Tractatus 2

2. What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs.

a ‘fact’ is a proposal –

what is the case – is what is proposed –

‘the existence of a state of affairs’ is a proposal

2.01. A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

a state of affairs – a state of things – is a proposal –

a combination of objects (things) is a propositional construct

2.011. It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of

affairs.

a ‘thing’ is a proposal –

‘a state of affairs’ is a propositional construct

‘a possible constituent of a state of affairs’ – is a proposal –

a proposal – a propositional construct – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

propositional uncertainty is the ground of possibility

nothing is ‘essential’ in propositional logic

2.012. In logic nothing is accidental; if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the

possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing.

logic is a rule governed propositional action

a rule governed propositional is a propositional game

the rules of a propositional game – as with any proposal / proposition can be critically evaluated –

and this is indeed what happens in game construction –

however putting the rules of a propositional game to question – to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty – is a different matter to playing the game

in the game mode the propositions / rules are not questioned – not put to doubt – or regarded as uncertain

if they are – there is no game

in a propositional game – you follow the rules of the game

a propositional analysis of a thing / proposal – is only ‘written into the thing’ – into the proposal – if that propositional analysis – is proposed –

and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and  uncertain

2.0121. It would seem to be a sort of accident, that a situation would fit a thing that

could already exist entirely on its own.

If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the

beginning.

(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible and all possibilities are its

facts.)

Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside of space or temporal

objects outside of time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from

the possibility of combining with others.

If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded

from the possibility of such combinations.

‘It would seem to be a sort of accident, that a situation would fit a thing that could

already exist entirely on its own.’ –

‘a thing existing entirely on its own’ – is that which is proposed

the proposition that one proposal (situation) fits another proposal (thing) –

is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the

beginning.’ –

what exists in a state of affairs is that which is proposed

any proposed relation between propositions – i.e. – ‘things and ‘states of affairs’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the ground of possibility is uncertainty

the only ‘beginning’ – is the proposal – the action of proposal

‘Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible and all possibilities are its

facts.’ –

logic is a rule governed propositional game  – one among many

its possibilities are rule governed

‘Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside of space or temporal

objects outside of time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from

the possibility of combining with others.’ –

yes it is possible to combine any proposition – with any other proposition –

but this is to make a trivial point –

‘If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them

excluded from the possibility of such combinations.’ –

yes – you can

proposals combined in a propositional state of affairs – can be put independently of a proposed state of affairs

2.0122. Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations,

but this form of independence is a form of connection with states of affairs, a form of

dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles: by themselves

and in propositions.)

proposals / propositions are proposed independently

propositional connections are proposals

words are proposals –

words can be proposed – independently of propositions in which occur

words / proposals can be combined to form new proposals

2.0123. If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.

(Everyone of these must be part of the nature of an object).

A new possibility cannot be discovered later.

I can’t know a proposal’s occurrence or use – in all propositional contexts –

I know a propositions occurrence in the propositional contexts that I use – or that I

have been introduced to

a propositional context is not part of a proposition – it is a separate proposal – a separate propositional construct

a new proposal or new propositional context can always be put

2.01231. If I am to know an object I need not know all its external properties, I must

know all its internal properties.

all properties of an object / proposal – are proposals separate and external to the object proposal –

there are no ‘internal’ properties

what I know is the proposals that I put – or that are put to me

2.0124. If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states are also given.

what is given – is what is proposed

all proposals – all possible proposals – are not given

2.013. Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space.

each thing / proposal – is put – is proposed

‘a space of possible states of affairs’ – is the unknown

the unknown is propositionally empty

a proposal – a proposition – is a response to – the unknown

every proposal – every proposition – defies the unknown

2.0131. A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an

argument place).

A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour; it is, so

to speak, surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the

same touch, must have some degree of hardness, and so.

