Part III: The Origin and Nature of the Emotions
PROP. XXXV. If anyone imagines that the thing loved is joined to another than himself with the same or faster bond of love than that which binds it to him, he will be affected with hatred towards the object loved, and envy towards the other.
‘the same or faster bond of love’ –
‘faster’ – here is irrelevant rhetoric –
the ‘speed’ at which someone loves something or someone – is logically irrelevant
what is relevant is only that a proposal of love is put –
at best – this notion of a ‘faster bond of love’ – is poetic
and as for the ‘same’ – how would you know that one person’s proposal of love – is the same – as another’s?
what you could know – is that another proposes love –
but just what that proposal amounts to – and how it might relate to your own proposal of love – is clearly a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the argument is that if person A proposes loves of an object or person – and finds that another – person B – also proposes love of that object or person – that person A will then hate the object or person – and envy person B –
why would you hate the thing that you supposedly love – just because another also loves it?
and if you both love the same thing – what ground for envy?
‘love’ – here – for Spinoza – is confused with ‘possession’
I might love another – but it makes no sense to say therefore that they are my possession
one does not ‘possess’ another object or person
love for Spinoza – is basically pleasure given or received
you love that which gives you pleasure – but you don’t therefore possess the thing loved –
so – I think here – Spinoza is confused –
the logic of the matter is this –
objects are proposals – and we propose in relation to proposals
love – however it is further described – is a proposal put – in relation to an object / person proposal –
and any proposal put – or any proposed relation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
which is to say any propositional state – is uncertain –
and any propositional determination – is logically open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
our reality is the reality of propositional possibility –
Spinoza – it seems – has no concept of propositional possibility
‘reality’ for Spinoza – is a rule-governed deductive game
what he doesn’t understand is that any so called ‘rule’ – is no more than a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
Proof. – The greater the love towards himself with which the thing loved is affected, the greater his self-complacency (prev. Prop.), that is the greater his pleasure (Note, Prop. 30, Part III.); and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he will endeavour to imagine as much as possible thing loved to be bound to him in the tightest bond of love, and this endeavour or appetite will increase if he imagines any one else to desire the same for himself (Prop. 28, Part III.). But this endeavour or appetite is supposed to be hindered by the image of the thing loved, accompanied by the image of him the thing loved has joined to itself. Therefore (Note, Prop. 11, Part III) he will be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of the thing loved as the cause, and at the same time the image of the other, that is (Note Prop. 15, Part III.), which by reason (Prop. 23, Part III) that he enjoys the object loved, he will envy. Q.e.d.
‘The greater the love towards himself with which the thing loved is affected, the greater his self-complacency (prev. Prop.), that is the greater his pleasure.’
this is to say – the more you feel loved – the greater the pleasure you take in yourself
perhaps –
or could it be that you have your love – affirmed and endorsed – and naturally you take pleasure in this
and as for ‘self-complacency’ – just what that amounts to is open to question
it suggests to me – someone who does not critically evaluate their propositional reality –
does not question – doubt – or explore their uncertainty
someone who is logically asleep
the simple point here is that how you respond to another’s proposal of love – and how you propose yourself – in response to the other’s proposal of love – is open to interpretation – interpretation that will likely be different – at least can be different – depending on circumstance – depending on propositional context
‘and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he will endeavour to imagine as much as possible thing loved to be bound to him in the tightest bond of love, and this endeavour or appetite will increase if he imagines any one else to desire the same for himself’
this is possible – but it is just one possible response to being loved
and the problem with Spinoza’s conception here – is that he does not take into account – does not consider the fact of circumstance – the fact of propositional context
propositional context just does not figure in his analysis of how people behave –
and for that reason – his analysis – never hits pay dirt
because I am loved – it just may be that given who I am – and given who – the person who loves me is – there is quite a different outcome to the one suggested by Spinoza
it may well be that I am not ‘bound in the tightest bond of love’ – but rather that I simply appreciate the other’s love – and do so without the pretence of exaggeration and rhetoric
and that another may propose love of someone that I propose love to – may have no affect on the nature of my proposal
‘But this endeavour or appetite is supposed to be hindered by the image of the thing loved, accompanied by the image of him the thing loved has joined to itself.’
