional – what we know is what we
propose
how we propose ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – is how we know good and
evil –
any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
our knowledge of good and evil – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
you can propose that our knowledge of good and evil
is nothing else than the emotion of pleasure or pain –
this proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain –
the propositional reality is that there are many other
proposals regarding the knowledge of good and evil –
and all of which are open to question
our knowledge of good and evil – is uncertain
Proof. – We call that good or evil which is useful to
us or the contrary for our preservation (Def 1 and 2, Part IV), that is (Prop.
7, Part III.), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders our power of
acting. And so, in so far as (see def. pleasure and pain, Note. Prop. 11, Part
III.) we perceive anything to affect us with pleasure or pain, we call it good
or evil; and therefore the knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the
idea of pleasure or pain which follows necessarily from the emotion of pleasure
or pain (Prop. 22, Part II.). But this idea is united to the emotion in the
same manner as the mind is united to the body (Prop. 21, Part II), that is (as
was shown in the Note on that Prop.), this idea is not diminished in truth from
that emotion or (Gen. Def. Emo.) from the idea of the modification of the body
save in conception alone. Therefore this knowledge of good and evil is nothing
else than emotion itself, in so far as we are conscious of it. Q.e.d.
‘We call that good or evil which is useful to us or the
contrary for our preservation (Def 1 and 2, Part IV), that is (Prop. 7, Part
III.), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders our power of acting.’
you can call good or evil this –
but even so just what this definition amounts to is open to
question
what is useful or contrary to our preservation is not
certain
what is useful or contrary to our preservation – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
as to our ‘power of acting’ –
our actions are propositional – there can be an increase or
diminishing of critical action
we will propose regardless of our circumstances – as long as
we are functioning propositional actors
‘And so, in so far as (see def. pleasure and pain, Note.
Prop. 11, Part III.) we perceive anything to affect us with pleasure or pain,
we call it good or evil; and therefore the knowledge of good or evil is nothing
else than the idea of pleasure or pain which follows necessarily from the
emotion of pleasure or pain (Prop. 22, Part II.).’
we may call that which affects with pleasure ‘good’ – and we
may call that which affects us with pain ‘evil’ – but there is no certainty here
someone may regard certain pleasures as evil – and there are
those who would regard pain – or forms of pain – as good
our knowledge of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – is uncertain –
regardless of how we define these terms at any particular time
I think in our lives we explore the uncertainty of good and
evil –
and so – at various times we will have different perceptions
and understandings of good and evil
our knowledge of good and evil – is an on-going –
propositional discovery
‘But this idea is united to the emotion in the same manner
as the mind is united to the body (Prop. 21, Part II), that is (as was shown in
the Note on that Prop.), this idea is not diminished in truth from that emotion
or (Gen. Def. Emo.) from the idea of the modification of the body save in
conception alone.
‘mind’ and ‘body’ are proposed explanations of
propositional activity –
we don’t need the mind / body explanations to deal with the
question of good and evil
these are / logical propositional issues – open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
however – there is nothing to stop anyone following Spinoza
here
‘Therefore this knowledge of good and evil is nothing else
than emotion itself, in so far as we are conscious of it.’
our ‘knowledge’ of good and evil is propositional –
that is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
PROP. IX. An emotion whose cause we imagine to be with us at
the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be present.
the ‘cause’ of any emotion is a proposal
what we ‘imagine’ – is what we propose –
‘imagination’ – is a name for propositional action
if the proposal is put – it is current
if we don’t put the proposal – the proposal is not there
Proof. – Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind
regards a thing as present (see def. in Note, Prop. 17, Part II) which
nevertheless indicates rather the disposition of the human body than the nature
of the external body (Coroll. 2, Prop. 16, Part II). Imagination is therefore
an emotion (Gen. Def. Emo.) in so far as it indicates the disposition of the
body. For imagination (Prop. 17, Part II.) is more intense as long as we
imagine which cuts off the present existence of the external object. Therefore
an emotion also, whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present, is more
intense and stringer than if we did not imagine it to be present with us. Q.e.d.
‘a thing’ regarded ‘as present’ – is
a proposal – and what it ‘indicates’ is open to question
imagination is an emotion?
any proposal – however described – i.e. – as an
‘imagination’ – will have an effect – and an affect
an affect is an emotion
any proposal can be regarded / described as an
emotion
propositional intensity – is a function of the lack of
critical / rational engagement with the proposition
any proposal put is present –
and any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain
Note. – When I said above in Prop. 18, Part III.,
that we are affected with the same emotion by a future or past thing as if the
thing which we imagine were present, I expressly gave warning that it is not
true in so far as we regard the image alone of the thing (for it is of the same
nature, whether we imagined things as present or not), but I did not deny that
it becomes weaker when we regard other things as present to us which cut off
the present existence of the future thing. I neglected to call attention to
this then, as I had determined to treat on the force of the emotions in this
part.
what Spinoza calls ‘the image alone’ – is the proposal – in
whatever time frame it is placed
‘it becomes weaker when we regard other things as present to
us which cut off the existence of the future thing’
it is not a question of ‘weakness’ here – rather of propositional
focus
a proposal put stands – as long as it is entertained – and
we may put and entertain a number of proposals in a critical exploration
what is in focus and what is not in focus – will change as a
result of the critical activity
Corollary – The image of a thing future or past, that
is, of a thing which we regard with reference to time future or past, to the
exclusion of time present, is under similar conditions, weaker than the image
of a thing present or past is, caeteris paribus, less intense than the
emotion towards a thing present.
a proposal put in reference to time – future or past – is no
different – to a proposal put in the present
logically speaking there is no time – past – present – or
future
time is a form of propositional context –
propositional context – logically speaking – is secondary to
the proposition as such
time – is a propositional description
as for ‘intensity’ –
a proposal / proposition – that is not critically evaluated
– can be described as ‘intense’
when put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty
explored – a proposition loses its so called ‘intensity’
what Spinoza calls ‘intensity’ here – is a measure of the
lack of critical evaluation
PROP. X. Towards a future thing we imagine to be close at
hand we are more intensely affected than if we imagine the time of its existing
to be further distant from the present; and by the recollections of a thing
which we imagine to have passed not long ago we are more intensely affected
also than if we imagine it to have passed long ago.
you can propose a time difference in relation to a
proposition put –
that is – place it in the past – the near past – to future –
the near future
the point is – these time descriptions are irrelevant to the
critical issue of the proposition in question
whether past – present – or future – the proposal /
proposition – is to be critically evaluated – that is put to question – put to
doubt – and its uncertainty explored –
and once this critical activity is underway – the intensity
of the proposal / imagination – dissipates
Proof. – For in so far as we imagine a thing to be
close at hand or not to be long past, we imagine that which will exclude the
presence of the thing less than if we imagine its future time of existing to be
further away from the present, or if it had passed long ago (as if
self-evident): therefore (prev. Prop.) we shall be affected towards it more
intensely. Q.e.d.
the ‘thing’ as proposed – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
whether we ‘imagine’ it / propose it – to be ‘close at hand’
– or in the future –
we will only be affected towards it ‘more intensely’ – if it
is not critically examined
question – doubt – uncertainty – are not time dependent
Note. – From what we have noted in Def. 6, Part IV.,
it follows that we are affected equally mildly towards objects which are
distant from the present by a longer space of time than we can determine by
imagining, although we know them to be also distant by a long space of time one
from the other.
what is a ‘mild affectation’? – how is it distinguished from
a ‘strong’ or intense affectation?
and surely these matters cannot be settled by fiat – but are
empirical –
and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
PROP. XI. The emotion towards a thing which we imagine to be
necessary is more intense, caeteris paribus, than towards a thing
possible, contingent, or not necessary.
an ‘intense emotion’ is – one that is not critically
evaluated – not put to question – put to doubt – or its uncertainty explored
and if you ‘imagine’ / propose a thing / ‘proposition’ – to
be necessary – you are putting that it is certain
there is no proposal that is certain –
to suggest such is to proceed illogically and irrationally
actually – you are not dealing with a proposal at all –
rather you are advocating a prejudice
any genuine proposal is contingent – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
any proposal is possible – in propositional life we are
always dealing with possibility
when critically evaluated any genuine proposal – will lose
its so-called ‘intensity’
Proof. – In so far as we imagine anything to be
necessary we affirm its existence, and on the contrary, we deny the existence
of a thing in so far as we imagine it not necessary (Note I, Prop. 33, Part
I,): and accordingly the emotion towards a thing necessary is more intense, caeteris
paribus, than towards a thing not necessary. Q.e.d.
what exists is what is proposed – and what is proposed is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
existence is uncertain
to propose necessity – is to propose certainty – which
illogical and irrational
in saying that we ‘deny the existence of anything that is
not necessary’ – Spinoza demonstrates the depth of his illogicity and
irrationality
his conception of reality is not rational – it is a
philosophy of prejudice and ignorance
in the absence of question – doubt – and the exploration of
uncertainty
any proposal – is logically ‘dead’
PROP. XII. The emotion towards a thing which we know to be
non-existent at the present time, and which we imagine possible, is more
intense, caeteris paribus, than towards a thing contingent.
a thing proposed – is a thing existing –
a ‘non-existent thing’ – is a thing not proposed –
it makes no sense to speak of a non-proposed thing – of a
non-proposed proposal
a thing proposed as possible – is logically no different to
a thing proposed as contingent – as both are open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
so called ‘affective intensity’ – is irrelevant to
the logical / critical appraisal of any proposal / proposition –
and my question to Spinoza is – what is this ‘intensity’
that is central to his argument here?
he gives no account of it
and whatever it is – how is it measured?
he says – there is a more intense emotion towards a
non-existent thing – than to a contingent thing –
if I had to – I would say the opposite –
and as it stands – Spinoza has no argument against this – as
he has no account of intensity to begin with
Proof. – In so far as we imagine the thing as
contingent, we are affected by no image of another thing, which posits its
existence (Def. 3, Part IV.); but, on the other hand (according to the
hypothesis), we imagine certain things which cut off its present existence. But
in so far as we imagine the thing to be possible in the future, we imagine
certain things which posit its existence. (Def. IV. Part IV.) , that is (Prop.
18, Part III.), which foster hope or fear: and therefore emotion towards a
thing possible is more intense. Q.e.d.
any proposal put is contingent – that is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
any proposal put – logically speaking – is a possibility –
that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to ‘certain things which cut off its present existence’
this is to put proposals that deny the proposal in question
well – what is it to be – a proposal put – or a proposal not
put?
so called emotional intensity has nothing to do with any of
this
Corollary. – Emotion toward a thing which we know to
be non-existent in the present, and which we imagine to be contingent, is far
more mild than if we imagine the thing to be present with us.
Proof. – Emotion towards a thing which we imagine to
exist in the present is more intense that if we imagine it as future (Coroll.,
Prop. 9, Part IV.), and is far more intense if we imagine the future time to be
far distant from the present (Prop.10, Part IV.). Therefore emotion towards a
thing whose time of existing we imagine to be far distant from the present is
far more mild than if we imagine it as present, and nevertheless is more intense
(pre. Prop.) than if we imagine that the thing is contingent. Therefore the
emotion towards a thing contingent is more intense than if we imagined the
thing to be with us in the present. Q.e.d.
the intensity of an emotion / proposal / propositional
action – is logically irrelevant
though I think it will be the case that an emotion – not put
to question – its uncertainty left unexplored – will be more intense – than one
that is critically examined
PROP. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we
know does not exist in the present, is far more mild, caeteris paribus,
than emotion towards a thing in the past.
Proof. – In so as we imagine a thing contingent, we
are affected by the image of no other thing which posits the existence of that
thing (Def. 3, Part IV.); but, on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine
certain things which cut off its present existence. But in so far as we imagine
it with reference to time past, we are supposed to imagine something which
restores it to memory, or, which excites the image of the thing (see Prop. 18,
Part II., with its Note), and thus far accordingly it brings it about that we
regard it as if it were present (Coroll,. Prop. 17, Part II.). And therefore
(Prop. 9, Part IV.)) emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know does not
exist in the present, is more mild, caeteris paribus, than towards a
thing past. Q.e.d.
firstly – any proposal put is contingent –
that is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
‘imagining things which cut off its existence’?
we do not propose non-existence – what exists – is what
is proposed – non-existence – is the absence of proposal
if a proposal is placed / described – in the past – we give
it a propositional context –
the proposal – regardless of propositional context – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any proposal put – is present –
whether the affect of a proposal is mild or not – is
logically irrelevant
PROP. XIV. A true knowledge of good and bad cannot restrain
any emotion in so far as the knowledge is true.
true knowledge of good and evil?
any proposed account of good and evil – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
emotions are propositional actions
the issue is not ‘restraining’ propositional action –
if we behave rationally – we put our propositional actions
to question – to doubt – and we explore their uncertainty
a true proposition – is a proposition we assent to – a false
proposition – a proposition we dissent from
any proposal of assent or dissent – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – An
emotion is an idea whereby the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of
existing of its body than before (Gen. Def. Emo.), and therefore (Prop. I, Part
IV,) it has nothing positive which can be removed by the presence of what is
true; and consequently a true knowledge of good or bad, in so far as it is
true, cannot restrain
any emotion. But in so far as it is an emotion (Prop. 8 Part
IV,). it is stronger than the
emotion to be restrained, thus far only (Prop. 7, Part IV,)
it can restrain an emotion, Q.e.d.
any proposition has an affect and an effect –
any proposition can be regarded as an emotion
an emotion is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
Spinoza leaves ‘power of existing’ undefined
our power is propositional – and propositional power is
logical – the power of question – the power of doubt – the power to explore
propositional uncertainty
our power is the power of critical evaluation
existence is proposed – existence is a proposal
existence for human beings is the reality of propositional
activity –
any propositional activity – affirms existence
a proposal / proposition is true if affirmed – false if
denied
any proposal of affirmation or denial is open to question
any proposal regarding what is good – what is bad – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we don’t ‘restrain’ – proposals / propositions – we put
them – and act on them –
if our action is rational – our propositions / emotions –
are put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored –
proposals / emotions do not restrain proposals / emotions –
proposals are put in relation to proposals – and if dealt
with rationally – critically evaluated
Spinoza’s restraint argument – is best understood in the
context of irrational and illogical behaviour
PROP. XV. Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good
and evil can be destroyed or checked by many other desires which arise from
emotions by which we are assailed.
‘desire’ – is a name for propositional activity
there is propositional activity / desire – before
propositional affirmation
if there was not – then there could be no affirmation –
i.e. – nothing to affirm
‘true knowledge’ – is the proposal affirmed – affirmed by
the propositional actor – for whatever reason –
and any proposal of affirmation – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
in the definitions at the start of part IV Spinoza says –
‘By GOOD (bonum) I understand that which we certainly
know to be useful to us’ and – ‘But by BAD (malum) I understand that
which we certainly know will prevent us from partaking in any good’
there is no certain knowledge – all knowledge is proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what is – or is not useful to us – is open to question –
we make decisions here – and our decisions – are open to
question
emotions are propositional actions –
we are not ‘assailed’ by emotions / propositional actions –
we put – emotions / propositional actions– and emotions
/ propositional actions / emotion – are put to us
emotions / propositional actions – can be checked –
this checking’ – is the critical process of question – doubt
– and the exploration of uncertainty
emotions / propositional actions – are not ‘destroyed’ –
as with any propositional action – an emotion is entertained
and acted on – or it is not
an emotion / propositional action can be replaced by
another – as a result of critical action
Proof. – From a true knowledge of good and evil, in
so far as this (Prop. 8, Part IV.) is an emotion, there necessarily arises
desire (Def, Eno. 1), which is the greater according as the emotion from which
it arises is greater (Prop. 37, Part III.). But inasmuch as this desire (by
hypothesis) arises from the fact that we truly understand something, it follows
also that it is within us so far as we are active (Prop. 3, Part III.). And
therefore it must be understood through our essence alone (Def. 2 Part III),
and consequently (Prop. 7, Part III.) its force and increase must only be
defined by human power. Again, the desires which arises from the emotions by
which we are assailed are greater according as the emotions are more intense;
and therefore their force and increase (Prop. 5, Part IV.) must be defined by
the power of the external causes, which, if compared with our own power,
indefinitely surpass our power (Prop. 3, Part IV.). And therefore the desires
which arise from similar emotions can be more intense than that which arise
from the knowledge of good and evil; and therefore (Prop. 7, Part IV,) they
will be able to check or destroy it. Q.e.d.
desire as proposal – is knowledge – knowledge – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
one proposal is neither ‘greater’ or ‘lesser’ – than another
–
all proposals / desires are open to question
any desire / proposal is put by us
a proposal is an action
we are not ‘assailed’ by emotions – emotion / propositional
action – is put by us – and put to us
propositional / emotional intensity – is a ‘measure’
of irrationality
a so called ‘intense’ propositional action / emotion – is
one not – critically investigated
‘external causes’ – are proposals entertained –
any proposal / knowledge – regarding ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – is
open to question – is uncertain
proposals are ‘checked’ – through critical investigation
emotions / propositional actions – are not ‘destroyed’ –
proposals / propositional actions are put – entertained –
critically examined – proceeded with – or not
the critical process may lead to the dropping of a proposal
– the ending of propositional action – and the adoption of an alternative
any proposal – replaced – or proceeded with – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XVI. The desire which
arises from the knowledge of good and bad, in so far as this knowledge has
reference to the future, can more easily be checked or destroyed than the
desire of things which are pleasing in the present.
any desire is a proposal / propositional
action –
and where it ‘arises from’ – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
as indeed is any proposed knowledge of good and bad
proposals are not ‘destroyed’ – they are entertained – or
not
and any proposal – whatever its reference in time –
if rationally ‘checked’ – is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty
explored
Proof. – Emotion towards a thing which we imagine to
be future is less intense than towards the thing present (Coroll., Prop 9, Part
IV.). But the desire which arises from the knowledge of good and bad, although
this knowledge should concern things which are good in the present, can be
destroyed or checked by any haphazard desire
(Pre. Prop., whose proof is universal). Therefore the desire
which arise from such knowledge, in so far as it has reference to the future,
can be more easily destroyed or checked, etc. Q.e.d.
less intense – more intense – is really a question of
whether a desire / proposal has been put to question or not
a proposal – not put to question – will be more ‘intense’ –
than the proposal critically appraised
critical evaluation of a proposal – will dissipate any
emotional / propositional intensity
and any desire / propositional action – can be
haphazardly replaced by another desire / proposal – if there is no
critical evaluation
where there is critical appraisal – any propositional change
will be rational
PROP. XVII. Desire which arises from true knowledge of good
and bad, in so far as this concerns things contingent, can be far more easily
restrained than the desire for things which are present.
desire / proposal – ‘that arises from the true knowledge of
good and bad in so far as this concerns things contingent’ – from a logical
point of view is – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
as is ‘desire for things which are present’ – there is no
logical difference
desire – of any description – if dealt with rationally – is
not ‘restrained’ – rather it is explored
the exploration of any desire / proposal – is a critical
activity
Proof. – This proposition is proved in the same
manner as the previous one, Coroll., Prop. 12, Part IV.
Note. – Thus I think I have shown the reason why men
are guided rather by opinion than by true reason, and why a true knowledge of
good and bad often excites disturbances of the mind, and often yields to all
manner of lusts. Whence is arisen the saying of the poet: Video meliora
proboque, deteroria sequor – ‘The better course I
see and approve, the worse I follow.’ This also Ecclesiastes seems to have
in mind when he said, ‘He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.’ I do not
say this, however, with the aim of proving therefrom that it is better to be
ignorant than to have knowledge, or that a wise man has no advantage over a
fool in moderating his emotions, but because it is necessary to know both the
power and want of power of our nature, so that we may determine what reason can
do in the moderating of the
emotions and what it cannot, and in this part I have said I
shall deal only with the want of human power. for I have decided to treat of
the power of reason over the emotions separately.
this ‘true knowledge of good and bad’ – has not been defined
– or explained – by Spinoza –
he simply asserts it – and as such – it is little more than
pretentious rhetoric
his idea of reason is a deductive system of propositions –
that is beyond question –
and that is essentially nothing more than common and garden
prejudice in the guise of philosophic wisdom
when he talks about ‘exciting disturbances of the mind’ –
all this can mean is that this knowledge – which is nothing more than proposal
– is uncertain
as to ‘all manner of lusts’ – what is that – but desires /
proposals – propositional actions?
‘The better course I see and approve, the worse I follow’ –
anyone in this situation – I would suggest – is someone
trapped in an ethical system that just doesn’t work for them – and so their
understanding of good and bad – is confused
such a person needs to have a good hard critical look at
themselves
‘He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow’ –
again – if your so called ‘knowledge’ – increases
sorrow – then I would say you are not critically evaluating the proposals you
are operating with – you are not dealing with your knowledge / proposals – in a
rational manner
the consequence of any proposal / propositional action – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – so sorrow is always a
possibility –
in my view – sorrow is not something that a rational man or
woman – would seek to increase –
however – that is just my view – logically / rationally
speaking – the matter is open to question –
there may well be people who see value in increasing sorrow
– and proceed in a critical manner
as to – ‘being ignorant and having knowledge’ –
all ‘knowledge’ is proposal –
and we propose against – or in response to the unknown
–
and any proposal put in relation to the unknown – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
in a final sense we never leave the unknown – we simply
respond to it
‘the power and want of power of our nature’ – is the issue
of human rationality
we are powerful to the extent that we are critically engaged
in our propositional life
where there is no critical activity – there is no power
PROP. XVIII. Desire which arises from pleasure is stronger, caeteris
paribus, than the desire which arises from pain.
this is a contingent issue
and any proposal in this regard is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
and how is the strength of any desire to be measured?
any proposed measurement – can only be working hypothesis –
and of course – open to question
it is not hard to imagine a circumstance where someone’s
desire from pain trumps their desire from pleasure –
in such a case – there is a clear preference for pain
and if critically evaluated – such a preference is rational
Proof. – Desire is the very
essence of man (Def. Emo. 1), that is (Prop.7, Part III) the endeavour
wherewith man endeavours to persist in his being. Wherefore
desire which arises from pleasure is helped or increased by the emotion of
pleasure itself (def. pleasure in Note, Prop. 11, Part III.); but that desire
which arises from pain is diminished or hindered by the emotion of pain (same
Note). And therefore the force of desire which arises
from pleasure must be defined by human power and, at the same time, by the
power of the external cause; but that which arises from pain must only be
defined by defined by human power; and therefore the former is stronger than
the later. Q.e.d.
‘Desire is the very essence of man (Def. Emo. 1), that is
(Prop.7, Part III) the endeavour wherewith man endeavours to persist in his
being’
desire is propositional activity
and propositional activity happens whether or not one
‘is endeavouring to persist in his being’
‘Wherefore desire which arises from pleasure is helped or
increased by the emotion of pleasure itself (def. pleasure in Note, Prop. 11,
Part III.); but that desire which arises from pain is diminished or hindered by
the emotion of pain’
whether more pleasure increases desire / propositional
activity – is open to question
perhaps in certain circumstances – it has no real effect –
i.e. – it is just more of the same
and whether pain increased by pain diminishes desire /
propositional activity) is likewise a contingent issue
‘And therefore the force of desire which arises from
pleasure must be defined by human power and, at the same time, by the power of
the external cause; but that which arises from pain must only be defined by
defined by human power; and therefore the former is stronger than the later. Q.e.d.’
the ‘force of desire’ – is the force of propositional action
pleasure – is an affect of propositional action
pain – is an affect of propositional action
if an ‘external cause’ is proposed – the ‘external
cause’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
how is pleasure to measured against pain – or pain measured
against pleasure?
Note. – In these few propositions I have explained
the causes of human weakness and inconstancy, and why men do not follow the
percepts of reason. It remains, however, that I should show what is that which
reason prescribes for us, and which of the emotions agree with the rules of
human reason, and which, on the other hand, are contrary to them. But before I
begin to prove this in full by the geometrical method we follow, it would be
well to show here briefly at first the dictates of reason, so that those things
which I mean may be perceived more easily by all. Since reason postulates
nothing against nature, it postulates, therefore, that each man should love
himself, and seek what is useful to him – I mean what is truly useful to him –
and desire whatever leads man truly to a greater state of perfection, and in
absolute terms, that each one should endeavour to preserve his being as far as
it in him lies. This is necessarily true as the whole is greater than the part
(see Prop. 4, Part III.). Again as virtue is nothing else (Def. 8, Part IV.)
than to act according to the laws of one’s nature, and no one endeavours to
preserve his being (Prop. 7, Part III,) save according to the laws of his own
nature, it follows hence, firstly, that the basis of virtue is the endeavour to
preserve one’s own being, and that happiness consists in this, that a man is
able to preserve his own being; secondly, that virtue should be desired by us
on its own account, and there is nothing more excellent or useful to us on
which account we should desire it; thirdly, that those who commit suicide are
weak spirited, and that they are conquered by external causes repugnant to
their nature. Again, it follows from Post. 4, Part II., that we can never bring
it about that we need nothing outside ourselves for our preservation, and that
in order to live we need have no commerce with things which are without us. If,
moreover we consider our mind, our intellect
would be more imperfect if the mind were alone and
understood nothing save itself.
Many things outside us which are useful to us, and therefore
much to be desired. Of these, none can be considered more excellent than those
which agree with our nature. For (to give an example) if two individuals of the
same nature seem to combine, they would form one individual twice as strong as
either individual; there is therefore nothing more useful to man than man.
Nothing, I say, can be desired men more excellent for their self-preservation
than that all with all should agree that they compose the minds of all as it
were into one mind, and the bodies of all as it were into one body, and all
endeavour at the same time as much as they can to preserve their being. and all
seek at the same time what is useful to them in common. From which it follows
that men who are governed by reason, seek what is useful to them, desire
nothing for themselves which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
and therefore they are just, faithful, and honourable.
These are the dictates of reason which I proposed in these
few words to point out before I proceed to prove them in greater detail, which
I did for this reason, that, if it were possible I might attract the attention
of those who believe that this principle, namely, that each should seek out
what is useful to himself, is the basis of virtue and piety, but of impiety.
Therefore, now that I have shown briefly that the contrary is the case, I
proceed to prove in the same manner as that in which we have proceeded so far.
‘Since reason postulates nothing against nature, it
postulates, therefore, that each man should love himself, and seek what is
useful to him – I mean what is truly useful to him – and desire whatever leads
man truly to a greater state of perfection, and in absolute terms, that each
one should endeavour to preserve his being as far as it in him lies. This is
necessarily true as the whole is greater than the part (see Prop. 4, Part
III.).
if reason postulates nothing against nature – and by
‘nature’ we understand – that which is proposed – then reason postulates
nothing
which is the case –
reason postulates nothing – for ‘reason’ – is the
critical activity – of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
‘therefore, that each man should love himself, and seek what
is useful to him’
this might be seen as good advice – in certain contexts –
but that is all it is –
it is no more than a proposal – that as with any proposal –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘I mean what is truly useful to him – and desire whatever
leads man truly to a greater state of perfection, and in absolute terms, that
each one should endeavour to preserve his being as far as it in him lies.’
what is ‘truly useful’ – in any circumstance – will be open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to – ‘a greater state of perfection’ – this is rubbish –
‘perfection’ – in so far as it an analogue of certainty – is
an illogical and irrational notion
‘that each one should endeavour to preserve his being as far
as it in him lies.’
why?
and who is to say what anyone should be doing?
and furthermore – there are those who decide not to preserve
being – but to end it –
and if ‘reason postulates nothing against nature’ – and
nature is just – ‘that proposed’
then on Spinoza’s own argument – not preserving one’s life –
ending it – is not against nature or reason
‘This is necessarily true as the whole is greater than the
part’
there is no necessity – what we have is uncertainty
and the ‘whole is greater than the part’ argument – has no
relevance here at all
‘Again as virtue is nothing else (Def. 8, Part IV.) than to
act according to the laws of one’s nature, and no one endeavours to preserve
his being (Prop. 7, Part III,) save according to the laws of his own nature, it
follows hence, firstly, that the basis of virtue is the endeavour to preserve
one’s own being, and that happiness consists in this, that a man is able to
preserve his own being; secondly, that virtue should be desired by us on its
own account, and there is nothing more excellent or useful to us on which
account we should desire it; thirdly, that those who commit suicide are weak
spirited, and that they are conquered by external causes repugnant to their
nature.’
there are no ‘laws’ of nature –
there are proposals put – propositions – hypotheses put – to
describe / explain ‘that proposed’
the propositions / hypotheses / theories of the ‘natural
world’ – of science – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
empirical science is a critical activity
empirical science is an exploration of propositional
uncertainty
if virtue is nothing else than to act according to the laws
of nature – then virtue is nothing other than the proposals / propositions put
to describe ‘that proposed’ –
that is to say – virtue is just what happens – what is
proposed
and if the idea is that virtue is something other than ‘just
what happens’ / what is proposed – then virtue cannot be equated with ‘the laws
of nature’
if you endeavour to preserve your being – then you
will avoid any propositional activity that puts your being at risk
Spinoza here proposes that the basis of virtue is the
preservation of one’s being
this proposal is as good as any other attempt to explain
virtue
and like any proposal regarding the nature of virtue – it is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and he puts the further proposal – that happiness consists
in being able to preserve one’s being
well – clearly if you are dead – you cannot be happy
however – this theory of happiness – again – is just one of
many – and as with any proposal regarding the nature of happiness – open to
question
that virtue should be desired by us on its own account?
if virtues is – nothing other than – what happens in nature
– there is in fact nothing to desire –
for desire is just what we do – that is our propositional
activity – in whatever form
as to the proposal that those who commit suicide are weak –
and overcome by external forces –
as with any other proposal this is contentious –
and is a proposition that can only be investigated
empirically
furthermore – as a generalization – it is prime facie –
false
for it may take courage and determination to suicide – and
in certain circumstances it may be regarded as not only desirable but virtuous
and according to Spinoza – (and he is right here) – how can
anyone do anything that is contrary to their nature?
‘Many things outside us which are useful to us, and
therefore much to be desired. Of these, none can be considered more excellent
than those which agree with our nature. For (to give an example) if two
individuals of the same nature seem to combine, they would form one individual
twice as strong as either individual; there is therefore nothing more useful to
man than man.’
if two individuals of the same nature seem to combine – they
may form one individual twice as stupid as either individual
man can be useful to man – and man can be a hindrance and a
danger to man
any form of human relationship is at base – uncertain –
in relation to each other – we constantly face – question –
doubt and uncertainty
with a bit of luck – we find those who work to our benefit –
and those who we can work to benefit
‘Nothing, I say, can be desired men more excellent for their
self-preservation than that all with all should agree that they compose the
minds of all as it were into one mind, and the bodies of all as it were into
one body, and all endeavour at the same time as much as they can to preserve
their being. and all seek at the same time what is useful to them in common.’
‘that all with all should agree that they compose the minds
of all as it were into one mind’ –
is to my mind an illogical – irrational and dangerous idea
it is such an idea that finds currency in authoritarian and
fascist ideologies
individuals are different one to the other – and it is
individual difference that is the real strength of humankind
we are not one mind – and we are not one body
the idea that we are – is simply fanciful
we share a common humanity – and we can we develop common
wealth – in many and varied forms
however – it is only out of individual initiative that any
such common advantage can be created
it is also the case that commonality can be the ground of
destruction – as in persecution – in whatever form that takes – and in war
and therefore – ‘commonality’ – as with any proposal – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘From which it follows that men who are governed by reason,
seek what is useful to them, desire nothing for themselves which they do not
also desire for the rest of mankind, and therefore they are just, faithful, and
honourable.’
men are not ‘governed by reason’
reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and
the exploration of uncertainty
men do not always seek out what is useful to them
and in any case what is ‘useful’ – is open to question – is
uncertain
it is ridiculous to say that we do not desire anything for
ourselves which we do not also desire for the rest of mankind
I desire may things – which I would not impose on the rest
of mankind
I only speak for myself – not for everyone
those who think they speak for everyone – are megalomaniacs
‘just’ – ‘faithful’ – ‘honourable’ – are proposals – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XIX. Each one necessarily desires or turns from, by
the laws of his nature, what he thinks to be good or evil.
firstly – one’s nature is propositional – and there are no
‘laws’ to propositional activity – no ‘laws’ to one’s nature
there is no necessity in propositional activity –
propositional activity is logically – uncertain –
desire is propositional activity – desire is uncertain
what one regards as good or evil – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
whether one desires what one regards as good – and turns
from what one regards as evil – is open to question – open to doubt and is
uncertain
Proof – The knowledge of good and evil (Prop. 8, Part
IV.) is the extension of pleasure or pain in so far as we are conscious of it;
and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) everyone desires what he thinks to be good,
and turns from what he thinks to be evil. But this desire is nothing else than
the very essence or nature of man (def. desire, which see in Note, Prop. 9,
Part III., and Def. Emo. 1). Therefore everyone, from the laws of his nature
alone, necessarily desires or turns from, etc. Q.e.d.
‘good’ and ‘evil’ – are proposals – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain –
the propositional / logical reality is that we explore these
proposals
the proposition that everyone desires what he thinks to be
good and turns from what he thinks to be evil – cannot be established –
we just can’t say – what everyone does –
we don’t know what everyone does –
the suggestion that we can know – is plainly wrong and
pretentious –
and furthermore – it is quite conceivable that in certain
circumstances – in certain propositional contexts – people will desire what
they think to be evil – and turn from what they think to be good
if by ‘desire’ – we understand ‘propositional activity’ –
then yes – our nature is propositional –
our nature – our propositional activity – is not ‘law
governed’ –
and there is no ‘necessity’ in propositional activity –
what we do and how we propose / understand what we do – is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. XX. The more one seeks what is useful to him, that is,
the more he endeavours and can preserve his being, the more he is endowed with
virtue; and , on the contrary, the more one neglects to preserve what is
useful, or his being; he is thus far impotent or powerless.
‘useful’ – here is a blank check – it can mean anything
and ‘preserving one’s being’ – likewise – can mean anything
–
and so ‘virtue’ – is left effectively – undefined
all we have here is a word substitution game
the logical reality is that what is ‘useful’ – and what
‘preserving one’s being’ amounts to – are matters – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
and whether what is useful – and whether preserving one’s
being is ‘virtuous’ –
again – is open to question
the problem with Spinoza’s analysis here is not the concepts
that he proposes – it is that he fails to deal with them in a critical manner
and who is to say what is useful – and how one preserve’s
one being?
there may well be as many answers to these questions as
there are human beings
and any answer proposed – is open to question
Proof. – Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by
the essence of man alone (Def. 8, Part IV.), that is, (Prop. 7 Part III.),
which is defined by the endeavour alone wherewith he endeavours to persist in
his own being. The more, therefore, the more he endeavours and succeeds in
preserving his own essence, the more he is endowered with virtue, and
consequently (Prop. 4 and 6, Part III.) in so far as he neglects to preserve
his being he is thus far wanting in power. Q.e.d.
‘the essence of man alone’
how is ‘the essence of man alone’ to be distinguished from
the essence of man in relation to all of nature?
so – someone preserves his own being – and causes nothing
but pain and suffering to his fellow man – a virtuous life?
yes – according to Spinoza –
for Spinoza – ‘virtue’ – amounts to something like survival
of the fittest
we have no sense from Spinoza what a ‘good life’ amounts to
– unless by ‘good life’ – you understand – a ‘long life’
there is no virtue in Spinoza’s outlook –
just endurance against the inevitable
Note. – No one therefore, unless he is overcome by
external causes and these contrary to his nature, neglects to desire what is
useful to himself and preserve his being. No one, I say, from the necessity of
his nature, but driven by external causes, turns away from taking food, or
commits suicide, which can take place in many manners. Namely, anyone can kill
himself by compulsion of some other who twists back is right hand, in which he
holds by chance his sword, and forces him to direct the sword against hi own
heart; or, like Seneca by the command of a tyrant, he may be forced to open his
veins, that is, to avoid a greater evil by encountering a less; or again,
latent external causes may dispose his imagination and so affect his body, that
it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and of which an idea cannot
be given in the mind (Prop. 10, Part III.). But that a man, from the necessity
of his nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, or change himself into
another form, is as impossible as it is for anything to be made from nothing,
as every one with a little reflection can see.
‘No one therefore, unless he is overcome by external causes
and these contrary to his nature, neglects to desire what is useful to himself
and preserve his being. No one, I say, from the necessity of his nature, but
driven by external causes, turns away from taking food, or commits suicide,
which can take place in many manners.’
‘the necessity of his nature’?
the nature of human beings is propositional – and there is
no ‘necessity’ in propositional life
‘necessity’ – is a concept designed to give logical force to
prejudice –
it is rhetorical concept – not logical
as to ‘external causes’ –
any so-called external cause – is a proposal put –
and whether you accept and adopt any such proposal put to
you – is a matter open to question
no one is compelled to adopt any proposal put to them
furthermore – there is a long history of fasting among
spiritualists – and there are those who for their reasons are prepared to
starve themselves to death
the empirical reality is that such actions are not contrary
to human nature
and it is this empirical reality that defeats Spinoza’s
‘necessity’
‘suicide’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt
– and as with any other proposal – uncertain
‘Namely, anyone can kill himself by compulsion of some other
who twists back is right hand, in which he holds by chance his sword, and
forces him to direct the sword against his own heart; or, like Seneca by the
command of a tyrant, he may be forced to open his veins, that is, to avoid a
greater evil by encountering a less; or again, latent external causes may
dispose his imagination and so affect his body, that it may assume a nature
contrary to its former one, and of which an idea cannot be given in the mind.’
as to the first example here – it’s murder – not suicide
Seneca had a choice – and made his choice – for his reasons
– and no doubt there was uncertainty involved
as to assuming ‘a nature contrary to its former one’ – this
is somewhat unclear –
however – if Spinoza is talking about an action taken by
someone who is mentally ill –
one would have to consider the view that such an action was
not rational
‘But that a man, from the necessity of his nature, should
endeavour to become non-existent, or change himself into another form, is as
impossible as it is for anything to be made from nothing, as every one with a
little reflection can see.’
well – it is not impossible – it is actually quite possible
and not uncommon –
‘as everyone with a little reflection can see’
PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act well, or
live well, who at the same time does not desire to be, to act, and to live,
that is, actually to exist.
is it not conceivable that someone could want to live well
etc. – but at the same time think that not existing would be preferable to what
life has given them?
Proof. – The proof of this proposition, or rather the
thing itself, is self-evident, and appears from the definition of desire. For
the desire (Def. Emo. 1) of being blessed, of acting well, and of living well,
etc., is the very essence of man, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), the endeavour
wherewith each one endeavours to preserve his own being, Therefore no one can
desire, etc. Q.e.d.
there are no self-evident propositions –
any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
desire is propositional action – in whatever form
‘being blessed’ – ‘acting well’ – ‘living well’ – are
proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the ‘essence’ of man – if we are to use this term – is to
propose – is propositional action
to exist is to propose
existing – is just the play of propositional action –
whether or not you ‘endeavour’ to exist – you will exist –
as long as you can propose
this ‘endeavour to exist’ – is really just rhetoric
PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this
virtue of endeavouring to preserve oneself.
what we conceive – that is propose – as a virtue – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the endeavour to preserve oneself can be proposed as a
virtue –
but as with any proposal – it is open to question – is
logically uncertain
logically speaking – there is no such thing as propositional
priority –
proposals are put – as and when they are put – and any
relation proposed between propositions – is open to question
Proof. – The endeavour of preserving oneself is the
very essence of a thing (Prop. 7, Part III.). If, therefore, any virtue can be
conceived as prior to this one, namely, this endeavour, the essence of the
thing would therefore be conceived (Def. 8, Part, IV.) prior to itself, which,
as is self manifest, is absurd. Therefore no virtue, etc. Q.e.d.
‘the very essence of a thing’ – is a logically stupid notion
–
any ‘thing’ – that – is any proposal – is open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
there is no final or essential characterization of any ‘thing’
/ proposal –
and characterization / definition etc. is logically speaking
– provisional
‘the essence of a thing would therefore be conceived prior
to itself’ –
there is no essence – so there is no question of it being
proposed prior to itself
the ‘itself’ here – is no more than a proposal – a thing
proposed –
and any conception of a thing – that is – any proposal of a
thing – is open to question
so – any elaboration / explanation / description of a
proposal – of any form – is open to question open to doubt – and uncertain
Corollary. – The endeavour of preserving oneself is
the first and only basis of virtue, for prior to this principle nothing else
can be conceived (pre. Prop.), and without it (Prop. 21, Part IV.) no virtue
can be conceived.
there is no ‘first and only’ – in propositional logic –
we begin with whatever we begin with – on any day – at any
time – and take it from there
the notion of virtue – is as with any proposal – open to
question –
virtues can be – and I would say are proposed – in the
absence of this notion of preserving oneself
however – there is nothing against proposing – the idea of
preserving oneself – as a virtue
and of course – you could view all other proposed virtues in
terms of this idea
this is what Spinoza is proposing –
however – such a proposed ‘ethic’ – as with any other – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking – I don’t think it matters what you
believe –
what does matter is whether or not you can critically
evaluate what you believe –
understand the value it may have for you – but also
understand the uncertainty inherent in any valuation – in any ‘virtue’
PROP. XXIII. Man in so far as he is determined to do
anything by the fact he has inadequate ideas, cannot absolutely be said to act
from virtue, but only in so far as he is determined by the fact that he
understands.
man is not ‘determined’ to do anything –
human beings are free to put any proposal – any
propositional action to question – to doubt – and to explore propositional
uncertainty
‘inadequate ideas’ – are proposals –
proposals open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
virtue – is a proposal – open to question
our understanding is proposal – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – In so far as man is determined to do
something by the fact that he has inadequate ideas, so far he is passive (Prop.
I, Part III.), that is (Def. 1 and 2, Part III.), he does something which
cannot be conceived through its own essence alone, that is (Def. 8, Part IV.)
which does not follow from his virtue. But in so far as he is determined to do
something by the fact that he understands, he is active (Prop. 1, Part III.) he
does something which can be perceived through his own essence alone or, (De. 8,
Part IV.) which follows adequately from his virtue. Q.e.d.
man’s ideas / proposals – are open to question – are
uncertain –
and any response to these ideas / proposals – is active – is
a propositional action
propositional activity – is not passive
anything a man does is propositional – is – logically
speaking – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
man’s virtue – however that is proposed – is not fixed – it
is a propositional action – open to question
any proposal – any propositional action – is a form of
understanding
if by ‘adequate’ – one means ‘certain’ – there is nothing
that ‘follows adequately’ –
any ‘follow on’ from a proposition – or propositional action
– is a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely according to virtue is nothing
else in us than to act under the guidance of reason, to live so, and to
preserve one’s being (these three have ethe same meaning) on the basis of
seeking what is useful to oneself.
‘to act absolutely’ – is to act in ignorance
any action – virtuous or not – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain –
to pretend ‘absoluteness’ – is to defy / deny logic
so called ‘absolute action’ – is false and pretentious
‘to act under the guidance of reason’ – is to hold one’s
proposals / propositions – open to question – open to doubt and to understand
and explore their uncertainty –
Spinoza’s idea of reason – is the deductive argument of the
‘Ethics’ –
the propositions of the ‘Ethics’ are not regarded by Spinoza
– as open to question – or open to doubt – they are regarded as certain
any such argument is the antithesis of reason
‘seeking what is useful to one’s self’ – as with any other
ethical proposal – is rational – if it is held open to question – open to doubt
– and its uncertainty explored
Proof. – To act absolutely from virtue is nothing
else (Def. 8, Part IV.) than to act according to the laws of one’s nature. But
we act only in so far as we understand (Prop. 2, Part III.). Therefore to act
according to virtue is nothing else in us than to act, to live, and to preserve
our being under the guidance of reason. 0n the basis of seeking what is useful
to oneself. Q.e.d.
firstly – there are no ‘laws of one’s nature’ –
any proposal regarding ‘one’s nature’ – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
we understand ourselves – the world – and our relation to
the world – in terms of the proposals we operate with –
these proposals – these understandings – from a logical
point of view ore never fixed – never ‘absolute’ – they are uncertain
understanding is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
PROP. XXV. No one endeavours to preserve his being for the
sake of anything else.
this is just plainly false –
it is not uncommon at all that people wish to stay alive for
others – for the sake of those they love – for those they feel a responsibility
for – for those they have an obligation to
here the facts of life – the facts of human propositional
activity – defeat Spinoza’s proposition
Proof. – The endeavour wherewith each thing
endeavours to persist in its own being is defined by the essence of the thing
alone (Prop. 7, Part III.), and from this alone, and not from the essence of
any other thing, it necessarily follows (Prop. 6, Part III,) that each one
endeavours to preserve his own being. The proposition is also obvious from
Coroll., Prop. 22, Part IV. For if man were to endeavour to preserve his being
for the sake of anything else, then that thing would be the primary basis of
his virtue (as is self- manifest), which is (by that Coroll.) absurd. Therefore
no one endeavours, etc. Q.e.d.
‘the essence of the thing alone’ – if we are still to use
this notion of ‘essence’ – is propositional – a matter open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
a thing’s relation to any other thing – is a propositional
relation – and is likewise a critical matter
nothing ‘follows necessarily’ in propositional life –
one may endeavour to preserve one’s being – but there is no
necessity in this –
and as a matter of experience – of fact – we know there are
those who do not endeavour to preserve their being
if by ‘primary basis is meant a certain or absolute
basis – there is no ‘primary basis to virtue
any proposed ‘basis to virtue’ – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXVI. Whatever we endeavour to do under the guidance
of reason is nothing else than to understand; nor does the mind, in so far as
it uses reason, judge anything useful to itself save what is conducive to
understanding.
reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and
the exploration of uncertainty
understanding is propositional – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
what is useful – may not be understood – but nevertheless –
useful
and just what is useful is open to question
Proof. – The endeavour to preserve oneself is nothing
else than the essence of the thing itself (Prop. 7, Part III.) which, in so far
as it exists as such, is conceived to have force for persisting in existing
(Prop. 6, Part III.), and for doing those things which necessarily follow from
its given nature (see the def. of appetite in Note, Prop. 9, Part
III.) But the essence of reason is nothing else than our
mind in so far as it understands clearly and distinctly (see def, in Note2,
Prop. 40, Part II.). Therefore (Prop. 40, Part II.), whatever we endeavour to
do under the guidance of reason is nothing else than to understand. Again, as
this endeavour of the mind, whereby, in so far as it reasons, it tries to
preserve its own being, is nothing other than to understand (first part of this
Prop.), therefore this endeavour to understand (Coroll., Prop. 22, Part IV,) is
the first and only basis of virtue. Nor do we endeavour
to understand things for the sake of any end, but, on the contrary, the mind,
in so far as it has reasons, cannot conceive anything as good for itself save
what is conducive to understanding (Def. I, Part IV.).
Q.e.d.
the ‘essence’ – (if we use this term) – of anything – is
propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
nothing follows necessarily from the nature of anything –
any deduction – is open to question – is uncertain
any so called ‘clear and distinct’ understanding – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the endeavour to preserve one’s being – will be an uncertain
activity
all propositional activity can be seen as understanding
the nature of virtue is open to question
‘Nor do we endeavour to understand things for the sake of
any end, but, on the contrary, the mind, in so far as it has reasons, cannot
conceive anything as good for itself save what is conducive to understanding’
I would have thought that for Spinoza – the ‘end’ of
understanding – is the preservation of one’s being?
‘understanding’ – is the critical process of question – of
doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty – just as the question of what is
‘good’ – is a critical propositional exploration
PROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or bad
save what is truly conducive to understanding or what can prevent us from
understanding.
there is no certain knowledge on any matter –
all knowledge is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
–
there is no certain ‘good’ – there is no certain ‘bad’
any proposal regarding ‘good’ or ‘bad – is open to question
– is uncertain – is a matter of critical / propositional exploration
understanding is the critical process of question –
of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
without question – without doubt – and without the
exploration of uncertainty – there is no understanding
what is conducive to understanding is an open mind and
critical inquiry
what prevents us from understanding – is a dogmatic view of
reality –
that is to say – a non-critical view on any matter
Proof. – The mind in so far as it has reasons,
desires nothing else than to understand, nor does it judge anything useful to
itself save what is conducive to understanding (prev. Prop.). But the mind
(Prop. 41 and 43, Part II, with its Note) has no certainty of things save in so
far as it has adequate ideas, or, (Prop. 40, Note 2 Part II.) is the same
thing, in so far as it has reasons. Therefore we understand nothing to be
certainly good save what is truly conducive to understanding, and, on the
contrary, that to be bad which can prevent us from understanding. Q.e.d.