if an object / proposal is described – defined – as ‘spatial’ – it will by definition be situated in space

as to whether the ‘space’ is infinite or not – that’s another question

any proposal is an argument place – in that it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and yes – a speck in the visual field will be coloured – if the visual field is defined as coloured

and by definition – a note has pitch – and objects of the same touch will have some degree of hardness

all we have here is a series of analytic definitions

analyticity is nothing more than propositional reassertion–

a spatial object – is a spatial object – a coloured object – is a coloured object – hard objects are hard objects

reasserting a proposition has no logical value –

its only value is rhetorical

the idea is that reassertion establishes a proposition’s truth –

and protects it from question – from doubt – and from uncertainty

any such view of the proposition is logically corrupt and pretentious

2.014. Objects contain the possibilities of all situations.

proposals / objects – are put – and put in propositional contexts

‘all situations ‘ – are all propositional contexts –

to say that a proposal contains the possibilities of all propositional contexts – is to say that a proposal – a proposition – contains in some mystical sense – all propositions –

when I propose one thing – I do not propose everything –

to suggest that one proposition contains all propositions – is preposterous and ridiculous

and the vanity of it is breathtaking

2.0141. The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.

the form of an object is the form of a proposal –

the form of a proposition – is a proposal of propositional structure

the possibility of a proposal / object occurring in a state of affairs – that is – in a propositional context – depends on the use of the object / proposal –

it is a contingent matter

2.02. Objects are simple.

objects are proposals –

how we describe an object / proposal – i.e. as ‘simple’ – or ‘complex’ – will be a matter of propositional context

and any description is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

2.0201. Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their

constituents and into the propositions that describe complexes completely.

any analysis of any of any proposal – ‘ i.e. ‘complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents’ – is a proposal –

any description is a proposal –

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

propositional uncertainty defies ‘completeness’ – and renders it illogical

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world that is why they cannot be

composite.

objects are proposals

the world is propositional

any proposal regarding the ‘substance of the world’ – is open to question –

there is no ‘cannot be’ – given propositional uncertainty

a composite description of the substance of the world – is as valid as any other proposed description –

and may well serve a purpose –

such a description – as with any other – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

2.0211. If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would

depend on whether another proposition is true.

that the world has substance – is a proposal

that the world has no substance – is a proposal –

these proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the sense of a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

a proposition is true – if it is assented to – for whatever reason

a proposition is false – if dissented from – for any reason –

any proposal of assent or any proposal of dissent  – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

2.0212. In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world.

a picture of the world – is a proposal –

a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘in that case’ – the picture sketched – would be of a world with no substance –

whatever that would amount to

and whatever that amounted to – would be a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.022. It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real

one, must have something – a form – in common with it.

this proposal can always be put – and is open to question

what do you say to an artist who says his picture (proposal) has nothing in common with the world of common experience?

the point is – there can be –  there is – question – doubt – uncertainty –

the ‘obvious argument’ – is really just rhetoric

logically speaking – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

logically speaking – nothing is ‘obvious’ – if ‘obvious’ means – beyond question

2.023. Objects are what constitutes this unalterable form.

objects are proposals –

‘form’ is a proposal of propositional structure –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

there is no unalterable form / propositional structure

2.0231. The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material

properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are

represented – only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.

‘the substance of the world’ – is a proposal

a form is a proposal of propositional structure – a form is proposed –

the world is propositional –

a ‘material property’ – is a proposal

it is only by means of proposal that material properties exist –

what exists is what is proposed

the ‘configuration of objects’ – is a proposal

2.0232. In a manner of speaking objects are colourless.

in a manner of speaking proposals / propositions are colourless

2.0233. If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction between them,

apart from their external properties, is that they are different.

an object is a proposal –

logical form is a proposal of propositional structure

two object / proposals – which it is proposed have the same propositional structure –

will be different at least in terms of their provenance – i.e. where and when – they were proposed –

they will be contingently different

2.02331. Either a thing has properties that nothing else has, in which case we can

immediately use a description to distinguish it from the others and refer to it; or, on

the other hand, there are several things that have the whole set of properties in

common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them.

For if there is nothing to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since otherwise it

would be distinguished after all.

if you have two things / two proposals –

you have two separate proposals to begin with  –

the question is –

apart from the fact that they are separate – what distinguishes them?

if one thing / proposal has properties / descriptions that are not applied to the other

those descriptions can be used to distinguish it from the other

if on the other hand those descriptions do not distinguish one from the other

the question remains how they are to be distinguished?

perhaps other descriptions will do the job

any proposal of distinction will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what distinguishes one thing / proposal from another – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

2.024. Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

what is independent of what is the case – that is of – what is proposed –

is the unknown

2.025. It is form and content.

form is a proposal of propositional structure

a proposition’s content – is what is proposed

form and content are propositional characterizations

form and content do not exist outside of the propositional context

2.0251. Space, time and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects.

space – time – and colour – are descriptions – proposals of propositional context – that are applied to the proposal of objects

2.026. There must be objects if the world is to have an unaltered form.

the proposal of objects – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

form is a proposal of propositional structure

any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

our world is propositional – it is not ‘unaltered’ – it is uncertain

2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one in the same.

objects are propositions – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

in that logically speaking – any proposition is uncertain – it is not ‘unalterable’

what exists in the absence of proposal – of propositions – is the unknown

2.0271. Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is

changing and unstable.

