NOTICE

The following work 'Spinoza's 'Ethics': A Critical Exploration' by Greg T Charlton, was first published in book form September 1 2024.  ISBN:978-0-6457199-1-8. (c) killer press. 2024. All rights reserved.

SPINOZA'S 'ETHICS': A CRITICAL EXPLORATION

 

SPINOZA’S ETHICS: A CRITICAL EXPLORATION

 

 

In what follows I offer a critical examination of Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’

 

I will present each proposition and following it with my remarks.

 

 

FIRST PART

 

CONCERNING GOD

 

DEFINITIONS

 

 

I. I UNDERSTAND that to be a CAUSE OF ITSELF (causa sui) whose essence involves existence and whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing.

 

 

a proposition is a proposal –

 

and any proposal put is a propositional action

 

a proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘cause of itself’ – makes no sense

 

any proposed cause – has a proposed effect

 

the idea that a cause is its effect – destroys the causal analysis

 

what exists is what is proposed – and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

existence is uncertain –

 

the ‘essence’ of anything – of any proposal – is a description – a propositional description of the proposal – and as such – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we propose against – and in response to – the unknown

 

outside of proposal – is the unknown

 

 

II. That thing is said to be FINITE IN ITS KIND (in suo genere finita) which can be limited by another thing of the same kind. E.g., a body is said to be finite because we conceive another larger than it. Thus a thought is limited by another thought. But a body cannot be limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.

 

a ‘body’ is a proposal – a ‘thought’ is a proposal –

 

there is no ‘finite in its kind’ –

 

any proposal can be ‘limited’ by any other proposal – that is – put in relation to any other proposal

 

there is only one ‘kind’ of proposal – or – all and any proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

III. I understand SUBSTANCE (substantia) to be that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: I mean that. the conception of which does not depend on the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.

 

 

a ‘substance’ – is a proposal 

 

it makes no sense to say of a proposal that it is ‘in itself’ – just as it makes no sense to say that a proposal is ‘outside itself’ – or ‘not in itself’ –

 

a proposal does not have a ‘self’

 

propositional actors can be said to have a self

 

and it is propositional actors that ‘conceive’ – that is propose – proposals / propositions

 

a proposal is put – does not ‘depend’ on any other proposal

 

 

IV. AN ATTRIBUTE (attributum) I understand to be that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.

 

 

an ‘attribute’ – is a proposal – a propositional description

 

the ‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional action

 

a ‘substance’ – is a proposal –

 

if ‘essence’ is meant as a description that is certain – logically speaking – there is no essence

 

any propositional description – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

V. By MODE (modus) I understand the Modifications (affections) of a substance or that which is in something else through which it may be conceived.

 

 

a ‘mode’ or ‘modification of a substance’ – is a propositional description of a ‘substance’ / proposal

 

one proposal is not ‘in’ another proposal

 

a proposal is put in relation to another proposal –

 

any proposed relation – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

VI. GOD (Deus) I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.

 

Explanation. – I say absolutely infinite, but not in its kind. For whatever is infinite only in its kind, we may deny the attribute to be infinite; but to the essence of what is absolutely infinite there appertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no attributes – no properties – no characteristics

 

the unknown is silent

 

the unknown is that to which all proposals are put –

 

we make known with proposal – with propositional action

 

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

VII. The thing is said to be FREE (libera) which exists by the mere necessity of its own nature and is determined in its actions by itself alone. That thing is said to be NECESSARY (necessaria), or rather COMPELLED (coacta), when it is determined in its existence and actions by something else in a certain fixed ratio.

 

 

a ‘thing’ – is a proposal –

 

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

it is propositional uncertainty – that is the ground of freedom

 

if by necessary a proposition is meant a proposition that is certain – there are no necessary propositions –

 

any proposal / proposition – is open to question – is logically uncertain

 

and any so called ‘determination’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

VIII. I understand ETERNITY (aeternitas) to be existence itself, in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing.

 

Explanation. – For such an existence is conceived as an eternal truth, just as is the essence of a thing, and therefore cannot be explained by duration or time, although duration can be conceived as wanting beginning and end.

 

 

‘eternity’ is an absence of reference to time

 

what exists is what is proposed –

 

any proposal can be put with or without a reference to time

 

an ‘eternal thing’ – is a proposal put without reference to time

 

 

AXIOMS

 

 

I. All things which are, are in themselves or in other things.

 

 

a ‘thing’ – of any description – is a proposal –

 

a proposal does not have a ‘self’ – and is therefore not ‘in itself’ –

 

a proposition put – is not in another proposition –

 

relations between propositions can be proposed –

 

any proposition – or any proposed relation between propositions – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

 

II. That which cannot be conceived through another thing must be conceived through itself

 

 

a proposition does not conceive itself

 

propositional actors conceive / propose – proposals / propositions

 

a proposal may be put in response to or in reaction to another proposal

 

or a proposal may be put without any relation to another proposal

 

 

III. From a given determined cause an effect follows from necessity, and on the other hand, if no determined cause is granted, it is impossible that an effect should follow.

 

 

any causal analysis / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

furthermore – we can negotiate our propositional reality quite successfully without a causal analysis

 

there is no propositional necessity –

 

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

proposals / propositions – are contingent

 

 

IV. The knowledge of the effect depends on the knowledge of the cause.

 

 

what we propose is what we know –

 

and what we know – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

if you propose a causal explanation of an event – the proposal just is that your knowledge of the effect depends on your knowledge of the cause

 

here we have the adoption of an epistemological framework –

 

it is an epistemological framework that has been – and is – used extensively – and one regarded as useful and productive

 

however – any such framework – in a logical – as distinct from pragmatic – sense – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

V. Things which have nothing in common reciprocally cannot be comprehended reciprocally through each other, or the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

 

 

reciprocity is a relation – a proposed relation

 

and just whether such a relation is said to hold will depend on how the things in question are defined – how they are characterized

 

any definition of a thing – any characterization of a thing – and any relation – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

VI. A true idea should agree with its ideal (ideatum), i.e., what it conceives.

 

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal

 

the proposal is the ideal – is what is proposed

 

there is no distinction between ‘idea’ and ‘ideal –

 

and no question of ‘agreement’

 

 

VII. The essence of that which can be conceived as not existing does not involve existence

 

 

what exists is what is proposed

 

that which does not exist – is that which is not proposed

 

 

PROPOSITIONS

 

 

PROP. I. A substance is prior in its nature to its modifications

 

Proof – This obvious from Def. 3 and 5

 

 

a ‘substance’ is a proposal –

 

the modifications of the substance – are the propositional descriptions of the proposal

 

propositional descriptions – are the proposal described – i.e. – the ‘substance’ described

 

a proposal is not prior to its description – the proposal is its description

 

and any description proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. II. Two substances, having different attributes, have nothing in common between them.

 

 

Proof. – This also is obvious from Def. 3. For each of them must be in itself and through itself be conceived, or the conception of one of them does not involve the conception of the other.

 

 

a substance is a proposal –

 

an attribute is a proposal – a propositional description

 

two proposals put – with different descriptions / attributes – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

this – they have in common

 

and logical uncertainty invites further description –

 

and with that the possibility of proposing – descriptions / attributes that are held in common –

 

any description / attribute proposed – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

PROP. III. Of two things having nothing in common between them, one cannot be the cause of the other.

 

 

Proof. – If they have nothing in common reciprocally. therefore (Ax.5) they cannot be known through each other, and therefore (Ax.4) one cannot be the cause of the other. Q.e.d.

 

 

’two things’ – are two proposals

 

‘causation’ – is a proposed relation – between proposals

 

if it is proposed that PA causes PB – then what is being proposed is that PA and PB have something in common

 

just what that is – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if they are not ‘known through each other’ – that is – if there is no relation proposed – then they are not related – and one cannot be said to be the cause of the other

 

‘causation’ – as with any proposal – any propositional relation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. IV. Two or three distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of their modifications.

 

 

Proof – All things that are, are either in themselves or other things (Ax. 1), that is (Def. 3 and 5) beyond the intellect nothing is granted save substances and their modifications. Nothing therefore is granted beyond the intellect, through which several things may be distinguished one from the other except substances, or what is the same thing (Def. 4) their attributes and modifications. Q.e.d.

 

 

a ‘substance’ – is a proposal – an ‘attribute’ a description of a proposal – and a modification – like ‘attribute’ – is a propositional description –

 

proposals and propositional descriptions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘distinct things’ – are proposals –

 

any proposal is different from any other – and proposals can be distinguished one from the other in any number of ways –

 

i.e. – where it is put that ‘the same thing’ is proposed in separate proposals – the proposals can be distinguished in terms the propositional actors that propose them – in terms of time and place of proposal – and in terms of their form or expression

 

where different things are proposed – propositions are distinguished by what they propose

 

the ‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action –

 

beyond propositional action – or outside of propositional action – is the unknown

 

 

PROP. V. In the nature of things, two or more substances may not be granted having the same nature or attribute.

 

 

Proof. – If several distinct substances are given, they must be distinguished one from the other either by the difference of their attributes or their modifications (prev. Prop.). If, then, they are to be distinguished by the difference of their attributes, two or more cannot be granted as having the same attribute. But if they are to be distinguished by the difference of their modifications, since a substance is prior in its nature to its modifications (Prop. 1), therefore let the modifications be laid aside and let the substance itself be considered in itself, that is (Def. 3 and 6), truly considered, (prev. Prop.), two or more substances cannot have the same nature or attribute. Q.e.d.

 

 

a ‘substance’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

an ‘attribute’ is a description of a proposal – and is open to question

 

a proposal may be given many different descriptions

 

different proposals – may be given the same description – and also may be distinguished by other descriptions

 

all proposals have the same logical ‘nature’ – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another.

 

 

Proof. – There cannot exist in the universe two substances of the same attribute (prev. Prop.), that is (Prop. 2), which have anything in common, and accordingly (Prop. 3) one of them cannot be the cause of the other or one cannot be produced by the other.  Q.e.d.

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced from anything else. For in the nature of things nothing is given save substances, as is obvious from Ax.1 and Def. 3 and 5: and it cannot be produced from another substance (prev. Prop.). Therefore a substance cannot be produced from anything else whatsoever. Q.e.d.

 

 

Another Proof. – This can be more easily shown by the method of proving the contrary to be absurd. For if a substance can be produced from anything else, the knowledge of it should depend upon the knowledge of its cause (Ax.4), and consequently (Def. 3) it would not be a substance.

 

 

a ‘substance’ is a proposal –

 

proposals do not ‘produce’ proposals

 

propositional actors ‘produce’ proposals –

 

and any proposal produced is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

PROP VII. Existence appertains to the nature of substance.

 

 

Proof. – a substance cannot be produced from anything else (pre. Prop., Coroll.): it will therefore be its own cause, that is (Def.1), its essence necessarily involves existence. or existence appertains to the nature of it. Q.e.d.

 

 

what exists is what is proposed –

 

‘substance’ is a proposal –

 

‘substance’ proposed – is substance existing

 

and what is proposed is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no necessity – only logical / propositional uncertainty –

 

existence is uncertain

 

 

PROP. VIII. All substance is necessarily infinite.

 

 

a proposal – a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no logical end to the logical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

 

propositional uncertainty defies any claim of necessity

 

 

Proof. –  No two or more substances can have the same attribute (Prop. 5), and it appertains to the nature of substance that it should exist (Prop. 7). It must therefore exist finitely or infinitely. But not finitely. For (Def.2) it would then be limited by some other substance of the same nature which also of necessity must exist (Prop 7): and then the two substances would be granted having the same attribute, which is absurd (Prop. 5). It will exist, therefore, infinitely. Q.e.d.

 

 

a substance is a proposal

 

an attribute is a proposal – a descriptive proposal

 

what is proposed – is what exists

 

two or more proposals – can have the same description – and can also have different descriptions

 

proposals are not limited by other proposals –

 

no proposal must exist –

 

propositional action is uncertain – and comes out of uncertainty

 

 

Note I. – As to be finite is, in reality, a denial in part, and as to be infinite is the absolute assertion of the existence of its nature, it follows, therefore (from Prop. 7 alone) that all substances must be infinite.

 

 

a proposal / proposition – is finite in its form

 

and any proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – and logically there is no end to this process

 

we act with propositions – and in acting with a proposition – we may suspend the process of critical discovery –

 

nevertheless – any proposition put to use – is – from a logical point of view – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note II. – I make no doubt but that to all those who form injudicious opinions of things and are not wont to see things through their first cause, it may be difficult to conceive the truth of the seventh Proposition; doubtless because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, nor know they in what manner things are produced. Hence it comes to pass that they apply the principle which they see in common things to substances. For those who do not know the real causes of things confuse everything, and without the least mental repugnance they picture trees no less than men as speaking, and imagine men to be formed from stones no less than from seed, and any forms to be changed into any other forms whatsoever. Thus those who confuse divine with human nature easily attribute human passions to God, more especially if they do not know how passions

are produced in the mind. But if men would give heed to the nature of substance they would doubt less concerning Prop. 7: rather they would reckon it an axiom above all others, and hold it among common opinions. For then by substance they would understand that which is in itself, and through itself is conceived, or rather that whose knowledge does not depend on the knowledge of any other thing: but by modification that which is something else, and whose conception is formed from the conception of whatever it is in. Wherefore we may have true ideas of modifications which do not exist; since although they do not really exist outside the mind, yet their existence is comprehended in something else, and through that they may be conceived. The truth of true sentences does not exist outside the mind unless it exists in themselves, because through themselves they are conceived. If anyone should say, then, that he has a clear and distinct, that is true, idea of substance, and should nevertheless doubt whether such substance existed, he would indeed be like one who should say that that he had a true and yest should whether it were false (as will be manifest to anyone who regards it carefully); or if anyone should say that the substance was created, he would state at the same time that a false idea might be made true, than which it is difficult to conceive anything more absurd. And therefore it must be necessarily acknowledged that the existence of substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth. And hence we may conclude in another manner that there cannot be two substances of the same nature: which it is now perhaps worthwhile to show. But let me arrange this in its proper order, therefore note: (1) the true definition of each thing involves nothing and expresses nothing else but the nature of the thing defined. From which it follows (2) that clearly no definition involves any certain number of individuals nor expresses it, since definition expresses nothing else than the nature of the thing defined. E.g., the definition of a triangle expresses nothing else than the simple nature of a triangle, but not a certain number of triangles. Let it be noted again (3) that for each existing thing a cause must be given by reason of which it exists. Note, moreover, that this cause, by reason of which anything exists, should either be contained in the very nature and definition of an existing thing (clearly because it appertains to its nature to exist), or should be given outside itself. It follows from these positions that if a certain number of individuals exist in nature that a cause must necessarily be given why those individuals, and why not, more or less exist. E.g., if in the nature of things twenty men were to exist (whom for the sake of better explanation I will say to have existed at the same time, and that none existed before them), it would not be enough when giving a reason why twenty men existed, to show the cause of human nature in kind, but it would be necessary also to show the cause why not more or less than twenty existed; since (Note 3) a reason or cause should be given why each thing existed. But this cause cannot be contained in nature itself (Notes 2 and 3), since the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty. Hence (Note 4) the reason why these twenty men exist, and consequently why each of them exists, must necessarily be given outside each of them: and therefore it may be absolutely concluded that everything whose nature involves the existence of a certain number of individuals must of necessity have, since they exist, an external cause. Now since, as has been shown already in this Note, existence appertains to the nature of substance, its definitions must then of necessity involve existence, and therefore from its mere definition its existence can be concluded. But since, in Notes 2 and 3, we have shown that from its own definition the existence of several substances cannot follow, it follows necessarily therefore that two or more substances cannot have the same nature as was put forward.

 

I will here consider this Note –

 

‘I make no doubt but that to all those who form injudicious opinions of things and are not wont to see things through their first cause, it may be difficult to conceive the truth of the seventh Proposition; doubtless because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, nor know they in what

manner things are produced. Hence it comes to pass that they apply the principle which they see in common things to substances. For those who do not know the real causes of things confuse everything, and without the least mental repugnance they picture trees no less than men as speaking, and imagine men to be formed from stones no less than from seed, and any forms to be changed into any other forms whatsoever. Thus those who confuse divine with human nature easily attribute human passions to God, more especially if they do not know how passions are produced in the mind. But if men would give heed to the nature of substance they would doubt less concerning Prop. 7: rather they would reckon it an axiom above all others, and hold it among common opinions.’

 

the ’first cause’ for Spinoza – is the ‘cause in itself” – which is that which has no cause

 

his use of ‘cause’ here is a misuse –

 

and furthermore – the notion of first cause contradicts his argument that substance is infinite

 

really all we have here is a ‘first principle’ – that is put as certain – and therefore is rightly termed a ‘first prejudice’

 

as to distinguishing between ‘modifications’ and ‘substance in itself’ –

 

there is no real distinction – in Spinoza’s terms –

 

modifications are substance expressed – or if you like – substance experienced

 

and as ‘for those who do not know the real cause of things’

 

if there is no cause (the ‘cause in itself’) – then you would think that they are free to know the world – however they do know it – however they propose it

 

and – ‘those who confuse divine nature with human nature’ –

 

in so far as – all that exists is substance – is therefore ‘God’ – in Spinoza’s own terms there can be no confusion

 

it is all of the one nature

 

prop 7 – ‘All substance is necessarily infinite’ –

 

the logical reality is that this proposal – this proposition – is – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

which is to say – more generally – how we understand the world – is an open matter

 

there is no necessity in how we characterize – how we describe – anything –

 

any proposal that we put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘necessity’ – in so far as it is a concept – a proposal – that is designed to defy propositional uncertainty – is illogical

 

it is a refuge of the dogmatic – which is to say – those who have for whatever reason – decided against logic – have decided against rationality

 

‘For then by substance they would understand that which is in itself, and through itself is conceived, or rather that whose knowledge does not depend on the knowledge of any other thing: but by modification that which is something else, and whose conception is formed from the conception of whatever it is in. Wherefore we may have true ideas of modifications which do not exist; since although they do not really exist outside the mind, yet their existence is comprehended in something else, and through that they may be conceived. The truth of true sentences does not exist outside the mind unless it exists in themselves, because through themselves they are conceived. If anyone should say, then, that he has a clear and distinct, that is a true, idea of substance, and should nevertheless doubt whether such substance existed, he would indeed be like one who should say that that he had a true and yet should whether it were false (as will be manifest to anyone who regards it carefully); or if anyone should say that the substance was created, he would state at the same time that a false idea might be made true, than which it is difficult to conceive anything more absurd. And therefore it must be necessarily acknowledged that the existence of substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth. And hence we may conclude in another manner that there cannot be two substances of the same nature: which it is now perhaps worthwhile to show.’

 

‘substance’ – is a proposal –

 

what is proposed – is what is known

 

what does it mean to say that something – anything – is ‘conceived through itself’?

 

it is to say that the thing – whatever it is – conceives itself – i.e. – a stone – conceives itself

 

in logical terms – this is to say a proposal – proposes itself –

 

proposals do not propose – generate – themselves –

 

human beings – propositional actors propose –

 

Spinoza’s reality of ‘substance conceived through itself ‘– is for us an alien world – a world that actually has no place for human beings

 

Spinoza’s world has no moorings in humanity

 

Spinoza in his conception – negates humanity

 

modification – ‘whose conception is formed by the conception of whatever it is in’

 

a conception is not in a conception –

 

a conception is a proposal – and in relation to a proposal – proposals can be put

 

proposals are not in proposals – proposals are put to proposals

 

proposals are put in relation to proposals

 

a true idea does not exist outside the mind?

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal – truth is a proposal of affirmation – falsity – a proposal of denial

 

the truth or falsity of an idea / proposal is a propositional response to a subject proposal

 

any such response – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

clear and distinct idea –

 

in a logical sense – there are no clear and distinct ideas – if by that is meant ideas that are certain

 

any idea – whether clear and distinct – or unclear – or indistinct – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a ‘true idea’ – is a proposal affirmed – a ‘false idea’ – a proposal denied –

 

any proposal is open to question – any propositional response to a subject proposal – is open to question

 

affirmation can be changed to denial – denial changed to affirmation –

 

we deal in propositional uncertainty – and at base our propositional assessments are uncertain

 

‘the existence of substance like its essence an eternal truth’ –

 

‘substance’ – is a proposal –

 

if by ‘essence’ you mean a certainty – there is no essence –

 

if by ‘essence’ – you mean a description – then ‘essence’ is a proposal – open to question

 

if by ‘eternal truth’ is meant – a truth that is certain for all time – there is no such thing

 

any proposed truth – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

that there cannot be two substances of the same nature?

 

the logical ‘nature’ of any proposal – is that it is uncertain

 

all propositions have the same logical nature

 

‘But let me arrange this in its proper order, therefore note: (1) the true definition of each thing involves nothing and expresses nothing else but the nature of the thing defined. From which it follows (2) that clearly no definition involves any certain number of individuals nor expresses it, since definition expresses nothing else than the nature of the thing defined. E.g., the definition of a triangle expresses nothing else than the simple nature of a triangle, but not a certain number of triangles. Let it be noted again (3) that for each existing thing a cause must be given by reason of which it exists. Note, moreover, that this cause, by reason of which anything exists, should either be contained in the very nature and definition of an existing thing (clearly because it appertains to its nature to exist), or should be given outside itself. It follows from these positions that if a certain number of individuals exist in nature that a cause must necessarily be given why those individuals, and why not, more or less exist. E.g., if in the nature of things twenty men were to exist (whom for the sake of better explanation I will say to have existed at the same time, and that none existed before them), it would not be enough when giving a reason why twenty men existed, to show the cause of human nature in kind, but it would be necessary also to show the cause why not more or less than twenty existed; since (Note 3) a reason or cause should be given why each thing existed. But this cause cannot be contained in nature itself (Notes 2 and 3), since the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty. Hence (Note 4) the reason why these twenty men exist, and consequently why each of them exists, must necessarily be given outside each of them: and therefore it may be absolutely concluded that everything whose nature involves the existence of a certain number of individuals must of necessity have, since they exist, an external cause. Now since, as has been shown already in this Note, existence appertains to the nature of substance, its definition must then of necessity involve existence, and therefore from its mere definition its existence can be concluded. But since, in Notes 2 and 3, we have shown that from its own definition the existence of several substances cannot follow, it follows necessarily therefore that two or more substances cannot have the same nature as was put forward.’

 

as to (1) – a true definition expresses the nature of the thing defined –

 

any ‘definition’ – is a proposal – open to question

 

as to the ‘nature’ of the thing proposed

 

a proposal regarding the ‘nature’ of anything proposed – is of course – open to question

 

(2) that no definition involves any number of individuals

 

if a man is defined as a member of a species – then being a member of a species – is a definition that involves any number of individuals

 

there are two modes of propositional action –

 

the critical mode where proposals are put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored

 

and the game mode

 

a game is a rule governed propositional exercise

 

if you play the game – you play according to the rule of the game

 

if you don’t play in accordance with the rule – there is no game

 

human beings critically evaluate their proposals – their propositions

 

and human being have devised and play rule governed games –

 

in short – we think and we play

 

mathematics is a rule governed propositional game –

 

a definition which involves number is a definition in which the number game has been applied

 

(3) that for each existing thing – a cause of its existence – must be given

 

the question why anything exists – is a natural philosophical question – and there will be various answers – and various ways to answer this question – and the matter will remain open – open to further proposal –

 

as to their must be a cause given for why anything exists – no – there is no necessity here – a thing can exist quite happily without the burden of a causal explanation

 

and yes – you can include a proposal as to the cause of a thing’s existence – in a definition of its nature – but again there is no necessity to do this

 

the propositional reality is that we will have different definitions of the nature of a thing proposed – different definition suiting different purposes – different propositional purposes

 

‘Now since, as has been shown already in this Note, existence appertains to the nature of substance, its definition must then of necessity involve existence, and therefore from its mere definition its existence can be concluded.’

 

anything proposed – exists as proposed –

 

if ‘substance’ is proposed – ‘substance’ exists as proposed –

 

and if proposed – the proposal ‘substance’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

if ‘substance’ is not proposed – it doesn’t exist

 

 

PROP. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes it will have.

 

Proof – This is obvious from Def..4.

 

 

a ‘thing’ – is a proposal –

 

the ‘reality’ or ‘being’ of a proposal – is the proposal put –

 

there is no ‘more’ to a proposal – than what is proposed

 

‘attributes’ – are descriptions – propositional descriptions –

 

proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the more attributes / descriptions – of a proposal – the more uncertainty to be explored

 

 

PROP. X. Each attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

 

 

Proof. – An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence (Def. 4), therefore (Def. 3) it must be conceived through itself.

 

 

Note. – Hence it appears that though two attributes are conceived really apart from each other, that is, one is conceived without the aid of the other, we cannot thence conclude that they form two entities or two different substances. For it follows from the nature of substance that each of its attributes can be conceived through itself: since all the attributes it ever had were in it at the same time, nor could one of them be produced from another, but each of them expresses the reality or being of the substance. Therefore it is far from right to call it absurd to attribute several attributes to one substance; but on the other hand, nothing is more clear than that each entity should be conceived under the effects of some attribute, and the more reality or being it has, the more attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity belong to it; so that nothing can be clearer than that an entity must be defined as absolutely infinite (as we defined it in Def. 6) which consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence. But if anyone still asks by what sign we shall be able to know the difference of substances, let him read the following Propositions, which shall show that in the nature of things only one substance exist, and it is absolutely infinite, wherefore he will ask for a sign in vain.

 

 

an ‘attribute’ – does not conceive itself

 

an attribute is conception / proposal – it is not the conceiver / propositional actor

 

an attribute is a propositional description / action

 

the ‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action –

 

a ‘substance’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘essence’ is meant a propositional description that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain – then there is no essence –

 

two attributes – are two descriptions of the one proposal

 

different proposals can be given the same description – and different proposals can be given different descriptions / attributes

 

the more descriptions put – the more propositional uncertainty to be explored –

 

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

there is no logical end to this process

 

no proposition is put outside of time – though any proposal can be put without a reference to time –

 

one proposal is different to any other another

 

 

PROP. XI. God or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence necessarily exists

 

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no attributes

 

‘substance’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any proposal put and any propositional description put is a response to the unknown –

 

and any proposal / propositional description put is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

for Spinoza ‘substance’ is a synonym for ‘God’ – and ‘God a description of his proposal ‘substance’

 

an ‘attribute’ – is a propositional description

 

there is no logical limit to the number of proposals that can be put in response to any subject proposal

 

there is no logical limit to the number of descriptions that can be put in response to a proposal

 

what exists is what is proposed –

 

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

existence is not necessary – existence is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – If you deny it, conceive it, if it to be possible, that God does not exist. Then (Ax.7) his essence does nor involve existence. But this (Prop. 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. Q.e.d

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

 

Another Proof. – A cause or reason ought to be assigned for each thing, why it exists or why it does not. E.g., if a triangle exists, the reason or cause of its existence should be granted; but if it does not exist, the reason or cause should be granted which prevents it from existing or which takes its existence from it. Now this reason or cause must be contained in the nature of the thing or outside of it. E.g., the reason why a square circle does not exist is shown by the very nature of the circle – clearly for it involves contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of a substance follows from its nature alone, for that involves existence (vide Prop.7). but the reason why a circle or a triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from their nature. From this likewise it should follow either that a triangle necessarily exists or that it is impossible that it can now exist. But these are made manifest through themselves. From which it follows that that must of necessity exist concerning which no reason or cause could prevent its existence. If thus no reason or cause can be granted which could prevent the existence of God or take his existence from him, it must certainly be concluded that he does exist of necessity. But if such a reason or cause be granted, it must be granted either in the nature of God itself or outside of it, that is, in another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, thereby it would be admitted that God is granted. But the substance of another nature has nothing in common with God (Prop. 2), and therefore can neither can give him existence or take it from him. And since the reason or cause which would take existence from God cannot be granted outside divine nature, i.e., the nature of God, it must of necessity be granted, if indeed God does not exist, in his own nature, and this would involve a contradiction. But to assert this of a being absolutely infinite and perfection all things is absurd: therefore neither within God nor without him is any cause or reason granted which could take his existence from him, and consequently God must necessarily exist. Q.e.d.

 

 

what exists is what is proposed –

 

if a triangle exists – it exists because it is proposed

 

if not proposed – it doesn’t exist

 

the reason or cause that something does not exist – is that it is not proposed

 

a proposal / proposition that involves a contradiction – proposes nothing – is not a proposal – it is a corruption of the proposal

 

if ‘substance’ exists – it exists because it is proposed

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ exists because he has proposed it –

if his God does not exist – the reason it does not exist – is that it has not been proposed –

 

no proposal or propositional action is necessary – all propositional is contingent

 

any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Another Proof. – Inability to exist is a want of power, and on the other hand, ability to exist is power (as is self-evident). If then that which now necessarily exists consists only of finite things, hence finite things are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite: and this, as is self-evident, is absurd. Therefore, either nothing exists, or a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists. But either in ourselves or in something else which exists of necessity, we also exist (vide Ax. 1, and Propo.7). Therefore a being absolutely infinite, that is (Def. 6) God, necessarily exists. Q.e.d.

 

 

that which does not exist is that which is not proposed

 

a lack of power – can only be proposed of that which does exist – of that proposed

 

there is no ‘lacking’ – in that which is not proposed – does not exist

 

furthermore – proposal or existence – is not power

 

proposal or existence is the ground or basis of power –

 

a proposal must exist to have the possibility of power –

 

a proposal’s power – rests in its use

 

power is a relative propositional relation – between propositional actions

 

i.e. –propositional action1 can be proposed as more powerful relative to propositional action 2 –

 

and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

no propositional action is necessary – all propositional action is contingent – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if nothing exists – nothing is proposed

 

we exist as proposed – by ourselves – or by others –

 

‘a being absolutely infinite’ – can be proposed –

 

and as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – In this last proof, I wished to show the existence of God a posteriori so that it might more easily be perceived, and not because the existence of God does not follow a priori from the same basis of argument. For since ability to exist is power, it follows that the more reality anything in nature has, the more power it will have to exist; and accordingly a being absolutely infinite, or God, has absolutely infinite power of existence from itself, and on that account absolutely exists. Many, however, perhaps will not be able to see the truth of this proof easily, because they are accustomed to look at and consider things which flow from external causes and of these, those which are quickly made, that is, which exist easily, they see perish easily; and on the other

hand, they judge those things to be harder to make, i.e., not existing so easily, to                                                                                                                                      which they find more attributes belong. But, in truth, to deliver them from these

prejudices I need not show here in what manner or by what reason this statement “that which is quickly made perishes easily”, is true, nor even, in considering the whole of nature, whether all things are equally difficult or not; but it suffices to note that I do not speak here of things that are made of external causes, but of substances alone which cannot be produced from any external cause. For those things which are made from external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, whatever perfection or reality they have, it is all there by reason of their external cause, and therefore their existence arises merely from the perfection of some external cause and not their own. On the other hand, whatever perfection a substance may have is due to no external cause, wherefore its existence must follow from its nature alone, which is nothing else than its essence. Perfection, then, does not take existence from a thing, but on the contrary, gives it existence; but imperfection, on the other hand, takes it away, and so we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything than of a being absolutely infinite or perfect, that is God. Now since his essence excludes all imperfection, by that very fact it removes all cause of doubt concerning his existence and makes it most certain: which will be manifest, I think, to such as pay it the least attention.

 

 

an ‘external cause’ – is a proposal – a propositional explanation – open to question –

 

existence – is neither perfect or imperfect – existence is uncertain

 

this notion of perfection – is a synonym for certainty – and is thus illogical –

 

as with ‘certainty’ – it is a propositional delusion

 

it has no relevance to rational propositional action –

 

our proposals / propositional actions are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

 

it is only ignorance that ‘removes doubt’

 

 

PROP. XII. No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided into parts.

 

 

‘substance’ – is a proposal – and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

an attribute is a description – a propositional description of a proposal

 

that it is proposed that ‘substance’ can described as ‘divided into parts’ – is a valid proposal – a legitimate critical analysis –

 

just as the proposal can be described as not divided into parts – so to the proposal can be described as divided into parts

 

if the proposal – or any descriptions of it are not held open to question – open to doubt and regarded as uncertain – then it is held illogically – it is held irrationally

 

 

Proof. – The parts into which substance can be divided will either retain the nature of the substance or not. In the first case, then (Prop. 8) each part must be infinite and (Prop. 6) its own cause, and (Prop. 5) must possess different attributes: and so from one substance several can be made, which (Prop. 6) is absurd. Again, the parts would have nothing in common with the whole (Prop. 2), and the whole (Def. 4 Prop. 10) could exist and be conceived without the parts that go to make it, which no one will doubt to be absurd. But in the second case, when the parts do not retain the nature of the substance, then, when a substance is divided into equal parts, it will lose the nature of the substance and will cease to be, which (Prop. 7) is absurd.

 

 

in response to any proposal – any number of proposals / propositional descriptions can be put –

 

and any such proposals / descriptions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

 

 

‘substance’ – can be described as ‘infinite’ and ‘indivisible’ –

 

such a propositional description – is open to question

 

and a ‘substance’ / proposal – can be described as ‘divisible’ –

 

and likewise – any such a description – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – If it is divisible, the parts into which it is divided will either retain the nature of the substance or will not. In the first case several substances would be given having the same nature, which (Prop. 5) is absurd.  In the second case, a substance absolutely infinite could cease to be (as above by Prop. 7) which is also absurd (Prop. II).

 

 

any proposal subjected to critical analysis – can be changed by this logical process – or – replaced with new propositional understandings –

 

and any new proposals put – like the subject proposal – will be open to question

 

all proposals have the same logical nature – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

two or more proposals can be described as ‘infinite’ – have the ‘attribute’ of infinity 

 

 

Corollary. – From this it follows that no substance, in so far as it is substance, can be divided into parts.

 

 

any proposal can be ‘divided’ that is modified or reproposed in a critical propositional action

 

 

Note. – That substance is indivisible can be seen more easily from this, that the nature of substance cannot be conceived except as infinite, and that by a part of a substance nothing else can be conceived than a finite substance, which (Prop. 8) involves an obvious contradiction.

 

 

if it is held that substance can only be regarded as infinite – then of course a finite substance is impossible

 

however – such a proposal is dogmatic and therefore irrational

 

furthermore – it may well be proposed that any ‘part’ of an infinity – is infinite –

 

this is the case i.e. in some presentations of set theory – i.e. – the set of infinite sets

 

 

PROP. XIV. Except God no substance can be granted or conceived.

 

 

‘God’ – is not a ‘substance’ – ‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

‘substance’ – is a proposal

 

what is being put in Prop. XIV. – is that no other proposal can be put – can be accepted – or indeed can be conceived

 

there are two problems with this –

 

firstly – Prop. XIV. – defies the fact of propositional reality –

 

we don’t as a matter of fact – operate with one proposition

 

as an empirical fact – other propositions are conceived / proposed – are put –

 

our lives are propositional – our thoughts – our actions – our creations – are proposals / propositions

 

secondly – the claim of Prop. XIV. – is illogical –

 

we have in Prop. XIV. – the pretence of certainty –

 

a proposal – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

as presented – Prop. XIV. – is not a proposal – a proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Prop. IV. – is a statement of prejudice

 

 

Proof. – As God is a being absolutely infinite, to whom no attribute expressing the essence of substance can be denied: (Def.6), and he necessarily exists (Prop. II), if any other substance than God be given, it must be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances would exist possessing the same attribute, which (Prop. 5) is absurd; and so no other substance than God can be granted, and consequently not even conceived. For if it can be conceived it must necessarily be conceived as existing, and this by the first part of the proof is absurd. Therefore except God no substance can be granted or conceived. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘argument’ here is –

 

if any other substance be given – it must be explained by some attribute of God – of the one substance – and thus – two substances would exist with the same attribute – and this is absurd

 

‘substance’ / (God) – is a proposal –

 

and it is not the only proposal we can entertain –

 

the world is the infinity of propositions

 

an attribute is a description –

 

a proposal can be described in any number of ways – and what description is proposed – is used at any time or place – is a contingent matter

 

so – it is quite possible – that two proposals – be given the same attribute – the same description

 

but this is not to say that such a description – or for that matter – any description –

 

is exhaustive – or – is what Spinoza would call ‘of the essence’ –

 

any description – any attribute – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

let us be clear too – ‘substance’  – exists – if proposed –

 

what exists is what is proposed

 

there is no limit or stricture on what can be proposed – any proposal – as such – is logically valid

 

our propositions are responses to the unknown –

 

and it can be said – they come from the unknown

 

 

Corollary I. – Hence it distinctly follows that (1) God is one alone, i.e., there is none like him, or in the nature of things only one substance can be granted, and that it is absolutely infinite, as we intimated in the note of Prop. 10.

 

 

‘there is none like him’ – any proposal is logically unique

 

‘only one substance can be granted’ – is to say there is only one proposal – and to say this is obviously and patently – absurd

 

as to – ‘absolutely infinite’ – any proposal can be described in any number of ways –

 

there is no logical limit to propositional description

 

 

Corollary II. – It follows, in the second place, that extension and thought are either attributes or modifications of attributes of God

 

 

we propose our reality

 

we can propose our reality as extension

 

and we can propose our reality as thought

 

in the absence of proposal – proposal of any kind – what we face – is the unknown –

 

we propose to make known

 

any proposal put – is open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our reality – propositional reality – is uncertain

 

our proposals – our descriptions – be they termed ‘attributes’ or ‘modifications’ – or whatever – are many and varied –

 

the possibility of proposal – of description – is endless

 

the unknown is open to all and any proposal

 

 

PROP. XV. Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

all proposal – propositional action – is a response to the unknown

 

what exists – is what is proposed –

 

no proposal is in another proposal

 

no one proposal – depends on another – for its formation –

 

a proposal exists – if proposed –

 

human reality is propositional – what we think – what we do – what we create – the world we live in – is what we propose –

 

our reality is – the proposals put – and logically speaking there is no limit to the number of propositions that can be put

 

to suggest that there is only one proposal – and that every other proposal is in that one proposal – defies propositional reality – defies logic – defies experience

 

 

Proof. – Save God no substance is granted or can be conceived (Prop. 14.) that is (Def. 3), a thing which is in itself and through itself and through itself is conceived. But modifications (Def. 5) cannot exist or be conceived without substance, wherefore these can only exist in divine nature, and through that alone be conceived. But nothing is granted save substances and their modifications (Ax. 1). Therefore nothing can exist or be conceived without God. Q.e.d.

 

 

no proposal is ‘in itself’ – and proposals do not conceive themselves –

 

a proposal has no ‘self’ –

 

propositional actors ‘conceive’ / propose – proposals / propositions

 

a ’modification’ – is a proposal

 

we propose in relation to proposals put –

 

and we modify proposals put with proposals

 

nothing is granted that is not proposed

 

 

Note. – There are some who think God to be like a man in mind and body, and liable to all passions. Yet how far this is from a true conception of God must be seen already from what has been proved. But I will pass by these people; for those who have considered divine nature in any manner have denied that God is corporeal; which they have excellently proved from the fact that by body we understand a certain quantity in length, breadth, and depth, with a certain shape, and what could be more absurd than to say this of God, a being absolutely infinite? However, from other arguments by which they try to prove this point, they show clearly that they completely separate corporeal or extended substance from divine nature and regard it as created by God. But from what divine power it could have been created they know not, which shows they do not understand what they themselves are saying. But I at least have proved with sufficient clearness, I think, that no substance can be produced or created from another (vide Coroll., Prop. 6, and Note 2, Prop. 8). Moreover (in Prop. 14) we have shown that save God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we conclude that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. But for the better and fuller explanation of this I shall refute the arguments of my opponents for all these arguments seem to return to this point. In the first place, that corporeal substance, as far as it is substance consists, they think, of parts: consequently they deny that it can

be infinite and consequently appertain to God. And this they illustrate with many

examples, from which I will select one or two. If corporeal substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived as divided into two parts; each part will be finite or infinite. If they are finite, then the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If they are infinite, then one thing is given as twice as infinite as the another, which is absurd. Or again, if an infinite distance is measured in equal feet, it would consist of an infinite number of these, or the same of it was measured in inches; and so one infinite number would be twelve times larger than another. And then if you would conceive an infinite number from any point, let two lines be drawn as AB and AC, of a fixed length at first, but increasing to infinity. It is certain that the distance between B and C will continue to increase, and from being a determined and finite distance, it will become immeasurable and infinite. They consider then that these absurdities follow from the supposition of an infinity quantity, and thence conclude that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently cannot appertain to the essence of God. The second argument also draws from the great perfection of God. For God, say they, as a being perfect in all things, cannot be passive; but corporeal substance, as it is divisible, can be passive. It follows then that this cannot appertain to the essence of God. These are the arguments that I find in the writings of many who would endeavour to prove that corporeal substance is unworthy of divine nature and cannot appertain to it. But in truth if anyone carefully attends to this, he will find that I have already answered these arguments, since they are based on this: that they suppose corporeal substance to be compose of parts, which I have shown in Prop. 12, to be absurd. Thence if any wish to consider the matter rightly, they will see that all these absurdities (if indeed they are all absurdities, for I am not disputing this now), from which they wish to conclude that extended substance is finite, follow not from the fact that an infinite quantity is supposed, but that they suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and composed of finite parts; and from the absurdities which thence follow they cannot conclude anything else than that an infinite quantity is not measurable or composed of finite parts. But this is the same as we have already shown in Prop. 12. And so the arrow which they intended for us they now direct against themselves. If, therefore, they nevertheless wish to conclude from this absurdity of theirs that extended substance is finite, they do nothing else in truth than what he would do who supposed a circle to have the properties of a square, and thence concluded that a circle did not have a centre from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For corporeal substance which can only be conceived as infinite, without like and indivisible, they conceive, in order to prove it finite, to be composed of finite parts, and to be multiplex and divisible. Thus also others, having pretended that a line is composed of points, can find many arguments wherewith to show that a line cannot be infinitely divided. And indeed it is no less absurd to suppose that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts than to suppose that a body is composed of surfaces, or surfaces of lines, and lines of points. But this all must confess who know clear reason to be infallible, and more especially those who deny the possibility of a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be divided so that its parts were distinct, why could not one part be annihilated while the others remain united as before? and why should they all be adjusted lest a vacuum be made? For clearly of things which in reality are reciprocally distinct from each other, one can exist without the other and can remain in the same condition. Since nature abhors a vacuum (of which more is to be said), and all parts must so concur as to prevent the formation of a vacuum, it follows that the parts of a corporeal substance cannot really be distinguished one from the other, that is, corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot be divided into parts. If anyone should still ask why we are so

prone by nature to divide quantities, I would make answer to him that, that quantity is

conceived by us in two manners, to wit, abstractly and superficially, as an offspring of imagination or as a substance, which is done by the intellect alone. If, then, we look at quantity as it is in the imagination, which we often and very easily do, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we look at it as it is in the intellect and conceive it, in so far as it is a substance, which is done with great difficulty, then we have already sufficiently shown, it ill be found to be infinite, without like and indivisible. This to all those who know how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect will be quite clear: for especially if attention is paid to this, that matter is the same everywhere, and its parts cannot be distinguished one from the other except in so far as we conceive matter to be modified in different modes, whence its parts are distinguished one from the other in mode but not in reality. E.g., we can conceive water, in so far as it is water, to be divided and its parts separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is a corporeal substance, for then it is neither separated or divided. Again, water, in so far as it is water, can be made and destroyed, but in so far as it is substance it can neither be made or destroyed. And thus I think I have answered the second argument, since it is also founded on this, that matter, in so far as it is substance is divisible and composed of parts. And though this should not be so, I know not why substance should be unworthy of the divine nature, for (Prop. 14) beyond God no substance can be given by which it would be affected. Everything, I say, is in God, and all things which are made, are made by the laws of the infinite nature of God, and necessarily follow from the necessity of his essence (as I shall soon show). And therefore no reason can be given by which it can be said that God is passive to anything else than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of divine nature, though it be supposed to be divisible, as long as it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But I have said enough of this at present.