‘The mind in so far as it has reasons …’
‘reasons’ are proposals – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
and ‘understanding’ – is propositional activity – the
proposals we work with
what we find useful – may not be something that we can
explain – but nevertheless – we regard as useful
and in any case – what is useful to us – is always a matter
– open to question
furthermore – we may not see understanding in terms of
utility –
we may seek to understand reality – rather in terms of how
it is – i.e. – its structure – as a scientist might do – rather than in terms
of its usefulness to us
or again we may seek – as artist might – to understand
reality or any aspect of it – in terms of its beauty – rather than its utility
–
the point being how we understand – how we propose – is
logically speaking – open to propositional possibility
‘But the mind (Prop. 41 and 43, Part II, with its Note) has
no certainty of things save in so far as it has adequate ideas ,,,’
I regard any proposal / idea – as adequate – if it is
held open to question – open to doubt – and held to be uncertain
however – if by ‘adequate’ – one means – as Spinoza does –
‘certain’ – not open to question – not open to doubt – then any such proposal /
idea – is illogical and irrational – and is nothing more than a prejudice
‘understanding’ – is propositional activity – put to
question –
and I suspect only severe mental / physical illness would
prevent propositional activity
PROP. XXVIII. The greatest good of the mind is the knowledge
of God, and the greatest virtue of the mind is to know God.
in Spinoza’s terms – ‘the greatest good’ – and ‘the greatest
virtue’ – amount to the most useful – the most useful knowledge
what will count as the most useful knowledge?
this is a contingent matter – and a matter open to question
– open to doubt and uncertain
no proposal / proposition – has any logical precedence or
superiority – over any other proposal
‘knowledge of God’ – however ‘God’ is defined – however
‘God’ is understood – is a proposal – a proposal like any other – open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if the proposal / knowledge of ‘God’ – is useful to you – it
will play a role in your propositional life – if it is not of any use to you –
it won’t –
and such a proposal may be ‘the most useful’ to one
propositional actor –
and of little use to another
in general – we can ask – is it knowledge that is ‘good’ –
or is it action?
and are not virtues – merely generalized descriptions – of
people’s actions?
could one act immorally or unethically – and according to
Spinoza – still claim the greatest good and the greatest virtue – so long as he
or she ‘knows God?’?
if so – all we have from Spinoza is ethical pretence
Proof. – The greatest thing that the mind can
understand is God. that is (Def. 6, Part I.) a being absolutely infinite, and
without which nothing can either be (Prop. 15, Part I.), or be conceived.
Therefore (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.) the thing of the greatest use or good to
the mind (Def. I, Part IV.) is the knowledge of God. Again, the mind, in so far
as it understands, thus far only is active (Prop. 1 and 3, Part III.), and thus
far (Prop. 23, Part IV.) can it be absolutely said that it acts according to
virtue. To understand, therefore, is the absolute virtue of the mind. But the
greatest thing that the mind can understand is God (as we have just proved).
Therefore the greatest virtue of the mind is to understand or know God. Q.e.d.
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
Spinoza’s view of ‘God’ – as ‘absolutely infinite’ – etc –
is as logically legitimate – as any other view
the point is that any interpretation of reality is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
our knowledge is proposal –
is any proposal of the greatest use or good?
really this is at base an empirical issue – dependent on how
individual propositional actors define – ‘greatest’ – ‘use’ and ‘good’ – and
not one that can be determined by fiat –
‘greatest’ – ‘use’ and ‘good’ – are proposals – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
the mind is propositional action
nothing can be ‘absolutely said’ –
anything ‘said’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
if the mind’s activity – is ‘virtuous’ – then any
propositional action – is virtuous
‘understanding God’ – is facing the unknown
PROP. XXIX. No particular thing whose nature is altogether
different from ours can aid or hinder our power of doing things, and absolutely
nothing can be either good or bad for us save if it have something in common
with us.
according to Spinoza everything that exists is an expression
of the one infinite and eternal substance – therefore it follows that no thing
is ‘altogether different’ from any other thing
and given that –
anything can be either good or bad for us –
assuming for the moment that Spinoza hasn’t ditched his
whole metaphysics – we can ask what would be an example of a thing whose nature
is ‘altogether different from us’?
so far – we have no answer from Spinoza
Proof. – The power of a
particular thing, and consequently (Coroll., Prop. 10, Part I) the power of
man, by which he exists and works, is determined only by another particular
thing (Prop. 28, Part I.) whose nature (Prop. 6, Part II,) must be understood
through the same attribute through which human nature is conceived. Therefore
our power of acting, in whatever way it may be conceived, can be determined,
and consequently aided or hindered, by the power of some other particular thing
which has something in common with us, and not by the power of something whose
nature is altogether different from ours; inasmuch as we call that good or bad
which is the cause of pleasure or pain (Prop. 8, Part IV.), that is (Prop. 11,
Note, Part III.), which increases or diminishes, aids or hinders our power of
acting, therefore the thing whose nature is entirely different from our can be
neither good nor bad for us. Q.e.d.
I would have thought that for Spinoza the ‘power of man’ –
is an expression of God
and again – what is this ‘other particular thing’?
our power of acting is logical – it rests in critical
activity –
that is the activity of question – of doubt – and the
exploration of uncertainty
without this critical activity our propositional lives are
stymied in dogmatism – ignorance – pretence and prejudice
‘some other particular thing’ – however described – is a proposal
– a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what I call ‘good’ – is an open mind – a critical /
rational outlook –
and what I call ‘bad’ – is a dogmatic / non-critical /
irrational approach to propositional life
pleasure and pain – are no different to any propositional
experience –
pleasure and pain – if dealt with rationally – are open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXX. Nothing
can be bad through that which it has in common with our nature, but in so far
as it is bad for us, thus far it is contrary to us.
again – if reality – including the nature of human beings –
is the one expression of God – as Spinoza proposes –
then there is nothing that is ‘contrary’ to us –
and as to what is common to our nature – is it not the
infinite eternal substance – that is God?
our reality is propositional – our actions are propositional
–
any propositional activity is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
what any propositional actor describes as ‘bad’ – will be a
matter open to question –
and any proposal – open to question – is not ‘contrary to
our nature’
Proof. – We call that which is the cause of pain bad
(Prop. 8, Part IV.), that is (by def., which see in Note, Prop. 11, Part II.),
which decreases or diminishes our power of acting. If. therefore, anything
through that which it has in common with us were bad for us, it would therefore
be able to diminish or hinder what it has in common with us, which (Prop. 4,
Part III.) is absurd. Therefore nothing through that which it has in common
with us can be bad for us; but. on the other hand, in so far as it is bad, that
is (as we have just shown), in so far it can diminish or hinder our power of
action, thus far (Prop. 5, Part III.) it is contrary to us. Q.e.d.
pleasure may be the cause of pain
and pain may increase or enhance one’s power of acting – if
pain is critically evaluated
given Spinoza’s view that anything and everything is an
expression of God –
all things share a commonality
what counts as ‘bad’ – will be open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
what diminishes our power of acting – is the failure to
critically examine the proposals / propositions that we operate with
what increases our power of acting is putting our proposals
/ propositions to question putting them to doubt – and exploring their
uncertainty
PROP. XXXI. In so far
as anything agrees with our nature, thus far it is necessarily good.
given his metaphysics – the question for Spinoza is – in so
far as ‘our nature’ – as with the ‘nature’ of everything – is an expression of
the one eternal and infinite substance – ‘God’ – what can disagree with our
nature?
‘our nature’ – is propositional
anything that we do – that is any human propositional
activity – is ‘of our nature’
our nature is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain –
our nature is uncertain
‘good’ and ‘bad’ – are proposals / descriptions that we use
with respect to our propositional activity –
510.
their use and application – is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain
our reality is uncertain – not necessary
Proof. – In so far as anything agrees with our nature
it cannot (prev. Prop.) be bad. It will therefore be either good or
indifferent. If we suppose this, that it is neither good nor bad, then nothing
(Ax., Part IV.) will follow from its nature which can serve for the
preservation of our nature, that is (by hypothesis), which serves for the
preservation of our nature of the thing itself. But this is absurd (Prop. 6,
Part III,). It will therefore be, in so far as it agrees with our nature,
necessarily good. Q.e.d.
as a matter of empirical fact – I think it is fair to say –
that we don’t always operate with value judgements – i.e. – ‘this is good’ –
‘this is bad’
value judgment / proposals can and do play a major role in
our propositional life –
but a good deal of our propositional activity is not the
subject of a value judgment –
and so – a proposal / proposition – may be – relative to
questions of value – indifferent or neutral–
Spinoza’s metaphysics cannot account for ethical
neutrality
and where there is a genuine question of good or evil –
ethical neutrality – is just where we start
Corollary. – Hence it follows that the more a thing
agrees with our nature, the more useful or good it is for us, and, on the other
hand, the more useful anything is to us, the more it agrees with our nature.
For in so far as it does not agree with our nature it will necessarily be
different from our nature or contrary to it. If it is different, then (Prop.
29, Part IV.) it can neither be good nor bad; if it is contrary, it will
therefore be contrary to that which agrees with our nature, that is (prev. Prop,)
contrary to good, i.e., bad. Nothing therefore, save in so far as it agrees
with our nature, can be good; and therefore the more it agrees with our nature,
the more it is useful to us, and contrariwise. Q.e.d.
given Spinoza’s view that all that exists is an expression
of the one eternal and infinite substance (God) – what is it that does not
agree with our nature?
Spinoza has no answer here –
this – ‘in so far as it does not agree with our nature’ – is
a straw man argument – and duplicitous –
and that needs to called out
PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are liable to passions they
cannot thus far be said to agree in nature.
man’s nature is propositional –
propositions are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
man’s propositional behaviour however described –
i.e. – as ‘passionate’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking –
in that propositional actors – operate in propositional
uncertainty – they can be said to ‘agree in nature’
Proof. – Things which are said to agree in nature are
understood to agree in power (Prop. 7, Part III.), but not in want of power, or
negation, and consequently (see Note, Prop. 3, Part III.) in passion. Wherefore
men, in so far as they are liable to passions, cannot be thus far said to agree
in nature. Q.e.d.
human power is logical – is propositional – is critical
as a matter of fact – men differ in their critical behaviour
if the statements – ‘black and white agree in this alone’ –
and ‘a man and a stone agree in this alone’ and ‘those things which agree in
negation in truth agree in nothing’ – are presented as statements of certainty
– as beyond criticism – beyond doubt – then they are not rational statements
the logical reality is that any proposal of agreement or any
proposal of disagreement – between things – that is – between proposals – is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘For those things
which agree in negation alone, or in what they have not, in truth agree in
nothing.’
a proposal put –
can be assented to or dissented from –
where it is
assented to – it has currency – where it is dissented from – it has no currency
– it is dropped from consideration
if two proposals
are negated – dissented from – they are both logically inactive – and not in
consideration –
there is no basis
for agreement – so long as they are dissented from
PROP. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature in so far as they are
assailed by emotions which are passions, and thus far one and the same man is
variable and inconsistent.
men do not differ in nature – human beings are propositional
actors
we are not assailed by emotions / passions
any so called ‘emotion’ or ‘passion’ is a proposal –
a proposal open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
‘variable and inconsistent’?
yes – human beings operate in propositional uncertainty
Proof. – The nature or essence of the emotions cannot
be explained through our essence or nature alone Def. 1 and 2, Part III.), but
must be defined by the power, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), by the nature of
external causes compared with our own.
Whence it comes about that there are many species of each
emotion as there are species of objects by which we are affected (Prop. 56,
Part III.), and that men are affected by one and the same object in different
manners (Prop. 51, Part III.), and thus far disagree in nature, and moreover,
that one and the same man (Prop. 51, Part III.) is affected in different
manners towards the same object, and thus far is variable, etc. Q.e.d.
our nature is propositional – that is to say open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
our nature is uncertain
‘external causes’ – are proposals – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘objects’ as with ‘emotions’ are proposals –
what we deal with in our propositional lives is the relation
between different proposals
and any proposed relation is open to question
‘that men are affected by one and the same thing in
different manners’ – and ‘that one and the same man is affected in different
manners towards the same object and thus far is variable’ –
indicates – propositional uncertainty
PROP. XXXIV. Men in so far as they are assailed by emotions
which are passions, can be contrary one to the other.
propositional actors are not assailed by emotions / passions
–
‘emotion’ – ‘passion’ – are names for proposals /
propositional actions –
we enact emotions / passions –
and any propositional action / emotion / passion – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
men – as propositional actors – operate in propositional
uncertainty –
whether men are contrary one to the other or in tune with
each other – they are dealing with propositional uncertainty
Proof. – A man, e.g., Peter can be the cause that
Paul feels pain either because he has something similar to a thing which Paul
hates (Prop. 16, Part III.), or because Peter alone possesses something which
Paul also loves (Prop. 32, Part III. with its Note), or for other causes (for
the principal ones, see Note, Prop, 55, Part III.). And therefore it comes
about from this that Paul hates Peter (Def, Emo. 7), and consequently it may
easily happen (Prop. 40, Part III., with its Note) that Peter on the other hand
hates Paul and therefore (Prop, 39, Part III.) that they endeavour to work each
other reciprocal harm, that is (Prop. 30, Part IV,), that they are contrary to
each other, But the emotion of pain is always a passion (Prop. 59, Part III.):
therefore men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions,
can be contrary to each other. Q.e,d.
it just does not follow that because Peter has something
that Paul hates – that Paul will hate Peter –
he may i.e. – pity Peter – or he may be disinterested in
Peter’s affairs
and it does not follow that because Peter has something that
Paul loves – he will hate Peter
he could i.e. – be pleased at Peter’s could fortune
there is no necessity in emotional / propositional
possibility
how anyone will react to any propositional circumstance – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and yes – people can hate each other – but hate like any
other emotional / propositional response – if dealt with rationally – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
men are not assailed by emotions and passions –
men operate in propositional uncertainty –
men can be contrary to each other – but any such
contrariness – as with compatibility – is open to question
Note. – I said that Paul may hate Peter, inasmuch as
he imagines him to possess what he loves. Whence at the first glance it seems
that these two, from the fact that they love the same thing, and consequently
agree in nature, are injurious to one another; and therefore if this is true,
Prop. 30 and 32 of this part are false. But if we are willing to examine the
matter fairly, we shall see that these statements entirely agree. For these two
are not hateful to each other in so far as they agree in nature, that is, in so
far as they both love the same thing, but in so far as they disagree one with
the other. For in so far as they both love the same thing, by that very fact
the love of each of them is fostered (Prop. 31, Part III.), that is (Def. Emo.
6) by that very fact the pleasure of each is fostered. Wherefore it is far from
being the case that in so far as they love the same thing and agree in nature
they are hateful one to the other; but the cause of this thing is, as I said,
nothing else than that they are supposed to disagree in nature. For we suppose
Peter to have the idea of the thing loved possessed by him, and Paul, on the
other the other hand, the idea of the thing loved lost to him. Whence it comes
about that the first is affected with pleasure, and the second with pain: and
thus far they are contrary to one to the other. And in this manner we can
easily show that the other causes of hatred depend on this alone, that men
disagree in nature, and do not depend on that in which they agree.
men operate in propositional uncertainty –
and it is propositional uncertainty that is the logical /
existential basis of any agreement or disagreement –
love and hate – pleasure and pain – are emotional /
propositional states – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXXV. In so far as men live under the guidance of
reason, thus far only they always necessarily agree in nature.
men are propositional actors –
men act logically and rationally in so far as they
critically evaluate their proposals –
however – critical evaluation – may not result is agreement
between men – it may result in disagreement – in fact disagreement is more
likely than agreement in any critical evaluation of a proposition – though
agreement is possible
further – any agreement or disagreement – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – In so far as men are assailed by emotions
which are passions they can be different in nature (Prop. 33, Part IV.) and
contrary one to the other (prev. Prop.). but men are said to be active only in
so far as they live under the guidance of reason
(Prop. 3, Part III.), and therefore whatever follows from
human nature, in so far as it
is defined by reason,
must (Def. 3, Part III.) be understood through human nature alone as its
proximate cause. But in so far as each
one desires according to the laws of his own nature what is good, and
endeavours to remove what he thinks to be good or bad, according to the
dictates of reason, is necessarily good or bad (Prop. 41, Part II.), therefore
men, in so far as they live according to the dictates of reason, do those things
which are necessarily good to human nature, and consequently to each man, that
is (Coroll., Prop. 31, Part IV.), which agree with the nature of each man. And
therefore men also necessarily agree one with the other in so far as they live
according to the mandates of reason. Q.e.d.
men are not
‘assailed’ by emotions / passions
emotions /
passions are propositional states – enacted by men
men are
propositional actors – their propositional actions can be varied and uncertain one
to the other
any proposal put – is an action –
whether rational or not
reason is
the critical process of question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
anything
that humans do – that is – any proposal put – any propositional action taken –
whether rational or not – ‘follows human nature’
reason –
rational behaviour plays a part in propositional life – but it is not the full
story
much of
what humans do – how they deal with their proposals / propositional actions – is
illogical and irrational
this ‘laws
of his own nature’ – is nothing more than an individual’s propositional action
as to
whether an individual’s propositional actions are good or bad – that will
depend on how that individual defines ‘good’ and ‘bad’ –
and the
logical reality is that any definition of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – is open to question
– open to doubt and uncertain
there is no
necessity is propositional activity – no necessity in definitions of ‘good’ or
‘bad’
there are
no ‘dictates of reason’ or ‘mandates of reason’ –
reason is
the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of
uncertainty –
there are
no things which are necessarily good –
what counts
as good – for any man – is a matter open to question – is uncertain
there is no
guarantee that men will agree with each other
men can and
do agree with each other – just as they can and do disagree with each other
any
agreement – or disagreement – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
Corollary I – There is no individual thing in nature
more useful to man than one who lives under the guidance of reason. For that is
most useful to man which mostly agrees with his nature (Coroll., Prop. 31, Part
IV.), that is (as is elf evident), man. But man is absolutely active according
to the laws of his nature when he lives under the guidance of reason (De. 2,
Part III.), and thus far only can he agree necessarily with the nature of
another man (prev. Prop.). Therefore there is nothing more useful to man than
man, etc. Q.e.d.
reason is the critical evaluation of proposals
the critical evaluation of proposals / propositions – is
logical and rational – and useful
however – it is open to question whether it is useful for
all men – in all circumstances
a non-critical – irrational – dogmatic view – might well be
regarded as useful by an individual in certain circumstances –
what is useful to someone may not be logical or rational –
the point being – what is useful – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
man is active – whether or not – he operates ‘under
the guidance of reason’ – that is – whether or not he is critically engaged
men can and do agree with each – but there is no necessity
in this –
any proposed agreement (or disagreement) between men – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
man can be useful to man – and man can be of no use
to man – and furthermore – destructive of man
the logical reality is that how man relates to man – is
uncertain
Corollary II. – As each man seeks that most which is
useful to him, so men are most useful one to the other. For the more man seeks
what is most useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more he is
endowed with virtue (Prop. 20, Part IV.). the more power he is endowed with to
act according to the laws of his nature, that is (Prop.3, Part III.), to live
under the guidance of reason. But men must agree most in nature when they live
under the guidance of reason (prev. Prop.). Therefore (prev. Coroll.) men are
most useful one to the other when each seeks out what is useful to himself. Q.e.d.
it's easy to say that each man seeks what is most useful to
him –
but the logical reality is that we often don’t know what is
most useful to us –
the fact is we explore – explore propositional
possibility –
and in any case – should we determine that a course of
action is most useful to us –
that determination is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
we do what we do – and we propose description of what we do
one such description is ‘useful’ – but it is only one of the
many descriptions / names – we give to our propositional actions
it is up for grabs – in any circumstance – whether or not
men are most useful one to the other
seeking what you believe to be most useful to yourself – may
not result in preserving yourself
and we can ask – do people actually operate on the basis of
preserving themselves?
I imagine that for some people in some circumstance –
preserving themselves becomes a focus –
however – it can be the case that one is seeking to enjoy
oneself – with no thought of preserving oneself
our motivations – are not set and determined – they are many
and varied –
they are at base – uncertain
reason is not a ‘guidance’ – reason is a critical
propositional activity –
those who question – doubt and explore uncertainty – that is
those who act logically and rationally – may or may not agree with each other
and whether acting rationally is useful one to the other –
is an open question
being rational – may not be useful
Note. – What we have shown is borne witness to by
experience daily with such convincing examples that it has become a proverb:
Man is a God to man. Yet it rarely happens that men live according tot the
instructions of reason, but among them things are in such a state that they are
usually envious of or a nuisance to each other. But nevertheless they are
scarcely able to live a solitary life, so that to many the definition that man
is a social animal must be very apparent; and in truth things are so ordered at
human affairs, that from the common society of men far more conveniences arise
than the contrary. Let satirists therefore laugh to their hearts content at
human affairs, let theologians revile them, and let the melancholy praise as
much as they can the rude
and barbarous isolated life: let them despise men and admire
the brutes – despite all this, men will find that they can prepare with
material aid far more easily what they need, and avoid far more easily the
perils which beset them on all sides, by united forces: to say nothing of how
much better it is, and more worthy of our knowledge, to regard the deeds of men
rather than those of brutes.
‘man is a God to man’ or ‘men are usually envious or a
nuisance to each other’?
man can be useful to man – and man can be envious and a
nuisance – but these relationships – do not exhaust the possible ways men can
and do relate to each other
in certain circumstances men may be of no use to each other
– and may indeed hinder each other
and – men may relate to each other without being useful –
envious or a nuisance –
i.e. – men may just simply enjoy each other company
how we relate to each – and how we describe any given
relationship – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
even though one may ‘scarcely live a solitary life’ – there
are those who have and do live with minimal contact with others – and there are
individuals who have tried to avoid any contact with other men
we can ask – for such people – how useful is man to man?
‘far more conveniences arise than the contrary’?
I think for most people – this is true – but there can be
exceptions to this
a barbarous isolated life – may suit some
yes – there are those who despise men and admire brutes –
and I see no issue with this
just whether ‘united forces’ – always work to our advantage
is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
war is a clear example of where ‘united forces’ – result in
death and destruction
man can learn a lot from animals
PROP. XXXVI. The greatest good of those who follow virtue is
common to all, and all can easily enjoy it.
any idea of the ‘greatest good’ – will be some
proposed ‘hierarchy of good’ – and any proposed hierarchy of good – will be
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as will any proposal of ‘good’ –
presumably – ‘those who follow virtue’ – are just those who
act in a way that they regard as good –
and acting in such a way – logically speaking – means
putting any proposed ‘good’ to question – to doubt – and exploring the
uncertainty of any proposed ‘good’
the logical reality is that propositional actors have
different conceptions of ‘good’ –
and the empirical reality is that there is no practise of
virtue that is common to all – that is enjoyed by all
Spinoza here demonstrates that he has no idea of the logic
of ‘good’ – or the actual use and practise of the proposal of ‘good’
Proof. – To act from virtue is to act from the
instruction of reason (Prop. 24, Part IV.), and whatever we endeavour to do
from reason is understanding (prop.26, Part IV.). And therefore (Prop. 28 Part
IV.) the greatest good of those who follow virtue is to know God, that is
(Prop. 47, Part II., and its Note). the good which can be possessed equally by
all men, in so far as they are of the same nature. Q.e.d.
reason is not an ‘instruction’ – reason is the critical
activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of
propositional uncertainty –
our ‘understanding’ is propositional – is uncertain
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
the unknown is just that – unknown –
to describe the unknown as ‘good’ – or the ‘greatest good’ –
is vacuous
any proposal of ‘good’ – is open to question – open to doubt
– and is uncertain
to be ‘good’ is to be virtuous – to be ‘virtuous’ is to be
good – the terms are interchangeable
just ‘what of the same nature’ means – is open to question
you can say all men are of the same nature – otherwise they
would not be men –
and according to Spinoza – anything that exists is an
expression of God – therefore everything ‘is of the same nature’
if ‘of the same nature’ – means ‘agreement between men’ – it
does not account for the natural – everyday fact of disagreement between men
so – if it means ‘agreement’ – it is simplistic and
inadequate
human beings are ‘of the same nature’ in that they are propositional
– that is they propose their reality – and they can put their proposals
to question – to doubt – and explore their uncertainty
Note. – But if one ask, What if the greatest good of
those who follow virtue were not common to all? would it not then follow as
above (see Prop. 34, Part IV.) that men who live according to the mandate of
reason, that is (Prop. 35, Part Iv.), men, in so far as they agree in nature,
would be contrary to each other? He has this answer for himself, that it arises
not accidentally but from the very nature of reason that the greatest good of
man should be common to all, clearly because it is deduced from human essence
itself in so far as it is defined by reason, and inasmuch as a man can neither
be nor be conceived without the power of enjoying the greatest good. For it
belongs (Prop. 47, Part II.) to the essence of the human mind to have adequate
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Spinoza’s answer to his question – ‘what if the greatest
good of those who follow virtue were not common to all’ – is really no argument
– it is rather nothing more than the assertion that the greatest good is
common to all men –
the so-called ‘argument’ – is a mishmash of inter-related
vague concepts – ‘human essence’ – ‘reason’ – ‘greatest good’ – ‘essence’ –
‘adequate knowledge’ – ‘eternal and infinite essence of God’
Spinoza has nothing here – but his assertion – and its
background noise
human beings can propose ‘good’ – can propose ‘virtue’ – and
their proposals are many and varied
furthermore – any such proposal is open to question – open
to doubt – and is uncertain
what is common to all is propositional uncertainty –
and by the way – we can ask here – what of those who don’t
follow virtue?
what place do they have in Spinoza’s cacophony?
PROP. XXXVII. The good which each one who follows virtue
desires for himself, he also desires for other men, and the more so the more
knowledge he has of God.
I may desire a good for myself – and take the view that I am
not is a position to speak for anyone else
and as for ‘the more knowledge he has of God’ – what is that
‘more knowledge’?
let us say you accept Spinoza’s idea of God – what ‘more’ is
there to it?
Proof. – Men is so far as they live under the
guidance of reason, are most useful to men (Coroll. 1, Prop. 35, Part IV.); and
therefore (Prop. 19, Part IV) we endeavour, under the guidance of reason, to
bring it about that men live under the guidance of reason. But the good which
each person who lives according to the dictates of reason, that is (Prop. 24,
Part IV), who follows virtue, desires for himself, is understood (Prop. 26,
part IV.); therefore the good which he desires for himself, he desires also
for other men. Again, desire, in so far as it has reference
to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. Emo. i); but the essence of
the mind constitutes of knowledge (Prop. 11, Part II) which involves knowledge
of God (Prop. 47, Part II.), and without which (Prop. 15, Part I) it cannot
exist or be conceived. And therefore, according as the essence of the mind
involves greater knowledge of God, so the desire with which he who follows
virtue desires the good which he desires for himself for others, will be
greater. Q.e.d.
‘Men is so far as they live under the guidance of reason,
are most useful to men (Coroll. 1, Prop. 35, Part IV.); and therefore (Prop.
19, Part IV) we endeavour, under the guidance of reason, to bring it about that
men live under the guidance of reason.’
‘reason’ – is the critical activity of question – of doubt –
and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
it is fair enough to suggest that this activity can be
useful –
as to the proposal that it is ‘most useful’ to men – this
proposal – as with any other – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
we cannot ride roughshod over contingent reality with
pretentious – so called ‘objective’ prescription
what is useful to men will be determined in context –
contingent context – and any determination – will be open to question
‘But the good which each person who lives according to the
dictates of reason, that is (Prop. 24, Part IV), who follows virtue, desires
for himself, is understood (Prop. 26, part IV.); therefore the good which he
desires for himself, he desires also for other men’
it just does not follow that the good which he desires for
himself – ‘understood’ – or not – he therefore desires for other men
it is presumptuous and pretentious to hold that what I
desire – everyone else desires
firstly – what I regard as good and what I desire – I may
think is not for everyone
secondly – I don’t know what others regard as good or
what they desire –
and should someone propose that what they desire is what I
desire – well and good
however – any such proposal is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain
‘Again, desire, in so far as it has reference to the mind,
is the very essence of the mind (Def. Emo. i); but the essence of the mind
constitutes of knowledge (Prop. 11, Part II) which involves knowledge of God
(Prop. 47, Part II.), and without which (Prop. 15, Part I) it cannot exist or
be conceived’
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional activity
‘body’ – is a name for propositional action
there is no ‘essence’ to propositional activity – or – propositional
activity – is the essence of propositional activity
knowledge is proposal – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
what can or does exist is a matter open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
there is no ‘greater knowledge of God’ –
the unknown – is unknown
‘knowledge’ is not a question of quantity –
knowledge is proposal – critically evaluated
Another Proof. – A man will love the good which he
desires for himself and loves, with greater constancy, if he sees that others
love it also (Prop. 31, Part III.). And therefore (Coroll., same Prop.) he will
endeavour to bring it about that others also will like it. And as this good
(prev. Prop.) is common to all, and all may enjoy it, he will endeavour,
therefore (by the same reason) to bring it to pass that all enjoy it, and
(Prop. 37, Part III.) the more so the more he enjoys it. Q.e.d.
‘A man will love the good which he desires for himself and
loves, with greater constancy, if he sees that others love it also (Prop. 31,
Part III.).’
perhaps so – but it is also quite possible that what others
desire and love does not influence what a man desires and loves
‘And therefore (Coroll., same Prop.) he will endeavour to
bring it about that others also will like it.’
this is possible – but he may take the view that what others
like – is up to them to decide
‘And as this good (prev. Prop.) is common to all, and all
may enjoy it, he will endeavour, therefore (by the same reason) to bring it to
pass that all enjoy it, and (Prop. 37, Part III.) the more so the more he
enjoys it.’
it is pretentious to assume that what one considers as a good
– is common to all
and it doesn’t follow that the more I enjoy something – that
I will ‘endeavour to bring it about that all enjoy it’
in fact – anyone who takes this view is bordering on
megalomania
Note I. – He who endeavours from emotion alone to
bring it to pass that others love what he loves, and that others should live
according to his liking, acts from impulse, and is hateful more especially to
those whom other things please, and who accordingly endeavour with the same
impulse to bring it about that others should live according to their idea of
life. Again, as the greatest good which men desire from
emotion is often that only one man possess it, it comes about that those who
love are not constant in mind, and while they delight to praise the things they
love, yet at the same time they fear to be believed. But
he who endeavours to lead the rest by reason, not impulse, acts humanely and
benignly, and is most constant in mind. Again.
whatever we desire, and do of which we are the cause, in so far as we have the
idea of God or in so far as we know God, I refer to Religion (religio). The desire, however, of doing good, which is engendered in
us by reason of the fact that we live according to the precepts of reason, I
call Piety (pietas). Again, the desire
wherewith a man who lives according to the instruction of reason is so held
that he wishes to unite others to him in friendship, I call Honesty (honestas),
and that honest which mem who live under the guidance of reason praise; and, on
the other hand, that base (turpe) which is opposed to the making of
friendship. Besides this, I have shown what are the basements of a state. Now the difference between true virtues and weakness can
easily be perceived from what has been said above, namely, that true virtue is
nothing else than living according to the precepts of reason; and therefore
weakness consists in this alone, that man allows himself to be led by things
which are outside of him, and is determined by them to do things which the
common disposition of external things postulates, and not those postulated by
his own nature considered in itself. Now these are
the things which I promised to prove in the Note of Prop. 18, Part IV., from
which it is apparent that the law not to slaughter animals has its foundation
more in vain superstition and womanish pity than true reason. The reason wherewith we seek what is useful to us teaches
us the necessity of uniting ourselves with our fellow men, but not with brutes
and things which are different from the human species in nature; but we have
the same right over them as they have over us. Again,
as everyone’s right is defined by his virtue or power, men have far more right
over beasts than beasts over men. I do not deny that beasts feel; but I deny
that on that account we should not consult our necessity and use them as much
as we wish and treat them as we will, since they do not agree with us in
nature, and their emotions are in nature different from human emotions (see
Note, Prop. 57, Part III.). It remains that I should explain what is just and
what unjust, what is sin and what is merit. On these points are the following
note.
‘Again, as the greatest good which men desire from emotion
is often that only one man possess it, it comes about that those who love are
not constant in mind, and while they delight to praise the things they love,
yet at the same time they fear to be believed.’
what men ‘desire from emotion’ – is what they propose
–
and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
if by being ‘constant in mind’ – is being uncritical and
dogmatic – then being constant is mind – is irrational
a critical mind – is an open mind – open to different
understandings – different propositional possibilities
‘fearing to be believed’?
the hard logical reality is that the best you can do is put
your proposal – and be open to critical analysis –
how your proposal is received – is really – anybody’s guess
‘But he who endeavours to lead the rest by reason, not
impulse, acts humanely and benignly, and is most constant in mind.’
impulsive action – is open to question – open to doubt – and
is uncertain
being open minded – and having a critical intelligence – is
really an anathema to the ‘most constant in mind’ –
a critical intelligence – is open to inconstancy – and in
fact – thrives on it
as to whether a critical / rational approach in
propositional life is ‘humane’ and ‘benign’ – will depend on how ‘humane’ and
‘benign’ – are defined
‘Again. whatever we desire, and do of which we are the
cause, in so far as we have the idea of God or in so far as we know God, I
refer to Religion (religio).’
Spinoza’s idea of God is purely intellectual – and his
metaphysics was not presented – by him – as a religion
religions do have an intellectual dimension – however
characteristically they are non-critical – dogmatic – authoritarian based
practises trading in fear and superstition
‘The desire, however, of doing good, which is engendered in
us by reason of the fact that we live according to the precepts of reason, I
call Piety (pietas).’
call it what you will – the fact is we operate with this
notion of ‘doing good’ – and just what that amounts to is open to question – is
uncertain
‘Again, the desire wherewith a man who lives according to
the instruction of reason is so held that he wishes to unite others to him in
friendship, I call Honesty (honestas), and that honest which mem who
live under the guidance of reason praise; and, on the other hand, that base (turpe)
which is opposed to the making of friendship.’
reason is not an ‘instruction’ – it is a critical activity
and yes – people do wish to unite in friendship – but just
what friendship amounts to is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
however – I can’t see why desiring a friend – is any more
‘honest’ – than desiring anything else
‘Now the difference between true virtues and weakness can
easily be perceived from what has been said above, namely, that true virtue is
nothing else than living according to the precepts of reason; and therefore
weakness consists in this alone, that man
allows himself to be led by things which are outside of him,
and is determined by them to do things which the common disposition of external
things postulates, and not those postulated by his own nature considered in
itself.’
reason has no precepts – reason is the critical activity of
question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
whether you call the critical approach to life ‘virtuous’ –
is neither here nor there
‘weakness’ – to my mind – consists in a non-critical view
and approach to propositional life
the good news is that what we are affected by – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as is our ‘nature’ – that is – what we postulate – what we
propose
‘Now these are the things which I promised to prove in the
Note of Prop. 18, Part IV., from which it is apparent that the law not to
slaughter animals has its foundation more in vain superstition and womanish
pity than true reason.’
as to whether this so-called ‘law to not slaughter animals
has its foundation in vain superstition and ‘womanish pity’ – is a matter open
to question –
it may well have its foundation in a view regarding the
ethical treatment of animals?
in any case – the ‘foundation’ of ‘true reason’ is the
critical activity of question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional
uncertainty
and ‘womanish pity’ – is yet another misogynistic mark
against Spinoza
and really what he is referring to here – is sensitivity
– which is characteristic of men and women – and might I add – non-human
species
‘The reason wherewith we seek what is useful to us teaches
us the necessity of uniting ourselves with our fellow men, but not with brutes
and things which are different from the human species in nature; but we have
the same right over them as they have over us.’
reason teaches us to keep an open mind –
and against Spinoza’s view here – is the view (ironically
Spinozistic) that we can unite ourselves with all that is in nature
as for ‘rights’ – I go with Jeremy Bentham – ‘nonsense on
stilts – rhetorical rubbish’
‘Again, as everyone’s right is defined by his virtue or
power, men have far more right over beasts than beasts over men. I do not deny
that beasts feel; but I deny that on that account we should not consult our
necessity and use them as much as we wish and treat them as we will, since they
do not agree with us in nature, and their emotions are in nature different from
human emotions’
men can have more power over animals – but it depends
on the circumstance – and the animal – re: Siegfried and Roy
man and animals are different species in the natural
world – and as such share a commonality – a common nature
and once again – such a view is quite consistent with
Spinoza’s metaphysic – and can be said to derive from it
Spinoza seems to have forgotten his own metaphysics when it
comes to women and animals
how we use each other – and how we use animals – is not a
matter of ‘rights’ –
it is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
Note II. – In the appendix of the first part I
promised to explain what was praise and blame, merit and sin, just and unjust.
As for praise and blame, I have explained them in the Note of Prop. 29, Part
III. I must now say something concerning the rest; but before doing that I must
say something concerning the natural and civil state of man.
Every man exists by consummate right of nature, and
consequently every man does by reason of this right those things which follow
from the necessity of his nature; and therefore each man judges for himself, by
his consummate right of nature, what is good or bad, and consults his advantage
according to his disposition (see Prop. 19 and 20, Part IV,) and revenges
himself (Coroll. 2 Prop. 40, Part III.), and endeavours to preserve what he
loves and to destroy what he hates (Prop. 28, Part III.). If men lived according to the dictates of reason, each one
would possess (Coroll. 1. Prop. 35, Part IV.) his right without any loss to
another; but because they are liable to emotions (Coroll., Prop. 4 Part IV.)
which far surpass the power of virtues (Prop. 6, Part IV.), they are therefore
often drawn in different directions (Prop. 33, Part IV.) and are contrary one
to the other (Prop. 34, Part IV.), while they need each other’s help (Note,
Prop. 35, Part IV). It is necessary, then, in order
that men live in concord and be of help to each other, that they should give up
their natural right and render themselves reciprocally secure, and determine to
do nothing that will be injurious to another. The
manner in which this can come about, namely, that men, who are necessarily
liable to emotions (Coroll. Prop, 4 Part IV.), and inconstant and variable
(Prop. 35, Part IV.), can make themselves mutually confident and have trust one
with the other is clear from Prop.7, Part IV., and Prop. 39. Part III., namely
that no emotion can be checked by another emotion stronger than the contrary to
the emotion checked, and that everyone refrains from inflicting evil through
fear of incurring a greater injury. By this law society (societas)
can be held together, provided it keep for itself the right everyone has of
vindicating wrong done to him, and judging what is good and evil, and if it
also has the power of prescribing a common system of life and behaviour, and of
making laws and forcing them to be respected, not by reason, which cannot check
emotions (Note, Prop. 17, Part IV.), but by threats. This society, ratified by
laws and power of keeping itself together, is called a state (civitas),
and those who are protected by this right are called citizens (civies).
From which we can easily understand that nothing can exist in a natural state
which can be called good or bad by common assent, since everyman, who is in a
natural state, consults only his own advantage, and determines what is good or
bad according to his fancy and in so far as he has regard
for his own advantage alone and holds himself responsible to
no one save himself by any law; and therefore sin cannot be conceived in a
natural state, but only in a civil state, where it is decreed by common consent
what is good or bad, and each one holds
himself responsible to the state. Therefore sin (peccatum)
is nothing else than disobedience, which is thus punishable by right of the
state alone; and on the other hand obedience is considered a merit in a
citizen, because he who rejoices in the advantages of a state is thereby judged
worthy. Again, in a natural state no one is master
of anything by common consent, nor can there be anything in nature which can be
said to belong to this man and not to that, but all things belong equally to
all men; and accordingly in a natural state no wish of rendering to each man
his own can be conceived, nor of taking away from a man what belongs to him,
that is, in a state of state of nature nothing takes place that can be called
just or unjust, but only in a civil state, where it is determined by common
consent what belongs to this man or that. From this it is apparent that
just and unjust, sin and merit, are merely extrinsic notions, not attributes
which explain the nature of the mind. But I have said enough of this.
‘Every man exists by consummate right of nature, and
consequently every man does by reason of this right those things which follow
from the necessity of his nature; and therefore each man judges for himself, by
his consummate right of nature, what is good or bad, and consults his advantage
according to his disposition (see Prop. 19 and 20, Part IV,) and revenges
himself (Coroll. 2 Prop. 40, Part III.), and endeavours to preserve what he
loves and to destroy what he hates (Prop. 28, Part III.).’
every man exists because he does – there is no ‘consummate
right of nature’
man is a propositional actor – there is no ‘necessity’ in
this – man’s propositional activity – that is – man’s existence – is uncertain
what is good or bad for any man is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
a man may revenge himself – and may endeavour to preserve
what he loves – however he may forego revenge – and he may not endeavour to
preserve what he loves – he may decide to let go of what he loves
whether to revenge – or whether to preserve what is loved –
are matters open to question – open to doubt – and – as with any proposal – any
propositional action – uncertain
‘If men lived according to the dictates of reason, each one
would possess (Coroll. 1. Prop. 35, Part IV.) his right without any loss to
another; but because they are liable to emotions (Coroll., Prop. 4 Part IV.)
which far surpass the power of virtues (Prop. 6, Part IV.), they are therefore
often drawn in different directions (Prop. 33, Part IV.) and are contrary one
to the other (Prop. 34, Part IV.), while they need each other’s help (Note,
Prop. 35, Part IV).’
there are no ‘dictates of reason – reason is the critical
activity
critically evaluating one’s proposals – one’s propositional
action – may incur a perceived loss
but any such perception – is logically speaking – open to
question
our proposal and our propositional actions are open to
question – so logically speaking we will be ‘drawn in different directions’
‘being contrary one to the other’ – is one with dealing with
propositional uncertainty
if we need another’s help – how that need is to be addressed
and understood – will be open to question – will be uncertain
‘It is necessary, then, in order that men live in concord
and be of help to each other, that they should give up their natural right and
render themselves reciprocally secure, and determine to do nothing that will be
injurious to another.’
to live rationally does not mean to live in concord – if
being in concord means living uncritically
security is open to question – open to doubt – and is
uncertain
being determined to do nothing that is injurious to another
– is to my mind – a good starting proposal –
however just what that means – as with any proposal – is an
uncertain matter
men can make
themselves ‘mutually confident and have trust one with the other’ – but any
such confidence and trust if it is rational needs to be understood as based in
critical thinking
emotions are
propositional actions – propositional actions – if dealt with rationally – are
put to question – not ‘checked’
‘fear of incurring
a greater injury’ – may be a reason for not inflicting evil – but it is not the
only possible reason –
i.e. – one may
refrain from inflicting evil – whatever that may amount to – because it is evil
‘By this law society (societas) can be held together,
provided it keep for itself the right everyone has of vindicating wrong done to
him, and judging what is good and evil, and if it also has the power of
prescribing a common system of life and behaviour, and of making laws and forcing
them to be respected, not by reason, which cannot check emotions (Note, Prop.
17, Part IV.), but by threats.’
a ‘society’ – is a propositional complex – of propositional
complexes –
it is ’held together’ – or not – by the propositional action
of its propositional actors
there is no ‘right’ to vindicate wrong – though wrongs do
get vindicated –
and regardless of what form a society takes – any proposal
by any propositional actor as to what is good and evil – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain –
a society – whatever its form – as with any individual in it
– is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
a society – is an uncertain proposal – an uncertain state of
affairs
any prescription of a common system of life and behaviour –
will always be – in reality – open to question
laws are proposals – and clearly open to question –
as is any enforcement of laws
a society based on threat – is logically and rationally
inferior – to a society – open to question
‘From which we can easily understand that nothing can exist
in a natural state which can be called good or bad by common assent, since
everyman, who is in a natural state, consults only his own advantage, and
determines what is good or bad according to his fancy and in so far as he has
regard for his own advantage alone and
holds himself responsible to no one save himself by any law; and therefore sin
cannot be conceived in a natural state, but only in a civil state, where it is
decreed by common consent what is good
or bad, and each one holds himself responsible to the state.’
human beings are propositional – however this
propositional ‘state’ is described –
i.e. – as ‘natural’ or ‘civil’
what is called ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – is open to question –
and assent – ‘common assent’ – as with any
propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
‘sin’ – is a notion that has its origins in authoritarianism
‘authoritarianism’ – is a logical corruption of the notion
of authority
the only genuine / logical ‘authority’ – is authorship
– propositional authorship –
there is no ‘sin’ in authorship –
no ‘sin’ in the authorship of any proposal –
no ‘sin’ in any proposal put
civil society is based on the rule of law – and the
enforcement of its laws
any ‘law’ – and any enforcement of law – as with any other
proposition or propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and
is uncertain
‘Therefore sin (peccatum) is nothing else than
disobedience, which is thus punishable by right of the state alone; and on the
other hand obedience is considered a merit in a citizen, because he who
rejoices in the advantages of a state is thereby judged worthy.’
if by ‘obedience’ – is meant blind assent – uncritical
assent – to a ‘law’ – a proposal – then obedience is irrational
as for being ‘judged worthy’ – this is just pretence and
rhetoric
the civil state can be advantageous to its citizens – but it
can also be disadvantageous
how the actions of any civil state are interpreted – and
valued – is a matter – open to question – for any rational citizen
‘Again, in a natural state no one is master of anything by
common consent, nor can there be anything in nature which can be said to belong
to this man and not to that, but all things belong equally to all men; and
accordingly in a natural state no wish of rendering to each man his own can be
conceived, nor of taking away from a man what belongs to him, that is, in a
state of state of nature nothing takes place that can be called just or unjust,
but only in a civil state, where it is determined by common consent what
belongs to this man or that.’
again – in the propositional state – any proposal put – and
propositional action taken – is open to question – open to doubt – and is
uncertain
possession of anything – at any time – can be put to
question – can be put to doubt – and is – logically speaking – uncertain –
what is ‘just’ and what is ‘unjust’ – is always a matter
open to question
‘common consent’ – is the rule of the mob – for better or
worse – and is always subject to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘From this it is apparent that just and unjust, sin and
merit, are merely extrinsic notions, not attributes which explain the nature of
the mind. But I have said enough of this.’
‘just’ and ‘unjust’ – proposals – open to question
‘sin’ and ‘merit’ – pretence and rhetoric
PROP. XXXVIII. That which so disposes the human body that it
can be affected in many different ways, or renders it capable of affecting
external bodies in many ways is useful to man, and the more so according as it
renders the body more apt to be affected in many ways or to affect other bodies
so; and, on the contrary, that is harmful (noxious) to man which renders
the body less apt for this.
Proof. – The more the body is rendered apt for this,
the more the mind is rendered apt for perceiving (Prop.14, Part II.): and
therefore that which disposes the body in that way and renders it apt for this,
is necessarily good or useful (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.), and more useful and
more apt it renders the body for this, and on the contrary (by the same Prop.
14, Part II., inverted, and Prop. 26 and 27 Part IV.), that is harmful which
renders the body less apt for this. Q.e.d.
‘That which so disposes the human body that it can be
affected in many different ways or renders it capable of affecting external
bodies in many ways’ –
is propositional action –
a proposal put – a propositional action – has affect –
a proposal put affects the propositional actor – and affects
those to whom it is put to
‘external bodies’ – are proposed realities
we live and operate in propositional complexes
what is ‘more apt’ or ‘less apt’ – and how we understand
‘harmful’ – is relative to propositional context – and as such – uncertain
propositional action / propositional affect – is just
what happens –
whether a propositional affect is useful – or not – will be
– in whatever propositional context or circumstance – open to question
there is no ‘necessary good’ – any proposed ‘good’ – is
uncertain
furthermore – to focus on ‘body’ – is to fall into the
dualist trap – the mind / body trap – and to miss the central unity that is the
person – the propositional actor
we begin and end with – the propositional actor –
however explained or described
PROP. XXXIX. Whatever brings it about that the proportion of
motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to each other is
preserved, is good: and contrariwise, that is bad which brings it about that
the parts of the human body have another proportion mutually of motion and
rest.
here we are talking about the health of an individual /
propositional actor
the reality is that one’s health is not certain
one’s health is open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
as to the ground of health – what ‘brings it about’ – that
is a question for science – just as is the basis of illness and disease
medicine is a science – open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
most would say that health is a good thing and illness a bad
state of affairs
perhaps though – it is not that simple
from time to time you here of those who say that an illness
or a disability has been the best thing that has happened to them – for as a
result of dealing with their malady they have discovered strengths they never
knew they had – or that as a result of the experience of sickness they have
come to a new and better understanding and appreciation of themselves and of
others and of life
and what of the case of an individual who wreaks havoc – and
can only do so because he is healthy enough to do so?
what is good and what is bad – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – The human body needs for its preservation
many other bodies (Post. 4, Part II.); but that which constitutes the form of
the human body consist of this, that its parts convey one to the other their
motions mutually in a certain proportion (Def. before lemma 4, which see after
Prop. 13, Part II.), Therefore that which brings it about that the proportion
of motion and rest which the parts of the body have one to the other is
preserved, preserves the form of the human body, and consequently brings it about
(Post. 3 and 6 Part II.) that the human body can be affected in many ways, and
also that it can affect external bodies in many ways: and therefore (prev.
Prop.) it is good. Again, that which brings it about that the parts of the
human body assume some other proportion of motion and rest, brings it about
(same Def., Part II.) that the human body assumes another form, that is (as is
self-evident, and as we stated towards the end of the preface of this part),
that the human body is destroyed, and consequently rendered entirely unsuitable
for being affected in many ways: and therefore (prev. Prop,) it is bad.
Q.e.d.
that a functioning propositional actor affects and effects –
can be seen as neither ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – but simply its natural state –
just as a propositional actor who is ‘rendered unsuitable
for being affected in many ways’ – likewise can be seen as being in its natural
state – neither good nor bad
and it should be remembered that how the proposal ‘natural
state’ is to be understood and explained – is open to question
furthermore – where we do propose a value on any natural
state – any proposed value is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – What harm or good this can do to the mind is
explained in the fifth part. But it must be noted here, that I understand the
body to suffer death when its parts are so disposed that they assume one with
other another proportion of motion and rest. For I do not dare deny that the
human body can be changed into another nature entirely different from its own,
although the circulation of the blood and other features on
account of which the body is thought to live is preserved.