‘objects’ are proposals – propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any proposed configuration of objects – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

what comes off as unalterable and subsistent – is philosophical prejudice

2.0272. The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

a configuration of proposals is a state of affairs

2.03. In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain.

in a propositional construct proposals / objects are placed in relation to proposals –

and their relation is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.

the relation of one proposition – one object / proposal – to another – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

2.032. The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the

structure of the state of affairs.

the relation of objects / propositions in a proposed state of affairs – logically speaking –

is indeterminate –

that is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.033. Form is the possibility of structure.

form is a proposal of structure

2.034. The structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs.

a ‘fact’ is a generally accepted proposal – within some propositional context

a ‘fact’ can be structured – that is propositionally structured

a ‘state of affairs’ – is a proposal – a proposition made up of other propositions – a proposition that can be analysed into other propositions and their relations

if the structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs –

there is not much point talking about ‘facts’ and ‘states of affairs’ – for in terms of structure – they amount to the same thing

and in that case – best to just speak of propositional structures

propositional structures – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.04. The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.

the totality of existing states of affairs – would be the totality of proposals – of propositions put –

however – it is pointless to talk of a ‘totality’ of propositions – propositional action is on-going

‘the world’ – is a proposal

2.05. The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do

not exist.

that which does not exist – is that which is not proposed

2.06.The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is a reality.

(We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a

negative fact.)

a state of affairs exists – if it is proposed

reality is that which is proposed –

that which is not proposed – is not there – is not a reality

there are no ‘negative facts’ –

a ‘negative fact’ would have to be ‘a proposal that is not proposed’ – which is an absurdity

reality is what is proposed

2.061. States of affairs are independent of each other.

a ‘state of affairs’ is a proposal –

one proposal is contingently independent of another

two proposals can be related via a third proposal etc.

2.062. From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to

infer the existence or non-existence of another.

it is possible to infer from the existence of one proposed state of affairs – to another

the inference is a relational proposal

.

there is no inference / proposal from a non-existent state of affairs / proposal

2.063. The sum total of reality is the world.

the world is not a sum total

reality is what is proposed –

reality is propositional –

and propositional action is on-going

2.1. We picture facts to ourselves.

a picture is a proposal – a proposal of representation

i.e. – that one proposition or set of propositions represents another proposition or set propositions

we propose facts to ourselves – and to others

do we picture facts?

firstly a fact is a proposal – a generally accepted proposal

do we propose that facts / proposals – represent –  other proposals – other propositions?

yes – you can put that one proposition or set of proposals / ‘facts’ – represent another proposition or set of other propositions

however at the same time not all proposals of facts are picture proposals – representation proposals

a fact may simply be proposed in a declarative statement –

i.e. ‘the Mona Lisa is in the Louvre’ – might be proposed as a fact

and not all propositional action is ‘representational’ –

we may i.e. propose to modify or even oppose another proposition –

representation – is one mode of propositional action –

and just what representation amounts to – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.11. A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

a picture is a proposal – a representative proposal

as to – ‘a situation in logical space’ –

the representative proposal –  is the situation

this notion of ‘logical space’ is superfluous –

what is logically relevant is that a proposition is put – and is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

packaging up a proposition with ‘logical space’ – is unnecessary and irrelevant

we do not have pictures / representational proposals of non-existent states of affairs

if a state of affairs is proposed – it exists

an existing state of affairs – is a proposal

if a state of affairs is not proposed – it doesn’t exist

what does not exist – is what is not proposed

2.12. A picture is a model of reality.

a picture is a proposal – a representative proposal

‘a model of reality’ – is a proposal – a representative proposal

reality is what is proposed – reality is a proposal

reality is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.13. In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.

you can propose an elemental analysis here –

this is where it is proposed that the picture – the representative proposal – is to be understood as elemental –

and that therefore the object proposal – is to be construed elementally

what you have here is an elemental analysis – an elemental argument

these proposals – the elemental proposal – and the proposal of the correspondence of the elements – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

not all pictures are construed elementally

2.131. In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects

if you run with an elemental analysis – that is a proposal – that is the argument

it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the fact is you can have a representative proposal that is not elemental –

that is not construed in terms of elements

                              

2.14. What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a

determinate way.

a picture is a proposal of representation –

what constitutes a picture – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

picture / proposals can be given an elemental analysis –

from a logical point of view – how the elements are related is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and if the picture / representative proposal – is not given an elemental / determinate analysis – does it cease to be a picture?