 

‘There are some who think God to be like a man in mind and body, and liable to all passions. Yet how far this is from a true conception of God must be seen already from what has been proved. But I will pass by these people; for those who have considered divine nature in any manner have denied that God is corporeal; which they have excellently proved from the fact that by body we understand a certain quantity in length, breadth, and depth, with a certain shape, and what could be more absurd than to say this of God, a being absolutely infinite?’

 

‘There are some who think God to be like a man in mind and body, and liable to all passions.’

 

Spinoza’s own argument – actually suggest this –

 

if there is only one substance – God – and everything is in God – then everything – including mind – body – passions – is of God –

 

if extension is an attribute of God – and the body is an extended thing – then is not God – an extended thing?

 

and is not ‘absolutely infinite’ – is not ‘infinite’ – as in ‘continuous’ – a form of measurement?

 

you can say God is a being absolutely infinite – but really – is that a definition?

 

for surely a definition – by its nature marks out limits – sets a boundary –

 

as I understand Spinoza – his ‘substance’ – his ‘God’ – is limitless – without boundary

 

and if so – this ‘substance / God’ – is literally – indefinable

 

indefinable – might suit mystics – but not logicians –

 

for indefinable comes off as – incoherent and meaningless

 

‘However, from other arguments by which they try to prove this point, they show clearly that they completely separate corporeal or extended substance from divine nature and regard it as created by God. But from what divine power it could have been created they know not, which shows they do not understand what they themselves are saying.’

 

Spinoza has a point here – how do those who say God creates corporal or extended substance – explain it – what account do they give?

 

however – it can also be asked – does Spinoza explain the workings of his God – the eternal and infinite – perfect substance –

 

or is it just that he proposes this God – and dogmatically holds to this proposal – and then proceeds to elaborate it?

 

point being either God – Spinoza’s or the God he argues against – when all is said and done – is without explanation

 

and if so Spinoza’s criticism – comes off as something of a cheap shot

 

another point –

 

the view of God that Spinoza argues against here – separates God and man – and is on the face it an argument for why God does not have the characteristics of man –

 

and on the face of it – therefore – it seems to me – a better argument than Spinoza’s to this conclusion

 

‘But I at least have proved with sufficient clearness, I think, that no substance can be produced or created from another (vide Coroll., Prop. 6, and Note 2, Prop. 8). Moreover (in Prop. 14) we have shown that save God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we conclude that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God.’

 

you could accept this argument – but still hold – ‘God is like a man in mind and body’

 

for nothing exists – that is not God – and therefore – any description of anything – is a description of God

 

‘But for the better and fuller explanation of this I shall refute the arguments of my opponents for all these arguments seem to return to this point. In the first place, that corporeal substance, as far as it is substance consists, they think, of parts: consequently they deny that it can be infinite and consequently appertain to God. And this they illustrate with many examples, from which I will select one or two. If corporeal substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived as divided into two parts; each part will be finite or infinite. If they are finite, then the infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If they are infinite, then one thing is given as twice as infinite as the another, which is absurd.’

 

if corporeal substance is described as infinite – can it be divided into parts?

 

division into parts will be – whatever the nature of the substance – however the substance is described – a propositional action

 

the fact is we perform this action – as it can be useful – useful for operating with – dealing with whatever is proposed

 

you could well accept that the reality is infinite – and at the same time recognise that in order to deal with it – division into parts can make practical sense

 

and if you take this view then the description ‘infinity’ – effectively drops out of the calculation

 

it is not relevant

 

and so – the description ‘infinite’ – while on a metaphysical level – may well be satisfying – on a functional level – is effectively useless

 

so here we are talking about different categories of description – different propositional uses

 

my general point here is that any proposal – can be given any number of different descriptions – none of which are essential or exhaustive –

 

different descriptions – have different functions – different uses

 

and logically speaking – any such description – and any proposal of relation between descriptions – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘Or again, if an infinite distance is measured in equal feet, it would consist of an infinite number of these, or the same if it was measured in inches; and so one infinite number would be twelve times larger than another. And then if you would conceive an infinite number from any point, let two lines be drawn as AB and AC, of a fixed length at first, but increasing to infinity. It is certain that the distance between B and C will continue to increase, and from being a determined and finite distance, it will become immeasurable and infinite. They consider then that these absurdities follow from the supposition of an infinity quantity, and thence conclude that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently cannot appertain to the essence of God.’

 

‘one infinite number would be twelve times larger than another’

 

it is rather that the numbers here – are calculated in different terms – feet and inches

 

and really – calculating ‘infinite numbers’ – is just a mathematical game –

 

and ironically – a way indeed of dividing into parts

 

the very point of the proposal of infinity – as usually understood – and I think understood by Spinoza – is that – that which is infinite – is immeasurable – is beyond calculation

 

Spinoza describes ‘substance’ as infinite and eternal – and he is arguing against those who describe ‘substance’ as finite

 

this description – ‘infinite’ – has a use in a metaphysical context –

 

but it is not the only possible description –

 

the point being that to understand our reality and to function in it – no one description will be sufficient – no one description will address the propositional issues we are faced with

 

Spinoza’s proposal of an infinite substance might be a good covering note for reality

 

but it is not an adequate description

 

‘The second argument also draws from the great perfection of God. For God, say they, as a being perfect in all things, cannot be passive; but corporeal substance, as it is divisible, can be passive. It follows then that this cannot appertain to the essence of God.’

 

in Spinoza’s proposal ‘substance’ / ‘God – is infinite and eternal – and anything that exists in God – is either an attribute of substance or a mode of substance –

 

therefore – on this argument – corporality or extension – is of God –

 

perhaps the argument from passivity – really just comes from a failure to comprehend the physics and chemistry of corporeal reality – and the failure to understand that nature – by its nature – is active

 

and the point to be noted here – is that this is the case whether you propose / describe corporality as ‘infinite’ or ‘finite’

 

‘Thence if any wish to consider the matter rightly, they will see that all these absurdities (if indeed they are all absurdities, for I am not disputing this now), from which they wish to conclude that extended substance is finite, follow not from the fact that an infinite quantity is supposed, but that they suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and composed of finite parts; and from the absurdities which thence follow they cannot conclude anything else than that an infinite quantity is not measurable or composed of finite parts.’

 

the ‘infinite’ – by definition is immeasurable –

 

if substance amounts to this – immeasurability –

 

then it will be a concept that is of little or no use to us –

 

in practical terms ‘immeasurability’ – amounts to ‘useless’

 

‘But this all must confess who know clear reason to be infallible, and more especially those who deny the possibility of a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be divided so that its parts were distinct, why could not one part be annihilated while the others remain united as before? and why should they all be adjusted lest a vacuum be made? For clearly of things which in reality are reciprocally distinct from each other, one can exist without the other and can remain in the same condition. Since nature abhors a vacuum (of which more is to be said), and all parts must so concur as to prevent the formation of a vacuum, it follows that the parts of a corporeal substance cannot really be distinguished one from the other, that is, corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot be divided into parts.’

 

the claim that ‘nature abhors a vacuum’ – is simply a reassertion – without argument – of Spinoza’s proposal that corporeal substance cannot be divided into parts

 

in any case – how relevant is the ‘no vacuum’ claim here?

 

I would suggest that the idea of dividing corporeal substance into parts – makes perfect sense even if you accept Spinoza’s continuum argument / no vacuum claim

 

the fact is – we perform the propositional action of division – because this action is useful to us –

 

and that is to say – you would divide things – and distinguish things – even if you hold that corporeal substance is a continuum – or you held that nature allows a vacuum

 

and it is no good saying this action is illusory – it is what happens – it is what we do

 

Spinoza’s perspective is metaphysical – and I have no problem with that – it is perfectly valid – however there is no obligation to view the proposal of substance or corporeal substance in this way – no obligation

 

the proposal is open to question – open to interpretation –

 

and so – it can be approached – is any number of ways – the possibilities – are effectively endless – and there is no one approach that is comprehensive and complete

 

what I am suggesting here – is that it is quite legitimate to see the matter in non-metaphysical terms – to see the matter in very practical terms –

 

and this is the propositional reality I think Spinoza fails to understand

 

the way to go in any rational discussion – is to realise that there will be no propositional account that is beyond question –

 

and so – as many perspectives as possible – should be brought to bear – none of which are beyond question – beyond doubt or certain

 

how we propose – how we describe – how we understand – is an open matter – and remains open – regardless of any propositional perspective or argument – we operate with – at any particular time

 

which propositional perspective we go with – which argument we prosecute – at any one time – will be determined by our interests and our needs – and these are never fixed

 

so – in relation to the vacuum – the question is – in what sense does a vacuum exist – and in what propositional contexts does the notion of vacuum – or some form of it – function?

 

what Spinoza is really saying here – is that the vacuum proposal has no place – has no function in his propositional structure

 

the fact is though – there are other metaphysical theories where the vacuum proposal does function

 

and that is the reality – no one proposal – or theory – will fit all philosophical contexts

 

but this does not mean that any proposal can be regarded as illegitimate –

 

and no one philosophical context – or theory – will suit all purposes – will cover all bases

 

by the way – if by ‘substance’ – one was to mean ‘space’ – if that was what is regarded as infinite and endless – the notion of the vacuum as any empty space – a void – works perfectly well

 

and this all comes down to how you propose ‘substance’ –

 

and the logical reality is that any proposal here – any description – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘If anyone should still ask why we are so prone by nature to divide quantities, I would make answer to him that, that quantity is conceived by us in two manners, to wit, abstractly and superficially, as an offspring of imagination or as a substance, which is done by the intellect alone. If, then, we look at quantity as it is in the imagination, which we often and very easily do, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we look at it as it is in the intellect and conceive it, in so far as it is a substance, which is done with great difficulty, then we have already sufficiently shown, it will be found to be infinite, without like and indivisible. This to all those who know how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect will be quite clear: for especially if attention is paid to this, that matter is the same everywhere, and its parts cannot be distinguished one from the other except in so far as we conceive matter to be modified in different modes, whence its parts are distinguished one from the other in mode but not in reality. E.g., we can conceive water, in so far as it is water, to be divided and its parts separated one from the other;

but not in so far as it is a corporeal substance, for then it is neither separated or

divided. Again, water, in so far as it is water, can be made and destroyed, but in so far as it is substance it can neither be made or destroyed. And thus I think I have answered the second argument, since it is also founded on this, that matter, in so far as it is substance is divisible and composed of parts.’

 

‘If anyone should still ask why we are so prone by nature to divide quantities, I would make answer to him that, that quantity is conceived by us in two manners, to wit, abstractly and superficially, as an offspring of imagination or as a substance, which is done by the intellect alone. If, then, we look at quantity as it is in the imagination, which we often and very easily do, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we look at it as it is in the intellect and conceive it, in so far as it is a substance, which is done with great difficulty, then we have already sufficiently shown, it will be found to be infinite, without like and indivisible.’

 

there is no logical distinction between ‘intellect’ and ‘imagination’

 

‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘imagination’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

any propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt -and uncertain

 

‘quantity’ – as with any proposal can be variously interpreted

 

what Spinoza calls the ‘imaginative’ understanding of quantity – is the scientific understanding – that a quantity is measurable – and divisible –

 

it is this understanding that we operate with – because it is functional and useful

 

as to the idea that quantity is infinite and indivisible –

 

such a ‘quantity’ is not measurable – and if ‘it’ is not measurable –

 

how is it a quantity?

 

‘This to all those who know how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect will be quite clear: for especially if attention is paid to this, that matter is the same everywhere, and its parts cannot be distinguished one from the other except in so far as we conceive matter to be modified in different modes, whence its parts are distinguished one from the other in mode but not in reality. E.g., we can conceive water, in so far as it is water, to be divided and its parts separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is a corporeal substance, for then it is neither separated or divided. Again, water, in so far as it is water, can be made and destroyed, but in so far as it is substance it can neither be made or destroyed. And thus I think I have answered the second argument, since it is also founded on this, that matter, in so far as it is substance is divisible and composed of parts.’

 

‘its parts distinguished in mode but not in reality’

 

on this view – natural science – which distinguishes ‘parts’ of the natural world – ‘one

 

from the other’ – and critically investigates these ‘natural parts’ – must be seen as ‘not in reality’

 

and as to the water argument – yes you can divide or not divide – and what you do will all depend on how you want to use the proposal ‘water’

 

‘And though this should not be so, I know not why substance should be unworthy of the divine nature, for (Prop. 14) beyond God no substance can be given by which it would be affected. Everything, I say, is in God, and all things which are made, are made by the laws of the infinite nature of God, and necessarily follow from the necessity of his essence (as I shall soon show). And therefore no reason can be given by which it can be said that God is passive to anything else than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of divine nature, though it be supposed to be divisible, as long as it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But I have said enough of this at present.’

 

if ‘everything is in God’ – then God / ‘everything’ – is passive

 

for there is nothing outside of God – to be acted upon

 

and what is in God – ‘everything’ – is God passive

 

and – if everything is in God – divisibility is in God

 

 

PROP. XVI. Infinite things in infinite modes (that is, all things which can fall under the heading of infinite intellect) must necessarily follow from the necessity of divine nature.

 

 

things and modes are proposals

 

‘infinite’ here – is a descriptive proposal – of things modes – and intellect

 

my question is whether the descriptive proposal ‘infinite’ – actually describes anything at all

 

if a ‘thing’ is described as ‘infinite’ – how is it a ‘thing’?

 

point being you would think – that a thing has definition – i.e. – an exact limit – a boundary – is distinct and determinate –

 

if a ‘thing’ is described as ‘infinite’ – it has none of these properties

 

you can adopt the ‘infinite’ description – but if so – you lose the ‘thing’

 

and this same argument applies to ‘mode’ and ‘intellect’

 

‘must necessarily follow from the necessity of divine nature’

 

a proposition is said to be ‘necessary’ – if it is certain –

 

this view of the proposition is illogical –

 

a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

uncertain – not necessary

 

in fact – the notion of a necessary proposition – is a corruption of logic –

 

the notion of necessity is a logical corruption

 

‘divine nature’ – is a proposal –

 

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

no proposal follows from another

 

proposals are put to proposals – we propose in relation to proposals –

 

proposals do not generate proposals

 

at best – the idea of necessity here – is nothing more than a game – a language game – the syllogistic game

 

a game is a rule governed propositional activity

 

the rule of the syllogistic game is that the conclusion of an argument follows from the premises –

 

and in such a format – the conclusion is contained in the premises –

 

there is no real ‘argument’ in a syllogism – it is nothing but the major premise restated – reformulated – as the conclusion –

 

and is therefore best seen as – a rhetorical play with language

 

and this I think – in the end – will be the fate of Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’

 

 

Proof. – This proposition must be manifest to everyone who will but consider this, that from a given definition of everything the intellect gathers certain properties, which in truth necessarily follow from the definition (that is, the very essence of the thing), and so the more reality the definition of a thing expresses. i.e., the more reality the definition of a thing involves, the more properties the intellect will gather. But as divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes, each of which expresses an infinite essence of its kind, infinite things in infinite modes (that is, all things that fall under the heading of infinite intellect) must necessarily follow from its necessity, Q.e.d.

 

 

what is real is what is proposed

 

‘the more reality the definition of thing expresses’ – is – the descriptive proposals put in relation to a subject proposal –

 

the more descriptive proposals put – the more avenues of uncertainty to be explored

 

infinite attributes – is ‘infinite descriptions’

 

in logical terms – there is no end to the number of descriptions that can be put in relation to a proposal –

 

but this is not to say that a proposal – generates its own descriptions

 

in practical terms there will be an operational / pragmatic limit to the number of descriptions that are put in relation to a proposal –

 

we describe – in order to use a proposal – to put proposal to work –

 

so – at some point in the critical propositional activity – a decision will be made to cease the critical discovery phase – and to move on to the propositional action phase – to putting the description to use –

 

and any proposition put to use – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to the ‘infinite intellect’ –

 

the ‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action

 

a propositional action is not endless – is not indefinite – is not infinite

 

 

Corollary I. – Hence it follows that God is the effecting cause of all things which can be perceived by infinite intellect.

 

 

there is no ‘infinite intellect’ –

 

there is no infinite propositional action

 

 

Corollary II. – Hence it follows that God is the cause through himself, and not indeed by accident.

 

 

‘God’ is a proposal –

 

a proposal does not propose / cause itself

 

and if you want to see the matter in terms of necessity and accident – there is no necessity – therefore – only accident

 

 

Corollary III. – Hence it follows that God is absolutely the first cause.

 

 

as to God as ‘first cause’ –

 

if you are going down this causal route – the question is – what is the cause of God?

 

is not Spinoza’s God – an infinite causal chain –

 

and if so – there is no first cause

 

and if you need a first cause to kick off infinity –

 

that’s the end of infinity

 

 

PROP. XVII. God acts merely according to his own laws, and is compelled by no one.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown does not make laws – and is not compelled

 

the reality we face – that we deal with – is propositional –

 

‘laws’ are proposals – proposals – human beings / propositional actors put – to order propositional reality

 

‘law’ proposals – as with any proposal – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

laws are uncertain

 

a proposed law – does not compel – anyone or anything

 

 

Proof. – That infinite things must follow from the mere necessity of divine nature, or what is the same thing, by the mere laws of divine nature, we have just shown (Prop. 16), and (Prop. 15) we have shown that nothing can be conceived without God, but that everything exists in God. Therefore nothing outside God can exist by which he could be determined or compelled in his actions; and therefore God acts merely according to the laws of his nature, and is compelled by no one. Q.e.d.

 

 

first up – there are no ‘infinite things’ – a thing – if it is a ‘thing’ – has definition – limits – boundaries

 

the ‘infinite’ – just is the absence of definition – of limits – of boundaries

 

hence – Spinoza’s ‘infinite thing’ – is a contradiction

 

no proposition necessarily follows from another proposition

 

propositions are simply put – and responded to with propositions

 

and if you wish to argue that a proposal follows from a proposal – that there is an implication relation – by all means do so – just recognise that your proposal – is open

 

to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

not ‘necessary’ – uncertain –

 

as to ‘divine nature –

 

for Spinoza divine nature – is God – is reality

 

reality is propositional –

 

there is no outside of propositional reality – but the unknown – there is no inside of propositional reality

 

our reality just is – that which is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

that is – reality is a proposition

 

a proposition does not compel

 

 

Corollary I. – Hence it follows that no cause can be given except the perfection of God’s nature which extrinsically or intrinsically incites him to action.

 

 

how is it that God’s nature extrinsically incites him to act?

 

the usual understanding of ‘extrinsic’ – is – that which is not part of the essential nature of someone or something – and therefore that which is external to that nature

 

Spinoza’s God is all there is – there is nothing else – and so nothing extrinsic to his nature – nothing external to ‘his’ nature

 

so how does ‘extrinsic’ square with Spinoza’s definition of God?

 

and if God needs to be ‘incited’ to action i.e. – ‘he’ is not naturally or always active – then presumably – in the absence of incitement – God is passive –

 

again – Spinoza asserts in a number of places that God is not passive

 

human beings can be seen as active and passive – and beings who can be incited –

 

is man a model for God?

 

in the note to Prop. XV. – Spinoza begins with –

 

‘There are some who think God to be like man in mind and body, and liable to passions’ –

 

and he then goes on to argue against this view –

 

Corollary I here – suggests that in fact man is a model for God – 

 

but if so – there is a problem with Spinoza’s definition of God – for who is going to say that man’s nature is perfect?

 

and furthermore – wouldn’t you say that a nature that can be incited –

 

is a nature that is passionate?

 

 

Corollary II. – Hence it follows that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists from the necessity of his own nature (Prop. II and Coroll.1. Prop. 14) and by the mere necessity of his nature he acts (prev. Prop.). And therefore (Def.7) he is the only free cause.

 

 

basically – Spinoza uses a causal argument to explain reality – but comes to the point where causation runs out – and instead of seeing that the argument of his metaphysics cannot be maintained – that it is a failure –  pretends that the failure of his argument is in fact its success – and to rescue this notion of cause here – he proposes the phrase ‘free cause’ – which means – no cause –

 

it is really at this point that Spinoza comes up with the notion of infinity –

 

‘substance’ is infinite – reality is endless

 

if you take the view that God is infinite – no problem with cause – you can effectively drop the causal argument –

 

that’s all very well – but a lot goes with it

 

for one – substance – God – everything – no longer has definition – for to have definition – you have to have limit and boundary

 

and limit and boundary – went out the window with cause

 

we propose in relation to the unknown – we propose to defy the unknown

 

our proposals – our proposition – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

which is to say we never stop facing the unknown

 

different propositional structures provide us with different proposals for a known reality

 

Spinoza’s metaphysics is one such proposal –

 

and it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – Others think that God is a free cause because they think he can bring it to pass that those things which we say follow from his nature, that is, which are in his power, should not be made, or that they should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they said that God can bring it to pass that it should not follow from the nature

of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles, or that from a given

cause no effect should follow, which is absurd. For further on, without the aid of this

proposition, I shall show that intellect and will do not appertain to the nature of God. I am well aware that there are many who say they can show that the greatest intellect and free will appertain to the nature of God: for they say they know nothing more perfect to attribute to God than that which among us is the greatest perfection. Further, although they conceive God’s intellect as having the greatest perception of things in action, yet they do not believe he can bring about the existence of everything which his intellect perceives in action: for they think they would thus destroy the power of God. They say that if he was to create everything his intellect perceives, he would not be able to create anything more, which they think opposed to the omnipotence of God; and accordingly they prefer to state that God is indifferent to all things, and creates nothing else than that which he determines to create by his own free will. But I think I have sufficiently shown (vide Prop.16) that from God’s supreme power or infinite nature, infinite things in infinite modes, that is all things, necessarily flow, or always follow from the necessity; in the same manner it also follows from the nature of a triangle from eternity to eternity that the three angles will be equal to two right angles. Wherefore God’s omnipotence was in action from eternity, and will remain in the same state of action through all eternity. And in this manner, in my opinion, the perfection of God’s omnipotence is asserted to be far greater. Indeed, the opponents of this view seem to deny (to speak freely) the omnipotence of God. For they are obliged to confess that God’s intellect perceives many things that could be created which nevertheless he cannot ever create. Because otherwise, if he created all that his intellect perceived, he would, according them, exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect. As, therefore, they say that God is perfect, they are reduced to state at the same time that he cannot complete all those things to which his power extends; and anything more absurd than this or more opposed to the omnipotence of God I cannot imagine could be conceived. Moreover, (as I would like to say something concerning the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God, something far else must be understood by these two attributes than what is commonly understood by men. For intellect and will, which would constitute the essence of God, must differ toto coelo from our will and intellect, nor can they agree in anything except name, nor anymore than the dog, as a heavenly body, and the dog as a barking animal, agree. This I shall show in the following manner. If intellect appertains to divine nature, it cannot, as with our intellect, be posterior (as many would have it) or even simultaneous in nature with the things conceived by the intellect since (Coroll. 1, Prop. 16) God is prior in cause alike in all things: but on the other hand, truth and the formal essence of things are such, because they do so exist objectively in God’s intellect. Wherefore the intellect of God, as far as it can be conceived to form his essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of their essence and their existence: which seems to have been noticed by those who have asserted that God’s intellect, will, and power are one in the same thing. Now as God’s intellect is the only cause of things, i.e., the cause of their essence and their existence, it must necessarily differ from in respect to its essence and in respect to its existence. For that which is caused differs from its cause precisely in that which it has from its cause. E.g., a man is the cause of existence but not the cause of essence of another man. (For the latter is an eternal truth): and so they can certainly agree in essence, but in existence they must differ, and on that account, if the existence of one of them perish, that of the other does not consequently perish; but if the essence of one of them could be destroyed or be made false, the essence of the other must also be destroyed. On this account a thing that is the cause of the essence and existence of any effect must

differ from that effect not in respect to its essence and in respect to existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause of the essence and existence of our intellect: and therefore God’s intellect, in so far as it can be conceived to form part of his essence, differs from our intellect both in respect to its essence and in respect to its existence, nor in any other thing save name can agree with it, which we wish to prove. And the argument concerning will would proceed in the same manner, as can easily be seen.

 

 

‘Others think that God is a free cause because they think he can bring it to pass that those things which we say follow from his nature, that is, which are in his power, should not be made, or that they should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they said that God can bring it to pass that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles, or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.’

 

the proposal that ‘God’ is a free cause – is as with any proposal – is legitimate –

 

and is – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

Spinoza’s criticism of this proposal – I think does not work

 

the triangle is a mathematical construction – and as such a rule governed propositional game

 

the triangle was invented – the game was proposed –

 

you can play the game or not play the game –

 

it is as with any other rule governed propositional game – a human invention

 

as played – its rules are not open to question

 

if the rules are questioned – are disputed – there is no game

 

‘For further on, without the aid of this proposition, I shall show that intellect and will do not appertain to the nature of God. I am well aware that there are many who say they can show that the greatest intellect and free will appertain to the nature of God: for they say they know nothing more perfect to attribute to God than that which among us is the greatest perfection.’

 

Spinoza argues that all is God – and all is in God – therefore it would seem that if there is intellect and will – it is in God

 

‘Further, although they conceive God’s intellect as having the greatest perception of things in action, yet they do not believe he can bring about the existence of everything which his intellect perceives in action: for they think they would thus destroy the power of God. They say that if he was to create everything his intellect perceives, he would not be able to create anything more, which they think opposed to the omnipotence of God; and accordingly they prefer to state that God is indifferent to all things, and creates nothing else than that which he determines to create by his own free will.’

 

‘God’ – is a name for unknown – the unknown has no characteristics

 

there is no intellect – in the unknown

 

‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional action

 

propositional actors engage in propositional action –

 

what is ‘brought about’ is proposal / propositional action

 

what exists – is what is proposed by propositional actors

 

 

‘Wherefore God’s omnipotence was in action from eternity, and will remain in the same state of action through all eternity. And in this manner, in my opinion, the perfection of God’s omnipotence is asserted to be far greater. Indeed, the opponents of this view seem to deny (to speak freely) the omnipotence of God. For they are obliged to confess that God’s intellect perceives many things that could be created which nevertheless he cannot ever create. Because otherwise, if he created all that his intellect perceived, he would, according them, exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect. As, therefore, they say that God is perfect, they are reduced to state at the same time that he cannot complete all those things to which his power extends; and anything more absurd than this or more opposed to the omnipotence of God I cannot imagine could be conceived.’

 

whoever ‘they’ are – Spinoza is right here – they do not understand the concept of omnipotence –

 

however – there is a question here for Spinoza –

 

does his use of this concept of omnipotence – actually support his argument concerning God?

 

if God’s omnipotence and creativity was in action from eternity and remains in the same state – and is never exhausted – then surely Spinoza must recognize the possibility – if not the reality of other worlds – other realities – and an infinity of them?

 

and if so – he must see that we don’t know all that there is – that our reality is just one of many possible realities –

 

Spinoza never took this step to possible worlds

 

instead – he argued that this world – this reality – is all that there is –

 

yes – it has infinite attributes – but this reality is all there is

 

and if so – then it would seem – that it is Spinoza that puts the brakes on his God

 

it must also be pointed out here – that regardless of whether it is used correctly or incorrectly – this notion of omnipotence is illogical –

 

there is no complete knowledge

 

any claim to knowledge – any claim of knowledge – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – and therefore – incomplete

 

this claim of omnipotence – is epistemological rubbish – pretence of the most audacious kind

 

and furthermore – what sense can we make of the idea of God / substance – reality itself knowing – having knowledge?

 

yes – there is knowledge in reality – in nature – the proposals and propositional structures of human beings – of propositional actors – but there is no evidence that knowledge exists in the rest of nature

 

‘Moreover, (as I would like to say something concerning the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God, something far else must be understood by these two attributes than what is commonly understood by men. For intellect and will, which would constitute the essence of God, must differ toto coelo from our will and intellect, nor can they agree in anything except name, nor any more than the dog, as a heavenly body, and the dog as a barking animal, agree.’

 

must differ toto coelo?

 

Spinoza argues – his God is everything – and everything is in God –

 

in that everything is in and of God – according to Spinoza – our intellect and will is in and of God

 

Spinoza says that our intellect and will must differ entirely from God’s

 

why must it be the case that there is a difference?

 

just asserting that it must be the case – doesn’t mean it is the case

 

this use of ‘must’ here – is pure rhetoric

 

if this God’s intellect and will – is totally different to human intellect and will – how would we know this?

 

and furthermore – how do we know that God’s intellect and will even exists?

 

and if God’s intellect and will is different – how is it different?

 

and if God’s intellect and will is totally and completely different – what sense then can we give to the use of the terms ‘intellect and will’ in relation to God?

 

effectively we are talking about something we have no knowledge of – and therefore cannot identify –

 

Spinoza says his God’s intellect and will and our intellect and will agree only in name

 

ok – if so – then it could be argued that ‘God’s intellect and will’ is just another name for our intellect and will

 

and furthermore – that his ‘God’ – is just another name – nothing more

 

 another name for the reality that we know and experience

 

Spinoza wants to argue that God’s intellect and will is greater than ours

 

even among human beings we find variation in intellect and will – but no one would argue that these differences in intellect and will – mean that intellects and wills are essentially different – are toto coelo

 

‘This I shall show in the following manner. If intellect appertains to divine nature, it cannot, as with our intellect, be posterior (as many would have it) or even simultaneous in nature with the things conceived by the intellect since (Coroll. 1, Prop. 16) God is prior in cause alike in all things: but on the other hand, truth and the formal essence of things are such, because they do so exist objectively in God’s intellect. Wherefore the intellect of God, as far as it can be conceived to form his essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of their essence and their existence: which seems to have been noticed by those who have asserted that God’s intellect, will, and power are one in the same thing. Now as God’s intellect is the only cause of things, i.e., the cause of their essence and their existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence and in respect to its existence. For that which is caused differs from its cause precisely in that which it has from its cause. E.g., a man is the cause of existence but not the cause of essence of another man. (For the latter is an eternal truth): and so they can certainly agree in essence, but in existence they must differ, and on that account, if the existence of one of them perish, that of the other does not consequently perish; but if the essence of one of them could be destroyed or be made false, the essence of the other must also be destroyed. On this account a thing that is the cause of the essence and existence of any effect must differ from that effect not in respect to its essence and in respect to existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause of the essence and existence of our intellect: and therefore God’s intellect, in so far as it can be conceived to form part of his essence, differs from our intellect both in respect to its essence and in respect to its existence, nor in any other thing save name can agree with it, which we wish to prove. And the argument concerning will would proceed in the same manner, as can easily be seen.’

 

yes – in terms of cause and effect – we see that that the cause is distinct from the effect – but cannot it not be said that the effect is the expression of the cause –

 

in the same manner in which according to Spinoza a mode – or modification – is an expression of substance?

 

and so – in so far as cause and effect are seen as distinct – can it not be said this perception – is in fact a superficial understanding of the relation?

 

and as to a man being the cause of another man’s existence – but not the essence of another man –

 

if the essence of a man – is his existence – then the existence of man – is his essence

 

and so – either ‘essence’ here adds nothing to ‘existence’ – or ‘existence’ adds nothing to ‘essence’

 

in terms of Spinoza’s question of the relation between God’s intellect and ours –

 

if there is a real relationship – then our intellect is an expression of God’s intellect –

 

and any distinction between God and man – is therefore – superficial

 

‘And the argument concerning will would proceed in the same manner, as can easily be seen’

 

‘intellect’ and ‘will’ are names for human propositional action

 

 

Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of things.

 

 

Proof. – All things that are in God, and through God must be conceived (Prop.15), and therefore (Prop. 16, Coroll.1) God is the cause of all things which are in him: which is the first point. Again, beyond God no substance, that is (Def. 3), a thing which outside God is in itself, can be granted (Prop. 14): which was the second point. Therefore God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

 

 

‘God is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown is not the indwelling cause of anything

 

‘all things’ – are proposals –

 

to suggest that all proposals are in the proposal ‘God’ – is to put that there is only one proposal –

 

such a suggestion is patently and obviously false

 

 

Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal.

 

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

our proposals / propositional descriptions (attributes) are a response to the unknown

 

no proposal / propositional description is eternal – is outside of time –

 

all propositional action is in time

 

 

Proof. – God (Def. 6) is a substance, which (Prop.11) necessarily exists, that is (Prop. 7), to whose nature existence appertains, or (what is the same thing) from whose

definition existence itself follows: accordingly (Def. 8) it is eternal. Again, by the attributes of God must be understood that which (Def. 4) expresses the essence of divine substance, that is, that which appertains to substance; that itself, I say, the attributes must involve. But eternity (as I have shown from Prop. 7) appertains to the nature of substance. Therefore each of the attributes must involve eternity, and therefore, they are all eternal. Q.e,d.

 

 

according to Spinoza – God is substance – why?

 

why isn’t substance – just substance?

 

and one cannot help but think that equating ‘substance’ to ‘God’ – is a move designed to hold onto at least some aspects of the traditional notion of God – i.e. – a God that is all powerful and all knowing

 

substance just is – and on a bare interpretation – just does what it does – and is neither omnipotent nor omniscient –

 

if Spinoza had just stuck with substance – there would be no reason to propose ‘God’

 

for Spinoza ‘God’ is an unnecessary proposal

 

 

Note. – The proposition is also most clearly shown which I used to prove the existence of God. From that proof, I say, it is certain that the existence of God, that is, his essence, is an eternal truth. Again, in the principles of Cartesian philosophy (Part1 Prop. 19) I proved the existence of God in another way, but it is not necessary to repeat it here.

 

 

what exists is what is proposed

 

if Spinoza’s ‘God’ is proposed – his God exists –

 

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XX. God’s existence and his essence are one in the same thing.

 

 

Proof. – God (prev. Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (Def. 8) each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of God, which (Def 4) explain the eternal essence of God, explain at the same time his existence, that is whatever forms the essence of God, forms also his existence: therefore the essence and existence of God are one and the same thing. Q.e.d.

 

 

Corollary I – Hence it follows that the existence of God, like his essence, is an eternal truth.

 

Corollary II – Hence it follows that God and all his attributes are immutable. For if they were changed with regard to existence. they must also (prev. Prop.) be changed with regard to essence, that is (as is self-evident), falsehood would be made from truth, which is absurd.

 

 

for Spinoza – God’s existence and essence are one in the same

 

if ‘existence’ and ‘essence’ are one in the same – what is the point of positing ‘essence’ –

 

what does it add to existence?

 

essence here – seems – at the very least inessential –

 

if not entirely unnecessary and irrelevant

 

it is as if Spinoza fears that without ‘essence’ – existence comes off as – empty – as without substance

 

what exists – is what is proposed

 

Spinoza proposes ‘God’ – therefore – his God exists –

 

however – such a proposal as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

and let’s be clear – if by ‘essence’ – you mean an attribute – a description – that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain –

 

logically speaking – there is no such thing –

 

to propose such an ‘essence’ – is to propose – ignorance

 

a true proposition – is one that is affirmed – by whoever – for whatever reason –

 

no affirmation is eternal

 

God and all his attributes are immutable?

 

is to say that the Spinoza’s proposal ‘God’ – and any descriptions put in relation to the proposal – are set in stone –

 

not open to question – not open to doubt – and – certain

 

any such proposal is irrational –

 

a falsehood made from truth?

 

there is nothing remarkable here –

 

a proposal put – can be affirmed – and then on review – a critical review – denied

 

any proposal of affirmation – or any proposal of denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

the truth or falsity of a proposition – is always – open to question –

 

no proposition is self-evident

 

the claim of self-evidence – is illogical and pretentious

 

 

PROP. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must exist for ever and infinitely, or must exist eternally and infinitely through that same attribute.

 

 

an attribute is a proposal – a proposed description

 

an attribute of Spinoza’s God – is a proposed description of his God –

 

we propose in relation to proposal

 

no proposal – no description – follows from another

 

a proposal – a description can be put – in relation to another proposal –

 

and in a logical sense – this activity of proposal put – in relation to proposal –

 

can go on indefinitely

 

 

Proof. – Conceive, if it can happen (if indeed you can deny it) that anything in any attribute of God following from its absolute nature is finite and has a fixed existence or duration, e.g., the idea of God in thought. But thought, since it is supposed an attribute of God is necessarily (Prop. 11) infinite in its nature. In so far as it has the idea of God, it is supposed to be finite. But (Def. 2) it cannot be conceived finite unless it is limited by thought itself; but it cannot be limited by thought in so far as it forms the idea of God, for then it would be finite: so it must be limited by thought in so far as it does not form the idea of God, and this idea nevertheless (Prop. 11) must exist necessarily. A thought is therefore granted which does not form the idea of God, and therefore from its nature, in so far as it is an absolute thought, the idea of God does not necessarily follow: thought is then conceived as forming and not forming the idea of God, which is contrary to the hypothesis. So if the idea of God in thought or anything (whatever is assumed, for the proof is universal) in any attribute of God follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute, it must necessarily be infinite: which is the first point.

 

Again, that which follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a fixed duration. If you deny this, let something which follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute be supposed to be granted in any attribute of God, e.g., the idea of God in thought, and let it be supposed not to have existed at some past time, or to cease to exist in some future time. But since thought is supposed

to be an attribute of God, it must of necessity exist, and that immutably (Prop. 11, and Coroll.2, Prop. 20). Thence it follows that outside the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for we suppose it once not to have existed, or not to exist at some future time), thought must exist without the idea of God: and this is contrary to the hypothesis, for it is supposed that the idea of God necessarily follows from the given thought. Therefore the idea of God in thought or anything that follows of necessity from the absolute nature of any attribute of God cannot have a fixed duration, but through the attribute itself is eternal: which was the second point. Note that this can be asserted of anything which in any attribute of God follows of necessity from the absolute nature of God.

 

 

‘Conceive, if it can happen (if indeed you can deny it) that anything in any attribute of God following from its absolute nature is finite and has a fixed existence or duration, e.g., the idea of God in thought.’

 

an attribute of Spinoza’s ‘God’ is a description – a propositional description

 

it is a proposal put in relation to his proposal ‘God’

 

a description is put to a proposal – it doesn’t ‘follow from’ it –

 

a proposal – a propositional description – does have a fixed existence or duration

 

it exists as long as it is proposed considered and critically evaluated

 

‘In so far as it has the idea of God, it is supposed to be finite. But (Def. 2) it cannot be conceived finite unless it is limited by thought itself; but it cannot be limited by thought in so far as it forms the idea of God, for then it would be finite: so it must be limited by thought in so far as it does not form the idea of God, and this idea nevertheless (Prop. 11) must exist necessarily.’

 

the duration of any proposal is finite

 

and its duration is finite whether ‘limited by’ another thought / proposal – or not –

 

as to ‘limited by another thought’ – this can only mean that another proposal is put – which – as put in relation to the subject proposal – and as a result – modifies the subject proposal –

 

Spinoza’s idea of ‘God’ exists – only if proposed –

 

and if proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘A thought is therefore granted which does not form the idea of God, and therefore from its nature, in so far as it is an absolute thought, the idea of God does not necessarily follow: thought is then conceived as forming and not forming the idea of God, which is contrary to the hypothesis.’

 

the idea that every proposal – proposes Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is ridiculous

 

‘So if the idea of God in thought or anything (whatever is assumed, for the proof is universal) in any attribute of God follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that attribute, it must necessarily be infinite: which is the first point.’

 

a ‘thought’ is a proposal –

 

the idea here is that thought is infinite – and therefore – any particular thought – is infinite

 

no particular thought / proposal – exists indefinitely –

 

and any proposed ‘process of thought’ – is just another proposal – that is active as long as it is considered

 

any proposal – is a contingent fact –

 

thought is a contingent fact –

 

that is the first point

 

‘Again, that which follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a fixed duration. If you deny this, let something which follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute be supposed to be granted in any attribute of God, e.g., the idea of God in thought, and let it be supposed not to have existed at some past time, or to cease to exist in some future time. But since thought is supposed to be an attribute of God, it must of necessity exist, and that immutably (Prop. 11, and Coroll.2, Prop. 20). Thence it follows that outside the limits of the duration of the idea of God (for we suppose it once not to have existed, or not to exist at some future time), thought must exist without the idea of God: and this is contrary to the hypothesis, for it is supposed that the idea of God necessarily follows from the given thought.’