the point is that there may be no hindrance at all – no negative impact at all
‘Therefore (Note, Prop. 11, Part III) he will be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of the thing loved as the cause, and at the same time the image of the other, that is (Note Prop. 15, Part III.), which by reason (Prop. 23, Part III) that he enjoys the object loved, he will envy.’
the picture we get here from Spinoza is of someone who regards love as possession
you do not possess another if you love them –
for one – you can’t possess another – you can only relate to another
and if you think you are possessing another – that the other is your possession – then you completely misconstrue the nature of the other – and indeed of yourself –
there is no love in such a relationship –
any such relationship with the other – or with yourself – can only be destructive – for it is logically corrupt
Note – This hatred towards an object loved together with the envy of another is called jealousy (zelotypia), which therefore is nothing else than a wavering of the soul caused by love and hate at the same time accompanied with the idea of a rival who is envied. Further this hate towards the object loved will be greater according to the joy with which the jealous man was wont to be affected from the reciprocated love of the thing loved, and also according to the emotion with which he was affected towards him who now, he imagines, joins the thing loved to himself. For if he hated this person, by that very fact he will hate the object loved (Prop. 24, Part III.), for that he imagines it to affect with pleasure what he himself hates, and also (Coroll., Prop.15. Part 111.) from the fact that he is forced to join the image of the thing loved to that of whom he hates: this state of affairs generally comes about when a man loves a woman.For he imagines that a woman he loves prostitutes herself to another, is not only saddened by the fact that his own desire is hindered, but also, as he is forced to unite the image of the thing loved with parts of shame and excreta of his rival, he is turned from her. To this also must be added that the jealous man is not received with the same countenance with which the thing loved was wont to greet him, on which account as a lover he will be saddened, as I shall soon show.
‘This hatred towards an object loved together with the envy of another is called jealousy (zelotypia), which therefore is nothing else than a wavering of the soul caused by love and hate at the same time accompanied with the idea of a rival who is envied.’
‘love and hate at the same time’ –
this makes no sense – it is to propose a contradiction
yes – you might love someone – and then hate them – or hate them and then love them
but you cannot propose love and hate simultaneously-
Spinoza’s definition of jealousy – fails because it is based on a contradiction
‘wavering of the soul’ –
if this means uncertainty – propositional uncertainty – a ‘wavering of the soul’ – is understandable – is logical
and here we are talking about a situation where one is uncertain how to regard the other –
but again – this is not love and hate – ‘at the same time’
is the other a ‘rival’ and is the other ‘envied’? –
well – the other may be regarded this way –
however – if one – actually accepts that the lover – no longer loves – if one is at were at peace with that – is the ‘other’ a rival – and a rival to be envied?
it could also be that the lost lover – was more trouble than he or she was worth –
and in that case their new partner – is not a rival – and not to be envied
‘Further this hate towards the object loved will be greater according to the joy with which the jealous man was wont to be affected from the reciprocated love of the thing loved, and also according to the emotion with which he was affected towards him who now, he imagines, joins the thing loved to himself.’
the hate towards the object loved?
there may be hate towards someone – who was once loved – but is no longer loved –
and – there may be no hate at all – again – for whatever reason one might not hate –
one might still love – and accept the change of circumstance –
or one might simply accept the change of circumstance without love or hate
as to the hate being ‘greater’ according to the joy once received from the other –
I think this idea that you can ‘measure’ love and hate – is without foundation – and the claim that you can is best seen as rhetorical –
yes – you may hate the other – but you may have a different response
love and hate are not absolutes –
love and hate are propositional states –
love and hate are proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
whatever the circumstances in which they are proposed
I would suggest that lovers know this – and that haters know this – but it seems Spinoza does not
‘For if he hated this person, by that very fact he will hate the object loved (Prop. 24, Part III.), for that he imagines it to affect with pleasure what he himself hates, and also (Coroll., Prop.15. Part 111.) from the fact that he is forced to join the image of the thing loved to that of whom he hates: this state of affairs generally comes about when a man loves a woman.’