For there is no reason which obliges me to state that a body does not die
unless it is changed into a corpse; indeed experience seems to persuade the
contrary. For it comes about at times that a man suffers such changes that it
is difficult to say he is the same, as I have heard it related of a Spanish
poet who had been seized with a certain sickness, and although he recovered
from it, remained oblivious of his past life that he did not think that the
tales and tragedies he had written were his own, and could easily have been
mistaken for a grown-up infant had he forgotten how to speak. And if this seems
incredible, what shall we say of infants, whose nature a man of advanced age
deems so different from his own that he could not be persuaded that he ever was
one if he did not make a conjecture about his own case from the example of
others? But lest I gather material for the superstitious to raise new
objections about, I had rather leave this question without further discussion.
‘What harm or good this can do to the mind is explained in
the fifth part. But it must be noted here, that I understand the body to suffer
death when its parts are so disposed that they assume one with other another
proportion of motion and rest.
underlying this statement is a clear mind / body distinction
Spinoza does not here refer to the death of the person
– of the propositional actor –
he speaks only of the death of the body – and leaves
the mind out of consideration here
the logical / propositional reality is that just what death
is – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we should note here that there are those dualists who hold
that the death is not the end of human life – that a ‘soul’ survives the death
of the body
and if we substitute mind for soul here – perhaps this is
not far from Spinoza’s view –
we will wait and see what the fifth part holds
‘For I do not dare deny that the human body can be changed
into another nature entirely different from its own, although the circulation
of the blood and other features on account of which the body is thought to live
is preserved. For there is no reason which obliges me to state that a body does
not die unless it is changed into a corpse; indeed experience seems to persuade
the contrary’
and in modern times we have the phenomena of people regarded
a brain dead – who are kept ‘alive’ – by machines
in bringing up the case of the Spanish poet – and childhood
– Spinoza it seems is suggesting that all we are really talking about is
changes of form in the body
and he makes this point above at the start of the note when
he says –
‘I understand the body to suffer death when its parts are so
disposed that they assume one with other another proportion of motion and
rest.’
another proportion of motion and rest – is not the end
of the relation of motion and rest –
and the end of the relation of motion and rest would be what
most would regard as death
this raises the question – does Spinoza believe in death?
from what he has written here – it doesn’t look like it
PROP. XL. Whatever is conducive to the common society of
men, or, whatever brings it about that men live together in agreement, is
useful, and on the contrary, that is bad which induces discord in a state.
Proof. – Whatever brings it about that men live
together in agreement, brings it about at the same time that they live under
the guidance of reason (Prop. 35, Part IV.) it is good: and (by the same
argument) that, on the other hand, is bad which fosters discord. Q.e.d.
‘the common society of men?
is there a ‘common society of men’?
at any time – any survey of societies – will show that there
are different social and political structures
and what is ‘common’ to them? –
probably only men and women
in any case – any proposal regarding what is ‘common to the
society of men’ – will be open to question – open to doubt and uncertain – as
will be any proposal regarding what is conducive to any so called ‘common
society of men’
‘men living together in agreement’?
as with the common society of men’ – ‘living together in
agreement’ is vague – and a notion of no logical use – but perhaps it has
rhetorical value – politicians seem to think so anyway
the logical reality is that men and women – propositional
actors – live and operate in logical uncertainty
yes – men and women agree on this and that – but at the same
time they disagree on many matters
a world where everyone agrees – is not useful to human
beings – in fact such a world would spell propositional death –
and such a state of affairs – where there is no critical
activity – or critical activity is suppressed – would only be ‘useful’ to a
dictator
the only ‘guidance of reason’ – is the critical activity of
question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
we need to be able to put our proposals – our propositional
actions – to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty – in order
to operate rationally –
therefore – disagreement and discord have a legitimate place
in any rational social structure – in the ‘common society of men’
Proof. –
Pleasure (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note) is an emotion by which the power
of acting of the body is increased or aided; but pain contrariwise is an
emotion whereby the body’s power of acting is diminished or hindered; and
therefore (Prop. 38, Part IV,) pleasure is directly good, etc. Q.e.d.
pleasure and pain – are possible propositional consequences
of propositional action
and pleasure and pain are open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘good’ and ‘bad’ – are proposals – evaluative proposals –
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
how one proposes and understands the value of pleasure – the
value of pain – will depend on one’s propositional circumstance – one’s
propositional context –
i.e. – pleasure – may be seen – in a particular
propositional context – as dulling one’s capacity to deal with issues that one
regards as more important than the experience of pleasure – and therefore
pleasure in such a context is not ‘directly good’ –
and there could be a circumstance where the experience of
pain is not ‘directly bad’ – but rather good – because it leads to a better
understanding
one’s power of acting – is one’s capacity to critically
evaluate proposals and propositional actions
how pleasure and pain affect and effect our critical
activity will depend on circumstance – on propositional context
PROP. XLII. There cannot be too much merriment, but it is
always good; but on the other hand, melancholy is always bad.
we can’t speak of ‘too much’ – as if it is an absolute –
clearly – the matter is relative and uncertain – i.e. – what is ‘too much’ for
one – may be ‘not enough’ for another – or ‘just right’ – for yet another
and is merriment always ‘good’?
what if there is merriment regarding a violent act against
another?
that is the merriment is sadistic
is Spinoza prepared to say – ‘nevertheless it is good’?
the point is – that any emotional affect or effect – and the
value placed on any emotional affect or effect – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
and melancholia – may be a bad experience for some – but can
it not have consequences – regarded as ‘good’?
i.e. – the melancholic poet – who as a result of his
melancholia – writes a marvellous poem – perhaps even about melancholia?
furthermore – where a propositional outlook is seen to be
not to our benefit – we can adopt a different propositional perspective – one
that enables us to change our emotional experience
to do this – one needs to approach one’s emotional /
propositional experience in a critical manner – put it to question – put it to
doubt – and explore its uncertainty
how we value any emotional experience is open to question
Proof. – Merriment (see def. in Note, Prop. 11, Part
III.) is pleasure which, in so far as it has reference to the body, consists of
this, that all the parts of the body are affected, that is (Prop. 11, Part
III.), that the body’s power of acting is increased or aided in such a way that
all the parts preserve the same proportions of motion and rest one with the
other; and therefore (Prop 39, Part IV.) merriment is always good, and can have
no excess. But melancholy (whose def. see in the same Note. prop. 11, Part
III.) is pain which, in so far as it has reference to the body is absolutely
diminished or hindered; and therefore (Prop. 38, Part IV.) it is always bad
‘all parts of the body are affected’ –
so when I’m merry – my big toe on my left foot is affected –
is perhaps – merry?
what is meant here by ‘all parts of the body’?
Spinoza does not explain this –
really what we have here is a lazy statement –
and one that would not have fitted with 17th
century understanding of how the body works – let alone a modern understanding
of the science of the body – of ‘body parts’
and why does Spinoza say – ‘as it has reference to the
body’?
is he just interested in the physical affects of merriment –
or is that he is here simply assuming a mind / body dichotomy?
and what does this come to?
emotional affects – are affects on the whole person –
on the propositional actor –
and as such – as with any propositional affect – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
that merriment is always good – is a naïve and simplistic
statement
merriment as with any propositional / emotional affect – is
open to question
whether it is regarded as good or not will depend on the
individual propositional actor – and his or her circumstance –
i.e. – one might be a drug addict or alcoholic and full of
merriment –
would we regard merriment in such a circumstance as ‘good’?
Spinoza apparently thinks so
as to melancholy –
we know as a matter of experience that it cannot be
‘objectively’ defined as bad –
what value we give it will depend on the individual
propositional actor and his / her propositional circumstance
it is not hard to argue that in certain cases melancholy can
have a good affect –
i.e. – it may result in creative activity – or it may be the
source of a better and even positive understanding of whatever is that is at
stake
PROP. XLIII. Titillation can be excessive and be bad; but
grief may be good in so far as titillation or pleasure is bad.
‘excessive’ is not an absolute – it is a relative notion –
which is to say that what one regards as excessive – may be seen by another as
moderate
and why regard any emotional action that is seen as
excessive – as bad?
again – ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not absolutes – they are relative
notions – evaluation proposals that are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
titillation or pleasure – however defined – i.e. – as
excessive – or moderate – or whatever – depending on circumstance – can be
given different valuations –
and – likewise grief – its affect – is open to question – is
uncertain
a question here – why this contrast with or comparison of
titillation and grief?
yes – titillation is a form of pleasure and grief a form of
pain –
however – would we not say that grief is the pain of loss?
are we going to say that titillation is a gain – a gain in
response to – or against the loss that is grief?
I think one could well experience titillation – while
experiencing grief – and the titillation have no effect on the grief –
a strange comparison from Spinoza
Proof. – Titillation is pleasure which, in so far as
it has reference to the body, consists of this, that one or several parts of
the body are affected beyond the rest (see its def. in Note, Prop. 11, Part
III.); the power of this emotion can be so great that it surpasses the
remaining actions of the body (Prop. 6, Part IV.), and becomes firmly fixed to
it, and accordingly prevents the body from being affected in other ways; and
therefore (Prop. 38, Part IV.) it can be bad. Again, grief which, on the other hand,
is pain, considered in itself alone cannot be good (Prop. 41, Part IV.). But
inasmuch as its force and increase is defined by the power of its external
cause compared with our own (Prop. 5, Part IV.), we can therefore conceive
infinite degrees and amounts of the strength of this emotion (Prop. 3, Part
IV.); and so we can conceive it to be such that it can restrain titillation so
that it is not excessive, and thus far (by the first part of this Prop.) bring
it about that the body is not rendered less apt; and thus far it will be good. Q.e.d.
the propositional actor is not paralysed by titillation – he
/ she will continue to be affected in many ways
and even if it was the case that titillation prevented the propositional
actor from being affected in other ways – why would this be ‘bad’?
one gets the impression here that for Spinoza – an affect is
only good if the whole body – and not just a part or parts – is affected
just what the ‘whole body’ for Spinoza – amounts to is not
clear – he has not elucidated this notion
and in any case – the issue is not ‘the body’ – but rather
the ‘person’ – the propositional actor
at the very least we can say that Spinoza’s focus on the
body – apparently with the exclusion of the mind – is lobsided – and is
defective – by his own account
as is his whole mind / body analysis
really – the focus needs to be on the whole person –
the propositional actor – however further described
what is clear is that affective experience – is a matter –
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
furthermore – I was under the impression that for Spinoza –
what is bad is pain
clearly – titillation is not pain
and in any case whether an affect is good or bad will be
open to question – open to doubt – and open to interpretation
‘But inasmuch as its force and increase is defined by the
power of its external cause compared with our own (Prop. 5, Part IV.), we can
therefore conceive infinite degrees and amounts of the strength of this
emotion’
any so called ‘external cause’ – is a proposal
and how we describe any affect – is open to question
‘and so we can conceive it to be such that it can restrain
titillation so that it is not excessive, and thus far (by the first part of
this Prop.) bring it about that the body is not rendered less apt; and thus far
it will be good. Q.e.d.’
as an affect / emotion – is uncertain – how it is proposed /
understood – and dealt with – is open to question
Proof. –
Love is a pleasure accompanied (Def. Emo, 6) by the idea of an external cause.
Therefore titillation (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) accompanied by the idea of an
external cause is love; and therefore love (prev. Prop) can be excessive.
Again, desire is the greater according as the emotion from which it arose is
greater (Prop. 37, Part III). Wherefore, as an emotion (Prop. 6, Part IV.) can
surpass the greater actions of man, so also can desire which arises from that
emotion surpass other desires, and so it can have the same excess as we proved
in the previous proposition titillation to have. Q.e.d.
for Spinoza – any
pleasure ‘accompanied by the idea of an external cause’ – is by definition –
‘love’ –
the advantage of
such a definition is its generality and comprehensiveness – you love anything
that gives you pleasure
however – ‘love’ is
a proposal – and one that is clearly open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
–
and I think many
would question the proposal that titillation – is love
‘excessive’ here –
can only be relative to what? – some other emotion?
and if there is no
other emotion enacted – then all you can say is that the so called ‘excessive’
emotion is just the emotion in play
and can there be a
genuine measurement of any emotion – of any emotional / propositional action?
measurement is a
rule governed propositional game –
emotional actions –
are not rule governed – are not a game
as to desire having
‘the same excess as we proved in the previous proposition titillation to have.’
I don’t see a dominant
emotion or a dominant desire as being ‘excessive’
it is simply the
desire or emotion that is in play –
and how it is
described – how it is regarded – will be open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
Note. – Merriment,
which we said to be good, can be more easily conceived than observed. For
emotions by which we are daily assailed have reference to some part of the body
which is affected beyond the others, and so the emotions as a rule are in
excess, and so detain the mind in the contemplation of one object that it
cannot think of others; and although men are liable to many emotions, and
therefore few are found who are always assailed by one and the same emotion,
yet there are not wanting those to whom one and the same emotion adheres with
pertinacity. We see that men are sometimes so affected by one object that,
although it is not present, yet they believe it to be present with them; when
this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or insane;
nor are they thought less mad who are fired with love, and who spend night and
day in dreaming of their ladylove or mistress, for they tend to provoke
laughter. But when a miser thinks of nothing save money or profit, or an
ambitious man of nothing save glory, these are not thought to be insane, for
they tend to be harmful, and are thought worthy of hatred. But in truth,
avarice, ambition, lust, etc., are nothing but species of madness, although
they are not enumerated among diseases.
‘For emotions by
which we are daily assailed have reference to some part of the body which is
affected beyond the others, and so the emotions as a rule are in excess,
and so detain the mind in the contemplation of one object that it cannot think
of others’
we are not ‘assailed’ by emotions – emotions are proposals /
propositional actions we put and enact – and any proposal however described –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
that one propositional action / emotion – at one point in
time – is dominant – does not
mean that it is in excess
yes – one may be experiencing a dominant emotion – but one
is not thereby incapable of thinking of other things – of putting other
proposals – and dealing with whatever else is proposed – in a critical manner
no propositional state is fixed – our promotional life is
open – and that means that any propositional state can be modified – or
indeed replaced – as a result of critical activity
‘and although men are liable to many emotions, and therefore
few are found who are always assailed by one and the same emotion, yet there
are not wanting those to whom one and the same emotion adheres with
pertinacity.’
where the same emotion ‘adheres with pertinacity’ – this
could simply mean that it has proven to be fruitful – or it may just mean that
it has not been put to question – not been put to doubt – and its uncertainty –
not explored
‘We see that men are sometimes so affected by one object
that, although it is not present, yet they believe it to be present with them;
when this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or
insane’
where one is not able – for whatever reason – to
operate critically – and is in a state of propositional fixation – such a
person – however further described – is logically incapable
‘nor are they thought less mad who are fired with love, and
who spend night and day in dreaming of their ladylove or mistress, for they
tend to provoke laughter.’
clearly Spinoza thinks that those ‘who are fired with love’
– are mad – and he laughs at them
such a view does strike me as somewhat unkind and cynical
in any case this is not the only possible response to such a
love and to such lovers –
i.e. – there are those who would see such behaviour as quite
natural – and furthermore take pleasure in witnessing it
more generally – any propositional behaviour – is open to
question – open to interpretation – and as such – is logically – uncertain
‘But when a miser thinks of nothing save money or profit, or
an ambitious man of nothing save glory, these are not thought to be insane, for
they tend to be harmful, and are thought worthy of hatred.’
I think one could be described as a ‘miser’ – and think of
other things – just as one may be ambitious in life – and at the same time –
live a rational life
I fail to see how focusing on saving money and profit – need
be ‘harmful’ – or ‘worthy of hatred’
or that ambition – whether it is for glory or some other end
– is in itself – ‘harmful’ or ‘worthy of hatred’
some would see the acquisition of money and profit – and
ambition in life – as beneficial and worthy of encouragement and indeed praise
hatred here – seems right out of place
‘But in truth, avarice, ambition, lust, etc., are nothing
but species of madness, although they are not enumerated among diseases.’
and as for madness –
to be fixed to one view of reality – to not question – to
not doubt – or to not appreciate the uncertainty of propositional reality – is
the source of madness
PROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good.
‘hatred’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘uncertain’ – means that an absolute view of hatred – is
illogical
and as to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – these proposals – likewise are
open to question
i.e. – if one’s view of what is good or bad – is a question
of consequence – then we can imagine a circumstance where hating another might
have a good consequence –
consider –
a wrong is done – and the person wronged can be emotionally
defeated by the action – or he can fight back –
hate may motivate him to fight back – and thus empower him –
and if he holds that being empowered is good – then that
which empowers him is good
Proof. – We endeavour to destroy the man whom we hate
(Prop. 39, Part III.) that is (Prop. 37, Part IV.), we endeavour to do
something which is bad. Therefore, etc. Q.e.d.
we may endeavour to destroy the man we hate – but we
may not –
I may hate someone – but not wish to destroy them
I may hate someone – and simply wish to have nothing more to
do with them
we may endeavour to destroy a man we hate – and this may be
bad – or it may not be
what of the case where a person is hated – and is seen to be
evil – i.e. – is a psychopath – is there not an argument for saying that
destroying such a person is a good act?
how we understand hate – and how we understand what is good
and what is bad – is open to question – will be dependent on circumstance and
propositional context
and any view taken is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
Note. – Let it be noted that here and in the
following propositions I understand by hatred only that towards men.
to my mind this shows that Spinoza recognizes a fault in his
conception of hate
why limit it to hatred towards men?
the answer is that if we understand hatred in its broadest
sense – then it would seem that there is a clear case where hatred may well be
seen as ethical
i.e. – hatred toward a totalitarian regime
Corollary I. – Envy, derision, contempt, anger,
revenge, and other emotions which have reference to hatred or arise from it,
are bad, which is clear from Prop. 39, Part III., and Prop. 37, Part IV.
other emotions – if they arise from hatred – as with
hatred – are open to question
and as to whether they are seen as good or bad – will
likewise be open to question
how we interpret any emotion – will depend on
propositional context –
and how we value any emotion – is not something that
can rationally be determined outside of propositional context
these generalizations of Spinoza – are simply worthless
they may have rhetorical value – but they have no logical
value
Corollary II. –
Whatever we seek owing to the fact that we are affected with hatred is
base, and unjust in the state; which is also obvious from Prop. 39. Part III.,
and from the definitions of base and unjust, which we see in the Note on Prop,
37, Part IV.
if hatred of a political regime – is a ground for change or
even revolution – it will be seen by those who support the regime as vicious
and unjust –
but for those who wish for a change – it will be seen as
justified and liberating
Note. II – Between derision (which we said to
be bad in the first Coroll.) and laughter (risus) I admit there is a
great difference. For laughter and also jocularity are merely pleasure; and
therefor provided they are not in excess, they are good in themselves (Prop.
41, Part IV.). Nothing, therefore, save gloomy and mirthless superstitions
prohibits laughter. For why is it more becoming to satisfy hunger and thirst
than to dispense melancholy? My reason is this, and I have convinced myself of
it: No deity, nor anyone save the envious. is pleased with my wont of power or
my misfortune, nor imputes to our virtue, tears, sobs, fear and other things of
this kind which are significant of a weak man; but on the contrary, the more we
are affected with pleasure, thus we pass to a greater perfection, that is we
necessarily participate in divine nature. To make use of things and take
delight in them as much as possible (not indeed to satiety, for that is not to
take delight) is the part of a wise man. It is I say the part of a wise man to
feed himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and to take pleasure
with perfumes, with the beauty of growing plants, dress, music, sports, and
theatres, and other places of this kind which man may use without any hurt to his
fellows. For the human body is composed of many parts of different nature which
continually stand in need of new and varied nourishment, so that the body as a
whole may be equally apt for performing those things which can follow from its
nature, and consequently so that the mind also may be equally apt for
understanding many things at the same time. This manner of living agrees best
with our principles and the general manner of life: from which it follows that
this manner of life is the best of all, and in all ways to be commended, nor is
there any need for us to be more clear or more detailed on this subject.
‘laughter’ as with any other propositional behaviour – is
open to question
to say that ‘laughter and also jocularity are merely
pleasure’ – really tells us nothing
in one context laughter may be an expression of joy – and
yet in another context – laughter may be cynical – and derisive
nothing is good – or bad ‘in itself’ –
what is good or bad is a value – a proposed value – given to
a proposal – or propositional situation
and any proposal here – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
the idea that laughter is the answer to our emotional life –
strikes me as naïve and superficial – and basically meaningless
as to ‘dispensing melancholy’ –
well – there may well be a circumstance – i.e. – where
people are laughing away a serious issue – in order to get them to get them
back to a hard reality – a dose of melancholy might be called for
like Spinoza I do not want to see others with a wont of
personal power – or to suffer misfortune – however this not to say that there
isn’t a place for melancholy in our lives
and tears – sobs – and fears – are signs of what?
people in distress
Spinoza’s ‘weak man argument’ here – is dismissive of human
suffering
the old chestnut ‘greater perfection’ –
if the notion of ‘perfection’ – makes sense – the notion of
‘greater perfection’ – does not
‘participating in divine nature’ –
if God is all – and all is God – as Spinoza argues – then anything
we do participates in divine nature
I agree – to make use of things and to take delight in them
is the mark of a wise person
moderate food and drink – is a good idea
as to perfumes – I’ll pass on that one
growing plants – dressing well – enjoying music – sports and
theatre – are all to my mind good things to do – if you are able to
again – Spinoza seems to think that we can divide the human
being into body and mind – and at least in the present context – drop the mind
altogether
any – body / mind division misses the central point – the
person – the propositional actor
yes - there are good reasons to a have a focus – on body –
on mind – for particular purposes – and for particular explanations – however
it is really important to that any particular focus is not seen as the whole
story
the whole story is the person – the propositional actor –
however further described – or explained
and what follows from the nature of the person – of the
human being – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza’s view that ‘this manner of life is the best of all’
– is fair enough – for Spinoza – and I would think – for many others
there are however – different views on the best manner of
life – and they too have their place in any rational discussion
the point really is that – what the best manner of living is
– is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XLVI. He who lives under the guidance of reason
endeavours as much as possible to repay his fellows hatred, rage, contempt,
etc, with love and nobleness.
he who lives under the guidance of reason puts his proposals
– and the proposals put to him – to question – to doubt – and he explores their
uncertainty
perhaps ‘love and nobleness’ – works as a response to hatred
– rage and contempt
whether it does or not will depend on the those involved –
and in any case – any response will be open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
one might take the view that you should fight fire with fire
–
who knows what the result of such an approach might be – who
can say?
Proof. – All emotions of hatred are bad (Coroll. 1,
prev. Proof): and therefore he who lives according to the precepts of reason,
will endeavour as much as possible to bring it to pass that he is not assailed
by emotions of hatred (Prop. 19, Part IV.), and consequently (Prop. 37, Part
IV.) he will endeavour he will prevent anyone else from suffering those
emotions. But hatred is increased by reciprocated hatred, and on the contrary,
can be demolished by love (Prop. 43, Part III.) in such a way that hatred is
transformed into love (Prop. 44, Part III.). Therefore he who lives under the
guidance of reason will endeavour to repay another’s hatred, etc., with love,
that is nobleness (whose def. see in Note, Prop. 59, Part III.). Q.e.d.
‘he who lives according to the precepts of reason’ – will
put his emotional / propositional states and actions – and those of others –
whatever they may be – to question – to doubt and will explore their
uncertainty
is hatred increased by reciprocal hated?
or is it rather that hatred meets its equal?
love may mitigate hatred – may ‘demolish’ it – but it may
also be the case that love comes up against a brick wall of hatred
Note. – He who wishes to revenge injuries by
reciprocal hatred will live in misery. But he who endeavours to drive away
hatred by means of love, fights with pleasure and confidence; he resists
equally one or many men, and scarcely needs at all the help of fortune. Those
whom he conquers yield joyfully, not from want of force but increase thereof.
All those things follow so clearly from the definitions alone of love and
intellect that there is no need for me to point them out.
whether ‘he who wishes to revenge injuries by reciprocal
hated will live in misery’ – will depend on who he is – how he proposes himself
and the world
is it not conceivable that one finds strength and joy in
their hatred?
as to the lover fighting with pleasure and confidence – well
that too – is up for question
the one fighting with love may have a hard time of it
‘That those who he conquers yield joyfully, not from want of
force but increase thereof’ –
what fairytale does this come from?
PROP. XLVII. The emotions of hope and fear cannot be in
themselves good.
any emotion / proposal is open – open to question – open to
evaluation
an evaluation – i.e. – ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – is a proposal /
propositional action
there is no ‘in itself’ to any proposal –
a proposal is a field of possibility – of critical
possibility
hope and fear are not good in themselves or bad in
themselves
fear and hope are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
any propositional evaluation put to a proposal of fear – or
a proposal of hope – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
Proof. – The emotions of hope and fear are not given
without pain. For fear is (Def. Emo.13) sadness or pain, and hope (see
explanation of Def. Emo. 12 and 13) is not given without fear. And thus
(Prop.41, Part IV.) these emotions cannot themselves be good, but only in so
far as they can restrain an excess of pleasure (Prop. 43, Part IV.). Q.e.d.
fear is a natural propositional state – an expression of
propositional uncertainty –
propositional uncertainty may or may not be painful
and pain – as with fear – is a natural propositional state –
hope – too a natural propositional state – and an expression
of uncertainty
we can hope without fear
as to whether these emotions are valued as good or bad –
will depend on the propositional actor involved – how he or she understands and
assesses the propositional context he or she is dealing with – and how he or
she proposes good or bad
and any decision on these matters will be open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – To this must be added that these emotions
indicate a wont of knowledge and weakness of mind; and on this account,
confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are significant of a weak mind.
For although confidence and joy are emotions of pleasure, they imply that pain
has preceded them, namely hope and fear. Therefore the more we endeavour to
live under the guidance of reason, the less we endeavour to depend on hope, and
the more to deliver ourselves and make ourselves free from fear and overcome fortune
as much as possible, and finally to direct our actions by the certain advice of
reason.
if by knowledge you mean certain propositions – then there
is no knowledge –
certainty is a synonym for pretence and ignorance
our ‘knowledge’ –is proposal – and any proposal is
uncertain –
the weak mind cleaves to the illusion of certainty –
a strong mind deals with uncertainty
confidence and joy may or may not presuppose pain – fear and
hope
the more we endeavour to live under the guidance of reason –
the more we put our emotions to question and to doubt – the more we explore
their uncertainty –
we will not live without fear – and will not be able to defy
all that fortune throws at us –
rationally speaking – the best we can do is deal with fear
and fortune in a critical manner
PROP. XLVIII. The emotions of partiality and disparagement
are always bad.
Proof. – Now these emotions (Def. Emo. 21 and 22) are
opposed to reason, and therefore (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.) they are bad, Q.e.d.
Def. Emo. 21 –
‘Partiality (existimatio) is estimating something too
highly by reason of love.’
Def. Emo. 22. –
‘Disparagement (despectus) is estimating something
too lowly by reason of hatred.’
what one propositional actor regards as an ‘over-estimation’
– due to love – another may regard as an accurate estimation – or even an
under-estimation
and the same applies with respect to disparagement due to
hatred
and we can ask is love the only explanations for
over-estimation?
i.e. – I may estimate something too highly – not because of
love but rather because I fail to see it in a propositional context
and the same applies to disparagement – it may be contextual
issue rather than a matter of hate
also – we can ask – is partiality bad?
an overestimation – may have a bad consequence – it may even
have a good consequence – or it may – relative to good and bad – be neutral
and as for underestimating – who is to say how the effect is
to be assessed?
the point is that partiality and disparagement – are not
absolutes in any sense
and what counts as good or bad is open to question
partiality and disparagement are open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain – as indeed is any evaluation of these affects
reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and
the exploration of propositional uncertainty
PROP. XLIX.
Partiality easily renders the man who is over-estimated, proud.
Proof. – If
we see any one praises more than justly what is in us through love we are
easily exalted (Note, Prop. 41, Part III.), or we are affected with pleasure
(Def. Emo. 30), and we easily believe whatever good we hear said about us
(Prop. 25, Part III.). And therefore we esteem ourselves beyond the limits of
justice through self-love, that is (Def. Emo. 28) we easily become proud. Q.e.d.
over-estimating
someone may render them proud – even if it does – where is the harm?
however – another
person may not be rendered proud as a result of an over-estimation
he may see
it as a form of flattery which he does not take seriously
and it is possible
that it is not interpreted as an ‘over-estimation’ – it may be
regarded as an accurate assessment
the point here is
that how praise is interpreted is open to question – is open to doubt – and is
uncertain
we cannot
generalise –
we need to have an
appreciation of the circumstance – the propositional context – and even then –
we deal with uncertainty
‘beyond the limits
of justice through self-love’ –
how we regard
ourselves – how we assess ourselves – is never fixed – but is rather variable –
we should not be
too quick to judge ourselves as we should not be too quick to judge others –
we are all
operating in propositional uncertainty
PROP. L. Pity in a man who lives under the guidance of
reason is itself bad and useless.
if pity is seen as a form of empathy – it is not useless –
for it may lead to an understanding of the other’s pain
however – if pity does not lead to a better understanding –
and is simply an acknowledgement of the other’s suffering – then it has minimal
value
also is it not possible that one may pity another – and
regard them with contempt – contempt because they have failed to lift
themselves up?
the point here is that pity – as with any other emotion /
propositional affect – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
to understand any emotional / propositional action – one
needs to appreciate the circumstances involved – and even then – to keep an
open mind
Proof. – For pity (Def, Emo. 18) is pain and
therefore (Prop. 41. Part IV.) is bad in itself. But the good which follows
from it, namely that we endeavour to free the man whom we pity from his misery
(Coroll, Prop. 27, Part III.), we desire to do from the mere command of reason
(Prop. 37, Part IV.), nor can we do anything which we know to be good save
under the guidance of reason Prop. 27, Part IV.). And therefore pity in a man
who lives under the guidance of reason is bad and useless in itself. Q.e.d.
‘pain’ as with any natural propositional phenomena – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and how any natural propositional phenomena is assessed –
what value it is given – is open to question
pain can be assessed as bad – but just as equally – it can
be regarded as good – i.e. if it is
regarded as instructive
also – I can pity a man – and not endeavour to free him from
his misery
and if I did endeavour to free from his misery – there is no
guarantee that my endeavour will have a ‘good’ result –
there is no ‘command of reason’ – ‘reason’ is the critical
evaluation of proposal –
Spinoza’s idea of reason – is some kind of authoritarian
directive – and what that amounts to is – prejudice
Spinoza – I think is confused on the question of pity –
on the one hand he says its bad – always bad –
on the other hand – he speaks of ‘the good which follows
from it’ –
so – what’s it to be – good or bad?
this confusion is a consequence of his absolutism in
psychology and ethics –
and that – a consequence of his metaphysical absolutism
Spinoza is stuck – and the world he lived in – and the world
we live in – is not –
the world is in motion – propositional motion –
which is to say – it is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Corollary. – Hence it follows that a man who lives
according to the dictates of reason endeavours as far as possible not to be
touched with pity.
a man who lives according to reason – puts emotional
proposals – and propositional states to question
and when ‘touched with pity’ – puts pity to question – and
investigates its uncertainty
Note. – He who rightly knows that all things follow
from the necessity of the divine nature, and come about according to the
eternal laws and rules of nature, will find nothing at all that is worthy of
hatred, laughter or contempt, nor will he feel compassion; but as far as human
virtue allows, he will endeavour to act well, as people say, and to rejoice. To
this must be added that he who is easily touched by the emotion of pity, and
whom is moved to tears at the misery of another, often does something of which
he afterwards repents: both inasmuch as we can do nothing according to emotion
which we certainly know to be good, and inasmuch as we are easily deceived by
false tears. I am speaking here expressly of a man who lives under the guidance
of reason. For he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to help others is
rightly called inhuman, for (Prop. 27, Part II.) he seems to be unlike a man.
‘He who rightly knows that all things follow from the
necessity of the divine nature, and come about according to the eternal laws
and rules of nature, will find nothing at all that is worthy of hatred,
laughter or contempt, nor will he feel compassion’
one can of course propose – ‘that all things follow
from the necessity of divine nature and come about according to the eternal
laws and rules of nature’ – but this proposal as with any – is open to question
– open to doubt and uncertain
in propositional reality – there is no necessity – there is
only uncertainty –
as to ‘divine nature’ – this is a propositional fiction –
designed to avoid the hard reality of the unknown
any laws or rules of nature – are human proposals – that can
only be formulated and understood in terms of context – propositional context –
which is to say – circumstance
the reality – on the ground is that human beings do propose
hatred –
laughter is a common and natural propositional action – as
is contempt and compassion
to suggest that these natural propositional expressions
amount to ‘nothing’ – is fanciful and delusional
as to – ‘he will endeavour to act well’ – here is a proposal
that has no content – that does amount to nothing – and is little more than
naïve rhetoric
‘To this must be added that he who is easily touched by the
emotion of pity, and whom is moved to tears at the misery of another, often
does something of which he afterwards repents: both inasmuch as we can do
nothing according to emotion which we certainly know to be good, and inasmuch
as we are easily deceived by false tears’
yes – on review – one might repent – feeling pity for
another
however – this is not to say that there is no reality to
pity – no place for pity
‘we can do nothing according to emotion which we certainly
know to be good’ –
there is no emotional certainty – there is no certain good –
there is no certainty full stop.
knowledge is proposal – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
and any proposal regarding what is ‘good’ – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and to suggest that our emotional life is somehow irrelevant
to the question of what is ‘good’ – that is to say – irrelevant to ethics –
effectively – negates emotional experience – and furthermore – it is to vanish
morality from emotional experience
this is a lose / lose result for Spinoza
it is as if for Spinoza – the only genuine human reality is
his undefined ‘guidance of reason’ – which despite sounding like something –
and something important – is nothing more than an unarticulated prejudice
and finally – pity makes a reappearance and something of a
recovery – from its pitiless dismal –
‘For he who is moved neither by reason or pity to help
others is rightly called inhuman’
I think the penny has just dropped –
and Spinoza now sees the consequence of his argument –
and in order to be considered ‘human’ – does a quick double
take
PROP. LI. Favour is not opposed to reason, but can agree
with it and arise from it.
reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and
the exploration of propositional uncertainty
out of a critical process anything may ‘arise’
Proof. – For favour is love towards him who has
benefited another (Def. Emo. 19); and therefore it can have reference to the
mind in so far as it is said to be active (Prop. 59, Part III.), that is (Prop.
3, Part III.), in as far as it understands; and therefore agrees with reason,
etc. Q.e.d.
love towards him – who has benefited another – strikes me a
limited and restricted view of favour –
can I not favour another – regardless of whether they have
benefited another?
any proposal put – is active – and any proposal is an
understanding –
and understanding – agrees with reason if it is held open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain –
‘mind’ – is a name for propositional activity
Another Proof. – He who lives under the guidance of
reason desires for others the good he desires for himself (Prop. 37, Part IV.).
Wherefore, by the very fact that he sees someone benefit another, his own
endeavour to benefit is aided, that is (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.), he will
feel pleasure, and that (by the hypothesis) accompanied by the idea of him who
benefited the other, and therefore (Def. Emo. 19) he favours him. Q.e.d.
whether or not the good I desire for myself – is to be
desired for the other – is a matter open to question – open to doubt and
uncertain
it may well be that I see my ‘good’ – as not being the
other’s ‘good’
the argument here is – if I see Peter benefit Paul – I will
be aided in my endeavour to also to benefit Paul – and as a result – favour
Peter
this might be the case in a particular propositional context
– but as a generalization it is simplistic and naïve
Peter’s action may have no impact on my own endeavour to
benefit Paul
I may take no pleasure in Peter’s actions – even though I
wish to benefit Paul –
and – I may recognise the benefit that Peter bestows on Paul
– but not favour Peter because of it
Note. – Indignation, as defined by us (Def. Emo. 20),
is necessarily bad (Prop. 45, Part IV.). But it must be noted that when the
sovereign power with the desire for preserving the peace, punishes a citizen
who has wrought another an injury, I do not say that it is indignant with the
citizen, inasmuch as it is not moved by hatred to ruin the citizen, but
punishes him out of piety.
indignation is defined by Spinoza as hate towards someone
who has maltreated another –
and Spinoza argues that the state is not indignant with the
citizen who has wrought an injury on another – for it punishes him out of
‘piety’ or duty
firstly – a ‘state’ does not hate – or love – or have any
emotional content or expression
so – there is no question of a state being indignant
and furthermore – Spinoza’s definition of indignation – is
extremely narrow – and I would suggest in general not applicable
do we hate – one who has maltreated another?
perhaps this occurs in some contexts – but hate is not the
only application of indignation
I may be indignant in the sense that I disapprove of the
offender’s actions – without hating the offender
and we may be indignant regarding the offence and the harm
done – but also seek an understanding of the offender’s actions
perhaps too – there is a case for suspending judgment until
the matter is thoroughly investigated
PROP. LII. Self-contentment can arise from reason, and only
that self-contentment which arises from reason is the greatest that can exist
reason is the critical process of question – of doubt
– and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
there is no rational self-contentment –
a rational life – is a life of critical analysis and the
exploration of propositional possibility
self-contentment – is non-critical – if you are content –
you have no cause to question – to doubt – or to explore
self-contentment is irrational – as indeed – is much of
human behaviour
rationality plays a small part in human behaviour –
as I see it – mostly human behaviour is irrational
Proof. – Self-contentment is pleasure arisen from the
fact that man regards himself and his power of acting (Def. Emo. 25). But the
true power of acting of a man or his virtue is reason itself (Prop. 3, Part
III.), which man clearly and distinctly regards (Prop. 40 and 43, Part II.).
Therefore self-contentment arises from reason. Again, man while he regards
himself perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, save those things which
follow from his power of acting (Def. 2, Part III.). that is (Prop. 3, Part III.),
which follow from his power of understanding. Therefore from this
self-regarding alone the greatest self-contentment possible arises. Q.e.d.
our power as human beings is rational power – is the
rational process of question of doubt – and the exploration of propositional
uncertainty
self-contentment does not arise from reason – from
the rational process –
self-contentment – is an anathema to rationality
Note. – Self-contentment is the highest thing we can
look for. For (as we have shown in Prop. 25, Part IV.) no one endeavours to
preserve his being for the sake of some end; and inasmuch as this contentment
is more and more cherished and encouraged by praise (Coroll., Prop. 35, Part
III.), and, and the contrary (Coroll. 1, Prop. 55, Part III.), disturbed more
and more by blame, we are led in life principally by glory, and under the
burden of blame we can scarcely endure it.
Spinoza seems to have dropped his ‘rational’ argument here –
and makes the point that human beings thrive on praise – and can hardly bear a
life of disgrace –
a fair enough observation I would think
however – this observation really doesn’t bear on the nature
of self-contentment –
except to say we would rather be content than shamed
PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or, does not arise
from reason.
Proof. – Humility is pain that arises from the fact
that a man regards his own want of power (Def. Emo. 26). But in so far as a man
knows himself by true reason, thus far he is supposed to understand his
essence, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), his power. Wherefore if a man, while he
regards himself, perceives any weakness of his, it arises not from the fact
that he understands himself, but (as we showed in Prop, 55, Part III.), from
the fact that his power of acting is hindered. But if we suppose that a man conceives
his weakness from the fact that he understands something more powerful than
himself, by the knowledge of which he determines his power of acting, then we
conceive nothing else than that man distinctly understands himself (Prop. 26,
Part IV.), or, that thus his power of acting is aided. Wherefore humility or
pain, which arises from the fact that man regards his weakness, does not arise
from contemplation, i.e., reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q.e.d.
it strikes me that understanding one’s power of acting from
contemplation – is not incompatible with experiencing the pain of weakness –
the two could well go together
it does not follow that because you understand a
propositional state – that you will not experience any pain
and understanding – may indeed – lead to the experience of
pain
humility is not pain arising from the fact that a man
regards his own want of power
as I see it humility comes from a balanced assessment of
one’s power and one’s want of power
any such assessment cannot be absolute –
the matter is fluid – depending on propositional
circumstance –
and any assessment of the relation of power to want of power
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
and we can ask here is humility a question of understanding
one’s power?
you can frame it in terms of power as Spinoza has done here
– but there are other ways of describing humility –
i.e. – we might say that humility is not underestimating or
overestimating one’s importance – one’s significance – one’s ‘place’ – in any
propositional context
the nature of humility is a matter open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza here – in discussing humility – defines a virtuous
action as one that arises from contemplation – and a passionate action as one
that arises from pain
reason is the critical evaluation of any proposal – any
propositional action
if ‘contemplation’ – is critical – it is rational –
and if a painful propositional experience is critically
evaluated – it is rational –
a ‘virtue’ – not critically examined – is irrational – is
virtue-less
a painful experience – or for that matter a pleasurable
experience – not critically assessed – is irrational
PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue. or, in other words.
it does not arise from reason, but he who repents of an action is twice as
unhappy or as weak as before.
Proof. – The first part of this proposition is proved
by the same manner as the preceding proposition. The second part is clear from
the definition of this emotion (see Def. Emo. 27). For the man allows himself
to be overcome first by bad desire and then by pain.
Note. – Insomuch as men rarely live by the dictate of
reason, these two emotions, namely humility and repentance, and besides these
hope and fear, work more good than harm: and so, as we must do wrong, it is
better to do wrong in that respect. For if men who are weak-spirited should all
become equally proud, and should have no shame or fear of anything, wherewith
could they be united as with chains and held together? If the mob is not in
fear, it frightens in its turn. Wherefore it is not to be wondered at that the
prophets, who consulted the advantage not of a few, but of the commonwealth,
should have so greatly commended humility, repentance, and reverence. And in
truth those who are liable to these emotions can be led far easier than others
who live under the guidance of reason, that is, to be free and enjoy the life
of the blessed.
what is repentance?
as with any proposal – any proposition – ‘repentance’ – is
open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
Spinoza defines repentance as – ‘pain accompanied by the
idea of some deed which we think we have done by the free decision of the mind’
this definition is too vague – too indeterminate – and it
could apply to any act that results in pain for the actor
we can still ask here – what is repentance?
‘some deed’ – ‘which we think we have done’?
I guess the first thing to note here is that Spinoza does
not say we repent a bad deed – just ‘some deed’ –
and so – it could be a good act that we repent –
and further – it is not a deed we know we have done –
only one that ‘we think we have done’ –
which opens up the possibility that we could – according to
Spinoza – repent a deed we have in fact – not done
‘twice as unhappy’?
I don’t know about ‘twice as unhappy’ – more likely just
confused – as to what has been done – and what value to place on it
for Spinoza – ‘repentance’ is a confusion – or he just
doesn’t know what it is
it is clear at least – that Spinoza is basically dismissive
of repentance
however – he has not done his ‘argument’ any service by
failing to make sense of just what repentance is
I think it is fair enough to say that – as it is commonly
understood – if we repent – we repent an action that we regard as bad or wrong
and is not repentance just that recognition that the act is
bad?
if so – are we twice as unhappy?
first up I might not be unhappy – I might acknowledge that
the act was bad – but regard this realization as instructive –
that is to say – that I can move forward with a better
understanding of my action – of myself
if – however – I am unhappy – I am only unhappy once –
that is just when I see the act as bad
now – it is possible that one may see his act as bad – feel
no pain – and no need to change one’s ways
in that case – there is no repentance
in general – I think – most would say that repentance –
involves a decision to change one’s ways –
I don’t know that there need be any pain involved in that –
more likely one would have a sense of liberation
Spinoza says repentance does not arise from reason –
if we are acting rationally – we put the proposal to
question – to doubt – and we explore its uncertainty
what is right and wrong is not fixed –
what is right or wrong – good or bad – moral – or immoral is
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
in other words – to come to a moral decision we have to
think it out – and it is always a complex matter
that is one thing
secondly – should I change my ways?
this is another issue that is complex and uncertain – and if
we are to be rational about it – one that we have to examine critically –
so – the question of repentance – is a rational question
I have said that I think rational / critical behaviour is
not as prominent in human behaviour – as non-critical irrational behaviour
this though is only an observation – and one open to
question
it is quite possible people do put most – if not all their
proposals and propositional actions to question
sometimes – it strikes me that this is how it is
I guess the truth is – that we don’t really know – we can
only speculate on this matter
and I should keep an open mind on this matter
in the same way – it is speculation whether or not –
humility – repentance – hope and fear – ‘work more good than harm’
as to ‘we must do wrong’ – what we can say is that
propositional actors do make the assessment – at various times that they do
wrong
however – there is no ‘must’ – or necessity in any
propositional behaviour
‘If the mob is not in fear, it frightens in its turn’
the argument from fear here – is simplistic and naïve
we can interpret social and political behaviour in terms of
fear –
however – when any mass behaviour – is examined critically –
much more than fear can come to light
social and political change – and especially violent social
and political change – can be understood in terms of many different emotions –
and a whole range of different ideas
mass social and political activity – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain – ‘uncertain’ – is the key here
as to prophets – hard to say
Spinoza’s view is most interesting – and one that ought to be
taken into account any biblical / political analysis
I think it is the case that those who are simply prepared to
follow the direction of some supposed authority are more easily led –
those who question and doubt and explore the uncertainty of
any proposal put to them are not easily led and pose a constant threat to
ignorance in the mask authoritarianism in all its forms
PROP. LV. The greatest pride or self-abasement is the
greatest ignorance of all.
Proof. – This clear from Def. Emo. 28 and 29.
Spinoza defines pride as overestimating oneself by reason of
self-love – and self-abasement as underestimating oneself by reason of pain –
who is to say what ‘overestimating yourself’ – or
‘underestimating yourself’ – amounts to?
the ‘self’ is not a measurable quantity – it is a proposal
– open to question
how we see ourselves is open to question – open to doubt –
and is – uncertain –
these terms ‘pride’ and ‘self-abasement’ – are descriptions
of character – which really only have rhetorical significance – and in that
sense they are logically – quite worthless
‘the greatest ignorance of all’?
this strikes me as rather emotive –
the ground of ignorance – is certainty
and in any case – ignorance is not a quantity – and is not
measurable
PROP. LVI. The
greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest weakness of spirit
in logical terms –
a ‘weakness of spirit’ has to do with critical activity
the weak spirited –
I would say – are those who are able to critically evaluate propositions and
propositional activity – but do not due to indolence
Proof. – The primary basis of
virtue is self-preservation (Coroll., Prop. 22, Part IV.), and that under
the guidance of reason (Prop. 24, Part IV.). He,
therefore, who knows not himself, know not the basis of all virtues, and
consequently is ignorant of all virtues. Again, to
act from virtue is nothing else than to under the guidance of reason (Prop. 24,
Part IV.), and he who acts under the guidance of reason necessarily knows that
he acts under the guidance of reason (Prop. 43, Part II.). He, therefore,
who has the greatest ignorance of himself, and consequently (as we have just
shown) of all virtues, acts the least from virtue, that is (as is clear from
Def. 8), he is most weak in mind; and therefore (prev. Prop.) the greatest
pride or dejection indicates the greatest weakness of spirit. Q.e.d.
‘The primary basis of virtue is self-preservation’ –
there is no basis – ‘primary’ – or otherwise – to anything –
let alone virtue
our reality is propositional – which is to say – any
proposal put – be it of ‘virtue’ – or anything else – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
the point being – there is no basis or foundation – to the
proposal – to propositional activity
as to self-preservation –
if regarded as a virtue – it is open to question –
we have many examples of where an individual has been
prepared to sacrifice themselves – for what they regard as a greater good – a
greater virtue –
‘He, therefore, who knows not himself, know not the basis of
all virtues, and consequently is ignorant of all virtues.’
an individual is a propositional actor – and ‘knows’ himself
in terms of his propositional activity –
knows himself as uncertain – in an uncertain world
‘virtues’ are proposals – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
you know that you propose – and you know what you propose
‘Again, to act from virtue is nothing else than to under the
guidance of reason (Prop. 24, Part IV.), and he who acts under the guidance of
reason necessarily knows that he acts under the guidance of reason (Prop. 43,
Part II.).’
reason is the critical evaluation of proposal
and yes – if you put your proposals – and those put to you –
to question – to doubt – and you explore their uncertainty – you are acting
rationally – and you know it
‘He, therefore, who has the greatest ignorance of himself,
and consequently (as we have just shown) of all virtues, acts the least from
virtue, that is (as is clear from Def. 8), he is most weak in mind; and
therefore (prev. Prop.) the greatest pride or dejection indicates the greatest
weakness of spirit. Q.e.d.’
the logical reality is that we are propositional actors –
whether we act from virtue or not – is open to question
no propositional action is either virtuous or not virtuous
in itself
‘weakness of mind’ – is not being able to critically
evaluate proposals
‘weakness of spirit’ – I would suggest – is being able to
critically evaluate one’s propositional actions – but being logically lazy –
and not doing so
Corollary. – Hence it follows most clearly that the
proud and self-abasing, are most liable to emotions.