 

an attribute is a description – a proposed description –

 

the fact of the matter is that the attribute / proposed description – will exist so long as it is considered – and will cease to exist when it is no longer considered

 

and yes – the proposal ‘thought’ indeed can exist – without the proposal of Spinoza’s ‘God’

 

‘Therefore the idea of God in thought or anything that follows of necessity from the absolute nature of any attribute of God cannot have a fixed duration, but through the attribute itself is eternal: which was the second point. Note that this can be asserted of anything which in any attribute of God follows of necessity from the absolute nature of God.’

 

any proposal is ‘eternal’ – if it is not given a reference in time

 

and that is the second point

 

 

PROP. XXII. Whatever follows from an attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by such a modification as exists of necessity and infinitely through the same, must also exist of necessity and infinitely.

 

 

Proof. – The proof of this proposition proceeds in the same manner as the proof of the last proposition.

 

 

an ‘attribute’ – is proposal – a proposed description –

 

a proposed description of a ‘substance’ – or whatever other term is used for the propositional object – i.e. – ‘God’ – ‘reality’ – ‘existence’ – etc.

 

nothing follows from an attribute / description –

 

you can propose – in relation to an attribute / description –

 

and that will be a supplementary description – a ‘modification’ – if you like – of the attribute / description

 

but the supplementary description – will only exist – if proposed

 

modified by such a modification?

 

this is just to say that a modification / propositional description – is proposed

 

such a description – is not ‘necessary’ – it is contingent – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

further it does not exist ‘infinitely’ –

 

what would an infinite description be?

 

a description that doesn’t end?

 

a description that doesn’t end is a description that has no definition –

 

and without definition – a description – does not describe – is not a description –

 

such a ‘description’ – will have no content – will be vacuous –

 

a proposition that proposes nothing

 

what this points to is that the notion of ‘infinity’ – is misapplied in this context

 

‘infinity’ – makes sense in a mathematical context

 

mathematics as a rule-governed propositional game

 

the ‘infinite game’ – is a game where the rule is that the calculation – i.e. – counting – is ongoing

 

a proposition – a propositional description – is not on-going – it is definitive –

 

otherwise – there is no proposal – nothing is proposed

 

propositional logic is not a game – it is not ‘rule-governed’ – it is a critical exercise –

 

a critical exercise of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

 

PROP. XXIII. Every mode which of necessity and infinitely exists must of necessity have followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists of necessity and infinitely.

 

 

a mode that exists of necessity?

 

here the ‘mode’ is a fixture – for one would think that in necessary existence – there will be no variation – no change

 

and a necessary existence that follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of Spinoza’s God –

 

the ‘absolute nature’ –

 

again – a nature that is fixed –

 

‘or from some attribute modified which exists of necessity and infinitely’

 

Spinoza’s reality – absolute and necessary – is a closed and fixed reality – one might say ‘infinitely’ – closed and fixed

 

there seems to be no movement is Spinoza’s world –

 

for where one thing ‘follows from’ another – we are not talking about an actual dynamic – but rather a deductive argument – a deduction

 

very strange

 

a ‘mode’ – is a proposal – a descriptive propositional construction – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

a propositional construction – is logically fluid – logically flexible – it is not fixed –

 

from a logical point of view – it cannot be fixed

 

there is no absolute – there is only logical uncertainty

 

there is no necessity – there is only contingency

 

 

Proof. – Now mode is in something else through which is must be conceived (Def. 5), and can only be conceived through God. If therefore, mode be conceived to exist of necessity and to be infinite, its existence and infinity must be concluded or perceived through some attribute of God, in so far as this attribute is conceived to express infinity and necessity of existence, or (Def. 8) eternity, that is (Def. 6 and Prop 19) as far as it is considered absolutely. Mode, therefore, which of necessity and infinitely exists, must have followed from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, and that either immediately (concerning which see Prop.21) or by means of some modification which follows from the absolute nature of the attribute, that is (prev. Prop.), which necessarily and infinitely exists. Q.e.d.

 

 

a mode is a proposal – a descriptive propositional construction

 

no proposal is conceived / proposed – ‘through something else’ –

 

a proposal / proposition may be put in relation to another proposal or proposals

 

a mode – is not infinite – a mode is finite –

 

a ‘mode’ – as with any proposal exists as long as it is proposed – as long as it is considered

 

‘infinity’ is a game concept – a propositional game – the rule of which is that a calculation is on-going

 

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and logically uncertain –

 

it is logical uncertainty that leads to – is the ground of – further proposal put in relation to a subject proposal

 

and there is no logical end to the critical investigation of a proposal put – or the proposals that might be put in any critical investigation

 

however – any such critical investigation is not rule-governed

 

a proposal exists as an uncertainty – not a necessity

 

there is no ‘necessity’ – necessity is a false concept – it is a child of the delusion

‘certainty’

 

‘attribute’ – is a name for propositional description

 

no proposal / proposition ‘follows from’ – a propositional description

 

yes – you can play the deductive game – but that is a game – a rule governed propositional game – it is not a critical activity

 

the proposal ‘God’ – however further proposed – however further described – however understood – as with any other proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

 

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown does not produce – does not produce the essence of things

 

if the essence of things does not involve existence – then essence – does not exist –

 

and so – the term ‘essence’ as Spinoza uses it – is empty – is meaningless

 

that which is proposed – exists

 

and any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –

 

proposal is uncertain – existence is uncertain

 

the ‘essence’ of any proposed existent – will be a description proposed – and any such description – will be open to question

 

the description of a thing will be a supplementary proposal to the proposal

 

you can propose – without putting a suppletory description –

 

a so called ‘essential’ description – is secondary to the proposal 

 

and – paradoxically – or ironically – it is not essential

 

 

Proof. – This is clear from Def.1. For that whose nature (considered in itself) involves existence is its own cause, and exists merely by the necessity of its own nature.

 

 

according to Spinoza –

 

Def. I. – that ‘cause of itself’ – involves existence –

 

is not a ‘proof’ of Prop. XXIV. – that essence of things produced by God does not involve existence

 

Spinoza’s God / substance – is – ‘cause of itself’ –

 

so – what this God produces – is – what this God is –

 

which is to say that for Spinoza – God produces existence – for what else is Spinoza’s God but existence?

and if so – then Def. I. – contradicts Prop. XXIV.

 

and how then do we understand ‘essence’ here?

 

‘essence’ – either doesn’t exist – of if it does exist – it is irrelevant to existence –

 

and given those possibilities ‘essence’ comes off as a useless notion

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that God is not only the cause that all things begin to exist, but also that they continue to exist, or (to use a scholastic term) God is the cause of the being (causa essendi) of things. For whether things exist or whether they do not, however often we consider their essence, we will find it to involve neither existence or duration: and their essence cannot be the cause of their existence or their duration, but only God, to whose nature alone existence appertains (Coroll. 1. Prop. 14).

 

 

Spinoza here – seems to want to separate essence from existence –

 

and again – the result is – that he must regard essence as not existing –

 

so – what is the point of essence?

 

the logical reality is that anything proposed – exists –

 

the question then – is how do we understand that proposed – that is understand the proposal?

 

the answer is – we propose description – and critically evaluate any description

 

‘essence’ – if proposed – is a propositional description – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘however often we consider their essence, we will find it to involve neither existence or duration’

 

look – the point is – if you propose ‘essence’ – it exists – however it might be described

 

and its duration – is – the time it is under consideration

 

‘but only God, to whose nature alone existence appertains’

 

if you proposed Spinoza’s ‘God’ – exists –

 

as to this ‘God’s nature’ – that is a matter of description – a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXV. God is not only the effecting cause of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown does cause

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any causal account of the existence of a thing – is an explanatory proposal –

 

and any explanatory proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

if ‘essence’ is to mean anything here – it is a description of a thing –

 

and any description put in relation to a proposal – is open to question

 

 

Proof. – If you deny it, then let God not be the cause of the essence of things; therefore (Ax.4) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But this (Prop. 15) is absurd. Therefore God is the cause of the essence of things. Q.e.d,

 

 

of course – a thing – a proposed thing – can be described – without Spinoza’s God

 

for Spinoza – ‘God’ is the final explanation – of all and everything

 

the logical reality is – there is no such thing as a final explanation –

 

any proposed explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

in logic – there is no finality

 

in ignorance and prejudice – you find finality

 

that is – claims that are not put to question – not put to doubt –

 

claims – the uncertainty of which – is not only – not explored – but flat out denied

 

 

Note. – This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. 16. For it follows from this, that from a given divine nature, the essence, as well as the existence of things, must of necessity be concluded; and to express it shortly, in that sense in which God is said to be his own cause, he must also be said to be the cause of all things, which will be seen more clearly from the following corollary.

 

 

Corollary. – Particular things are nothing else than modifications of attributes of God, or modes by which attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determined manner. The proof of this is clear from Prop. 15 and Def. 5.

 

 

a ‘particular thing’ – is a proposal – a proposition –

 

any proposed relation between propositions – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXVI. A thing which is determined for the performing of anything was so determined necessarily by God, and a thing which is not determined by God cannot determine itself to do anything.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown does not determine anything

 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any propositional determination – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – That through which things are said to be determined for performing anything must necessarily be something positive (as is self-evident): and therefore God, by the necessity of his nature, is the effecting cause of the essence and existence of this (Prop. 25 and 16): which was the first point. From which clearly follows that which was proposed in the second place. For if a thing is not determined by God could determine itself, the first part of this proof would be false: which is absurd, as we have shown.

 

 

Spinoza here introduces the concept ‘positive’ – without any elaboration – or explanation –

 

and he is quite happy to run the ‘self-evident’ claim here –

 

I assume – by ‘self-evident’ – he means a claim that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain

 

Spinoza – for all the propositions – in his ‘Ethics’ – consistently and systematically defies the logic of the proposition

 

a proposition – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

logically speaking – nothing is – self-evident

 

any claim of self-evidence – should be seem for what it is – a stand for ignorance – and prejudice

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

no proposal is ‘necessary’ – or a cause – ‘effecting’ or otherwise

 

 

PROP. XXVII.  A thing which is determined by God for the performing of anything cannot render itself undetermined.

 

 

Proof. – This is obvious from the third axiom.

 

 

a thing that is determined – is determined –

 

really nothing more than a tautology

 

a ’thing’ is a proposal –

 

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and if uncertain – it is not determined – rather undetermined

 

(another tautology)

 

 

PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or whatever thing that is finite and has a determinate existence, cannot exist or be determined for action unless it is determined for action and existence by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause also cannot exist nor be determined for action unless it is determined for existence and action by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence: and so on to infinity.

 

 

yes – and ‘so on to infinity’ –

 

is – ‘so on’ – to indeterminacy

 

the causal argument – here – does not have an end

 

does not have a determination

 

and so – the ‘causal chain’ – does not chain anything

 

 

Proof. – Whatever is determined for existence or action is so determined by God (Prop. 26, and Coroll., Prop. 24). But that which is finite and has a determined existence cannot be produced from the absolute nature of any attribute of God: for anything that follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must be infinite and eternal (Prop. 21). It must have followed, therefore, from God or some attribute of his, in so far as it is considered as modified in some mode: for save substance and modes nothing is granted (Ax. 1, and Def. 3 and 5) and modes (Coroll., Prop. 25) are nothing else than modifications of attributes of God. But it also cannot have followed from God or any attribute of his, in so far as it is modified by some modification which is eternal and infinite (Prop. 22). It follows, then, that it must have been determined for existence or action by God or some attribute of his, in so far as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence: which was the first point. Then again, this cause or mode (by the same reason by which we have proved the first part) must also have been determined by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, the latter (by the same reason) must have been determined by another: and so on to infinity. Q.e.d.

 

‘Whatever is determined for existence or action is so determined by God (Prop. 26, and Coroll., Prop. 24). But that which is finite and has a determined existence cannot be produced from the absolute nature of any attribute of God: for anything that follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must be infinite and eternal (Prop. 21). It must have followed, therefore, from God or some attribute of his, in so far as it is considered as modified in some mode: for save substance and modes

nothing is granted (Ax. 1, and Def. 3 and 5) and modes (Coroll., Prop. 25) are nothing else than modifications of attributes of God. But it also cannot have followed from God or any attribute of his, in so far as it is modified by some modification which is eternal and infinite (Prop. 22). It follows, then, that it must have been determined for existence or action by God or some attribute of his, in so far as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence: which was the first point.’

 

‘Whatever is determined is determined by God – but that which is finite is not produced by any attribute of God – for what follows from any attribute of God – must be finite.’

 

you would think that finite things – are either of God – or they are not –

 

on the face of it then – Spinoza cannot account for what he calls ‘finite things’

 

and finite things contradict his claim that –

 

‘Whatever is determined for existence or action is so determined by God’

 

and if you accept the argument that a finite thing – is modified by a modification of an attribute which is finite –

 

the confusion is not resolved

 

for we are left with the question – how can a modification of an infinite attribute – be anything but infinite?

 

Spinoza here cannot account for finite things

 

just slotting them in as a modification of an infinite attribute – doesn’t work

 

it is logically inconsistent

 

if you go with this ‘modified by a modification’ argument – then Spinoza’s theory of God and finite things is in trouble –

 

for either his God is not connected to finite things –

 

or there are no finite things

 

‘Then again, this cause or mode (by the same reason by which we have proved the first part) must also have been determined by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, the latter (by the same reason) must have been determined by another: and so on to infinity. Q.e.d.’

 

any explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and it is just the logical uncertainty of any proposed explanation –

 

that leads to further explanations – and explanations of explanations

 

logically speaking there is no end to this process

 

so here it seems that Spinoza wants to accommodate his ‘finite and determinate existence’ to infinity – via the critical process of logical and propositional uncertainty

 

this is a switch on Spinoza’s part

 

he begins with the idea of substantial infinity – (whatever that is supposed to mean)

 

however – such an infinity cannot be applied to finite existents –

 

hence – a reconfiguring of ‘infinity’ – to be the logical possibility and process of continual propositional explanation

 

a critical propositional analysis – that in principle – is on-going – is really all infinity can amount to

 

what we have then is what you might call propositional infinity – or critical / logical infinity

 

is this really what Spinoza has in mind with his notion of substance / God – as infinite?

 

I think there is something to this –

 

but I think he also wants infinity to be substantial – to be a substantial reality

 

and I don’t think we can make sense of that

 

and so – Spinoza – is actually confused about infinity –

 

if he was to go with logical infinity – where is the substance?

 

and if substantial infinity – doesn’t that end up as critical / logical infinity?

 

so even without the problem of accounting for finite existents – Spinoza has a problem with infinity

 

the matter is resolved – once it is understood that ‘substance’ – is nothing more than a proposal – a proposition – that like any other proposition – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Note. – As certain things must have been produced immediately by God, for example, those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, by means of these first causes, which nevertheless cannot exist nor even be conceived without God, it follows that God is the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him, absolutely, not, as some would have it, in his kind. For the effects of God cannot exist or be conceived without their cause (Prop. 15, and Coroll., Prop. 24). It follows, again, that God cannot be said in truth to be the remote cause of individual things which are

immediately produced by God, or which rather follow from his absolute nature. For we understand by a remote cause one which is in no wise connected with its effect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God that without him they can neither exist nor be conceived.

 

 

if all is of God – then all is of God’s nature – sui causa –

 

which is to say – without cause

 

if God is the absolute cause of everything – nothing – is caused

 

however – without ‘cause’ – what account – what explanation – does Spinoza have of substance?

 

he tries to tie off causation – with ‘first cause’ –

 

but again – ‘first cause’ – doesn’t stand up – if God / substance – is sui causa – without cause –

 

a first cause – as with any other cause – is resolved in – no cause

 

Spinoza’s God – is just what is – is just whatever – is proposed –

 

and whatever is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXIX. In the nature of things nothing contingent (contingens) is granted, but all things are determined by the necessity of divine nature for existing and working in a certain way.

 

 

what exists is what is proposed –

 

‘all things here’ – is the universe – or reality – proposed

 

how the universe works is open to question –

 

proposals put – i.e. scientific hypotheses / explanations – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any proposal / proposition put – is contingent – that is open to question –

 

‘nature’ – is a propositional complex – open to question –

 

as is any propositional ‘determination’

 

our understanding of nature – is uncertain – not necessary

 

Spinoza here characterizes nature as ‘divine’

 

so how then are to understand his ‘God or nature’ characterization’?

 

on the face if it ‘divine nature’ – is not ‘God or nature’

 

if nature is divine – that is – our world is divine – as he says here –

 

why bother with nature – with natural?

 

or – if ‘nature’ is just what it is – then you would think ‘divine’ is out of the question – that his proposed ‘God’ – is unnecessary

 

could he not have run a ‘nature metaphysics’ – without his God?

 

I think so

 

that he doesn’t – indicates – I suggest – that he holds on to a traditional Jewish conception of God – albeit with a 17^th century twist –

 

hence there is the argument – if ‘God’ and ‘nature’ – are synonyms – one of them should go – one of them is unnecessary –

 

keeping the ‘deus sive natura’ notion – leaves his philosophy open to the charge of duplicity

 

so – ‘God’ or ‘nature’ – what’s it to be?

 

 

Proof. – Whatever is, is in God (Prop. 15). But God cannot be called a contingent thing for (by Prop. 11) he exists of necessity and not contingently. Again, the modes of divine nature do not follow from it contingently, but of necessity (Prop. 16) and that either in so far as divine nature be considered absolutely or as determined for certain action (Prop. 27). Now God is the cause of these modes, not only in so far as they simply exist (Coroll., Prop, 24), but also in so far as they are considered as determined for the working of anything (Prop. 26). For if they are not determined by God it is impossible, not contingent indeed, that they should determine themselves; and on the other hand, if they are determined by God, it is impossible and in no wise contingent for them to render themselves undetermined. Wherefore all things are determined by the necessity of divine nature, not only for existing, but also for existing and working after a certain manner, and nothing contingent is granted. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘But God cannot be called a contingent thing’

 

what exists – is what is proposed –

 

and whether or not an entity – a thing – is proposed – is a contingent matter

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – may or may not – be proposed –

 

if the proposal ‘God’ – is put – it is contingent – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

any determination of propositional relations – i.e. – between Spinoza’s proposal ‘God’

 

– and the proposal of ‘modes of existence’ – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

 

Note. – Before proceeding I would wish to explain, or rather remind you, what we must understand by active and passive nature (natura naturans and natura naturata), for I think that from the past propositions we shall be agreed that by nature active we must understand that which is in itself and through itself is conceived, or such attributes of substance that express eternal and divine essence, that is (Coroll. 1, Prop.14 and Coroll. 2, Prop. 17), God, in so far as he is considered a free cause. But by nature passive I understand all that follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or any one of his attributes, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which cannot exist or be conceived with God.

 

 

as to – active nature – natura naturans –

 

‘that which is in itself and conceived through itself’ –

 

a conception – does not conceive itself –

 

a proposition does not propose itself –

 

a proposition exists if proposed – by a propositional actor

 

the fact of a proposition – is a contingent fact

 

any attribute – that is propositional description – can be elaborated on – that is to say – a proposition can be put in relation to it –

 

and this action of a proposition put in relation to proposition – logically speaking can go on indefinitely

 

Spinoza’s proposal ‘God’ – is not a cause

 

as to passive nature – natura naturata

 

no proposition follows from another –

 

any proposal or propositional relation is a contingent fact

 

a proposal put – is a free action –

 

a mode is a proposal – a propositional construction –

 

no proposal / propositional construction – is in another proposal / propositional construction

 

proposals can be put in relation to other proposals

 

all propositional relations are external

 

Spinoza’s natura naturans / natura naturata distinction fails –

 

any proposal / proposition – is an action – is active

 

and all propositional activity – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXX. Intellect, finite or infinite in actuality (actus), must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God and nothing else.

 

 

‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

in propositional action we propose our reality – and any proposal – or description (attribute / mode) is open to question

 

propositional action is not determined – there is no ‘must’ in propositional action

 

all proposals are open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the proposal ‘God’ – or Spinoza’s ‘God’ – however further described – is one proposal

 

our propositional reality – is not the reality of one proposal – and ‘nothing else’

 

it is the infinity of human proposal – the infinity of propositional action

 

any particular proposal – any particular propositional action – exists as long as it is considered

 

there is no infinite consideration

 

 

Proof. – A true idea must agree with its ideal (Ax. 6), that is (as is self-evident), that which is contained in the intellect objectively must of necessity be granted in nature. But in nature (Coroll. 1, Prop. 14), only one substance can be granted (Prop. 15) and that is God, and only such modifications can be granted (Prop. 15) as are in God and (same Prop) cannot exist or be conceived without God. Therefore, intellect finite or infinite in actuality must comprehend the attributes and modifications of God and nothing else. Q.e.d.

 

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal – an ‘ideal’ is that proposed

 

there is no logical distinction between an ‘idea’ and ‘its ideal’ –

 

just what ‘agreement’ amounts to – is open to question

 

a proposal (‘idea’ / ‘ideal’) is true if affirmed – false – if denied

 

any proposal of affirmation – or denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

how we propose ‘nature’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘one substance’ – is one proposal –

 

propositional reality – is not the reality of ‘one’ proposal –

 

propositional reality – is the reality of an infinity of human proposal – an infinity of propositional action

 

 

PROP. XXXI. The intellect in actuality, whether it be finite or infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc. must be referred not to active, but passive nature.

 

 

active and passive nature?

 

according to Spinoza (Note – Prop. XXIX) – an ‘active nature’ is that which is in itself and through itself conceived – that is God in so far as he is considered a free cause

 

if so – there is no ‘active nature’ – for a proposal does not conceive itself – does not propose itself

 

a proposal does not propose

 

a proposal is proposed – by a human being – a propositional actor

 

by ‘passive nature’ Spinoza means that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God –

 

if so – there is no ‘passive nature’ –

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is a proposal

 

and nothing follows from any proposal –

 

there is no ‘necessity’ in propositional logic

 

proposals are put in relation to proposals –

 

all proposal – is active

 

the ‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘will’ – ‘desire’ – ‘love’ – are proposed descriptive categories – of different propositional actions

 

 

Proof. – Now by intellect (which is self-evident) we do not understand absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking which differs from other modes, such as desire and love, etc., and therefore must (Def. 5) be conceived through absolute

thought: moreover (Prop. 15 and Def. 6), it must be so conceived through some

attribute of God which expresses eternal and infinite essence of thought, that without it, it can neither exist or be conceived. On this account (Note, Prop. 29), like the other modes of thinking, the intellect must be referred not to active but passive nature. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘thought’ – is a name for propositional action

 

if by ‘absolute thought’ is meant a propositional action that is not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain

 

there is no ‘absolute thought’

 

what you have here masquerading as thought – is prejudice – is ignorance

 

‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

‘desire and love etc.’ – are proposed descriptive categories of different propositional actions –

 

any proposed descriptive category – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

i.e. – we can ask –

 

do we separate our intellect from love and desire?

 

is not the intellect involved in love and desire?

 

and is not desire involved in love?

 

and may not love be proposed as a form of desire?

 

the point here is that no sharp distinction can be drawn between propositional descriptive categories –

 

between propositional actions

 

what it comes down to is propositional use and propositional contexts –

 

i.e. in one context ‘love’ – will have a particular use and understanding

 

in another propositional setting – it will have a different use and different understanding

 

these are contingencies –

 

any use – any understanding – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

all propositional action – however named or described – is active

 

there is no passive propositional action

 

no proposal is ‘conceived through’ another – each proposal is logically unique –

 

and no proposal expresses ‘an eternal and infinite essence’ –

 

the ground of any proposal is logical uncertainty

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – has no basis in logic – and is in fact a denial of propositional logic – it is a philosophical pretence

 

 

Note – The reason why I speak of intellect in actuality is not that I concede that intellect in potentiality can be granted, but that I wish to avoid all confusion, and would not speak of anything save that so easily perceived by us, that is understanding itself, for nothing is so clearly perceived by us as this. For we can perceive nothing which does not lead to a greater comprehension of understanding.

 

 

the ‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action

 

propositional action – is actual –

 

and there is potential in propositional action – the potential of proposal – and critical evaluation

 

any proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘understanding’ is not – ‘clearly perceived’ –

 

understanding is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

 

PROP. XXXII. Will can only be called a necessary cause, not a free one.

 

 

propositional action can be proposed as – explained as / described as – ‘will’

 

‘will’ is a name for propositional action –

 

such a description will suit certain purposes – and as with any proposal – any propositional description – is open to question

 

as for it being a ‘necessary cause’ –

 

no proposal / propositional action – is the cause of another proposal –

 

a ‘causal analysis’ – is a pragmatic construction – which again may serve certain purposes – have certain uses and functions in various contexts

 

however – the logical reality is that any such construction – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

there is no necessity in propositional action –

 

all propositional action is free

 

 

Proof. – Will, like the intellect, is only a certain mode of thinking, and therefore (Prop. 28) any single volition cannot exist or be determined for action unless it be determined by some other cause, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity. Now if will be supposed infinite, it must then be determined for existence and action by God, in so far, not as he is the infinite substance, but as he has an attribute expressing infinite and eternal essence of thought (Prop. 23). So in whatever way it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined for existence or action: and therefore (Def. 7) it cannot be said to be a free cause, but only a necessary one. Q.e.d.

 

 

a ‘single volition’ – is a single proposal –

 

a proposal exists – if proposed –

 

a proposal is not determined – it is a free action –

 

a proposal – a ‘single volition’ – is finite

 

there is no ‘infinite proposal’ – the notion makes no sense

 

any causal explanation of any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

furthermore – a proposal – can be put – and dealt with critically – without explanation – causal or otherwise

 

 

Corollary I – Hence it follows that God does not act from freedom of will.

 

 

all action takes place in space and time –

 

and in so far as Spinoza ‘God’ – is infinite and eternal – outside of space / time – there is the question – does this ‘God’ act at all?

 

 

Corollary II. – Hence it follows again that will and intellect hold the same place in the nature of God as motion and rest, and that, absolutely, as with all natural things which (Prop. 29) must be determined by God in a certain way for existence and action. And although from a given will or intellect infinite things follow, yet it cannot be said on that account that God acts from freedom of will any more that it can be said that, infinite things follow from motion and rest (for infinite things follow from these too), God acts from freedom of motion and rest. Wherefore will does not appertain to the nature of God any more than the rest of the things of nature, but holds the same place in God’s nature as motion and rest, and all other things which we have shown to follow from the necessity of divine nature, and to be determined by it for existence and action in a certain way

 

82.

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown does not act

 

for Spinoza – God’s will – follows ‘from the necessity of divine nature’

 

which is to say ‘God’s will’ – is no more than a synonym for necessity

 

there is no necessity –

 

all propositional actions are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

which is to say all propositional action is contingent

 

‘will’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘intellect’ – a name for propositional action

 

propositional action is not determined

 

there are no ‘infinite things’ –

 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal – and a proposal is finite –

 

propositional action is finite

 

nothing ‘follows from’ a propositional action

 

proposals can be put in relation to a propositional action

 

any proposal / propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been produced by God in any other manner or order than that in which they were produced.

 

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown does not produce – anything

 

how any ‘thing’ / proposal – is ‘produced’ – and the manner in which it is produced –

is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

furthermore – what could be the case – is open to question open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – All things must have followed of a necessity from a given nature of God (Prop. 16), and they were determined for existence or action in a certain way by the                                                                                                                              necessity of divine nature (Prop. 29). And so if things could have been of another

nature or determined in another manner for action so that the order of nature were

different, therefore, also, the nature of God could be different from how it is now: then (Prop. 11) another nature of God must exist, and consequently two or more Gods could be granted, and this (Coroll. 1 Prop. 14) is absurd. Wherefore things could not have been produced in any other way or order, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

Spinoza’s argument is that if reality were to be different then God’s nature would have to be different – and another nature of God – would mean two or more Gods –

 

according to Spinoza – God / substance – is an infinity of attributes of which we know two – extension and mind –

 

and that these two attributes constitute our reality

 

so – what we know – is only two attributes – and those two attributes constitute reality as we know it –

 

it does not follow that God / reality – could not be otherwise – or that to propose that it could be – we would have to postulate two or more Gods

 

all that follows – from his argument – is that what we know of God – ‘God’s nature – is limited –

 

and further that beyond what we know – of God – of God’s nature – is what we don’t know –

 

so perhaps – reality / God – is different to how we know it?

 

or – God – is limited by two attributes – and is not an infinity of attributes

 

and if so – God is just what we know – and nothing more –

 

and if such is case – you might argue that Spinoza’s concept of God – is unnecessary – is irrelevant –

 

Spinoza can’t have it both ways – either God is more than what we know – or just and only what we know

 

what is it to be?

 

the point really is that the proposal ‘God’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

that our reality – our reality however proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note I. – Although I have shown more clearly than the sun at noonday that there is absolutely nothing in things by which we can call them contingent, yet I would wish to explain here in a few words what is the signification of contingent (contingens); but first that of necessary (necessarium) and impossible (impossibile). Anything is said to be necessary either by reason of its essence or its cause. For the existence of anything

necessarily follows either from its very essence or definition, or from a given effecting

cause. A thing is said to be impossible by reason of these same causes; clearly for that its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or that no external cause can be given determined for the production of such a thing. But anything can in no wise be said to be contingent save in respect to the imperfection of our knowledge. For when we are not aware that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or when we are quite certain that it does not involve a contradiction, and yet can affirm nothing with certainty concerning its existence, as the order of causes has escaped us, such a thing can seem neither necessary nor impossible to us: and therefore we call it either contingent or possible.

 

‘For the existence of anything necessarily follows either from its very essence or definition, of from a given effecting cause.’

 

a thing exists – if proposed

 

how it exists – what form or kind of existence it has – is a matter open to question

 

the ‘essence’ of a thing – is a description of it – and any such description – is open to question – is uncertain

 

a definition – is a propositional determination – and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and – any causal explanation of a thing – again is a proposal – open to question

 

propositions do not follow from propositions – propositions are put in relation to proposition

 

there is no necessity in propositional action

 

‘A thing is said to be impossible by reason of these same causes; clearly for that its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or that no external cause can be given determined for the production of such a thing.’

 

a contradiction – is not a proposal – is not a proposition – nothing is proposed in a contradiction

 

‘But anything can in no wise be said to be contingent save in respect to the imperfection of our knowledge.’

 

any proposed reality – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our knowledge is contingent – our reality / realities – are contingent

 

‘an order of causes’ – is nothing more than a proposed explanation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘and yet can affirm nothing with certainty’ –

 

such is the reality we face – and the reality we deal with – with question – with doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

 

any affirmation with certainty – is illogical

 

 

Note II.

 

It clearly follows from the preceding remarks that things were produced by the consummate perfection of God, since they follow from a given most perfect nature. Nor does this argue any imperfection in God, for his perfection has forced us to assert this. And from the contrary of this proposition it would have followed (as I have shown) that God was not consummately perfect, in as much as if things were produced in any other way there must have been attributed to God a nature different to that which we are forced to attribute to him from consideration of a perfect being. I make no doubt however, but that many will deride this opinion as absurd, nor will they agree to give up their minds to the contemplation of it: and on no other account than that they are wont to ascribe to God a freedom far different to that which has been propounded by us (Def. 6). They attribute to him absolute will. Yet I make no doubt but that, if they wish rightly to consider the matter and follow our series of propositions, weighing well each of them, they will reject that freedom which they now attribute to God, not only as futile, but also clearly as an obstacle to knowledge. Nor is there any need for me to repeat what was said in the note on Prop. 17. But for their benefit I shall show this much, that although it be conceded that will appertains to the essence of God, yet it nevertheless follows that things could not have been created in any other manner or order than that in which they have been created; and this will be easy to show if we first consider the very thing which they themselves grant, namely , that it depends solely on the degree and will of God that each thing is what it is, for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. They grant further, that all the decrees of God have been appointed by him and through all eternity: for otherwise it would argue mutability and imperfection in God. But as in eternity there are no such things as when, before, or after, hence it follows merely from the perfection of God that he never can or could degree anything else than what is decreed, or that God did not exist before his decrees, nor without them could he exist. But they say that although we suppose that God had made the nature of things different or had decreed otherwise concerning nature and her order from eternity, it would not thence follow that God was imperfect. Now if they say this, they must also admit that God can change his decrees. For had God decreed otherwise than he had concerning nature and her order, that is, had he willed and conceived anything else concerning nature, he must necessarily have some other intellect and will than those he now has. And if it is permitted to attribute to God another will and intellect than those which he now has, without any change in his essence or perfection, what would there be to prevent him from changing his decrees concerning things created, and yet remaining perfect? For his intellect and will concerning things created and their order is the same in respect to his essence and perfection, in whatever manner they may be conceived. Furthermore, all the philosophers, I have seen, concede that no such thing as potential intellect in God can be granted, but only actual. But as they make no distinction between his intellect and will and his essence, being all agreed in this, it follows then that if God had another actual intellect and will, he must necessarily also have another essence; and thence, as I concluded in the beginning, that, were things produced in any other way than in which they were, God’s intellect and will, that is, as has been granted, his essence, also must have been other than it is, which is absurd.

Now since things could not have been produced in any other manner or order than that in which they were, and since this follows from the consummate perfection of God, there is no rational argument to persuade us to believe that God did not wish to create all things which are in his intellect, and that in the same perfection in which his intellect conceived them. But they say that in things there is no such a thing as perfection or imperfection, but that which causes us to call a thing perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the will of God; moreover that if God, had willed it he could have brought to pass that what is now perfection might have been the greatest imperfection, and vice versa. But else is this but to openly assert that God who necessarily understands what he wishes, could bring to pass by his own will that his intelligence could perceive things in another manner than they now do. This (as I have just shown) is the height of absurdity. Wherefore I can turn their argument against them in the following manner. All things depend on the power of God. That things should be different from what they are would involve a change in the will of God, and the will of God cannot change (as we have most clearly shown from the perfection of God): therefore things could not be otherwise than they are. I confess that the theory that subjects all things to the will of an indifferent God and makes them dependent on his good will is far nearer the truth than that which states that God acts in all things for the furthering of good. For these seem to place something beyond God which does not depend on God, and to which God looks in his actions as to an example or strives after as an ultimate end. Now this nothing else than subjecting God to fate, a greater absurdity of which it is difficult to assert of God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and their existence. Wherefore let me not waste more time in refuting such idle arguments.

 

 

‘It clearly follows from the preceding remarks that things were produced by the consummate perfection of God, since they follow from a given most perfect nature. Nor does this argue any imperfection in God, for his perfection has forced us to assert this. And from the contrary of this proposition it would have followed (as I have shown) that God was not consummately perfect, in as much as if things were produced in any other way there must have been attributed to God a nature different to that which we are forced to attribute to him from consideration of a perfect being.’

 

in so far as Spinoza’s God – is the cause or essence of all that is – Spinoza’s God is the cause or essence of imperfection –

 

and for Spinoza – this leads to the contradiction that God is both perfect and imperfect

 

a contradiction – cannot stand – nothing is proposed in a contradiction

 

on this basis – Spinoza’s God cannot stand

 

the perfection argument is not an argument against the view that reality could be other than what we know

 

perhaps God in his perfection – has created a reality – through the infinity of his attributes – that is different to the reality that we know?

 

and in so far as we don’t know the infinity of attributes – Spinoza you would think has to accept that the matter is left – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I make no doubt however, but that many will deride this opinion as absurd, nor will they agree to give up their minds to the contemplation of it: and on no other account than that they are wont to ascribe to God a freedom far different to that which has been propounded by us (Def. 6). They attribute to him absolute will. Yet I make no doubt but that, if they wish rightly to consider the matter and follow our series of propositions, weighing well each of them, they will reject that freedom which they now attribute to God, not only as futile, but also clearly as an obstacle to knowledge. Nor is there any need for me to repeat what was said in the note on Prop. 17. But for their benefit I shall show this much, that although it be conceded that will appertains to the essence of God, yet it nevertheless follows that things could not have been created in any other manner or order than that in which they have been created; and this will be easy to show if we first consider the very thing which they themselves grant, namely , that it depends solely on the degree and will of God that each thing is what it is, for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. They grant further, that all the decrees of God have been appointed by him and through all eternity: for otherwise it would argue mutability and imperfection in God. But as in eternity there are no such things as when, before, or after, hence it follows merely from the perfection of God that he never can or could degree anything else than what is decreed, or that God did not exist before his decrees, nor without them could he exist. But they say that although we suppose that God had made the nature of things different or had decreed otherwise concerning nature and her order from eternity, it would not thence follow that God was imperfect.’

 

surely everything in Spinoza’s God – is absolute –

 

and in so far as – everything that is in God – ‘will’ – will be in God and absolute

 

if not – either God is not ‘absolute’ – or there is no will –

 

eternity as proposed by Spinoza is outside of time –

 

we can ask then – how does God – how does anything eternal – have any relation to what exists in time?

 

so – it is not a question of whether things could have been produced different to how they are – rather the issue is how God could have produced anything all – in time?

 

there is the problem – then of how we account for time in Spinoza’s metaphysics

 

for if all is in God – time is in God – and we can ask – how can time be in the timeless?

 

these notions of ‘eternity’ and ‘time’ have been proposed by propositional actors – because they have been useful to them in their propositional activity

 

nevertheless – ‘eternity’ and ‘time’ – any proposed relation between them – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Now if they say this, they must also admit that God can change his decrees. For had God decreed otherwise than he had concerning nature and her order, that is, had he willed and conceived anything else concerning nature, he must necessarily have some other intellect and will than those he now has. And if it is permitted to attribute to

God another will and intellect than those which he now has, without any change in his essence or perfection, what would there be to prevent him from changing his decrees concerning things created, and yet remaining perfect? For his intellect and will concerning things created and their order is the same in respect to his essence and perfection, in whatever manner they may be conceived.’

 

according to Spinoza – what we know – is what we know of God –

 

he claims further that there is much that we do not know – i.e. God’s infinity of attributes

 

what we don’t know is the problem for Spinoza –

 

for if we don’t know the full nature of God – his God – we cannot know what this God is capable of –

 

we cannot know that his God – has not created other worlds – that are just as actual as the world we know –

 

and we cannot know that he could have created our reality in a different manner –

 

even should you accept Spinoza’s metaphysics – these matters are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Furthermore, all the philosophers, I have seen, concede that no such thing as potential intellect in God can be granted, but only actual. But as they make no distinction between his intellect and will and his essence, being all agreed in this, it follows then that if God had another actual intellect and will, he must necessarily also have another essence; and thence, as I concluded in the beginning, that, were things produced in any other way than in which they were, God’s intellect and will, that is, as has been granted, his essence, also must have been other than it is, which is absurd.’

 

to the question – of what is ‘actual’ for Spinoza’s God – we have no answer – because we cannot know the full actuality of God – the full intellect of God – the full essence of his God –

 

these matter – even from a Spinozistic point of view – must be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Now since things could not have been produced in any other manner or order than that in which they were, and since this follows from the consummate perfection of God, there is no rational argument to persuade us to believe that God did not wish to create all things which are in his intellect, and that in the same perfection in which his intellect conceived them.’

 

God – according to Spinoza has an infinity of attributes –

 

Spinoza here is confining God’s intellect and his perfection to the two attributes – extension and mind

 

given that we don’t know the full nature of God’s intellect – we cannot say that God

 

created all things that are in his intellect –

 

and we cannot know if he could have created things differently

 

here too – we can ask – does this God create anything?

 

if as Spinoza claims – his God is eternal – infinite and unchanging –

 

what’s to create?

 

‘But they say that in things there is no such a thing as perfection or imperfection, but that which causes us to call a thing perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the will of God; moreover that if God, had willed it he could have brought to pass that what is now perfection might have been the greatest imperfection, and vice versa.’

 

‘now perfect might have been the greatest imperfection and vice versa’ –

 

is really just to recognize that what is proposed – is open to question – is open to doubt and is uncertain –

 

which is indeed to be rational – and open minded –

 

however – this it appears is just what Spinoza is arguing against

 

‘But else is this but to openly assert that God who necessarily understands what he wishes, could bring to pass by his own will that his intelligence could perceive things in another manner than they now do.’

 

perhaps – the intelligence of Spinoza’s God – is a critical intelligence?

 

that is – an intelligence – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘This (as I have just shown) is the height of absurdity. Wherefore I can turn their argument against them in the following manner. All things depend on the power of God. That things should be different from what they are would involve a change in the will of God, and the will of God cannot change (as we have most clearly shown from the perfection of God): therefore things could not be otherwise than they are.’

 

Spinoza’s God – it appears – is limited in his power – he cannot change – what he has willed – and cannot change what he has done –

 

his perfection it seems – actually rests in his want of power –

 

it might well be put – that in so far as this God cannot change – he is in fact impotent

 

it is Spinoza’s failure to see that his proposal ‘God’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – that enables these criticisms –

 

Spinoza does not have an open mind on God

 

and according to him – God does not have an open mind either

 

‘I confess that the theory that subjects all things to the will of an indifferent God and makes them dependent on his good will is far nearer the truth than that which states that God acts in all things for the furthering of good. For these seem to place something beyond God which does not depend on God, and to which God looks in his actions as to an example or strives after as an ultimate end. Now this is nothing else than subjecting God to fate, a greater absurdity of which it is difficult to assert of God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and their existence. Wherefore let me not waste more time in refuting such idle arguments.’

 

we are left with impression that Spinoza’s God – is irrelevant to the affairs of men

 

and his proposal ‘God’ – is not subject to question – open to doubt – and there is no uncertainty to be explored–

 

such a proposal – is irrational

 

 

PROP. XXXIV. The power of God is the same as his essence.