2.141. A picture is a fact.

a ‘picture’ is a proposal – a representative proposal

a ‘fact’ is a proposal –

you can describe a picture – a relational / representative proposal as a fact –

in any case this picture / ‘fact’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.15. The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate

way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.

Let us call this connection of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call

the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.

you can propose an elemental / determinate relation of representation between propositions – i.e. between a painting – and its subject –

you will adopt this proposal if it suits your purpose

this proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and it should be understood is that is not the final word on representation

representation – is open to question – open to interpretation

the point being that not all proposals of representation – will be – or need be –

elemental and determinate –

what if the proposal is that the picture – the relational representative proposal – depicts a non-elemental – indeterminate relation?

does it cease to be a picture?

as to this notion of ‘pictorial form’ – it is nothing other than the representative proposal –

nothing other than the picture

2.151. Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the

same way as the elements of a picture.

‘pictorial form’ – just is the representative proposal – that is the picture

an elemental analysis is not essential to representation

representation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.1511. That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.

a representational proposal is put –

just what that representation amounts to is open to question

this ‘reaching out’ can only be the putting of the representational proposal

the picture – the proposal of representation – is a reality –

it is not something other than reality – it is reality

our reality is propositional

2.1512. It is laid against reality like a measure.

a proposition – is not laid against reality – it is reality –

propositions are related to propositions –

and relations between propositions – are proposed –

our reality is a reality of propositions and propositional relations

2.15121. Only the end points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to

be measured.

we can do without the quasi-mathematical and quasi-geometrical imagery here

propositions are put in relation to propositions –

and any relation proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

2.1513. So a picture conceived in this way, also includes the pictorial relationship,

which makes it into the picture.

the pictorial relationship is not ‘included in’ the picture –

this ‘pictorial relationship’ – the relational / representative proposal – is the picture

2.1514. The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the picture's elements

with things.

the picture is the representative proposal –

the elemental correlation – is a secondary proposal

the elemental proposal – and the proposed elemental correlation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

not all pictures / representations are proposed in terms of an elemental analysis – or an elemental correlation

2.1515. The correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture's elements, with

which the picture touches reality.

the ‘correlations’ are relational proposals – relational propositions

the relational proposals – are ‘feelers’ – only in the sense that they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

we don’t ‘touch’ reality – we propose reality

2.16. If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it

depicts.

if a ‘fact’ – a proposal – is to be a picture – the fact will be a representative proposal

what is common to the picture and what it represents – if indeed there is a proposed commonality –  is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

‘commonality’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.161. There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable

the one to be a picture after all.

if you consider abstract art – there is always a question of just what it represents

identity doesn’t seem to be in the picture at all – or necessary to it

and the more general issue is just what representation amounts to –

yes you can propose identity – but does it hold in all proposals of representation?

there is no ‘must’ here – no necessity – the matter is better understood in terms of –

uncertainty

2.17. What a picture must have common with reality, in order to be able to depict it –

correctly or incorrectly – in the way it does, is its pictorial form.

‘pictorial form’ is nothing other than the proposal of representation – that is to say –

 the picture

once this is recognized this notion of ‘pictorial form’ – will be seen to be unnecessary and irrelevant

2.171. A picture can depict any reality whose form it has.

A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc.

a picture / proposal may depict a subject – a proposal (a reality) – whose propositional structure it is proposed it has –

or it may not depict that structure

a picture may propose / depict a different structure altogether –

we see this i.e. in abstract art – in theoretical science – and in philosophy

if the picture / proposal is described as spatial – then what it represents will be described as spatial

if the picture / proposal is described as coloured – then what it represents will be described as coloured –

what we have here are analytic definitions –

a spatial picture – depicts anything spatial – a coloured picture – depicts anything coloured

analyticity is nothing more than propositional reassertion–

a spatial object – is a spatial object – a coloured object – is a coloured object

reasserting a proposition has no logical value –

its only value is rhetorical

the issue is just what description to give the picture / proposal –

and that is open – open to question – open to doubt – and is – regardless of any decision on description – uncertain