‘emotions’ – are proposals – propositional actions
we are all ‘liable to emotions’ –
we are propositional actors – in a propositional reality
the point is to act rationally – to put proposals and
propositional actions to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty
–
and to not be distracted by rhetorical labels
Note. – However, self-abasing can be more easily
corrected than pride, since the later is an emotion of pleasure, while the
other is an emotion of pain; and therefore (Prop. 18, Part IV.) pride is the
stronger of the two.
underlying this – seems to be some notion of balance –
Spinoza sees pride as an overestimation of self – and
self-abasement as the under-estimation of the self.
again – the ‘self’ – is not a measurable quantity – so these
notions of ‘over-estimation’ and ‘under-estimation’ – do not apply to the self
– just as some notion of a mean point – or ‘balance’ – is not applicable
and the issue is not ‘correcting’ the self – it is rather
critically investigating one’s propositional actions and propositional
relations – be they to do with pleasure or to do with pain – and dealing with
the uncertainty
PROP. LVII. A proud man loves the presence of parasites or
flatterers, but the presence of the generous he hates.
this may well be a genuine observation by Spinoza – but
whether it holds beyond that is the question
could I not be a proud man – and be dismissive of parasites
and flatterers?
and could it not be that a proud man recognizes generosity
and appreciates it?
at the heart of this is how we understand pride
is there not a sense in which pride is a self-affirming
propositional state?
if I have worked hard and achieved what I set out to do –
should I not be proud of my achievement?
is pride not a fair estimate of oneself?
the crucial point in all this is that ‘pride’ – as with any
proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza’s view of pride – is one understanding of it – but
his view is not the only one possible – and his view is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
it might here be said that Spinoza over-estimates his view
of pride
Proof. – Pride is pleasure arisen from the fact man
over-estimates himself (Def. Emo. 28 and 6); this opinion a proud man
endeavours as much as possible to foster (see Note, Prop. 13, Part III). And
therefore he will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (the definitions
of these are omitted, for they are too well known), and he will shun the
presence of the generous, who see through him. Q.e.d.
Spinoza it seems has no concept of false pride – and
false pride is deception
that is – where I present myself in a manner that I know is
false – in order to take advantage of others in some way or another
those who fall for this deception – would be the parasites
and flatterers Spinoza refers to –
in a sense – parasites and flatterers are created by the
deception as well as being victims of it
do the generous see through Spinoza’s proud man?
maybe they do – but I can’t see why being generous enables
them to do so –
being generous doesn’t mean you are perceptive
Note – It would take too long to enumerate here all
the evils of pride, for the proud are liable to all emotions, but to none less
than to the emotions of love and pity. But I must not be silent concerning the
fact that a man is called proud who underestimates his fellows; and therefore
pride in this case must be defined as pleasure arisen from a false opinion
whereby a man considers himself above his fellows. And the self-abasement
contrary to this pride must be pain arisen from the false opinion whereby a man
thinks himself below his fellows. But this being posited we can easily conceive
that a proud man is necessarily envious (see Note, Prop. 55, Part III.), and
hates those who are most praised by reason of virtue, nor can his hatred be
easily overcome by their love or benefit (Note Prop. 41, Part III.), and that
he delights only in the presence of those who humour his weak spirit and from
being merely foolish make him mad.
‘and therefore pride in this case must be defined as
pleasure arisen from a false opinion whereby a man considers himself above his
fellows.’
are there not grounds and circumstances – when one can quite
rightly regards oneself as ‘above his fellows’ – without denigrating them?
I have in mind i.e. – the teacher in relation to his
students – or the doctor in relation to his patients
people do have knowledge – talents and experience that
others don’t – and these differences are just a fact of life –
and the opposite – I would say equally holds –
in terms of nearly all fields of knowledge I would place
myself below those who have expertise –
and that is not self-abasement – it is just being realistic
as I see it – a proud man can be seen as one who understands
and appreciates his achievements –
such a person is not necessarily envious of anyone else – or
upset that others are praised for their virtue
and the person whose pride is false – may not ‘delight’
– in those who pander to his false pride –
he may actually view them with contempt
as to making him ‘mad’ – it is not clear what this is
supposed to mean
the logical reality here – is that we cannot prescribe –
how any propositional actor – of any description – acts or reacts in any
propositional context or circumstance –
the matter is uncertain –
the best we can do as observers and analysts – is consider
possible interpretations – and keep an open mind
Although self-abasement is contrary to pride, yet a
self-abasing man is nearest to a proud one. For since the pain arises from the
fact that he compares his weakness with the strength or virtue of others, his
pain will be removed, that is, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be
occupied in the contemplation of the vices of others, whence the proverb has
arisen: It is a comfort to the unhappy to have companions in misery; and on the
other hand, he will feel the more pain the more he thinks himself beneath
others: whence it comes about that none are more prone to envy the self-
abasing, and that these, more than others, endeavour to observe the deeds of
men with the object of carping at them rather than of correcting them, and that
they praise and glory in self-abasement alone, but in such a way that they will
seem to abase themselves. Now these things follow from
this emotion with the same necessity as it does from the nature of triangle
that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and I have already said
that I call these and like emotions bad in so far as I have regard for human
advantage alone. But the laws of nature concern the common order of nature
of which man is a part, which I have paused to mention in passing lest anyone
should think me to wish to relate the vices of men and their absurd deeds, and
not to show the nature and properties of things. For as
I said in the preface of Part III., I regard human emotions and their
properties in the same manner as other natural objects. And surely human
emotions indicate, if not human power, at least the power and artifice of
nature, no less than many other things which we wonder at and in whose
contemplation we delight. But I pass on to note these things about the emotions
which bring advantage to men or which bring them harm.
the picture Spinoza paints of the self-abasing man – is
perceptive
as I observe there are those who fit this description to a
tee
however – I would put that as there is a false pride – there
is a false humility
Spinoza’s self-abasing man – is one who engages in false
humility – that is he operates with a false sense of himself – and does so
because he sees advantage in such a pretence
whether or not he is advantaged – is open to question
a humble individual – I suggest – is one who can be seen as
having a realistic understanding of his or her capacities – virtues and vices –
in this respect such a person is not so different to the
proud individual – who has a realistic appreciation of his achievements
on my account – this humble individual does seem to have a
more complete understanding of himself – for while he recognizes his strengths
he also understands his failings – whereas we would say the proud man is one
whose focus is just on his strengths
I do recognize Spinoza’s description of the self-abasing
individual –
however – I would also say that as with any description – a
critical investigation will bring to life different perspectives –
and that while we might start with such a description – once
critically evaluated –our understanding will go beyond it –
the point is that from a logical point of view – any account
of any propositional actor is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Now these things follow from this emotion with the same
necessity as it does from the nature of triangle that its three angles are
equal to two right angles; and I have already said that I call these and like
emotions bad in so far as I have regard for human advantage alone’
firstly – nothing in propositional life follows with
necessity –
propositional life is uncertain
as to the nature of the triangle –
the triangle is an example of a propositional game –
a propositional game is a rule-governed propositional
exercise –
the point of any propositional game is that you follow the
rule of the game –
if you play a propositional game – the rules are not open to
question
the rules of a propositional game – determine the game –
determine the play
if you don’t follow the rule of the game – there is no game
the rule of the triangle game is that its three angles are
equal to two right angles
if you don’t follow the rule of the triangle game – there is
no game – there is no triangle –
there are two modes to propositional life –
the critical mode and the game mode
human beings critically evaluate their proposals – and human
beings play propositional games
human emotions and human propositional behaviour – are not
rule-governed propositional exercises – are not propositional games
human emotions and human behaviour – are open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
and as to whether any emotion is ‘bad’ – this will depend on
how the emotion / propositional action is evaluated –
any propositional evaluation is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
our concepts of good and bad – are uncertain
‘For as I said in the preface of Part III., I regard human
emotions and their properties in the same manner as other natural objects. And
surely human emotions indicate, if not human power, at least the power and
artifice of nature, no less than many other things which we wonder at and in
whose contemplation we delight. But I pass on to note these things about the
emotions which bring advantage to men or which bring them harm’
human emotions are proposals – natural objects are proposals
–
proposals are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
whatever human emotions ‘indicate’ – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘nature’ – is a proposal – open to question
and ‘wonder’ – is a springboard for all critical
propositional thinking
PROP. LVIII. Glory is not opposed to reason but can arise
from it.
Proof. – This is clear from Def. Emo. 30, and from
the definition of honourable, which we see in Note 1, Prop. 37, Part IV.
Def. Emo. 30 is as follows –
‘Glory (gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some
action of ours which we imagine others to praise’
Note I Prop. 37, Part IV –
here I use the Edwin Curley translation –
‘The desire by which a man who lives according to the
guidance of reason is bound to join others to himself in friendship, I call
honourable, and I call that honourable which men who live according to the
guidance of reason praise; on the other hand, what is contrary to the formation
of friendship, I call dishonourable’
to live in accordance with reason is to question – to doubt
– and to explore propositional uncertainty
we are not bound to do anything by reason
friendship – if dealt with rationally – is critically
explored
glory – or self-esteem – can arise from a critical process
Note. – What is called vainglory is the
self-contentment which is fostered only by the opinion of the mob; and when
this ceases, so also does the self-contentment cease, that is (Note, Prop. 52,
Part IV.), the greatest good which each person loves. Whence it comes about
that he whose feeling of glory depends on the opinion of the mob, must day by
day strive with the greatest anxiety, act and scheme in order to retain his
reputation. For the mob is fickle and inconstant, and therefore if a reputation
is not carefully preserved it dies quickly. Everyone desires to obtain for
himself the applause of the mob, so each one is ready to decry the reputation
of the other, from which, since the struggle is for what is esteemed the
greatest good, an enormous desire arises of suppressing one another in whatever
manner is possible, and he that comes out victor has more glory from having
done harm to others than from having profited himself. This glory or
contentment is in truth vain, for it is nothing.
and as he notes – if it is based on the
opinion of the mob – it is destructive of a healthy view of the self – and
results in no contentment –
so – what is he on about here?
he proposes ‘self-contentment’ – and as a
result of his definition – decides there is no self-contentment –
there is bitterness somewhere in this mix
if one is rational – one’s sense of self –
and one’s ‘self-contentment’ – however that is understood – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
if not critically evaluated
‘self-contentment’ – is ‘self-ignorance’ –
and if critically evaluated self-contentment
is replaced with critical self-awareness
Spinoza says ‘everyone desires to obtain the
applause of the mob’
he is wrong about that
I for one have never desired the applause of
the mob – and it is doubtful that Spinoza himself ever desired the applause of
the mob
and not everyone who desires the applause of
the mob – is ready to decry the reputation of the other –
all we have here is Spinoza’s prejudice
against those who wish for approval
and the claim that human beings have an
‘enormous desire’ ‘of suppressing one another in whatever manner is possible’ –
is a very bleak view of humanity –
as to that those who it seems have more
glory from having done harm to others than they profited themselves –
we can make this observation – have this
opinion – but as with any observation and as with any opinion – it is open to
question
What must be noted concerning shame can be easily gathered
from what we said of pity and repentance. This only will I add, that just as
compassion so also shame, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless good in
so far as it indicates in the man who is overcome with shame a desire to live
honourably, just as pain is good in so far as it shows that the injured part is
not yet purified. Wherefore, although a man is ashamed of some deed is in truth
pained, he is nevertheless more perfect than a shameless person who has no
desire of living honourably.
how we understand ‘living honourably’ – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
the first thing to note here – is that one might be shamed –
but actually have no desire to reform – to – as Spinoza put it – ‘to live
honourably’ – but instead decide to continue acting in the way that has brought
shame –
and such a person is not shameless
there is no such thing as ‘more perfect’ –
propositional actors can live rationally – by putting their
actions to question – to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty
or they can live irrationally – and not engage in critical
evaluation –
as to which manner of living is preferable –
the matter – to my mind – is open to question
And these are the points which I undertook to note
concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain. As for desires, these are either
good or bad in so far as they arise from good or bad emotions. But all in
truth, in so far as they are engendered in us by emotions which are passions,
are blind (as can easily be gathered from what has been said in Note. Prop. 44,
Part IV.), nor would they be of any use at all if men could easily be led to
live according to the dictates of reason alone, as I shall now show in a few
words.
‘As for desires, these are either good or bad in so far as
they arise from good or bad emotions’
‘desires’ – are propositional actions
‘emotions’ – are propositional actions
how a propositional action – however described – is valued –
i.e. – as ‘good’ as ‘bad’ – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
a propositional action described as a ‘passion’ – if
not put to question – if not put to doubt – its uncertainty left unexplored –
is irrational
a ‘passion’ is of use – if put to a use
there are no ‘dictates of reason’ – reason is the critical
evaluation and investigation of proposals and propositional actions
men can be easily led to operate rationally
all that is needed is for men and women to understand – that
when they question – when they doubt – and when they explore propositional
uncertainty – they are acting rationally
being rational is a natural human behaviour – and it is
commonplace
PROP. LIX. To all actions to which we are determined by an
emotion which is a passion we can be determined without that emotion by reason
alone.
firstly – no proposal – no propositional action – is
‘determined’
any propositional action – is uncertain – and as such
undetermined
any so called ‘causal’ analysis of a propositional action –
as with any other explanatory proposal – is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain –
‘determined’ is a synonym for ‘certainty’ –
any notion of certainty is a failure of logic – a failure to
understand or accept the logic of the proposal –
the proposal / propositional action – is open to question –
open to doubt and is uncertain
certainty is the refuge of ignorance
secondly ‘emotion’ – and ‘passion’ – are descriptions
of propositional action –
thirdly – reason is the critical process of question
– of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
Proof. – To act from reason is nothing else (Prop. 2
and def. 2, Part III.) to do those things which follow from the necessity of
our nature considered in itself. But pain is bad in so far as it hinders our
power of acting (Prop. 41, Part IV.). Therefore from this emotion we can be
determined to no action which we could not do if we were led by reason.
Moreover, pleasure is bad in so far as it prevents man from being ready for
action (Prop. 41 and 43, Part IV.). And therefore we can be determined to do no
action which we could not do if we were led by reason. Again, in so far as
pleasure is good it agrees with reason (for it consists of this, that man’s
power of acting is increased or aided), nor is it a passion save insofar as it
does not increase man’s power of acting to the extent that he conceives himself
and his actions adequately (Prop. 3, Part III. with its Note). Wherefore if a
man affected with pleasure is led to such perfection that he conceives himself
and his actions adequately, he will be as apt, nay more apt, to those actions
which he was determined by emotions which are passions. But all emotions have
reference either to pleasure, pain, or desire (see explain. Def. Emo. 4), and
desire (Def. Emo. 1) is nothing else than the endeavour to act. Therefore to
all actions to which we are determined by an emotion which is a passion we can
be led by reason alone. Q.e.d.
‘To act from reason is nothing else (Prop. 2 and def. 2,
Part III.) to do those things which follow from the necessity of our nature
considered in itself.’
if this is reason – there is no reason
our nature is uncertain – and reason is the critical
exploration of that uncertainty
‘But pain is bad in so far as it hinders our power of acting
(Prop. 41, Part IV.)
our power of acting rests is the critical process of
question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –
pain may or may not hinder our power of acting –
pain may enhance the critical process
the matter is open to question
‘Therefore from this emotion we can be determined to no
action which we could not do if we were led by reason’
‘emotion’ – is propositional action
any action – however described – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
reason does not lead – it is not an authority
– it is not a directive
reason is a critical process – which propositional actors
can choose to use – or not to use
if used – propositional actors behave rationally –
if not used – propositional actors behave irrationally –
people can and do behave irrationally and rationally
‘Moreover, pleasure is bad in so far as it prevents man from
being ready for action (Prop. 41 and 43, Part IV.).’
whether pleasure prevents man from being ready for action –
for critical analysis – or actually enables man to be ready for action – for
critical analysis – will depend on circumstance
the matter is uncertain
‘Again, in so far as pleasure is good it agrees with reason
(for it consists of this, that man’s power of acting is increased or aided),
nor is it a passion save insofar as it does not increase man’s power of acting
to the extent that he conceives himself and his actions adequately (Prop. 3,
Part III. with its Note).’
pleasure – if it is not put to question – not put to doubt –
its uncertainty left unexplored – is dealt with irrationally
what counts as ‘good’ – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
propositional actors – acting rationally do not conceive
themselves or their actions as adequate –
if we operate rationally – we propose ourselves – and our
actions – as uncertain
one’s power of acting – rests in the critical process
‘Wherefore if a man affected with pleasure is led to such
perfection that he conceives himself and his actions adequately, he will be as
apt, nay more apt, to those actions which he was determined by emotions which
are passions.’
pleasure is a propositional action – open to question
there is no perfection – only uncertainty
if by ‘adequate’ is meant – beyond question – beyond doubt
and certain – then to conceive adequately – is to conceive irrationally
if man behaves rationally – he conceives himself and his
actions as uncertain
reason is not a determination – reason is a critical process
emotions – are proposal / propositional actions –
emotions / propositional actions do not determine – they
invite question and doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –
as with ‘emotions’ – ‘passions’ – are descriptions of
propositional actions –
propositional actions – open to question
‘But all emotions have reference either to pleasure, pain,
or desire (see explain. Def. Emo. 4), and desire (Def. Emo. 1) is nothing else
than the endeavour to act. Therefore to all actions to which we are determined
by an emotion which is a passion we can be led by reason alone.’
the ground of any propositional action – or the reference of
any propositional action – however described – is open to question
desire – is propositional action
propositional action – as such is not an ‘endeavour’ – it is
the natural action of human beings
reason is not a determination – reason is the critical
process –
any emotion / passion – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
Another Proof. – Each action is said to be bad in so
far as it arises from the fact the we are affected with hatred or any other bad
emotion (see Coroll. 1, Prop. 45, Part IV.). But no action considered in itself
is good or bad (as we showed in the preface of this part), but one and same
action which is now bad, or which arises from some bad emotion, we can be led
by reason (Prop. 19, Part IV.). Q.e.d.
no emotion / propositional action is good or bad in itself
‘good’ and ‘bad’ – will be proposed evaluations of
proposals – of propositional actions –
and any such proposal / evaluation – is open to question –
open to doubt – and is uncertain
Note. – These points will be
explained more clearly by an example. The action of striking, in so far as it
is considered physically, and in so far as we pay attention to this alone, that
a man raises his arm, clenches his fist and brings his whole arm down violently,
is a crime which is conceived from the construction of the human body. If,
therefore, a man moved by hatred or rage is determined to clench his fist or
move his arm, this comes about, as we showed in the second part, because one
and the same action can be united to any images of things whatsoever, and
therefore both from these images of things which we conceive confusedly and
from which we conceive clearly and distinctly, we can be determined to one and
the same action. It is therefore apparent that every desire which arises from
an emotion which is a passion would be of no use if men were guided by reason.
Let us see now why desire which arise from an emotion which is a passion is
called blind by us.
‘These points will be explained more clearly by an example.
The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far
as we pay attention to this alone, that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist
and brings his whole arm down violently, is a crime which is conceived from the
construction of the human body.’
‘considered physically, and in so far as we pay attention to
this alone’
it is not a violent act – rather a motion
and ‘considered physically, and in so far as we pay
attention to this alone’ – is not a ‘crime’
the action is only ‘violent’ or a ‘crime’ – if so interpreted
– and such an interpretation goes beyond a purely physical description
‘If, therefore, a man moved by hatred or rage is determined
to clench his fist or move his arm, this comes about, as we showed in the
second part, because one and the same action can be united to any images of
things whatsoever, and therefore both from these images of things which we
conceive confusedly and from which we conceive clearly and distinctly, we can
be determined to one and the same action.’
if by a ‘clear and distinct’ conception – is meant a
conception beyond question – beyond doubt and certain – any such conception is
irrational
a propositional action put to question – put to doubt – its
uncertainty explored – is a proposition conceived rationally
propositional actions can be conceived irrationally or
rationally
‘It is therefore apparent that every desire which arises
from an emotion which is a passion would be of no use if men were guided by
reason. Let us see now why desire which arise from an emotion which is a
passion is called blind by us.’
irrational desires and actions – may well be useful
just as desires / emotions / passions – critically explored
– may well be useful
we cannot dictate what will be useful to human beings – but
we can distinguish rational and irrational uses of proposals and propositional
actions
what is clear from the foregoing is that Spinoza – in order
to have a place for his view of reason and rationality – has had to accept
propositional uncertainty –
for without this propositional uncertainty – there is no
possibility of interpreting emotions and passions – and interpreting
them as rational
I say he has had to accept propositional uncertainty –
though I am sure he would rail against this
the point is – his theory demands propositional uncertainty
– even though he fails to recognize or appreciate this logical reality
PROP. LX. Desire which arises from pleasure or pain which
has reference to one or certain parts of the body but not all has no advantage
to man as a whole.
this proposition is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
a part is a part of
whole – therefore – if desire that arises from pleasure or pain – which has
reference to a part of the body – it will affect the whole –
if that is not the
case – then the part is not a part of the whole
and what is to
count as an ‘advantage’ – or for that matter – a ‘disadvantage’ to ‘man as
whole’?
and as for ‘man as
whole’ – what is going on here?
is Spinoza working
with a mind / body distinction?
does he have an
account of ‘man as a whole’ – or is this just an empty phrase?
and what is ‘man as
whole’ – but the propositional actor
Spinoza – has
nothing to say here – he has no argument here
his man as a whole
– is an empty space
Proof. – Let it be supposed that a part, e.g.,
A, of a body is so aided by the force of some external cause that it overcomes
the rest (Prop. 6, Part IV.). The part will not endeavour to lose its forces in
order that the other parts may perform their functions, or it would then have
the force or power of losing its forces, which (Prop. 6, Part III.) is absurd.
The part will therefore endeavour, and consequently (Prop. 7 and 12, Part III.)
the mind also will endeavour to preserve its condition; and therefore desire
which arises from such an emotion of pleasure will not bring advantage to the
body as a whole. Then if, on the other hand, it is supposed that the part A is
hindered in such a way that the remaining parts overcome it, it may be proved
in the same manner that the desire which arises from the pain will not bring
advantage to the body as a whole. Q.e.d.
here ‘man as whole’ – it appears is the ‘body as a whole’ –
is that ‘man as a whole’?
be that as it may – the fact remains that a part that does
not affect the whole – is not a part of the whole
and the desire that arises from pain that has reference to a
part of the body – will affect the whole body – or the part is not a part of
the whole
how is the body as a whole advantaged or disadvantaged by
any desire that arises in the body?
the matter is uncertain – and is open to proposal – to
speculation – and any answer here will be context dependent – and even then –
open to question – and open to doubt
Note. – As pleasure has reference generally (Note,
Prop. 44, Part IV.) to one part of the body, we therefore desire as a rule to
preserve our being without having regard to our health as a whole. To which
must be added that the desires by which we are usually held (Coroll., Prop. (,
Part IV.) have regard only for present not future time.
pleasure may be proposed in such a way that it has
reference to one part of the body –
but it can also be proposed as having a general affect
on the body – on the health of the body as a whole
whether pleasure is an ‘advantage’ or not to the health of
the body – will be a matter open to question – and again dependent on the
circumstances of the body in question
desires have regard for present not future time?
I might see a desire that arises – as good – or bad – as not
just for now – but also for the future
it is about thinking the matter out –
finally – Spinoza’s use of the part / whole argument is
logically confused – and effectively undermines his argument –
he really has no concept of the person – of the
propositional actor
he only understands man in terms of the division into mind
and body
we have desires / propositional actions – and any account of
how they arise – and what their affect is on the propositional actor is
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
PROP. LXI. Desire which arises from reason can have no
excess.
Proof. – Desire (Def. Emo. 1) absolutely considered
is the very essence of man in so far as it is conceived as determined in any
manner to do anything. Therefore desire which arises from reason, that is
(Prop. 3, Part III.), which is engendered in us in so far we are active, is the
very essence or nature of man in so far as it is conceived as determined to do
those things which are adequately conceived through the essence of man alone
(Def. 2, Part III.). If, therefore, this desire can have excess, then human
nature considered in itself can exceed itself, or could do more than it can do,
which is a manifest contradiction, And therefore this desire cannot have
excess. Q.e.d.
‘desire’ – is propositional action –
propositional action is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
there is no ‘absolute’ consideration – of anything –
any consideration – as in – any critical evaluation of any
proposal / proposition put – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘the very essence of man’ – as in – the nature of man – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘reason’ – is the critical process of question – of doubt –
and the exploration of uncertainty
‘human nature’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
the point being – we don’t know the limits of human nature –
of propositional action
the matter is open to question – is uncertain
PROP. LXII. In so far as the
mind conceives a thing according to the dictates of reason, it will be equally
affected whether the idea of a thing present, past or future.
this ‘dictates of reason’ – has not been explained by
Spinoza – as it stands – it is nothing more than a fantasy – a catch cry – a
piece of rhetoric –
there are no dictates of reason
reason is the critical activity of question – of
doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional
activity –
any idea / proposal – regardless of whether it refers to the
present – the past – or the future – is open to question – open to doubt and is
uncertain
Proof. – Whatever the mind
conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives entirely under a certain
species of eternity or necessity (Coroll. 2, Prop. 44, Part II) and is affected
with the same certainty (Prop. 43, Part II., and its Note). Wherefore, whether the idea be of a thing future, past or
present, the mind will conceive it by the same necessity and will be affected
by the same certainty; and whether the idea be of a thing present, past, or
future, it will nevertheless be equally true (Prop. 41, Part II), that is (Def.
4, Part II.), it will have, nevertheless, the same properties of an adequate
idea. And therefore in so far as the mind conceives of a thing according to
the dictates of reason it is affected in the same manner, whether the idea of a
thing future, past, or present. Q.e.d.
‘Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason,
it conceives entirely under a certain species of eternity or necessity (Coroll.
2, Prop. 44, Part II) and is affected with the same certainty (Prop. 43, Part
II., and its Note).’
‘a certain species of eternity’?
we conceive / propose in time –
the idea that we can conceive / propose outside of time – is
fanciful
no proposal is necessary – or certain
any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
Spinoza’s ‘species of eternity or necessity’ – and his
notion of certainty – is a denial of propositional reality
‘Wherefore, whether the idea be of a thing future, past or
present, the mind will conceive it by the same necessity and will be affected
by the same certainty; and whether the idea be of a thing present, past, or
future, it will nevertheless be equally true (Prop. 41, Part II), that is (Def.
4, Part II.), it will have, nevertheless, the same properties of an adequate
idea.’
whether the idea / proposal – be of a thing future – past –
or present – it will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘adequate’ is meant ‘certain’ – any proposal put – is
‘inadequate’ – as in ‘uncertain’
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional activity
Note. – If we could have an
adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason
their times of existing, we should regard things future and present with same
emotion, and the mind would desire, as if it were present, the good which it
conceives as future: and consequently it would neglect necessarily a lesser
present good for a future one, and it would desire in no wise what was good in
the present, but the cause of future ill, as we shall soon show. But we can only have a most inadequate idea of the
duration of things (Prop. 31, Part II.). and we must determine things’ time of
existing by imagination alone (Note, Prop. 44, Part II), which is not equally
affected by the image of a thing present and one future. Whence it comes about that the true knowledge of good and
evil which we have is only abstract or general, and the judgment which we make
of the order of things and the connection of causes, so as to be able to
determine what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than
real. And therefore is it not wonderful that the
desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this has
reference to the future, can be more easily restrained by the desire of things
which are pleasant in the present, concerning which see Prop. 18, Part IV.
‘If we could have an adequate knowledge of the duration of
things, and could determine by reason their times of existing, we should regard
things future and present with same emotion, and the mind would desire, as if
it were present, the good which it conceives as future: and consequently it
would neglect necessarily a lesser present good for a future one, and it would
desire in no wise what was good in the present, but the cause of future ill, as
we shall soon show.’
adequate / certain knowledge of the duration of
things – is philosophical fantasy – with no basis in propositional logic
any proposal regarding a calculation of present good as
against a future good – is open to question – is uncertain
‘But we can only have a most inadequate idea of the duration
of things (Prop. 31, Part II.). and we must determine things’ time of existing
by imagination alone (Note, Prop. 44, Part II), which is not equally affected
by the image of a thing present and one future.’
we propose – a thing’s duration’ – whether the
reference is to the past – the present or the future – and any such proposal is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Whence it comes about that the true knowledge of good and
evil which we have is only abstract or general, and the judgment which we make
of the order of things and the connection of causes, so as to be able to
determine what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than
real.’
‘true knowledge’ – of good and evil – is any proposal of
good and evil that we affirm
and any proposal of affirmation – is open to question
whether ‘abstract and general’ or not – any judgment – is
open to question – is uncertain
any proposal regarding ‘the order of things’ – and any
causal explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any proposal regarding what is good or bad for us in the
present – is real – not imaginary
‘And therefore is it not wonderful that the desire which
arises from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this has reference to
the future, can be more easily restrained by the desire of things which are
pleasant in the present, concerning which see Prop. 18, Part IV.’
we propose in relation to the present and in relation to the
future –
it is open to any propositional actor to sacrifice a
proposed present pleasure for a proposed future good
PROP. LXIII. He that is led by fear to do good in order to
avoid evil is not led by reason.
‘led by reason’?
firstly – Spinoza’s ‘reason’ – is undefined – .
we have no clear statement from him as to what reason is –
or what being ‘led by reason’ amounts to
reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and
the exploration of propositional uncertainty
‘fear’ is a natural propositional response of the
propositional actor to danger –
one may – in the critical / process of investigating one’s
fear – rationally decide to avoid evil in order to do good
or one may decide that evil needs to confronted full on –
and that any such confrontation is to the good –
these are two possible responses
my point is in any moral issue we are faced with possible
responses
there is no correct or right propositional response –
the best we can achieve is a critical response
and a critical response is a rational response
Proof. – All emotions that have reference to the
mind, in so far as it is active, that is (Prop.3, Part III), which have
reference to reason, are none other than the emotions of pleasure and desire
(Prop. 59, Part III). And therefore (Def. Emo 13) he that is led by fear to do
good in order to avoid evil is not led by reason. Q.e.d.
ok – so here we do have something of a definition of reason
‘that is that which has reference to reason’ –
and that which has ‘reference to reason is the mind’ – ‘in
so far as it is active’
and the emotions that have reference to the mind in so far
as it is active are pleasure and desire
firstly – the mind is a name for propositional
activity
any proposal / proposition put – is active – is an
action
reason – is the application of the critical process of
question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
if – Spinoza is saying that reason is metal activity –
propositional activity – then any propositional activity is rational
and if that is the case his theory of rationality – is wide
of the mark – and a failure
reason / rational activity – is not propositional action –
but rather the critical evaluation of propositional activity
pleasure and desire – are propositional states –
propositional actions – that as with any propositional action – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
likewise – fear is a propositional state – a propositional
action – and logically no different to pleasure and desire – and as such open
to question
one gets the impression that Spinoza’s ethic is an attempt
to circumvent evil – to in some way by-pass it – to not confront or deal with
it
he seems to think we can over-ride evil simply by focusing
on the good
Note 1. – The superstitious, who know better how to
reprobate vice than to teach virtue, and who do not endeavour to lead men by
reason, but to inspire them with fear that they avoid evil rather than love
virtue, have no other intention than to make the rest as miserable as
themselves; and therefore is it not wonderful that for the most part they are a
nuisance and hateful to men.
the ‘superstitious’?
those who reproach others for their vice – rather than lead
them to virtue – and inspire them to avoid evil rather than love virtue
I don’t see where superstition comes in here –
rather it seems that to focus on avoiding evil – rather than
trumpeting virtue – is at base – a different moral approach or strategy
and such a strategy is as valid as any other – but as with
any other – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
are those who adopt this approach ‘miserable’?
it seems they make Spinoza miserable – if not angry –
and this speaks to Spinoza’s failure to understand
difference –
and is really no more than a statement of prejudice from
Spinoza
whether those who adopt this different approach to moral
issues are ‘a nuisance and hateful to men’ – if this comment is to be taken
seriously – is an empirical matter
Spinoza does not provide any empirical evidence for this
view
Corollary. – By reason of the desire which arises
from reason we directly follow what is good and indirectly avoid what is evil.
‘indirectly avoiding evil’ –
doesn’t this amount to an ethic based on the failure to face
and deal with evil?
all very well to have your mind on virtue – but if you can’t
or don’t see evil – if you as it were – pass it by – and so fail to deal with
it – what good is your virtue?
does this ‘virtue’ become nothing more than an avoidance of
the moral reality?
a pretence
Proof. –The desire which arises from reason can only
arise from the emotion of pleasure which is not a passion (Prop. 59, Part
III.), that is, from pleasure which cannot be excessive (Prop. 61, Part IV,)
and not from pain. And accordingly this desire (Prop. 8, Part IV.) from the
knowledge of good, and not from that of evil. And therefore under the guidance
of reason we directly desire what is good, and thus far only we avoid evil. Q.e.d.
any desire – that is – any propositional action – that
arises from reason – from the critical process – be it in relation to pleasure
or pain – will be a desire that is put to question – put to doubt – its
uncertainty explored
our knowledge – our proposals – is what we propose as good
or what we propose as evil –
and that ‘knowledge’ will be rational – if it is critically
evaluated
Note II. – This corollary can be explained by the
example of a sick and healthy man. The sick man eats what he dislikes from fear
of death; but a healthy man enjoys his food, and thus reaps more benefit from
life than if he feared death and desired to avoid it directly. Thus a judge who
is not imbued with hatred or rage etc., but merely with love for public safety,
and condemns the guilty to death, is led by reason alone.
the idea of enjoying your food without fear of death – makes
sense to me
however – there may be good reasons for eating what you
dislike – at least for a time if that will improve your health
a lot depends on what you like and what you dislike –
if you like food that is unhealthy – too much of it – too
much enjoyment – may lead to illness – not a happy outcome –
and healthy eating practices may result in a change in what
you actually enjoy
pleasure / enjoyment – is open to question
there is nothing wrong with having an eye to death – we all
do –
it is the reality we all face
though it does seem that Spinoza for one – proposes that we
should and can avoid facing this reality –
and that I think is the death knell of his ethics
as to the judge who has a love of public safety –
if that judge was imbued with hatred and rage – and
condemned the guilty man to death –
the result is the same
PROP. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.
Proof. – The knowledge of evil (Prop. 8, Part IV.) is
pain itself in so far as we are conscious of it. But pain is a transition to a
lesser state of perfection (Def. Emo. 3), which on account cannot be understood
through the essence of man (Prop. 6 and 7, Part III,) And accordingly (Def. 2,
Part III.), it is a passion which (Prop. 3, Part III.) depends on inadequate
ideas, and consequently (Prop. 29, Part II.) the knowledge of evil is
inadequate. Q.e.d.
‘evil’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘pain’ – is a propositional state – open to question -open
to doubt – and uncertain
one can interpret pain as evil – but pain may be
interpreted in others ways –
i.e. – it may be regarded as a natural phenomenon – neither
good nor bad –
and it may be understood as good – in the sense that it
indicates a problem that needs to be solved
there is no ‘lesser state of perfection’ – as there is no
state of perfection
‘perfection’ – as a form of certainty – is logically
incoherent
the human state is one of logical uncertainty
as to – ‘the essence of man’ –
any proposal as to the nature of man – is valid – and
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
so – if we use the term ‘essence’ – it must be understood to
be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a ‘passion’ is a ‘proposal / propositional action’ –
a passion is open to question
all our ideas / proposals – are open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
our knowledge is proposal – is uncertain
Corollary. – Hence it follows that if the human had
only adequate ideas it would form no notion of evil.
if by ‘adequate idea’ is meant an idea that is certain – is
beyond question – beyond doubt – there is no adequate idea
the notion of the adequate idea has no basis in logic
it is an example of empty rhetoric
what is clear hear is that Spinoza’s aim is not to deal with
evil – with proposals of evil – but rather to abolish it
his strategy is to avoid it with the empty argument of
adequate ideas – and to propagate the pretence of the unreality of proposed
evil
human beings make value judgments – we propose good and we
propose evil – we enact good and we enact evil –
this is an empirical fact –
our value judgments are a reflection of – and response to –
the uncertainty of our complex propositional reality
PROP. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we follow the
greater of two things which are good and the lesser of two things which are
evil.
Proof. – A good thing which prevents us from enjoying
a greater good is in truth an evil, for good and bad is said of things (as we
showed in the preface of this part) in so far as we compare them one with the
other, and (for the same reason) a lesser evil is in truth a good. Wherefore
(Coroll., prev. Prop) under the guidance of reason we desire to follow only the
greater of two things which are good and the lesser of two which are evil. Q.e.d.
Corollary – We may follow under the guidance of
reason the lesser evil as if it were the greater good and neglect the lesser
good as the cause of a greater evil. For the evil which is here called lesser
is in truth good, and, on the other hand, the good is evil. Wherefore (Coroll.,
previous Prop) we desire the former and avoid the latter. Q.e.d.
‘For good and bad is said of things as we showed in the
preface of this part) in so far as we compare them one with the other, and (for
the same reason) a lesser evil is in truth a good’
‘good’ and ‘bad’ are proposals – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
here Spinoza does not define ‘good’ and ‘bad’ – and
prescribe how these terms are to be used – which is something of a departure
from his foregoing approach to ethical terms
instead – he seems to recognise that these terms – can have
whatever meaning they are given by whoever uses them –
and so – he seems to recognise the uncertainty of these
terms
be that as it may –
the underlying issue here – in the face of logical
uncertainty – is what propositional action to proceed with?
as I see it – we call a proposal ‘good’ – for
whatever reason – that we decide to proceed with – and we call a
proposal ‘bad’ – for whatever reason – which we decide not proceed with –
any action – however explained / accounted for i.e. – as
‘good’ or ‘bad’ – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
‘greater’ and ‘lesser’ – are relative terms –
and any relative term is an expression of propositional
uncertainty –
and relative terms do focus our attention on uncertainty
Spinoza holds that we will always choose a greater good over
a lesser good – and a lesser evil over a greater evil
what this presumes is that propositional actors always think
in these relative terms of greater and lesser –
he seems here – at least – not to see – that people may well
not think in these terms –
and may i.e. – just opt for a good act – or be against a bad
act – with no thought of greater goods – or lesser evils
when the greater / lesser comparison seems warranted – the
question is how to distinguish a ‘greater good’ from a ‘lesser good’ – or a
‘greater evil’ from a ‘lesser evil’?
there are no rules here – these matters are uncertain –
we can put it this way –
what one person may regard as a ‘greater good’ – another may
see as the ‘lesser good’
and can it be said that even when propositional actors
operate with the greater / lesser relation – that they will always choose the
greater good?
what if one chooses a lesser good – simply because it is
more achievable?
Spinoza speaks of the ‘guidance of reason’ –
reason is the critical evaluation of proposals /
propositions –
any decision on greater and lesser – good or evil –
is ‘rational’ – if it is the result of a critical evaluation
if it is not a result of critical evaluation – it is not
rational
PROP. LXVI. Under the guidance of reason we desire a greater
future good before a lesser present one, and a lesser evil in the present
“before a greater in the future” (van Volten’s version).
reason is the critical examination of any proposal put –
desire – is propositional action
as a result of a critical examination of a proposed greater
future good as against a lesser present on – it may be that a propositional
actor determines in favour of the lesser present good because it is more likely
attainable than the greater future good
in the case of evil –
is it not possible that after a critical look at the
possibilities – that a propositional actor decides against the lesser present
evil – and takes the view that there is a possibility that the greater future
evil will not eventuate or be overcome?
Proof. – If the mind could have adequate knowledge of
the future thing, it would be affected with the same emotion towards a future
thing as towards a present thing (Prop. 62, Part IV.). Wherefore, in so far as
we have agreed to reason, as we are supposed to do in this proposition, whether
the greater good or evil be supposed future or present, the thing is the same.
And therefore, (Prop. 65, Part IV.) we desire a greater future good before a
lesser present one. Q.e.d.
a future thing and a present thing – are proposals
and if dealt with rationally – are put to question – put to
doubt – and their uncertainty explored
the point is that tense is logically irrelevant
it is the critical / logical process that underlies this –
not the fiction of ‘adequate knowledge’
knowledge is proposal – open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
our desires – if dealt with rationally – are open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
we may after critical analysis – decide for a lesser present
good – against a future greater good –
or we may choose the proposed greater future good – against
the proposed present lesser good
the point is that any choice here is rational – if it
is the result of a critical evaluation
if there is no critical evaluation – any choice is
irrational
Corollary – We desire under the guidance of reason a
lesser present evil which is the cause of a greater future good, and we would
avoid a lesser present good, which is the cause of greater future evil. The
proof of this collar bears the same relation to that of the previous
proposition as the Coroll. of Prop. 65 bore to Prop. 65 itself.
‘under the guidance of reason’ – we critically evaluate
proposals put
we can only speculate about the future – it is uncertain
so as to whether a present ‘lesser evil’ will be the cause
of a greater good – is a speculative matter
we may indeed speculate – but we may also choose against a
‘lesser present evil’ – regardless of whether or not it might lead to a
‘greater good’
and whether a proposed ‘lesser present good’ leads to a
‘greater future evil’ – will be open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
so – we might simply opt for the present good
Note. – If these statements are compared to what we
showed concerning the force of the emotions in this part up to the eighteenth
proposition, we shall easily see what is the difference between a man who is
led by opinion of emotion and one which led by reason. The former, whether he
will or not, performs things of which he is entirely ignorant; the latter is
subordinate to no one, and only does those things which he knows to be of
primary importance in his life, and which on that account he desires the most;
and therefore I shall call the former a slave, but the latter free, concerning
whose habits and manner of life we may here say a few words.
‘the opinion of emotion’ – will be rational – if that
‘opinion’ / proposal – is critically evaluated
anyone who puts proposals / propositions – is not ‘entirely
ignorant’
our ‘knowledge’ just is proposal – and it is rational
– if put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored
the rational / critical propositional actor – has an open
mind –
the non-critical actor – operates irrationally – and is
close minded
PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of nothing less than of
death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but of life.
a ‘free man’ can think whatever he likes –
a free man is a propositional actor who questions – doubts –
and explores propositional uncertainty –
a free man is one who thinks critically
‘nothing less than of death’ –
‘death’ – as with any other proposal – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
and wisdom – likewise – is open to question
and a rational propositional actor can ‘meditate’ – on
whatever propositional state he chooses
Proof. – A free man, that is, one who lives according
to the dictates of reason alone, is not led by the fear of death (Prop.63, Part
IV.), but directly desires what is good (Coroll., same Prop.), that is
(Prop.24, Part IV.), to act, to live, and preserve his being on the basis of
seeking what is useful to him. And therefore he thinks of nothing less than
death, but his wisdom is a meditation of life. Q.e.d.
Spinoza’s ‘dictates of reason’ – have not to my mind been
defined
however – if what they are – amounts to Spinoza’s proposals
as to what is good – and preserving of one’s being – and seeking that which is
useful – fair enough –
but these are only proposals – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain –
and as such – logically – no different – to any other
ethical proposals – that anyone else has advanced
furthermore – it does not follow – that if you follow
Spinoza’s ‘dictates of reason’ – you will ‘think nothing less than death’
it might just be i.e. – that you think that a meditation on
death is the key to the good life – to preserving your being – and figuring out
what is useful
there is a switch here from the proposition to the proof –
Spinoza in the proposition speaks of thinking about
death – in the proof – it is not thinking about death – but fearing
death
firstly – thinking and fearing are different propositional
actions – different propositional states
and secondly – fear is a natural emotion – and not to be
written off as a weakness – or an evil
‘fear’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
depending on circumstance – propositional context – fear may
have positive results or negative results
and fear of death – is not something that can be ‘written
out’ of people’s experience by the idea of a ‘meditation on life’ –
fear of death is natural – and I suggest – is healthy –
without a healthy fear of death human beings would be
without parameters –
and Spinoza’s ‘good’ – his ‘preservation of being’ – and his
‘being able to determine what is useful’ –
would be without definition – and as such – have no value
Spinoza of course does not deny death – but it is quite
clear he wishes to avoid thinking about death
this fits with his view of evil – that he who operates in
accordance with Spinoza’s ‘dictates of reason’ – can avoid evil
Spinoza’s ethic is an ethic of avoidance –
and as such it is lopsided – inadequate – and fails to deal
with the ethical reality
PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free they would form no
conception of good and bad as long as they were free.
men are free to the extent that they engage in the critical
process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional
uncertainty
it is as a result of this critical process that they propose
good and evil
this is a logical reality and an empirical reality
the idea that human beings have ever operated without value
proposals is fanciful –
and bears no relation to human reality
Proof. – I said that he is free who is led by reason
alone. He, therefore, who is born free and remains free has only adequate
ideas, and accordingly has no conception of bad (Coroll., Prop. 64. Part IV.)
and consequently (for good and bad are correlatives) none of good. Q.e.d.
the failure here – is Spinoza’s notion of ‘adequate idea’ –
his ‘adequate idea’ – is an idea – a proposal that is beyond
question – beyond doubt and certain
there is no such idea / proposal –
the closest we come to it is blind prejudice
freedom is reason – the critical activity of question –
doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
our notions of good and bad – are critical notions –
critical proposals
our propositional reality constantly challenges us –
we can respond to this challenge critically – or we can
ignore it –
if we respond critically – we act rationally – if we ignore
it – our propositional actions are irrational –
even so – no functioning propositional actor – whether
acting rationally or acting irrationally – operates without conceptions of good
and bad
not even blind prejudice avoids the question of good and
evil
Note. – That the hypothesis of this proposition is
false and cannot be conceived save in so far as we have regard for the sole
nature of man, or rather for God, not in so.
far as he is infinite, but in so far alone as he is the cause of man’s
existence, is obvious from the fourth proposition of this part. And this and
the other points which we have already demonstrated seem to have been meant by
Moses in his history of the first man. For in that no other power of God is conceived
save by which he created man, that is, a power by which he consulted only the
advantage of man; and thus it is related that God prohibited free man of eating
of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it, at
once he began to fear death rather than desire to live; again, when man found a
wife, who agreed most perfectly with his own nature, he knew there could be
nothing nature more useful to him, but that afterwards, when he thought that
the brute creation were similar to himself, he began at once to imitate their
emotions (see prop. 27, Part III.) and lost his freedom, which the Patriarchs
under the guidance of the spirit of Christ, that is the idea of God, afterwards
recovered: on this idea alone it depends that man should be free, and that he
should desire for other men the good which he desires for himself, as we showed
above (Prop. 37, Part IV.).
‘That the hypothesis of this proposition is false and cannot
be conceived save in so far as we have regard for the sole nature of man, or
rather for God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far alone as he is
the cause of man’s existence, is obvious from the fourth proposition of this
part.’
the hypothesis of this proposition – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain – whichever way it is ‘explained’ – or ‘packaged
up’ –
‘And this and the other points which we have already
demonstrated seem to have been meant by Moses in his history of the first man.’
Spinoza here – puts that his proposition is reflected in the
Moses story –and therefore it can be seen to have biblical authority –
be that as it may – the proposition is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
‘For in that no other power of God is conceived save by
which he created man, that is, a power by which he consulted only the advantage
of man; and thus it is related that God prohibited free man of eating of the
tree of knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it, at once
he began to fear death rather than desire to live;’
this story or fantasy – is consistent with the idea of PROP.
LXVIII. –
and as with this proposition it is based on logical and
epistemological error
‘again, when man found a wife, who agreed most perfectly
with his own nature, he knew there could be nothing nature more useful to him,
but that afterwards, when he thought that the brute creation were similar to
himself, he began at once to imitate their emotions (see prop. 27, Part III.)
and lost his freedom, which the Patriarchs under the guidance of the spirit of
Christ, that is the idea of God, afterwards recovered: on this idea alone it
depends that man should be free, and that he should desire for other men the
good which he desires for himself, as we showed above (Prop. 37, Part IV.).’
Spinoza’s interpretation of the biblical story of the
creation of man in terms of his metaphysics – epistemology and ethics – and his
more comprehensive work of biblical analysis in the Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus is really quite ingenious – and still – after all this
time – quite revolutionary
PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man appears equally great
in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them.
any proposed danger is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
if one critically evaluates a proposed danger or dangerous
act – one deals with it rationally –
if it is not subject to question – to doubt – and its
uncertainty explored – it is not dealt with rationally
Proof. – Emotion cannot be hindered or negated save
by a contrary emotion and one that is stronger (Prop. 7, Part IV.). But blind
daring and fear are emotions which can be conceived equally great (Prop. 5 and
3, Part IV.). Therefore an equally great virtue or fortitude (see def., Note,
Prop.59, Part III.) of mind is required to restrain daring as to restrain fear,
that is (Def. Emo. 40 and 41), a free man avoids dangers with the same virtue
of mind as that which he attempts to overcome them. Q.e.d.
‘emotion’ – is a name or description of
propositional action
propositional action – is open to question –
and it is in the critical process of question – of doubt –
and the exploration of propositional uncertainty – that emotion / propositional
action can be modified or negated
‘fortitude’ – if not critically assessed – is just another
irrational propositional action
‘fear’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if critically assessed – it is dealt with rationally – if
not – it is dealt with irrationally
‘danger’ is open to question –
if dealt with in a critical manner – it is rationally
assessed
a free man critically evaluates dangers – and any response
to danger is rational – if critically assessed
Corollary. – Therefore a free man is led by the same
fortitude of mind to take flight in time as to fight; or a free man chooses
from the same courage or presence of mind to fight or to take flight.
it is not a question of fortitude – courage or presence of
mind
the ‘free man’ critically evaluates the circumstance – the
propositional context – and makes his call – for his own reasons
reasons / proposals – that remain – open to question
Note. – What courage is, or what I understand by it,
I have explained in the Note on Prop. 59, Part III. But I understand by danger
all that which can be the cause of any evil, namely of pain, hatred,
disagreement, etc.
what if the performance of a dangerous act has a good result
– and is one that gives pleasure – and leads to agreement?
PROP. LXX. A free man, who lives among ignorant people,
tries as much as he can to refuse their benefits.