 

 

this proposition is uninformative –

 

it is just a word game – where ‘power’ – whatever that amounts – can be substituted for ‘essence’ – whatever that amounts to

 

 

Proof. – It follows from the mere necessity of the essence of God that God is his own cause (Prop. 11), and (Prop.16 and its Coroll.) the cause of all things. Therefore the power of God, by which he and all things are and act, is the same as his essence. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘essence’ – for Spinoza – is effectively an empty concept –

 

it is a descriptive place – if you like – a propositional place or category for other descriptions

 

the one in focus at the moment is ‘power’ –

 

again – we are not told what power is – Spinoza offers no explanation – except to say it is – as with a lot of other concepts – essence

 

essence is power – power is essence

 

what we have here is a word game – a game of synonymy – which might be fun to play – but it tells you nothing about the terms used

 

it is clear that Spinoza’s method is this –

 

he puts forward a concept – you are supposed to know what it means – if you don’t know what it means – he will give you an ‘equivalent’ term – that you are supposed to

 

know the meaning of – and this process of substitution goes on and on

 

and if you don’t get it – you don’t get – bad luck buster –

 

and you will get nowhere with Spinoza if you raise any questions – doubts or uncertainties –

 

he doesn’t recognize them – he is without question – without doubt and certain

 

and that is the problem –

 

propositional action is an action of critical elaboration –

 

where proposals are put in relation to proposals – as a result of question – of doubt – and uncertainty

 

it is not a parlor game – a game of synonymy – a game of word substitution –

 

it is the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

so – what is the ground of Spinoza’s thinking?

 

well – those of a classical rationalist persuasion call it ‘intuition’ –

 

I call it high minded pretentious ignorance –

 

by all means have your intuitions – I have no problem with that at all

 

it is not intuition that is at issue – it is the failure to see that an intuition is a proposal

 

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and most importantly – uncertain

 

and as to this notion of ‘power’ – as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – open to interpretation – and uncertain

 

it is a proposal that is used and will be used in many and varied propositional contexts 

 

and if assessed critically – will be used rationally

 

 

PROP. XXXV. Whatever we conceive to be in the power of God necessarily exists.

 

 

here – ‘power’ which in the previous prop. XXXIV – was proposed as an ‘explanation’ of essence – is now put as an ‘explanation’ of existence

 

and by ‘explanation’ – I mean effectively – substitution

 

power = existence – existence = power

 

Spinoza seems to think that by substituting terms – one for the other – in some way –

 

these terms are explicated – when all you effectively have is a word game

 

the hard truth is – we have no idea what ‘existence’ means for Spinoza – and we have no idea what ‘power’ is – from Spinoza

 

all we have is a game of synonymy –

 

but it is not much of a game – because we are given no reasons for why one word is synonymous with another

 

driving Spinoza’s argument in the ‘Ethics’ is a presumption of authority

 

he has chosen the geometric / deductive format – I think – to give the impression of logical authority

 

and this approach really begs the question – for all the geometric / deductive method amounts to is a particular presentation –

 

it is effectively a language-game

 

the only ‘authority’ is authorship – and the authorship of a proposal – of a proposition – is logically irrelevant

 

we assess a proposal – not on the basis of its authorship – who puts it – but rather on how it stands up to question – to doubt – and to an exploration of its uncertainty

 

and – any assessment here – is of course – open to question

 

 

Proof. – Now whatever is in the power of God must (prev. prop.) be so comprehended in his essence that it follows necessarily from it, and so it necessarily exists. Q.e.d.

 

 

firstly – Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

secondly any ‘comprehension’ of power – is a matter open to question

 

thirdly – a thing exists – if proposed – and there is no necessity in this – a proposal is a contingency – existence is contingent

 

and finally – ‘power’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXVI. Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.

 

 

a thing exists – if proposed

 

a thing proposed – has an effect – if an effect is proposed

 

and if an effect is proposed – the proposed ‘thing’ – can be proposed as the cause of the effect

 

if no effect is proposed – there is no effect

 

 

Proof. – Whatever exists expresses in a certain and determined manner (Coroll., Prop. 25) the nature or essence of God, that is (Prop. 34), whatever exists expresses in a certain and determined way the power of God, which is the cause of all things, and therefore (Prop. 16) from it some effect must follow. Q.e.d.

 

 

what any proposal expresses – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

APPENDIX

 

This appendix has four paragraphs to it. Instead of presenting the appendix in one whole piece I will present each paragraph separately and follow it with my remarks.

 

(Paragraph 1)

 

In these propositions I have explained the nature and properties of God: that he necessarily exists: that he is one alone: that he exists and acts merely from the necessity of his nature: that he is the free cause of all things and in what manner: that all things are in God, and so depend on him that without him that could neither exist or be conceived: and finally, that all things were predetermined by God, not through his free will or good will, but through his absolute nature or infinite power. I have endeavoured moreover, whenever occasion prompted, to remove any misunderstandings which might impede the good understanding of my propositions. Yet as many misunderstandings still remain which. to a very large extent, have prevented and do prevent men from embracing the concatenation of things in the manner in which I have explained it, I have thought it worth while to call these into the scrutiny of reason. Now since all these misunderstandings which I am undertaking to point out depend upon this one point, that men commonly suppose that all natural things act like themselves with an end in view, and since they assert with assurance that God directs all things to a certain end ( for they say God made all things for man, and man that he might worship God), I shall therefore consider this one thing first, inquiring in the first place why so many fall into this error, and why all are by nature so prone to embrace it; then I shall show its falsity, and finally, how these misunderstandings have arisen concerning good and evil, virtue and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and other things of this kind. But this is not the place to deduce these things from the nature of the human mind. It will suffice here for me to take as a basis of argument what must be admitted by all: that is, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have a desire of acquiring what is useful; that they are conscious, moreover, of this. From these premisses it follows then, in the first place, that men think themselves free in as much as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and they are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to wish and desire, and they do not even dream of their existence. It follows, in the second place, that mean do all things with and end in view, that is they seek what is useful. Whence it comes to pass that they always seek out only the final causes of things performed, and when they have divined these they

cease, for clearly then they have no cause of further doubt. If they are unable to learn these causes from some one, nothing remains for them put to turn to themselves and reflect what could induce them to personally bring about such a thing, and thus necessarily estimate other natures by their own. Furthermore, as they find in themselves and without themselves many things which aid them not a little in their quest of things useful to themselves, as, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for mastication, vegetables and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, they consider these things like all natural things to be made for their use; and as they know that they found these things as they were, and did not make themselves, herein they have cause for believing that someone else prepared these things for their use. Now having considered things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created; but they must conclude from the means which they are wont to prepare for themselves, that there is some governor or governors, endowed with human freedom, who takes care of all thing for them and makes all things for their use. They most naturally form an estimate of the nature of these governors from their own, for they receive no information as regards them: and hence they come to say that the Gods direct all things for the use of men, that men may be bound down to them and do them the highest honour. Whence it comes about that each individual has devised a different manner in his own mind for the worship of God, and that God may love him above the rest and direct the whole of nature for the gratification of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. This misconception became a superstition and fixed its roots deeply in mind, and this was the reason why all diligently endeavoued to understand and explain the final causes of things. But while they have sought to show that nature does nothing in vain (that is nothing that is not of use to man), they appear to have shown nothing else than nature, the Gods and men are all mad. Behold now, I pray you, what this thing has become. Among so many conveniences of nature they are bound to find some conveniences – storms, earthquakes, and diseases, etc. – and they said these happened by reason of the anger of the Gods aroused against men through some misdeed or omission in worship; and although experience daily belied this, and showed with infinite examples that conveniences and their contraries happen promiscuously to the pious and impious, yet no even then did they turn from their inveterate prejudice. For it was easier for them to place this among other unknown things whose use they knew not, and thus retain their present and innate condition of ignorance than to destroy the whole fabric of their philosophy and reconstruct it. So it came to pass that they started with the greatest certainty that the judgements of God far surpassed human comprehension: and this was the only cause that truth might have lain hidden from the human race through all eternity, had not mathematics, which deals not in the final causes, but the essence and properties if things, offered to men another standard of truth. And besides mathematics there are other causes (which need not be enumerated here) which enabled men to take notice of these general prejudices and to be led to the true knowledge of things.

 

 

‘In these propositions I have explained the nature and properties of God: that he necessarily exists: that he is one alone: that he exists and acts merely from the necessity of his nature: that he is the free cause of all things and in what manner: that all things are in God, and so depend on him that without him that could neither exist or be conceived: and finally, that all things were predetermined by God, not through his free will or good will, but through his absolute nature or infinite power.’

 

Spinoza’s propositions concerning the nature and properties of God – are valid proposals –

 

we have from Spinoza a brilliant and comprehensive metaphysics –

 

however – his proposal – is only one of a number of possible propositional responses to the unknown

 

and as with any proposal or propositional framework – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

the certainty that he proposes – has no logical basis –

 

for any proposal put – in any context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

his certainty is nothing more than philosophical prejudice

 

what exists is what is proposed – and any proposal put is a contingency – not a necessity

 

as to ‘the free cause of all things’ –

 

if you accept a causal analysis – the causal chain – is without end –

 

to come to an uncaused event – or a free causal agent – you must abandon the causal argument –

 

and if you do this – then it is clear that it is a self-defeating argument

 

Spinoza’s God is reality – is nature – and for Spinoza – there is nothing else

 

and if you take this view as Spinoza holds it – there is no alternative to it – it is not genuinely open to question – open to doubt – or uncertain

 

and so – it is held illogically

 

our propositional existence – our propositional reality – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – there is no predetermination

 

our world is as proposed – however – whenever – wherever –

 

and any proposal put – is open to question – is uncertain

 

infinity is best seen as a mathematical / logical game –

 

in any other propositional context – the notion of infinity is mis-placed – and misapplied

 

‘absolute’ – is a synonym – for ‘ignorance’ –

 

and ‘power’ – a relative measure of propositional action.

 

Spinoza’s God – is not a ‘he’ – Spinoza’s God is an ‘it’

 

‘It will suffice here for me to take as a basis of argument what must be admitted by all: that is, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have a desire of acquiring what is useful; that they are conscious, moreover, of this. From these premisses it follows then, in the first place, that men think themselves free in as much as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and they are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to wish and desire, and they do not even dream of their existence.’

 

any proposal regarding ‘the cause of things’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and any view – i.e. – Spinoza’s that the cause of things can be known with certainty – is ignorant

 

even if you accept the proposition – that men have a desire of acquiring what is useful to them – (and this view – as with any – is open to question) – such a view raises the question – just what is useful?

 

and I would put that just what is useful to human beings – is an uncertain matter –

 

and further – that any person who considers the question of utility – in a rational manner sees this clearly

 

our freedom does not come from being ignorant of causes – or being able to pursue what we consider useful to us –

 

it comes out of understanding that any explanation that we put regarding our nature – is open – open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘It follows, in the second place, that men do all things with and end in view, that is they seek what is useful. Whence it comes to pass that they always seek out only the final causes of things performed, and when they have divined these they cease, for clearly then they have no cause of further doubt.’

 

well does it follow that men do all things with an end in view?

 

really – this is an empirical question – that should be investigated and tested –

 

it is not good enough to just assert it

 

as to ‘final causes’ – again – it is an empirical issue whether or not men always seek out final causes

 

my bet is – that this does not always happen – and probably – not often at all –

 

I suspect people generally run with whatever causal explanation works for them at the time – and that they are doubtful of finding a final cause to their actions and behaviour

 

and in any case any proposed ‘final’ cause – is open to question – and as soon as this is realized – the ‘finality’ – disappears

 

and seeking out ‘final causes’ – actually – is a sure road to doubt

 

‘If they are unable to learn these causes from someone, nothing remains for them put to turn to themselves and reflect what could induce them to personally bring about such a thing, and thus necessarily estimate other natures by their own.’

 

the argument is that because I can’t know the final cause of my wishes and desires – I regard myself as the final cause – and that I see all other natures as being their own cause

 

perhaps there are people who take such a view – but there are many who simply accept that they don’t – in any ‘final’ sense know what is the cause of their wishes and desires – and further that actually knowing a so-called final cause – is effectively irrelevant to the pursuit of what they wish and desire

 

do we estimate other natures by our own?

 

this may or may not happen – there is no ‘necessity’ in this at all –

 

also – it would seem that ‘other natures’ – are just that – other natures –

 

why would you assume that other natures have the same nature – as your own?

 

and ironically – it might well be said that in his argument that all is of God – that Spinoza himself argues that there is only one nature – and if – so there is something to be said for – estimating other natures by one’s own

 

‘Furthermore, as they find in themselves and without themselves many things which aid them not a little in their quest of things useful to themselves, as, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for mastication, vegetables and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, they consider these things like all natural things to be made for their use; and as they know that they found these things as they were, and did not make themselves, herein they have cause for believing that someone else prepared these things for their use.’

 

that ‘someone else prepared these things for their use’ – is a valid proposal –

 

and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Whence it comes about that each individual has devised a different manner in his own mind for the worship of God, and that God may love him above the rest and direct the whole course of nature for the gratification of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice’

 

an individual who devises a different manner for the worship of God –

 

presumably such an individual has put the worship of God – and how it is practised in his experience – to question – and come up with a different approach –

 

if so – on the face of it – such a person has behaved rationally –

 

does such a person thinks that God may love him above the rest and direct the whole

 

course of nature to his use?

 

this does not follow –

 

however – perhaps there are people who think they are superior to others in God’s eyes – and that God directs nature to the gratification of their desires –

 

if they hold such a view – it should be put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty exposed

 

if they don’t engage in this critical process – then they hold such an opinion – irrationally

 

‘This misconception became a superstition and fixed its roots deeply in mind, and this was the reason why all diligently endeavoued to understand and explain the final causes of things. But while they have sought to show that nature does nothing in vain (that is nothing that is not of use to man), they appear to have shown nothing else than nature, the Gods and men are all mad.’

 

it will only be a ‘misconception’ to those who hold a different view –

 

and only a ‘superstition’ – if not critically evaluated –

 

Spinoza regards such a view as demonstrating madness

 

which suggests that he has run out of reasons to oppose it – and has decided instead to deride it –

 

Spinoza – it seems – cannot tolerate a different conception of God

 

‘Behold now, I pray you, what this thing has become. Among so many conveniences of nature they are bound to find some inconveniences – storms, earthquakes, and diseases, etc. – and they said these happened by reason of the anger of the Gods aroused against men through some misdeed or omission in worship; and although experience daily belied this, and showed with infinite examples that conveniences and their contraries happen promiscuously to the pious and impious, yet not even then did they turn from their inveterate prejudice. For it was easier for them to place this among other unknown things whose use they knew not, and thus retain their present and innate condition of ignorance than to destroy the whole fabric of their philosophy and reconstruct it.’

 

this is a savage criticism –

 

and here we see Spinoza putting this view of God and men to question – to doubt – and exploring its uncertainty – and that is all to the good

 

and it stands in stark contrast to his failure to put his own view to question – to doubt – and to explore its uncertainty

 

the unknown is not – and should not be used as – a refuge for prejudice –

 

it is that to which all proposals are put – 

 

all knowledge is a reaction to and response to the unknown

 

recognizing and understanding this – is wisdom

 

‘So it came to pass that they started with the greatest certainty that the judgements of God far surpassed human comprehension: and this was the only cause that truth might have lain hidden from the human race through all eternity, had not mathematics, which deals not in the final causes, but the essence and properties if things, offered to men another standard of truth.’

 

again – Spinoza is quite right to challenge the certainty of the view that he opposes –

 

however – he fails to see that his own philosophy – falls to the same criticism

 

‘And besides mathematics there are other causes (which need not be enumerated here) which enabled men to take notice of these general prejudices and to be led to the true knowledge of things.’

 

as for mathematics saving the day – there is nothing to this at all

 

mathematics is a rule governed propositional game

 

there is no truth in a game – no ‘true knowledge of things’ in mathematics – there is only the rules of game – and the delight of the play

 

all knowledge is proposal – proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

APPENDIX (CONTINUED)

 

(Paragraph 2)

 

Thus I have explained what I undertook in the first place. It is scarcely necessary that I should show that nature has no fixed aim in view, and that all final causes are merely fabrications of men. For I think this is sufficiently clear from the bases and causes from which I have traced the origin of this prejudice, from Prop, 16, and from the corollaries of Prop. 32, and above all, from those propositions in which I have shown that all things in nature proceed eternally from a necessity and with the utmost perfection. I should add, however, this further point, that the doctrine of final causes overthrows nature entirely. For that which in truth is a cause it considers an effect, and vice versa, and so it makes that which is first by nature to be last, and again, that which is highest and most perfect it renders imperfect. As these two questions are obvious, let us pass them over. It follows from Prop. 21, 22, and 23, that the effect that is produced immediately from God is the most perfect, and that one is more imperfect according as it requires more intermediating causes. But if those things which are immediately produced by God are made by him for the attaining of some end, then it necessarily follows that the ultimate things for whose sake these first were made must transcend all others. Hence this doctrine destroys the perfection of God: for if God seeks an end he necessarily seeks something that he lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians make a distinction between the end that is want and that which is assimilation, they confess that God acts on his own account, and not for the sake of creating things; for before the creation they can assign nothing save God

on whose account God acted, and so necessarily they are obliged to confess that God lacked and desired those things for the attainment of which he wished to prepare means, as is clear of itself. Nor must I pass at this point that some of the adherents of this doctrine who have wished to show their ingenuity in assigning final causes to things have discovered a new manner of argument for the proving of this doctrine, to wit, not a reduction to the impossible, but a reduction too ignorance, which shows that they have no other mode of arguing their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof on the head of a passer-by and kills him, they will show by their method of argument that the stone was sent to fall and kill the man; for if it had not fallen on him by God’s will, how could so many circumstances (for often very many circumstances concur at the same time) concur by chance? You will reply, perhaps: “That the wind was blowing, and that the man had to pass that way, and hence it happened.” But they will retort: “Why was the wind blowing at the time?” and why was the man going that way at that time?” If again you reply: “That the wind had risen on account of the agitation of the sea the day before, and the previous weather had been calm, and that the man was going that way at the invitation of a friend”, the will again retort, for there is no end to their questioning: “Why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?” And thus they will pursue you from cause to cause until you are glad to take refuge in the will of God, that is, the asylum of ignorance. Thus again, when they see the human body they are amazed, and as they know not the cause of so much art, they conclude that it is made not by mechanical art, but divine or supernatural art, and constructed in such a manner that one part may not injure the other. And hence it comes about that those who wish to seek out the causes of miracles, and who wish to understand things of nature as learned men, and not stare at them in amazement like fools, are soon deemed heretical and impious, and proclaimed such by those whom the mob adore as the interpreters of nature and the Gods. For these know that once ignorance is laid aside, that wonderment which is the only means of preserving their authority would be taken away from them. But I now leave the point and proceed to what I determined to discuss in the third place. ‘Thus I have explained what I undertook in the first place. It is scarcely necessary that I should show that nature has no fixed aim in view, and that all final causes are merely fabrications of men.

 

‘Thus I have explained what I undertook in the first place. It is scarcely necessary that I should show that nature has no fixed aim in view, and that all final causes are merely fabrications of men.’

 

as to the ‘fabrications of men’ – what we have from men – is proposal – and a proposal – of any kind – is not a ‘fabrication’ –

 

any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a ‘final causes’ proposal – as with any other proposal – is open to question

 

Spinoza’s own proposals – are open to question –

 

his proposal ‘God’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘I should add, however, this further point, that the doctrine of final causes overthrows nature entirely. For that which in truth is a cause it considers an effect, and vice versa, and so it makes that which is first by nature to be last, and again, that which is highest and most perfect it renders imperfect.’

 

the ‘final cause’ – is best described as a ‘final aim’

 

Spinoza argues that if you hold to the final cause argument – you confuse cause and effect –

 

I think Spinoza is confusing two different arguments here –

 

for you can have a cause-and-effect analysis – without the idea of there being a final aim to any causal action

 

or you can have a causal analysis – and – as it were – supplement that analysis – with the idea of a final aim

 

as to the claim that the final cause argument renders the perfect imperfect

 

Spinoza is arguing that the idea of a final cause – or aim – renders God or nature – imperfect – in that it suggests that God or nature is fundamentally lacking – and hence strives for fulfillment

 

Spinoza asks – how can perfection be lacking? – how can God or nature – be lacking?
‘

in response to this perfection argument – it might be put – that Spinoza’s perfection – in so far as it is not lacking – is a dead perfection – a perfection – doing nothing and going nowhere –

 

and yet of course Spinoza holds that God or nature is the cause – the free cause of all that exists

 

you could ask here – if perfection – is completion – how can there be causation – for doesn’t the fact of causation suggest – incompletion – and indeed a galloping incompletion – one might say – an on-going incompletion?

 

perhaps God’s ‘perfection’ – nature’s ‘perfection’ – (if this term ‘perfection’ is to be used at all) – rests not in some metaphysical stasis – but rather in on-going action – and on-going action that is never complete?

 

and what then of ‘final cause’? –

 

well on this view – there is no final cause – but it is different argument to that put by Spinoza

 

the final cause argument – logically speaking is no different to any proposal put – it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

perhaps it is best seen as a heuristic hypothesis – used to advance discovery?

 

if seen is in this way – it can be seen to be more than useful

 

‘As these two questions are obvious, let us pass them over. It follows from Prop. 21, 22, and 23, that the effect that is produced immediately from God is the most perfect, and that one is more imperfect according as it requires more intermediating causes.

But if those things which are immediately produced by God are made by him for the

attaining of some end, then it necessarily follows that the ultimate things for whose sake these first were made must transcend all others. Hence this doctrine destroys the perfection of God: for if God seeks an end he necessarily seeks something that he lacks.’

 

‘that effect that is produced immediately from God is the most perfect’

 

and if so – what do make of cause and effect here?

 

if God / nature – is cause & effect – what distinguishes cause and effect

 

does not the above statement undercut any notion of cause and effect?

 

what we have – is God – is nature – and that is all there is to it

 

God is not caused – nature is not caused – God is not an effect – nature is not an effect

 

yes – you can use a causal analysis as a way into God – into nature – but once you get there – it has no value

 

and as for ‘perfect’ – ‘perfect’ – here is what is complete – and as such – proposed as beyond question – as beyond doubt – and certain

 

as such – the notion of perfection is illogical – just another instance of philosophical prejudice

 

there is no perfection – no ‘perfect’ proposition –

 

our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

our world – our propositional world – is uncertain – and it is out of this uncertainty – that our reality is created

 

‘And although theologians and metaphysicians make a distinction between the end that is want and that which is assimilation, they confess that God acts on his own account, and not for the sake of creating things; for before the creation they can assign nothing save God on whose account God acted, and so necessarily they are obliged to confess that God lacked and desired those things for the attainment of which he wished to prepare means, as is clear of itself.’

 

Spinoza’s God – his ‘perfect’ God – his certain God – is a do-nothing God –

 

our reality is a proposition driven by uncertainty

 

and it is out of this uncertainty – that God / nature is proposed – and once proposed – explored –

 

and it is as a result of this uncertainty – this exploration – that our reality is created – and continually created

 

‘Nor must I pass at this point that some of the adherents of this doctrine who have wished to show their ingenuity in assigning final causes to things have discovered a new manner of argument for the proving of this doctrine, to wit, not a reduction to the impossible, but a reduction to ignorance, which shows that they have no other mode of arguing their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof on the head of a passer-by and kills him, they will show by their method of argument that the stone was sent to fall and kill the man; for if it had not fallen on him by God’s will, how could so many circumstances (for often very many circumstances concur at the same time) concur by chance? You will reply, perhaps: “That the wind was blowing, and that the man had to pass that way, and hence it happened.” But they will retort: “Why was the wind blowing at the time?” and why was the man going that way at that time?” If again you reply: “That the wind had risen on account of the agitation of the sea the day before, and the previous weather had been calm, and that the man was going that way at the invitation of a friend”, the will again retort, for there is no end to their questioning: “Why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?” And thus they will pursue you from cause to cause until you are glad to take refuge in the will of God, that is, the asylum of ignorance. Thus again, when they see the human body they are amazed, and as they know not the cause of so much art, they conclude that it is made not by mechanical art, but divine or supernatural art, and constructed in such a manner that one part may not injure the other. And hence it comes about that those who wish to seek out the causes of miracles, and who wish to understand things of nature as learned men, and not stare at them in amazement like fools, are soon deemed heretical and impious, and proclaimed such by those whom the mob adore as the interpreters of nature and the Gods. For these know that once ignorance is laid aside, that wonderment which is the only means of preserving their authority would be taken away from them. But I now leave the point and proceed to what I determined to discuss in the third place.’

 

here it is clear that Spinoza has some understanding of the argument that in a final sense we don’t know

 

he of course rejects this view entirely

 

any proposed event – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and in response to this uncertainty – we are invited to put forward proposals –

proposals which themselves are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

further proposals can be put – and logically speaking – the matter is ongoing

 

there is no final proposal – there is only continual propositional exploration

this is what we do – we explore – explore propositional uncertainty

 

and yes – at some point in this process we decide to proceed with a proposal – a propositional explanation – knowing full well that it is open to question –

 

nevertheless – we make what use of it that we can

 

‘And thus they will pursue you from cause to cause until you are glad to take refuge in the will of God, that is, the asylum of ignorance.’

 

it is not a pursuit of cause here – rather propositional inquiry and exploration –

 

and if one is logical – and I think to be logical – some courage is required – one will not seek refuge – in the will of God – or in anything else for that matter

 

one will see that wherever one lands – whatever position one comes to – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we never leave uncertainty – we only ever explore it –

 

and at the back of all this exploration is the realization that in any final sense – we don’t know

 

that what we face ultimately is the unknown –

 

and the unknown is silent – the unknown has no one answer – the unknown is open to all answers – all proposals

 

as to miracles –

 

the proposal of miracles – is valid – but as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘For these know that once ignorance is laid aside, that wonderment which is the only means of preserving their authority would be taken away from them. But I now leave the point and proceed to what I determined to discuss in the third place.’

 

Spinoza – it seems – has never had the experience of wonder

 

to wonder is to approach reality with an open mind and an open heart

 

APPENDIX (CONTINUED)

 

(Paragraph 3)

 

As soon as men had persuaded themselves that all things which were made, were made for their sakes, they were bound to consider as the best quality in everything that which was most useful to them, and to esteem that above all things which brought them the most good. Hence they must have made for their sakes, they were bound to consider as the best quality in everything that which was most useful to them, and to esteem that above all things which brought them the most good. Hence they must have formed these notions by which they explain the things of nature, to wit, good, evil, order, confusion, hot, cold, beauty, and ugliness, etc.; and as they deemed themselves free agents, the notions of praise and blame, sin and merit, arose. The latter notions I will discuss when I deal with human nature latter on, but the former are to be discussed now. They call all that is conclusive of health and worship of God good, and all that is conducive to the contrary, evil. And foreasmuch as those who do not understand the things of nature are certain of nothing concerning those things, but only imagine them and mistake their imagination for intellect, they firmly

believe there is order in things, and are ignorant of them and their own nature. Now

when things are so disposed that when they are represented to us through our senses                                                                                                                                

we can easily imagine and consequently easily remember them, we call them well

ordered; and on the other hand, when we cannot do so, we call them ill-ordered and

confused. Now forasmuch as those things, above all others, are pleasing to us which

we can easily imagine, men accordingly prefer order to confusion, as if order were anything in nature save in respect to our imagination; and they say that God has created all things in order, and thus unwittingly they attribute imagination to God, unless indeed they would have that God providing for human imagination disposed all things in such a manner as would be most easy for our imagination; nor would they then find it perhaps a stumbling block to their theory that infinite things are found which are far beyond the reach of our imagination, and many which confuse it through its weakness. But of this I have said enough. The other notions are also nothing other than modes of imagining in which imagination is affected in diverse manners, and yet they are considered by the ignorant as very important attributes of things: for as we have said, they think all things were made for them, and call their natures good or bad, healthy or rotten, and corrupt, according as they are affected by them. E.g., if motion, which the nerves receive by means of the eyes from objects before us, is conducive to health, those objects by which it is caused are called beautiful; if not, then the objects are called ugly. Such things as affect the nerves by means of the nose are thus styled fragrant or evil smelling; or when by means of the mouth, sweet or bitter, tasty or insipid; when by means of touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc. And such things as affect the ear are called noises, and form discord or harmony, the last of which has delighted men to madness, so that they believe harmony delights God. Nor have there been wanting philosophers who assert that the movements of the heavenly spheres compose harmony. All of which sufficiently show that each one judges things according to the disposition of his own mind, or rather takes for things that which is really modifications of his imagination. Wherefore it is not remarkable (as we may incidentally remark) that so many controversies we find have arisen among men, and at last Skepticism. For although human bodies agree in many points, yet in many others they differ, and that which seems to one good yet to another evil; and to one order, yet to another confusion; to one pleasing, yet to another displeasing, and so on, for I need not treat further of these, as this is not the place to discuss them in detail, and indeed they must be sufficiently obvious to all. For it is in everyone’s mouth: “As many minds as men,” “Each is wise in his own manner,” “As tastes differ, so do minds” – all of which proverbs show clearly enough that men judge things according to the disposition of their minds, and had rather imagine things than understand them. For if they understood things, my arguments would convince them at least, just as mathematics, although they might not attract them.’

 

‘As soon as men had persuaded themselves that all things which were made, were made for their sakes, they were bound to consider as the best quality in everything that which was most useful to them, and to esteem that above all things which brought them the most good. Hence they must have formed these notions by which they explain the things of nature, to wit, good, evil, order, confusion, hot, cold, beauty, and ugliness, etc.; and as they deemed themselves free agents, the notions of praise and blame, sin and merit, arose. The latter notions I will discuss when I deal with human nature latter on, but the former are to be discussed now. They call all that is conclusive of health and worship of God good, and all that is conducive to the contrary, evil.’

 

the proposal that all things were made for man’s sake – is a valid proposal – and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

I can understand that someone might find it useful to see the world in these terms –

 

but my first question would be – how can you know that everything was made for

 

your use?

 

and who made all the things for your use?

 

‘God’– you say? –

 

again – how is it that you know this – and how do you know God made all things for your use?

 

and in any case – do the facts of human experience – bear out the view that all things are made for your use?

 

i.e. – how can you say that the disasters of nature which afflict men and cause human suffering and death – are of use to men?

 

a big stretch to argue that one

 

all in all – such a view comes across as very narrow and limited –

 

nevertheless – if someone chooses to propose the world in this fashion – so long as they hold their view open to question – open to doubt – and recognise its uncertainty

 

they hold the view rationally

 

you are free to propose the world anyway you wish

 

the only authority is authorship

 

you can hold that what is most useful to men – men consider to be good – and that which harms them – they consider evil – without the claim that all things were made for their use –

 

still – any proposal – regarding what is useful to man – is open to question

 

and any theory – of good and evil – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘And foreasmuch as those who do not understand the things of nature are certain of nothing concerning those things, but only imagine them and mistake their imagination for intellect, they firmly believe there is order in things, and are ignorant of them and their own nature.

 

to understand – is to question – is to doubt – is to be uncertain

 

those who do not question – do not doubt – and claim to be certain – hide in ignorance and pretention

 

mistaking imagination for intellect?

 

‘imagination’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘intellect’ – a name for propositional action

 

logically speaking – what we deal with is proposal / propositional action

 

and whatever is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

whether explain / describe – your proposal – as of the ‘intellect’ – or explain / describe your proposal – as of the ‘imagination’ – is little more than propositional packaging –

 

however – presented – however dressed up – your proposal is open to question – and is uncertain

 

and yes – in a final sense – what we face is the unknown

 

‘Now when things are so disposed that when they are represented to us through our senses we can easily imagine and consequently easily remember them, we call them well ordered; and on the other hand, when we cannot do so, we call them ill-ordered and confused.’

 

whatever we propose – and however we describe what we propose – i.e. – ‘well ordered’ – or ‘confused’ – and however we explain our proposal – i.e. – ‘through the senses’ –

 

our proposal – is open to question

 

‘through the senses’ – or whatever other explanation is offered – again – from a logical point of view – is neither here nor there –

 

what is relevant is that the proposal is critically explored

 

empiricism and rationalism are attempts to ground knowledge – one in experience – the other in reason

 

knowledge has no ground – knowledge has no foundation

 

knowledge is proposal – knowledge is what is proposed – and proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

these ‘theories of knowledge’ in their many forms – have been and are – of use as ways of exploring propositional reality – however in so far as they are proposed as final or definitive accounts of human knowledge – they have missed the point entirely

 

‘Now forasmuch as those things, above all others, are pleasing to us which we can easily imagine, men accordingly prefer order to confusion, as if order were anything in nature save in respect to our imagination; and they say that God has created all things in order, and thus unwittingly they attribute imagination to God, unless indeed they would have that God providing for human imagination disposed all things in such a manner as would be most easy for our imagination; nor would they then find it perhaps a stumbling block to their theory that infinite things are found which are far beyond the reach of our imagination, and many which confuse it through its weakness.’

 

‘and thus unwittingly they attribute imagination to God’ –

 

here is just where Spinoza’s argument – his metaphysics – falls apart

 

if – ‘all is of God’ – then ‘imagination’ – is of God – and – human imagination – is – ‘of God’ – and – is – of nature – is – a natural phenomenon

 

‘infinite things are found which are far beyond the reach of our imagination’

 

and as for infinite things – there are no infinite ‘things’ – a ‘thing’ – is not infinite

 

‘infinite’ – is a propositional game term – it is a term that makes sense in the context of a game where the play is on-going – be that in mathematics – or in some other game form

 

and look the notion of ‘infinite’ – is not one ‘far beyond the reach of our imagination’

 

if it was – the term would not exist

 

‘The other notions are also nothing other than modes of imagining in which imagination is affected in diverse manners, and yet they are considered by the ignorant as very important attributes of things: for as we have said, they think all things were made for them, and call their natures good or bad, healthy or rotten, and corrupt, according as they are affected by them. E.g., if motion, which the nerves receive by means of the eyes from objects before us, is conducive to health, those objects by which it is caused are called beautiful; if not, then the objects are called ugly. Such things as affect the nerves by means of the nose are thus styled fragrant or evil smelling; or when by means of the mouth, sweet or bitter, tasty or insipid; when by means of touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc. And such things as affect the ear are called noises, and form discord or harmony, the last of which has delighted men to madness, so that they believe harmony delights God. Nor have there been wanting philosophers who assert that the movements of the heavenly spheres compose harmony. All of which sufficiently show that each one judges things according to the disposition of his own mind, or rather takes for things that which is really modifications of his imagination.’

 

yes – ‘each one judges things according to the disposition of his own mind’ –

 

which is to say we are free to propose the world – as we like – as we see it

 

and if we are rational about – we hold any proposal we put – or others put – open to question – open to doubt – and we recognize the uncertainty of any proposal put

 

‘Wherefore it is not remarkable (as we may incidentally remark) that so many controversies we find have arisen among men, and at last Skepticism. For although human bodies agree in many points, yet in many others they differ, and that which seems to one good yet to another evil; and to one order, yet to another confusion; to one pleasing, yet to another displeasing, and so on, for I need not treat further of these, as this is not the place to discuss them in detail, and indeed they must be sufficiently obvious to all. For it is in everyone’s mouth: “As many minds as men,” “Each is wise in his own manner,” “As tastes differ, so do minds” – all of which

proverbs show clearly enough that men judge things according to the disposition of

their minds, and had rather imagine things than understand them. For if they understood things, my arguments would convince them at least, just as mathematics,

although they might not attract them.’

 

‘Wherefore it is not remarkable (as we may incidentally remark) that so many controversies we find have arisen among men’

 

here we have a piece of philosophical realism from Spinoza

 

‘and at last Skepticism’ –

 

I am reminded here of Giacoma Casonova’s observation regarding Spinoza’s philosophy –

 

'The great philosopher who believed, after studying nature, that he could claim victory by recognizing GOD in it, died too soon. Had he lived a little longer, he would have gone much further, and he would not have had far to go. Finding himself in his maker, he could no longer have denied Him: He would have found him inconceivable; but this would not have troubled him. Could God, the supreme principle of all principles, who has no principle, ever conceive Himself, if in order to conceive himself he needed to know his own principle? O blissful ignorance! Spinoza, the virtuous Spinoza died before achieving such ignorance.'

 

The Story of My Life. 1791.

 

it is clear that Spinoza was well and truly aware of the possibility of skepticism –

 

and so – Casanova’s observation that he died before he understood skepticism is not right

 

nevertheless – Casanova – in my view – makes the valid point that in disregarding skepticism – Spinoza missed a great philosophical opportunity

 

Spinoza here argues that if his argument is understood – skepticism is avoided –

 

and he specifically mentions mathematics as an argument against skepticism

 

Spinoza proposes a grand and brilliant propositional construct – that – as with any other proposal or propositional construct – is valid

 

however – he holds that his propositional vision – is certain –

 

and in taking this view – he holds it illogically and irrationally

 

his ‘certainty’ – is illogical and pretentious – and amounts to a high-minded prejudice

 

as for mathematics saving the day for certainty –

 

mathematics is a rule-governed sign game –

 

if you play the mathematics – game – you play in accordance with its rules –

 

if you don’t play in accordance with its rules – there is no game – there is no mathematics –

 

a game is neither true or false – games have no truth value

 

you can put the rules of a mathematical game to question – but that is not mathematics

 

putting propositions to question – to doubt – exploring their uncertainty – is a critical activity

 

and the critical activity is grounded – not in certainty – but uncertainty

 

in the absence of proposal – what we face – what we deal with is the unknown

 

we propose to make known – and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

APPENDIX (CONTINUED)

 

(Paragraph 4)

 

We have thus seen that all arguments by which the vulgar are won’t to explain nature are nothing else than modes of imagination, and indicate the nature of nothing whatever, but only the constitution of the imagination; I Call them entities, not of reality, but of the imagination: and so all arguments directed against us from such notions can easily be returned. For many are wont thus to argue: if all things have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, whence have so many imperfections in nature arisen? For example, the corruption of things even to rottenness, the ugliness of things which often nauseate, confusion, evil, sin etc. But I have just said, these are easily confuted. For the perfection of things is estimated solely from their nature and power; nor are things more or less perfect according as they delight or disgust human senses, or according as they are useful or useless to men. But to those who ask, “Why did not God create all men in such a manner that they might be governed by reason alone?” I make no answer but this: because material was not wanting to him for the creating of all things from the highest to the lowest; or speaking more accurately, because the laws of his nature were so comprehensive as to suffice for the creation of everything that infinite intellect can conceive, as I have shown in Prop. 16. These are the misunderstandings which I stopped here to point out. If any of the same sort remain, they can easily be dispersed by means of little reflection.

 

‘We have thus seen that all arguments by which the vulgar are won’t to explain nature are nothing else than modes of imagination, and indicate the nature of nothing whatever, but only the constitution of the imagination; I Call them entities, not of reality, but of the imagination: and so all arguments directed against us from such notions can easily be returned.’

 

Spinoza puts forward his proposals – and holds that his proposals have authority because they are products of the intellect – when in fact the ‘intellect’ is nothing more than propositional action – that as with the proposals it is meant to give authority to – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

the only authority is authorship – and beyond that any claim of authority is pretentious

and he describes those proposals that don’t fit his proposed reality that challenge is

 

proposed reality– as ‘vulgar’ – as ‘of the imagination’ – when – in logical terms they are no different to his preferred set of proposals – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s propositions are logically valid – and he gives us a picture of reality that is comprehensive and brilliant – but in so far as he holds that his propositions are superior to those that give a different account of reality – he abandons logic and reason and he shows himself to be authoritarian and elitist

 

‘For many are wont thus to argue: if all things have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, whence have so many imperfections in nature arisen? For example, the corruption of things even to rottenness, the ugliness of things which often nauseate, confusion, evil, sin etc. But I have just said, these are easily confuted.’

 

if Spinoza’s God is ‘of the most perfect nature’ – and if ‘all is of God’ – then there are no imperfections – and if there are no imperfections – then what Spinoza calls the propositions of the imagination – are not imperfect – and not to be distinguished from others – in terms of perfection

 

which in my terms is to say any proposal – any proposition is valid – and equal –

 

and by ‘equal’ here I mean that any proposal is logically equal to any other – in that it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘For the perfection of things is estimated solely from their nature and power; nor are things more or less perfect according as they delight or disgust human senses, or according as they are useful or useless to men. But to those who ask, “Why did not God create all men in such a manner that they might be governed by reason alone?” I make no answer but this: because material was not wanting to him for the creating of all things from the highest to the lowest; or speaking more accurately, because the laws of his nature were so comprehensive as to suffice for the creation of everything that infinite intellect can conceive, as I have shown in Prop. 16. These are the misunderstandings which I stopped here to point out. If any of the same sort remain, they can easily be dispersed by means of little reflection.’

 

here we have the argument that this perfect God – created the imperfect – because he could – what do we say here?

 

the imperfect – is not imperfect – but rather an expression of God’s perfection?

 

something has to give here – and I think its perfection

 

or – the perfection of God – is not perfect – and if so – God is not perfect

 

and something has to give here too – and I think – it’s God

 

regardless of any proposed issues with Spinoza’s proposal ‘God’ – the proposal is as

 

valid as any other

 

and if held open to question – open to doubt – it is rationally held

 

SECOND PART

 

CONCERNING THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

 

 

PREFACE

 

I now wish to explain such things as follow from the essence of God or of a being eternal and infinite: not all of them indeed (for they must follow in infinite number and in infinite modes, as we have shown in Part I., Prop. 16). but only such as can lead us by the hand (so to speak) to the knowledge of the human mind and its consummate blessedness.

 

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no essence – and is not a being – eternal or infinite

 

nothing follows from the unknown –

 

we propose in response to the unknown

 

we propose to make known –

 

knowledge is proposal

 

and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a proposal can be put in relation to a subject proposal –

 

and a proposal put in relation to the subsequent proposal –

 

there is no logical end to this action of proposal put in relation to proposal

 

the proposals put – and the propositional relations proposed – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

‘blessedness’ – is rhetoric – not logic

 

 

DEFINITIONS

 

 

I. BY BODY (corpus) I understand that mode which expresses in a certain determined manner the essence of God in so far as he is considered as an extended thing (vide part I., Prop. 25., Coroll.).

 

 

‘body’ is a proposal – how ‘body’ is defined / described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a ‘mode’ is a proposal – a propositional construct –

 

the body can be proposed as a propositional construct –

 

the body can be proposed / described as an ‘extended thing’ –

 

any proposed description of ‘body’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

II. I say that appertains to the essence of a thing which, when granted, necessarily involves the granting of a thing, and which, when removed, necessarily involves the removal of the thing; or that without which the thing, or on the other hand, without which the thing can neither exist nor be conceived.