it just does not follow that if you hate the new lover of the one you loved – you will hate the one you loved
you may still love your ex-lover – or you may neither love or hate them –
it all depends on the people involved – the circumstances in which they find themselves
so – there is really no point at all in even attempting a generalization –
the best you can do is lay out possible propositional responses
I think whether it is hate or love that you propose – in reality – you will put your proposal to question – to doubt – you will explore its uncertainty –
that is to say – if you behave rationally – you will be uncertain
‘this state of affairs generally comes about when a man loves a woman.’-
this state affairs can also come about when a woman loves a man – or a man loves a man – or a woman loves a woman –
really – logically speaking – the correct term here is neither ‘man’ or ‘woman’ – it is‘propositional actor(s)’
‘For he imagines that a woman he loves prostitutes herself to another, is not only saddened by the fact that his own desire is hindered, but also, as he is forced to unite the image of the thing loved with parts of shame and excreta of his rival, he is turned from her.’
from this it is clear that Spinoza regards a woman loved as a possession of the lover –
he doesn’t understand or accept that a woman can freely choose who she loves – and freely choose who she unites with
and he thinks a woman who chooses another partner should be regarded as a prostitute
interesting that he does not consider the reverse situation – that is when a man leaves a woman for another woman
has the woman left – lost a possession?
is the man who leaves a prostitute?
apparently not
I think it is fair to say here that Spinoza was a misogynist –
and the real shame of this is that his prejudice against women – really undercuts his metaphysics
for from a metaphysical point of view – in Spinoza’s philosophy – there are not male and female modifications and modes of God
metaphysically speaking gender is irrelevant
when it comes to women – Spinoza loses the plot –
he is not the first – and he won’t be last –
and of course there are women who have lost the plot over men
I get the impression that Spinoza’s experience with Clara Maria – who as a young man he loved and lost – hit hard – and perhaps he never recovered from that experience –
also – his dealings with his sister Rebecca – over their inheritance – would not have left him over joyed
having your desire hindered – may well result in sadness – however that is not necessarily the case –
on reflection – one may i.e. – decide that all things considered – for whatever reasons – one is – or can be – better off – without that desire –
but here of course one must put one’s desire to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty
that is – one needs to be open and rational –
and it is not that difficult to be so
‘but also, as he is forced to unite the image of the thing loved with parts of shame and excreta of his rival, he is turned from her.’
this is some statement! – where to begin?
if you want any indication of Spinoza’s bitterness in relation to lost romantic / sexual love – it’s right here
the parts of shame?
presumably genitalia – but why is any part of the human body – male or female to be regarded as a ‘part of shame’?
I think Spinoza’s reason here is clouded and derailed by pain experienced –
in any case – this statement – just doesn’t fit with his metaphysics of the body – the human body as a mode of extension
the ‘excreta of his rival’ –
I had to check out ‘excreta’ in the Oxford dictionary – just to make sure I had this right –
‘waste expelled from the body’
Spinoza is saying – that any man who has lost a lover to another – would ‘unite’ the image of the one loved with the rival’s genitalia and his shit –
an extreme and somewhat troubling view
the logical reality is that we cannot know how anyone will react in such a situation – or for that matter any propositional situation –
and any proposal put – as to how someone does or will act or react – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain
‘To this also must be added that the jealous man is not received with the same countenance with which the thing loved was wont to greet him, on which account as a lover he will be saddened, as I shall soon show.’
what if he was greeted ‘with the same countenance’ by his former lover?
it is possible –
would he no longer be saddened?
the point here is that all we have here from Spinoza is speculation –
and any speculation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Spinoza conception of jealousy rests on the proposal that one can love and hate at the same time
this is to propose a contradiction – and therefore – this conception of jealousy – is at best – illogical and therefore – irrational
could we take it from this that Spinoza sees jealousy as irrational?
I don’t think so – if anything he believes that jealousy and his understanding of it – is logical within his deductive system
another question is – can one be jealous without hate of the ‘rival’ – and hate of the one – once loved?
yes – I think so –
one could see the loss of one’s lover to another – as a misfortune – and the ‘rival’ as being advantaged – by the misfortune –
and therefore – one would be ‘jealous’ – as in – wish for oneself the good fortune of the 'rival'
as to the one loved – are they advantaged or disadvantaged by their change of partner?
a good question
(c) greg t. charlton. 2022.