Proof. – Everyone judges according to his own
disposition what is good (see Note, Prop. 39, Part III.). Therefore an ignorant
man who has conferred a benefit on anyone will estimate according to his own
disposition, and if he sees it to be estimated less by him to whom he gave it,
he will be pained (Prop. 42, Part II.). But the free man desires to join other
men to him in friendship (Prop. 37, Part IV,), and not to repay men with
similar gifts according to their emotion towards him: he tries to lead himself
and others according to the free judgment of reason, and to do those things
only which he knows to be of primary importance. Therefore a free man, lest he
should become hateful to the ignorant, and lest he should be governed by their
appetite, instead of by reason alone, endeavours as far as possible to refuse
their benefits.
‘Therefore an ignorant man who has conferred a benefit on
anyone will estimate according to his own disposition, and if he sees it to be
estimated less by him to whom he gave it, he will be pained.’
bear in mind here – we have no definition of ‘an ignorant
man’ – from Spinoza
and I would think that anyone – ‘ignorant’ or not – might
well be disappointed if a gift given is ‘estimated less by him to who he gave
it’
‘But the free man desires to join other men to him in
friendship (Prop. 37, Part IV,), and not to repay men with similar gifts
according to their emotion towards him:’
a free man has an open mind in relation to others –
this may result in friendship or it may not
and as to reciprocation – or not – the free man will assess
the matter critically
‘he tries to lead himself and others according to the free
judgment of reason, and to do those things only which he knows to be of primary
importance.’
a ‘free man’ – will question – doubt – and explore
uncertainty –
as to leading others in this direction – that too – is open
to question –
perhaps – in a given circumstance – to do so – would be
assessed as appropriate –
just as equally though – it may well be seen as not
appropriate or useful
the ‘free man’ – is not an evangelist
and as for what is of ‘primary importance’ – no critical
thinker will be dogmatic on this matter
what is of ‘primary importance’ – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
and whatever one’s view on ‘primary importance’ – it may
have no relevance at all in relation to an act of gift giving
and we should note Spinoza does not give his view of
‘primary importance’
‘Therefore a free man, lest he should become hateful to the
ignorant, and lest he should be governed by their appetite, instead of by
reason alone, endeavours as far as possible to refuse their benefits.’
Spinoza’s ‘free man’ comes across as an intellectual snob
and for Spinoza – it seems ‘the ignorant’ – are simply those
who do not view the world in the same way as he does
and if this is so – it is Spinoza – with all his vacuous
talk of ‘reason’ – who is ignorant
for the ignorant man is he who does not question – does not
doubt – the pretended certainty of his own propositions
the world is full of different appetites – and reason is the
critical evaluation of proposals and propositional actions
yes – you can refuse a benefit from another – but don’t
think that the pretence of superiority – is to be equated with reason
Note. – I say ‘as far as possible’, for although men are
ignorant, they are nevertheless men and can confer human aid, greater than
which there is none, in time of necessity. And it often happens that it is
necessary to receive benefits from them, and consequently to repay them in
kind. To which must be added that even in refusing benefits caution must be
used lest we seem to despise or to refuse them out of avarice, for fear of
having to repay them, and thus, while we are trying to avoid their hatred, incur
their offence. Wherefore in refusing benefits we must have regard for use and
honour.
‘I say ‘as far as possible’, for although men are ignorant,
they are nevertheless men and can confer human aid, greater than which there is
none, in time of necessity.’
it seems Spinoza’s so called ‘free man’ will deign to
accept aid from his inferiors – if he is in need –
but if he is not in need – he will refuse it because they
are not worthy of giving anything to him –
Spinoza’s ‘free man’ comes across as a conceited prig
‘And it often happens that it is necessary to receive
benefits from them, and consequently to repay them in kind’
a quick line from Spinoza – with no elaboration – which
effectively sinks his proposition
and what this makes clear – is that here – Spinoza is on
very shaky ground here – and knows it
‘To which must be added that even in refusing benefits
caution must be used lest we seem to despise or to refuse them out of avarice,
for fear of having to repay them, and thus, while we are trying to avoid their
hatred, incur their offence. Wherefore in refusing benefits we must have regard
for use and honour.’
more back-tracking –
‘lest we seem to despise or to refuse out of avarice’
‘seem’ here – indicates that maintaining the pretence of
good will is all-important to this so called ‘free man’
‘Wherefore in refusing benefits we must have regard for use
and honour.’ –
so – in the end – nothing is left of Spinoza’s argument
PROP. LXXI. Only free men are truly grateful one to the
other.
Spinoza’s ‘free man’ – he says – is led by reason – the
dictates of reason –
there are no ‘dictates of reason’ – reason is the critical
activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
the ‘dictates of reason’ – or ‘reason’ for Spinoza – amounts
to his philosophical prejudices – his views on the nature of reality
his philosophical views / propositions are quite valid – as
valid as any –
however – he fails to see that his conceptions and arguments
– as with any other – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
it is reasonable to suggest that those who see the world in
the same way are likely to be grateful one to the other in the same way –
no guarantee of this – but it might be expected
this however does not mean that those who have different
outlooks cannot be grateful – one to the other
gratitude is simply appreciation of a gift given –
and one can appreciate a gift given – without knowing
the other’s outlook on the world – without knowing whether the other is
Spinoza’s so called ‘free man’
Proof. – Only
free men are truly useful to one another, and are united by the closest bond of
friendship (Prop. 35, and its first Coroll.) and endeavour to benefit each
other with an equal impulse of love (Prop. 37, Part IV.). And therefore (Def.
Emo. 14) only free men are truly grateful one to the other. Q.e.d.
men and women – whether they have the same outlook as
Spinoza’s ‘free man’ – or not – can be useful to one another
and people do not need to be united in the ‘closest bond of
friendship’ – to be useful to each other
as to ‘the endeavour to benefit each other with an equal
impulse of love’ –
I think it is only natural to try to reciprocate –
however – whether any reciprocation comes from ‘an equal
impulse of love’ – will be open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
men and women can be grateful one to the other regardless of
their circumstances – and regardless of how they see world
Note. – The gratitude which men who are led by
blind desire have one to the other is usually a matter of bargain or a snare
rather than gratitude. Moreover ingratitude is not an emotion. But ingratitude
is nevertheless base, inasmuch as it indicates that man is affected with too
great hatred, anger, pride, or avarice. For he who does not repay gifts by
reason of foolishness is not ungrateful, and far less is he who is not moved by
the gift of a courtesan to serve her lust, nor of a thief to hide his theft, or
any other similar person. But, on the contrary, he shows that he has a constant
mind, for he will not allow himself to be bribed by any gifts to bring ruin on
himself and society.
‘The gratitude which men who are led by blind desire
have one to the other is usually a matter of bargain or a snare rather than
gratitude.’ –
this can be the case – but it may not be – as Spinoza’s
‘usually’ – indicates
‘Moreover ingratitude is not an emotion. But ingratitude is
nevertheless base, inasmuch as it indicates that man is affected with too great
hatred, anger, pride, or avarice.’
the actions of one affected with hatred – pride – or avarice
– in the context of a gift given to them – may indicate ingratitude
and if so – ingratitude here – is a possible consequence of
these emotions
however – is it not also possible that one’s hatred – pride
– or avarice – is – as it were – ‘upstaged’ by the generosity – and that such a
person finds himself – unexpectedly – grateful?
here we are in the realm of what might be termed ‘moral
surprise’
‘For he who does not repay gifts by reason of foolishness is
not ungrateful, and far less is he who is not moved by the gift of a courtesan
to serve her lust, nor of a thief to hide his theft, or any other similar
person’
the ‘gift of a courtesan’ – may be to serve her lust – but
it will most likely be a gift at the service of her customer’s lust – and if so
– if you are the customer – why not be grateful?
and if you are the courtesan – why not be grateful?
‘But, on the contrary, he shows that he has a constant mind,
for he will not allow himself to be bribed by any gifts to bring ruin on
himself and society.’
he who ‘will not allow himself to be bribed by any gifts’ –
has a critical mind –
a ‘constant mind’ – is an uncritical mind –
and an uncritical mind – is a mind blind to propositional
reality
PROP. LXXII. A free man never
acts by fraud, but always with good faith.
Proof. – If a free man were to something by fraud in
so far as he is free, he would act according to the dictates of reason (for
thus far only we call him free); and therefore to act fraudulently would be a
virtue (Prop. 24, Part IV.) and consequently (same Prop.) it would be most
advantageous to each one to act fraudulently, that is (as is self-manifest), it
would be most advantageous for men to agree only in what that say, but to be
contrary one to the other in what they do, which (Coroll., Prop. 31, Part IV)
is absurd. Therefore a free man, etc. Q.e.d.
Note. – If it be asked, “If a man can liberate
himself from present danger of death by deception, would not consideration for
the preservation of his own being persuade him to deceive?” it may be answered
in the same manner, “That if reason persuaded him that, it would persuade it to
all men, and therefore reason would persuade all men not to unite all their
forces and have laws in common save in deception one to the other, that is not
to have common laws, which is absurd.”
reason is the critical process – of question – of doubt –
and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
if a man decides – in a particular propositional context
– to deceive in order to secure his life – his decision is rational – if it is
the result of an engagement in the critical process of question – of doubt –
and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –
and that decision – as with any other – from a logical point
of view – is open to question
if there is no engagement in the critical process – his
decision is irrational
as to whether all men – if faced with the same
circumstance – after engaging in the critical process – would come to the same
decision – we cannot say –
for we cannot know that all men would face the same
situation –
and we cannot know what decision all men would
make – in any circumstance – as a result of engaging in the critical process
further – to suggest that one can speak for all men –
or dictate to all men – is nothing less than the height of arrogance and
pretension
PROP. LXXIII. A free man who is guided by reason is more
free in a state where he lives according to common decision than in solitude
where he obeys only himself alone.
a free man – is a critical man – a man who questions –
doubts – and explores propositional uncertainty – whether his propositional
context is that of common decision or he operates in solitude
Proof. – A man who is guided by reason is not led to
obey by fear (Prop. 63, Part IV.), but in so far as he endeavours to preserve
his being according to the dictates of reason, that is, (Note, Prop. 66, Part
IV.) in so far as he endeavours to live freely, he desires to have regard for
common life and advantage (Prop. 37, Part IV.) he desires to live according to
the common decisions of the state. Therefore a man guided by reason alone
desires, so as to live with more freedom, to keep the common laws of the state.
Q.e.d.
‘common life’ – is a propositional state – ‘advantage’ – is
a proposal –
for a free man – a critical man – propositional states and
proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a free man – a critical man – may well desire to keep the
common laws of the state –
however – he may just equally – as a result of critical
evaluation and analysis – argue against the common laws of the state
anyone blindly accepting the common laws of the state –
adopts the posture of a slave – not that of a free man
Note. – These and such things which we have shown of
the true freedom of man have reference to fortitude, that is (Note. Prop. 59,
Part III.), to courage and generosity. Nor do I think it worthwhile to show
here separately all the properties of fortitude, and far less that a strong man
hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one,
despises no one, and is in no wise proud. For these points, and all which
relate to the true life and religion, are easily proved from Prop. 37 and 46,
Part IV., namely, that hatred should be overcome by love, and that everyone led
by reason desires for his fellows the good he desires for himself. To which
must be added that we noted in Note of Prop. 50, Part IV., and in other places,
namely, that a strong man considers this above all things, that everything
follows from the necessity of divine nature; and accordingly, whatever he
thinks to be a nuisance or bad, and whatever, moreover, seems to him impious,
horrible, unjust, or disgraceful, arise from
the fact that he conceives these things in a disturbed,
mutilated, and confused manner:
and on this account he endeavours above all to conceive
things as they are in themselves, and to remove obstacles from true knowledge,
as, for example, hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and other things of this
kind which we have noted in the previous propositions: and therefore he
endeavours as much as he can, as we said, to act well and to rejoice. How far
human virtue lends itself to the attainment of this, and what it is capable of,
I shall show in the next part.
‘These and such things which we have shown of the true
freedom of man have reference to fortitude, that is (Note. Prop. 59, Part
III.), to courage and generosity.’
the ‘true freedom of man’ is embedded in propositional logic
the proposition is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
the idea that there are propositions that are certain –
beyond question – beyond doubt – is the source of human bondage
‘Nor do I think it worthwhile to show here separately all
the properties of fortitude, and far less that a strong man hates no one, is
angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, despises no one,
and is in no wise proud.’
rationality is our strength
one can be rational – with or without courage
anger – envy – indignancy – despising – and pride – are
propositional states – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘For these points, and all which relate to the true life and
religion, are easily proved from Prop. 37 and 46, Part IV., namely, that hatred
should be overcome by love, and that everyone led by reason desires for his
fellows the good he desires for himself.’
hatred may be overcome with love –
however – the rational approach here is to subject hatred to
question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty
I may well desire for my fellows a good I do not desire for
myself
‘To which must be added that we noted in Note of Prop. 50,
Part IV., and in other places, namely, that a strong man considers this above
all things, that everything follows from the necessity of divine nature’
a rational man – puts any argument to question – to doubt –
and explores its uncertainty
‘and accordingly, whatever he thinks to be a nuisance or
bad, and whatever, moreover, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, or
disgraceful, arise from the fact that he conceives these things in a disturbed,
mutilated, and confused manner: and on this account he endeavours above all to
conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove obstacles from true
knowledge, as, for example, hatred, anger, envy,
derision, pride, and other things of this kind which we have
noted in the previous propositions: and therefore he endeavours as much as he
can, as we said, to act well and to rejoice.’
we do not conceive in a disturbed – mutilated – or confused
manner
our conceptions are proposals – propositions – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘things as they are in themselves’ – are uncertain – and
open to question
‘true knowledge’ – is the proposal – the proposition – you
affirm –
and any propositional affirmation – or denial – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
form a logical point of view – one lives well – if one has a
critical view and an open mind
whether you rejoice or not is logically irrelevant
APPENDIX
What I have said in this part concerning the right manner of
life is not so arranged that it can be seen at one glance. but has been proved
by me in parts, for then I could easily prove one from another. I have
determined, therefore, to collect the parts here and reduce them to their
principal headings.
Spinoza’s ‘proofs’ – are simply restatements of his
propositions –
they have more to do with rhetoric than logic
the so called ‘deductive proof’ – is little more than a
language-game – where the conclusion is contained in the premise
deductive arguments have more to do with poetry than logic
there are no ‘proofs’ – there are only proposals /
propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
I. All our endeavours or desires follow from the necessity
of our nature in such a manner that they can be understood either through this
alone, as through their proximate cause, or in so far as we are a part of
nature which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other
individuals.
all our endeavours or desires are proposals / propositions /
propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
this notion of necessity – is an empty notion – a rhetorical
notion –
it has no basis in logic
our understanding is propositional – and as such – uncertain
‘nature’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
‘other individuals’ – are proposals – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
how we understand ourselves – from a logical point of view –
is open to question
II. Desires which follow from our nature in such a way that
they can be understood through it alone are those which have reference to the
mind in so far as this is conceived to consist of adequate ideas; the remaining
desires have no reference to the mind save in so far as it conceives things
inadequately, and their force and increase are not defined by human power, but
by power which is outside us. Therefore the first are called actions, while the
second, passions. For the former always indicate our power, and the latter, on
the contrary, indicate our want of power and our mutilated knowledge.
the ‘mind’ is a name for
propositional activity
ideas – are proposals / propositions / propositional actions
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘adequate idea’ is meant a proposal that is certain –
then there are no adequate ideas
what goes for ‘adequate ideas’ – are entrenched
prejudices
all ideas – are proposals – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
human power is logical power – human power rests in critical
activity
any proposal / proposition put to us – logically
speaking – is no different from any proposal / proposition that we put – it is
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘passion’ – is a name given to
propositional action
from a logical point of view – the name is not important –
it is irrelevant – as all propositional action – however named – however
described – is open to question –
all propositions are actions – action we take – or
actions taken in relation to us –
and all propositional action is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
our knowledge is proposal – is propositional action
our knowledge is not mutilated – it is uncertain
III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
by the power or reason of man, are always good: the others can be both good and
bad.
our propositional actions are rational – if
critically evaluated – that is – put to question – put to doubt – their
uncertainty explored
an action may be proposed as ‘good’ – yet not critically
examined
and an action may be proposed as ‘bad’ – and critically
examined
there are any number of proposals as to what is good and
what is bad
any such proposal is rational – if critically examined
IV. It is therefore extremely useful in life to perfect as
much as we can the intellect or reason, and of this alone does the happiness or
blessedness of man consist: for blessedness (beatitudo) is nothing else
than the satisfaction of mind which arise from the intuitive knowledge of God.
But to perfect the intellect is nothing else than to understand God and his
attributes and actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore
the ultimate aim of man who is guided by reason, that is, the greatest desire
by which he endeavours to moderate all others, is that which brings him to
conceive adequately himself and all things which can come within the scope of
his intelligence.
‘the intellect or reason’?
the intellect here – for Spinoza is another name for
reason
and his notion of reason – is the argument – the deductive
argument of the Ethics –
any deductive argument is a language-game –
a language-game where the conclusion is contained in the
premise –
which is to say the conclusion is a reconstitution of the
premise
so effectively all you have with the deductive ‘argument’ is
a restatement of the initial premise or proposal in a different form
Spinoza’s ‘proofs’ are restatements of his propositions
reason for Spinoza – is repetition
and if this is all ‘reason’ or ‘intellect’ comes to – then
reason or intellect is little more than a pretence
‘intellect’ or reason?
‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional
action
I put the view that reason is the critical capacity of
question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
as to the happiness or blessedness of man –
one’s happiness may involve reason – that is – may involve
critical activity – however one may be happy without critical activity
as to happiness or blessedness being tied to the intuitive
knowledge of God –
firstly – what is intuitive knowledge – but knowledge that
is not critically evaluated –
and knowledge of God –
‘God’ – is a name for known
we propose in relation to the unknown – in reaction to the
unknown
any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
there is no perfection – or perfection of the intellect /
propositional action
what we deal with ‘intellectually’ – is propositional
uncertainty
as to the nature of God –
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
the unknown – is not a necessity – and nothing follows
from it
human beings – propositional actors – have no ultimate aim –
any ‘aim’ is propositional – and open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
we do not conceive ‘adequately’ – our conceptions are uncertain
V. Accordingly no rational life is without intelligence, and
things are only good in so far they help man to enjoy intellectual life, which
is defined intelligence (intelligentia). But those things which prevent
a man from perfecting his reason and enjoying a rational life – these things, I
say, alone we call evil.
‘intelligence’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to
interpretation
it is not the case that things are only good in so far as
they help man to enjoy intellectual life
what is good – is open to question – open to doubt – and
open to interpretation –
many would say that sensual experience – can be a
non-intellectual good – and the source of enjoyment
a rational life – is a life of question – of doubt – and the
exploration of uncertainty
man has the capacity to challenge prejudice – pretence – and
authoritarianism
by the same token – much of human activity and experience is
non-critical – this does not make such human activity and experience ‘evil’ –
it just makes it – irrational
furthermore – there is nothing good or bad in itself about
irrational propositional behaviour – just as there is nothing good or bad in
itself regarding rational propositional action
the rational and the irrational are propositional realities
– propositional possibilities –
we live with and operate with the irrational and the
rational
VI. But inasmuch as all things of which man is the affecting
cause are necessarily good, therefore nothing evil can happen to man save from
external causes, namely, in so far as he is a part of the whole of nature, to
whose laws human nature is forced to submit, and to agree with which it is
compelled in almost infinite ways.
in so far as man is a part of nature ‘all things of which man
is the affecting cause’ – are natural
whether they are proposed as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ – depends on
one’s propositional conceptions of good and evil
and any proposal put here is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
as for ‘external causes’ –
any so called ‘external cause’ is a proposal put –
how it is evaluated is – as with any proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
so called ‘laws of human nature’ – are proposals – open to
question –
‘in almost infinite ways’
VII. Nor can it come about that man is not a part of nature,
nor follow its common order, but if he dwells among
individuals which agree with him in nature, by that very fact his power of
acting is aided and fostered. And if, on the other hand, he dwells among
individuals who agree with him in no wise in nature, he will scarcely be able
to accommodate himself with them without a great change in his nature.
just what man is a ‘part of’– and whether there is any
‘common order’ to what man is a ‘part of’ – is open to question – open to doubt
– and is uncertain
‘but if he dwells among individuals which agree with him in
nature, by that very fact his power of acting is aided and fostered’
‘our power of acting’ – ‘is aided and fostered’ – by
critical thinking –
if there is no question – no doubt – no uncertainty – among
those who we dwell with – there is no rational life to be had with them – and
they will have nothing of rational significance to offer us –
the reality is – we dwell among people with different
understandings and different perspectives
we live in a critical reality – a reality of question – of
doubt – and uncertainty
dealing with those who do not agree with – is a common
logical reality – and it is no bad thing – for it challenges us – and offers us
different propositional perspectives
if we deal with those who do not agree with us in a rational
manner – we will put them to question and we will put ourselves to question
and whatever the result – it too should be put to question
whether we are relating to those who agree with us – or
those who do not – if we live rationally and effectively – we question – we
doubt – and we explore the uncertainty of the propositions we put – and those
propositions put us
VIII. Whatever exists in the universe which we judge to be bad, or capable of preventing us from existing and enjoying a rational life, we may remove from us in the way that seems the safest: and whatever, on the other hand, exists which we judge to be good or useful for the preserving of our being and the enjoyment of rational life, we may seize and use in whatever way we please. And in absolute terms everyone can do by the sovereign rights of nature whatever he judges will be of advantage to him.
a judgment is a proposal – open to question –
and this notion of ‘right’ – or ‘sovereign right’ – is just
rhetoric – authoritarian rhetoric
all we have – is proposal – and there is nothing
behind it – nothing to ground or guarantee it
the rational life is the critical life –
in order for it to flourish – critical activity does
not require anything to be removed from the universe – or for that matter –
added to it
the only ‘threat’ to the rational life – to critical
activity – is the delusion of certainty – and the authoritarian structures that
underpin – support – and benefit from it
yes – you can do whatever you judge / propose – to be
of advantage to you –
but any such judgment – if rational – is open to question –
open to doubt and is uncertain –
i.e. – what you may judge is to your advantage – may
disadvantage others
and in such a case – you may decide to forgo the advantage –
so that others may not suffer
IX. Nothing can agree more with the nature of anything than
other individuals of the same species: and therefore (No. 7) nothing exists
that is more useful to a man for preserving his being and enjoying a rational
life than a man who is led by reason. Again, inasmuch as we know nothing among
particular things which is more excellent than a man who is led by reason,
therefore everyone can show his skill and ingenuity in nothing better than in
so educating men that they live according to the command of their own reason.
individuals – within a species – can and do disagree
a man who is led by reason – is a critical man – a man who
questions – doubts and explores propositional uncertainty
a critical approach may or may not be useful to a man for
preserving his being –
and it may be irrelevant to the matter of preserving one’s
being
and a critical approach – logical as it is – might not be a
source of enjoyment
calling a life of reason – that is the critical approach to
life ‘excellent’ – strikes me as advertising and rhetoric
I think educating others to have an open mind and to think
critically – is a good thing to do
X. In so far as men are affected with envy or any other
emotions of hatred they are contrary to one another, and consequently they are
more to be feared the more power they have than the other individuals of
nature.
one fears what one cannot or does not deal with rationally –
that is what one does not put to question – does not put to
doubt – and does not critically explore
our power rests in our critical capacity
one may be envious without hatred –
and the one who does hate will only have the pretence of
power – if his hate is not put to question – not put to doubt – and its
uncertainty unexplored
XI. But minds are conquered not by arms but by love and
generosity.
to suggest that the minds of others are to be conquered
– one way or the other – is to propose that the relation between men is one of
aggression
love and friendship if true – and if rational is a gift –
not a conquest
propositional actors are not to be conquered – they are to
be put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored
XII. It is above all useful to men that they join together
in companionship and bind themselves together with such bonds by which they can
most easily make one being of them all, and absolutely do those things which
serve for the purpose of confirming friendship.
companionship –
the company of others – is always open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain
companionship can be productive – and it can be destructive
the idea that men can ‘make one being of them all’ – is a philosophical
fantasy –
men are individual propositional actors –
and ‘friendship’ – again – as with any propositional
relation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
a good friendship is a rational friendship –
friends should put each other to question – to doubt – and
help other to explore their uncertainties
XIII. But for this skill and vigilance is required. For men
are varied (for those are rare who live according to the rule of reason), and
moreover they are generally envious and more prone to revenge than pity. There
is need, therefore, of considerable strength of mind to regard each one
according to his disposition and to constrain oneself and not to imitate the
emotions of others. But those who are cavil at men and prefer rather to
reprobate vices than to inculcate virtues, and those who do not strengthen, but
weaken the minds of men – these, I say are a nuisance both to themselves and
others. Wherefore many, owing to too great impatience of mind and a false zeal
for religion, have preferred to live among beasts rather than among men: just
as children or youths who cannot bear with equanimity the reproaches of their
parents, run away to enlist and choose the inconveniences of war and the
command of a tyrant rather than the conveniences of home and paternal
admonition, and who will bear any kind of burden provided they may thereby
spite their parents.
‘But for this skill and vigilance is required. For men are
varied (for those are rare who live according to the rule of reason), and
moreover they are generally envious and more prone to revenge than pity.’
yes – men and women are varied – and there is no ‘rule’ of
reason –
a rule is a game concept –
a game can only be played in terms of its rules –
where there are no rules – there is no game –
‘reason’ – is not a game
reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and
the exploration of uncertainty
there are no ‘rules’ to the critical process
as to – ‘they are more generally envious and prone to
revenge than pity’
this proposal / proposition – is of course open to question
–
and what reason or evidence does Spinoza provide for this
generalization?
‘There is need, therefore, of considerable strength of mind
to regard each one according to his disposition and to constrain oneself and
not to imitate the emotions of others.’
it is not a question of ‘strength of mind’ – it is rather a
matter of critical openness and flexibility
how we regard ‘each one’ – rationally speaking – is a matter
open to question
why would you want to ‘imitate’ the emotions of others?
‘But those who are cavil at men and prefer rather to
reprobate vices than to inculcate virtues, and those who do not strengthen, but
weaken the minds of men – these, I say are a nuisance both to themselves and
others.’
those who find fault with others – are as rationally blind –
as those who preach virtues
both are a nuisance and tiresome
the best we can do for others is to put their propositions
and their propositional behaviour to question – and to help them explore their
uncertainties
‘Wherefore many, owing to too great impatience of mind and a
false zeal for religion, have preferred to live among beasts rather than among
men: just as children or youths who cannot bear with equanimity the reproaches
of their parents, run away to enlist and choose the inconveniences of war and
the command of a tyrant rather than the conveniences of home and paternal
admonition, and who will bear any kind of burden provided they may thereby
spite their parents.’
men – women – children and youths – follow different paths
in the exploration of an uncertain reality –
to understand and to assist our fellow travellers – we need
an open mind – and a critical temperament
XIV. Therefore, although men are as a rule governed in
everything by their lust, yet from their common society many more advantages
than disadvantages follow. Wherefore it is preferable to bear their injuries
with equanimity, and to be zealous for those things which produce harmony and
friendship.
‘Therefore, although men are as a rule governed in
everything by their lust, yet from their common society many more advantages
than disadvantages follow.’
this is a proposition that requires empirical evidence – to
even get off the ground –
and we have none from Spinoza –
men and women can be ‘governed’ by ignorance – dogmatism and
prejudice
or they can exercise their freedom – and question – doubt –
and explore propositional uncertainty
and how can it be established – that there are more
advantages than disadvantages for men and women in common society?
any such proposal – is clearly open to question
‘Wherefore it is preferable to bear their injuries with
equanimity, and to be zealous for those things which produce harmony and
friendship.’
‘bearing injuries with equanimity’ – is really the
philosophy of the slave
there is no advantage in submitting to injustice –
we should tackle injustice – not with equanimity – but
rather with rationality
harmony and friendship – are no simple matters –
just what they amount to – is open to question – open to
doubt and is uncertain
and furthermore – they should not be seen as a substitute
for individual and social justice
XV. The things which give rise to harmony are those which
have reference to justice, equity and honourable dealing. For men are ill
pleased not only when a thing is unjust or injurious, but also when it is held
to be disgraceful. or, when any one despises the customs of the state. But for
procuring love those things are especially necessary which relate to religion
and piety. On which points see Notes I and 2 Prop. 17, and Note: Prop. 46, and
Note, Prop. 73, Part IV.
harmony – is a pretence – albeit – generally speaking – a
pleasant pretence
it is a mask placed over propositional reality – the reality
of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
justice – equity – and honourable dealing – are critical
matters – and their status is uncertain
we might have an experience of harmony – if and when – we
suspend critical thinking
and there is nothing wrong with this – we can all welcome a
break from critical thinking
however – the propositional reality remains – and it is a
critical reality
if a thing is unjust or injurious – we are best to deal with
it rationally
and as for what is disgraceful – well that is a matter open
to question
what is regarded as ‘disgraceful’ to one – will not be so –
to another
the ‘customs of the state’ – are entrenched propositional
practises – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
no intelligent citizen will simply submit to state customs
the point is not to despise – but rather to critically
evaluate –
and this – I suggest – happens as a matter of course in any
society
‘love’ – for some – may well be tied to religion and piety –
but for others – not so
is Spinoza suggesting – only religious people love?
XVI. Harmony is often born of fear, but then it is not
trustworthy. Moreover fear arises from weakness of the mind, and therefore does
not appertain to the use of reason: nor does compassion, although it seems to
present an appearance of piety.
the notion of harmony arises when critical thinking is
suspended –
fear does not arise from ‘weakness of the mind’ –
fear is a natural propositional reaction to threat
can harmony arise out of fear – as a response to fear – I
suppose so –
as for harmony being trustworthy or not –
any propositional response that is an avoidance of critical
thinking – is irrational
and people do ‘trust’ the irrational –
however – any ‘trust’ – if it is to be rational – must be
put to question
and so – it is with compassion –
a non-critical compassion – is irrational
‘harmony’ as I see it – is a notion that comes from music –
and is then applied in other propositional contexts
and the ground of this notion of harmony is mathematical –
mathematics is a rule based propositional game –
and harmony a rule based propositional / mathematical
structure in sound
the key point here is that – rationality is not a rule-
based propositional game –
rationality is the critical process of question – of doubt –
and the exploration of uncertainty
and so – this notion of harmony is misapplied in any
discussion of rationality
XVII. Men, moreover, are won over by open-heartedness (largitas)
especially those who have not the wherewithal to purchase what is necessary for
sustaining life. However, to give to give aid to every poor man is far beyond
the power and advantage of a private man. For the riches of a private man are
far too little for such a thing. Moreover, the ability of one man is far too
limited for him to be able to unite all mem to himself in friendship: for which
reason the care of the poor is incumbent on society as a whole, and looks to
the general advantage only.
‘Men, moreover, are won over by open-heartedness (largitas)
especially those who have not the wherewithal to purchase what is necessary for
sustaining life.’
men and women may be ‘won over by open-heartedness’ – but
there is no guarantee of this –
being ‘open’ to the other person – is rational – and is
generous
but it may not win them over – if ‘winning them over’ –
amounts to getting them to be open to you – being generous in return – or
perhaps just agreeing with you – or accepting you
the other may not be won over – and may simply take
advantage of you – of your open-heartedness – of your generosity
‘for which reason the care of the poor is incumbent on
society as a whole, and looks to the general advantage only.’
there will always be those – who for whatever reason – are
advantaged relative to their fellow citizens – and those who disadvantaged –
for whatever reason – relative to others
however – in a just society – all citizens should be
accorded basic social security –
I would think – all citizens should be guaranteed housing –
health services – education – and employment –
how these basics of social security are to be ensured
– is a question for each society – for each culture – and for the uncertain art
of politics
XVIII. In accepting benefits and returning thanks our
concern must be wholly different: concerning which see Note, Prop.7-. and Note,
Prop. 71, Part IV.
the act of gift giving is propositional – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
and any propositional response to a gift – if it is to be
rational – will be a critical assessment
I think one can be critically aware – and at the same time
pragmatic –
ideally – I would say that a gift should be accepted and
reciprocated
the point being that if accepted and reciprocated – there is
no loss to either party
and if reciprocation is not possible – the best approach – I
think – is to decline the gift
and to explain that it is declined – not because one is ungrateful
– but rather because one cannot reciprocate –
having said that – gift giving and receiving – is an
uncertain business – and we are best to understand it as such
XIX. Moreover,
meretricious love, that is the lust of generation which arises from beauty, and
absolutely all love which acknowledges any other cause than freedom of the
mind, passes easily into hatred, unless – what is still worse – it be a sort of
madness, and then it is fostered more by discord than by harmony (see Coroll.,
Prop. 32, Part III.)
logically speaking – love – however characterized – i.e. –
as ‘sensual’ – or ‘sexual’ – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is
uncertain –
if not dealt with critically – it is irrational
and ‘madness’ I would suggest – is propositional action that
is pursued without question – without doubt – and to those who are caught up in
it – seen to be a driven certainty
madness – is not rational –
it can be destructive – it can be creative
XX. As for what concerns matrimony, it is certain that it is
in concord with reason if the desire of uniting bodies is engendered not from
beauty alone, but also from the love of bearing children and wisely educating
them: moreover, if the love of either of them, that is, of husband or wife, has
for its cause not only beauty, but also, and above all, freedom of mind.
‘not from beauty alone’ – why not?
and people marry who do not want to have children
the propositional / empirical reality is that people marry
for any number of reasons –
and furthermore – they end marriages for any number of
reasons –
marriage – as with any propositional relation – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as for a rational marriage –
any intimacy between people will likely be characterized by
a mixture of the irrational and rational
and freedom of mind?
a free mind is an open mind – a critical mind –
when we put our proposals to question – to doubt – and
explore their uncertainty – and help the other to do the same – we share the
gift of rationality
whether doing so results in a successful marriage or not –
is itself – open to question
and what counts as a successful marriage?
this is a matter for the husband and wife to determine – for
the husband and wife to come to understand –
and any determination – any understanding reached – will
come – as the result of question – of doubt – and the exploration of each
other’s uncertainties
XXI. Flattery also gives rise to harmony, but only by means
of the abhorrent crime of slavery or by means of perfidy: none are more taken
in by flattery than the proud, who wish to be the first and are not.
‘Flattery also gives rise to harmony, but only by means of
the abhorrent crime of slavery or by means of perfidy’
I think the idea here – is that the one put in a
disadvantaged position – due to subjugation or deceit – tries to achieve – and
perhaps does – a sense of worthiness – through flattery of the one who
dominants or persecutes
and if so – the sense of worthiness – or Spinoza’s so-called
‘harmony’ – achieved through flattery – is a deception – and illusion
perhaps – though – there are circumstances where one might
need to deceive oneself in order to survive harsh realities?
in any case – any so-called ‘harmony’ – is really an
avoidance of propositional reality – of rationality
the reality of question of doubt and of propositional
uncertainty
‘none are more taken in by flattery than the proud, who wish
to be the first and are not.’
one can be legitimately proud of one’s achievements –
however – false pride is a form of deception – where
one credits oneself – for achievements that one has not secured
such a person – may well be ‘taken in’ by flattery –
or they may see it for what it is – a false response to
their falseness
also – one may be flattered by another – without being proud
– or without having a false pride
it may just be a means of the other ingratiating themselves
–
and this can be quite harmless –
in any case flattery – as with any propositional action – if
viewed rationally – should be put to question – put to doubt – and its
uncertainty explored
XXII. There is in self- abasement a false appearance of
piety and religion; and although self-abasement is contrary to pride, yet one
who abases himself is the nearest to the proud man (see Note, Prop. 57, Part
IV,).
pride – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
Spinoza has a negative view of pride –
but we can ask – is there anything wrong with taking pride
in oneself?
for pride can be seen as valuing oneself – and having a
realistic view of one’s achievements
self-abasement – as with any propositional behaviour is open
to question
humiliating or belittling oneself – one would think is
neither a healthy or well-balanced view of oneself
however – self-abasement could be an attempt to maintain a
sense of oneself – in the face of some form of oppression – and therefore – not
without value as a survival strategy
XXIII. Shame also is conducive to harmony, but only in those
things that cannot be hidden. Again, as shame is a sort of pain, it has no
relation to the use of reason
‘Shame also is conducive to harmony, but only in those
things that cannot be hidden.’
I can see that one may acknowledge shame in the hope of
reconciliation –
however – whether or not that acknowledgment has the desired
result – is open to question –
it would all depend on propositional circumstance and the
propositional actors involved
it may work – or it may not –
i.e. – it may just result in dismissal or even ridicule by
others
‘Again, as shame is a sort of pain, it has no relation to
the use of reason’
any emotional / propositional action – has ‘a
relation to the use of reason’
as any emotional / propositional action – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
pain – is open to question – open to interpretation – is a
logically uncertain experience
and any experience of shame – likewise – can be rationally
assessed
XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are
directly opposed to justice, equity, honourable life, piety and religion, and
although indignation seems to present an appearance of equity, yet life would
be lawless in many a place where each one could pass judgment concerning the
actions of another and enforce either his own right or the right of another.
our emotional / propositional experiences – be they of pain
and sadness or pleasure and joy – are not opposed to justice – equity –
an honourable life – piety or religion
emotional experience – uncertain as it is – is the ground
of our notions of justice – equity – the honourable life – piety – religion –
and other propositional constructions or ways of being that that we propose
for it is out of the uncertainty of our emotional experience
that we propose and explore these notions
pain or sadness – is no different to any other emotional
experience – it is open to question open to doubt – and is uncertain
as for ‘indignation’ – or anger provoked by injustice – its
value is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
I suspect that there will be circumstances where a
propositional actor puts his / her indignation to what he / she regards as a
good use –
and there will be propositional contexts – where indignation
is regarded as of no use or even counter-productive
XXV. Modesty (modestia), that is the desire of
pleasing men which is determined by reason, has reference (as we said in the
first Note of Prop, 37, Part IV.) to piety. But if it arises from emotion, then
it is ambition, or, a desire whereby men, under the false guise of piety,
excite discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid others either by word
or deed so that they may enjoy the greatest good – he, I will say, will strive
above all to win over their love for himself, and not bring them to a state of
wonderment so that a discipline may receive his name nor will he give any cause
absolutely for envy. Moreover, in his every day conversation he will take care
not to make reference to vice and to speak very sparingly of human want of
power: but not at all of human virtue or power, and in what way it can be
perfected, so that men endeavour to live not from fear or aversion, but moved
only by an emotion of pleasure according to the dictates of reason, as far as
in them lies.
a modest person – is unpretentious –
one may adopt a modest approach to life – as a way of being
– regardless of whether it is pleasing to others
the desire to please others – is natural –
where is it is pretentious – it is irrational
emotion – and whatever proposal arises from it – is rational
– if put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty – explored –
we aid others in a rational manner – if we give them the
benefit of critical thinking
if one is rational – one is open – not restricted in one’s
conversation –
as to not discussing ‘want of human power’ –
‘want of human power’ – is as legitimate a proposal for
critical reflection – as any other
men do experience fear – to suggest that fear can be
‘philosophically eliminated’ – is unrealistic and fanciful
fear – as with any emotion – can be dealt with rationally –
with question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
we are not moved – ‘only by an emotion of pleasure’ –
and pleasure – as with fear – is open to question – is
uncertain
XXVI. Save men we do not know any particular thing in nature
in whose mind we may rejoice or which we may join to us in bonds of friendship
or any other kind of association: therefore the consideration of our own
advantage does not demand that we preserve whatever exists in nature besides
men. Instead, it teaches us that we should preserve or destroy it according to
its usefulness, or adapt it to our use in any manner we please.
‘Save men we do not know any particular thing in nature in
whose mind we may rejoice or which we may join to us in bonds of friendship or
any other kind of association:’
Spinoza it seems doesn’t realise that human beings are not
the only sentient creatures in nature
to not realise that there are other animals ‘in whose minds
we may rejoice’ – is a singular and extraordinary failure of observation and
understanding of the natural world
it is frankly hard to believe he could be so blind
‘therefore the consideration of our own advantage does not
demand that we preserve whatever exists in nature besides men. Instead, it
teaches us that we should preserve or destroy it according to its usefulness,
or adapt it to our use in any manner we please.’
this statement to my mind – is beyond the pale
even if you accept that man’s only interest is his own
advantage – it is blatantly obvious that conserving the natural world is to
man’s advantage –
it is the natural world that nourishes and sustains man
how we preserve our natural environment in a manner that is
to our advantage – and to the advantage of other natural creatures – is no
simple matter
any proposal for preservation or destruction – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
and any proposal for any environmental action – requires our
best science and our best critical thinking
it is clearly not simply a matter of acting ‘in any manner
we please’
the idea that we should ‘act in any manner we please’ – is
irrational – and to my mind immoral
finally – how does Spinoza square the proposal of XXVI –
with his statement that ‘man is not a kingdom within a kingdom’?
the fact of it is – he cannot –
and as a result – either his ‘ethics’ is contradicted by his
metaphysics – or his metaphysics is contradicted by his ethics –
in any case – the fabric of his philosophy – falls apart at
the seams
XXVII. The advantage we reap from things which are outside
us, together with the experience and knowledge we acquire from the fact that we
observe them and change them from one form to another, is principally the
preservation of the body; and in this respect those things are especially
useful which we can so feed and nourish the body that all its parts can rightly
perform their functions. For the more the body is apt to be affected in many
ways, the more apt is the mind for thinking (see Prop. 38 and 39. Part IV). But
there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature. Wherefore for the
nourishment of the body as it is necessary to use many foods of different
nature: for the human body is composed of many parts of different nature which
need continuous and varied nourishment so that the whole body may be equally
fit for all the things that can follow from its nature, and consequently that
the mind may be equally fit for the conception of many things.
‘For the more the body is apt to be affected in many ways,
the more apt is the mind for thinking’
the body – is a name for propositional
activity –
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional
action –
and ‘thinking’ – is the critical activity of question – of
doubt – and the exploration of proposition uncertainty
it is not a question of being ‘affected in many ways’ –
however we are ‘affected’ – that is to say – whatever
proposals / propositions – we put or are put to us – if we are being rational –
we will engage in the critical activity
and furthermore – critical activity – does not depend on
physical nourishment –
except to say – that if you are too weak and thus unable to
function – you may not be able to engage in critical activity –
or it may be that with your last breath – you have a
question – you have a doubt?
and again – the issue is not ‘the conception of many things’
– but rather the critical activity of question of doubt – and the exploration
of propositional uncertainty
XXVIII. But for providing these things the strength of one
man would scarcely suffice if men did not exchange services. However money has
provided a short way to all these things, whence it has come about that the
image of money occupies the principal place in the mind of the vulgar, for they
can scarcely imagine any kind of pleasure unless it is accompanied by the idea
of money as its cause.
how does Spinoza know this – how can he know
this without empirical evidence – evidence he does not have?
all we have here from Spinoza is intellectual prejudice –
and referring to those who may have a focus on money as
‘vulgar’ – shows Spinoza to be an intellectual snob
the logical reality is that any propositional focus
is valid
and any propositional focus that is critically evaluated is
dealt with rationally –
this applies to philosophers and their concerns – as much as
does to anyone else
XXIX. But this vice is only theirs who seek to acquire
money, not from need or reason of necessity, but because they have learned the
arts of gain wherewith to raise themselves to a splendid estate. They feed
their bodies of course according to custom, but sparingly, for they think they
lose as much of their goods as they spend on the conservation of the body. But
those who know the true use of money and moderate their desire of money to
their requirement alone are content with very little.
‘But this vice is only theirs who seek to acquire money, not
from need or reason of necessity, but because they have learned the arts of
gain wherewith to raise themselves to a splendid estate.’
the reasons for acquiring money – are many and varied –
any acquisition – is rational – if put to question – put to
doubt – the its uncertainty – explored
there are those who do acquire money ‘because they have
learnt the arts of gain wherewith to raise themselves to a splendid state’ –
and who is to say that this activity is a vice?
‘They feed their bodies of course according to custom, but
sparingly, for they think they lose as much of their goods as they spend on the
conservation of the body.’
here we get to see the depth of Spinoza’s prejudice against
the rich
what he is saying here – is that the rich don’t eat much
because they think they lose wealth by spending on food
I would like to know what evidence Spinoza has for his foray
into the eating habits of the rich –
and by the sounds of it – Spinoza never met a rich fat
person
in any case this comment is beneath Spinoza – for it has no
basis in empirical evidence or rational argument – and is clearly a statement
of straight-out prejudice
‘But those who know the true use of money and moderate their
desire of money to their requirement alone are content with very little.’
the ‘true use of money’ – is any use that is affirmed
by the user –
and any rational use of money – is a use put to question –
put to doubt – its uncertainty explored
full marks to those who are ‘content with very little’ – but
not everyone falls into that category
and let’s be clear the matter is relative –
what Spinoza might regard as very little – someone who has
less than he has – may see him as being rich –
what people are ‘content with’ – is a matter for them –
and if their content is rational – it will have been put to
question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored
XXX. Since, therefore, those things which are good which aid
the parts of the body to fulfil their functions, and since pleasure consists in
the fact that the power of man, in so far as he consists of mind and body, is
aided or increased – all these things then which bring pleasure are good. But
since things do not act with the end in view of giving pleasure, and since
their power of acting is not tempered according to our need, and moreover,
since pleasure as a rule has reference to one part of the body in particular,
most of our emotions of pleasure (unless we have regard for reason and keep
watch over them) and consequently our desires also are excessive. To which must
be added that when we follow our emotions, we count as primary that which is
pleasure in the present, nor can we estimate a future thing with an equal
emotion of mind (see Note, Prop. 44 and Note, Prop. 60, Part IV.).
‘Since, therefore, those things which are good which aid the
parts of the body to fulfil their functions, and since pleasure consists in the
fact that the power of man, in so far as he consists of mind and body, is aided
or increased – all these things then which bring pleasure are good.’
the power of man – rests in man’s critical / rational
capacity
‘pleasure’ – may or may not aid one’s rational capacity –
and ‘pleasure’ – as with any other propositional experience
– is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
not all things which bring pleasure – are assessed as ‘good’
‘But since things do not act with the end in view of giving
pleasure, and since their power of acting is not tempered according to our
need’
‘things’ are proposals –
‘things’ – do not act – it is propositional actors – that
act
proposals are logical entities – which if critically
investigated reveal logical / propositional possibility
‘our needs’ – are proposals – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘and moreover, since pleasure as a rule has reference to one
part of the body in particular, most of our emotions of pleasure (unless we
have regard for reason and keep watch over them) and consequently our desires
also are excessive.’
even if you accept that ‘that pleasure as a rule has
reference to one part of the body’
and even with the qualification of ‘reason and keeping a
watch over them’ – it does not follow that – ‘most of our emotions of pleasure
and consequently our desires are excessive’
what grounds does Spinoza have here for saying our emotion
of pleasure and our desires are excessive?
and how does Spinoza define ‘excessive’?
Spinoza’s ‘argument’ here – just strikes me as very
incomplete – if not empty
‘To which must be added that when we follow our emotions, we
count as primary that which is pleasure in the present, nor can we estimate a
future thing with an equal emotion of mind (see Note, Prop. 44 and Note, Prop.
60, Part IV.).’
when we follow our emotions – is just when we act
do we always count as primary that which is pleasure in the
present?
I don’t know – and Spinoza offers no evidence for this
proposal –
at best we can say – the matter is open to question
and as to ‘a future thing’ – well – the matter – of course –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
XXXI. But superstition, on the contrary, seems to call that
grand which brings pain and that bad which brings pleasure. But we have already
said (see Note, Prop. 45., Part IV.), no one save an envious person takes
pleasure in my wont of power and inconvenience. For the greater emotion of
pleasure we are affected with, the greater perfection we pass on to, and
consequently the more we partake of the divine nature: nor can pleasure ever be
had which is guided by a true regard for our advantage. But he on the other
hand, who is led by fear and does what is good in order to avoid what is bad,
is not led by reason (see prop. 63, Part IV.).
‘But superstition, on the contrary, seems to call that grand
which brings pain and that bad which brings pleasure.’
the propositional reality is that there are ethical /
religious systems – and variations that see pain or suffering – as a way to
salvation – and see the pursuit of pleasure – as immoral
the logical reality is that any view of pain – or of
pleasure – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
pleasure and pain – are uncertain propositional states
‘But we have already said (see Note, Prop. 45., Part IV.),
no one save an envious person takes pleasure in my wont of power and
inconvenience.’
it does depend on who you are and what you have done –
I may take pleasure in another’s wont of power – if when he
/ she had power they disadvantaged me
‘For the greater emotion of pleasure we are affected with,
the greater perfection we pass on to, and consequently the more we partake of
the divine nature:’
firstly – there is no perfection –
perfection is just a reconfiguration of the notion of
certainty –
and certainty is a delusion
pleasure if rationally assessed – leads to question – to
doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –
as to ‘partaking in divine nature’ –
what we ‘partake in’ – is propositional reality –
and propositional reality is – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘nor can pleasure ever be had which is guided by a true
regard for our advantage.’