 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a ‘thing’ is ‘granted’ – if proposed –

 

the ‘essence’ of a thing – is a description of the thing

 

if by ‘essence’ is meant a description – that is not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain

 

there is no essence –

 

a thing / proposal – is not ‘removed’ – if a description / ‘essence’ is removed

 

a proposal is ‘removed’ – if dropped from consideration

 

 

III. By IDEA (idea) I understand the conception of the mind which the mind forms by reason of its being a thinking thing.

 

Explanation. – I say conception rather than perception, for the name perception seems to point out that the mind is passive to the object, while conception seems to express an action of the mind.

 

 

an ‘idea’ – is a proposal – a propositional action

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –

 

a ‘conception’ is a propositional action

 

a ‘perception’ – is propositional action

 

a perception is not passive –

 

there are no ‘passive’ proposals –

 

all proposals / propositions are actions

 

 

IV. By ADEQUATE IDEA (idea adequate) I understand an idea which, if it is considered in itself without respect to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

 

 

Explanation. – I say intrinsic in order that I may exclude what is extrinsic, i.e., the agreement between the idea and its ideal.

 

 

no idea / proposal – is ‘conceived through itself’

 

an idea / proposal – is conceived / proposed by a propositional actor

 

an ‘object’ is a proposal –

 

an idea / proposal – has no properties – but those proposed – and no intrinsic marks

 

a ‘true idea’ / proposal – is a proposal affirmed –

 

affirmed by a propositional actor

 

any proposal of affirmation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘adequate idea’ is meant an idea / a proposal that is not open to question – not open to doubt – that is certain –

 

there are no adequate ideas

 

an ‘idea’ – is a proposal – an ‘ideal’ is that proposed –

 

there is no logical distinction between an ‘idea’ and its ‘ideal’ –

 

a true proposal (idea / ideal) is a proposal affirmed – for whatever reason

 

any proposal of affirmation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a proposal – has no intrinsic marks

 

 

V. DURATION (duratio) is indefinite continuation of existing.

 

 

Explanation. – I say indefinite because it can in no wise be determined by means of the nature of an existing thing nor by an effecting cause, which necessarily imposes existence on a thing but cannot take it away.

 

 

‘duration’ – is a measure of propositional action in terms of time –

 

a proposal exists as long as it is active – that is – as long as it is considered

 

duration is a measurement of this consideration

 

‘the effecting cause’ of any proposal / propositional action – is a propositional actor

 

a proposal / propositional action may be taken up by other propositional actors –

 

and then by other propositional actors again – and again

 

 

VI. REALITY and PERFECTION (realitas et perfectis) I understand to be one and the same thing.

 

 

‘reality’ – is a proposal –

 

a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

reality is uncertain

 

‘perfection’ is a synonym for certainty –

 

there is no propositional certainty

 

there is no propositional perfection

 

 

VII. BY INDIVIDUAL THINGS (res singulars) I understand things which are finite and have a determined existence; but if several of them so concur in one action that they are all at the same time the cause of one effect, I consider them all thus far as one thing.

 

 

‘individual things’ are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

an ‘individual thing’ / proposal – exists as long as it is considered

 

several proposals do not concur in one proposal / propositional action

 

several proposals – are different proposals – different propositional actions – different things

 

the ‘cause’ of any proposal – is the propositional actor who puts the proposal

 

 

AXIOMS

 

 

I. The essence of a man does not involve necessary existence, that is, in the order of nature it can easily happen that this or that man exists as that he does not.

 

 

‘a man’ – is a proposal 

 

the ‘essence of a man’ – is a proposed description – put in relation to the proposal ‘a man’

 

any proposal / propositional description – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

‘essence’ – is uncertain

 

there is no necessary existence – all proposal is contingent

 

 

II. Man thinks.

 

 

man proposes –

 

‘thinking’ – is a description of propositional action

 

 

III. The modes of thinking. such as love, desire, or any other name by which the emotions of the mind may be designated, are not granted unless an idea in the same individual is granted of the thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea can be granted although no other mode of thinking be granted.

 

 

‘modes of thinking’ – are modes of proposal – descriptive categories of proposal / propositional action

 

and a modal proposal is a proposal put in relation to another proposal – the object proposal

 

i.e. – I propose love – and put my love proposal – in relation to another proposal – an ‘object proposal’

 

and the ‘idea’ / proposal – can be put without reference to any other modal proposal

 

which is to say the proposal can be put uniquely

 

any proposal – and any relational proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

as to the ‘emotions of the mind’ –

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘emotion’ – is a name for propositional action

 

propositional actions however named – however described – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

IV. We feel that a certain body is affected in many ways

                                                                                                                                

 

we can propose that a certain body / proposal – can be described in many ways

 

 

V. We neither feel nor perceive any individual things save bodies and modes of thinking. For postulates, see after Prop. 13.

 

 

what we ‘feel’ or ‘perceive’ – is what we propose –

 

and any proposal put – or any proposal described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘feeling’ and ‘perception’ – are explanations / descriptions of propositional action –

 

‘bodies’ can be proposed – ‘modes of thinking’ – can be proposed –

 

and some people propose things such as ‘souls’ and ‘spirits’ –

 

and these proposals – and any others put – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROPOSITIONS

 

 

PROP. I. Thought (cognatio) is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

 

 

‘thought’ is a name for propositional action

 

an ‘attribute’ is a propositional description

 

God is a name – a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no attributes

 

the unknown is not a thinking thing

 

 

Proof. – Individual thoughts, or, this and that are individual mode which express in a certain determined way the nature of God (Coroll., Prop. 25 Part I). So the attribute whose conception all individual thoughts involve and through which they are conceived, belongs to God (Def. 5, Part I). Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God which express the eternal and infinite essence of God (vide Def. 6, Part I.), or God is a thinking thing.

 

 

what an individual thought expresses – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

individual thoughts are not ‘conceived through’ an attribute – that is – through a description

 

they are proposed / ‘conceived’ – by propositional actors –

 

description belongs not to God – but to propositional actors

 

and according to Spinoza – thought is one of the infinite number of attributes / descriptions which express the eternal and infinite essence of his God

 

what we know is that thought is a propositional action –

 

and any propositional action – however described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – This proposition is also clear from the fact that we can conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more a thinking being can think, the more reality or perfection we conceive to have. Therefore a being which can think infinite things in infinite modes is necessarily, as regards thinking, infinite. Since, therefore, from the mere consideration of thought we can conceive an infinite being, therefore necessarily (Defs. 4 and 6, Part I.) thought is one of the attributes of God, as we wish to prove.

 

 

‘God’ – an infinite thinking being – is necessarily thinking and infinite?

 

this is no argument – this is just a play with words –

 

it establishes nothing at all

 

and Spinoza’s conclusion – that thought is an attribute of God

 

is just a restatement of the premise –

 

what we have here is a word game  

 

 

PROP. II. Extension (extension) is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.

 

 

Proof. – This proof proceeds in the same manner as that of the previous proposition.

 

 

and if so – this ‘proof’ – is just another demonstration of tautological word play

 

 

PROP. III. In God there is necessarily granted not only the idea of his essence, but also the idea of all the things which follow from his essence.

 

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

nothing is ‘granted’ in the unknown

 

no proposal – is ‘necessarily granted’

 

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – not necessary

 

‘the idea of his essence’ – is a descriptive proposal – put in relation to the subject proposal i.e. – ‘God’

 

any such descriptive proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

‘the idea of all things’ – is just a description of Spinoza’s ‘God’ –

 

the ‘God’ he is proposing

 

nothing ‘follows from’ any proposal –

 

proposal can be put in relation to proposals –

 

and any proposal put – is open to question – is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – God can think infinite things in infinite modes (Prop. I, Part II.), or (what is the same thing, by Prop. 16, Part I.) he can form an idea of his essence and of all things which follow from it. Now all that is in the power of God necessarily exist (Prop. 35, Part I.). Therefore such an idea is granted, and that only in God (Prop. 15, Part I.). Q.e.d.

 

 

‘God is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown does not think – does not think infinite things in infinite modes – or form an idea of its essence

 

nothing follows from the unknown

 

nothing is granted in the unknown

 

to think is to propose

 

‘thinking’ – is propositional action

 

propositional actors / human beings – proposal / think –

 

the power of a proposal rests in it use

 

no proposal necessarily exists –

 

all proposals exist – as long as they are considered

 

all proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – The generality of people understand by the power of God the free will of God and his right over all things that are, and so these are commonly considered contingent. For they say that God has the power of destroying everything and reducing it to nothing. Moreover they often compare the power of God to that of kings. But this is in Coroll. 1 and 2, Prop. 32, part I., we have refuted: and in Prop. 16, Part I., we have showed that God acts by the same necessity by which he understands himself: that is it follows from the necessity of divine nature (as all will grant unanimously) that God understands himself, and from the same necessity it follows that God performs infinite things in infinite ways. Again, in Prop. 34, Part I., we showed that the power of God is nothing else than the active essence of God: and accordingly it is impossible for us to conceive God inactive as to conceive him non- existent. And if I may pursue this matter further, I could furthermore point out that the power which the generality attribute to God is not only human power (showing that they conceive God to be a man or like one), but also involves a want of power. But I do not wish to return to this subject so many times. I only ask that the reader again and again to turn over in his mind once and again what I have written on this subject in Part I., from Prop. 16 to the end. For no one can rightly perceive what I wish to point out unless he takes the greatest care not to confound the power of God with human power or right of kings.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown does not have a will

 

the unknown does not act

 

the unknown does not understand itself

 

nothing follows from the unknown

 

the unknown has no power

 

human beings – and other animals – act

 

‘will’ is a description applied to sentient propositional action

 

we understand ourselves when we critically evaluate our propositional actions

 

no proposition ‘follows from’ another proposition

 

propositions are put in relation to propositions – 

 

power is a relative measure of propositional action

 

human beings / propositional actors propose in response to – in reaction to – the unknown

 

the unknown is silent

 

if we act rationally – we put our proposals to question – to doubt – and we explore their uncertainty

 

 

PROP. IV. The idea of God from which infinite things in infinite modes can follow can only be one.

 

 

Proof. – Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes and modifications of God. (Prop. 30, Part I.). God is one (Coroll. 1, Prop. 14. Part I.). Therefore the idea of God from which infinite things in infinite modes follow can only be one.

 

 

the idea of God – is a proposal – and a proposal is one proposal

 

nothing follows from the idea / proposal ‘God’ – unless it is proposed –

 

no descriptive proposal – follows from any proposal –

 

proposals are put to – proposals –

 

and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to ‘infinite things in infinite modes’ –

 

 a ‘thing’ is a proposal

 

and ‘modes’ – are proposals – descriptive category proposals –

 

a proposal – if it is a proposal – is by definition limited

 

a so called ‘proposal’ – that is not ‘limited’ – is a proposal without definition –

 

that is – a ‘proposal’ – that has no form – no formulation –

 

and therefore – has no sense – no value – and is of no use

 

 

PROP. V. The formal being of ideas acknowledges God as its cause only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not in so far as he is revealed in some other attribute: that is, the idea, not only of the attributes of God, but also of individual things, do not acknowledge their ideals or the objects perceived as their effecting cause, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

 

 

Proof. – This is obvious from Prop. 3 of this part. For there we concluded God can form an idea of his essence and of all things that follow therefrom necessarily, and from this alone that he is a thinking thing, and not from the fact that he is the object of his idea. Wherefore the formal being of ideas acknowledges God for its cause in so far as he is a thinking thing. But this can be shown in another manner. The formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking (as is self-evident), that is (Coroll., Prop. 25, Part I.), a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of God in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore (Prop. 10, Part I.) involves the conception of no other attribute of God, and consequently (Ax. 4, Part I.) is the effect of no other attribute but thought. Therefore the formal being of ideas acknowledges God as its cause only in so far as he is a thinking thing, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the formal being of ideas’?

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal – a proposal exists – has being – if proposed –

 

there is no ‘formal being’ – there is only proposed being

 

a proposal as such – does not ‘acknowledge’ –

 

propositional actors ‘acknowledge’ –

 

what we acknowledge is what we propose

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown – and nothing follows from the unknown

 

as to the cause of ideas / proposals – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and I would suggest in terms of propositional activity – irrelevant

 

the unknown is the reason for proposal – for propositional action

 

the unknown is not a ‘thinking thing’ – ‘God’ is not a thinking thing –

 

we can propose that there are thinking things – in nature (or God – as Spinoza would say) –

 

the proposal that all of nature is a thinking thing – that everything in the natural world thinks – is a valid proposal – 

 

however – there is no evidence for this proposal and therefore no good reason to affirm it

 

a ‘thinking thing’ is a proposal – a proposal we can use to describe human beings – and perhaps some other sentient creatures

 

‘thinking’ – is a proposal – that can be used to describe propositional action

 

different proposals / different descriptions / attributes can be put against – or in response to – the unknown

 

in our propositional action we make the unknown – known –

 

though any proposed ‘knowledge’ here – is uncertain

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is just a proposal – a name proposal – that can be variously interpreted / described – in any number of ways – or in Spinoza’s terms – God has infinite attributes

 

what Spinoza doesn’t understand is that human beings put proposals –

 

and that any proposal put – any description – any ‘attribute’ – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. VI. The modes of any attribute of God have God for their cause only in so far as he is considered through the attribute, and not in so far as he considered through any other attribute.

 

 

the modes of any attribute are propositional categories – descriptive categories – that human beings propose

 

‘God’ – in the absence of proposal – reality in the absence of proposal – is the unknown

 

we propose to make known – and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

one propositional description – is not another

 

 

Proof. – Each attribute is conceived through itself without the aid of another (Prop. 10, Part 1). Wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of their attribute and not that of another; and so (Ax. 4, Part I) the modes of any attribute of God have God for their causes only in so far as he is considered through that attribute, and not in so far as he is considered through any other. Q.e.d.

 

 

each attribute conceived through itself without the aid of another?

 

an attribute / a proposal – will be distinct – nevertheless – it will – most likely be a response to another proposal

 

and indeed – can be a response to a different – to a another – propositional category – to another mode

 

the point here is that modes – propositional categories are not set in stone – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and any critical approach to any proposal – to any propositional mode – is open – open to proposal from any other propositional category – open to proposal from any other mode

 

as to the cause of a proposal – of a propositional category – any ‘mode’ –

 

any causal proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

what we can say is that proposals / propositions – are put by human beings

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown – the unknown does not put proposals

 

we put proposals to the unknown –

 

the unknown is variously proposed – is described in any number of ways – in fact there is no restriction – no limit on how the unknown can be proposed – can be described

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that the formal being of things which are not modes of thinking does not follow from divine nature because it has first known the things: but things conceived follow and are conclude from their attributes in the same manner and by the same necessity as we have shown ideas to follow from their attribute of thought.

 

 

what exists is what is proposed –

 

‘things’ – are proposed – ‘ideas’ – are proposed –

 

and any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

there is no – as it were – automatic follow on – from any proposal to another – no ‘necessity’ – in any propositional activity

 

proposals are put in relation to proposals

 

 

PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

 

 

there is no ‘order and connection’ of ideas as such – and no ‘order and connection’ of things – as such

 

any ‘order and connection’ – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question –

 

such a proposal may be put as a way of organizing proposals and as a way of seeing the world –

 

but any such proposal – again is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

all we ever have is proposals put – and proposals put in response to proposals –

 

there is no propositional order

 

as to the relation between proposed ideas and proposed things –

 

look at it this way –

 

if ‘x’ is proposed – ‘x’ can be described – in any number of ways –

 

i.e. – as an ‘idea’ – or – as a ‘thing’ – or in some other manner

 

the proposal of ‘x’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the proposal of ‘x’ is open to interpretation

 

in practise – the proposal of ‘x’ will come with a description of ‘x’ – i.e. – ‘x’ as a

 

thing of some kind – or perhaps as an idea of some kind –

 

whatever the case – any proposal / description of ‘x’ is open to question – i.e. – ‘x’

 

proposed as a ‘thing’ – may well be reinterpreted an ‘idea’

 

 

Proof. – This is clear from Ax. 4. Part I. For the idea of everything that is caused depends on the knowledge of which it is an effect.

 

 

a cause-and-effect analysis – is one response to a proposal –

 

such a response is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that God’s power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting: that is, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, follows also invariably objectively from the idea of God in the same order and connection, in God.

 

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown – the unknown has no power – no power of thinking no power of acting

 

power – rests in propositional action

 

human beings propose – and our proposals are uncertain

 

our power is uncertain

 

our proposals do not follow an order – unless such an order is proposed –

 

and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the proposal of a propositional order – may well be regarded as a useful propositional act

 

 

Note. – Before we proceed further, let us call to mind what we have already shown above: that whatever can be perceived by infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, invariably appertains to one substance alone; and consequently thinking substance and extended substance are one in the same substance. which is now comprehended through this and now through that attribute. Thus also the mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two manners, which certain of the Jews seemed to have perceived but confusedly, for they said that God and his intellect and the things conceived by his intellect were one and the same thing. For example a circle existing in nature and the idea of an existing circle which is also in God is one and the same thing, though explained through different attributes. And thus whether we consider nature under the attribute of

extension or under the attribute of thought or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order and one and the same connection of causes: that is the same

things follow from one another. Nor did I say that God is the cause of an idea of a

circle only in so far as he is a thinking thing, and of a circle only in so far as he is an

extended thing, with any other reason than that the formal idea of a circle can only be

perceived through some other mode of thought as its proximate cause, and that again

through another, and so on to infinity: so that as long as things are considered as

modes of thought we must explain by the mere attribute of thought the order and

connection of causes of all nature; and in so far as things are considered as modes of extension, the order also of the whole of nature must be explained through the mere attribute of extension; and I understand the same of other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves, God is in truth the cause, forasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes; nor can I explain this more clearly at the present.

 

 

‘Before we proceed further, let us call to mind what we have already shown above: that whatever can be perceived by infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, invariably appertains to one substance alone; and consequently thinking substance and extended substance are one in the same substance. which is now comprehended through this and now through that attribute.’

 

what we perceive – is what we propose – there is no infinite intellect –

 

propositions are put by human beings

 

‘substance’ – is a proposal – and as with any proposal – if put – it can be variously further proposed – further described

 

human beings – and perhaps some other creatures – can be characterised / described as thinking things and extended things

 

there is in no end to how any proposal can be further proposed / described / characterized

 

‘Thus also the mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two manners, which certain of the Jews seemed to have perceived but confusedly, for they said that God and his intellect and the things conceived by his intellect were one and the same thing.’

 

different proposals – are not – ‘one in the same’ –

 

any proposal can be said to refer to the unknown

 

‘For example a circle existing in nature and the idea of an existing circle which is also in God is one and the same thing, though explained through different attributes.’

 

a proposed circle ‘that exists in nature’ – is not ’the same thing’ – is a different proposal – to ‘the idea of a circle’ –

 

different proposals – different propositional contexts

 

different response to the unknown

 

 ‘And thus whether we consider nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order and one and the same connection of causes: that is the same things follow from one another’

 

nothing – as such – follows from – any proposition – 

 

you can propose order – you can propose connection – you can propose cause – all of which is to say you can propose relations between propositions –

 

however – any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Nor did I say that God is the cause of an idea of a circle only in so far as he is a thinking thing, and of a circle only in so far as he is an extended thing, with any other reason than that the formal idea of a circle can only be perceived through some other mode of thought as its proximate cause, and that again through another, and so on to infinity: so that as long as things are considered as modes of thought we must explain by the mere attribute of thought the order and connection of causes of all nature; and in so far as things are considered as modes of extension, the order also of the whole of nature must be explained through the mere attribute of extension; and I understand the same of other attributes.’

 

this ‘formal idea of a circle’ – is just another proposal – open to question

 

and yes – if put – it can be further described – further proposed – and logically speaking there is no end to this propositional activity –

 

‘God’ – or the unknown – is not the cause of propositional activity

 

the unknown – it can be said – is the reason for propositional activity

 

that is – we propose against the unknown – to make known – and any proposal put – is open to question

 

there is no ‘must’ – in how we explain – any proposal put

 

any proposal put is open – open to interpretation – that is – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

which is to say that in any propositional investigation – what is proposed may well be tackled from different perspectives –

 

i.e. – a proposed existing thing may well be considered from an ideal perspective – as an idea – or a proposed ideal reality – may be put against a proposed existing thing or state of affairs

 

we are not forced to consider any matter from just one propositional perspective – any propositional perspective can go into the mix

 

‘Wherefore of things as they are in themselves, God is in truth the cause, forasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes; nor can I explain this more clearly at the present.’

 

‘God’ – the unknown – has no attributes

 

we propose attributes – that is descriptions – to make known – and this propositional activity is open to all and any further proposal – and logically speaking – is without end – and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is

uncertain

 

 

PROP. VIII. The ideas of individual things or modes which do not exist must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God in the same way as the formal essences of individual things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

 

 

an idea of an individual thing or mode that does not exist – does not exist

 

if ‘comprehended’ – it is proposed – and if proposed – it does exist –

 

as for the ‘infinite idea of God’ –

 

there is no ‘infinite idea’ – an ‘idea’ is a proposal – and a proposal – is contingent – limited and uncertain

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown – is contentless

 

ideas are proposed to make the unknown – known – and any proposed idea is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a ‘formal essence’ – does not exist – unless it is proposed – and if proposed – as with any proposition – is open to question – is uncertain

 

‘God’ – the unknown – has no attributes –

 

attributes are descriptive proposals – put by human beings – to make the unknown – known

 

any proposed attribute is open to question – open to doubt – and is logically speaking – uncertain

 

 

Proof. – This proposition is clear from the preceding note.

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that as long as individual things do not exist save in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, their objective being or ideas do not exist save in so far as the infinite idea of God exists: and when individual things are said to exist not only in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they are said to last, their idea also involve existence, through which they are said to last.

 

‘comprehended in the infinite idea of God’ –

 

can only mean – we do not know what can or does exist –

 

as to what lasts – what lasts is proposal –

 

a proposal that doesn’t last – is a proposal that is dropped from consideration

 

a lasting proposal – is an existing proposal – and a proposal ‘lasts’ – as long as it is considered

 

what exists – is what is proposed –

 

and any proposed existence – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Note. – If anyone should ask for an example for the better explanation of this thing, I shall in truth not eb able to give him one which will explain it adequately, for it is unique. I will endeavour, however, as far as possible to illustrate this. Now a circle is such by nature that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their segments are equal to one another. Wherefore in a circle an infinite number of rectangles are even can the idea of any one of these rectangles contained equal to one another. Nevertheless none of these rectangles can be said to exist except in so far as the circle exists; nor even can the idea of any one of these rectangles be said to exist save in so far as it is comprehend in the idea of a circle. let us conceive that out of the infinite lines two only exist, to wit, E and D. Now the idea of these not only exist in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also in so far as they involve the existence of the rectangles: whence it comes about that they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

 

 

 

there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode and the game mode

 

in the critical mode – proposals are put – they are open to question – open to doubt – and their uncertainty explored

 

in the game mode – our propositional activity is rule-governed –

 

when you play a propositional game of any kind – you follow the rules of the game – you play in accordance with the rules of the game

 

if you don’t follow the rules – you don’t play the game

 

the rules of the game – are not open to question –

 

if the rules are put to question – and of course this can be done – you are no longer in the game mode – no longer playing the game – you have engaged the critical mode – and are now involved in a critical propositional action

 

mathematics is rule-governed propositional activity – geometry is a rule- governed propositional activity

 

if you perform mathematical operations – if you construct and investigate geometrical models – you play these propositional games in accordance with the rules of these games

 

mathematical and geometrical games are applied and played in various propositional contexts where structure and order are required

 

what we have above – from Spinoza – in his illustration of his metaphysics – is a propositional game –

 

Spinoza sets the rules within a geometrical construction – and you play the game –

 

perhaps this is just what Spinoza’s metaphysics amounts to – a game –

 

and as with any other rule-governed propositional activity – as with any other game – if played – must be played in accordance with its rules –

 

the logical reality – however – is that a game has no truth value – a game is neither true nor false

 

for a propositional activity to have truth value – for a proposition to be true or false – it must be held open to question – held open to doubt – and held to be uncertain

 

a game – as played – is not open to question – not open to doubt – and is certain –

 

this ‘game certainty’ has no logical value

 

 

PROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing has God as its cause, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of another individual thing actually existing of which also God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another third idea and so on to infinity.

 

 

God is the cause of the idea of an individual thing actually existing?

 

is to say the unknown is the cause of an individual actually existing

 

the unknown is not a cause

 

an ‘idea’ of any kind is a proposal –

 

the ‘cause’ of any idea – of any proposal – is open to question

 

what is relevant is that the idea / proposal – is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

 

we can of course speculate on the cause of a proposal / idea – 

 

and any speculation – is – if you like – a propositional back story – and – is open to question –

 

for all intent and purpose – the propositional actor is the ‘cause’ of proposal / propositional action

 

Spinoza says his God is affected by the idea of another individual thing actually existing – and by a third idea – and so on to infinity –

 

I take from this that Spinoza is saying that these ideas are – as it were – live – in God

 

this is to say that all ideas / proposals of individual things existing are present or active in God

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown – the unknown has no idea(s)

 

the logical reality is that propositional actors propose the world of individual things actually existing –

 

and as proposed – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

an ‘affective proposal’ – is one that it can be said ‘affects’ propositional actors –

 

and any proposed affect can be further described – and any further description – further described – etc. – etc. -

 

any propositional description is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The idea of an individual thing actually existing is an individual mode of thinking and distinct from all others (Coroll. and Note, Prop. 8, Part II); and therefore (Prop. 6, Part II.) has God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, for its cause. But not (Prop. 28, Part I) in so far as he is a thinking absolutely, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking, and again he is the cause of this in so far as he is affected by a third, and so on to infinity. But the order and connection of ideas is the same (Prop. 7, Part II) as the order and connection of causes. Therefore the cause of one individual idea is another idea of God in so far as he is considered as affected by the other idea; and of this idea God is the cause in so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity. Q.e.d.

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown does not think

 

the unknown is not a cause

 

there is no ‘order and connection of proposals’ – be they put as ‘ideas’ or ‘causes’

 

proposal put and propositional relations put – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain – not ‘ordered’

 

a proposal does not cause another proposal

 

if the term ‘cause’ is to be used here – it is the propositional actor who causes proposals – and the relations between proposals

 

Spinoza’s causal argument ‘to infinity’ –

 

if the causal chain is infinite – then there is no first cause –

 

and if no first cause – the causal chain – falls apart

 

 

Corollary. – The knowledge of whatever happens in the individual object of any idea is granted in God, but only in so far as he has the idea of the object.

 

 

‘the individual object of any idea’ – is what is proposed – is a proposal –

 

and whatever happens in the individual object of any idea –

 

is whatever is proposed – of any idea – of the subject proposal

 

the subject proposal – and any proposals put in relation to it – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no ideas

 

 

Proof. – Whatever happens in the object of any idea has its idea in God (Prop. 3 Part II), not in so far as he is infinite, but only in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing (prev. Prop). but (Prop 7, Part II) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. Therefore the knowledge of that which happens in any individual object is in God in so far only as he has the idea of the object. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things’?

 

the object of any ‘idea’/ proposal – is what is proposed – i.e. – ‘the thing’

 

the ‘idea’ is the proposal and the ‘thing’ – that which is proposed –

 

you can look at it this way – what we have is –

 

the action that is proposal (idea) – and the content (thing) of the action

 

all we have is the proposal –

 

so – you can analyse or deconstruct the proposal into action and content –

 

but we are not dealing with two separate entities or existents – ‘ideas’ and ‘things’ –

 

and so – to propose an ‘order and connection between ideas and things’ –

 

is to misrepresent propositional reality

 

 

PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man, or, again, substance does not constitute the form (forma) of man.

 

 

the being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man?

 

therefore – you would think – the essence of man – the ‘form of man’ – is not of the being of substance

 

is not of substance

 

and if so – is not this ‘essence of man’ – outside of substance – outside of Spinoza’s God

 

on the face of it – Spinoza has a problem here – for he argues that substance is all – and that ‘all is of God’

 

so – essence – is what?

 

you would have to say – essence – is not in his picture –

 

not in his God –

 

or – alternatively – Spinoza’s God – is not all there is

 

 

Proof. –The being of substance involves necessary existence (Prop. 7. Part I). If therefore the being of substance appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man also must be necessarily granted (Def. 2, Part II.), and consequently man must necessarily exist, which (Ax. I, Part II) is absurd. therefore, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

again – it appears there is a gulf between Spinoza’s substance – his ‘God’ – and man

 

for Spinoza the problem is – either man is in God – or he is not

 

if he is in God – his existence is necessary – which Spinoza say is ‘absurd’ –

 

or – if man is not in substance / God – then ‘substance’ is not all there is –

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ is not all there is –

 

Spinoza here wants the essence of man to be contingent – a contingency in necessity?

 

it doesn’t work

 

 

Note. – This proposition may also be proved from Prop. 5, Part I., to wit, that two substances cannot be granted having the same nature. For as many men exist, therefore that which constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance. Again, this proposition is manifest from the other properties of substance, to wit, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, etc., as can easily be seen by all.

 

 

if the form of man is not in substance – where is it?

 

and if substance is infinite – then what is in substance is infinite immutable – indivisible – to wit – man?

 

and this idea of man is one that Spinoza – for obvious reasons rejects

 

but the wash up is –

 

if Spinoza wants to maintain his ‘God’ –

 

there is no place for man

 

and if he wants to have a philosophy of man –

 

then he must abandon his God

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of attributes of God. For the being of substance (prev. Prop.) does not appertain to the essence of man. The latter is therefore something that is in God and which cannot exist or be conceived without God, whether it be a modification or mode that expresses the nature of God in a certain determined manner.

 

 

the being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man –

 

and yet the essence of man is something that is in God – the being of substance

 

something that is in God (the essence of man) is not of the being of substance – of Spinoza’s God

 

here we have a contradiction –

 

the essence of man cannot be in God / substance – and not ‘appertain’ – to the being of God / substance

 

you can’t have it both ways –

 

man is either in Spinoza’s God – or not in his God

 

again – Spinoza cannot account for man –

 

or – if he accounts for man – his God is not all it’s cracked up to be

 

 

Note. – All surely must admit that without God nothing can exist or be conceived. For it must be agreed in the minds of all that God is the only cause of all things both of their essence and of their existence, that is, God is not only the cause of things with regard to their creation (secundum fieri), but also with regard to their being (secundum esse). But at the same time there are many who say that that appertains to the essence of anything without which the thing cannot exist or be conceived: and therefore they believe either that the nature of God appertains to the essence of things created, or that things created can exist and be conceived without God, or, what is still more certain, they cannot properly satisfy themselves what is the cause. The cause of this I think is that they have not observed the order of philosophical argument. For divine nature, which they ought to have considered before all things, for that it is prior in nature and knowledge and nature, they have thought to be the last in the order of knowledge, and things which are called the objects of the senses they have believed to be prior to all things. Hence it has come to pass that, that while they considered the things of nature, they paid no attention to divine nature, and then when at last they directed their attention to divine nature, they could have no regard for their first fabrications on which they had founded their knowledge of natural things, in as much as these things give no help to the knowledge of divine nature. No wonder, then. that they have contradicted themselves at all points. But I will pass this by. For my intention here was only to give a reason why I did not say that that appertains to the essence of anything without which the thing can neither exist or be conceived without God, and yet God does not appertain to their essence. But I said that necessarily constitutes the essence of anything which being granted the thing also is granted, which being removed, so also is the thing removed, or that without which the thing, or, on the other hand, that which without the thing, can neither exist or be conceived. Cf. Def.2.

 

‘All surely must admit that without God nothing can exist or be conceived. For it must be agreed in the minds of all that God is the only cause of all things both of their essence and of their existence, that is, God is not only the cause of things with regard to their creation (secundum fieri), but also with regard to their being (secundum esse).’

 

the ‘cause’ of anything – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘But at the same time there are many who say that that appertains to the essence of anything without which the thing cannot exist or be conceived: and therefore they believe either that the nature of God appertains to the essence of things created, or that things created can exist and be conceived without God, or, what is still more certain, they cannot properly satisfy themselves what is the cause.’

 

if as Spinoza proposes ‘all is in and of his God –

 

then – ‘the nature of God does ‘appertain’ to the essence of things created’

 

further – clearly – as a matter of fact – ‘things created can exist and be conceived without God’

 

one is not obliged in any sense to see the world through Spinoza’s eyes

 

our reality – is open to question – open to interpretation

 

and yes – it may well be that ‘they cannot properly satisfy themselves what is the cause’

 

reason being – the proposal ‘cause’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘The cause of this I think is that they have not observed the order of philosophical argument. For divine nature, which they ought to have considered before all things, for that it is prior in nature and knowledge and nature, they have thought to be the last in the order of knowledge, and things which are called the objects of the senses they have believed to be prior to all things. Hence it has come to pass that, that while they considered the things of nature, they paid no attention to divine nature, and then when at last they directed their attention to divine nature, they could have no regard for their first fabrications on which they had founded their knowledge of natural things, in as much as these things give no help to the knowledge of divine nature. No wonder, then. that they have contradicted themselves at all points. But I will pass this by.’

 

there is no order of philosophical argument

 

‘For my intention here was only to give a reason why I did not say that that appertains to the essence of anything without which the thing can neither exist or be conceived without God, and yet God does not appertain to their essence.’

 

so what is the reason?

 

‘But I said that necessarily constitutes the essence of anything which being granted the thing also is granted, which being removed, so also is the thing removed, or that without which the thing, or, on the other hand, that which without the thing, can neither exist or be conceived. Cf. Def.2.’

 

so – if the essence – is granted – the thing is granted – and if the essence is removed – so to the thing

 

Spinoza’s God is eternal – infinite – immutable

 

and – you assume – all that is in God – is likewise eternal – infinite and immutable

 

so how is it that anything in Spinoza’s God – can cease to be?

 

how can an essence be removed – and how is it that a thing in God – can cease to exist?

 

Spinoza – does not account for contingency

 

or his God proposal collapses

 

 

PROP. XI. The first thing that constitutes the actual being of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of an individual thing actually existing.

 

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

an ‘idea – is a proposal

 

what we propose – is what exists

 

and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. –  The essence of man (Coroll., prev. Prop) is constituted by certain modes of attributes of God; that is (Ax. 2, Part II.), by certain modes of thinking, of all which (Ax. 3, Part II.) the idea is prior in nature, and this idea being granted the remaining modes (to wit. those which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (Ax. 4, Part II). And therefore the idea is the first thing that constitutes the being of the human mind. But not the idea of a thing not existing: for then (Coroll., Prop, 8, Part II.) that very idea cannot be said to exist. It must therefore be the idea of a thing actually existing. But not of a thing infinite. For an infinite thing (Prop. 21 and 23, Part I.) must always necessarily exist. But this (Ax. I, Part II) is absurd. Therefore the first thing which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is the idea of an individual thing actually existing. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘essence’ is a proposal – open to question –

 

if the term is used at all – it functions as a propositional place for description

 

an ‘attribute’ – is a description – a propositional description

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no attributes

 

a ‘mode’ is a proposal – a propositional description / construct

 

the ‘idea’ / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the ‘idea’ / proposal – is open to description –

 

an ‘idea’ / proposal – is not in an individual – and ‘idea’ / proposal is put by an individual – by a propositional actor

 

that which does not exist – is that which is not proposed

 

the ‘idea’ of a ‘thing’ – is a proposal

 

there is no ‘infinite thing’ – a proposal / ‘thing’ – is finite –

 

a proposal exists as long as it is considered –

 

a proposal put – actually exists

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and thus when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we say nothing else than that God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea: and when we say that God has this or that idea only in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but also in so far simultaneously with the human mind as he also has the idea of another thing, then we say that the human mind perceives the thing only in part or inadequately.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no intellect –

 

human propositional actors have ‘intellect’

 

the ‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action

 

the unknown – has no idea

 

an idea is a proposal

 

the unknown does not constitute the essence of the human mind

 

the ‘essence’ – if you wish to use this term – of the human mind – is proposal / propositional action –

 

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘inadequate’ – is meant – uncertain

 

any proposal put can be regarded as inadequate

 

 

Note. – Here doubtless the readers will become confused and will recollect many things which will bring them to a standstill: and therefore I pray them to proceed gently with me and form no judgement concerning these things until they have read all.

 

 

Spinoza’s proposal – or proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and any judgement regarding Spinoza’s proposals – likewise – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XII. Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind must be perceived by the human mind, or the idea of that thing must necessarily be found in the human mind: that is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be the body, nothing can happen in the body which is not perceived by the mind.

 

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

there is no necessity in propositional action –

 

propositional action is uncertain

 

‘the idea of that thing’ – is the proposal of that thing

 

the human body – can be proposed as an action – can be proposed as an object

 

and if posed as an object

 

that proposal / ‘body’ is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

nothing ‘happens’ in a proposal –

 

a proposal is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

‘perception’ – is a propositional action

 

what the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

perception – is propositional action –

 

and any ‘perception’ / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – Now whatever happens in the object of any idea, the knowledge of it is necessarily granted in God (Coroll., Prop. 9, Part II) in so far as he is considered affected by the idea of that object, that is (Prop. II. Part II.) in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything. Therefore whatever happens in the object of an idea constituting the human mind, knowledge of it must be granted in God in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II), the knowledge of this thing will be necessarily in the mind or the mind will perceive it. Q.e.d.

 

 

Note. – This proposition is obvious and is still more clearly understood from Note, Prop. 7, Part II., which [we can?] see.

 

 

the ‘object of any idea’ is what is proposed

 

nothing happens in a proposal –

 

a proposal can be critically evaluated

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

nothing is ‘granted’ in the unknown

 

the unknown does not ‘constitute’ anything

 

knowledge is proposal

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

perception is a propositional action

 

there is no necessity in propositional action –

 

propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing else.

 

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

there is no ‘object constituting’ – propositional activity

 

we propose our reality

 

‘objects’ – are proposals

 

what actually exists – is what we propose

 

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – Now if the body is not the object of the human mind the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in God (Coroll., Prop. 9 Part II.) in so far as he constitutes our mind but the mind of some other thing, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11. Part II.), the idea of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind. But (Ax. 4 Part II) we have idea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and that (Prop. 11 Part II) actually existing. Further, if there were still another object of the mind besides the body, then since (Prop. 36, Part I.) nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow, therefore (Prop. 11, Part I) necessarily there would be in our minds an idea of some effect of that object. But (Ax. 5, Part II) no idea of this is found. Therefore the object of our mind is the existing body and nothing else. Q.e.d.

 

the human body – is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘body’ – here – is proposed as an object

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

there is nothing in the unknown

 

any ‘idea of the modifications of the body’ – is a proposal

 

modifications of a proposal – are proposals / descriptions put to the proposal ‘body’

 

there is no object constituting propositional activity

 

propositional activity ‘constitutes’ our reality

 

all propositional activity is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that man consists of mind and body, and the human body exists according as we feel it.

 

 

what man ‘consists of’ – is open to question open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

‘body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

the human body exists as proposed

 

a ‘feeling’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – From these we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what must be understood by the union of the mind and body. But in truth no one will be able to understand this adequately or distinctly unless previously he is sufficiently acquainted with the nature of our body. For these things which we have so far propounded have been altogether general, and have not appertained more to man than to other individual things which are all, though in various grades, animate (animate). For of all things there must necessarily be granted an idea in God, of which idea God is the cause, just as he is the cause of the idea of the human body; and so whatever we say concerning the idea of the human body must necessarily be said concerning the idea of any other thing. Nevertheless we cannot deny that, like objects, ideas differ one from another, one transcending another having more reality, according as the object of one idea transcends the object of another or contains more reality than it. And so for the sake of determining in what the human mind differs from other things, and in what it excels other things, we must know the nature of its object, as we said, that is the human body. What the nature is, I am unable to explain here, but that is not necessary for what I am going to show. This, however, I will say in general, that according as a body is more apt than others for performing many actions at the same time; and according as the actions of a body depend more solely on itself, and according as fewer other bodies concur with its action, so its mind is more apt for distinct understanding. And thus we may recognise how one mind is superior to others, and likewise see the cause why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and many other things which I shall deduce from these. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and prove more accurately these statements, for which purpose I must premise a few statements concerning the nature of bodies.

 

‘From these we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what must be understood by the union of the mind and body.’

 

propositional actors engage in propositional action

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ are descriptions of the action of the person / of the propositional actor

 

there is no question then of a ‘union’ of ‘mind’ and ‘body’

 

the person / propositional actor is not divided – is a unity –

 

and his / her actions can be variously ‘explained’ or described

 

‘For these things which we have so far propounded have been altogether general, and have not appertained more to man than to other individual things which are all, though in various grades, animate (animate). For of all things there must necessarily be granted an idea in God, of which idea God is the cause, just as he is the cause of the idea of the human body; and so whatever we say concerning the idea of the human body must necessarily be said concerning the idea of any other thing.’

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no idea

 

the unknown is not a cause

 

any proposal put regarding the human body – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and whether any proposal regarding the human body is relevant to other proposals of other things – is open to question

 

there is no necessity in propositional reality

 

‘Nevertheless we cannot deny that, like objects, ideas differ one from another, one transcending another having more reality, according as the object of one idea transcends the object of another or contains more reality than it.

 

the reality of a proposal – is what it proposes

 

reality is not a quantity – reality is not ‘contained’ in a proposal

 

there is no ‘transcendence’ – all proposals have the same logical status

 

no proposal is less real – or more real than another

 

reality is just what is proposed

 

‘And so for the sake of determining in what the human mind differs from other things, and in what it excels other things, we must know the nature of its object, as we said, that is the human body. What the nature is, I am unable to explain here, but that

is not necessary for what I am going to show. This, however, I will say in general, that according as a body is more apt than others for performing many actions at the same time; and according as the actions of a body depend more solely on itself, and according as fewer other bodies concur with its action, so its mind is more apt for distinct understanding.’