2.172. A picture cannot however depict its pictorial form: it displays it

the picture is a representative proposal –

pictorial form just is the representative proposal – that is the picture

the proposal is the depiction – is the display

2.173. A picture represents its subject from a position outside of it. (Its standpoint is

representational form). That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or

incorrectly.

a picture is a representative proposal

and yes – it represents its subject / proposal from outside of it –

a correct representation is a proposal of representation – that is assented to – for whatever reason

an incorrect representation is a proposal of representation – that is dissented from – for whatever reason

any proposal of assent or dissent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.174. A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.

what is called the ‘representational form’ here – just is the relation of representation – that is the picture

and yes – a picture proposal – is not outside itself

2.18. What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order

to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e.

the form of reality.

our reality is propositional

a picture is a proposal of representation

a picture – a proposal of representation – is a reality

the form or structure of reality –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.181. A picture whose pictorial form is logical is called a logical picture.

any form – that is – any proposed propositional structure – is logical – if it is held open to question – open to doubt – and regarded as – uncertain

2.182. Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand, not every

picture is, for example, a spatial one)

every proposition – every picture / proposition – described as ‘spatial’ – or – given some other description – is – from a logical point of view –

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.19. Logical pictures can depict the world.

logical pictures are proposals – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

any proposal can be described as logical picture –

and any proposal can be described as a depiction of the world – of reality

2.2. A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts.

a logico-pictorial form – is a proposal of propositional structure – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

what a picture represents is another proposal or set of proposals

a picture can – but need not – have a common ‘logical pictorial form’ – that is a common structure – to what it represents –

we need only consider i.e. –  abstract art – quantum physics – or various philosophical theories – to see the point here

in any case just what representation amounts to – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

it is not a fixed concept

2.201. A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-

existence of states of affairs.

the picture is the depiction –

a picture – a representational proposal – is reality

what is proposed – exists

what is not proposed – is non-existent –

we don’t have pictures of what doesn’t exist

2.202. A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.

a picture does not represent a possible situation in logical space

a picture – is a representative proposal –

a picture is a reality – is actual

the notion of ‘logical space’ here – is irrelevant –

it’s not in the picture

2.203. A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.

a picture is the situation proposed

what is proposed is a representation

2.21. A picture agrees with reality or it fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or

false.

a picture is a proposal – a representative proposal

reality is propositional – a picture / proposal is a reality

a proposal is true – if it is affirmed  for whatever reason – false if it is denied – for whatever reason

a representational proposal  – is true – if it is affirmed – false – if it is denied

any proposal of affirmation or denial – is like the proposal – the picture – in question – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

2.22. What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by

means of its pictorial form.

a picture – is a representative proposal

what a picture represents – and how it represents – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a proposal of representation is true – if it is assented to – false if it is dissented from

any proposal of assent or dissent is independent of the proposal of representation

any proposal of assent or dissent – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

a proposal put – exists – regardless of whether it is affirmed or denied

2.221. What a picture represents is its sense.

the picture is a proposal – a proposition –

the picture is a representational proposal

the ‘sense’ of a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

the sense of a picture – a representative proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

2.222. The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or

falsity.

the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality –

is the question of the agreement or disagreement of the sense of one proposal (the picture) – with the sense of another (what it represents)

any proposed relation of agreement or disagreement between proposals – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

truth and falsity – are the propositional actions of affirmation and denial –

if it is proposed that that the picture / proposal represents a reality (another proposal) –

and this is agreed to – the proposed relation will be deemed true

if it is proposed that the picture / proposal represents a reality (another proposal) – and this is denied the proposed relation will be deemed false –

any propositional action of agreement or disagreement – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

2.223. In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with

reality.

the relation between a picture and what it represents –

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

any comparison – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

whether the picture is true or false –

is the question of  whether a proposed relation i.e. agreement – is affirmed – for whatever reason – or denied – for whatever reason –

any proposal of affirmation – or any proposal of denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

it should be noted too – that just what ‘agreement’ amounts to – and just what ‘disagreement’ amounts to – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

2.224. It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.

yes –

whether a picture is true or false – depends on whether the representative proposal that has been put – is affirmed – or denied

2.225. There are no pictures that are true a priori.

a picture is a proposal – a representative proposal

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if by ‘true a priori’ – is meant that a proposal – a  proposition is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain

logically speaking – there are no a ‘true a priori’ propositions –

there are no pictures that are true a priori

the ‘true a priori’ tag – is a mark of logical ignorance .

© greg . t. charlton. 2018.