I think this is a mistranslation
in the Curley edition of the ‘Ethics’ – we have instead –
‘Nor can joy which is governed by the true principle of our
advantage ever be evil’ –
it is up for question whether the experience of joy is
‘governed by the true principle of our advantage’
I don’t know that you can say that joy is governed by any
principle –
joy – however explained – is open to question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain
there may well be propositional actors – in certain
propositional contexts – who take a dark view of joy
‘But he on the other hand, who is led by fear and does what
is good in order to avoid what is bad, is not led by reason (see prop. 63, Part
IV.).’
again – fear is a natural propositional state – and if
viewed rationally is put to question
and reason just is the critical process of question – of
doubt and the exploration of uncertainty
I can well understand someone – who after critically
evaluating a situation decides that doing good will avoid an evil –
now that decision and course of action – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain – but it is not irrational
XXXII. But human power is considerably limited and
infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, and therefore we have not
absolute power of adapting things which are outside us for our usage. But we
shall bear the equanimity of those things which happen to us contrary to that
which a regard for our advantage postulates, if we are conscious that we have
performed our duty and cannot extend the power we have to such an extent as to
avoid those things, and moreover, that we are a part of nature as a whole,
whose order we follow. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part
of us which is called our understanding, or rather intelligence, that is, the
best part in us, will acquiesce in this entirely, and will endeavour to persist
in that acquiescence. For in so far as we understand, we can desire nothing
save what is true; and therefore in so far as we understand this rightly, the
endeavour of the best part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.
‘But human power is considerably limited and infinitely
surpassed by the power of external causes, and therefore we have not absolute
power of adapting things which are outside us for our usage.’
human power – is the power of rationality – the power of
question – the power of doubt – the power of the exploration of propositional
uncertainty
‘things which are outside us’ – are proposals put
any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
there is no ‘absolute power’ – any proposed power – is open
to question – is uncertain
‘But we shall bear the equanimity of those things which
happen to us contrary to that which a regard for our advantage postulates, if
we are conscious that we have performed our duty and cannot extend the power we
have to such an extent as to avoid those things, and moreover, that we are a
part of nature as a whole, whose order we follow.’
what is to our advantage is always an uncertain matter
our power is rationality – question – doubt – the
exploration of propositional uncertainty
our nature / our reality – is propositional –
and any proposed order – is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
‘If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of
us which is called our understanding, or rather intelligence, that is, the best
part in us, will acquiesce in this entirely, and will endeavour to persist in
that acquiescence.’
the ‘best in us’ – is our rational / critical capacity –
and when we act rationally – we do not ‘acquiesce’ – we
question – we doubt – we explore propositional uncertainty
‘For in so far as we understand, we can desire nothing save
what is true; and therefore in so far as we understand this rightly, the
endeavour of the best part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.’
our understanding – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
what is true is what we give our assent to –
and any proposal of assent – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
any proposed ‘order of the whole of nature’ –
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
FIFTH PART
CONCERNING THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT OR HUMAN FREEDOM
PREFACE
I pass on at last to that part of the Ethics which concerns
the manner or way which leads to liberty (de modo sive via quae ad
libertatem ducit). In this part then, concerning the power of reason. I
shall endeavour to show what power reason has over the emotions, and moreover,
what is mental liberty or blessedness (mentis libertas seu beaititudo):
from which we shall see how far a wise man excels an ignorant. But in what
manner or by what means the intellect must be perfected, and again, by what art
the body must be completely cured so that it may perform its functions
correctly, does not appertain to this part: for the latter relates to medicine
and the former to logic. Here, therefore, I shall show, as I said, the power of
the mind or reason, and above all how great and of what kind is its power over
the emotions to restrain and moderate them. For we have not complete command
over our emotions, as we have already shown. The
Stoics, however, were of the opinion that the emotions depend absolutely on our
free will, and that we have absolute command over them. But they were compelled
by the outcry of experience, not by their principles, to confess that not
little practise and zeal were required to restrain and moderate them. This
someone has endeavoured to point out by the example (if I remember rightly) of
two dogs, one of a domestic dog and the other hunting: namely, that it can at
length be brought about that the domestic dog hunts and the hunting dog
refrains from hunting and chasing hares. This
opinion is not a little favoured by Descartes, for he held that the soul or
mind was particularly united to a certain part of the brain, called the pineal
gland, by means of which it feels all the movements that take place in the
external body and external objects, and which the mind by the very fact it
wishes can move in various ways. He held that this gland is suspended in
the middle of the brain in such a way that it can be moved by the least motion
of the animal spirits. He held, moreover, that this gland is suspended in the
middle of the brain in as many ways as
the animal spirits impinge on it, and moreover, that there are impressed on
that gland as many marks as there were varied external objects propelling the
animal spirits towards it: whence it comes about that if the gland is
afterwards suspended by the will of the mind moving it in various ways, in this
or that way, then the gland drives away and determines the animal spirits in
the same way as they were repulsed before by a similar suspension of the gland.
He held, moreover, that every wish or will of the mind is united to a certain
motion of the gland, e.g., if anyone has a wish to see a distant object, this
will bring it about that the pupil is extended; but if he thought only of the
dilation of the pupil alone, it would profit him nothing to have the wish to
see that thing, inasmuch as the motion of the gland which serves to impel the
animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a convenient way for contracting or
dilating the pupil, is not joined in nature to the wish to contract or dilate
it, but with the wish to see objects near or far. He held, finally, that
although each motion of this gland seems to be connected by nature to a certain
one of our thoughts at the beginning of our lives, yet it could be joined
through habit to others: this he endeavours to prove inn the Passions de
l’Ame, Part I., Art. 50. he thereby concludes that there is no mind so weak
that it cannot, if well directed, acquire absolute power of its passions. For
these as defined
by him are perceptions or feelings or disturbances of the
mind which have reference to
its species, and which are produced, preserved, and
strengthened by some movement of the spirits (see Descartes’ Passions de l’Ame,
Part I., Art. 27). But since we can join each motion of the gland, and
consequently of the spirits, to any will, the determination of the will depends
on our power alone. If therefore, we determine our will by certain fixed
decisions according to which we will to direct the actions of our life, and
unite the movements of the passions which we wish to have to these decisions,
we shall have absolute dominion over the passions. This the opinion of that
illustrious man (as I gather it from his own words), which I would scarcely
have believed to have been put forward by so great a man, were it less acute. I
cannot sufficiently wonder that a philosophic man, who directly stated that he
would deduce nothing save self-evident principles, and that he would assert
nothing save what he perceived clearly and distinctly – one, moreover, who so
many times reproved the schoolmen for wishing to explain obscure things by
occult qualities, should put forward an hypothesis far more occult than all
occult qualities. What does he understand, I ask, by the union of mind and
body? What clear and distinct conception, I say, has he thought closely united
with a certain quantitative particle? Truly I should
like him to explain this union through it proximate cause. But he conceived the
mind so distinct from the body that he could not assign a particular cause for
this union nor for the mind itself, but he had perforce to recur to the cause
of the whole universe, that is, to God. Again, I should like to know how
many degrees of motion the mind can impart to the pineal gland, and with how
much force it can hold it suspended? For I know not whether this gland is moved
around more quickly or slowly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and
whether the movements of the passions which we have united securely to certain
firm decisions cannot be disjoined from them again by corporeal causes: from
which it would follow that although the mind have firmly proposed to go out
against dangers and had joined to this decision the motions of daring, yet at
the sight of the peril the gland would be so suspended that the mind would only be able to think of
flight. And clearly as there is no relation between will and motion, so also
there can be no comparison between the power or strength of the mind and body;
and consequently the strength of one cannot be determined by the strength of the
other. Add to this that this gland is not found situated in the middle of the
brain in such a way that it can be moved so easily and in such a number of
ways, and that the nerves are not all extended to the cavities of the brain.
Finally, I omit everything he asserts concerning the will and its freedom,
since I have more than sufficiently shown that it is false. Therefore, inasmuch
as the mind’s power, as I have shown above, is defined by understanding alone,
the remedies for the emotions (which I think everyone experiences, but does not
accurately observe nor distinctly see) we shall determine from mere knowledge
of the mind and deduce therefrom all things which relate to blessedness.
‘I shall endeavour to show what power reason has over the
emotions, and moreover, what is mental liberty or blessedness (mentis
libertas seu beaititudo): from which we shall see how far a wise man excels
an ignorant.’
reason is the critical evaluation of proposals /
propositions
‘emotions’ – and ‘emotion’ – is propositional action
it is not a matter of reason having power over
emotional proposals / propositional actions
rational evaluation – explores the uncertainty of
propositional action
men question – men doubt and men explore uncertainty – as a
matter of course
the ignorant man – is he who opts for the delusion of
certainty –
and the ignorant man is one who holds to the delusion of
propositional authority
any proposal / proposition put – however further described
or explained – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
the only genuine authority – is authorship
‘Here, therefore, I shall show, as I said, the power of the
mind or reason, and above all how great and of what kind is its power over the
emotions to restrain and moderate them. For we have not complete command over
our emotions, as we have already shown.’
Spinoza speaks as if the emotions are a threat to human
beings
our emotions – are the proposals we put – in response to the
unknown –
our emotions plot our way forward –
from a rational point of view – it is not a question of restraining
our emotions –
and it is not a matter of having command over our
emotions
it is rather a matter of critically evaluating and exploring
our emotional / propositional actions
‘The Stoics, however, were of the opinion that the emotions
depend absolutely on our free will, and that we have absolute command over
them. But they were compelled by the outcry of experience, not by their
principles, to confess that not little practise and zeal were required to
restrain and moderate them. This someone has endeavoured to point out by the
example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, one of a domestic dog and the
other hunting: namely, that it can at length be brought about that the domestic
dog hunts and the hunting dog refrains from hunting and chasing hares.’
the Stoics made the same mistake as Spinoza – the issue is
not command – but critical evaluation and exploration
how domestic dogs and hunting dogs are to be trained – will
be a determination that comes about as a results of question – doubt – and the
exploration of uncertainty
and any such determination – will itself be open to question
‘This opinion is not a little favoured by Descartes, for he
held that the soul or mind was particularly united to a certain part of the
brain, called the pineal gland, by means of which it feels all the movements
that take place in the external body and external objects, and which the mind
by the very fact it wishes can move in various ways’
Descartes – as with Spinoza – and the Stoics – fails to see
that the issue is not command and control – but rather rational / critical
evaluation –
the ‘mind’ and the ‘body’ – are names for propositional
action –
the logical reality is propositional –
that is to say we operate with proposals / propositions –
however they are further explained or described – and if we are dealing with
them rationally – they are put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty
explored –
seen in these terms – the mind / body issue – simply
dissolves – into the issue of the critical evaluation of proposals put
our focus must be on the propositional actor – regardless of
how he / she – is analysed or deconstructed – and on his / her propositional
actions –
philosophers have got caught up and lost in their
explanations – to the point where they no longer see what their explanations
are explanations of –
and the best example of this mistake is in the work of
Descartes –
for to him – his explanations – became real substances
and he was left with the problem of how to turn his two
‘substances’ – back into the one propositional actor
his ‘gland theory’ – fails to do this – for you still have
two ‘substances’ – however they are supposedly ‘connected’ or however they are
supposed to “interact’
in Descartes the unity of the propositional actor is lost –
in a mish mash of substance interaction –
the Australian mind-brain identity theory – effectively –
another ‘gland theory’ – avoids Descartes’ problem by simply hypothesizing the
mind as brain –
it is just a straight our materialist / physicalist
assertion – that does not recognize Descartes’ dualism –
however – as with Descartes and Spinoza – the mind-brain
identity theorists make the mistake of substance
logically speaking our reality is not a substance or
substances – it is a proposal or proposals – it is propositional
propositional actors engaged in critical inquiry have
proposed / created / invented the mind proposal – and proposed / created
/ invented the body proposal –
and these proposals being useful – have become entrenched in
our thought and language
the point is – we find it useful to have propositional
focus
and we describe such foci – under different headings – with
different descriptions – i.e. – under the description ‘mind’ – under the
description ‘body’ –
and so – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are no more than efficient propositional
descriptions or categories that have focus value –
whatever the focus – or its description – the issue
is the critical evaluation of propositions put – of propositional action
that is proposals / propositions – put question – put to
doubt – their uncertainty explored
Spinoza goes on to critically evaluate Descartes’ gland
theory – and in this connection says –
‘Truly I should like him to explain this union through it
proximate cause. But he conceived the mind so distinct from the body that he
could not assign a particular cause for this union nor for the mind itself, but
he had perforce to recur to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God.’
‘God’ has been a backstop for both Descartes and Spinoza
for both – ‘God’ – is the explanation that is the end of
explanation –
what both philosophers have failed to face and deal with is
the unknown –
and no amount of deductive argument or construction – can
cover the fact that all our propositional action is a response to the unknown
and if the term ‘God’ – has any coherent meaning – then
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
Spinoza continues to savage Descartes’ gland theory –
however – one thing that can be said for Descartes here – is
that his interactionist theory – though in the end – beset with fatal problems
– was innovative and valiant – and that it was a genuine attempt to map out the
dynamics of the proposed interaction
and we might say of Spinoza’s attribute theory – the mind
and body as two attributes of the one substance – that yes – it is elegant –
and not as messy as Descartes’ interactionist dualism – but is it not – in the
end – a mystical theory – and one without explanation – or any attempt at
explanation?
‘Therefore, inasmuch as the mind’s power, as I have shown
above, is defined by understanding alone, the remedies for the emotions (which
I think everyone experiences, but does not accurately observe nor distinctly
see) we shall determine
from mere knowledge of the mind and deduce therefrom all
things which relate to blessedness’
the ’mind’s’ power is propositional –
and rests in the critical activity of question – of doubt –
and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –
the emotions are not illnesses that require remedies
the ‘emotions’ – are the propositional actions we take in
our attempts to construct a workable reality –
‘deduction’ is a propositional game – which has no
critical value –
‘blessedness’ – is a mystical notion – and as with all such
notions – an anathema to critical inquiry
AXIOMS
firstly – an ‘axiom’ is supposedly a self-evident truth
there are no ‘self-evident’ truths – no self-evident
propositions –
a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
to represent a proposal / proposition as self-evident’ – is
to perpetrate a logical fraud
where you have axioms in mathematics and symbolic logic –
what you have is rules – rules to propositional games –
propositional games are determined by rules –
be it mathematics – symbolic logic – or AFL football –
without rules – there is no game
as played – the rules – are not put to question – not
put to doubt –
if their uncertainty is explored – there is no game –
there are two modes to propositional experience – to
propositional life –
the critical mode – and the game mode
which is to say we critically evaluate proposals put – and
we play propositional games
we can play propositional games for any number of reasons –
one reason I think is that it gives us some relief from
propositional uncertainty –
and the main reason I would say is that human beings simply
enjoy playing games –
be they games of mathematics – chess – or those played on
the sporting field –
or any other rule based propositional activity
I. If in the same subject two contrary actions are excited,
a change must take place in both or in one of them until they cease to be
contrary.
this may happen – but it is not in any way ‘necessary’ –
‘contrary actions’ – point to propositional uncertainty –
and propositional uncertainty is the ground of rationality –
and the fact is human beings / propositional actors live
with uncertainty –
it is the ground of our experience –
if propositional uncertainty is closed down – we descend
into irrationality and ignorance and prejudice
II. The power of the effect is defined by the power of it
cause in so far as its essence is explained or defined through the essence of
the cause. This axiom is clear from Prop. 7, Part III.
any cause /effect analysis is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
firstly – by ‘effect’ – we are talking about a propositional
action –
any proposed cause of a propositional action – is open to
question
and ‘the power of its effect’ – is its propositional
consequence –
and this can only be understood – if put to question – put
to doubt – and its uncertainty explored
PROPOSITIONS
PROP. I. Just as thoughts and the ideas of things are
arranged and connected in the mind, so the modifications of the body, or, the
images of things, are exactly arranged and connected in the body.
the first thing to note here is that we are still dealing
with a dualism of mind and body
the arrangement and connection proposed here is a parallelism
– not a unity –
and really – any claim of parallelism here – has to be more
than just an assertion –
if there is no empirical evidence for it – then it has no actual
reality
we have no empirical argument from Spinoza
Spinoza assumes an underlying unity of substance –
however – the parallelism argument can be proposed without
the assumption of substantial unity
i.e. – two different substances may be
‘arranged and connected’ – operate – parallel to each other –
the unity – is assumed – but the logical reality is – that
if you begin with a dualism – of any kind – the unity is fractured – and
left as an empty assumption
on the other hand – if you start with the reality of unity –
then any propositional division – comes as a result of propositional focus
and a propositional focus here is a focus on proposals /
propositions put – not on the myth of substance
and any proposal / proposition put – however further described
– i.e. of the body – of the mind – is open to question – open to doubt – and is
uncertain
we can get on with the critical evaluation of proposal – and
discard dualism – in whatever form – be it Descartes’ interaction of different
substances – or Spinoza’s parallelism of ideas and modifications of the body
the mind / body problem only emerges as a result of not
recognising that the issue is propositional
substance is the black hole of the failure of perspective –
it is the failure that comes about by not facing the
propositional reality – and not dealing with it in a critical manner
Proof. – The order and connection of ideas is the
same as the order and connection of things (Prop. 7, Part II.), and vice
versa, the order an connection of things is the same (Coroll., Prop. 6 and
7, Part II.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore just as the order
and connection of ideas in the mind is made according to the order and
connection of the modifications of the body (Prop. 18, Part II.), so vice
versa (Prop. II, Part III.), the order and connections of the modifications
of the body is made according as thoughts and ideas of things are arranged and
connected in the mind. Q.e.d.
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –
the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action –
‘ideas’ – are proposals – ‘things’ are proposals
an ‘idea of thing’ – is the thing / proposal –
proposed–
‘things’ and ‘ideas’ are not separate logical entities –
separate exists
they are one in the same – the proposal
there is only the proposal – and the proposal is that
proposed
outside of the proposal / propositional reality – is the
unknown
PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the mind, or an
emotion from the thought of an external cause and unite it to other thoughts,
then love or hatred towards the external cause, as well as waverings of the
mind which arise from these emotions, are destroyed.
Proof. – For that which constitutes the form of love
or hatred is pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause
(Def. Emo. 6 and 7). When this is then removed, the form of love or hatred is
also removed: and therefore these emotions and those which arise from them are
destroyed. Q.e.d.
an ‘external cause’ – is a proposal –
that is to say an external cause only exists – if
it is proposed –
and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt –
and is uncertain
‘a disturbance of the mind or emotion’ – in logical
propositional terms – is a propositional conflict
which is to say that ‘a disturbance of the mind or emotion –
results from propositional uncertainty
‘love or hatred’ – likewise – are proposals – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
uniting it – the disturbance – to other thoughts – if
this is a critical activity – will put the disturbance – and any love or
hate to question – to doubt – and may facilitate an exploration of
propositional uncertainty
we cannot say – as it were a priori – what the result
of any such critical exploration will result in
there may well be resolution of the propositional conflict –
but if so – any such ‘resolution’ will be open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain –
emotions are not ‘destroyed’ – emotions are proposed or not
– enacted or not – and if proposed – if enacted – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
an emotion / proposal
can be replaced with another emotion / proposal – and an emotion / propositional action – can be discontinued
PROP. III. An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a
passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.
an ‘emotion’ is a description of a propositional
action – a ‘passion’ is a description of a propositional action
however described – a propositional action – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
there is no logical distinction between an ‘emotion’ – and a
‘passion’
for all intents and purposes – these names / descriptions of
propositional are interchangeable –
a ‘clear and distinct idea’ – is a proposal that has
not been put to question – not been put to doubt – its uncertainty – left
unexplored
such proposals are naïve – and of no logical value
Proof. – An emotion which is a passion is a confused
idea (Gen. Def. Emo.). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of this
emotion, this idea will be distinguished only conceptually (non risi ratione)
from the emotion in so far as it has reference to the mind alone (Prop. 21,
Part II., with its Note): and therefore (Prop. 3, Part III.) the emotion will
cease to be a passion. Q.e.d.
all ideas / proposals are logically uncertain
to form a clear and distinct idea of an emotion / passion –
is to defy critical analysis
the mark of a clear and distinct idea / proposal – is
ignorance
there is no ‘reference to the mind alone’ –
the reference of any propositional action – is the
propositional actor
our emotional life is passionate –
if we examine or emotions / passions critically – we deal
with them rationally
Corollary. Therefore the more an emotion becomes
known to us, the more it is within our power and the less the mind is passive
in regard to it.
our emotions / passions – are proposals – we put –
propositional actions – we enact
there is no question of them not being ‘in our power’ –
and our power – rests in the critical capacity of question –
of doubt – and the exploration of propositional/ emotional / passionate –
uncertainty
our propositional actions are not passive
and in so far as we are critically active – we are not
passive
PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body of which we
cannot form a clear and distinct conception.
a so called ‘clear and distinct conception’ – is a proposal
that is not questioned – not doubt – and regarded as certain
any such ‘conception’ – is simply ignorant and irrational
one can be ignorant and irrational regarding anything at all
Proof. – Things which are common to all can only be
adequately conceived (Prop. 38, Part II.) and therefore (Prop. 12, and Lemma 2,
which is to be found after Prop. 13, Part II.) there is no modification of the
body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q.e.d.
any proposal of ‘things common to all’ – is open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘adequate conception’ – is meant a conception /
proposal – not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain –
there is no adequate conception
any conception / proposal – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
any ‘modification of the body’ is a proposal / description
put – again – open to question
Corollary. – Hence it follows that there is no
emotion of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an
emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (Gen. Def. Emo.), which on
that account (prev. Prop.) must involve some clear and distinct conception.
an emotion – however described – i.e. – as an’ idea’ – or
‘modification of the body’ – is a propositional action –
if held to be ‘clear and distinct’ – it is held irrationally
Note. – Hence there is nothing from which some effect
does not follow (Prop. 36, Part I,), and whatever follows from an idea which is
adequate in us we understand clearly and distinctly (Prop. 40, Part II.), it
follows everyone has power of understanding himself and his emotions clearly
and distinctly, if not absolutely at least in part, and consequently of
bringing it about that he is less passive in regard to them. For this purpose care must be taken especially that we
understand clearly and distinctly each emotion as far as this may be possible,
so that the mind may be determined by the emotion to think those things which
it clearly and distinctly perceives and in which it acquiesces entirely; and
thus the emotion is separated from the thought of an external cause and united
to true thoughts. From which it comes about not
only love, hatred. etc., are destroyed (Prop. 2 Part V.), but also that the
appetites or desires which are wont to arise from such emotion can have no
excess (Prop. 61, Part IV.). For it must be noted above all that that it is
one and the same appetite through which a man is said to be both active and
passive. E.g., we have shown that human nature is so
disposed that each one desires that others should live
according to his way of thinking
(see Note, Prop. 31. Part III.): and this desire in a man
who is not guided by reason is passion which is called ambition, and which
differs very little from pride; and, on the contrary, in a man who is guided by
reason it is an action or virtue which is called piety (see Note 1, Prop, 37,
Part IV)., and the second part of that Prop.). And in this manner all appetites
and desires are only passions in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas.
and they are accredited to virtue when they are excited or generated by
inadequate ideas. For all desires by which we are determined to do anything can
arise from adequate and inadequate ideas (see Prop. 59. Part IV.). And this
remedy for the emotions (to return from my digression), which consists in true
knowledge of them, is excelled by nothing in our power we can think of, since
there exists no other power of the mind than of thinking and forming adequate
ideas, as we showed above (Prop. 3, Part III.).
‘Hence there is nothing from which some effect does not
follow (Prop. 36, Part I,), and whatever follows from an idea which is adequate
in us we understand clearly and distinctly (Prop. 40, Part II.), it follows
everyone has power of understanding himself and his emotions clearly and
distinctly, if not absolutely at least in part, and consequently of bringing it
about that he is less passive in regard to them.’
‘Hence there is nothing from which some effect does not
follow’
an ‘effect’ is a proposal
‘an effect follows’ – only if a ‘follow on’ is so
proposed
an ‘adequate idea’ – is a proposal that is not put to
question – not put to doubt – its uncertainty – not explored
a so called ‘adequate idea’ – is a proposal – held
irrationally
everyone who is functional – has the power – the logical
power – the critical power – to put an emotional proposal / propositional
action – to question – to doubt – and the power to explore its uncertainty
we understand ourselves – through critical propositional
exploration
and a question for Spinoza – if a clear and distinct
understanding is not ‘absolute’ – then is it not – uncertain?
one is ‘passive’ – if one does not engage in critical
activity
the hallmark of passivity is Spinoza’s adequate idea
‘For this purpose care must be taken especially that we
understand clearly and distinctly each emotion as far as this may be possible,
so that the mind may be determined by the emotion to think those things which
it clearly and distinctly perceives and in which it acquiesces entirely; and
thus the emotion is separated from the thought of an external cause and united
to true thoughts’
‘as far as this may be possible’?
if the understanding is clear and distinct – where is
the wriggle room?
to ‘acquiesce entirely’ to clear and distinct perception –
is the mark of someone who
does not think – and who lives in deluded reality
an ‘external cause’ – is a proposal
an emotion is ‘tied’ to an external cause – if it is so
proposed –
the issue is not ‘uniting’ an emotional propositional action
to ‘true thoughts’ –
the issue is critically evaluating any emotional
propositional action
‘true thoughts’ here – are Spinoza’s uncritical ‘adequate
ideas’
‘From which it comes about not only love, hatred. etc., are
destroyed (Prop. 2 Part V.), but also that the appetites or desires which are
wont to arise from such emotion can have no excess (Prop. 61, Part IV.).’
this does not follow –
if anything results from adequate ideas and clear and
distinct conceptions – it is avoidance and repression of appetites or desires
appetites and desires – are propositional actions – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
it is only through critical evaluation that appetites
and desires will be understood in a rational manner
as to ‘excess’ – the matter is relative – what is an excess
to one – may well be understood as a moderation to another
whatever the case – appetites and desires – however
characterized – can be dealt with in a critical / rational manner
no emotional propositional action – is ‘destroyed’ –
love and hatred – are proposals –
proposals are put or not put – acted or not – critically
evaluated – or not
‘For it must be noted above all that that it is one and the
same appetite through which a man is said to be both active and passive. E.g.,
we have shown that human nature is so disposed that each one desires that
others should live to his way of thinking (see Note, Prop. 31. Part III.): and
this desire in a man who is not guided by reason is passion which is called
ambition, and which differs very little from pride; and, on the contrary, in a
man who is guided by reason it is an action or virtue which is called piety
(see Note 1, Prop, 37, Part Iv., and the second part of that Prop.).’
a rationally active man is he who critically evaluates his
appetites
a man who does not critically evaluate his appetites – is
passive – is irrational
each man does not desire that others should live
according to his way of thinking –
there are many people who are tolerant and even appreciative
of different ways of thinking and different ways of living
the desire that others should live according to one’s way of
thinking – is the mark of a narrow-minded – self-obsessed – ignorant individual
such a person is someone who does not have an open mind –
and who does not critically evaluate his / her own way of thinking
if such a person did critically evaluate his / her way of
thinking they would see that it
is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and it this uncertainty that frees us up to consider and
appreciate different ways thinking – and different ways of living
his view –
logically speaking – as with any other view on how to live – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
for Spinoza though
– there is no uncertainty –
he holds that his
view on how to live can be shown to be ‘adequate’ and ‘clear and distinct’ –
and thus – certain –
there is no
propositional certainty – any proposal put – is open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
certainty is a
delusion
his ‘guided by
reason’ – denies critical thinking –
it is irrational –
it is pretentious – it is ignorant
‘And in this manner all appetites and desires are only
passions in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas. and they are accredited
to virtue when they are excited or generated by inadequate ideas. For all
desires by which we are determined to do anything can arise from adequate and
inadequate ideas (see Prop. 59. Part IV.).’
‘appetite’ and ‘desire’ – are names or descriptions
– given to propositional actions – they are classifications of propositional
actions
‘ideas’ – are propositional actions – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
an ‘adequate idea’ – in Spinoza’s terms – is an idea that is
logically certain – there are no such ideas – all proposals / propositional
actions – are uncertain – or in Spinoza’s terms – ‘inadequate’
any proposal of ‘virtue’ – is open of question – open to
doubt – and is uncertain
‘And this remedy for the emotions (to return from my
digression), which consists in true knowledge of them, is excelled by nothing
in our power we can think of, since there exists no other power of the mind
than of thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we showed above (Prop. 3, Part
III.).’
emotions do not need to be ‘remedied’ –
emotions are the propositional actions we employ to
understand and negotiate our reality
our knowledge of the emotions – of emotional / propositional
actions – or states – is an on-going propositional exploration
and at any point in such an exploration – any proposal put –
is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
the ‘mind’s power’ – rest in the propositional actor’s
capacity to critically evaluate any proposal put
so-called ‘adequate ideas’ – are presented as – beyond
question – beyond doubt – and certain –
any such ‘idea’ – is a prejudice –
and as such – the very mark of illogical and irrational
thinking
PROP. V. Emotion towards a thing which we imagine simply not
as necessary nor possible nor contingent, is caeteris paribus, the
greatest of all.
Proof. – Emotion towards a thing which we imagine to
be free is greater than that towards one which is necessary (Prop. 49, Part
III.), and consequently still greater than that towards a thing which we
imagine as possible or contingent (Prop. 11. Part IV.). But to imagine a thing
as free can be nothing else than to imagine it simply while we are ignorant of
the causes by which it was determined for acting (from what we have shown in
the Note of Prop. 35, Part II.). Therefore emotion towards a thing which we
imagine simply is greater, caeteris paribus, than towards a thing necessary,
possible, or contingent, and consequently the greatest. Q.e.d.
‘a thing’ – is a proposal – a proposition
to ‘imagine simply’ – is to propose – to put a
proposition –
any proposition put – is ‘imagined simply’ –
complications – as it were – to this ‘simplicity’ – arise
when the proposal / proposition is critically evaluated – put to question – put
to doubt – its uncertainty explored
there are no necessary proposals / propositions – all
proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what goes for ‘necessary propositions’ – are prejudices
‘possible propositions’?
either a proposition is put – or it is not –
if it is put – it is actual – if not put – it does
not exist
a ‘contingent proposition’?
if by ‘contingent’ here – is meant a proposition – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
then all propositions are contingent
‘greatest of all’?
our emotions are propositional actions put – in relation to
proposals / propositions put
and yes – our propositional actions in response to a
proposal / proposition put – can be further described –
any further description is open to question
‘great’ – or ‘greatest of all’ – is rhetoric
finally – we are free to put any proposal – and any proposal
put is free –
any causal analysis – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
a proposition’s ‘freedom’ rests in its logical uncertainty
PROP. VI. In so far as the mind understands all things as
necessary it has more power over the emotions, or is less passive in regard to
them.
a so called ‘necessary understanding’ – is a false
understanding –
it is the claim that we understand things / proposals – as
certain
how we understand ‘things’ / proposals – is open to question
– open to doubt – and is uncertain –
a false understanding – will in no way enable us to deal
effectively with emotional propositions
and furthermore – the issue is not power – and ‘power over
the emotions’ –
the issue is – critical evaluation of emotional /
propositional action
critical evaluation is not ‘power over’ the emotions – it is
the rational exploration of emotional / propositional uncertainty
any propositional activity – is active
we are passive to the extent that we do no not engage in
critical evaluation of our emotional / propositional activity
Proof. –The mind understands
all things to be necessary (Prop. 29, Part I.), and to be determined for
existing an acting by an infinite connection of causes (prop. 28. Part 1.): and
therefore (prev. Prop.) it brings it about that it is less passive in regard to
the emotions which arise from them and (Prop.48, Part III.) that it is affected
less towards them Q.e.d.
‘The mind understands all things to be necessary (Prop. 29,
Part I.), and to be determined for existing an acting by an infinite connection
of causes (prop. 28. Part 1.)’
‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional action
propositional action is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
there is no necessity in propositional action
propositional action is not determined
propositional action – is open – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
as for an ‘infinite connection of causes’ –
if you take ‘infinite connection of causes’ on face value –
there can be no final cause
and if you propose an infinite connection of causes – then
the propositional action in question – is ‘infinitely’ – undetermined
Spinoza’s ‘infinite connection of causes’ – undermines his
determinism – and as a result – his argument – is incoherent
‘and therefore (prev. Prop.) it brings it about that it is
less passive in regard to the emotions which arise from them and (Prop.48, Part
III.) that it is affected less towards them’
even if you were to accept Spinoza’s – ‘The mind understands
all things to be necessary (Prop. 29, Part I.), and to be determined for
existing an acting by an infinite connection of causes’ –
it just does not follow – that the mind is less passive in
regard to the emotions – and is affected less towards them – in fact the
opposite is the case
all that could be said to follow is that the mind has no
understanding of the uncertainty of emotional / propositional actions – and is
therefore – entirely passive in relation to them
Note – The more this knowledge, namely, that things
are necessary, is applied to particular things which we imagine more distinctly
and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, which is
borne witness to by experience. For we see the pain caused by the loss of some
good to be lessened or mitigated as soon as he
who lost it considers that it could have been preserved in
no manner. Thus also we see that no one pities and infant because it cannot
talk, walk, reason, or lastly, that it lives so many years as if it was
unconscious of itself. But if most were born full grown and only one now and
then an infant, then we should pity each infant: for then we should regard
infancy not as a thing natural and necessary, but as a flaw or mishap in
nature. And we should note many other examples of this kind.
‘The more this knowledge, namely, that things are necessary,
is applied to particular things which we imagine more distinctly and vividly,
the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, which is borne witness
to by experience.’
‘knowledge’ is proposal –
‘the mind’ is a name for propositional
action –
whether a proposal is ‘distinct and vivid’ or not – it is not
necessary – rather – it is uncertain
it is not a matter of ‘power over’ the emotions –
emotional propositions – can be critically evaluated
– that is – put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored
‘For we see the pain caused by the loss of some good to be
lessened or mitigated as soon as he who lost it considers that it could have
been preserved in no manner.’
pain or loss – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain –
experience tells us – that to simply adopt the view that a
loss is unavoidable – is unrealistic – uncritical – and as such irrational
‘Thus also we see that no one pities and infant because it
cannot talk, walk, reason, or lastly, that it lives so many years as if it was
unconscious of itself. But if most were born full grown and only one now and
then an infant, then we should pity each infant: for then we should regard
infancy not as a thing natural and necessary, but as a flaw or mishap in
nature.’
from a rational point of view – there are no flaws or
mishaps in nature
PROP. VII. Emotions that arise from or are excited by
reason, if we regard time are greater than those which are referred to
particular things which we regard as absent.
our emotions are proposals –
reason – is the critical evaluation of proposals put –
whether a proposal is the result of a critical evaluation of
another proposal – or a proposal put without critical evaluation –
it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – We do not regard a thing as absent by reason
of the emotion with which we imagine it, but by reason of the fact that the
body is affected by another emotion which cuts off the existence of that thing
(Prop. 17, Part II.). Wherefore an emotion which is referred to a thing which
we regard as absent is not of such a nature that surpasses and overcomes the
other actions and power of a man (concerning which we see Prop. 6, Part IV.),
but contrariwise is of such a nature that it can be hindered in some manner by
those modifications which cut off the existence of its external cause (Prop. 9,
Part IV.). But an emotion which arises from reason has
reference necessarily to the common properties of things (see def. of reason in
Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II.) which we always regard as present (for there can be
nothing to cut off their present existence), and which we always imagine in the
same manner (Prop. 38, Part II.). Wherefore such an emotion remains
the same always, and consequently (Ax. I Part V.) emotions which are contrary
to it, and which are not aided by their external causes, must more and more
accommodate themselves to it until they are no longer contrary, and thus far
emotion which arises from reason is the stronger. Q.e.d.
‘We do not regard a thing as absent by reason of the emotion
with which we imagine it, but by reason of the fact that the body is affected
by another emotion which cuts off the existence of that thing (Prop. 17, Part
II.).’
a ‘thing’ is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
if we ‘imagine’ it – we propose it – if we propose it
– it is not ‘absent’ – it is there –
it exists
and the proposal will exist as long as it is considered – as
along as it is entertained
a proposal / emotion – dropped from consideration – for
whatever reason – is not there
an emotion / proposal can be replaced by another emotion /
proposal
‘Wherefore an emotion which is referred to a thing which we
regard as absent is not of such a nature that surpasses and overcomes the other
actions and power of a man (concerning which we see Prop. 6, Part IV.), but
contrariwise is of such a nature that it can be hindered in some manner by
those modifications which cut off the existence of its external cause (Prop. 9,
Part IV.).’
if a’ thing’ is proposed – it is there – it is not ‘absent’
–
‘the other actions and power of a man’ – are other proposals
– other propositional actions
any emotion / proposal / propositional action – can be
overridden by other emotions / proposals / propositional actions
an emotion / proposal is not ‘hindered’ – by other proposals
–
an emotion / proposal is either active – or dropped from
consideration –
if dropped from consideration it can be replaced by other
emotions / proposals
an ‘external cause – is a proposal –
an ‘external cause’ – is irrelevant – in relation to whether
a proposal is active or not
what is relevant here is critical evaluation – for critical
evaluation will determine the status of the emotion / proposal / propositional
action
‘But an emotion which arises from reason has reference
necessarily to the common properties of things (see def. of reason in Note 2,
Prop. 40, Part II.) which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing
to cut off their present existence), and which we always imagine in the same
manner (Prop. 38, Part II.).’
an emotion can ‘arise from reason’ – that is be proposed as
a result of a critical propositional investigation
‘things’ are proposals –
any proposed ‘common properties of things’ – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any such proposal ‘exists’ – as long as it is entertained
and any such proposal can be ‘re-imagined’ – can be
reformulated – or replaced
‘Wherefore such an emotion remains the same always, and
consequently (Ax. I Part V.) emotions which are contrary to it, and which are
not aided by their external causes, must more and more accommodate themselves
to it until they are no longer contrary, and thus far emotion which arises from
reason is the stronger. Q.e.d.’
an emotion / proposal – is active – as long as it is
considered
no proposal / proposition – is beyond question – beyond
doubt – or certain
so – any emotional proposition – critically evaluated – put
to question – its uncertainty explored – will be challenged – and will likely
be reconsidered –
Spinoza’s idea of an emotion that remains the same – fails
to appreciate the uncertainty at the heart of any emotional propositional state
emotions / emotional propositions – do not ‘accommodate
themselves’ –
emotional proposals / propositional actions are put – and if
rationally considered – put to question
Spinoza’s argument – that emotion which arises from reason
is stronger – is wrong –
emotional propositions however they come about – have
the same logic – they are open to question – they are uncertain
reason – which is critical evaluation – is not in any way opposed
to any form of emotional proposition
reason is the critical exploration of the emotional
experience
critical exploration opens up our emotional
experience – opens it up to possibility –
the possibility that is always present
PROP. VIII. The more an emotion is excited by many causes
occurring at the same time, the greater it is.
any causal
explanation – is open to question
an emotion /
propositional action s open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘lesser’ /
‘greater’ – are rhetorical notions
Proof. – Many causes can do more at the same time
than if they were fewer (Prop. 7, Part III.) And therefore (Prop. 5, Part IV.)
the more an emotion is excited by many causes at the same time, the stringer it
is.
how can an effect / affect have more than one cause?
the ‘cause’ of anything is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain –
but if you adopt a causal analysis – an effect / affect –
will have one cause – not many
Note – This proposition is clear also from Ax. 2 of
this part.
Ax. 2 – ‘The power of an effect is defined by the power of
its cause, insofar as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its
cause’
yes – one cause – one effect –
for the point of Prop. VII here – is really the point of Ax.
2 – that the power of the effect – comes from the power of the cause
the issue seems to be that Spinoza wants to say some
emotions are ‘greater’ than others –
I think he need the many cause ‘argument’ to account for his
idea that some emotions are ‘greater’ than others –
it doesn’t work for its an argument that is based on a
misuse of the causal argument
in any propositional episode – that one emotion may
predominate others – does that make it more powerful?
our power rests in our critical capacity
I think that for Spinoza it would have been better to have
dropped this proposition altogether
PROP. IX. An emotion which has reference to many different
causes which the mind regards at the same time as the emotion itself is less
harmful, and we are less passive in regard to it and less affected towards each
cause than another emotion equally great which has reference to one alone or
fewer causes.
firstly – no emotion in itself is harmful –
an emotion – may be assessed as harmful – it may be assessed
as harmless – it may be assessed as positive –
it can be given any kind of valuation –
but any such propositional assessment / valuation – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
emotions are not harmful – they are – uncertain
‘an emotion with reference to many different causes’ –
any causal explanation is open to question – so – just what
the cause (of an affect) is –
will be a critical matter – will be uncertain
however – if you do opt for a causal explanation – then an
emotion – the affect – will have one cause – not many
Proof. – An emotion is bad or harmful only in so far
as the mind is prevented by it from thinking (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.). And therefore that emotion by which the mind
is determined for regarding many objects at the same time is less harmful than
another equally great which detains the mind in the contemplation of one alone
or fewer objects in such a manner that it cannot think of the others: which was
the first point. Again, in as much as the essence of the mind, that is (Prop.
7, Part III.) its power, consists of thought alone (Prop. 11, Part III.),
therefore the mind is less passive to an emotion by which is determined for the
regarding of many things than to an emotion equally great which holds the mind
occupied in regarding one alone or fewer objects, which is the second point.
Finally, this emotion (Prop. 48, Part III.), in so far as it has reference to
many external causes, is less towards each one of them. Q.e.d.
‘An emotion is bad or harmful only in so far as the mind is
prevented by it from thinking (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.).’
‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
‘thinking’ is the critical activity of question – of
doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –
‘emotion’ – is a name for propositional
action –
any emotion / propositional action – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
no propositional action prevents thinking –
one can chose not to engage in critical / logical activity –
however – no functioning propositional actor is prevented
from such engagement
‘And therefore that emotion by which the mind is determined
for regarding many objects at the same time is less harmful than another
equally great which detains the mind in the contemplation of one alone or fewer
objects in such a manner that it cannot think of the others: which was the
first point.’
regarding many objects at once – Spinoza says – is less
harmful – than regarding one or fewer – because in regarding one or fewer – the
mind cannot think of the others –
this is an issue of propositional focus
our propositional / emotional focus – is open to question –
is uncertain –
and so – we may go from considering many proposals – to
focusing on one or fewer – or from one or fewer to many
it is never the case that we cannot think /
critically evaluate – different propositional objects
we may decide to limit our focus – or broaden it –
and whatever the decision here – it is – logically speaking
– open to question –
I see no reason to think that harm need be the
consequence of a specific focus –
‘Again, in as much as the essence of the mind, that is
(Prop. 7, Part III.) its power, consists of thought alone (Prop. 11, Part
III.), therefore the mind is less passive to an emotion by which it is
determined for the regarding of many things than to an emotion equally great
which holds the mind occupied in regarding one alone or fewer objects, which is
the second point.’
we are only passive if we don’t critically
evaluate our emotional / propositional actions – be they one or many or a
few –
PROP. X. As long as we are not assailed by emotions which
are not contrary to our nature we have the power of arranging an connecting the
modifications of the body according to the order of the intellect.
there are no emotions that are contrary to our nature –
our emotions are propositional actions –
our nature is propositional
there is no ‘order of the intellect’ –
the ‘intellect’ is a name for propositional
action
and any ‘order’ proposed – logically speaking – is
open to question – is uncertain
any change that people make to how they act – is rational –
if it is a result of the critical process of question – of doubt – and the
exploration of their propositional uncertainty
Proof. – The emotions which are contrary to our
nature, that is (Prop. 30, Part IV,) which are bad, are bad in so far as they
prevent the mind from understanding (Prop. 27, Part IV.). As long, then as we
are not assailed by emotions which are contrary to our nature, so long the
mind’s power which it endeavours to understand things is not hindered; and
therefore so long as it has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas and
of deducing some from others (see Note 2, Prop. 40 and Note, Prop. 47, Part
II.): and consequently so long (Prop. 1, Part V.) we have the power of
arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the order
of the intellect. Q.e.d.
emotions do not prevent understanding – emotions are
proposals – proposals for understanding
and any emotional / propositional action – is an
understanding – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
our nature is propositional –
no emotion is contrary to our nature
understanding is hindered when it is not put to question –
not put to doubt – and regarded as certain
clear and distinct ideas – in so far as they are regarded as
certain – are logically false
an ‘idea’ is a proposal – open to question – and uncertain
any proposed ‘order of the intellect’ – that is a proposed
way of being and behaving – logically speaking – is as good as any other
and any proposed ‘order of the intellect – is open to
question – is logically – uncertain
Note. – By the power of arranging and connecting the
modifications of the body we can bring about that we are not easily affected by
bad emotions. For (Prop. 7, Part V.) greater force is required to hinder
emotions arranged and connected according to the order of the intellect than if
they were uncertain and random. The best thing that we can bring about, as long
as we have no perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to
conceive some right manner of living or certain rules of
life, to commit them to
memory, and to apply them continuously to the particular
things that come to our way frequently in life, so that our imagination may be
extensively affected by them and they may always be at hand for us. E.g.,
we stated among the rules of life (Prop. 46, Part IV, and its note) that hatred
must be overcome by love or generosity, not requited by reciprocated hatred.
But in order that this rule may be always at hand for us when we need it, we
must think on and meditate on the common injuries done to men, and in what
manner and according to what method they may best be avoided by
generosity. For thus we unite the image of the injury to the
imagination of this rule,
and it will always be at hand (Prop. 18, Part II.) when an
injury is done to us. If we always have at hand a
regard for our true advantage and the good which follows from mutual friendship
and common intercourse, and moreover, if we remember that complete contentment
of mind (animi acquiescentia) arises from the right way of life (Prop.
52, Part IV.), and that men, like other things, act according to the necessity
of nature – then the injury or hatred which is a wont to arise from it would
occupy a lesser part of the mind and would be easily overcome, or if the anger
which arises from the greatest injuries is not overcome, it will nevertheless
be overcome, although not without a wavering of the mind, in a far less space
of time than if it had not previously meditated on these things, as is clear
from Prop. 6, 7, and 8 of this part. We must think
of courage in the same manner in order to lay aside fear, that is, we must
enumerate and often imagine the common perils of life and in what manner they
may be best avoided and overcome by presence of mind and courage. But let it be noted that we must always pay
attention in the ordering of our thoughts and images (Coroll. Prop. 63, Part
IV., and Prop. 59, Part III.) to those things which are good in each thing, so
that we may be determined always for action by an emotion of pleasure, E.g.,
if anyone sees that he seeks glory too early, let him think of the right use of
it, to what end it should be sought, and by what means it may be acquired: and
not of its abuse and the vanity and the inconstancy of men, or of other things
of this kind, of which no one ever thinks save from an unhealthy mind. For those who are most ambitious assail themselves most
with such thoughts when they despair of attaining the honour which they long
for, and while they vomit forth their rage wish to appear wise. Wherefore it is
certain that those who are most desirous of glory who cry out loudest of its
abuse and the vanity of the world. And this is not peculiar to the ambitious,
but to all to whom fortune is unfavourable and who are of weak spirit. For a
poor man who is greedy will not cease to talk of the abuse of money and the
vices of the rich: by which he does naught else but afflict himself, and show
others that he resents not only his own poverty but also other’s wealth. Again,
those who are badly received by their sweethearts think of nothing save the
fickleness, deception, and other often related faults of womanhood, all of
which, however, they immediately forget as soon as they are received again.
He therefore who tries to moderate his emotions and
desires from a love of freedom alone – he, I say, endeavours as much as
possible to obtain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his
mind with that joy which arises from a true knowledge of them, and by no means
to regard the vices of men, to disparage his fellows and to rejoice in a false
species of liberty. And he that will diligently
observe what is said here (for it is not difficult) and make use of it. will be
able in a short space of time to direct his actions for the most part according
to the command of reason.
‘By the power of arranging and connecting the modifications
of the body we can bring about that we are not easily affected by bad
emotions.’.
this ‘power of arranging and connecting modifications of the
body’ – is critically evaluating emotional propositional actions
there are no ‘bad emotions’ – there is only emotional
propositional action –
human beings / propositional actors – make value judgements
regarding propositional actions –
it is what we do –
and these value judgments are proposals put against – or in
response to – our emotional propositional actions –
what ‘good’ amounts to – and what ‘bad’ amounts to – will be
matters open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘For (Prop. 7, Part V.) greater force is required to hinder
emotions arranged and connected according to the order of the intellect than if
they were uncertain and random.’
it is not a question of ‘hindering’ emotions –
how we deal with our emotions is through critical evaluation
any proposed ‘arrangement and connection’ – is open to
question –
just as is – any proposal that is viewed as ‘random’ – or
unconnected
‘The best thing that we can bring about, as long as we have
no perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive some right manner of
living or certain rules of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them
continuously to the particular things that come to our way frequently in life,
so that our imagination may be extensively affected by them and they may always
be at hand for us. E.g., we stated among the rules of life (Prop. 46,
Part IV, and its note) that hatred must be overcome by love or generosity, not
requited by reciprocated hatred.’
here – Spinoza finally recognises that we have no perfect
knowledge –
something of a slip-up on his part
and yes – to conceive some right manner of living or
certain rules of life …’ –
the ‘some’ – here – really leaves the question open – as to
‘right manner of living’
the empirical / propositional reality is that there are many
and different conceptions of ‘right manner of living’
that the question of what is a ‘right manner of living’ – is
open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
this you would think – would be obvious to Spinoza
and given this any proposed ‘right manner of living’ –
including Spinoza’s – is – logically valid
he goes on to say that hatred must be overcome by love
well – I don’t think hatred must be overcome
which is to say hatred as with any emotion – has a place in
human experience –
i.e. – for an oppressed person – hatred may just be what
sustains them in their suffering
and for those who do want to overcome hatred – whether love
does the trick or not – is open to question
sometimes the best thing to do – and it’s not easy – is to
just walk away from both love and hate
‘But in order that this rule may be always at hand for us
when we need it, we must think on and meditate on the common injuries done to
men, and in what manner and according to what method they may best be avoided
by generosity. For thus we unite the image of the injury to the imagination of
this rule, and it will always be at hand (Prop. 18, Part II.) when an injury is
done to us.’
the problem with this rule is that it ties you into a
particular outlook – which will not deal effectively with all circumstances
at best it is a rule of thumb
rules in general give people a false sense of security –
the logical reality is that any so called ‘rule’ – is no
more than a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
generosity – may not avoid injury
and if generosity doesn’t avoid injury – where does that
leave you – if all you have in your ethical tool kit is Spinoza’s ‘rule’?