 

there is no distinction between the human mind and the human body

 

the human being – is not divided into mind and body –

 

the human being is an active unity

 

the human being is a propositional actor

 

propositional action is open to question – open to description

 

‘mind’ – or ‘mental’ – is a description of propositional action

 

body – or ‘physical’ – another – description of propositional action

 

and there are any number of other ways to describe propositional action –

 

and the reason for this that propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the focus of any description – is the propositional actor – the person – the human being

 

Spinoza says here – the more apt the body is and the more independent it is – the more apt the mind for understanding

 

understanding is not some supposed mind / body issue

 

understanding is the critical activity of putting our proposals and propositional action to question – to doubt – and the exploring their uncertainty

 

‘And thus we may recognise how one mind is superior to others, and likewise see the cause why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and many other things which I shall deduce from these. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and prove more accurately these statements, for which purpose I must premise a few statements concerning the nature of bodies.’

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –

 

no one propositional action is superior to another

 

propositional actions are different – one from the other

 

our knowledge is what we propose

 

propositions regarding the body – are not confused

 

propositions regarding the body are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

AXIOM I. All bodies are either moving or stationary.

 

‘all bodies are either moving or they are not’ – or – ‘all bodies are stationary or they are not’ –

 

this ‘proposal’ is a tautology –

 

tautologies are regarded as trivially true – which is to say they are proposals without content – and – in a sense – constructed to be – beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain

 

tautologies – therefore are not genuine propositions – they are dummy propositions –

 

in my view they are to be disregarded as pretentious fakes

 

 

AXIOM II. Each body is moved now slowly now more fast

 

axiom II here – either a body moves slow – or it doesn’t – (it moves fast)

 

again – a tautology

 

 

LEMMA I. Bodies are reciprocally distinguished with respect to motion or rest, quickness or slowness, and not with respect to substance.

 

 

a ‘body’ can be proposed as an action – or an object

 

if we need to distinguish bodies – we can do this with different descriptions

 

and any description is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘substance’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown does not distinguish anything

 

 

Proof. – The first part of this proposition I suppose to be clear of itself. But that bodies should not be distinguished one from the other with respect to substance is obvious both from Prop. 5 and Prop. 8, Part I., and still more clearly from what was said in the Note on Prop. 15, Part I.

 

‘substance’ – the unknown – distinguishes nothing

 

bodies are proposals –

 

and any proposal of distinction – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

LEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects.

 

 

‘in certain respects’ – leaves the matter open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and that is as it should be

 

 

Proof. – all bodies agree in this, that the involve the conception of one and the same attribute (Def. I, Part II): and again, that they may be moved more quickly or more slowly or be absolutely in motion or absolutely stationary.

 

 

one and the same attribute – is one and the same description –

 

different proposals / bodies – have different descriptions

 

‘a body as that which can be moved or is absolutely stationary’?

 

from one propositional perspective a body will be proposed as being in motion –

 

from another propositional perspective the same body will be at rest

 

‘motion’ and ‘rest’ – are propositional contexts – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined for motion or rest by some other body, which likewise, this by a third, and so on to infinity.

 

 

Proof. – Bodies (Def. 1 Part II) are individual things, which (Lemma 1) are distinguished reciprocally with rest to motion or rest: and therefore (Prop. 28, Part 1), each must necessarily be determined for motion or rest by some other individual thing, that is (Prop. 6, Part II), by another body, which (Ax.1) also is either in motion or rest. But this one also by the same reason, cannot be in motion or at rest unless it was determined for motion or rest by another body, and that again (by the same reason) by another, and so on to infinity. Q.e.d.

 

 

any propositional explanation of motion or rest – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

there is no ‘necessary determination’ –

 

any ‘determination’ – is propositional – is contingent – is uncertain

 

and the causal explanation – which back tracks to infinity – is really no more than the proposal of a body’s motion or the proposal of a body’s rest – endlessly reasserted

 

it explains nothing

 

and there is another problem with such an ‘explanation’ –

 

surely any casual chain begins with a first cause? – and if so – the infinite causal chain – makes no sense

 

the practical reality is that we use and operate with causal explanations in relation to proposals of motion and rest

 

however – the logical reality is that causal explanations – useful as they may be – as accounts of motion and rest – and as useful as they may be in many other propositional contexts – are no more than proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that a moving body continues in motion until it is determined for rest by another body: and that a body at rest continues so until it is determined by another body for motion. This is self-evident. For if I suppose a given body A to be at rest and pay not attention to other moving bodies, I can say nothing concerning the body A save that it is at rest. And if afterwards it comes about that the body A moves, it clearly could not have been brought into motion by the fact that it was at rest: for from this it could only follow that it should remain at rest. If on the other hand, the body A be supposed in motion, as long as we only have regard for the body A we can assert nothing concerning it save that it is in motion. And if it subsequently comes to pass that the body A comes to rest, it also clearly cannot have evolved from the motion that it had: far from this nothing else can follow than that A should have been moved.  It therefore comes to pass from something that was not in A, that is, from an external cause, that it was determined for rest.

 

 

the proposal ‘body’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

in different propositional contexts – ‘a body’ will have different characteristics

 

I am sitting at my desk – at rest – I then get up and move –

 

do we say that my rest or my motion is determined by an external cause?

 

a stone is at rest – I pick up the stone and throw it

 

here we may say the motion of the stone is a result of an action external to the stone

 

however – you could propose a physics where all objects and actions are of the one piece – expressions of single unity – and where the concepts of internal and external – have no place

 

the point is that any physics – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

AXIOM 1. All modes in which any body is affected by another follow alike from the body affected and the body affecting: so that one in the same body may be moved in various ways according to the variety of the natures of the moving bodies, and, on the other hand, various bodies may be moved in various manners by one and the same body.

 

 

AXIOM II. When a moving body impinges another body at rest which cannot move, it recoils in order to continue to move: and the angle of the line of recoiling motion with plane of the body at rest which it impinged will be equal to the angle which the

line of motion of incidence made with the same plane.

 

 

Thus far we have been speaking of most singular bodies (corpora simplicissima), which are distinguished reciprocally merely by motion or rest, by swiftness of slowness: now we pass on to compound bodies (corpora composita).

 

 

axiom I and axiom II here – are examples of rule governed propositional games –

 

these game models may well be useful in certain propositional contexts

 

 

Definition. – When a number of bodies of the same or different size are driven so together that they remain united one with the other, or if they are moved with the same or different rapidity so that they communicate their motions one to another in a certain ratio, those bodies are called reciprocally united bodies (corpora invicem unita), and we say that they all form one body or individual, which is distinguished from the rest with this union of bodies.

 

 

bodies ‘driven so together that they remain united?

 

united in what sense?

 

bodies moved in the same ratio – form one body?

 

well – it is an open question – whether we regard ‘reciprocally united bodies’ – as one body – or just bodies moving in a certain ratio

 

this definition may well be of use in certain propositional contexts – but as with any definition – it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

AXIOM III. According as the parts of an individual or compound body are united on a greater or less surface so the greater the difficulty or facility with which they are

forced to change their position and, consequently, the greater the difficulty or facility with which it is brought about that the individual assumes another form. Hence bodies whose parts are united over a small surface I shall call hard (dura), and those whose parts are united over a small surface are called soft (mollia), and those whose parts are in motion among each other are called fluid (fluida).

 

 

a greater or lesser surface is a propositional context

 

propositional contexts are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

point being – how we see the relations between body proposals – is not fixed –

 

and with any change in propositional context – it is likely that there will be changes in how bodies are proposed

 

bodies proposed over a small surface (propositional context) called hard?

 

what you ‘call’ such bodies – is how you propose such bodies – and any proposal of bodies as – ‘hard’ – ‘soft’ – ‘fluid’ – or whatever – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

in certain propositional contexts – for certain uses – bodies will be proposed – as having certain characteristics –

 

in different contexts – with different uses in mind – the same bodies may well be proposed with different attributes

 

 

LEMMA IV. If from a body or individual which is composed of several bodies certain are removed, and at the same time the same number of bodies of the same nature succeed to their place, the individual will retain its nature as before without any change of its form.

 

 

yes – you can propose several bodies – as one body

 

and you can remove bodies from this ‘one’ – and refer to what is left – as ‘one’

 

it is all a question of how you propose

 

and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

different proposals will be put in different circumstances – for different reasons – different uses

 

the matter is entirely – logically flexible –

 

what is ‘one’ in a particular propositional construction – may be regarded as ‘many’ in another

 

 

Proof. – Now bodies (Lemma 1) are not distinguished with respect to substance. But that which constitutes the form of an individual consists of a union of bodies (prev. Def.). But this union (by hypothesis), although the change of bodies continue, is retained: the individual will therefore retain as before its nature with respect to substance and mode. Q.e.d.

 

 

how bodies are ‘distinguished’ – is the matter of how they are proposed –

 

how they are described

 

if you put that any proposal ‘body’ is to be defined as substance – then bodies will not be distinguished in terms of substance –

 

but what does this definition ‘substance’ amount to?

 

does it amount to anything?

 

and we have to ask – what is the value – the actual – practical value – of this notion of substance?

 

what difference does it make?

 

 

LEMMA V. If the parts composing an individual become larger or smaller, but in such proportion that they preserve between themselves with respect to motion and rest the same ratio as before, the individual will retain its nature as before without any change of form.

 

 

Proof. – This is the same as that of the previous lemma.

 

yes – you can propose this – but the opposite view is just as valid

 

 

LEMMA VI. If certain bodies composing an individual are forced to change their motion which they had in one direction into another, but in such a manner that they can continue their motion and preserve one with the other the same ratio with respect to motion and rest as before, the individual will retain its nature without any change of form.

 

 

Proof. – This is self-evident. For it is supposed to retain all that which in its definition we said constituted its form.

 

 

that there is no change of form – is up for question

 

clearly there are changes – and it will all depend on how the form is proposed

 

and I wonder again just how relevant and how useful this notion of form is – if it covers all and any change

 

in practise it strikes me that ‘form’ – would have no actual – usable – function

 

like ‘substance’ – it comes off as useless concept

 

 

LEMMA VII. Moreover, the individual thus composed retains its nature whether as a whole it be moved or remain at rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction, provided that each part retains its motion and communicates it as before to the other parts.

 

 

Proof. – This is clear from its definition (the definition of an individual) which see before, Lemma 4.

 

 

this is an example of a rule-governed propositional statement

 

the rule is that each part retains its motion and relation to other parts

 

where that rule is applied ‘the individual thus composed retains its nature’

 

(which is to say the individual thus proposed)

 

the point being what we have here is a game proposal – that is – a rule-governed propositional game

 

rule governed propositional games are applied in many propositional contexts –

 

the point of such games is to provide propositional structure –

 

and out of such propositional structure – propositional systems can be developed – which are regarded as useful in certain contexts – and in relation to certain propositional problems

 

Note. – From these examples we see in what manner a composite individual can be affected in many ways and, despite this, preserve its nature. But thus far we have conceived an individual as composed only of bodies that are distinguished one from the other merely by motion or rest, rapidity or slowness, that is, as composed of the most simple bodies. But if we now conceive of some other individual composed of many individuals of a different nature, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways, preserving its nature notwithstanding. For since each part of it is composed of numerous bodies, each part will therefore (prev. Lemma) be able without any change in its nature to be moved now slower now faster, and consequently communicate its motions to the others with varying speeds. If we conceive a third class of individuals composed of these second ones, we shall find that this one can be affected in many other ways without any change of its form. And if thus further we proceed to infinity, we can easily conceive that all nature is one individual whose parts, that is all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change of the individual as a whole. If it were my purpose to lecture on the body, I should explain and prove this in greater detail, but I have already said that this is not my intention, nor have I stayed at this point save that from these things I can more easily prove what I have before me.

 

                                                                   

‘But if we now conceive of some other individual composed of many individuals of a different nature, we shall find that it can be affected in many other ways, preserving its nature notwithstanding.’

 

the proposal here is that even in the case of ‘many individuals of a different nature’ – ‘affected in many different ways’ – we can still regard such a composite as a unity

 

ok – that is the proposal – and it is a proposal that may well have some function and some use

 

nevertheless – it is only a proposal – and the logical reality is that – this proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

i.e. - ‘many individuals of a different nature affected in many different ways’ – may well be proposed – as just that – without the notion of a ‘composite individual’

 

‘If we conceive a third class of individuals composed of these second ones, we shall find that this one can be affected in many other ways without any change of its form. And if thus further we proceed to infinity, we can easily conceive that all nature is one individual whose parts, that is all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change of the individual as a whole.’

 

the fact is you don’t have to ‘proceed to infinity’ (whatever that is supposed to mean) – to propose that there is ‘no change of the individual as a whole’

 

all you have to do is put the proposal – and operate with it – if that is what you want to do

 

you can drop the whole baggage of infinity – as irrelevant – and of no use at all

 

the question is – what is the actual value of the proposal that there is ‘no change of the individual as a whole’?

 

is it going to play any part in the actual critical evaluation of ‘individuals’ and their relations?

 

it seems to be just an irrelevant metaphysical overlay – that would have no critical or experimental value

 

it could even be the case that if such a view was taken seriously – and somehow affected critical evaluation – that it might well hamper open and rational investigation

 

 

POSTULATES

 

 

I. The human body (corpus humanum) is composed of many individuals (of different nature), each of which is composed of many parts.

 

 

the human body may be proposed in this manner –

 

however – it can also be proposed as a whole – as a singularity

 

how the human body is proposed – how it is viewed and understood – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘the human body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

 

II. The individuals of which the human body is composed are some fluid, some soft, and some hard.

 

 

‘fluid’ – ‘soft’ – and ‘hard’ – are proposals – descriptions

 

and in terms of today’s science – very primitive description

 

any description of the human body is valid –

 

and any description – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

III. The individuals composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself is affected in many ways by external bodies.

 

 

‘the human body’ is a proposal – ‘external bodies’ – is a proposal

 

any proposed investigation of relation between the human body proposal and the external bodies proposal – that is – of the affects on the human body – is an investigation of propositional action

 

how we propose the human body – how we understand the human body is open to question

 

the many ways it is affected by external bodies – is one way of proposing the human body – is one way of critically investigating the human body

 

however – it is not the only approach

 

we can also investigate the human body from the point of view of its internal

strengths and weaknesses

 

 

IV. The human body needs for its preservation many other bodies from which it is, so to speak, regenerated.

 

 

what counts as regeneration – and what counts as degeneration – is open to question – is uncertain

 

 

V. When the fluid part of the human body is so determined by an external body that it impinges frequently on another part which is soft, it changes its surface and imprints such marks on it as the traces of an external impelling body.

 

 

yes – an affect – if it is an affect – will leave a trace – this goes without saying

 

one question will be – how lasting is any trace?

 

that is – perhaps in time any initial trace disappears?

 

the matter is open to question

 

 

VI. The human body can move external bodies in many ways, and dispose them in many ways.

 

 

‘dispose them in many ways’?

 

I understand this to mean ‘move and arrange them in many ways’ –

 

this is one way of describing human action

 

 

PROP. XIV. The human mind is apt to perceive many things, and more so as its body can be disposed in more ways.

 

 

Proof. – Now the human body (Post 3 and 6) is affected by external bodies in many ways and disposed to affect external bodies in many ways. But the human mind must perceive all things which happen in the human body. Therefore the human mind is apt to perceive many things, and more so. etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

that ‘the human mind is apt to perceive many things’ – is effectively to say – perception is an open matter

 

‘and more so as the body can be disposed in more ways’ –

 

consider the case of someone who is a paraplegic – and that his paraplegia only affects his physical functions – is such an individual therefore mentally disadvantaged?

 

granted physical limitations may in certain cases effect mental capacity – but it is not always the case

 

‘But the human mind must perceive all things which happen in the human body’

 

the ‘human mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘human body’ is a name for propositional action

 

we can for all intents and purposes drop the ‘mind’ reference – and drop the ‘body’

 

reference – and just refer to propositional action

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ – different descriptions of propositional action

 

where the proposal ‘body’ – its action – is the focus of question – of doubt – and uncertainty –

 

proposals will be put – and critically investigated –

 

no one proposal – or any number of proposals – will be – all possible proposals that could be put

 

our propositional action – is uncertain – is limited –

 

so – the idea that ‘human mind’ must perceive all things which happen in the human body – is fanciful –

 

we do not – cannot – propose ‘everything’ that can happen in relation to the body – or any other proposed object

 

 

PROP. XV. The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of many ideas.

 

 

the ‘human mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

propositional action is the ‘being’ of the ‘human mind’ –

 

propositional action ‘is composed of’ many proposals

 

 

Proof. – The idea which constitutes the formal idea of the human mind is the idea of the body (Prop. 13, Part II), which (Post. I) is composed of many individuals, each composed of many parts. But the idea of each individual composing the body is necessarily granted in God (Coroll., Prop. 8, Part II.) Therefore (Prop. 7 Part II) the idea of the human body is composed of many ideas of the component parts.

 

 

Spinoza argues that the ‘idea of the body’ – ‘constitute the formal idea of the mind’ –

 

that is to say – the body constitutes the mind – the mind is constituted by the body

 

so – what are we dealing with here – the body or the mind?

 

or – if one is the other – and there is no distinction – why continue to refer to body and mind?

 

the ‘human mind’ is a name for propositional action –

 

the ‘human body’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘body’ and ‘mind’ are different descriptions of the unity – that is propositional action

 

where ‘human body’ – is proposed as an object for critical investigation –

its proposed actions – will be the focus of question – of doubt – and uncertainty –

 

proposals will be put – and critically investigated –

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown –

 

nothing is granted in the unknown –

 

the unknown has no idea

 

 

PROP. XVI. The idea of every mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body.

 

 

‘affects’ – are proposals –

 

an ‘external body’ is a proposal

 

where a propositional relation is proposed between an affect – and a proposed ‘external body’ –

 

that propositional relation is open to critical investigation

 

 

Proof. – All modes in which the human body is affected follow from the nature of the body affected, and at the same time from the nature of the affecting body (Ax. 1 after Coroll., Lemma 3). Wherefore the idea of them (Ax 4, Part I.) must involve necessarily the nature of each body. Therefore the idea of each mode in which the human body affected by an external body involves the nature of the nature of the human body and that of the external body. Q.e.d.

 

 

a proposed relation – involves the different proposals related

 

and any proposed relation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Corollary I. – Hence it follows in the first place that the human mind can perceive the nature of many bodies at the same time as the nature of its own body.

 

 

the ‘human mind’ – is a name for human propositional action

 

we can propose the nature of many bodies – and propose the nature of the human body – and give consideration – critical consideration – to these proposals – when

 

they are put

 

any such critical consideration – is an investigation of propositional action

 

Corollary II. – It follows in the second place that the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate rather the disposition of our body than the nature of the external bodies, which I explained in the appendix of Part I, with many examples.

 

 

the ‘ideas’ we have of the external bodies – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

that such ideas / proposals ‘indicate rather the disposition of our body than the nature of the external bodies’ – is a valid proposal –

 

and as with any proposal it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

i.e. – it can be put that our ideas / proposals of external bodies do in fact ‘indicate’ the nature of external bodies –

 

a good deal of science is based on this proposal

 

 

PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected by a mode which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind regards that external body as actually existing, or is present to itself until the body is affected by a modification which cuts off the existence or presence of that body.

 

 

what we propose – is what exists

 

if for whatever reason – a proposal is dropped from consideration – it does not exist

 

 

Proof. – This is clear. For as long as the human body is thus affected, so long does the human mind regard this modification of the body (Prop. 12. Part II.); that is (prev. Prop.), it has the idea of the mode actually existing, and the idea involves the nature of the external body, that is, it has an idea which does not cut off the existence or presence of the nature of the external, but imposes it. Therefore the mind regards (Coroll. 1, Prev. Prop.) the external body as actually existing or present, until it is affected, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘affect’ – here – is explained – as a relation between the human body and an external body –

 

that is a relation between proposals

 

the proposal of the modification of the body / the affect – exists as long as it considered

 

the proposal ‘external object’ – exists – as long as it is considered

 

and the proposed relation – the explanation of the affect – exists as long as it is considered –

 

what exists is what is proposed

 

and that proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

i.e. – we can ask – are all ‘affects’ to be explained by a proposed ‘external body’?

 

might not an affect occur as a result of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

and how are we to understand this proposal of the ‘external body’?

 

it might well be put that the proposal ‘external body’ – is really just a catch-all phrase for an uncertain ‘external cause’ proposal?

 

i.e. – how is the external body to be defined?

 

these questions – raise doubts about the proposed explanation

 

 

Corollary. – The mind can regard external bodies by which the human body was once affected, although they do not exist, nor are present, as if they were present.

 

 

an ‘external body’ proposed – is an ‘external body’ – existing

 

a proposal does not exist – unless it is proposed

 

what is present – is what is proposed

 

and how that is understood – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – When external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that they often impinge the soft parts, they change the surface of them (Post. 5). Whence it comes about (Ax. 2 after Coroll., Lemma 3) that they are reflected thence in a different manner than before, and as afterwards they impinge on new surfaces by their spontaneous movement, they are reflected in the same manner as if they ere driven towards those surfaces by external bodies, and consequently while they continue to be reflected they will affect the human body in the same manner, and the human mind will (Prop. 12 Part II) again think of external bodies, that is (Prop. 17, Part II.), the human mind will regard the external body as present, and that as long as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the same surfaces by their spontaneous motion. Wherefore although the external bodies by which the human mind was once affected no longer exist, the mind nevertheless regards them as present as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.e.d.

 

 

propositional action – for all intents and purposes – is spontaneous

 

however – for Spinoza – the claim of spontaneous motion – is in direct conflict with his view that all action is causal

 

what is ‘present’ – is what is proposed

 

 

Note. – We thus see that it come to pass that we regard those things which are not existing as present, and this often happens. And it can happen that this comes to pass through other causes. But it will suffice me just as much to show one here by means of which I can so explain what I want, as if I was to show it by means of the true cause. Nor do I think I have wandered far from the truth, since all the postulates I have assumed scarcely contain anything that is not borne out by experience, which we may not doubt after having shown that the human body as we feel it exists (Coroll. after Prop. 13. Part II). Moreover (prev. Coroll and Coroll. 2, Prop.16. Part II) we clearly understand what is the difference, e.g., the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter, and the idea of Peter as it exists in the mind of another, say, Paul. The first directly explains the essence of the body of Peter, nor does it involve existence save as long as Peter exists; but the second idea indicates rather the disposition of Paul’s body than the nature of Peter, and so long as this disposition of Paul’s body lasts his mind will regard Peter though he no longer exists as if he was nevertheless present to him. Again, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, the ideas which represent to us external bodies as if they were present, we shall call the images of things, although they do not recall the figures of things; and when the mind regards bodies in this manner we say it imagines them. And here, so that I may begin to point out where lies error, I would have you note that the imaginations of the mind, regarded in themselves, contain no error, or that the mind does not err from that which it imagines, but only in so far as it is considered wanting the idea which cuts off the existence of those things which it imagines as present to itself. For the mind if it imagines things not existing as present to itself knew at the same time that these things did not in truth exist, it would attribute this power of the imagination to an advantage of its nature not a defect, more especially if this faculty of imagining depends on its own nature alone, that is (Def.7. Part 1.), if the mind’s faculty of imagining be free.

 

‘Nor do I think I have wandered far from the truth, since all the postulates I have assumed scarcely contain anything that is not borne out by experience, which we may not doubt after having shown that the human body as we feel it exists. (Coroll. after Prop. 13. Part II).’

 

‘the human body as we feel it exists’?

 

yes – but ‘as we feel it’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

furthermore – the human body exists – even when we don’t feel it –

 

if you experience paralysis – you don’t feel your body – still it exists

 

or when we have died – we don’t feel – anything – and yet the human body exists

 

‘Moreover (prev. Coroll and Coroll. 2, Prop.16. Part II) we clearly understand what is the difference, e.g., the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter, and the idea of Peter as it exists in the mind of another, say, Paul. The first

directly explains the essence of the body of Peter, nor does it involve existence save as long as Peter exists; but the second idea indicates rather the disposition of Paul’s body than the nature of Peter, and so long as this disposition of Paul’s body lasts his mind will regard Peter though he no longer exists as if he was nevertheless present to him.’

 

 

‘the idea of peter which constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter’?

 

as I understand it – this means ‘consciousness’

 

‘consciousness’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘the idea of Peter as it exists in the mind of another, say, Paul’?

 

Paul proposes Peter

 

‘The first directly explains the essence of the body of Peter, nor does it involve existence save as long as Peter exists;’?

 

the ‘essence’ of the body of Peter?

 

does the body have an essence – what is an essence?

 

it strikes me that the idea of essence is really just a logical dead end

 

for if you decide on an essence – then there will be no further question – no further doubt – no uncertainty –

 

certainty is illogical –

 

for any proposal – any proposition – if it is held logically – is held open to question – open to doubt – and held to be uncertain

 

‘but the second idea indicates rather the disposition of Paul’s body than the nature of Peter, and so long as this disposition of Paul’s body lasts his mind will regard Peter though he no longer exists as if he was nevertheless present to him.’

 

what the second ‘indicates’ – is a proposal

 

and the proposal will exist – as long as it is entertained –

 

when it is not present – it does not exist

 

‘Again, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, the ideas which represent to us external bodies as if they were present, we shall call the images of things, although they do not recall the figures of things; and when the mind regards bodies in this manner we say it imagines them.’

 

‘images’ as ideas which represent to us external bodies as if they were present’ – are proposals

 

‘images’ are proposals – and whether the external body is present or not – is from a critical point of view – irrelevant

 

‘although they do not recall the figures of things’?

 

does the ‘figure of things’ – mean the number of things?

 

if ‘external bodies’ (plural) – are proposed – then is there not a calculation of the number of bodies – either proposed or presumed?

 

‘we say it imagines them’ –

 

look – what you have here is a proposal – and yes you may wish to distinguish it from other proposals – by further proposing it as ‘an image’ – and all that might go with that –

 

however – the logical reality is that the proposal – however further proposed – however further described – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘And here, so that I may begin to point out where lies error, I would have you note that the imaginations of the mind, regarded in themselves, contain no error, or that the mind does not err from that which it imagines, but only in so far as it is considered wanting the idea which cuts off the existence of those things which it imagines as present to itself.’

 

the ‘imaginations of the mind’ – are proposals / propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘the mind does not err from what it imagines but only in so far as it is considered wanting the idea which cuts off the existence of those things which it imagines as present to itself’

 

the mind does not err from what it imagines’?

 

if what it imagined / proposed – is not put to question – not put to doubt – and regarded as certain

 

the issue here is not ‘error’ – but uncertainty

 

‘the idea which cuts off the existence of those things’ – is a different proposal – a different understanding of ‘the existence of those things’

 

‘existence’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

which means ‘existence’ can be given different interpretations – and any interpretation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘For the mind if it imagines things not existing as present to itself knew at the same time that these things did not in truth exist, it would attribute this power of the imagination to an advantage of its nature not a defect, more especially if this faculty of imagining depends on its own nature alone, that is (Def.7. Part 1.), if the mind’s

faculty of imagining be free.’

 

‘that these things did not in truth exist’ –

 

‘these things’ – exist – as proposed –

 

and how that is understood – how it is explained – how it is further proposed – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘it would attribute this power of the imagination to an advantage of its nature not a defect’

 

there is no ‘power’ here – no advantage – no defect –

 

there is just proposal – proposal put –

 

proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected at the same time by two or more bodies, when the mind afterwards remembers any one of them it will straightaway remember the others.

 

 

whether this happens or not is really an empirical / experimental issue – and as such – open to question –

 

i.e. – memory can be defective – memory can be unreliable – memory can false –

 

the point being – any memory proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The mind (prev. Coroll) imagines any body for this reason, that the human body is affected and disposed by impressions of an external body in the same way as it is affected when certain parts of it are affected by the same body. But (by the hypothesis) the body was then so disposed that the mind imagined two bodies at once. Therefore it will imagine two bodies at the same time, and the mind when it imagines one of them will straightaway recall the other. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘The mind (prev. Coroll) imagines any body for this reason, that the human body is affected and disposed by impressions of an external body in the same way as it is affected when certain parts of it are affected by the same body’

 

the ’mind’ proposes – is propositional action

 

and what is here proposed is that – ‘the human body is affected and disposed by impressions of an external body’

 

‘impressions of an external body’ – are proposals put / propositions – put

 

‘But (by the hypothesis) the body was then so disposed that the mind imagined two bodies at once’ –

 

the proposal is – that two bodies affect at the same time –

 

that is two proposals put at the same time –

 

I don’t think so – there will always be a time difference between proposals put

 

now when one of these body proposals is again put – can we say for sure that the other body proposal will ‘straightaway’ be recalled – that is – be re-proposed?

 

this may well happen – but equally – it may not –

 

the second body proposal – may now be in some way different – or may in fact have been forgotten –

 

again – what happens – is an empirical question

 

and any proposal in this connection – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – Hence we clearly understand what is memory (memoria). For it is nothing else than a certain concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body, and this takes place in the mind according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body. I say then in the first place that it is a concatenation of those ideas only which involve the nature of things which are outside the human body and of external bodies. I say in the second place that this concatenation of things takes place according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of human body in order to distinguish it from the concatenation of the ideas which takes place according to the order of the intellect through which the mind perceives things through their first causes and which is the same in all men. And hence we can clearly understand why the mind from the thought of one thing should immediately fall upon the thought of another which has no likeness to the first, e.g., from the thought of the word pomum a Roman immediately began to think about fruit, which has no likeness to the articulate sound nor anything in common, save that the body of that man was affected by these two, that is the man frequently heard the word pomum while looking at the fruit: and thus one passes from the thought of one thing to the thought of another according as his habit arranged the images in his body. For a soldier, e.g., when he sees the footmarks of a horse in the sand passes from the thought of the horse to the thought of the horseman, and thence to the thought of war, etc. But a countryman from the thought of a horse would pass to the thought of a plough, field, etc., and thus each one according to whether he is accustomed to unite the images of things in this or that way passes from the thought of one thing to the thought of another.

 

‘Hence we clearly understand what is memory (memoria). For it is nothing else than a certain concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body, and this takes place in the mind according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body.’

 

here we have a proposal – an explanation of the proposal ‘memory’ –

 

‘a concatenation of ideas’? – is a concatenation of proposals –

 

‘involving the nature of things’? – that is proposing the nature of things –

 

and these ideas / proposals ‘take place in the mind’

 

the ‘mind’ is propositional action – it is not a ‘place’

 

‘according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body’?

 

this is to effectively propose that ‘memory’ is a function of the human body

 

now just exactly what this amounts to – this propositional relation between memory proposals and the human body proposal is of course a matter – open to question

 

I think most would think that by definition – ‘memory’ has reference to the past – yet in this explanation of memory from Spinoza – there is no such reference

 

so – my question here is – if the past is not in the picture – how is the propositional action of ‘memory’ – in any way different from any other propositional action?

 

this is a question for Spinoza

 

in my view – there is no difference

 

any proposal – however ‘explained’ – or described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

that is where we start – that is where we end

 

‘and this takes place in the mind according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body.’

 

now here I think Spinoza is proposing that the body / brain holds memories –

 

a proposal exists for as long as it is actually entertained –

 

and therefore – memory proposals exist as long as they are entertained –

 

that propositions do not exist before they are put – or after they have ceased to be entertained

 

‘I say in the second place that this concatenation of things takes place according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of human body in order to distinguish it from the concatenation of the ideas which takes place according to the order of the intellect through which the mind perceives things through their first causes and which is the same in all men.’

 

here Spinoza clearly distinguishes body and mind – as different ‘concatenations’

 

in so far as Spinoza uses the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – and regards them as significant – and informative – he maintains a dualism – within a proposed monism

 

how can that be – how can that work?

 

his idea is that the body is ‘the formal essence of the mind’ –

 

which is to say – he places the body in the mind –

 

if ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are different places – how can two different places be the one place?

 

and if ‘mind’ and ‘body’ one place – there is no distinction

 

mind and bodies are not ‘places’ –

 

‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –

 

‘body’ is a name for proposition action –

 

and once this is understood – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – disappear –

 

the focus is not ‘mind’ or ‘body’ – rather the propositional actor

 

and finally – if ‘essence’ – is to mean anything here – the essence of the human being – is propositional action

 

‘And hence we can clearly understand why the mind from the thought of one thing should immediately fall upon the thought of another which has no likeness to the first, e.g., from the thought of the word pomum a Roman immediately began to think about fruit, which has no likeness to the articulate sound nor anything in common, save that the body of that man was affected by these two, that is the man frequently heard the word pomum while looking at the fruit: and thus one passes from the thought of one thing to the thought of another according as his habit arranged the images in his body.’

 

the word ‘pomum’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

that the proposal ‘pomum’ – is put to mean ‘a fruit’ – is to propose a meaning

 

and this ‘meaning’ proposal – is open to question

 

i.e. – perhaps there is a propositional context in which ‘pomum’ is not proposed as ‘a fruit’?

 

now you can further put that the proposals ‘pomum’ and ‘a fruit’ – are related in terms of the images proposed by the propositional actor

 

however – to propose this is not to settle any matter of explanation –

 

for an ‘image’ is a proposal – as with the proposal it is put to explain – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

by all means go with the image explanation – if it suits your purpose – but make no mistake – it is open to question

 

in logic we operate without a net – and without a ground beneath the net

 

‘For a soldier, e.g., when he sees the footmarks of a horse in the sand passes from the thought of the horse to the thought of the horseman, and thence to the thought of war, etc. But a countryman from the thought of a horse would pass to the thought of a plough, field, etc., and thus each one according to whether he is accustomed to unite the images of things in this or that way passes from the thought of one thing to the thought of another.’

 

what this points to is different propositional contexts –

 

different propositional contexts in which a proposal will be understood differently

 

this occurs because any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is logically uncertain

 

 

PROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the human body, nor does it know it to exist, save through ideas of modifications by which the body is affected.

 

 

propositional action – whether described as of the ‘body’ or of the ‘mind’ – is knowledge – is the knowledge of the propositional actor

 

and our knowledge / proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body (Prop. 13, Part II), which (Prop. 9, Part II) is in God in so far as he is considered affected by another idea of an individual thing: or because (Post. 4) the human body needs many bodies from which it is continually regenerated, so to speak, and the order and connection of idea is (Prop. 7, Part II.) the same as the order and connection of causes this idea will be in God in so far as he is considered as affected by the ideas of several things. God therefore has the idea of the human body, or has a knowledge of the human body, in so far as he is considered as affected by many other ideas and is not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, that is (Coroll., Prop 11, Part II), the human mind has no knowledge of the human body. But the idea of the modification are in in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind perceives those modifications (Prop. 12. Part II), and consequently (Prop. 16, Part II) the human body itself, and that (Prop. 17, Part II.) as actually existing. The human mind, therefore, perceives only thus far the human body. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

knowledge is not in the unknown

 

mind and body are not two parallel places that have the same order and connection –

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action – ‘the human body’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

the human being is a propositional actor –

 

once this is understood – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are seen as names for the one activity – that is the action of the propositional actor –

 

there is no order and connection in the unknown

 

the unknown has no idea

 

the unknown does not constitute anything

 

‘perceived modifications’ – are propositional actions

 

the ‘human body’ can be put as a propositional object – as a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘the human body as actually existing’ – is a description of propositional action

 

 

PROP. XX. The idea of the human mind is granted in God and follows in God, and is referred to him in the same manner as the idea of knowledge of the human body.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

nothing is granted in the unknown – or ‘follows’ in the unknown

 

‘the unknown’ – is not an ‘he’ – the unknown has no gender

 

‘the human mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘the human body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

knowledge is proposal – is propositional action

 

propositional action is a response – the propositional actor’s response – to the unknown

 

 

Proof. – Thought is an attribute of God (Prop.1. Part II.), and therefore (Prop. 3, Part II.) the idea of this and all modifications, and consequently of the human mind (Prop. ii, Part II,), must necessarily be granted in God. Now this idea or knowledge of the human mind is not granted in God in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing (Prop. 9, Part II.). But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection causes (Prop. 7. Part II.). It follows, therefore, that this idea or knowledge of the human mind is in God and is referred to God in the same manner as the knowledge or idea of the human body.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown – the unknown has no attributes

 

‘thought’ – is a proposal put – thought is propositional action –

 

‘modifications’ are propositional actions

 

nothing is granted in the unknown –

 

ideas are proposal – causes are proposals

 

there is no order and connection of proposals –

 

all propositional action is a response to the unknown

 

 

PROP. XXI. The idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body.

 

 

Proof. – That the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact that the body is the object of the mind (Prop. 12 and 13, Part II): and therefore by that same reason the idea of the mind is united to its object, that is the mind itself, in the same manner as the mind is united to the body, Q.e.d.

 

 

the body as object of the mind?

 

the ‘human body’ – as with anything else – can be proposed as the object of propositional action

 

the idea of the mind?

 

what this amounts to – is how the mind is proposed

 

any proposal here – is a propositional action –

 

the mind is not a substance – the body not a substance

 

mind and body are not substances ‘united’ – or attributes united

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are names for propositional action

 

propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – The proposition can be understood far more easily from what has been said in the note on Prop. 7. Part II. For there we showed that the idea of the body and the body itself, that is (Prop.13, Part II.) the mind and body, are one in the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, and now under the attribute of extension. Wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one in the same thing and are conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself follow from the same necessity in God and from the same power of necessity. For in truth the idea of the mind, that is the idea of an idea, is nothing else than the form (forma) of an idea in so far as it is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to its object: for if a man knows anything, by that very fact he knows he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity. But of this more again.

 

 

‘For there we showed that the idea of the body and the body itself, that is (Prop.13, Part II.) the mind and body, are one in the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, and now under the attribute of extension.’

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are not one and the same individual

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ are names for propositional action

 

‘for if a man knows anything, by that very fact he knows he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity.’

 

‘and so to infinity’ – this is no more than mindless rhetorical duplication

 

what we know is what we propose – and what we propose is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

our knowledge is uncertain – our knowing is uncertain

 

to propose that you know that you know – is to propose that you propose

 

and doing this is quite pointless

 

 

PROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the idea of these modifications.

 

 

an ‘idea’ – is a proposal / propositional action

 

modifications of the body – are descriptions of propositional action

 

the ‘idea’ of these modifications – is the propositional action that is the modification

 

all we really have here from Spinoza is a statement of the fact of propositional activity – as it can or might relate to the proposal ‘body’

 

 

Proof. – The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God in the same way and are referred to him in the same way as the ideas of modifications, which is proved in the same manner as Prop. 20 Part. But the ideas of modifications of the body are in the human mind (Prop. 12, Part II.), that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II), in God in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. Therefore, the ideas of these ideas are in God, in so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (Prop. 21. Part II.) in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only modifications of the human body but also the ideas of them. Q.e.d.

 

 

an idea of an idea – is a proposal – proposed –

 

which is to say – a proposal put –

 

you can engage in the mindless proposal of proposal – of proposed etc – as if to infinity –

 

but to do so – is simply to engage in a duplication game – which has no logical value

 

‘modifications of the body’ – are proposals – propositional actions

 

‘in the human mind’ –

 

the ‘human mind’ is not a place – it is propositional action

 

‘in God in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind’ –

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

and the unknown – does not ‘constitute’ –

 

‘the ideas of these ideas’ – is just a proposal – proposed

 

and this proposal is not in ‘God’ / the unknown –

 

any such proposal – is put against the unknown – or in reaction to it

 

we propose – to make known

 

our knowledge is proposal – is propositional –

 

and any proposal put – in defiance of the unknown – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXIII. The mind has no knowledge of itself save in so far as it perceives the idea of the modifications of the body.

 

 

Proof. – The idea or knowledge of the mind (Prop. 20 part II) follows in God, and is referred to him in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (Prop. 19. Part II) the human mind does not know the human body, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II) since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, therefore neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to God in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, and therefore (same Coroll, Prop.11, Part II) the human mind has no knowledge of itself. Then again the ideas of the modifications of which the body is affected involve the nature of the human mind itself (Prop. 16. Part II), that is (Prop. 13, Part II), they agree with nature of the mind. Wherefore the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves the knowledge of the mind. But (prev. Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself. Therefore the human mind has only thus far a knowledge of itself. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘knowledge’ – is proposal / propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘modifications of the body’ – are proposals / propositional actions

 

we can propose that we propose – ad infinitum –

 

this is a useless game

 

the point is that our knowledge of ourselves – of our propositional actions –– just is our propositional activity

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no knowledge

 

the unknown has no idea

 

knowledge of the human body – is proposal put – and critically investigated

 

‘knowledge of the human mind’ – is proposal put and critically investigated

 

the essence of the unknown – is that it is unknown

 

the unknown does not ‘constitute’ anything

 

‘knowledge of the human mind’ – is propositional activity – put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

 

PROP. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human body.

 

 

if by ‘adequate knowledge’ – is meant ‘certain knowledge’ – there is no ‘adequate’ knowledge

 

knowledge is proposal – and proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if ‘adequate knowledge’ – is understood to be ‘uncertain knowledge’ – then all knowledge is ‘adequate’ –

 

any proposed ‘knowledge’ of the ‘component parts of the human body’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The parts composing the human body do not appertain to the essence of that body save in so far as they reciprocally communicate their motions in a certain ratio (vide Def. after Coroll., lemma 3), and not in so far as they may be considered as individuals without relation to the human body. For the parts of the human body (Post. 1) are individuals very complex, the parts of which (Lemma 4) can be taken

away from the human body without harm to the nature or form of it, and can communicate their motions (Ax. I after Lemma3) to other bodies in another ratio. And therefore (Prop. 3 Part II.) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God in so far as (Prop. 9, Part II.) he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing which is prior in the order of nature to that part (Prop. 7. Part II.). This also can be said of any part of the individual component of the human body, and therefore the knowledge of each component part of the human body is in God in so far as he is affected by many ideas of things, and not in so far as he has only an idea of the human body, that is (Prop. 13, Part II.) the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind. And therefore (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II) the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human body. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘The parts composing the human body do not appertain to the essence of that body save in so far as they reciprocally communicate their motions in a certain ratio (vide Def. after Coroll., lemma 3), and not in so far as they may be considered as individuals without relation to the human body.’