‘If we always have at hand a regard for our true advantage
and the good which follows from mutual friendship and common intercourse, and
moreover, if we remember that complete contentment of mind (animi
acquiescentia) arises from the right way of life (Prop. 52, Part IV.), and
that men, like other things, act according to the necessity of nature – then
the injury or hatred which is a wont to arise from it would occupy a lesser
part of the mind and would be easily overcome, or if the anger which arises
from the greatest injuries is not overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome,
although not without a wavering of the mind, in a far less space of time than
if it had not previously meditated on these things, as is clear from Prop. 6,
7, and 8 of this part.’
our ‘true advantage’ – is never clear cut – it is always an
uncertain matter – nevertheless – we can propose a ‘true advantage’ – and see
how it goes –
when ‘good’ does come from mutual friendship and common
intercourse – it is to be appreciated – but it is not always the case that
friendships are positive – or that common intercourse is beneficial
there is no ‘complete contentment of mind’ – the mind
explores the notion of contentment – and explores its uncertainty
‘a right way of life’ – is a nice idea – but is somewhat
fanciful –
the reality is that life is a struggle in uncertainty –
now and again – you hit on satisfaction – and it should be
enjoyed while it lasts –
there is no necessity in human nature – our nature is
propositional – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
anger – may in certain propositional contexts – be a
positive affect – and have a positive effect –
good or bad – as with any emotion – it is open to question –
it is uncertain
and what can a ‘wavering of mind’ be – but a critical look
at the emotion
a ‘wavering of mind’ can lead to an exploration of
uncertainty –
and what this means is that in spite of all that has
preceded – Spinoza must bow to uncertainty
‘We must think of courage in the same manner in order to lay
aside fear, that is, we must enumerate and often imagine the common perils of
life and in what manner they may be best avoided and overcome by presence of
mind and courage.’
it is always useful to propose strategies for dealing with
the ‘common perils of life’ –
however – if they are to be of value – such propositional
strategies – will be put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty
explored
‘But let it be noted that we must always pay attention in
the ordering of our thoughts and images (Coroll. Prop. 63, Part IV., and Prop.
59, Part III.) to those things which are good in each thing, so that we may be
determined always for action by an emotion of pleasure, E.g., if anyone
sees that he seeks glory too early, let him think of the right use of it, to
what end it should be sought, and by what means it may be acquired: and not of
its abuse and the vanity and the inconstancy of men, or of other things of this
kind, of which no one ever thinks save from an unhealthy mind.’
rational behaviour is not about ‘ordering our thoughts and
images’ – it is the business of critically evaluating our proposals and
propositional actions
any proposal as to what is ‘good in each thing’ – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
any ‘determination’ for propositional action – is open to
question
we may hope that our actions always result in
pleasure – but this is just wishful thinking
and it is just not the case that we are determined always
for action by an emotion of pleasure –
i.e. – we may act not to find pleasure – but rather to avoid
pain – and we may act with no reference to pleasure or pain
to ‘seek glory’ is like any other endeavour –
if we act rationally – we question – doubt – and explore the
uncertainty of what we intend to do
a healthy mind is a critical mind
‘For those who are most ambitious assail themselves most
with such thoughts when they despair of attaining the honour which they long
for, and while they vomit forth their rage wish to appear wise. Wherefore it is
certain that those who are most desirous of glory who cry out loudest of its
abuse and the vanity of the world. And this is not peculiar to the ambitious,
but to all to whom fortune is unfavourable and who are of weak spirit. For a
poor man who is greedy will not cease to talk of the abuse of money and the
vices of the rich: by which he does naught else but afflict himself, and show
others that he resents not only his own poverty but also other’s wealth. Again,
those who are badly received by their sweethearts think of nothing save the
fickleness, deception, and other often related faults of womanhood, all of
which, however, they immediately forget as soon as they are received again’
here we have a number of observations by Spinoza –
but as with any observation regarding human behaviour –
these are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
i.e. – it is not certain that those who are ‘most
desirous of glory’ – ‘will cry out loudest of its abuse and the vanity of the
world’ –
an intelligent person seeking glory – might keep his / her
mouth shut –
and likewise with a greedy man
and there is the danger that our ‘observations’ are infected
with prejudice –
Spinoza’s ‘observation’ here about women is a case in point
–
that women are fickle – deceptive – and have other faults –
is really just misogyny
‘He therefore who tries to moderate his emotions and desires
from a love of freedom alone – he, I say, endeavours as much as possible to
obtain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with
that joy which arises from a true knowledge of them, and by no means to regard
the vices of men, to disparage his fellows and to rejoice in a false species of
liberty.’
moderation has its place – but much has been achieved by
human beings whose emotions and desires are described as ‘immoderate’ or
‘excessive’
our endeavours are open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
any ‘knowledge’ of ‘virtues and their causes’ – will come as
a result of critical reflection
all knowledge is propositional – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
if the idea here is to not consider the vices of men
– then any understanding of men will be entirely inadequate –
and once again we have from Spinoza an ethic of avoidance
–
the avoidance of the so called ‘vices of men’ –
a ‘mind filled with joy’ runs the risk of failing to
acknowledge and deal with the great variety and uncertainty of human emotional
experience –
our liberty rests in our ability to question – to doubt –
and to explore propositional uncertainty
‘And he that will diligently observe what is said here (for
it is not difficult) and make use of it. will be able in a short space of time
to direct his actions for the most part according to the command of reason.’
what Spinoza proposes as the right way of living – is as
valid as any other such proposition – and as with any other – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
reason is the critical evaluation of proposals put – not the
obedience to a command
PROP. XI. The more any image has
reference to many things the more frequent it is, i.e., the more often it
flourishes, the more it occupies the mind.
an image – is a proposal –
any reference that the image / proposal has – is proposed
if more than one propositional reference is proposed – this
will be a result of a critical exploration – where the image / proposal is put
to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored
Proof. – The more an image or emotion has reference
to many things, the more causes there are by which it can be excited and
cherished, all of which the mind (by hypothesis) regards at the same tome with
the emotion. And therefore the emotion is more frequent or more often
flourishes, and (Prop. 8, Part V,) it occupies the mind more, Q.e.d.
the more references that are proposed – the more the
uncertainty of the image is explored
we do not put multiple proposals ‘at the same time’ –
a proposal may be explored – and the exploration may in time
result in other propositional references being put
it does not follow that because an image / emotion /
proposal is explored – that it will be ‘more frequent’ or ‘more often flourish’
– or occupy more of our thinking –
it can reoccur – as often as it is proposed – or it may be
just a ‘one-off’ proposal
PROP. XII. The image of things are more easily joined to
images which have reference to things which we understand clearly and
distinctly than to others.
images are proposals –
any proposal can be put in relation to any other
proposal
images / proposals – however described – i.e. – as ‘clear
and distinct’ – logically speaking – are no different to any other image /
proposal – however described
there is no difficulty in putting image / proposals
in relation to each other
so – the idea that it is easier to put so called
‘clear and distinct’ image / proposals in relation to each other – has no
logical basis – and makes no logical sense
Proof. – Things which we clearly and distinctly
understand are either the common properties of things or what we deduce from
them (see def. of reason in Note 2. Prop 40. Part 1.), and consequently they
are more often excited in us (prev. Prop.). And therefore it can more easily
happen that we should regard things at the same time with these than with other
things, and consequently (Prop. 18, Part II.) that they are joined with these
more easily than with other things. Q.e.d.
‘clear and distinct understanding’ – is a logical fraud – a
logical pretence
all understanding is propositional – and all propositional
understanding is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –
uncertain – not ‘clear and distinct’
to ‘understand’ – is put proposals / propositions to
question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty
any proposed ‘common properties of things’ – is open to
question
‘things’ are proposals – and the common logical property of
proposals is uncertainty
as to ‘they (common properties) are more often excited in
us’ –
what is ‘excited in us’ not – not logically irrelevant
there is nothing against ‘joining up’ proposals in terms of
some proposed common property –
the fact remains the basis of any such ‘joining’ (i.e.
common properties)
is open to question – is uncertain
PROP. XIII. The more an image is joined by many other
things, the more often it flourishes.
this goes without saying – and one wonders why Spinoza
bothered to say it
Proof. – The more an image is joined with many other
things, the more causes there are (Prop. 18, Part II.) by which it can be
excited. Q.e.d.
any ‘cause’ is a proposal – a propositional explanation –
and any causal explanation – is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
causal explanations can be proposed – but we don’t
need causal explanations in order for propositional images to be related to
other proposals –
we don’t need causal explanations in order for there to be
propositional activity
causal explanations come after propositional actions
– after the proposing of propositional relations
an image is a proposal – proposals are not ‘excited’ – they
are put –
as to the ground or reason for any proposal – for any
propositional image –
that is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about that all the
modifications of the body have reference to the idea of God.
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action
a ‘modification of the body’ – is a propositional action
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
any proposal / propositional action is a response to the
unknown
Proof. – The is no modification of the body of which
the mind cannot form a clear and distinct conception (Prop. 4, Part V.). And
therefore it can bring it about (Prop.15, Part I.) that all the modifications
have reference to the idea of God. Q.e.d.
the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
a ‘clear and distinct conception’ – is a proposal that has
not been critically assessed –
and if held – is held irrationally
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
all ‘modifications’ / propositional actions are responses to
– or reactions to the unknown
PROP. XV. He who understands himself and his emotions
clearly and distinctly loves God, and the more so the more he understands
himself and his emotions.
Proof. – He who clearly and distinctly understands
himself and his emotions, rejoices (Prop. 13, Part III.) accompanied with the
idea of God (Prev. Prop.). And therefore (Def. Emp 6.) he loves God, and (by
the same argument) the more so the more he understands himself and his
emotions. Q.e.d.
any understanding is propositional – and as such is critical
– that is to say – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and the more critical one is of oneself and one’s emotions –
the more one understands oneself and one’s emotions
so called ‘clear and distinct understanding’ – is
‘understanding’ – that is not put to question – not put to doubt – its
uncertainty – unexplored –
‘clear and distinct understanding’ – is not understanding
anything –
and the absence of understanding – is nothing to rejoice in
it does not follow that as a result of a genuine – critical
understanding – you will love anyone or anything
a critical understanding of yourself and your emotions – may
lead you to love – but just as equally – love may not be the result
as to God –
if we take Spinoza’s view of God as substance – infinite and
eternal –
we can ask the question – how can something so impersonal be
the subject of human love?
perhaps such an understanding gives pleasure – but just as
equally – it may leave one cold
and as to a critical understanding – of oneself –
one’s emotions – i.e. love – and any conception one has of God –
any critical understanding will lead to question – to doubt
– and to the exploration of uncertainty –
one may ‘rejoice’ in this understanding – or simply regard
it – without fanfare – as logical and rational
PROP. XVI. This love of God must occupy the mind most.
Proof. – This love is joined with all the
modifications of the body (Prop. 14, Part V.), by all of which it is cherished
(Prop. 15, Part V.). And therefore (Prop.11, Part V.) it must occupy the mind
most. Q.e.d.
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity
there is no necessity – no ‘must’ – in propositional
activity
propositional activity is indeterminate and uncertain
what proposals ‘occupy the minds most’ – is not something
that can be known –
for it presumes that we can know all propositional activity
in all minds at all times –
which is fanciful
‘modifications of the body’ – are propositional actions
the idea that one proposal – ‘this love of God’ – as
a matter of fact – is ‘joined with all modifications of the body’
– is frankly absurd
if Spinoza had said – that it is his view that love
of God – as he has proposed ‘God’ -should occupy the mind the most –
then at least his argument – would have made sense – for
such is an ethical recommendation
instead – he presents this idea as a ‘must’ –
and there is no necessity – no ‘must’ – in human
propositional action
‘God’- is a name for the unknown
recognizing the unknown – makes good epistemological sense –
loving it – I think – makes no sense
PROP. XVII. God is free from passions, nor is he affected
with any emotion of pleasure or pain.
firstly – Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is substance – infinite and
eternal –
this ‘God’ is not a ‘he’ – this ‘God’ – is an ‘it’
secondly – according to Spinoza – human beings are
expressions of the eternal and infinite substance – expressions of God –
if so – then human passions – emotions of pleasure and pain
– are expressions of this ‘God’ – of the eternal and infinite substance –
and therefore – Spinoza’s God is the source of human passion
– and affected by emotions of pleasure and pain
on the other hand – if this God is free from passions – and
not affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain – then this ‘God’ – has no
connection with human beings
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – cannot be both the source of passion – and
free of passion
Spinoza’s conception of ‘God’ – is a contradiction –
and therefore – a failed conception
Proof. – All ideas, in so far as they have reference
to God, are true (Prop. 32, Part II.), that is (Def. 4, Part II.), they are
adequate: and therefore (Gen, Def. Emo.) God is without passions. again, God
cannot pass to a higher or lower perfection (Coroll. 2, Prop. 20, Part 1.): and
therefore (Def. Emo. 2 and 3) he is affected with no emotion of pleasure or
pain. Q.e.d.
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
an ‘idea’ is a proposal
any proposal can be seen as a response to the unknown
a proposal is true if it is affirmed – if it is assented to
and any proposal of affirmation or assent – is open to
question
if by adequate idea – is meant a proposal that is not open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
then this so-called adequate idea – is nothing more than a
prejudice –
the unknown – does not ‘pass to higher or lower perfection’
the unknown – has no emotion
Corollary. – God, to speak strictly, loves no one and
does not hate any one. For God (prev. Prop.) is affected with no emotion of
pleasure or pain, and consequently (Def. Emo. 6 and 7), loves no one and does
not hate anyone.
if we are expressions of Spinoza’s God – the eternal and
infinite substance – and we love and hate – then there is love and hate in God
PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.
‘hate’ – in Spinoza’s terms is sadness or pain accompanied
by the idea of an external cause (Def. VII. Part III.) –
‘God’ for Spinoza – is reality – substance – infinite and
eternal –
a person may experience what can be described as
‘existential pain’ –
that is where they regard the world as such – as the source
of their pain
and therefore – in Spinoza’s terms ‘hate God’
I think one can hate the world – but as soon as that
proposal is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored – it is
most likely that hating the world – will be seen to be lacking focus – and
therefore of no actionable value –
and when put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty
explored – any such hate may well become a propositional springboard for
different emotions – different emotional understandings and actions
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
we can recognise the unknown
it makes no sense to hate it
Proof. – The idea of God in us is adequate and
perfect (Prop.46 and 47 Part II.). And therefore in so as we regard God we are
active (Prop. 3, Part III.) and consequently (Prop. 59, Part III.) there can be
no pain accompanied by the idea of God, That is (Def. Emo. 7), none can hate
God. Q.e.d.
no idea we have – that is – no proposal we put – is adequate
and perfect
any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
yes – we can recognize the unknown as an epistemological
reality – and in so doing we are active
I don’t know that there can be no pain accompanied by the
idea of God / the unknown
the unknown may well be painful for some
and as to hating the unknown –
if you reject the unknown (as Spinoza has done) –
what’s to hate?
and if you accept the unknown – why would you hate it?
Corollary. – Love toward God cannot be changed into
hatred.
any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain –
any proposal can be changed
Note. – But it may be raised in objection to this,
that while we understand God as the cause of all things, by that very fact we
consider him to be the cause of pain. But to this I make answer, that in so far
as we understand the causes of pain it ceases to be a passion (Prop. 3, Part
V.), that is (Prop. 59, Part III.), thus far it ceases to be pain: and
therefore in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain we rejoice.
Spinoza does not succeed her in rebutting this objection
that his God is the cause of pain
all he does here is propose that if you hold that his God is
the cause of pain – you should ‘rejoice’ –
which to my mind is perverse and twisted
PROP. XIX. He who loves God cannot endeavour to bring it
about that God should love him in return.
according to Spinoza –
‘God’ is reality – and for Spinoza reality is – substance –
infinite and eternal
and ‘love’ – is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an
external cause
we can ask – is it not the case that people have the
experience of feeling one with the world – feeling pleasure or joy from the
world around them?
if so – given Spinoza’s definitions – man can feel love from
Spinoza’s God
and we may wish to ‘bring it about’ – that is – put
ourselves in the emotional state that enables that experience
I think we can have the experience of loving the
world we live in –
and we can put ourselves in the emotional state where
we feel that the world loves us
however – there is no ‘should’ involved in this – and there
is no quid pro pro
if we feel love for the world we live in – or feel loved by
the world –
I say that is a lucky moment
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
the unknown does not love
we can recognise the unknown but it makes no sense to say we
love the unknown –
there is nothing there to love
Proof. If man desired this, he would therefore desire
(Coroll. Prop. 17, Part V.) that the God whom he loves should not be God, and
consequently (Prop. 19, Part III.) he would desire to be pained, which (Prop.
28, Part III,) is absurd. Therefore he who loves God, etc. Q.e.d.
it is fair enough to desire that the world brings you
pleasure and joy –
and it is absurd to say that such a desire is a
desire for pain
PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be polluted by an
emotion either of envy or jealousy, but is strengthened the more, the more we
imagine men to be bound to God by this bond of love.
if by God – we mean Spinoza’s God – substance – infinite and
eternal – passionless and emotionless –
is it not conceivable that a person – finite – passionate
and emotional – might at some point envy that state of being – which is not
shadowed by death – and not plagued by passions and emotions?
and so – could such a person – at such a time – be jealous
of such a ‘God’ –
I think so –
love towards God – strengthened – the more we imagine men to
be bound to God?
if you imagine that man is bound to ‘God’ by love –
the more you imagine this – the more you reinforce – what you imagine
just as equally – you can imagine that Spinoza’s God
– infinite and eternal – emotionless and passionless – has no relation to man –
and therefore – is unlovable –
and the more you imagine this – the more you keep
proposing it – the more you reinforce it –
an image – an imagination – is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
if you approach your images – your imaginations rationally
– you do not reinforce them – you critically evaluate them –
and if you critically evaluate them – whatever they may be –
you come face to face with uncertainty
Proof. – This love towards God is the greatest good
which we can desire according to the dictates of reason (Prop. 28, Part IV.),
and it is common to all men. (Prop. 36, Part IV.), and we desire that all
should enjoy it (Prop. 37 Part. IV.). And therefore (Def. Emo. 26) it cannot be
stained by the emotion of envy, nor again by the emotion of jealousy (Prop.18,
Part V., and the def. of jealousy, which we see in Note, Prop. 35, Part III.),
it must be strengthened the more, the more men imagine and enjoy it. Q.e.d.
‘This love towards God is the greatest good which we can
desire according to the dictates of reason (Prop. 28, Part IV.), and it is
common to all men. (Prop. 36, Part IV.), and we desire that all should enjoy
it.’
firstly – Spinoza on a number of occasions refers to this
‘dictates of reason’ – but he offers no account of what these ‘dictates’
are –
at best – they come off as empty propaganda –
this ‘love towards God’ – Spinoza’s God – is not as a
matter of fact – common to all men –
and – as a matter of fact – all men do not
desire that all should enjoy it –
any proposal as to ‘the greatest good’ – is open to question
– open to doubt and uncertain
and there may well be those who say there is no greatest
good
‘And therefore (Def. Emo. 26) it cannot be stained by the
emotion of envy, nor again by the emotion of jealousy (Prop.18, Part V., and
the def. of jealousy, which we see in Note, Prop. 35, Part III.), it must be
strengthened the more, the more men imagine and enjoy it.
Spinoza ‘God’ – is substance – infinite and eternal –
passionless and emotionless
I think – in a moment of discontent or crisis – one could
envy that state – and in a sense so be jealous of this ‘God’ – so called –
however – on reflection – critical reflection – realize that
– (at least according to Spinoza) – such a state is not human – and therefore
any emotional response to it is misguided
and we can ask – is such a ‘God’ – with apparently no human
or animal characteristics – lovable?
what’s to enjoy?
Note. – We can show in the same manner that there is
no emotion which is directly contrary to this love by which this love can be
destroyed: and therefore we can conclude that this love towards God is the most
constant of all emotions, nor can it be destroyed in so far as it has reference
to the body, save with the body itself.
But of what nature it may be, in so
far as it has reference to the mind alone, we shall see later. In the above
propositions I have described all the remedies for the emotions, or everything
which the mind considered in itself alone can do to restrain the emotions. From which it is apparent that the mind’s power over the
emotions consists: 1st. In the knowledge of the emotions (see Note, Prop. 4,
Part IV.). 2nd. In the fact that the emotions are separated from the
thought of the external cause we imagine confusedly (see Prop. 2. with its Note
and Prop. 4. Part V.). 3rd. In the time in which the emotions have
reference to the things we understand surpass those which have reference to the
things to things which we conceive confusedly and in a mutilated manner (see
Prop. 7 Part V.). 4th. In the multitude
of causes which the emotions have reference to the common properties of things
or to God are fostered (see Prop. 9 and 11, Part V.). 5th. Finally,
in the order in which the mind can arrange and connect one to the other its
emotions (see Note, Prop. 10 and 12, 13 and 14, Part V.).
But in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
may better be understood, it must first be noted that the emotions are called
great by us when we compare the emotions of one man with that of another, and
when we see one man to more assailed by an emotion than another man, or when we
compare one with the other the emotions of one and the same man, and find him
to affected or moved more by one emotion than another. For
(Prop. 5 Part IV.) the force of any emotion is defined by knowledge alone: its
weakness or passion is estimated solely by privation of knowledge, that is, by
that where ideas are said to be inadequate. From
which it follows that mind is most passive whose greatest part is constituted
by inadequate ideas so that it is characterized by passivity rather than
activity: and that on the other hand, is most active which is constituted for
the most part of adequate ideas in such a way that although there are as many
inadequate ideas in this as in the former, yet it is characterized rather through
those which have reference to human virtue than those which show human
weakness. Again, it is to be noted that these
unhealthy states of mind and misfortunes owe their origin for the most part to
excessive love for a thing that is liable to many variations, and of which we
can never seize the mastery. For no one is anxious
or cares about anything that he does not love, nor do injuries, suspicions,
enmities, etc. arise from anything else than love towards a thing of which no
one is truly the master. From this we can easily
conceive what clear and distinct knowledge, and principally that third kind of
knowledge (concerning which we see Note, Prop. 47, Part II.), whose basis is
the knowledge of God, can do with emotions,
namely, that if it
does not remove them entirely in so far as they are passions (Prop. 3,
with Note, Prop. 4,
Part V.), at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of
the mind (see Prop. 14, Part V.). Moreover, it gives rise towards a
thing immutable and eternal (Prop, 15, Part V.), and of which we are in truth
masters (Prop. 45, Part II.), and which cannot be polluted by any vices which
exist in ordinary love, but which can become greater and greater (Prop. 15,
Part V.) and occupy the greatest part of the mind (Prop.16, Part V.) and effect
it extensively. And thus I have done with all that
regards this present life. For what I have said in the beginning of this note,
that I have summed up in these few words all the remedies of the emotions,
anyone can easily see who pays attention to what we have said in this note, and
at the same time to the definitions of the mind and its emotions, and finally
to Prop.1 and 3, Part III. So it is now time that I should pass to those points
which appertain to the duration of the mind with out relation to the body.
‘We can show in the same manner that there is no emotion
which is directly contrary to this love by which this love can be destroyed:
and therefore we can conclude that this love towards God is the most constant
of all emotions, nor can it be destroyed in so far as it has reference to the
body, save with the body itself.’
love towards – this ‘God’ – Spinoza’s God – can be
directly opposed
it can be argued that this ‘God’ – is unlovable –
any proposal of love is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain – and therefore is not logically constant – it can be dropped
human beings do not exist after death – they do not love
after death
‘But of what nature it may be, in so far as it has reference
to the mind alone, we shall see later. In the above propositions I have
described all the remedies for the emotions, or everything which the mind
considered in itself alone can do to restrain the emotions.’
the emotions do not need to be ‘remedied’
‘emotions’ – are propositional actions –
propositional action – is how we deal with our reality –
it is not a matter of ‘restraining’ emotions / propositional
actions
any propositional action is open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
‘body’ and ‘mind’ – are names for propositional action –
once it is realised that the logical focus is the
propositional actor – and the actions of the propositional actor
‘body’ and ‘mind’ – are rendered irrelevant descriptions
‘From which it is apparent that the mind’s power over the
emotions consists: 1st. In the knowledge of the emotions (see Note, Prop. 4,
Part IV.). 2nd. In the fact that the emotions are separated from the
thought of the external cause we imagine confusedly (see Prop. 2. with its Note
and Prop. 4. Part V.). 3rd. In the time in which the emotions have
reference to the things we understand surpass those which have reference to the
things to things which we conceive confusedly and in a mutilated manner (see
Prop. 7 Part V.). 4th.’ In the multitude of causes which the
emotions have reference to the common properties of things or to God are
fostered (see Prop. 9 and 11, Part V.). 5th. Finally, in the order
in which the mind can arrange and connect one to the other its emotions (see
Note, Prop. 10 and 12, 13 and 14, Part V.).’
1st – any ‘knowledge of the emotions’ – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
2nd – any proposed external cause – is open to
question
propositional actors are not ‘confused’ – they are
uncertain
3rd –any conception is a proposal – regardless of
time – and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
4th –any proposal can have reference to any other
proposal
proposed common properties are open to question – and are
uncertain
5th – proposals / propositional actions can be
ordered in any number of ways –
any proposed order is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘But in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
may be better be understood, it must first be noted that the emotions are
called great by us when we compare the emotions of one man with that of
another, and when we see one man to more assailed by an emotion than another
man, or when we compare one with the other the emotions of one and the same
man, and find him to affected or moved more by one emotion than another.’
any observation of others and their emotional states – is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
it is not a question of ‘this power of the mind over the
emotions’ –
but rather whether or not we deal with our emotions in a
rational manner
a rational understanding of the emotions is a critical
understanding
‘For (Prop. 5 Part IV.) the force of any emotion is defined
by knowledge alone: its weakness or passion is estimated solely by privation of
knowledge, that is, by that where ideas are said to be inadequate.’
any ‘knowledge’ is propositional – is proposal – and
any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
an emotional / propositional action that is not
critically evaluated – is not more forceful – it is irrational
‘From which it follows that mind is most passive whose
greatest part is constituted by inadequate ideas so that it is characterized by
passivity rather than activity: and that on the other hand, is most active
which is constituted for the most part of adequate ideas in such a way that
although there are as many inadequate ideas in this as in the former, yet it is
characterized rather through those which have reference to human virtue than
those which show human weakness.’
any proposal put – is an action – is active
‘inadequate ideas’ – are proposals that are open to question
– open to doubt – and regarded as uncertain
Spinoza’s so called ‘adequate ideas’ – are ideas / proposals
that are not put to question – not put to doubt – that is regarded as certain –
and are the best examples of propositional passivity
so called ‘human virtue’ and so called ‘human weakness’ –
are propositional issues open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘Again, it is to be noted that these unhealthy states of
mind and misfortunes owe their origin for the most part to excessive love for a
thing that is liable to many variations, and of which we can never seize the
mastery.’
healthy and unhealthy states of mind – are matters open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what one regards as a healthy state of mind – another may
well regard as unhealthy
‘excessive love’?
once again – how the description ‘excessive’ – is used – is
applied i.e. – to love – will vary for different propositional actors – in
different propositional contexts
any emotional state – is liable to many variations –
and the reason is that any emotion / propositional action is
open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
there is no ‘mastery’ to be ‘seized’ –
if we proceed rationally – we proceed critically – in
relation to our proposal / propositional action – we question – we doubt – and
we explore propositional uncertainty
‘For no one is anxious or cares about anything that he does
not love, nor do injuries, suspicions, enmities, etc. arise from anything else
than love towards a thing of which no one is truly the master.’
this statement is naïve –
I may not love the people of Gaza – but in face of an over
whelming military assault from the Israelis – I am anxious for them and I care
about them –
just as I was anxious for and cared for the Jewish people
attacked by Hamas on October 7 2023
love may play a part in injuries – suspicions and
enmities – but just as equally – love may have nothing to do with these issues
–
various forms of propositional conflict – may be ‘explained’
in any number of ways –
i.e. – propositional misunderstandings – may have nothing to
do with love or hate
injuries – suspicions – enmities – if not critically
evaluated – are irrational
logically speaking there is no ‘mastery’ of propositional
reality –
propositional reality is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘From this we can easily conceive what clear and distinct
knowledge, and principally that third kind of knowledge (concerning which we
see Note, Prop. 47, Part II.), whose basis is the knowledge of God, can do with
emotions, namely, that if it does not remove them entirely in so far as they
are passions (Prop. 3, with Note, Prop. 4, Part V.), at least it brings it
about that they constitute the smallest part of the mind (see Prop. 14, Part
V.).’
the idea of ‘removing emotions entirely’ – is logically
absurd
‘emotions’ – are propositional actions –
it is in terms of our propositional actions that we know
and deal with our reality
to remove propositional actions – is to remove humanity
so – not only is this idea ridiculous – it is sick
‘passions’ – and ‘emotions’ – are descriptions of
propositional action
our passions and our emotions cannot be ‘removed’ – however
– we can deal with them rationally –
and to live rationally is to question – to doubt – and to explore
– explore – the uncertainty of our passions and emotions
Proof. – The mind does not express the actual
existence of it body nor conceive the modifications of the body as actual save
while the body endures (Coroll. Prop. 8 Part II.), and therefore (Prop. 28,
Part II,) it conceives no body as actually existing save
while its own body endures. And thus it can imagine nothing
(see def. imagination in Note, prop. 17, Part II.) nor recollect past things
save while the body endures (see def. memory in Note, Prop. 18, Part II.). Q.e.d.
‘mind’ and ‘body’ are names for propositional action
–
propositional action is open to question
once it is realised that there is no logical distinction
between propositional actions – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are rendered unnecessary descriptions
and can be dispensed with –
the human being is a propositional actor –
in our efforts to understand ourselves – our propositional
actions – we do propose descriptive categories such and ‘mind’ and
‘body’ –
these descriptive categories – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – have
proven to be of useful and have become entrenched in our propositional practise
however – logically speaking – we only ever deal with propositional
actions – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
as to Prop. XXI. and its Proof –
if a proposal cannot be put – it cannot have reference –
if a proposal is put – any reference proposed – is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
PROP. XXII. In God, however, there necessarily exists the
idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the species
of eternity.
‘God is a name for the unknown
nothing exists or exists necessarily in the unknown
there are no ideas in the unknown
any logical reference to the human being is a reference to
the propositional actor and propositional actions
‘under the species of eternity’ –
‘eternity’ – as Spinoza proposes it – is outside time
any proposal can be put with a reference to
time – or without a reference to time
‘under the species of eternity’ – is a proposal put without
a reference to time
‘eternity’ – is a temporal non-reference
Proof. – God is not only the cause of this or that human
body’s existence, but also of their essence (Prop. 25, Part I.) which therefore
must necessarily be conceived through the essence of God (Ax, 4, Part I.) and
that with a certain eternal necessity (Prop. 16 Part I.): and this conception
must necessarily exist in God (Prop. 3, Part II.) Q.e.d.
any causal proposal – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
the ‘essence’ of anything – is a proposal – open to question
there is no propositional necessity – only propositional
uncertainty
eternity – is no more than a proposal that has no time stamp
PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed
with the human body, but something of it remains which is eternal –
if the propositional actor dies – then his / her ability to
propose – and to critically evaluate proposals put – dies too
proposals put – and evaluated – may remain after death – in
memory and in record
there is no eternal memory – there is no eternal record
in Spinoza’s metaphysics extension and mind are two known
attributes of the one infinite and eternal substance
and so according to
Spinoza – for the human being – body and mind are two aspects or expressions of
the one nature
the question for Spinoza is – if one is ‘destroyed’ – how is
it that the other is not?
for according to Spinoza – these two aspects are effectively
mirror images of each other – i.e. – if one goes – the other is gone –
if Spinoza is going to hold that something of the mind
remains when the body is ‘destroyed’ – then he has to accept some form of
dualism
or is it that the mind and body – both exist after
death – in some form or another?
Spinoza cannot have it both ways –
either mind and body are different ‘substances’ – something
of the mind remains – and something of the body does not – and therefore –
dualism –
or the body – as with the mind – is not ‘destroyed’ –
something of it remains as with the mind – and therefore – monism –
what is it to be?
if I was Spinoza – I’d go with the view that something of
the human being – mind and body remains –
but I think – when it comes down to it – Spinoza is a closet
Cartesian
and in this Proposition XXIII. – the closet door – creaks
open
Proof. – There is necessarily in God the conception
or the idea that expresses the essence of the human body (prev. Prop,), which
therefore is necessarily something which appertains to the essence of the human
mind (Prop. 13, Part II.). But we attribute to the human mind no duration which
can be defined by time, save in so far as it expresses the actual existence of
the human body, which is explained by means of duration and can be defined by
time, that is (Coroll., Prop 8, Part II.) we do not attribute duration to it
save as long as the body lasts. But as there is nevertheless something which is
conceived under a certain eternal necessity through the essence of God, this
something, which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be
eternal.
‘There is necessarily in God the conception or the idea that
expresses the essence of the human body (prev. Prop,), which therefore is
necessarily something which appertains to the essence of the human mind (Prop.
13, Part II.).’
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
the unknown – is without characteristics – it is unknown
there is no ‘necessity’ in the unknown – no ‘conception’ –
the unknown does not express ‘essence’ – the unknown – expresses – nothing –
these notions – ‘necessity’ – ‘conception’ – ‘essence’ – are
proposals – human proposals – and as such – open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain –
a ‘necessary’ proposition – so called – is held to be
certain
there are no certain propositions – certainty is a delusion
–
a ‘conception’ – is a description of a proposal –
as to ‘essence’ – again – a proposed certainty –
and it should be noted that Spinoza gives no account of
these notions central to his metaphysics –
he assumes them – and assumes them without explanation
and his idea of ‘God’ – if you strip away these false
notions of ‘necessity’ and ‘essence’ – comes to nothing –
comes right back to the unknown
‘But we attribute to the human mind no duration which can be
defined by time, save in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the
human body, which is explained by means of duration and can be defined by time,
that is (Coroll., Prop 8, Part II.) we do not attribute duration to it save as
long as the body lasts’
the first statement here – that ‘we attribute to the human
mind no duration…’ –
is to my mind – outrageous –
who attributes this to the human mind?
and if anyone does – what is their argument?
experience tells us that the lives of human beings – body and
mind – - if you are a dualist – have a duration
that death is the end of life – ‘body’ and ‘mind’ –
if you wish to describe human life in these terms
the human mind has duration – it lives and dies
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action
propositional action – ‘has duration’ – as long as the
propositional actor is functioning and alive
propositional action
‘But as there is nevertheless something which is conceived
under a certain eternal necessity through the essence of God, this something,
which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal.
‘under a certain eternal necessity through the essence of
God’ – is metaphysical gobbledygook –
and to say – ‘this something which pertains to the
essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal’– is no argument –
what is this ‘something’?
it is this unknown ‘something’ indicates how weak Spinoza’s
argument is here
Spinoza has no argument for the above –
he simply states it and assumes it has meaning – and assumes
further – that his readers will just fall for it –
his proposals here – are open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain – but his ‘argument’ – if you can call it that – for these
proposals – is weak – to say the least
Note. – This idea, we have said, which expresses
under a certain species of eternity the essence of the body, is a certain mode
of thinking which appertains to the essence of the mind, and which is
necessarily eternal. It cannot happen, however, that we can remember that we
existed before our bodies, since there are no traces of it in the body, neither
can eternity be defined by time nor have any relation to time. But nevertheless
we sense and experience that we are eternal.
For the mind no less senses those things which it conceives in
understanding than those which it has in memory. For the eyes of the mind by
which it sees things and observes them are proofs. So though we do not remember
that we existed before the body, we sense nevertheless that our mind in so far
as it involves the essence of the body under the species of eternity is
eternal, and its existence cannot be defined by time or explained by duration.
Our mind therefore can only be said to endure, and its existence can be defined
by a certain time, only in so far as it involves the actual existence of the
body, and thus far only it has the power of determining the existence of things
by time and of conceiving them under duration.
‘This idea, we have said, which expresses under a certain
species of eternity the essence of the body, is a certain mode of thinking
which appertains to the essence of the mind, and which is necessarily eternal.’
so – the argument is – that an idea which ‘expresses
eternity’ (in relation to the ‘body’ and the ‘mind’) is ‘necessarily eternal’
an idea that is eternal – is eternal –
all we have here from Spinoza is a tautology –
this tells us nothing
‘It cannot happen, however, that we can remember that we
existed before our bodies, since there are no traces of it in the body, neither
can eternity be defined by time nor have any relation to time.
if you say ‘eternity’ is ‘timeless’ – or ‘time without end’
– then the term is defined by time and does have a relation to
time –
if ‘eternity’ – cannot be defined by time or have any
relation to it – what then is it?
again – from Spinoza – we have nothing
‘But nevertheless we sense and experience that we are
eternal’ –
it will be said in response to this that all our sense and
experience is in time –
and that even a proposal of ‘eternity’ – whatever that may
mean – occurs in time
my view is that ‘time’ – as with any proposal – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and in response to this logical reality – this uncertainty –
we do have proposals of timelessness – and of time without end –
these proposals as with the proposal of time – are open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘For the mind no less senses those things which it conceives
in understanding than those which it has in memory.’
yes – propositional actors propose – outside of memory –
any such proposal – is open to question
‘So though we do not remember that we existed before the
body, we sense nevertheless that our mind in so far as it involves the essence
of the body under the species of eternity is eternal, and its existence cannot
be defined by time or explained by duration’
again – I ask – who senses this?
no doubt some claim to – but there are others who would
regard this proposal as pure fantasy
‘Our mind therefore can only be said to endure, and its
existence can be defined by a certain time, only in so far as it involves the
actual existence of the body, and thus far only it has the power of determining
the existence of things by time and of conceiving them under duration.
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action
–
the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action -
‘the actual existence of the body’ – is – the actual
existence of propositional action
propositional action can be defined by reference to
time –
however – a proposal can be put without reference to time
Proof. – This is
clear from Prop. 25, Part I
we ‘understand’ when we put our propositions to question –
to doubt – and when we explore their uncertainty
‘particular things’ – are proposals –
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
the more we deal with uncertainty – the more we come face to
face with the unknown
PROP. XXV. The greatest endeavour of the mind and its
greatest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
‘knowledge’ is proposal
there is only one ‘kind’ of knowledge – propositional
knowledge –
to ‘understand things’ is to put our proposals – our
propositional knowledge – to question – to doubt – and to explore its
uncertainty
this is not I think a ‘great endeavour’ – it is rather a natural
endeavour
I don’t see critical thinking as being virtuous or not –
however – it can be proposed as such –
and any such proposal – is – as with any other proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – The third kind of knowledge proceeds from
the adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the
essence of things (see its def. in Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II.), and the more we
understand things in this manner, the more (prev. Prop.) we understand God. And
therefore (Prop. 28, Part IV.) the greatest the virtue of the mind, that is
(Def. 8, Part IV.), the mind’s power or nature, or (Prop. 7, Part III.) its
greatest endeavour, is to understand things according to the third kind of
knowledge, Q.e.d.
if by ‘adequate knowledge’ – is meant propositions that are
not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain – then propositions held
in such a way are not examples of knowledge – but rather examples of blind
prejudice –
Spinoza’s ‘third kind of knowledge’ – is a prime example of
uncritical thinking
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown – the unknown – has no
known attributes –
if we use the term ‘essence’ in a logical manner – the
‘essence’ of anything – of any proposal – is uncertainty
a ‘thing’ is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
the more we understand things in a critical manner – the
more we come face to face with the unknown
even if you accept Spinoza’s idea of this ‘third of kind of
knowledge’ – I fail to see how or why such an understanding is ‘the greatest
virtue of the mind’ –
any understanding – however described – is neither virtuous
or not virtuous – it is simply a basic and natural action of human beings
PROP. XXVI. The
more apt the mind is for understanding things by the third kind of knowledge,
the more it desires to understand things by this third kind of knowledge.
Proof. – this is clear. For in so far as we conceive
the mind to be apt for understanding things by this kind of knowledge, thus far
we conceive as determined to understand things by the same kind of knowledge,
and consequently (Def. Emo. 1) the more apt the mind is for this, the more it
desires it. Q.e.d.
the third kind of knowledge – a recap –
Note 2 Prop. 40, Part II. –
‘Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is a third, as I
shall show in what follows, which we shall call intuition (scientia
intuitiva). Now this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the
formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the
essence of things. I shall illustrate these by one example. Let three numbers
be given to find the fourth, which is in the same proportion to the third as
the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by
the third and divide the product by the first: either because they have not
forgotten the rule which they received from the school master without any
proof, or because they have often tried it with very small numbers, or by
conviction of the proof of Prop. 19, Book VII., of Euclid’s elements, namely
the common property of proportional. But in very small numbers there is no need
of this, for when the numbers 1, 2, 3, are given, who is there who could not
see the fourth proportional is 6? and this is much clearer because we conclude
the fourth number from the same ratio which intuitively we see the first bears
to the second.’
put forward as certain
Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge is so called ‘intuitive
knowledge’ –
in general – as proposed ‘intuitive knowledge’ – is not open
to question – open to doubt – or uncertain – is put forward as ‘certain’
as such it is not ‘knowledge’ – it is ignorance –
in the example Spinoza gives of three numbers being given to
find a fourth which is the same proportion to the third as the second is to the
first – what we have is a propositional (mathematical) game – a rule-governed
propositional action –
the ‘intuition’ here – is no more than familiarity with the
rule –
if so – all we get from Spinoza is the rule that
‘knowledge of the essence of things’ follows from ‘an adequate idea of the
formal essence of certain attributes of God’
there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical
mode and the game mode
in the critical mode – we put our proposals / propositions
to question – to doubt – and explore their uncertainty
in the game mode our activity – our play is rule
governed – we play according to the rule
and if we don’t play according to the rule – there is no
game
human beings critically evaluate propositions and we play
propositional games
the playing of games is not a critical activity –
any claim of knowledge is a critical issue – not a game
issue –
Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge – is a propositional game
– and as such has no epistemological significance
there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge – ‘knowledge’ – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
PROP. XXVII. From
the third kind of knowledge the greatest possible content of mind arises.
this third kind of knowledge – amounts to Spinoza’s
conception of God –
in logical terms – just another proposal
if we deal with our proposals / propositions in a rational
manner – we put them to question – we put them to doubt – and we explore their
uncertainty –
the point being that a critical / rational approach to
whatever is proposed – challenges contentment
Proof. – The greatest virtue of the mind is to know
God (Prop. 28, Part IV.), or, to understand things by the third kind of
knowledge (Prop. 25, Part V.): and this virtue is the greater according as the
mind knows more things by this kind of knowledge (Prop. 24, Part V.). And
therefore he who knows things by this kind of knowledge, passes tot the
greatest state of human perfection, and consequently (Def. Emo. 2) he is
affected with the greatest pleasure, and that (Prop. 45, Part II.) accompanied
by the idea of himself and his virtue: and therefore (Def. Emo 25.) from this
kind of knowledge the greater contentment possible arises, Q.e.d.
Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge – as he proposes it – is
not open to question – not open to doubt – and is certain
what we have here from Spinoza is a philosophical prejudice
–
and to suggest that holding to this prejudice is ‘the
greatest virtue of the mind’ and ‘the greatest state of human perfection’ – and
‘the greatest pleasure’ – leading to ‘the greatest contentment’ – is nothing
more than rank propaganda
PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire of knowing things by
the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but can arise from the
second kind of knowledge.
Proof. – This proposition is self-evident. For
whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we either understand through
itself or through something else that is conceived through itself: that is, the
ideas which are distinct and clear in us, or which have reference to the third
kind of knowledge (Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II.), cannot follow from ideas
mutilated and confused which (same Note) have reference to the first kind of
knowledge, but can follow from adequate ideas or (same Note) from the second
and third kind of knowledge. And therefore (Def. Emo. 1) the desire of knowing
them by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from knowledge of the first
kind, but only of the second. Q.e.d.
no proposition is ‘self-evident’
a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
a so called ‘self-evident proposition’ – is nothing more
than a prejudice
a so called ‘clear and distinct’ proposition – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
this concept of ‘clear and distinct’ – has no logical
significance –
it is just a catch phrase used by those who either can’t
think critically – or – who for their own reasons – wish to avoid any critical
analysis of their propositions
we understand when we engage in the critical process
of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge –
however a proposal / proposition is constructed – whatever
meaning it is given – it is open to question
it is in terms of our proposals / propositions – and
critical evaluation of them – whatever they may be – that we know the world –
and our knowledge is uncertain
for Spinoza ‘adequate ideas’ – are ideas not open to
question – not open to doubt – and ideas that are certain
these ‘adequate ideas’ – so called – are held uncritically –
and are therefore – prejudices
is there a desire – to know these ideas – these clear and
distinct prejudices?
not if you think critically
PROP. XXIX.
Whatever the mind understands under the species of eternity, it does not
understand owing to the fact that it conceives the actual existence of the
body, but owing to the fact it conceives the essence of the body under the
species of eternity.
this ‘species of eternity’ – is the proposal that we
consider things outside of time
the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action
‘the actual existence of the body’ – is propositional action–
and if you are not a dualist – and you shouldn’t be one –the
focus here is the propositional actor
as to ‘the essence of the body’ –
the ‘essence’ of the body is propositional action
we can propose without reference to time –
we do propose without reference to time –
this is all ‘eternity’ is – the absence of a propositional
reference to time
Proof. – In so far as the mind conceives the present
existence of its body, thus far it conceives duration which can be determined
by time, and thus far only it has the power of conceiving things with relation
to time (Prop. 21, Part V., and Prop. 26, Part II.). But eternity cannot be
explained through duration (Def. 8, Part I., and its explanation). Therefore
the mind thus far has not the power of conceiving things under the species of
eternity. However, inasmuch as it is the nature of reason to conceive things
under the species of eternity (Coroll. 2, Prop. 44, Part II.), and it
appertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under
the species of eternity (Prop. 23. Part V.), and save these two nothing else
appertains tot the essence of the mind (Prop. 13, Part II.), this power of
conceiving things under the species of eternity appertains to the mind only in
so far as it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity. Q.e.d.
‘In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of
its body, thus far it conceives duration which can be determined by time, and
thus far only it has the power of conceiving things with relation to time
(Prop. 21, Part V., and Prop. 26, Part II.). But eternity cannot be explained
through duration (Def. 8, Part I., and its explanation).’
I can propose the actual existence of the body – or more
correctly – the actual existence of the propositional actor – without reference
to duration – without reference to time –
or I can propose the actual existence of the body – of the
propositional actor – with reference to duration – with reference
to time
‘time’ and ‘eternity’ are propositional options
‘However, inasmuch as it is the nature of reason to conceive
things under the species of eternity (Coroll. 2, Prop. 44, Part II.), and it
appertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under
the species of eternity (Prop. 23. Part V.), and
save these two nothing else appertains to the essence of the
mind (Prop. 13, Part II.),
this power of conceiving things under the species of
eternity appertains to the mind only in so far as it conceives the essence of
the body under the species of eternity.’
again – ‘the nature of reason’ – is a concept Spinoza assumes
– but has never explained –
and so – ‘the nature of reason’ or ‘reason’ in Spinoza – is
an empty concept – a philosophical pretension
the logical reality is that ‘time’ and ‘eternity’ – are propositional
options
you can propose in terms of time – or you can propose
without reference to time –
there is nothing more to it than that
and saying that these propositional options
‘appertain to the essence of mind’ – and only these two options appertain to
the essence of the mind –
is really only to say – if you propose in relation to time –
then you can – if it suits you – remove that reference – and propose without
reference to time
any proposal with reference to duration and time – as with
any proposal without reference to duration and time – is open to question –
open to doubt and uncertain
Note. – Things are conceived as actual in two ways by
us, either in so far as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time
and space, or in so far as we conceive them to be contained in God and to
follow from the necessity of divine nature. But those that are conceived in
this second manner as true or real we conceive under the species of eternity,
and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed
in Prop, 45, Part II.: see also its Note.
‘Things are conceived as actual in two ways by us, either in
so far as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and space, or
in so far as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the
necessity of divine nature.
a ’thing’ is a proposal – and any proposal put
– is actual
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
‘But those that are conceived in this second manner as true
or real we conceive under the species of eternity, and their ideas involve the
eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in Prop, 45, Part II.: see
also its Note.’
there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge –
any proposal put – with or without reference – is real
–
and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt
and uncertain
PROP. XXX. The human mind in so far as it knows itself and
its body under the species of eternity, thus far necessarily has knowledge of
God, and knows that it exists in God and is conceived through God.
‘the human mind’ – is a name – for propositional
activity
there is no ‘itself’ to propositional activity –
there is the activity of proposal put – and the activity of
proposals critically evaluated
what we propose – is what we know –
and what we know is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
‘the body’ – is a name for propositional activity –
and any such name / description / explanation – is open to
question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘eternity’ – is absence of reference to time
‘under the species of eternity’ – is to propose that ‘mind’
and ‘body’ – that is propositional activity – can be regarded as without
reference to time
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
there is no ‘knowledge of God’ – ‘God’ – is the unknown
–
‘the human mind … knows that it exists in God and is
conceived through God’
‘the human mind’ – is propositional activity –
propositional activity – is a response to the unknown
Proof. – Eternity is the essence of God in so far as
this involves necessary existence (Def, 8, Part I.), Therefore to conceive
things under the species of eternity is to conceive them in so far as they are
conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they
involve existence through the essence of God. And therefore our mind, in so far
as it conceives itself and its body under the species of eternity, has thus far
necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, etc. Q.e.d.
‘Eternity is the essence of God in so far as this involves
necessary existence (Def, 8, Part I.)’
‘eternity’ – is the absence of reference to time –
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
there is no necessary existence – all existence is contingent
– open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
existence is uncertain
‘Therefore to conceive things under the species of eternity
is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God
as real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of
God.’
‘things’ are proposals
‘to conceive things under the species of eternity’ –
is to propose things / proposals – without reference to time
–
‘or in so far as they involve existences through the essence
of God’ – they are proposed as unknowns
any proposal put is real –
‘And therefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself
and its body under the species of eternity, has thus far necessarily a
knowledge of God, and knows, etc.’
‘the mind’ and ‘the body’ – are names for propositional
activity –
any propositional activity proposed under the species of
eternity – is proposed without reference time
God – is a name for the unknown
‘knowledge of God’ – can only mean recognition of the
unknown
PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind
as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal.
Spinoza’s ‘third kind of knowledge’ – is his proposal
that there is knowledge that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain
there is no such ‘knowledge’ –
Spinoza – with his third kind of knowledge – mistakes
knowledge for prejudice – philosophical prejudice
there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge – proposals / propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity
propositional activity is ‘eternal’ – if it is proposed without
reference to time –
any proposal can be put without a time
reference –
and any proposal can be put with a time
reference
Proof. – The mind conceives nothing under the species
of eternity save in so far as it conceives the essence of its body under the
species of eternity (Prop. 29, Part V), that is Prop. 21 and 23, Part V,), save
in so far as it is eternal. And therefore (prev. prop.) in so far as it is
eternal it has knowledge of God, and this is necessarily adequate (Prop. 46,
Part II.): and therefore the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is apt for
knowing all those things which can follow from the given knowledge of God (Prop.
40, Part II.), that is, for knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see
its def in Note 2, Prop. 40 Part II.): and therefore the mind (Def.1, Part
III.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of this.
Q.e.d.
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity –
eternity is a proposal put without reference to time
proposing ‘under the species of eternity’ – is to propose
without reference to time
anything I propose can be put without reference to time
‘God’ is a name for the unknown –
‘to know God’ – can only mean –to recognise the unknown
there is no adequate knowledge – if by ‘adequate knowledge’
– is meant knowledge – not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain
any proposal can be put without reference to time –
nothing follows from the unknown
this third kind of knowledge – is not knowledge – it
is prejudice
any proposal advanced that is not open to question –
not open to doubt – is a prejudice
propositional activity can be the formal cause of
prejudice –
human beings – who do not critically evaluate their
proposals – their propositions – will live in ignorance and prejudice –
propositional prejudice is not uncommon
Note. – The more advanced then everyone is in this
kind of knowledge, the more conscious he is of himself and God, that is, the
more perfect or blessed he is, which will be yet more clear from the following
propositions. But it must be noted here that although we are now certain that
the mind is eternal in so far as it conceives things under the species of
eternity, we shall consider it (in order that what we wish to show may be
explained the more easily and better understood) as if it had just begun to exist
and just begun to understand things under the species of eternity, as thus far
we have done: which we may do without any danger of error, if we take care to
conclude nothing save from premises that are evident.
the more advanced then everyone is in this kind of prejudice
– the more irrational and ignorant they are
we are not certain that the mind is eternal
we are not certain of anything – if we proceed critically
and rationally in relation to how we propose ourselves and the world
and as for the mind being eternal –
the ‘eternal’ – is a proposal with a time stamp
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity
–
any proposal put can be put without reference
to time
or any proposal can be put with reference to time
what Spinoza calls ‘eternity’ – is a referential
option
PROP. XXXII. Whatever we understand by the third kind of
knowledge we are pleased with, and that accompanied by the idea of God as the
cause.
there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge –
any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
to say ‘whatever we understand by the third kind of
knowledge’ – suggests that our understanding of this proposal of knowledge God
– is open to interpretation – and therefore – open to question – open to doubt
– and uncertain
if he was serious about ‘whatever’ – one might say that
Spinoza in Prop. XXXII – had a moment of clarity
as to whether we are ‘pleased’ – with this knowledge – well
that is open to question
one could well accept Spinoza’s proposal of knowledge of God
– and regard it indifferently – or indeed feel let down by it
‘God’ – as the cause of this idea?
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown – the unknown does not
‘cause’
if we are going to use ‘cause’ here – then the propositional
actor is the cause of any idea / proposal that he or she puts
and of course – you could ask – why does any proposal have
to have a cause?
perhaps – propositional action – like Spinoza’s ‘God’ – can
well be regarded as uncaused?
Proof. – From this kind of knowledge follows the
greatest possible contentment of mind (Prop. 27, Part V.), that is (Def. Emo.
25), pleasure arises, and that accompanied by the idea of oneself, and
consequently (Prop. 30, Part V.) accompanied also by the idea of God as the
cause. Q.e.d.
‘the greatest possible contentment of mind’ – does not
follow from Spinoza’s ‘God’ proposal –
logically speaking – what does follow from it is question –
doubt – and uncertainty –
one may get pleasure from Spinoza’s proposal – I imagine he
did – and if so – I am glad for him –
from what I can gather – his life was austere and marked by
few pleasures –
however – one can easily see that his proposal regarding God
– may not be a source of pleasure – even for those who accept it –
it may be regarded indifferently – or even unfavourably –
again – any proposal is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
Corollary. – From the third kind of knowledge arise
necessarily the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge arise
(prev. Prop.) pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as the cause, that is
(Def. Emo. 6), the love of God, not in so far as we imagine him present
(Prop.29. Part V.), but in so far as we understand God to be eternal: and this
is what I call the intellectual love of God.
nothing arises necessarily from any knowledge – that
is from any proposal –
any proposal – is ‘open’ – open to question –
what will come of that questioning is uncertainty – not
necessity
‘intellectual love of God’ –
the ‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional action
for Spinoza love comes down to pleasure – so one could
take pleasure in Spinoza’s proposal of God –
on the other hand – the proposal may affect one indifferently
– or one may view it unfavourably
‘pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as the cause’ – and
– ‘in so far as we understand God to be eternal’
in so far as we are of ‘God’ – and in ‘God’ – according to
Spinoza – God is the cause of anything that happens in us and to us –
and so – the cause of any kind of pleasure
therefore – I don’t think ‘pleasure accompanied by the idea
of God as the cause’ – distinguishes the ‘intellectual love of God’ – from any
other pleasure
and understanding Spinoza’s ‘God’ as eternal –
any proposal that does not have a time reference
– a time stamp – can be regarded as ‘eternal’ – if by eternal is meant outside
of time
Spinoza fails to define this ‘intellectual love of God’
PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God which arises from
the third kind of knowledge is eternal.
firstly – even if you were to accept Spinoza’s ‘third kind
of knowledge’ – knowledge of his God – ‘intellectual love of God’ – (or shall
we just say for the moment ‘love of God’) – need not follow
the point being – that you may well understand and accept
Spinoza’s idea of ‘God’ – without loving it – and without loving his ‘God’
his ‘God’ – may leave you cold
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown
as to this so-called ‘third kind of knowledge’ –
there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and as for ‘eternal’ –
our proposals can be put with or without a time stamp –
however – any proposal – with or without a reference to time
– is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Proof. – The third kind of knowledge (Prop. 31, Part
V., and Ax. 3, Part I.) is eternal: and therefore (same Ax., Part I.) love
which arise from it is also necessarily eternal. Q.e.d.
‘the third kind of knowledge’?
Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge – is knowledge of God –
Spinoza’s God
a ‘God’ that for Spinoza – is beyond question – beyond doubt
and certain
our knowledge is proposal – proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza’s proposal of ‘God’ – is illogical – irrational and
ignorant
a proposal is ‘eternal’ – if it is proposed without a
reference to time
there is no ‘necessity’ in this – ‘eternity’ is nothing more
than a referential option
Note. – Although this love towards God has no
beginning (prev. Prop) it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as
if it had arisen, as the corollary of previous propositions I supposed. Nor is
there any difference here, save that the mind has had from eternity those same
perfections which we have now supposed to accrue to it, and that accompanied by
the idea of God as the external cause. Wherefore if pleasure consist in the
transition to a greater perfection, blessedness must clearly consist in the
fact that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.
this ‘intellectual love of God’? –
saying that ‘it has no beginning’ and that ‘it has all the
perfections of love’ – requires explanation – otherwise these statements look
like empty hubris
and saying that – it just follows – that it is ‘the
corollary of previous propositions I supposed’ – is – in the absence of an
explanation – or a demonstration of some kind – the weakest of arguments
one gets the sense here that Spinoza actually has no
definition of the ‘intellectual love of God’
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity
for Spinoza to use the phrase ‘from eternity’ suggests he is
putting that eternity is related to time –
such a view contradicts his stated view that eternity is not
to be confused with time – that eternity is outside of time
and as for the mind’s ‘perfections’ –
propositional action is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
what we deal with in propositional activity is uncertainties
– not perfections
‘perfection’ – as proposed by Spinoza – is beyond question –
beyond doubt – and certain –
and as such ‘perfection’ is a fine example of illogical –
dogmatic – fanciful thinking
‘God as the external cause’?
if you hold to Spinoza’s metaphysics – all the exists –
exists in God –
given this – there is no ‘external’ cause
pleasure is not ‘a transition to perfection’ –
pleasure is a propositional state – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
if ‘blessedness’ consists in the fact that ‘the mind is
endowered with perfection itself’
there is no blessedness
or ‘blessedness’ is just a ‘corollary’ of previous false
concepts like ‘perfection’ – ‘adequate idea’ – and ‘God’ –
just another empty pretension
PROP. XXXIV. The mind is liable to emotions which are
referred to passions only while the body endures.
if the mind survives death – death of the body – then it
seems – the mind and body are (in Spinoza’s terms) different substances
on the other hand – if they are proposed as different
descriptions of the one modification of substance – a human being – then
then the death of the human being is the end of the modification –
or alternatively – both dimensions of the one mode survive
death – in some form –
this I think would be the best argument for Spinoza – if he
is to maintain a monism
however – it seems here – this is not what Spinoza wants –
or is arguing for –
and so – we fall back to some form of mind / body dualism –
and we are left in the dark as to just what this means for
Spinoza –
all in all – we are left with a mind / body confusion
the logical reality is that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are names
for propositional activity
death then is the end of propositional activity
‘emotions’ – ‘passions’ – are propositional descriptions of
propositional activity
Proof. – Imagination is the idea with which the mind
regards anything as present (see def. in Note, Prop. 17, Part II), which
nevertheless indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than
the nature of the external body (Coroll. 2, Prop.
16, Part II.). Therefore emotion is imagination (Gen Def.
Emo.) in so far as it indicates
the present disposition of the body and therefore (Prop. 21,
Part V.) the mind is only liable to emotions, which are referred to passions
while the body endures. Q.e.d.
what is present – is that which is proposed
what any proposal indicates – is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
‘the external body’ – is a proposal
‘emotion’ is a description of propositional action
‘imagination’ – is a description of propositional action –
any description of propositional action – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
you can refer to propositional actions in any way you wish
Corollary. – Hence it follows that no love save
intellectual love is eternal.
this does not follow at all
we still don’t have a coherent account of ‘intellectual
love’ from Spinoza
as for ‘eternal’ –
any proposal put without reference to time – to duration –
can be described as ‘eternal’
love – however described – is a propositional action – a
propositional state
a propositional action – only exists – if the propositional
actor is able to propose
Note. – If we pay attention to the common opinion of
men we shall see that they are conscious of the eternity of their minds; but
they confuse eternity with duration, and attribute it to memory or imagination,
which they believe to remain after death.
‘common opinion’ – is at the bottom of the philosophical
barrel –
or to be fair – common opinion – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘God’ – is a name
for the unknown –
the unknown has no
characteristics – no properties – it is unknown
so – to suggest
that the unknown has a self – that it loves itself with an infinite
intellectual love – is plainly ridiculous
there is no
infinite love – intellectual or otherwise
love is a proposal
– and any proposed love is finite –
love has a
beginning – and love has an end –
as propositional
actors have a beginning and have an end
Proof. – God
is absolutely infinite (Def. 6. Part I.) that is (Def. 6, Part II.), the nature
of God enjoys infinite perfection, and that (Prop. 3, Part II.) accompanied by
the idea of himself, that is (Prop. 11 and Ax. I, Part I.), by the idea of its
cause, and this is what we said to be intellectual love in Coroll., Prop. 32,
Part V.
if – as Spinoza’s
suggests – God – is reality – then he is here saying – reality ‘enjoys infinite
perfection’ –
and in so far as
human beings are in God and of God – according to Spinoza – then they ‘enjoy
infinite perfection’ – as does a tree – a cat – and the wind –
if you are taking
this line – I would have thought ‘perfection’ – is enough – and no real need
for ‘infinite’
the logical reality
is that the world as proposed – in any form – is open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain –
uncertain – not
perfect –
uncertainty
puts pay to this notion of ‘perfect’ –
as to ‘infinity’ –
‘infinity’ – is a
propositional game concept
and the rule of
the infinity game is that its play is without end –
this game is proposed
and played most notably in pure mathematics and in cosmology
the notion is
misapplied if taken out of the game context
‘the idea of
himself’ –
in so far as –
according to Spinoza – God is substance – infinite and eternal – ‘God’ –
is not a ‘he’ – ‘God’ is an ‘it’ –
an ‘it’ cannot propose
itself – an ‘it’ has no idea of itself – an ‘it’ – has no ‘self’ –
an ‘it’ – has no
‘intellect’ – and an ‘it’ cannot love – an ‘it’ cannot love itself –
consciousness is
not a characteristic of all existents – rather it is a characteristic of
specific types of existents –
are we to say that
substance – infinite and eternal – that is reality – and all that exists in
reality – is conscious – is aware?
this would have to
be the case if Spinoza’s God – if his ‘substance’ – is to have an idea of
itself and the idea of its cause
we have no
observation / evidence that supports this proposal –
what this comes
down to – is the projection of a human / animal characteristic –
consciousness – on to the whole of nature –
and some would say
– that to propose this – is a prime example of the so-called anthropomorphic
fallacy –
nevertheless – this proposal that ‘God enjoys infinite
perfection, and that accompanied by the idea of himself, that is by the idea of
its cause …’ – is quite valid
as valid as any proposal
and as with any proposal put – open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
it is this uncertainty that brings down Spinoza’s
metaphysical edifice
and with that collapse – his notion of ‘intellectual love’
lies in the ruins
PROP. XXXVI. The mental intellectual love towards God ‘is
the very love of God with which God loves himself, not in so far as he is
infinite, but in so far as he can be expressed through the essence of the human
mind considered under the species of eternity, that is mental intellectual love
towards God is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself.
‘love’ – however further described – i.e. – as ‘sensual’ –
as ‘mental’ – as ‘intellectual’ etc. – is a proposal – open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
‘God’ is a name for the unknown
‘love of God’ – is – love of the unknown –
‘love of the unknown’ – is a strange notion to my mind – as
I would think we only love what we know – and we do not love that which is
unknown
though perhaps for those of mystical bent – there is
something in it –
in any case this ‘love of God’ – love of the unknown – is
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘the very love of God which God loves himself, not in so far
as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be expressed through the essence of
the human mind considered under the species of eternity’
the unknown – is unknown – it has no characteristics
– i.e. – it is not ‘infinite’ –
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is not a ‘he’ – Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is an
‘it’ –
an ‘it’ does not have a ‘self’ –
‘expressed through the essence of the human mind’ –
the human mind – is a name for propositional action
the ‘essence of the human mind’ – of propositional action is
uncertainty
and that expressed through the essence of the human mind is
propositional uncertainty
any proposal can be put with a reference to time – or
without a reference to time
this ‘species of eternity’ – is any reference that does not
have a time stamp
the unknown does not love – the unknown does not love itself
if by ‘infinite’ you mean ‘never ending’ – love is not
‘infinite’
our propositional actions are finite
human beings love and their love is finite –
love exists as it is proposed
love dies with the lover – if not before
Proof. – This mental love must be referred to the
actions of the mind (Coroll., Prop. 32, Part V., and prop. 3 Part III.), which
therefore is an action with which the mind regards itself accompanied by the
idea of God as a cause (Prop. 32, Part V., and its Note), that is (Coroll,.
Prop. 25, Part I., and Coroll, Prop. 11, Part II.), and action which God, in so
far as he may be expressed through the human mind, regards himself accompanied
by the idea of himself. And therefore (prev. Prop.) this mental love is part of
the infinite love with which God loves himself.
‘mental love’ – is a description – a propositional
elaboration of love proposed
the mind is a name for propositional action
as to the ‘cause’ of any proposal – the matter is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we do not need the notion of ‘cause’ – for propositional
action and investigation –
‘God’ is a name for the unknown –
God is not a ‘he’ – God is an ‘it’ -
there is no ‘self’ to the unknown
the unknown – does not love
love is a human proposal – and love as with any proposal –
is not ‘never ending’ – is not infinite
proposals – as with the propositional actors who propose
them – are finite
love is finite
Corollary. – Hence it follows that God, in so far as
he loves himself, loves men, and consequently that the love of God for men and
the mind’s intellectual love towards God is one and the same thing.
human beings can propose a ‘God’ – and love that ‘God’
Spinoza’s proposed God – likewise can be loved –
however – any proposal of God and any proposal of love of
God – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and in so far as Spinoza’s God – is not a ‘he’ – but an ‘it’
– one would think that it would be harder to love this ‘God’ – than ‘Gods’ that
it is proposed have human characteristics –
Spinoza’s ‘God’ – could well be deemed as unlovable –
but does not Spinoza play both sides of the fence with his
‘God’?
on the one hand he wants to say his ‘God’ is not a ‘God’
with human characteristics – but on the other hand he claims his ‘God’ loves –
really what we get from Spinoza is a duplicitous conception
of ‘God’
and as a result – his ‘God’ – is a confusion
Note. – From this we clearly understand in what
consists our salvation, blessedness, or liberty (salus nostra seu beaititudo
seu libertas), namely, in the constant and eternal love of God, or the love
of God for men. And this love or blessedness is called
in the Scriptures “glory” – not without reason. For whether this love has
reference to God, or the mind, it can rightly be called mental satisfaction,
which is truth cannot be distinguished from glory (Def. Emo. 25 and 30). For in
so far as it has reference to
God it is (Prop.
35, Part V.) pleasure, if I may use the term, accompanied by the idea
of himself, just as
in so far as it has reference to the mind (prop. 27, Part V.). Again, in as much as the essence of our mind consists in
knowledge alone, the beginning and the basis of which is God (Prop. 15, Part I.
and Note, prop. 47, Part III.) it is hence quite clear to us in what manner and
for what reason our mind follows with regard to essence and existence from
divine nature and continually depends on God. I
have thought it worth while to note this in order that I may show by this
example how much the knowledge of individual things which I called intuition or
knowledge of the third kind (see Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II,) is advanced, and
more powerful than knowledge which I called universal or of the second class.
For although I showed in the first part in general that all things (and
consequently the human mind) depend on God with regard to essence and
existence, that proof, though perfectly legitimate and placed beyond the reach
of doubt, does not affect the mind in the same manner as when it is concluded
from the essence of any individual thing which we may say depends on God.
‘From this we clearly understand in what consists our
salvation, blessedness, or liberty (salus nostra seu beaititudo seu libertas),
namely, in the constant and eternal love of God, or the love of God for men.’
‘our salvation’ – salvation from what?
human beings do not need to be saved –
unless of course they are in danger of injury or loss of
life –
there is no ‘original sin’ – as the Bible claims –
and human beings do not commit ‘sins’ –
there is no ‘sin’ –
we face uncertainty – and we deal with it rationally or
irrationally
the idea that people need to be saved – presumably from
themselves – is the argument of authoritarians –
those who wish to make people think they are in some
fundamental way – powerless –
they push this salvation rubbish – in the attempt to
dominate and control
human beings are not powerless –
any human being – any propositional actor – has the ability
to question – to doubt – and to explore propositional uncertainty –
and it is in this logical / rational capacity – that our
power lies
as for ‘blessedness’ – in Spinoza – ‘blessedness’ – is
little more than pretension and propaganda
and as for liberty – our liberty rests in our critical
capacity to question to doubt – and to explore uncertainty
‘the constant and eternal love of God, or the love of God
for men.’ –
what we have here is a myth – and a myth designed to
strip men and women of their critical capacity –
Spinoza’s ‘God’ is not the source of liberty –
human beings make their own liberty in the exercise of their
critical capacities
‘And this love or blessedness is called in the Scriptures
“glory” – not without reason. For whether this love has reference to God, or
the mind, it can rightly be called mental satisfaction, which is truth cannot
be distinguished from glory (Def. Emo. 25 and 30).’
this is a significant statement – for in it we see that
Spinoza has never really left the Old Testament – that his ‘Ethics’ – is
effectively a philosophical reworking – of what he believed was the ethical
message of the Bible
that is – in the ‘Ethics’ – he has attempted to – as it were
– ‘modernize’ what he regarded as the ethical message of the Bible – by
translating it into philosophical terms
and if for no other reason – his ‘Ethics’ is a remarkable
achievement –
and a great complement to his work in biblical analysis set
out in his earlier book the ‘Theologico-Political Treatise’
a work that as with the ‘Ethics’ – is
extraordinary and brilliant
it can be said – that to the end – Spinoza was true to the
faith – the faith that had no faith in him
just a note on the argument here –
I suppose you can equate ‘glory’ to ‘mental satisfaction’ – but
to my mind ‘glory’ has more to do with vanity
and ‘mental satisfaction’ I would think is to be found in
rational understanding
‘For in so far as it has reference to God it is (Prop. 35,
Part V.) pleasure, if I may use the term, accompanied by the idea of himself,
just as in so far as it has reference to the mind (prop. 27, Part V.).
God pleasuring himself
‘Again, in as much as the essence of our mind consists in
knowledge alone, the beginning and the basis of which is God (Prop. 15, Part I.
and Note, prop. 47, Part III.) it is hence quite clear to us in what manner and
for what reason our mind follows with regard to essence and existence from
divine nature and continually depends on God.’
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity
the essence – if you wish to use that term – of
propositional activity – is the proposal
our knowledge is proposal
it is human propositional activity that has proposed ‘divine
nature’
and in that sense – ‘God’ – depends on us
‘I have thought it worth while to note this in order that I
may show by this example how much the knowledge of individual things which I
called intuition or knowledge of the third kind (see Note 2, Prop. 40, Part
II,) is advanced, and more powerful than knowledge which I called universal or
of the second class.’
‘intuition’ – is a non-critical – momentary prejudice – that
gets elevated to a certainty
there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge
the power of knowledge is critical power – the power of
question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
‘For although I showed in the first part in general that all
things (and consequently the human mind) depend on God with regard to essence
and existence, that proof, though perfectly legitimate and placed beyond the
reach of doubt, does not affect the mind in the same manner as when it is
concluded from the essence of any individual thing which we may say depends on
God.’
the proof – was not ‘placed beyond reach of doubt’ –
from a rational point of view – no proposal – however
described i.e. as a ‘proof’ – is beyond doubt –
any proposal – or so-called ‘proof’ is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
an ‘individual thing’ is a proposal –
and as with any proposal – it depends only on the
propositional actor who puts the proposal
PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature which is contrary
to this intellectual love or which can remove it.
‘this intellectual love’ – however explained – is a
proposal –
and as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
and if critically evaluated –– it may well be ‘removed’ from
consideration –
and furthermore – may well be replaced with a ‘contrary’
proposal
Proof. – This intellectual love follows necessarily
from the nature of the mind in so far as it is considered as an eternal truth
through the nature of God (Prop. 33 and 29, Part V.). If, therefore, there be
anything contrary to this, it must be contrary to what is true, and
consequently whatever could remove this love would bring it about that what is
true should be made false, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore
there is nothing in nature, etc. Q.e.d.
‘This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature
of the mind in so far as it is considered as an eternal truth through the
nature of God (Prop. 33 and 29, Part V.).’
here we have an account – an explanation from Spinoza of
‘this intellectual love’
this account / explanation – is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If, therefore, there be anything contrary to this, it must
be contrary to what is true, and consequently whatever could remove this love
would bring it about that what is true should be made false, which (as is
self-evident) is absurd. Therefore there is nothing in nature, etc.’
contrary proposals can be put – and often are – in any
rational propositional investigation –
a proposal / proposition – is true – if it is affirmed –
false if it is denied
and any proposal of affirmation – and any proposal of denial
– is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Note. – The axiom of the fourth part relates to
individual things in so far as they are considered with relation to certain
time and place, which I think no one will doubt.
an ‘individual thing’ is a proposal
a proposal – of an individual thing – or of anything else –
can be ‘considered with relation to certain time and place’
and a proposed individual thing – or anything else proposed
– can be considered without relation to time and place
whether you tag your proposals to time and place – or not –
is a propositional option
PROP. XXXVIII. The more the mind understands things by the
second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it will be passive to emotions
which are evil, and the less it will fear death.
firstly – there is one kind of knowledge – propositional
knowledge – knowledge open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza’s second kind of knowledge – is based on his notion
of ‘common properties’
any so called ‘common property’ – is open to question
his so called ‘third kind of knowledge’ – is intuition –
intuition he says of the attributes of God which leads to
adequate knowledge of the essence of things –
any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
secondly – ‘emotions’ – are descriptions or
characterizations of propositional actions
emotions / propositional actions are not passive – they are
active
we are passive to the extent that we do not critically
evaluate or propositional actions
emotions as such – are not evil –
emotions / propositional actions are open to question – open
to doubt – and uncertain
our moral evaluations – are proposals
and any evaluation of emotions / propositional actions –
i.e. as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ – is open to question -
how we understand ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is open to question –
open to doubt – and uncertain
‘and the less it will fear death’ –
‘death’ – is open to question –
that is to say – there are many different understandings –
proposals – as to what death is –
from a logical point of view – death is no different to life
–
both life and death are open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
it is this uncertainty which challenges fear of death
Proof. – The essence of the mind consists of
knowledge (Prop. 11, Part II.). The more things then the mind understands by
the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be that part of it
that remains (Prop. 29 and 23, Part V.), and consequently (pre. Prop.) the
greater will the part of it that is not touched by emotions which are contrary
to our nature, that is (Prop. 30, Part IV.), which are evil. The more then the
mind understands things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater
will be that part of it which remains unhurt, and consequently it will be less
subject to emotions, etc. Q.e.d.
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –
our ‘nature’ is propositional
no emotion is contrary to our nature –
‘emotion’ – is a description of propositional action
propositional action is emotional action –
our propositional actions / emotions – are open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza in putting this very odd idea that the mind remains
‘unhurt’ – is I think imagining that there is propositional action that can be
– that is protected from –critical investigation
and I think he has in mind here – his ‘third kind of
knowledge’ – which in truth is just plain philosophical prejudice
Note. – Hence we understand what I touched on in
Note, Prop. 39, Part IV., and which I promised to explain in this part, namely
that death is the less harmful the more the mind’s knowledge is clear and
distinct, and consequently the more the mind loves God. Again, inasmuch as
(Prop. 27, Part V.) from the third kind of knowledge arises the greatest
possible satisfaction, it follows that the human mind may be of such a nature
that the part of it which we showed to perish with the body may be of no moment
to it in respect to what remains. But I shall deal with that more fully soon.
‘death’ – is not ‘harmful’ – it is a proposal – open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any so called ‘clear and distinct knowledge’ – is open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘clear and distinct knowledge’ - amounts to philosophical
prejudice
Spinoza’s ‘love of God’ – is love of this prejudice
‘it follows that the human mind may be of such a nature that
the part of it which we showed to perish with the body may be of no moment to
it in respect to what remains. But I shall deal with that more fully soon’
looking forward to that
PROP. XXXIX. He who has a body capable of many things, has a
mind of which the greater part is eternal.
the ‘body’ is a name for propositional activity –
it is the propositional actor that is capable of many things
and whether ‘capable of many things’ – or capable of a few
things –
propositional action – of any kind – is the action of
understanding and negotiating the world
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity – the
propositional activity of the propositional actor
there are no ‘parts’ – to propositional action
any and all proposals / propositions – are
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if by ‘eternal’ you mean – ‘outside of time’ –
any proposal can be put without reference to
time
and any proposal can be put with reference to
time
‘eternity’ and ‘time’ are referential options
Proof. – He who has a body apt for doing many things
is less assailed by emotions which are evil (Prop. 38, Part. IV), that is
(Prop. 30 Part IV.), by emotions which are contrary to our nature. And
therefore (Prop. 20, Part V.) it has the power of arranging and connecting the
modifications of the body according to intellectual order, and consequently of
bringing it to pass (Prop. 14, Part V.0 that all the modifications of the body
have reference tot the idea of God, from which it follows (Prop. 15, Part V.)
that he is affected with love towards God, and this love must occupy or
constitute the greater part of his mind (Prop. 16, Part V.): and therefore
(Prop. 33, Part V.) he has a mind of which the greater part is eternal.
‘He who has a body apt for doing many things is less
assailed by emotions which are evil (Prop. 38, Part. IV), that is (Prop. 30
Part IV.), by emotions which are contrary to our nature.’
emotions are propositional actions
‘our nature’ – is propositional
no emotion / propositional action – is ‘contrary to our
nature’ –
we are not ‘assailed’ by emotions
no emotion is ‘evil’ -
our emotions / propositional actions – are open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
‘And therefore (Prop. 20, Part V.) it has the power of
arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to
intellectual order, and consequently of bringing it to pass (Prop. 14, Part V.0
that all the modifications of the body have reference to the idea of God, from
which it follows (Prop. 15, Part V.) that he is affected with love towards God,
and this love must occupy or constitute the greater part of his mind (Prop. 16,
Part V.): and therefore (Prop. 33, Part V.) he has a mind of which the greater
part is eternal.’
‘modifications of the body’ are proposals / propositional
actions
one can propose an ‘order’ to proposals / propositional
actions
any proposed order is open to question – open to doubt – and
uncertain
one can propose and order to proposals / propositional
actions which has reference to the idea / proposal of God
any such proposal is open to question – is uncertain
for Spinoza ‘God’ – is ‘reality’
it does not follow that if you order your propositional
action in terms of this God – that you will love it –
and it does not follow that such a proposal will be the
focus of one’s propositional actions
and it does not follow that the majority of one’s
propositional actions will be proposed as ‘eternal’
‘eternity’ as Spinoza defines it is ‘outside of time’
any proposal can be put with or without a time stamp
Note. – Inasmuch as human bodies are capable of many
things, there is no doubt that they may be of such a nature that they may be
referred to minds which have a great knowledge of themselves and God, and of
which the greatest or principal part is eternal, and that therefore that they
should scarcely fear death. But in order that these points may be more clearly
understood, it must be remarked here that we live subject to continual
variation, and according as we change into a better or worse state we are called
happy (felices) or unhappy (infelices). For he who passes from
being an infant or child into being a corpse, is said to be unhappy, while, on
the other hand, he is said to be happy who is enabled to live through the whole
period of a life with a healthy mind and a healthy body. And in truth, he who
has a body, as, for example, an infant or a child capable of the least number
of things and mostly dependent of external causes, has a mind which, considered
in itself, is conscious scarcely of itself, of God, or things. In this life
then we principally endeavour to change the body of an infant, in so far as its
nature allows and is conducive thereto, so that it is capable of many things,
and so that it is referred to a mind which is most conscious of God, itself,
and other things: or so that all that which has reference to its memory or
imagination should be scarcely of any moment whatever with respect to its
intellect, as I said in the Note, prev. Prop.
‘Inasmuch as human bodies are capable of many things, there
is no doubt that they may be of such a nature that they may be referred to
minds which have a great knowledge of themselves and God, and of which the
greatest or principal part is eternal, and that therefore that they should
scarcely fear death.’
‘death’ as with ‘life’ – is a proposal –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
many would say death – as in the end of life – is a
certainty –
however – the matter is open to question – and this –
Spinoza well knows
there are proposals put by people of religious faith that
death is not the end of life
and furthermore – it is empirically conceivable that medical
science could one day defeat death –
as for fear of death –
fear of death is open to question –
‘fear’ is a natural emotion – and fear of death is common
and there will be those who say they do not fear death
there are propositional options in relation to death and
fear of death
‘But in order that these points may be more clearly
understood, it must be remarked here that we live subject to continual
variation, and according as we change into a better or worse state we are
called happy (felices) or unhappy (infelices).’
‘continual variation’ – is propositional uncertainty
strange that it is that late stage of his ‘Ethics’ – that
Spinoza glimpses the light
what counts as ‘a better or worse state’ – as with
‘happiness’ and ‘unhappiness’ – is open to question
‘For he who passes from being an infant or child into being
a corpse, is said to be unhappy, while, on the other hand, he is said to be
happy who is enabled to live through the whole period of a life with a healthy
mind and a healthy body.’
‘healthy body and healthy mind’ –
‘body’ and ‘mind’ are names for propositional action
–
what we are dealing with here is a healthy propositional
actor
and ‘healthy propositional action’ – is propositional action
– put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored
‘In this life then we principally endeavour to change the
body of an infant, in so far as its nature allows and is conducive thereto, so
that it is capable of many things, and so that it is referred to a mind which
is most conscious of God, itself, and other things: or so that all that which
has reference to its memory or imagination should be scarcely of any moment
whatever with respect to its intellect, as I said in the Note, prev. Prop.’
the best we can do for children is to enable and foster
their critical capacity –
for in doing this – we prepare them for the uncertain world
they have to deal with
PROP. XL. The more perfection anything has, the more active
and less passive it is; and contrariwise, the more active it is, the more
perfect it becomes.
‘perfection’ is a synonym for ‘certainty’ –
in propositional reality what we deal with is not
‘perfection’ – but uncertainty –
a ‘thing’ is a proposal – open to question – open to
doubt and uncertain
we are propositionally active to the extent that we
put our proposals / propositions to question – to doubt – and we explore their
uncertainty
the more we explore propositional uncertainty – the more
active we are
we are passive if we fall for the logical delusions of
certainty and perfection
Proof. – The more perfect anything is, the more
reality it has (Def. 6, Part II.), and consequently (Prop. 3, Part III., with
its Note), it is more active and less passive: which proof can proceed in an
inverted order; from which it may follow that a thing is more perfect the more
active it is. Q.e.d.
reality is proposal
a ‘thing’ – is a proposal –
a propositional actor is more active – the more he / she
critically evaluates his / her proposals
Corollary. – Hence it follows that the part of the
mind which remains, of whatever size it is, is more perfect than the rest. For
the eternal part of the mind (Prop. 23 and 29, Part V.) is the intellect
through which alone we are said to act (Prop. 3, Part III.); but that part
which we see to perish is the imagination (Prop. 23, Part V.) through which
alone we are said to be passive (Prop. 3, Part III., and Gen Def. Emo), And
therefore (prev. Prop.) the first part, of whatever we size it may be, is more
perfect than the other. Q.e.d.
the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity
there is no ‘perfect’ proposal – any proposal is open to
question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
we do not measure propositions
‘the intellect’ – is a name for propositional
activity
any proposal – however named or described – is an action
‘the imagination’ – is a name for propositional
activity
there is no logical distinction between the ‘intellect’ –
and the ‘imagination’
‘intellect’ and ‘imagination’ – are different names
for or different descriptions of propositional activity –
a propositional activity ‘perishes’ – with the propositional
actor
Note. – This is what I had determined to show
concerning the mind in so far as it is considered without relations to the
existence of the body. From this and from Prop. 21, Part I., and other
propositions, it is apparent that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an
eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of
thinking, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity: so that they
all constitute at the same time the eternal and infinite intellect of God.
‘This is what I had determined to show concerning the mind
in so far as it is considered without relations to the existence of the body.’
‘mind’ and ‘body are names for propositional action
any division of propositional action into ‘mind proposals’
and ‘body proposals’ – is superficial
any proposal – however named or described – is open
to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the propositional actor is not divided – and his actions – however
named or described – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘…it is apparent that our mind, in so far as it understands,
is an eternal mode of thinking…’
our understanding is propositional –
for Spinoza – the ‘eternal’ is outside of time
a propositional understanding can be put with
reference to time – or it can be put without reference to time
if you propose your understanding – without reference to
time – you can describe the proposal as ‘eternal’ – but all that means is that
you have not given it a time stamp
‘… which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking,
and this one again by another, and so on to infinity: so that they all
constitute at the same time the eternal and infinite intellect of God.’
our proposals – our propositional actions are not determined
– they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any causal proposal is open to question – open to doubt –
and uncertain
‘infinity’ – is a propositional game –
the rule of the game is that it has no end point
you can play the infinity game with propositions – but to
what end?
Spinoza says it ends in ‘the eternal and infinite intellect
of God’ –
if you play the infinity game – there is no end point –
Spinoza’s ‘God’ proposal – can only be one step before the next
Spinoza’s ‘God’ is not a ‘person’ – Spinoza’s God is an ‘it’
an ‘it’ – does not have an intellect –
only humans – and perhaps some other species – have
‘intellect’ – that is – are propositionally active
‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –
the unknown has no characteristics
PROP. XLI. Although we did not know that our mind is
eternal, we would behold before all things piety and religion, and absolutely
all things which we have shown in Part IV., to have reference to courage and
nobility.
the argument here is that if we did not know that our mind
was eternal – nevertheless we would hold to piety and religion and those things
which have reference to courage and nobility
this can mean that the argument of Part IV – stands on its
own – and that the argument of Part V complements or enhances the Part IV
argument –
this is how I think Spinoza wants us to see it
however – it can also be interpreted as indicating that the
Part V argument – does not follow from the argument of Part IV – that it is not
a logical consequence –
and if so – Spinoza’s grand deduction – is not ultimately
successful –
that at least between Part IV and V – the supposed deductive
chain has a break in it
Proof. – The first or only basis of virtue or a
system of right living is (Coroll., Prop. 22 and 24, Part IV,) the seeking of
what is useful to oneself. But to determine these things which reason dictates
to be useful to us, we had no regard for the eternity of the mind, which we
have only considered in this fifth part. Therefore although we were ignorant at
the time that the mind is eternal, yet we held these things first which we
showed to have reference to courage and nobleness. And therefore, though we were
ignorant of it now, we should hold first these precepts of reason. Q.e.d.
again – this does suggest that Spinoza is now saying plainly
that that the argument of Part V is a separate argument – and one that is not
related to the argument of Part IV – and vice versa
and this I think is the case
his ‘system of right living’ – as presented in Part IV – is
quite distinct from his overall metaphysical argument – and you could say –
therefore irrelevant to it –
and therefore – that his metaphysical argument actually has
no connection to his ethical argument –
furthermore – there is an issue with this notion of
‘precepts of reason’
the point is that his ‘precepts of reason’ – are really no
more than his claim that his argument has the authority of reason
just what ‘reason’ is for Spinoza is never fully articulated
–
basically – he assumes it as an authority – and
leaves it at that – assuming too that his readers will make the same assumption
and really it is an assumption – based on nothing – nothing
but pretence –
the only genuine authority is authorship – and that
he can claim
Note. – The general notion of the vulgar seems to be
quite contrary. For most seem to think that they are free in so far as they may
give themselves up to lust, and that they lose their right in so far as they
are obliged to live according to the divine laws. They therefore think that
piety, religion, and all things which have reference to fortitude of mind are
burdens which after death they will lay aside, and hope to receive a reward for
their servitude, that is their piety and religion. Not by this hope alone, but
also, and even principally, by the fear of suffering dreadful punishments after
death, are they induced to live, as far as their feebleness and weak-mindedness
allows them, according to divine laws, and if this hope or fear was not in men,
but, on the other
hand, if they thought that their minds were buried with
their bodies, and that there
did remain for the wretches worn out with the burden of
piety the hope of a longer
life, they would return to life according to their own idea,
and would direct
everything according to their lust, and obey fortune rather
than their selves. This
seems no less
absurd to me than if a man, when he discovered that he could not keep his body
alive for ever with wholesome food, should straightway seek to glut himself
with poison and deadly foods; or that a man, when he discovered that his mind
was not eternal and immortal, should prefer to live without any mind at all;
this all seems so absurd to me that it scarcely deserves to be refuted.
‘The general notion of the vulgar seems to be quite
contrary. For most seem to think that they are free in so far as they may give
themselves up to lust, and that they lose their right in so far as they are
obliged to live according to the divine laws.’
what we have here is basically Spinoza’s view of
those who do not live in terms of his ethical opinions
do most people who don’t follow Spinoza’s view of how to
live think that their freedom consists in being able to give into their lusts?
what evidence does he have for this view?
he doesn’t provide any – and we are left wondering if all we
have here from Spinoza is snobbery and prejudice
I can well imagine someone who does give into what Spinoza
calls their ‘lusts’ – also holding the view that their freedom consists
in having the choice of whether to give into lust or not
also – we can ask – does everyone recognise what Spinoza
calls ‘divine laws’
and I think this the first time this notion of ‘divine laws’
has been introduced into the ‘Ethics’
and really – what are these so-called ‘divine laws’?
are they the moral strictures proposed in the bible – i.e.
the ten commandments of Moses?
or does Spinoza think we will take his ethical opinions
to be ‘divine laws’?
any ‘law’ is a proposal – a proposal put by
propositional actors (i.e. Moses and Spinoza) – and as such – open to question
– open to doubt – and uncertain
‘They therefore think that piety, religion, and all things
which have reference to fortitude of mind are burdens which after death they
will lay aside, and hope to receive a reward for their servitude, that is their
piety and religion…’
perhaps in some social and historical context – this a valid
hypothesis regarding some people’s attitudes and behaviours –
but again – what evidence does Spinoza have for such a view?
none is forthcoming – so – in the end – all we have is
Spinoza’s opinion –
and such is the case with regard to the other pronouncements
and analyses in the rest of this Note
it is fair enough to make such ‘observations’ – and to have
such opinions –
but Spinoza fails to critically challenge his own opinions –
or it seems – to recognise that they are open to question
and as a result – his views bear the mark of prejudice and
philosophical snobbery
‘This seems no less absurd to me than if a man, when he
discovered that he could not keep his body alive for ever with wholesome food,
should straightway seek to glut himself with poison and deadly foods; or that a
man, when he discovered that his mind was not sternal and immortal, should
prefer to live without any mind at all; this all seems so absurd to me that it
scarcely deserves to be refuted.’
the overall point of this Note – it seems – is to denigrate
those caught up in moral and ethical conflict – by describing them as ‘feeble
and weak-minded’ – and their struggles as ‘absurd’ –
the fact is though – it is only out of such conflict and
struggle that human beings have been able to discover their strengths – and it
is only out of such conflicts and struggles that they have been able to propose
solutions to their fundamental ethical problems
the best we can offer those caught up in moral conflict is
not disparagement – but rather the possibility of rationality – the critical
process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional
uncertainty
for it is in such exploration that human beings exercise and
discover their freedom
and freedom from ignorance authoritarianism and prejudice
PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but
virtue itself; nor should we rejoice in it for that we restrain our lusts, but,
on the contrary, because we rejoice therein we can restrain our lusts.
Proof. – Blessedness consists of love towards God
(Prop. 36, Part V, and its Note), and this love arises from the third kind of
knowledge (Coroll., Prop. 32, Part V.). And therefore this love (Prop. 59 and
3, Part III.) must be referred to the mind in so far as it is active, and
therefore it is a virtue itself (Def. 8, Part IV.): which is the first point.
Again the more the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, the more
it understands (Prop. 32, Part V.), that is (Coroll Prop. 3 Part V.) the more
power it has over the emotions, and (Prop. 38, Part V.) the less passive it is
to emotions which are evil. And therefore, by the very fact that the mind
rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, it has the power of restraining
lusts, inasmuch as human power to restrain lusts consists of intellect alone.
Therefore no one rejoices in blessedness because he restrained his lusts, but,
on the contrary, the power of restraining lusts arises from blessedness itself.
‘blessedness’ is ‘love towards God’
so – ‘blessedness’ is a synonym for ‘love of God’ –
presumably the idea is that one who loves God – is blest –
we can ask – blest by whom?
Spinoza’s God is reality writ large – Spinoza’s God – is not
a person – Spinoza’s God is an ‘it’ – and an ‘it’ does not bless
whatever ‘blessing’ amounts to – it is only a propositional
actor who can bless
blest by themselves?
if so – ‘blessedness’ – comes off as a ‘love of oneself’
as to arising from the ‘third kind of knowledge’ –
does love arise from knowledge?
perhaps so – but also perhaps not
there is only one ‘kind’ of knowledge – propositional
knowledge
you could well know Spinoza’s God – that is propose
this God – without loving it
the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action
any proposed ‘love’ – is a propositional action –
and any propositional action is open to question – open to
doubt – and uncertain
‘love of God’ – or love anything – is open to question – is
open to doubt – and certain
which is the first point –
rejoicing in love – is one thing –
‘understanding’ – is a critical activity
the ‘emotions’ are proposed names for propositional
actions
our power is logical and rests in the critical activity
of question – doubt and the exploration of uncertainty
we are passive – to the extent that we do not put our
proposals – propositional actions to question – to doubt – and do not explore
their uncertainty
there are no evil emotions –
our emotions / propositional actions – are open to question
–open to doubt and are uncertain
rejoicing in divine love or blessedness – is not a critical
activity
and therefore – rejoicing in divine love or blessedness – is
impotent
‘lusts’ – as with any propositional actions – are open to
question – open to doubt – and uncertain
critical power does not arise from blessedness
Note. – Thus I have completed all I wish to show
concerning the power of the mind over emotions or the freedom of the mind. From
which it is clear how much a wise man is in front and how stronger he is than
an ignorant one, who is guided by lusts alone. For an ignorant man, besides
being agitated in many ways by external causes, never enjoys one true
satisfaction of the mind: he lives almost unconscious of himself, of God, and
things, and as soon as he ceases to be passive ceases to be. On the contrary,
the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is scarcely moved in
spirit: he is conscious of himself, of God, and things by a certain eternal
necessity, he never ceases to be, and always enjoys satisfaction of the mind.
If the road I have shown to lead to this is very difficult, it can yet be
discovered. And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom found. For
how could it be that it is neglected practically by all, if salvation were
close at hand and could be found without difficulty? But all excellent things
are as difficult as they are rare.
‘From which it is clear how much a wise man is in front and
how stronger he is than an ignorant one, who is guided by lusts alone.’
Spinoza’s ‘wise man’ – is one who holds Spinoza’s proposed
metaphysics – and holds it to be certain –
that is – does not put it to question – put it to doubt –
and does not explore its uncertainty –
Spinoza’s ‘wise man is therefore – irrational
Spinoza’s ‘ignorant man’ – is guided by lusts alone –
if he does not put his lusts to question – or explore their
uncertainty – he is likewise – irrational –
if he does critically evaluate his lusts – he is a step
ahead of Spinoza’s ‘wise man’
‘For an ignorant man, besides being agitated in many ways by
external causes, never enjoys one true satisfaction of the mind: he lives
almost unconscious of himself, of God, and things, and as soon as he ceases to
be passive ceases to be’
any propositional actor – deals with ‘external causes’ –
that is – proposals put to him
if one is ‘agitated in many ways’ – one is most likely to
put one’s actions to question
furthermore – is it not possible for the lustful man to
achieve a ‘true satisfaction’ – if ‘true satisfaction’ for him – is to be found
in his lustful exploits?
in any case – any ‘satisfaction’ – is uncertain
as to living ‘almost unconscious of oneself’ – what
is that supposed to mean?
either you are conscious or you are not – there is no sense
in ‘almost’
if one ‘ceases to be passive’ – I would assume that one
starts to be active
as to Spinoza’s ‘ignorant man’ ‘ceasing to be’ – because he
does not adopt Spinoza’s outlook – that’s rubbish
‘On the contrary, the wise man, in so far as he is
considered as such, is scarcely moved in spirit: he is conscious of himself, of
God, and things by a certain eternal necessity, he never ceases to be, and
always enjoys satisfaction of the mind.’
the ‘wise man’ who is ‘scarcely moved in spirit’ – will be
one who is scarcely logically alive – will be one who has little or no critical
activity
as to – ‘he never ceases to be’ – this again is ridiculous
I think anyone can enjoy satisfaction of mind – in any
number of ways – but I would suggest that any satisfaction – tends to be short
lived
‘If the road I have shown to lead to this is very difficult,
it can yet be discovered. And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom
found. For how could it be that it is neglected practically by all, if
salvation were close at hand and could be found without difficulty? But all
excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.’
the road Spinoza has shown is the dogmatic road of certainty
it is not a road any rational man or woman would choose
dogmatic thought and practises are not hard to
find – quite the opposite –
you can find them in philosophical systems - political systems - and in the opinions and actions of individuals
we have no need for salvation – only rationality
not all excellent things are difficult or rare
© greg t. charlton. 2024.