 

‘the parts composing body do not appertain to the essence of that body’

 

from a logical point of view there is no essence – of the human body – or for that matter of anything else

 

any claim of ‘essence’ is a claim of definitive or certain characterization of a thing

 

‘essence’ – to my mind – only makes sense as a heuristic endeavour that unlocks propositional uncertainty – and leads to more and more avenues of critical inquiry

 

any characterization of anything – is a descriptive proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to ‘the parts composing the human body’ –

 

the ‘human body’ – is a proposal – open to question –

 

and it is just because it is a proposal – open to question – that the proposal / description – ‘parts of the human body’ – is possible

 

‘parts of the human body’ – are descriptive proposals – put in response to the proposal ‘human body’ –

 

‘in so far as they reciprocally communicate their motions in a certain ratio’

 

here is a relational proposal – that is a proposal – as to the relation between proposed parts of the human body

 

this proposal – as with the proposal it is a response to – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘and not in so far as they may be considered as individuals without relation to the human body’

 

who is going to consider a part of the human body – as not a part of the human body?

 

‘For the parts of the human body (Post. 1) are individuals very complex, the parts of which (Lemma 4) can be taken away from the human body without harm to the nature or form of it, and can communicate their motions (Ax. I after Lemma3) to other bodies in another ratio’

 

parts can be taken away from the human body – without harm to the nature or form of it?

 

this strikes me as plainly wrong

 

ask anyone who has lost a limb – if the nature or form of their body has not suffered

 

the proposal that parts taken away from the human body can communicate their motions to other bodies in the same ratio – is to my mind – a fantastical proposal

 

a severed leg – ‘communicating its motions’ – I don’t think so – unless we are talking Edgar Allan Poe

 

on the other hand – would we not say that a human heart taken from a deceased body and transplanted to another could be made to communicate ‘its motions’ – to the other?

 

‘And therefore (Prop. 3 Part II.) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God in so far as (Prop. 9, Part II.) he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing which is prior in the order of nature to that part (Prop. 7. Part II.). This also can be said of any part of the individual component of the human body, and therefore the knowledge of each component part of the human body is in God in so far as he is affected by many ideas of things, and not in so far as he has only an idea of the human body, that is (Prop. 13, Part II.) the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind.’

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no knowledge – no idea –

 

human propositional actors have knowledge – put proposals and critically investigate them –

 

the unknown is not a propositional actor

 

‘And therefore (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II) the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human body. Q.e.d.’

 

all knowledge is proposal – and proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘inadequate’ – is understood ‘uncertain’ – then all knowledge is ‘inadequate’ –

 

if all we have is uncertain knowledge – then there is a sense in which that knowledge is ‘adequate’ for our purposes – adequate for our uncertain reality

 

any proposal that divides the body into component parts will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

in the history of the sciences of the human body we have many such proposals – and with those proposals – different and exciting lines of critical inquiry

 

any such proposal will increase the scope of propositional question – doubt and uncertainty –

 

and as such increase our critical knowledge of the human body

 

 

PROP. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

 

 

an idea of a modification of the human body – is a proposal put in relation to the proposal of the human body

 

all knowledge is proposal – a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

knowledge is uncertain –

 

and given this – we are best to drop this adequate / inadequate distinction

 

what is ‘adequate’ – is uncertain – what is inadequate – is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – We have shown (Prop. 16, Part II.) that the idea of the modification of the human body involves the nature of the external body in so far as the external body determines the human body in a certain way. But in so far as the external body is an individual which has no reference to the human body, its idea or knowledge is in God (Prop. 9, Part II.) in so far as God is considered as affected by the idea of the other thing which (Prop. 7, Part II.) is by nature prior to the external body. Therefore adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God in so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human body, or the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body.

 

‘We have shown (Prop. 16, Part II.) that the idea of the modification of the human body involves the nature of the external body in so far as the external body determines the human body in a certain way.’

 

the ‘human body’ – is a proposal –

 

the ‘external body’ – is a proposal

 

a relation can be proposed between the human body proposal and the external body proposal

 

any such propositional relation is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

no one proposal determines another

 

the external body proposal does not determine the human body

 

a relation between the human body and the external body can be proposed

 

and that propositional relation – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘But in so far as the external body is an individual which has no reference to the human body, its idea or knowledge is in God (Prop. 9, Part II.) in so far as God is considered as affected by the idea of the other thing which (Prop. 7, Part II.) is by nature prior to the external body.’

 

the external body is a proposal – put by a propositional actor – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

God is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no knowledge

 

 

PROP. XXVI. The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing save through ideas of modifications of its body.

 

 

the ‘human mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘human body’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘perception’ is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘external body’ is proposed in propositional action

 

the ‘external body’ exists if proposed – and as proposed

 

the proposal ‘external object’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – If the human mind is affected in no way by any external body, then (Prop. 7 Part II. ) neither is the idea of the human body, that is  (Prop. 13, Part II.), the human mind, affected in any way wise by the idea of the existence of the external body, or, in other words, it does not perceive in any way the existence of the external body. But in so far as the human body is affected in any way by the external body, thus far (Prop. 16, Part II., and its Coroll.) it perceives the external body. Q.e.d.

 

 

if there is no propositional relation proposed between the external body and the propositional actor –

 

the propositional actor is not ‘affected’ by the external body

 

if a relation is proposed between the propositional actor and the external body –

 

the propositional actor perceives the relation

 

 

Corollary. – In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, thus far it has no adequate knowledge of it.

 

 

‘imagination’ is a name for propositional action –

 

if by ‘adequate knowledge’ is meant ‘certain knowledge’ – there is no adequate knowledge –

 

‘knowledge’ is proposal / propositional action

 

propositional action – however named or described – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say it imagines (Note on Prop. 17, Part II.): nor can the human mind in any other way imagine (prev. Prop) external bodies as actually existing. And therefore (Prop. 25, Part II.) in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has no adequate knowledge of them. Q.e.d.

 

 

when the propositional actor ‘imagines’ ‘external bodies’ we say – he / she – proposes

 

that which is proposed – is that which exists –

 

any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

all ‘knowledge’ is proposal – all proposal uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

 

 

a ‘modification of the human body’ – is a propositional action

 

all ‘knowledge’ – is proposal –

 

if by ‘adequate knowledge’ is meant certain knowledge – there is no adequate knowledge

 

all proposal / knowledge – is uncertain

 

any propositional action – put by a propositional actor – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – Any idea of the modification of the human body involves the nature of the nature of the human body in so far as the human body itself is considered to be affected in a certain manner (Prop. 16, Part II). But in so far as the human body is an individual which can be affected in many other ways, the idea of the modifications, etc. (vide Proof of Prop. 25 Part II).

 

 

the ‘human body’ put as an object proposal –

 

‘any idea of the modification of the human body’ – is a proposal / propositional action – put to – the proposal ‘human body’

 

and the ‘human body’ proposal – is modified by the action

 

the human body proposal can be modified in many ways –

 

which is to say – any number of modification proposals can be put to the human body proposal

 

proposal / propositional action – is knowledge –

 

knowledge / proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

knowledge of the human body is not certain – i.e. – ‘adequate’

 

knowledge of the human body is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXVIII. The idea of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone, are not clear and distinct but confused.

 

 

so called – ‘modifications of the human body’ – are propositional actions

 

any propositional action affects the propositional actor –

 

how that affect is explained / described – is open to question

 

the propositional actor is not divided into ‘mind’ and ‘body’

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ are not different places / spaces / entities

 

logically speaking – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are outmoded descriptions of the propositional actor – of propositional actions

 

however – these notions – can function as foci for detailed investigation of critical propositional issues – i.e. a physician may describe his propositional activity as ‘of the body’ – and a psychologist may describe his activity ‘of the mind’

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ here are different propositional descriptions of propositional action

 

logically speaking – no proposal or propositional action is ‘clear and distinct’

 

and by the same token no proposal or propositional action is ‘confused’

 

proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve both the nature of the external bodies and that of the human body itself (Prop. 16. Part II): and not only must they involve the nature of the human body, but also that of its parts. For modifications are modes (Post. 3) in which parts of the human body, and consequently the whole body is affected. But (Prop. 24 and 25, Part II) adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God in so far as he is considered as affected by the human mind, but in so far as he is considered affected by other ideas. These ideas of modifications, in so far as they have reference to the human mind alone, are like consequences without premises, that is (as is self-evident) confused ideas. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘ideas of the modifications of the human body’ – are propositional actions

 

any such propositional action ‘involves’ / affects the propositional actor

 

how such actions are further proposed and described – is open to question

 

an ‘external body’ is a proposal – open to question

 

there is no ‘adequate knowledge’ of external bodies

 

there is no’ adequate knowledge’ of propositional action

 

all such knowledge is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

there is no knowledge in the unknown

 

the unknown is not ‘affected’

 

no ‘modification’ – that is no propositional action – has reference to ‘the mind alone’

 

any modification / propositional action affects the propositional actor –

 

the propositional actor as such – is not divided into ‘mind’ and ‘body’

 

any such description – undermines the unity that is the propositional actor

 

and logically speaking – presents a distorted and incoherent picture of the propositional actor –

 

however – as noted above – these notions of ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are used as names for specific critical foci and investigation

.

 

Note. – The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is shown in the same manner when considered in itself not to be clear and distinct; also the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference to the human mind alone, which everyone can easily see.

 

 

logically speaking – there is no reference ‘to the human mind alone’ – 

 

or if there is – it represents a failed understanding of the propositional actor – of the unity of the propositional actor –

 

however – the ‘mind alone’ may function as a name for a specific propositional focus and investigation – i.e. the focus and investigation of the psychologist

 

logically speaking – no idea / proposal / propositional action – is ‘clear and distinct’

 

any idea / proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and this – not everyone can easily see

 

 

PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind.

 

 

‘the idea of the idea of each modification’ –

 

is the proposal of the proposal of each proposal –

 

a proposal – is just that – any proposal of the proposal – is repetition – is duplication – and of no logical value

 

in any case no proposal / propositional action – is adequate knowledge – if by adequate knowledge is meant ‘certain knowledge’

 

any proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The idea of the modifications of the human body (Prop. 27 Part II.) does not involve adequate knowledge of the body, or in other words, does not express its nature adequately, that is (Prop.13, Part II), it does not agree adequately with the nature of the mind. And therefore (Ax. 6, Part I) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not involve adequate knowledge of it. Q.e.d.

 

 

there is no agreement – or disagreement – between the ‘mind’ and the ‘body’

 

the ‘mind’ and the’ body’ are different names for the propositional action of the propositional actor

 

if by adequate knowledge is meant ‘certain’ knowledge – there is no adequate knowledge

 

knowledge is proposal – is propositional action

 

propositional action – is open to doubt and is uncertain –

 

‘the idea of this idea’ – is the proposal of this proposal –

 

propositional repetition and duplication – is empty and has no logical value

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that the human mind, whenever it perceives a thing in the common order of nature, has no adequate knowledge of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated knowledge thereof. For the mind knows not itself save in so far as it perceives ideas of modification of the body (Prop. 23, Part II). But it does not perceive its body save through the ideas of modification, through which it also perceives external bodies. And therefore in so far as it has these ideas it has no adequate knowledge of itself (Prop. 29, Part II.), nor of its body (Prop. 27, Part II.), but only (Prop. 28 and Note, Part II.) a confused and mutilated one. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘perception’ – is a propositional action

 

a ‘thing’ – is a proposal

 

the ‘common order of nature’ is a proposal

 

the proposal ‘a thing’ – can be put in relation to the proposal ‘common order of nature’

 

the propositional actor – perceives a thing in the common of nature

 

the ‘human mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

it is not the ‘mind’ that knows itself –

 

the ‘mind’ is not an entity

 

the propositional actor knows him / herself – through his / her propositional action

 

the ‘human body’ is a name for propositional action –

 

‘external bodies’ are proposals

 

the propositional actor perceives / proposes ‘external bodies’ –

 

the perception of the propositional actor – is a propositional action

 

if by adequate knowledge is meant ‘certain knowledge’ – there is no adequate knowledge

 

knowledge is proposal / propositional action

 

proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note – I say expressly that the mind has no adequate but only confused knowledge of itself, of its body, and of all external bodies, when it perceives a thing in the common order of nature, that is when it is determined externally, that is by fortuitous circumstances, to contemplate this or that, and not when it is determined internally, that is by the fact that it regards many things at one, to understand their agreements, differences and oppositions on to the another. For whenever it is disposed in this or any other way from within, then it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I shall show further on.

 

if by ‘adequate knowledge’ is meant ‘certain’ knowledge – there is no certain knowledge

 

the propositional actor has no ‘adequate knowledge’ of him / her self –

 

the propositional actor’s knowledge of him / her self – is uncertain

 

when the propositional actor perceives / proposes a relation between a ‘thing’ and the proposal ‘common order of nature’ – the propositional actor’s knowledge – is uncertain

 

the propositional actor is not determined – the propositional actor determines

 

the propositional actor does not regard many things at once – the propositional proposes propositional relations between proposals – and puts propositional relations to question – to doubt – and explores their uncertainties

 

the propositional actor’s understanding is not ‘clear and distinct’ – it is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXX. We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.

 

the duration of the propositional actor – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Proof. – The duration of the body does not depend on its essence (Ax. 1, Part II), nor on the absolute nature of God (Prop. 21, Part I) but (Prop. 28, Part I) it is determined for existence and action by certain causes, which are in their turn determined for existing and acting in a certain determined ratio by other causes, and these by others, and so on to infinity. Therefore the duration of our body depends on the common order of nature and the disposition of things. But there is in God an adequate knowledge of the reason why things are disposed in any particular way, in so far as he has idea of all things, and not in so far as he has only a knowledge of the human body (Coroll., Prop. 9, Part II). Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is very inadequate in God in so far as he is considered as constituting only the nature of the human mind, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.), this knowledge is inadequate in our mind. Q.e.d.

 

 

one might argue that the duration of the propositional actor – just is the duration of his / her essence

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown – nothing depends on the unknown

 

as to ‘causes’ –

 

an infinite causal chain is incoherent

 

for such – by definition – is without a first cause

 

if you take Spinoza’s view – that his ‘God’ – is the first cause – then the causal chain is not ‘infinite’ –

 

and if you were to stick with infinite causal chain – his ‘God’ – can only be one link in the chain –

 

the chain that is chained to nothing

 

the infinite argument – is nothing more than pointless propositional repetition

 

the duration of the propositional actor – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

duration is uncertain

 

there is no knowledge in the unknown – ‘adequate’ or otherwise

 

how things are disposed – is open to question – open to question – open to doubt –

and uncertain

 

our knowledge – is uncertain –

 

that is to say our proposals / our propositional actions – are uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of individual things which are outside us.

 

an ‘individual thing’ – is a proposal

 

no proposal is determined by another

 

all propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the duration of any proposed ‘thing’ – is uncertain

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that all individual things are contingent and corruptible. For we can have no adequate knowledge concerning their duration (prev. Prop.), and

this is what must be understood by the contingency of things and their liability to corruption (vide Note 1, Prop. 33, Part I.). For (Prop. 29, Part I), save this, nothing is granted to be contingent.

 

 

all proposal – is contingent – that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they have reference to God are true.

 

 

an ‘idea’ – is a proposal

 

‘God’ is a name of the unknown

 

all proposals have the unknown as ‘object’

 

any propositional action is a response or reaction to the unknown

 

an ‘idea’ / proposal – is ‘true’ – if affirmed by a propositional actor – for whatever reason – ‘false’ – if denied by a propositional actor – for whatever reason

 

any proposal of affirmation / denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – Now all ideas which are in God, must entirely agree with their ideals (Coroll., Prop. 7, Part II): and therefore (Ax, 6, Part I) they are true. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no ideas

 

an idea is a proposal – an ‘ideal’ – that proposed

 

there is no logical distinction between idea and ideal –

 

any distinction is grammatical

 

an idea / proposal – is ‘true’ – if affirmed – ‘false’ is denied

 

any proposal of affirmation or denial is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, wherefore they could be called false.

 

 

Proof. – If you deny this, conceive, if possible, a positive mode of thinking which could constitute the form of error of falsity. This mode of thinking cannot be in God (prev. Prop.), and outside God it cannot exist or be conceived (Prop. 15. Part I.). Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas, wherefore they could be called false. Q.e.d.

 

 

for Spinoza – ‘positive’ here – is a synonym for ‘true’ –

 

and therefore – there can be no positive mode of thinking – that is false

 

‘positive’ defined as ‘true’ – ‘true’ defined as ‘positive’

 

therefore – no ‘false’ positive

 

all we have is a word game – and no actual definition of ‘true’ or ‘false’

 

and furthermore – in a dogmatic way he shunts these issues back to his ‘God’ –

 

i.e. – there can be no error in God

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal –

 

a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a ‘true’ – ‘idea’ / proposal / proposition / propositional action – is one affirmed – for whatever reason – by a propositional actor

 

a ‘false’ – ‘idea’ / proposal / proposition / propositional action – is one denied – for whatever reason – by a propositional actor

 

proposals of affirmation and denial – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ – are not properties of propositions

 

‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ – are propositional actions – proposals of affirmation or denial – put in relation to subject proposals

 

 

PROP. XXXIV. Every idea in us which is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.

 

 

Proof. – When we say that an adequate idea and a perfect idea is granted in us, we say nothing else than that (Coroll., Prop. 11. Part II) there is granted in God an adequate and perfect idea in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind, and consequently (Prop.32. Part II.) we say nothing else than that such an idea is true. Q.e.d.

 

 

there are no ideas that are ‘absolute’ – ‘adequate’ – or ‘perfect’ –

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal – and any proposal – put by a propositional actor –is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

an idea / proposal – is ‘true’ – if affirmed by a propositional actor – ‘false’ – if denied by a propositional actor

 

any proposal of affirmation or denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

no idea / proposal ‘is granted in us’ – a proposal is put – by a propositional actor

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

nothing ‘is granted in’ the unknown

 

the unknown does not ‘constitute’ anything

 

 

PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate or mutilated and confused ideas.

 

 

‘knowledge’ – is proposal – proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

what we deal with is not the ‘privation’ of knowledge – but the uncertainty of knowledge

 

a false proposition – is a proposal that – for whatever reason – is denied

 

so just what counts as ‘falsity’ – a reason for denial is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘ideas’ are proposals – proposals are not ‘inadequate’ – ‘mutilated’ – or ‘confused’ –

 

‘ideas’ / proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – Nothing positive is granted in ideas which could constitute the form of falsity (Prop. 33, Part II). But falsity cannot consist in mere privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and be mistaken), nor in mere ignorance: for ignorance and error are two different things. Wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate knowledge or confused ideas. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘nothing positive is granted in ideas which could constitute their falsity’

 

for Spinoza ‘positive’ – is a synonym for true –

 

so – no truth in an idea constitutes a form of falsity

 

which is to say – no truth is false –

 

again – all we get here from Spinoza – is a convoluted word game – that tells us nothing

 

an ‘idea’ – is a proposal / a proposition

 

truth and falsity are not properties of propositions

 

truth and falsity – are propositional actions

 

an idea / proposition is true – if – for whatever reason – it is affirmed – an idea / proposition is false – if – for whatever reason it is denied

 

just how a propositional actor will judge a proposal as true or false – that is what criteria he / she will use to affirm or deny – is a matter open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and any proposal of affirmation or any proposal of denial – likewise – is open to question

 

‘But falsity cannot consist in mere privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and be mistaken), nor in mere ignorance: for ignorance and error are two different things. Wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate knowledge or confused ideas.’

 

for Spinoza – his ‘adequate’ ideas – are certain – and true

 

and it is in ‘inadequate’ idea – that we find falsity

 

so – no adequate idea is false –

 

and all inadequate ideas – are false

 

so – for Spinoza – it is not the case that any proposition is either true or false

 

only ‘adequate’ ideas / propositions are true – and only ‘inadequate’ ideas / propositions are false

 

one problem for this lobsided theory of truth is that Spinoza’s adequate ideas – his certain truths – cannot be established

 

any proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and it is only propositional uncertainty that allows the possibility of truth or falsity –

 

if a proposition cannot be false – there is the argument that it cannot be true

 

Spinoza’s certain propositions – his adequate ideas – on this view – actually have no truth value

 

 

Note. – In the note on Prop. 17 of this Part I explained for what reason error consists in the privation of knowledge. For further explanation, however, I shall give an example. For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; and this opinion consists in this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This, therefore, is their idea of liberty, that they should know no cause of their actions. For that which they say, that human actions depend on the will, are words they do not fathom. For none of them know what is will and how it moves the body; those who boast of this and feign dwellings and habitations of the soul, provoke either laughter or disgust. Thus when we look at the sun we imagine that it is only some two hundred feet distant from us: which error does not consist in that imagination alone, but in the fact that while we thus imagined

it we were ignorant of the causes of this imagination and the true distance. For though we may afterwards learn that the sun is some six hundred times the earth’s diameter distance from us, we imagine it nevertheless to be near to us: for we do not imagine the sun to be nearer because we are ignorant of the true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun in so far as the body is affected by it.

 

 

‘For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; and this opinion consists in this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This, therefore, is their idea of liberty, that they should know no cause of their actions. For that which they say, that human actions depend on the will, are words they do not fathom. For none of them know what is will and how it moves the body; those who boast of this and feign dwellings and habitations of the soul, provoke either laughter or disgust.’

 

to be conscious of your actions – is to propose your actions –

 

‘consciousness’ – is a description of propositional action

 

‘will’ – is a description of propositional action –

 

that propositional actors may have different understandings of ‘will’

 

is no reason to ridicule them

 

any propositional action – however described – is open to question

 

any proposed ‘cause’ of one’s actions / proposals – is a matter open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

our freedom – is logical

 

we are free to the extent that we critically evaluate our proposals / propositions / propositional actions –

 

we are free to the extent that we question – doubt – and explore propositional uncertainty

 

‘Thus when we look at the sun we imagine that it is only some two hundred feet distant from us: which error does not consist in that imagination alone, but in the fact that while we thus imagined it we were ignorant of the causes of this imagination and the true distance. For though we may afterwards learn that the sun is some six hundred times the earth’s diameter distance from us, we imagine it nevertheless to be near to us: for we do not imagine the sun to be nearer because we are ignorant of the true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun in so far as the body is affected by it.’

 

any proposal as to the distance of the sun from us – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

you can propose that the sun is only two hundred feet from us

 

this is a valid proposal – and as with any proposal – open to question –

 

and it is a result of putting such a proposal to question – to doubt – that alternative – different proposals – like those of current scientific thinking have emerged

 

there is no ‘error’ in any proposal – what you deal with is not error – but logical uncertainty

 

‘error’ has to do with rhetoric – not logic

 

whether you describe a proposal – a proposition as ‘imaginative’ – or not – is logically irrelevant

 

a proposition – however described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it is clear here that Spinoza uses the concept of imagination to discredit and discount proposals / propositions that don’t suit his world view –

 

a world view I might add that he believes is certain –

 

and as such – a world view that has no basis in propositional logic

 

 

PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow from the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.

 

 

there is no ‘necessity’ – any proposed propositional relation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any ‘idea’ / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

for Spinoza an adequate idea is a ‘certain’ –

 

there is no logical basis to certainty –

 

Spinoza’s certain / adequate ideas are – are baseless

 

proposals / propositions are not ‘clear and distinct’ – or ‘confused’ – they are uncertain

 

 

Proof. – All ideas are in God (Prop. 15, Part I.), and in so far as they have reference to God, they are true (Prop. 32, Part II.) and (Coroll., Prop. 7. Part II.) adequate; and therefore none are inadequate or confused save in so far as they have reference to the individual mind of anyone. On this point, vide Prop. 24 and 25, Part II. And therefore all ideas, both adequate and inadequate, follow from the same necessity (Coroll., Prop. Part II.) Q.e.d.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

there are no ideas – adequate or inadequate in the unknown –

 

propositional actors propose –

 

any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

 

‘And therefore all ideas, both adequate and inadequate, follow from the same necessity

 

for Spinoza – this necessity is his ‘God’

 

and on this view his God is both adequate and inadequate – both certain and confused –

 

Spinoza’s God is a contradiction

 

 

PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (see Lemma 2), and that which is equally in part and in the whole, do not constitute the essence of an individual thing.

 

 

if by ‘essence’ – is meant that which is distinctive – then that which is common will not be that which is distinctive

 

 

Proof. – If you deny this, conceive, if it can be, that it does constitute the essence of a thing, namely the essence of B. Then (def. 2, Part II.) it cannot be conceived nor exist without B. And this is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to the essence of B, nor can it constitute the essence of any other thing, Q.e.d.

 

 

Spinoza argues here –

 

that if you say that that which is common to all things is the essence of B – then it (the essence) cannot exist if B does not exist

 

however – B does exist –

 

therefore – that which is common – does not appertain to the essence of B

 

this is a spurious argument

 

for if B does not exist – it does not follow that there is no essence – to that which does exist

 

now if essence – however it is proposed – is something other than existence – 

 

then whether B exists or not – or whether anything else exists or not – is not relevant to essence –

 

essence – on this view – in some sense – stands alone

 

however – this does not work – for presumably – essence – exists – if talk of essence is meaningful

 

on the other hand – is essence – existence?

 

if so – how can essence be that which is distinctive of an individual thing – for existence is common to all?

 

and if ‘essence’ is existence – then what is the point of this notion of essence?

 

is it not an unnecessary – irrelevant concept?

 

I think essence has had its day – it is a confused concept – it is not a useful proposal

 

‘individual things – are proposals

 

we do distinguish proposals – with proposals

 

however – any ‘distinguishing’ proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we can make distinction – while recognizing commonality – and we recognise that any proposed distinction – as with any proposed commonality – is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXVIII. Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.

 

 

any proposal of commonality – those things which are common to all – equally in part and whole – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

logically speaking – uncertain propositions are all we have –

 

in that sense they are ‘adequate’

 

but if by ‘adequate’ – is meant – complete or certain – logically speaking – no proposition is adequate

 

‘certainty’ is a rhetorical notion – it has no basis in logic

 

 

Proof. – Let A be something that is common to all bodies, and which is equally in one part of any body and in the whole. Then I say A can only be conceived adequately. For its idea (Coroll., Prop. 7, Part II.) will necessarily be adequate in God which is so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in so far as he has the idea of its modifications, which (Prop. 16, 25 and 27, part II.) involves in part both the nature of the human body and that of external bodies, that is (Prop. 12 and 13, Part II.), this idea will necessarily be adequate in God in so far as he constitutes the human mind or in so far as he has ideas which are in the human mind. Therefore the mind (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II) necessarily adequately perceives A, and both in so far as it perceives itself and its own or external body: nor can A be conceived in any other manner. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘Let A be something that is common to all bodies, and which is equally in one part of any body and in the whole. Then I say A can only be conceived adequately.’

 

whatever A amounts to – A – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘conceiving A’ – is proposing A – A once put – once proposed – is open to question

 

just proposing A – does not make A – beyond question – beyond doubt – or certain

 

‘this idea will necessarily be adequate in God in so far as he constitutes the human mind or in so far as he has ideas which are in the human mind.’

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

there are no ideas – adequate or inadequate in the unknown –

 

the unknown does not constitute – anything

 

propositional actors – propose – and their proposals are actions

 

the ‘human mind’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal – a propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by an ‘adequate’ idea – is understood a ‘complete’ and / or ‘certain’ idea – logically speaking – there is no adequate idea

 

on the other hand –

 

any idea is adequate – if understood as uncertain

 

 

Corollary. – hence it follows that certain ideas or notions are granted common to all men. For (Lemma 2) all bodies agree in certain things which (prev. Prop.) must adequately or clearly and distinctly be perceived by all.

 

 

‘common ideas’ – are common proposals –

 

the proposal of ‘common ideas’ – is far enough –

 

however – it is just a proposal that may or may not be put

 

where it has been put – it has proved to be a useful proposal – and the more useful – the more it has been investigated – critically examined – and explored

 

but just what such a proposal amounts to – what the ground of any proposed ‘common idea’ is – and – just what these common ideas / proposals are – is a matter

 

that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

in logic – nothing is ‘granted’

 

logically speaking there is no adequate / clear and distinct perception

 

‘perception’ is a name for propositional action – and any propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

perception is uncertain –

 

and who can possibly say with any confidence – what is perceived by all?

 

 

PROP. XXXIX. That which is common to and property of the human body, and certain external bodies by which the human body is used to be affected, and which is equally in part and whole of these, has an adequate idea in the mind.

 

 

any proposed common property of the human body and external bodies by which the body is affected – is a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the mind is a name for the propositional action of the propositional actor

 

if by ‘adequate’ you mean ‘certain’ – there are no certain ‘ideas’ / proposals –

 

all proposals / propositional actions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – Let A be that which is common to and a property of the human body and certain external bodies, and which is equally in the human body and in the external bodies, and which is equally in the human body and in the external bodies, and which is equally in a part and the whole of each human body. There will be in God and adequate idea of A (Coroll., Prop. 7, Part II.), both in so far as he has the idea of the human body, and in so far as he has ideas of given external bodies. Then let it be granted that the human body is affected by an external one and through which it has in common with it, namely, A. The idea of this modification involves the property A (Prop.16, Part II.): and therefore (Coroll., Prop.7, Part II) the idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God in so far as he is affected by the idea of the human body, that is (Prop. 13, Part II.), in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind (Prop.13. Part II.). And therefore (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.e.d.

 

 

the property A – as common to the human body and certain external bodies – can well be proposed – but it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and this is the case – whatever A is referred to – i.e. – to ‘God’ – to man – or whatever else

 

the proposal of A – as a working hypothesis – can be useful – but will only be useful –

 

will only have heuristic value – if it is understood as open to question – open to doubt

and uncertain

 

as a proposal – that is held to be ‘adequate’ – that is beyond question – beyond doubt and certain – it will have no logical value –

 

its only ‘value’ will be rhetorical –

 

which is to say –

 

it will be no more than an advertisement for pretentious ignorance

 

‘The idea of this modification involves the property A (Prop.16, Part II.): and therefore (Coroll., Prop.7, Part II) the idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate in God in so far as he is affected by the idea of the human body, that is (Prop. 13, Part II.), in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind (Prop.13. Part II.). And therefore (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.e.d.’

 

‘the idea of this modification’ – is a just the proposal of this modification

 

the ‘modification’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

the idea of this modification – is from a logical point of view – uncertain – and in Spinoza’s terms – inadequate

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

this proposal – ‘the idea of this modification’ – is not in God / the unknown –

 

the unknown is not ‘affected’ – the unknown does not ‘constitute’

 

‘this idea’ – is a proposal – the ‘human mind’ – is a proposal –

 

a proposal put by a propositional actor –

 

proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and if you like – therefore – inadequate

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that the mind is more apt to perceive many things adequately, the more its body has things in common with other bodies.

 

 

all perception / proposal is uncertain / inadequate – regardless of any proposed commonality between the number of bodies proposed / perceived

 

 

PROP. XL. Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind, are also adequate.

 

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal / propositional action –

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘ideas’/ proposals do not ‘follow in the mind’ –

 

there is no magical follow on from one proposition to another

 

proposals are put in relation to each other –

 

and the putting of propositional relations is a propositional action

 

propositional actions are the work of the propositional actors

 

if by ‘adequate ideas’ – is meant ideas / proposals that are not open to question – open to doubt – and are certain

 

these ideas – are not proposals – they are prejudices –

 

any proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – This is clear. For when we say that in the mind ideas follow from other ideas which are adequate in the mind, we say nothing else than (Coroll., Prop. 11 Part II) that an idea is granted in the divine intellect itself whose cause is God, not in so far as he is infinite nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of many individual things, but in so far only as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

 

 

this ‘spin-out’ to the ‘divine intellect’ – is really just an obfuscation and no more than a denial of propositional logic

 

for even should we accept this notion of divine intellect – logically speaking – nothing changes –

 

ideas / proposals – wherever they are ‘located’ – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

as for ‘the cause is God’ –

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown does not cause – or constitute – anything

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is just a metaphysical graveyard for his failed philosophical theories

 

 

Note 1 – In these propositions I have explained the cause of notions which are called common, and which are the fundamental principles of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions which, would be advantageous to explain by

this method of ours. For from these it could be concluded which notions are more useful than others, and which are scarcely of any value; and, again, which are common to all, which are clear and distinct to those alone who do not labour under misconceptions, and finally, which are ill-founded. Then again, it would be concluded whence these notions are called secondary, and consequently when the axioms which are founded on them, derive their origin, and other points over which I meditated for some time. But as I have decided to make another treatise of this, and as I am afraid of wearying the reader by too much prolixity, I have decided to pass this over here. Nevertheless, lest I should omit anything that is necessary to be known, I shall briefly add the causes from which the terms called transcendental have taken their origin, such as being, thing, something. These terms have arisen from the fact that the human body, since it is limited, is only capable of distinctly forming in itself a number of images (I have explained what is an image in Note on Prop. 17. Part II): and if more than this number are formed, the images begin to be confused; and if this number of images of which the body is capable of forming in itself be much exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with the other. Since this is so, it is clear from Coroll., Prop. 17 and Prop. 18, Part II., that the mind can imagine distinctly as many bodies as images can be formed in its body at the same time. But when images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and, so to speak, comprehends all under one attribute, that is under the attribute of being, of thing, etc. This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not always equally clear, and from other causes analogous to this which it is not necessary to explain here; and for the purpose which we wish to attain it suffices to consider one only. For all may be reduced to this, that these terms signify idea extremely confused. And from similar causes have arisen these notions which are called universal or general, such as man, dog horse, etc. I mean so many images arise in the human body. e.g., so many images of men are formed at the same time, that they overcome the power of imagining, not altogether indeed, but to such an extent that the mind cannot imagine small differences between individuals (e.g., colour, size, etc.) and their fixed number, and only that in which all agree in so far as the body is affected by them is distinctly imagined: for in that was the body most affected by each individual, and this the mind expresses by the name of man, and predicates concerning an infinite number of individuals. For as we have said, it cannot imagine a fixed number of individuals. But it must be noted that these notions are not formed by all in the same manner, but vary with each individual according to the variation of the thing by which the body was most often affected, and which the mind imagines or remembers the most easily. For example those who have most admired men for their stature, by the name of man will understand an animal of erect stature; those who are wont to regard men in another way will form another common image of men, namely a laughing animal, or a featherless biped animal, a reasoning animal, and each one will form concerning the other things universal images of things according to the disposition of his body. Wherefore it is not surprising that so many controversies should have arisen among philosopher who wish to explain things of nature merely by images of things.

 

 

‘In these propositions I have explained the cause of notions which are called common, and which are the fundamental principles of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions which, would be advantageous to explain by this method of ours. For from these it could be concluded which notions are more useful than others, and which are scarcely of any value; and, again, which are common to all, which are clear and distinct to those alone who do not labour under misconceptions,

and finally, which are ill-founded. Then again, it would be concluded whence these notions are called secondary, and consequently when the axioms which are founded on them, derive their origin, and other points over which I meditated for some time. But as I have decided to make another treatise of this, and as I am afraid of wearying the reader by too much prolixity, I have decided to pass this over here.’

 

as far as I can see – the ‘explanation’ Spinoza gives of ‘the cause of those notions which are called common’ – is adequacy – and adequacy has its cause in God –

 

it seems from the above – that Spinoza senses the ‘inadequacy’ of such an explanation

 

at least he seems to doubt that it is the whole truth

 

the logical reality is that we put such proposals – that the putting of such proposals – is natural to human beings –

 

and fair enough that we might look to explain this –

 

but any explanation – as with such a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Nevertheless, lest I should omit anything that is necessary to be known, I shall briefly add the causes from which the terms called transcendental have taken their origin, such as being, thing, something. These terms have arisen from the fact that the human body, since it is limited, is only capable of distinctly forming in itself a number of images (I have explained what is an image in Note on Prop. 17. Part II): and if more than this number are formed, the images begin to be confused; and if this number of images of which the body is capable of forming in itself be much exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with the other.’

 

so according to Spinoza – these general notions / transcendental terms – come about because of the limitation of the mind – with respect to the number of images it can form – and the result is confusion

 

‘Since this is so, it is clear from Coroll., Prop. 17 and Prop. 18, Part II., that the mind can imagine distinctly as many bodies as images can be formed in its body at the same time. But when images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and, so to speak, comprehends all under one attribute, that is under the attribute of being, of thing, etc.’

 

and from this confusion of individual images – the mind – as it were – jumps to transcendental terms such as ‘being’ and ‘thing’ – which then become ‘catch all terms’ – for the confusion

 

we can ask how does this ‘jump’ from particular to general take place?

 

Spinoza has no answer here – no explanation

 

interesting too – that Spinoza does not include in his analysis here – his own principle transcendental terms – ‘attribute’ – ‘mode’ – ‘God’ –

 

for on this analysis – his ‘God’ – is just the metaphysical dumping ground for confusion

 

be that as it may – Spinoza does not here successfully distinguish particular and universal terms –

 

from a logical point of view – any term – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

so – on my view this universal / particular distinction has no basis in logic

 

I think it is a matter of propositional focus – and propositional utility –

 

I would suggest that – just as a matter of fact – as a working fact of human propositional activity – we operate with different propositional foci – a particular propositional focus and a general propositional focus –

 

and that we have these propositional foci – because they are useful – useful to us in negotiating of propositional reality

 

now my ‘explanation’ here – as with Spinoza’s explanation – is of course – a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘This can also be deduced from the fact that images are not always equally clear, and from other causes analogous to this which it is not necessary to explain here; and for the purpose which we wish to attain it suffices to consider one only. For all may be reduced to this, that these terms signify ideas extremely confused. And from similar causes have arisen these notions which are called universal or general, such as man, dog horse, etc. I mean so many images arise in the human body. e.g., so many images of men are formed at the same time, that they overcome the power of imagining, not altogether indeed, but to such an extent that the mind cannot imagine small differences between individuals (e.g., colour, size, etc.) and their fixed number, and only that in which all agree in so far as the body is affected by them is distinctly imagined: for in that was the body most affected by each individual, and this the mind expresses by the name of man, and predicates concerning an infinite number of individuals.’

 

‘images’ – are proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

we are not dealing with confusion – what we deal with is uncertainty

 

and it is not that ‘so many images of men are formed at the same time… that the mind cannot imagine small differences between individuals… and their fixed number’

 

we do not put ‘so many’ proposals – at the same time

 

what happens is – a proposal is put – and it is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty is explored-

 

it is in the exploration of propositional uncertainty – that other proposals are put – alternative proposals are put – ‘small differences’ – are proposed – ‘number’ – is calculated

 

‘for in that was the body most affected by each individual, and this the mind expresses by the name of man, and predicates concerning an infinite number of individuals.’

 

‘an infinite number of individuals’?

 

if by ‘number’ – you mean a sign system for calculating / counting – then an ‘infinite number’ – represents a propositional action that by definition cannot be completed – effectively cannot be actually calculated – cannot be counted –

 

in that sense there is no ‘infinite number’ –

 

it is theoretically possible to calculate the number of men – existing – and even – those who have existed –

 

and whatever the number is – it is not this so called ‘infinite number’

 

as to – the proposal ‘man’ –

 

just what it represents – what it means – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘For as we have said, it cannot imagine a fixed number of individuals. But it must be noted that these notions are not formed by all in the same manner, but vary with each individual according to the variation of the thing by which the body was most often affected, and which the mind imagines or remembers the most easily. For example those who have most admired men for their stature, by the name of man will understand an animal of erect stature; those who are wont to regard men in another way will form another common image of men, namely a laughing animal, or a featherless biped animal, a reasoning animal, and each one will form concerning the other things universal images of things according to the disposition of his body. Wherefore it is not surprising that so many controversies should have arisen among philosopher who wish to explain things of nature merely by images of things.’

 

‘For as we have said, it cannot imagine a fixed number of individuals.’

 

well – it can be a fixed number – it has to be a ‘fixed number’ – if it is a number at all

 

‘But it must be noted that these notions are not formed by all in the same manner, but vary with each individual according to the variation of the thing by which the body was most often affected, and which the mind imagines or remembers the most easily.’

 

in saying this – Spinoza is effectively recognizing ‘these notions’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

 

‘For example those who have most admired men for their stature, by the name of man will understand an animal of erect stature; those who are wont to regard men in another way will form another common image of men, namely a laughing animal, or a featherless biped animal, a reasoning animal, and each one will form concerning the other things universal images of things according to the disposition of his body.’

 

yes – the term ‘man’ the proposal ‘man’ – the definition of man – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Note II. – From all that has been said above it is now clearly apparent that we perceive many things and form universal notions, first, from individual things represented to our intellect mutilated, confused, and without order (Coroll. Prop. 29, Part II), and therefore we are wont to call such perceptions knowledge from vague or casual experience (cognitio ab experientia vaga); second from signs, e.g., from the fact that we remember certain things through having read or heard certain words and from certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine things (Note, Prop. 18, Part II.) Both these ways of regarding things I shall call hereafter knowledge of the first kind (cognitio primi generis), opinion (opinio), or imagination (imaginatio). Third, from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (Coroll., Prop. 38, Coroll. and Prop. 39 and Prop, 40, Part II.). And I shall call this reason (ratio) and knowledge of the second kind (cognitio secondi generis). Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is a third, as I shall show in what follows, which we shall call intuition (scientia intuitiva). Now this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I shall illustrate these by one example. Let three numbers be given to find the fourth, which is in the same proportion to the third as the second is to the first.  Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first: either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from the school master without any proof, or because they have often tried it with very small numbers, or by conviction of the proof of Prop. 19, Book VII., of Euclid’s elements, namely the common property of proportional. But in very small numbers there is no need of this, for when the numbers 1, 2, 3, are given, who is there who could not see the fourth proportional is 6? and this is much clearer because we conclude the fourth number from the same ratio which intuitively we see the first bears to the second.

 

‘From all that has been said above it is now clearly apparent that we perceive many things and form universal notions, first, from individual things represented to our intellect mutilated, confused, and without order (Coroll. Prop. 29, Part II), and therefore we are wont to call such perceptions knowledge from vague or casual experience (cognitio ab experientia vaga); second from signs, e.g., from the fact that we remember certain things through having read or heard certain words and from certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine things (Note, Prop. 18, Part II.)’

 

our world – is propositional – we propose our reality

 

‘individual things’ – are proposals – ‘universal notions’ – are proposals – ‘signs’ are proposals

 

as to the nature – basis – origin – explanation – of proposal – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Both these ways of regarding things I shall call hereafter knowledge of the first kind (cognitio primi generis), opinion (opinio), or imagination (imaginatio). Third, from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (Coroll., Prop. 38, Coroll. and Prop. 39 and Prop, 40, Part II.). And I shall call this reason (ratio) and knowledge of the second kind (cognitio secondi generis). Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is a third, as I shall show in what follows, which we shall call intuition (scientia intuitiva).’

 

there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge – knowledge – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

with Spinoza’s first and second kinds of knowledge – we have a categorization of propositional knowledge

 

such propositional categorization – might be a useful way of organizing propositional activity

 

however any such categorization – is open to question

 

‘Now this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I shall illustrate these by one example. Let three numbers be given to find the fourth, which is in the same proportion to the third as the second is to the first.  Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first: either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from the school master without any proof, or because they have often tried it with very small numbers, or by conviction of the proof of Prop. 19, Book VII., of Euclid’s elements, namely the common property of proportionals. But in very small numbers there is no need of this, for when the numbers 1, 2, 3, are given, who is there who could not see the fourth proportional is 6? and this is much clearer because we conclude the fourth number from the same ratio which intuitively we see the first bears to the second.’

 

there are two modes of propositional action –

 

firstly – the critical mode – in which propositions are put to question – put to doubt and their uncertainty explored –

 

and secondly – the game mode – where the propositional action is rule-governed

 

in a rule governed propositional action – the rule(s) are not put to question – the rules are followed

 

to play the game you play in accordance with the rules –

 

if you don’t play in accordance with the rules – there is no game

 

mathematics – mathematical calculation – is a rule-governed propositional action –

 

mathematics is a rule-governed game –

 

if you play this game – you play in accordance with its rules

 

in the example given here by Spinoza of a numbers game – the rule is that the fourth number is in the same proportion to the third as the second is to the first –

 

you find the fourth number if you follow this rule

 

Euclid’s ‘proof’ – is simply a restatement of the rule – namely ‘the common property of proportionals’

 

there is no intuition here – there is only an understanding of the rule – and action in accordance with the rule

 

Spinoza’s third kind of ‘knowledge’ – is a propositional game –

 

his – ‘adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ – is a propositional game

 

Spinoza’s ‘adequate idea’ – is a propositional game

 

all you ‘know’ when you ‘know’ a game – is the play in accordance with its rules –

 

if we are going to talk in terms of ‘highest’ and ‘lowest’ – this kind of ‘knowledge’ is not the ‘highest’ form of knowledge – it is – if anything – the very lowest –

 

for it is propositional action without question – without doubt – and without the exploration of uncertainty –

 

and as such is not in fact knowledge – rather it is best described as play –

 

it is not knowing – it is playing

 

nevertheless – play is a principal mode of human action –

 

I suspect that we play games and do enjoy playing games simply because they provide us with relief from the business of knowledge – from critical propositional activity –

 

and it should be noted too – that we make games because they provide useful models for organizing propositional action –

 

and in this respect – the game of games – is mathematics

 

human beings make games – human beings play games –

 

God does not make games – God does not play games – God is not a game –

 

God is the unknown

 

 

PROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity; knowledge of the second and third kind is necessarily true.

 

 

Proof. – We said in the preceding note that all those ideas which are inadequate and confused appertain to knowledge of the first kind: and therefore (Prop. 35, Part II) this knowledge is the only cause of falsity. Then as for knowledge of the second and third kinds, we said that those ideas which are adequate appertain to it; therefore (Prop. 34, Part II.) it is necessarily true, Q.e.d.

 

 

knowledge is proposal –

 

and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

truth and falsity are not properties of a proposition –

 

truth and falsity are propositional responses to a subject proposal / proposition

 

you might say a ‘truth response’ – is a positive response – and a ‘falsity response’ – a negative response

 

and as to – the nature of these responses – how they are to be accounted for – how they are to be explained – how they are to be further described 

 

these matters are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

 

a proposal / proposition is true – if assented to – false if dissented from

 

I take the view that we assent to a proposition – if we believe we can proceed with it

 

and that we dissent from a proposition if our assessment is that it has no actionable value

 

any proposed affirmation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and any proposed denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

we proceed – or not – in uncertainty

 

there is no necessity in propositional activity –

 

propositional activity – in whatever form it takes – is pure contingency

 

against a standard of certainty – no proposal – no proposition – is ‘adequate’

 

if adequacy equates to uncertainty – than any proposal / proposition – held open to question – is ‘adequate’

 

however – once it is understood that logically speaking any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

we can ask – what logical value does this adequate / inadequate distinction have?

 

 

PROP. XLII. Knowledge if the second kind and third kinds and not of the first kind teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.

 

 

there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any organization of proposals – i.e. – propositions dealing with opinion – propositions dealing with common notions – and intuitive propositions – may have a use –

 

however – such a categorization does not bear on the issue of truth and falsity – or the logical status of any proposition

 

‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ – are not properties of propositions – however they are organized or categorized

 

there are no true or false propositions

 

truth and falsity are dispositional responses to a proposal / proposition

 

what is termed a ‘true proposition’ – is that proposition that I am – for whatever reason disposed to endorse or affirm

 

and this propositional response – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what is termed a ‘false proposition’ – is that proposition I am – for whatever reason disposed to reject or deny

 

and this propositional response is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we can respond positively – or negatively to any proposal – any proposition – however it is categorized

 

where there is a positive response – the proposition will be entertained – and most likely proceeded with

 

where a negative response – the proposition will not be entertained – or proceeded with

 

any propositional response is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

so – it is quite possible that what is regarded as a true proposition under certain circumstances – will be viewed as false in a change of circumstance –

 

and a proposition regarded as false in certain circumstances – may well be endorsed in a different propositional context

 

whatever the propositional response – and whenever the propositional response – that response – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ – are markers of uncertainty

 

 

Proof. – This proposition is clear of itself. For he who would distinguish the true idea from the false must have an adequate idea of what is true and false, that is (Note 2, Prop. 40 Part II.) must know the true and false by the second and third kinds of knowledge.

 

 

the proposition may well be ‘clear’ – but it is not beyond question – beyond doubt – and not certain

 

any ‘idea’ – that is any proposal – regarding ‘what is true and false’ – cannot be determined a priori

 

what is ‘true and false’ – is an empirical matter –

 

you have to see how a proposition is responded to – to see if it is held to be true or false –

 

that is see if it is affirmed or denied

 

propositions of the ‘second and third kinds of knowledge’ – that is proposals that put forward ‘common notions’ – and propositions that are proposed as ‘intuitive’ – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

a so called ‘adequate idea’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain

 

 

PROP. XLIII. He who has a true idea, knows at the same time that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt concerning the truth of the thing.

 

 

if you give your assent to proposal – you know you have assented to it –

 

if you affirm a proposal – you know you affirm it

 

any proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any proposal of assent – or dissent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – A true idea in us is that which is adequate in God (Coroll., Prop. 11) in so far as he is explained through the nature of the human mind. let us suppose, them, that there is in God, in so far as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, an adequate idea A. The idea of this idea must necessarily be granted in God, and it refers to God in the same manner as the idea A (Prop. 20, Part II, whose proof is universal in its application). But the idea A is supposed to refer to God in so far as he is explained through the nature of the human mind: therefore also the idea A must refer to God in the same manner, that is (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the same mind as the adequate idea A: and therefore he who has an adequate idea or (Prop. 34, Part II) who knows a thing truly must at the same time have an adequate idea of his knowledge or a true knowledge, that is (as is self-evident), he must at the same time be certain. Q.e.d.

 

 

with this ‘idea of the idea’ – what is being proposed here – is that the idea is an idea in God – and therefore ‘adequate’

 

now if the idea is adequate – why the ‘idea of the idea’?

 

why not just the idea is adequate – in God – and therefore in man?

 

an ‘idea of an idea’ – is a ‘proposal of a proposal’ –

 

the propositional act – is not duplicated – it stands on its own

 

this ‘idea of an idea’ makes no sense – and for Spinoza – I think – clogs up the works – with rhetoric

 

does Spinoza want to say that ‘adequacy’ equates to uncertainty?

 

quite clearly not – for he concludes here that ‘true knowledge … must at the same time be certain’

 

knowledge – is anything but certain

 

and – ‘he who has a true idea’ – is he who has affirmed a proposal – and obviously knows he has affirmed it –

 

he also knows that the proposal he has affirmed – is open to question

 

and he knows his proposal of affirmation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

knowledge is proposal –

 

and any proposal / knowledge – is uncertain

 

 

Note. – In the note of Prop. 21 of this part I explained what was the idea of an idea, but it must be noted that the foregoing proposition is sufficiently manifest of itself. For no on who has a true idea can be ignorant of the fact that a true idea involves the greatest certainty. For to have a true idea means nothing else than to know something perfectly or best; nor can one doubt of this unless he thinks that an idea is something mute like a picture on a painting canvas and not a mode of thinking, namely understanding itself. And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything unless he first understands the thing itself? I mean, who can know that he is certain of anything unless he be first certain of that thing? What then can be more clear or more certain than a true idea to be a standard of truth? Clearly, just as light shows itself and darkness also, so truth is a standard of itself and falsity. And thus I think I have sufficiently answered these questions: namely, that if a true idea, in so far as it is said only to agree with its ideal, be distinguished from a false idea, then it will have no more reality or perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished by their intrinsic names) and consequently not even a man who has a true idea has any advantage over one who only has false one. Then how does it come to pass that men have false ideas? And again how can any one be certain that he has ideas which agree with their ideals? thus I think I have answered these questions. For as to the difference between a true idea and a false idea, it can be seen in Prop, 35 of this part, that one bears the same relation to the other as being bears to non-being: the causes or sources of falsity I have most clearly shown in Prop, 19 to 35, with the note on that proposition. And from these it is also apparent what is the distinction between a man who has a true idea and one who has false ideas, as to what refers to the last question, namely, in what way can a man know that he has an idea which agrees with its ideal. I have shown more than sufficiently well that it arises from this alone, that he has an

idea which agrees with its ideal, or that truth is its own standard. add to these that the mind, in so far as it truly perceives a thing, is a part of the infinite intellect of God (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II): and therefore it is as necessary that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are true as it is that those of God are true.

 

‘In the note of Prop. 21 of this part I explained what was the idea of an idea, but it must be noted that the foregoing proposition is sufficiently manifest of itself.  For no on who has a true idea can be ignorant of the fact that a true idea involves the greatest certainty.’

 

yes – the ‘foregoing proposition is sufficiently manifest of itself’ – and this notion of ’idea of an idea’ – only confuses the matter with unnecessary duplication

 

we don’t propose a ‘proposal of a proposal’ – we just put the proposal

 

and as for ‘knowing’ – ‘with the greatest certainty’ – this is just rhetoric –

 

rhetoric designed to promote the absurd epistemology of certainty

 

 ‘And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything unless he first understands the thing itself? I mean, who can know that he is certain of anything unless he be first certain of that thing? What then can be more clear or more certain than a true idea to be a standard of truth?’

 

what an argument!

 

‘understanding the thing itself’ – just is to recognise that the ‘thing’ / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘a true idea to be the standard of truth’ –

 

you’ve got to be kidding –

 

a circular argument – if ever there was one

 

the ‘standard of truth’ – is whatever grounds are proposed by a propositional actor for the affirmation of a proposition –

 

and that ‘standard’ of course – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and anyone – of any intelligence will be aware of this – when they affirm (or dissent from) a proposition

 

truth is a matter of doubt –

 

truth is uncertain

 

‘that if a true idea, in so far as it is said only to agree with its ideal, be distinguished from a false idea, then it will have no more reality or perfection than a false one (since they are distinguished by their intrinsic names) and consequently not even a man who has a true idea has any advantage over one who only has false one.’

 

is there any advantage in affirming a proposition – as against denying it?

 

prime facie – no

 

affirmed or denied – the proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and how is ‘advantage’ to be determined?

 

surely – a matter – open to question

 

‘Then how does it come to pass that men have false ideas? And again how can anyone be certain that he has ideas which agree with their ideals?’

 

well – it is not that someone ‘has false ideas’ –

 

one’s ideas – that is one’s proposals / propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

one’s ideas are uncertain

 

as to why someone denies a proposition – well that is effectively an empirical matter – ask them

 

how can anyone ‘be certain that he has ideas that agree with their ideal’?

 

the short answer is – from a logical point of view – one cannot be certain

 

certainty – is illogical –

 

a claim of certainty is a stand for prejudice and ignorance

 

one’s ‘idea’ is what one proposes

 

and that proposed is the ‘ideal’

 

there is no logical distinction between idea and ideal

 

all that we operate with is the proposal –

 

open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘For as to the difference between a true idea and a false idea, it can be seen in Prop, 35 of this part, that one bears the same relation to the other as being bears to non-being:’

 

a proposal / proposition that is denied – is not a non-existent proposition –

 

to be denied – it has to exist

 

it might not – under the circumstances – be put to use –

 

however – the proposition does not cease to exist because it has been denied

 

‘and therefore it is as necessary that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are true as it is that those of God are true.’

 

by all means put forward ‘clear and distinct ideas’ –

 

but any idea – so called – ‘clear and distinct’ – or – indeed unclear and indistinct – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no idea – clear – distinct – or confused

 

 

PROP. XLIV. It is not the nature of reason to regard things as contingent but necessary.

 

 

it is the nature of reason to critically evaluate propositions / propositional actions–

 

to put proposals / propositional actions – to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty

 

which is to say any proposal in this regard – will be – from a logical point of view – uncertain – that is – contingent

 

‘things’ are proposals – 

 

any proposal is open to question

 

that which is ‘necessary’ – can only be that which is ‘protected’ from criticism

 

‘necessity’ – has no logical basis – it is at best – a rhetorical notion – at worst – plain dumb ignorance

 

 

Proof. – It is the nature of reason to perceive things truly (Prop. 41, Part II), namely (Ax 6, Part I.), as they are in themselves, that is (Prop. 29, Part I.), not as contingent but necessary.

 

 

reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

a proposal – a proposition is true – if assented to – false if dissented from

 

any proposal of assent or dissent – is open to question

 

a ‘thing’ – is a proposal –

 

a proposal can be considered independently of a propositional context – or it can be considered in a propositional context –

 

however considered – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no necessity in propositional reality

 

propositional reality – is uncertain – is contingent

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that it depends solely on the imagination that we consider things whether in respect to the past or future as contingent.

 

 

propositions can be placed in context

 

past – present – future – are propositional contexts –

 

however – a proposition can also be considered – as it were – in itself – without context

 

whether considered in a context or not – a proposition is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and whether a proposition is described as ‘imaginary’ – or not –

 

the proposition is – logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

all propositions are uncertain – all propositions are contingencies

 

 

Note. – In what manner this comes about I shall explain in a few words. we have shown above (Prop. 17, Part II., and its Coroll.) that the mind imagines things as present always to itself, though they may not exist, unless causes arose which cut off their present existence. Then (Prop. 18, Part II) we showed that if the human body has once been affected at the same time by two external bodies, whenever the mind subsequently recalled one of them it would immediately recall the other, that is, it would regard both as present to itself unless causes arose which cut off their present existence. Moreover, no one doubts but that we imagine time from the very fact that we imagine some bodies to be moved slower or faster than others, or equally fast. Let us then suppose a boy who yesterday first of all saw Peter in the morning, at mid-day Paul, and in the evening Simon, and to-day again saw Peter in the evening. From Prop. 18 this part it is clear that as soon as he sees the morning light he will imagine the sun to run the same course as it did the day before, and will imagine a whole day: with the morning he will imagine Peter, with noon Paul, and with the evening Simon; that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon with relation to future time: and, on the other hand, if in the evening hour he sees Simon, he will refer Peter and Paul to past time by imagining them at the same time as he does past time, and the more often he sees them in this order the more certain will his imaginings be. But if at any time it comes to pass that instead of Simon he sees James, then the next morning he will imagine with the evening time now Simon and now James, but not both at once, for he is not supposed to have seen the two at the same time in the evening, but one of them. And so his imaginings will waver, and with the future evening time he

will imagine now this one and now that one, that is, he will regard them in the future

neither as certain, but both as contingent. And this wavering of the imagination will be the same if the imagination be of things which we regard in the same manner with reference to the past or present time, and consequently we imagine things as contingent whether they relate to present, past, or future time.

 

‘In what manner this comes about I shall explain in a few words. we have shown above (Prop. 17, Part II., and its Coroll.) that the mind imagines things as present always to itself, though they may not exist, unless causes arose which cut off their present existence.’

 

‘the mind imagines things as present to itself’ –

 

this is to say – proposals / propositions – are put

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

that which is proposed – is that which exists –

 

we propose existence –

 

any proposal – any proposed ‘existence’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

 

any proposal is open to further proposal – is open to further description

 

as for ‘the mind imagines’ –

 

this is to say a proposal is put – and further described as ‘imaginary’

 

that a ‘present existence’ is ‘cut off’ – is to say – the proposal is dropped from consideration

 

‘Then (Prop. 18, Part II) we showed that if the human body has once been affected at the same time by two external bodies, whenever the mind subsequently recalled one of them it would immediately recall the other, that is, it would regard both as present to itself unless causes arose which cut off their present existence.’

 

the propositional actor is affected by proposals / propositions put

 

an external body is a proposal

 

the propositional actor is not affected by two proposals / propositions ‘at the same time’

 

one proposal will follow another in time – one affect will follow another

 

proposals are put – whether ‘recalled’ or not – and what their relation to other proposals is – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

a proposals existence is ‘cut off’ – if it is dropped from consideration

 

‘Moreover, no one doubts but that we imagine time from the very fact that we imagine some bodies to be moved slower or faster than others, or equally fast.’

 

‘time’ – here – is a propositional game – a measurement game –

 

we can play this game to distinguish propositions and to calculate their relations –

 

‘Let us then suppose a boy who yesterday first of all saw Peter in the morning, at mid-day Paul, and in the evening Simon, and to-day again saw Peter in the evening. From Prop. 18 this part it is clear that as soon as he sees the morning light he will imagine the sun to run the same course as it did the day before, and will imagine a whole day: with the morning he will imagine Peter, with noon Paul, and with the evening Simon; that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon with relation to future time: and, on the other hand, if in the evening hour he sees Simon, he will refer Peter and Paul to past time by imagining them at the same time as he does past time, and the more often he sees them in this order the more certain will his imaginings be.’

 

when the boy sees the morning light – he may propose ‘Peter’ – ‘Paul’ – ‘Simon’ – as he did previously –

 

but there is no necessity here –

 

if he does – it will be a coincidence –

 

and of course – when he sees the morning sun – he may propose a whole different set of propositions

 

the real point here – is that we don’t know – what propositional reality – the morning light will bring –

 

the matter is open to question – is uncertain

 

past – present – and future – are useful propositional categories – that we employ to order to organise our proposals – to order our propositional life

 

his ‘seeing them’ in this order – is proposing them in this order –

 

proposing and re-proposing – does not amount to certainty

 

it is only propositional duplication

 

‘But if at any time it comes to pass that instead of Simon he sees James, then the next morning he will imagine with the evening time now Simon and now James, but not both at once, for he is not supposed to have seen the two at the same time in the evening, but one of them.’

 

again – he may imagine / propose the evening time with Simon and now James – or he may not –

 

the matter is not predictable – it is uncertain

 

i.e. – out of the blue – for some reason – Andrew might drop in –

 

or perhaps – no one is proposed – no one is there – and he just contemplates / proposes the stars

 

Spinoza’s theory of imagination here – it seems – lacks imagination

 

‘And so his imaginings will waver, and with the future evening time he will imagine now this one and now that one, that is, he will regard them in the future neither as certain, but both as contingent. And this wavering of the imagination will be the same if the imagination be of things which we regard in the same manner with reference to the past or present time, and consequently we imagine things as contingent whether they relate to present, past, or future time.’

 

it is not that ‘imaginings will waver’ – rather that different proposals can be entertained – simply because propositional reality – is uncertain

 

a proposal – a proposition – in any context – however described – however classified – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Corollary II. – It is the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis specie).

 

 

regardless of any proposed context in which it is placed – or any proposed circumstance in which it is put – a proposition stands open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – It is the nature of reason to regard things not as contingent, but as necessary (prev. Prop.). It perceives this necessity of things (Prop. 41. Part II.) truly, that is Ax. 6, Part I.). as it is in itself. But (Prop. 16, Part I.) this necessity of things is the necessity itself of the eternal nature of God. Therefore it is the nature of reason to regard things under this species of eternity. Add to this that the bases of reason are notions (Prop. 38, Part II.) which explain these things which are common to all, and which (Prop. 37, Part II.) explain the essence of no individual thing: and which therefore must be conceived without any relation of time, under a certain species of eternity. Q.e.d.

 

‘things’ are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘things’ – are uncertain – not necessary

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

‘eternity’ – is a term for the absence of temporal context –

 

the logic of a proposal / proposition – is that it can be assessed – that is – put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored – in the absence of any context

 

reason – is the critical activity – of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

with regard to ‘things common to all’ –

 

any proposal as to what is common to all – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

PROP. XLV. Every idea of every body or individual thing actually existing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

 

 

an idea – is a proposal –

 

what exists is what is proposed – by a propositional actor

 

and what is proposed / exists – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

existence is uncertain

 

logically speaking – there is no ‘propositional necessity’ – there is only – propositional uncertainty

 

as to ‘the eternal and infinite essence of God’ –

 

‘eternity’ – is the absence of temporal context –

 

an ‘infinite essence’ – is an undefined essence –

 

and an undefined essence – is meaningless

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

we propose against the unknown – to make known –

 

we put proposals / ideas – to dispel the unknown

 

and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The idea of an individual thing existing necessarily involves the essence of that thing and its existence (Coroll., Prop. 8. Part II). But individual things (Prop. 15. Part I) cannot be conceived without God: and foreasmuch as (Prop.6. Part II) they have God for a cause in so far as he is considered under the attribute, of which these things are modes, their ideas must necessarily (Ax. 4, Part I) involve the conception of their attribute, that is (Def. 6, Part I.) they must involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.e.d.

 

 

the idea of an individual thing existing – is the proposal of an individual thing

 

as to its essence –

 

any proposed ‘essence’ – is a proposed description – and any description – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

cannot be conceived without God?

 

God is a name for the unknown – we propose in response to the unknown

 

as to the ‘cause’ of any proposal –

 

the propositional actor is the cause of any proposal / propositional action

 

an ‘attribute’ is a description – a proposed description of a thing proposed

 

an ‘attribute’ – is open to question

 

‘infinite essence of God’ –

 

‘essence’ – is a proposed description –

 

an ‘infinite description’ – would be a description – that has no end –

 

any description – if it is to be formed – must come to an end – otherwise there is no description

 

so – there cannot be an infinite description

 

however – you may well say that the unknown – is open to endless proposal – endless possible description

 

 

Note. – By existence I do not mean here duration, that is existence in so far as it is conceived abstractly and as a certain form of quantity. I speak of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to individual things by reason of the fact that they follow from the eternal necessity of the nature of God, infinite in number and in infinite ways (vide Prop. 16, Part I). I speak, I say, of the very existence of things in so far as they are in God. For although each one is determined by another individual thing for existing in a certain manner, yet the force wherewith each of them persists in existing follows form the eternal necessity of the nature of God. Concerning which see Coroll., Prop. 24, Part I.

 

 

what exists is what is proposed –

 

a proposition exists – for as long as it is entertained –

 

a proposal is not an abstraction – a proposal is an action

 

a proposal is not a ‘quantity’ –

 

a ‘quantity’ – is that which can be measured –

 

‘measurement’ – is a rule-governed propositional game

 

a propositional game is rule governed –

 

as played – it is not open to question – open to doubt – or uncertain

 

a proposal is not rule-governed – a proposal is not a game –

 

a proposal – is an action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

nothing ‘follows from’ the unknown

 

nothing is in the unknown

 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal –

 

a proposal is not determined by another proposal

 

propositional action is undetermined –

 

proposals do not ‘persist’ – proposals are put – and as put – exist

 

the existence of a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect.

 

 

knowledge is proposal –

 

any proposal / knowledge – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘adequate’ – is meant ‘certain’ – there is no ‘adequate’ knowledge

 

as for ‘perfect’ – this is just a synonym for ‘certain’ –

 

‘perfect’ – has no logical value – its only value is rhetorical

                                                                                 

‘the eternal and infinite essence of God’ – is a proposal –

 

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no properties

 

‘the eternal’ – is the absence of temporal reference –

 

 

Proof. – The proof of the previous proposition is of universal application, and whether the thing be considered as a part or a whole, its idea, whether considered as a part or a whole (prev. Prop.) involves the eternal and infinite essence of God. Wherefore that which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, and equally in part as in whole (Prop. 38. Part II.) this knowledge will be adequate.

 

 

a ‘thing’ – is a proposal –

 

an ‘idea’ – is a proposal –

 

whether a proposal is considered as a part or a whole –

 

it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘God is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no properties

 

logically speaking - what is common to all – to all proposals – is that proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

knowledge is proposal –

 

knowledge is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

 

 

the ‘human mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘knowledge’ – is proposal – is propositional action

 

all knowledge / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

from a logical point of view ‘adequate knowledge’ is – ‘uncertain knowledge’

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no essence

 

the unknown has no characteristics

 

 

Proof. – The human mind has ideas (Prop. 22, Part II.) from which (Prop. 23, Part II.) it perceives itself and its bodies (Prop. 19, Part II.) and (Coroll, Prop. 16 and 17, Part II.) external bodies as actually existing; and therefore (Prop. 45 and46, Part II.) it has adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘ideas’ are proposals

 

propositional actors have ideas – that is put proposals

 

a proposal – is knowledge

 

the propositional actor knows he / she is putting a proposal

 

what exists is what is proposed

 

an ‘external body’ – is a proposal

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no essence

 

 

Note. – Hence we see that the infinite essence of God and his eternity are known to all. But as all things are in God, and through him are conceived, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge many things which we may adequately know and therefore form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in Note 2, Prop, 40, Part II., and of the excellence and use of which we shall occasion \to speak in the fifth part. But that men have knowledge not so clear of God as they have of common notions arises from the fact that they cannot imagine God as they do bodies, and that they affix the name of God to images of things which they are accustomed to see, and this men can scarcely avoid, for they are continually affected by external bodies. Now many errors consist of this alone, that we do not apply names rightly to things. For when one says that lines which are drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference are unequal, he means at least at the time, something different by circle than mathematicians. Thus when men make mistakes in calculation they have different numbers in their heads than those on paper. Wherefore if you could see their minds they do not err; they seem to err, however, because we think they have the same numbers in their minds as on the paper. If this were not so we should not believe that they made mistakes any more than I thought a man in error whom I heard the other day shouting that his hall had flown into his neighbour’s chicken, for his mind seemed sufficiently clear on the subject. And hence have arisen very many controversies, for men either do not explain their own minds, or do not rightly interpret the minds of others. For, in truth, while they flatly contradict themselves, they think now one thing, now another, so that there may not be found in them the errors and absurdities which they find in others.

 

 

‘Hence we see that the infinite essence of God and his eternity are known to all.’

 

nothing ‘follows’ here –

 

what we can say is that ‘infinite essence’ – amounts to ‘undefined essence’ – which is to say – no essence

 

and ‘eternity’ – is a term for the absence of temporal context –

 

as to what is ‘known to all’ – this is a ridiculous notion

 

what is known is what is proposed

 

‘known to all’ – would be that which is proposed by all –

 

it is an empirical question – as to what people propose –

 

and the idea that they all put the one proposition – is absurd

 

 

‘But as all things are in God, and through him are conceived, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge many things which we may adequately know and therefore form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in Note 2, Prop, 40, Part II., and of the excellence and use of which we shall occasion \to speak in the fifth part.’

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

nothing follows from the unknown – and there can be no deductions from the unknown –

 

any knowledge – any ‘kind’ of knowledge – is proposal –

 

and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘adequate’ – is meant ‘uncertain’

 

then all knowledge is ‘adequate’

 

‘But that men have knowledge not so clear of God as they have of common notions arises from the fact that they cannot imagine God as they do bodies, and that they affix the name of God to images of things which they are accustomed to see, and this men can scarcely avoid, for they are continually affected by external bodies.’

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown is the absence of image

 

‘Now many errors consist of this alone, that we do not apply names rightly to things. For when one says that lines which are drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference are unequal, he means at least at the time, something different by circle than mathematicians’

 

any name – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no ‘right’ application of any proposal

 

mathematics is a rule-governed propositional game –

 

if you don’t play the game in accordance with its rules – you don’t play the game – there is no game

 

anyone who says that lines drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference are unequal – doesn’t understand the rules of the circle game –

 

they just don’t know how to play the game

 

‘Thus when men make mistakes in calculation they have different numbers in their heads than those on paper. Wherefore if you could see their minds they do not err; they seem to err, however, because we think they have the same numbers in their minds as on the paper. If this were not so we should not believe that they made

mistakes any more than I thought a man in error whom I heard the other day shouting that his hall had flown into his neighbour’s chicken, for his mind seemed sufficiently clear on the subject.’

 

calculation is a rule-governed propositional game –

 

you either play according to the rules of this game – or you don’t

 

if you don’t follow the rules – you don’t calculate

 

as to the man shouting in the hall etc. –

 

he is not playing a rule-governed propositional game –

 

he is putting a proposal –

 

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘And hence have arisen very many controversies, for men either do not explain their own minds, or do not rightly interpret the minds of others. For, in truth, while they flatly contradict themselves, they think now one thing, now another, so that there may not be found in them the errors and absurdities which they find in others.’

 

well – I think men can and do explain their own proposals – and of course they interpret the proposals of others –

 

the hard logical reality is that my explanations of my proposals – as with my interpretations of the proposals of others – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we do not deal with ‘errors’ – we deal with uncertainties

 

 

PROP. XLVIII. There is in no mind absolute or free will. but the mind is determined for willing this or that by a cause which is determined in its turn by another cause, and this one again by another and so on to infinity.

 

 

Proof. – The mind is a fixed and determined mode of thinking (Prop. 11. Part II.), and therefore (Coroll. 2. Prop. 17, Part I.) cannot be the free cause of its actions, or it cannot have the absolute faculty of willing and unwilling: but for willing this or that it must be determined (Prop, 28, Part I.) by a cause which is determined (prop. 28, Part I.) by a cause which is determined by another, and this again by another, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

this causal argument is a self-defeating – it collapses on itself –

 

for the ‘end result’ – infinity – means there is no cause –

 

and all you have with the infinity argument is mindless propositional repetition

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –

 

mindless propositional repetition is not propositional action –

 

it’s wheels spinning in a gravel road’

 

‘will’ – is a name for propositional action

 

our freedom consists in our capacity for critical evaluation –

 

the propositional actor is free to the extent that he / she puts his / her proposals / propositional actions to question – to doubt – and to the extent propositional uncertainty is explored

 

propositional action is only fixed – if it is not critically evaluated

 

 

Note. –  In the same manner it may be shown that there cannot be found in the mind an absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. Whence it follows that these and such like faculties are either entirely fictitious, or nothing else than metaphysical or general entities, which we are wont to form from individual things: therefore intellect or will have reference in the same manner to this or that idea, or to this or that volition as “stoneness” to this or that stone, or man to Peter and Paul. But the reason why men think themselves free I have explained in the appendix of Part I. But before I go any further, let this be noted, that I understand by will the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, and not the desire by which the mind takes a liking or an aversion to anything. Now after we have shown that these faculties are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from the individual things from which we formed them, we must then inquire whether these volitions are anything else than the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there can be found in the mind any affirmation or negation save that which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves, on which subject see the following proposition and Def.3. Part II., lest the thought of pictures should occur. For I do not understand by ideas, images which are formed at the back of the eye, if you will, in the centre of the brain, but conceptions of thought.

 

‘In the same manner it may be shown that there cannot be found in the mind an absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. Whence it follows that these and such like faculties are either entirely fictitious, or nothing else than metaphysical or general entities, which we are wont to form from individual things:’

 

understanding –

 

understanding rests in the critical evaluation of proposal / propositional action

 

desiring – loving etc – are different names of – different descriptions of –

propositional action

 

‘therefore intellect or will have reference in the same manner to this or that idea, or to this or that volition as “stoneness” to this or that stone, or man to Peter and Paul.’

 

‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘will’ is a name for propositional action propositional action

 

220.

 

an ‘idea’ – is a proposal / propositional action

 

‘stoneness’ – a description of the proposal ‘stone’

 

‘peter’ and ‘paul’ – names of propositional actors

 

‘But the reason why men think themselves free I have explained in the appendix of Part I. But before I go any further, let this be noted, that I understand by will the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, and not the desire by which the mind takes a liking or an aversion to anything.’

 

men are free –

 

we are free to question – free to doubt – free to explore propositional uncertainty

 

our freedom rest in propositional uncertainty

 

‘the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, and not the desire by which the mind takes a liking or an aversion to anything.’

 

a proposition is true if affirmed

 

 a proposition is false – if denied –

 

any proposal of affirmation – or denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and any proposed explanation of affirmation or denial – is open to question

 

here Spinoza gives the name ‘will’ – to proposed explanations of affirmation and denial – though he wants to exclude ‘liking’ and ‘aversion’ as explanations

 

‘liking’ and ‘aversion’ are just different names for affirmation and denial

 

the logical reality is that one can affirm or deny a proposition – for whatever reason

 

and any proposal of affirmation or denial is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

‘Now after we have shown that these faculties are general notions, which cannot be distinguished from the individual things from which we formed them, we must then inquire whether these volitions are anything else than the ideas of things.’

 

a question for Spinoza here –

 

if these general notions cannot be distinguished from individual things – then are they not just individual things?

 

on the face of it – this doesn’t make sense – for as a matter of fact we propose individual things – and we propose general notions –

 

that is – we make two different proposals and recognise the difference

 

are general ideas – ideas of things?

 

‘general ideas’ – are proposals – that function as organisational proposals

 

and they are – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘We must inquire, I say, whether there can be found in the mind any affirmation or negation save that which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves, on which subject see the following proposition and Def.3. Part II., lest the thought of pictures should occur. For I do not understand by ideas, images which are formed at the back of the eye, if you will, in the centre of the brain, but conceptions of thought.’

 

what we deal with logically speaking is proposals –

 

a proposal affirmed – is true – a proposal denied is false –

 

any proposal of affirmation or denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

yes – you can describe proposals as ‘ideas’ – but the description – as with any description – is just dressing for ‘proposal’

 

as to ‘pictures and images’ –

 

a ‘picture’ is a proposal – an ‘image’ – is a proposal –

 

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

proposals that can be affirmed – that can be denied –

 

a ‘conception of thought’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation save that which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves.

 

 

the mind is a name for propositional action

 

affirmation and negation – are the propositional actions –

 

a proposal can be assented to or dissent from – for whatever reason –

 

assent or dissent are propositional action put in relation to a subject proposal –

 

propositional actions of assent or dissent – as with the subject proposal – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘volition’ – is a name for propositional action

 

 

Proof. – There is not in the mind (prev. Prop.) an absolute faculty of willing and unwilling, but only individual volitions such as this or that affirmation and this or that negation. Let us conceive then the individual volition, namely the mode of thinking, whereby the mind affirms that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. The affirmation involves the conception or idea of the triangle, that is without the idea of the triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same when I say that A involves the conception of B. Then this affirmation (Ax. 3 Part II. cannot be without the idea of the triangle. Therefore this affirmation cannot exist or be conceived without the idea of the triangle. Moreover, this idea of the triangle must involve the same affirmation, namely that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore, vice versa also, this idea of the triangle cannot exist or be conceived without this affirmation: and therefore (Def. 2 Part II.) this affirmation appertains to the essence of the idea of the triangle, nor is anything else than that. And what we have said of this volition (for it was selected at random) can be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘Let us conceive then the individual volition, namely the mode of thinking, whereby the mind affirms that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. The affirmation involves the conception or idea of the triangle, that is without the idea of the triangle it cannot be conceived.’

 

Spinoza has this all wrong

 

firstly – there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode – and the game mode

 

in the critical mode proposals – propositions are put to question – put to doubt – and their uncertainty – explored

 

in the game made – we deal with rule governed constructions –

 

when you play a rule-governed propositional game – you do not put the rules of the game to question – to doubt – the rules as such are not uncertain

 

if you play the game – you play in accordance with the rules –

 

if you don’t play in accordance with the rules – there is no game

 

mathematics and geometry are rule governed propositional games

 

the triangle is a rule governed propositional game

 

that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles – is a calculation rule within the rule of the triangle

 

affirmation – or denial are propositional responses within the critical mode of propositional action

 

there is no affirmation or denial with respect to propositional games

 

a game is neither true – nor false – a game is played – or not played –

 

if played – played – in accordance with its rule

 

furthermore – in relation to the critical mode – the affirmation does not involve the conception of the proposal

 

the proposal is neither true nor false as put –

 

the proposal is open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

whether it is true or false – affirmed or denied – is a separate – distinct – propositional action

 

‘And what we have said of this volition (for it was selected at random) can be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea.’

 

this ‘volition’ – that is ‘such as this or that affirmation and this or that negation’ –

 

is a proposal of affirmation or negation

 

and this ‘volition’ is not relevant to propositional games –

 

however – in the critical context – what can be said of this ‘volition’ / proposal – can be said of any other ‘volition’ – namely that it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘that is without the idea of the triangle it cannot be conceived.’

 

the idea – is the conception of the triangle – that is the conception of a rule governed propositional game –

 

a game within the complex of games and rules that make up the game and rules of mathematics

 

 

Corollary. – Will and intellect are one and the same thing.

 

 

Proof. – Will and intellect are nothing but individual volitions and ideas (Prop. 48. Part II., and Note thereon). But an individual volition and idea (prev. Prop.,) are one and the same thing. Therefore will and intellect are one and the same thing. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘will’ and ‘intellect’ are different names for propositional action

 

 

[The following is a long note – I will write my commentary as we go through it – rather than at the end of it.]

 

Note. – We have thus removed the cause to which error is commonly attributed. For we have shown above that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in mutilated and confused ideas. Wherefore a false idea, in so far as it is false, does not involve certainty. Thus when we say a man acquiesces in what is false,

and that he has no doubts concerning it, we do not say that he is certain but merely that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false because there are no reasons which might cause his imagination to waver. On this subject, see Prop. 44 Part II. Thus although a man is supposed to adhere to what is false, yet we never say that he is certain. For by certainty we understand something positive (Prop. 43, Part II., and its Note), not a privation of doubt. By the privation of certainty we understand falsity. But for the further explanation of the preceding proposition there are several warnings yet to be made. Next, it remains for me to answer any objections which may be made to this our doctrine. And finally to remove any scruples I have though it worth while to point out some of the advantages of this doctrine: I say some, for they will be better understood from what we shall say in the fifth part.

 

 

‘For we have shown above that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in mutilated and confused ideas.’

 

‘falsity’ – as the ‘privation of knowledge’?

 

this argument shows that Spinoza has no grip on truth and falsity –

 

for if there is no knowledge – there is nothing that is true – nothing that is false

 

as to ‘mutilated and confused ideas’ –

 

‘mutilated’ – is over-doing it – and ‘confused’ – begs analysis

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal – a proposal – described as ‘idea’ – for whatever reason

 

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

the exploration of propositional uncertainty – may result in ‘confusion’ – but any so called ‘confusion’ – is a door to propositional exploration

 

‘Wherefore a false idea, in so far as it is false, does not involve certainty. Thus when we say a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts concerning it, we do not say that he is certain but merely that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false because there are no reasons which might cause his imagination to waver.’

 

‘Wherefore a false idea, in so far as it is false, does not involve certainty.’

 

a false idea / proposal – is a proposal that is denied –

 

any proposal of denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

if you dissent from a proposition – deny it – you do not ‘acquiesce’ – in it

you discount it

 

[Note continued]

 

I begin then with the first point, and warn readers to make an accurate distinction between idea, or a conception of the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. Then it is necessary to distinguish between ideas and words by which we

point out things. For these three, namely images, words and ideas, are by most people either entirely confused or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence they are entirely ignorant of the fact that too know this doctrine of the will is highly necessary both for philosophic speculation and for the wise ordering of life. Those who think that idea consist of images which are formed in us by the concourse of bodies, persuade themselves that those ideas of things like which we can form no image in the mind are not ideas, but fabrications which we invent by our own free will; they therefore regard ideas a lifeless pictures on a board, and preoccupied thus with this misconception they do not see that idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation. Then those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation that the idea involves, think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel. Anyone can easily rid himself of these misconceptions if he pays attention to the nature of thought which least involves the conception of extension; and therefore he will clearly understand that an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) does not consist in the image of anything nor in words. For the essence of words and images is constituted solely by bodily motions which least involve the conception of thought

 

‘I begin then with the first point, and warn readers to make an accurate distinction between idea, or a conception of the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. Then it is necessary to distinguish between ideas and words by which we point out things. For these three, namely images, words and ideas, are by most people either entirely confused or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence they are entirely ignorant of the fact that too know this doctrine of the will is highly necessary both for philosophic speculation and for the wise ordering of life.’

 

we propose – and we describe or characterize our proposals –

 

one such description / characterization is ‘idea’

 

‘a conception of the mind’ – is a further characterization of the proposal ‘idea’

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional activity

 

another description / characterization of a proposal is ‘image’

 

an image is a proposal

 

as to words – words are proposals

 

propositional reality – as a matter of fact – throws up different descriptions / characterizations of the proposal

 

these descriptions / characterizations have different uses – serve different propositions functions –

 

and in different propositional structures – i.e. – philosophic theories – they are given further precise and distinctive description and characterization

 

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

which means any description / characterization – is open to question –

 

and this remains the case regardless of how these different descriptions / characterizations are configured

 

‘Those who think that idea consist of images which are formed in us by the concourse of bodies, persuade themselves that those ideas of things like which we can form no image in the mind are not ideas, but fabrications which we invent by our own free will; they therefore regard ideas as lifeless pictures on a board, and preoccupied thus with this misconception they do not see that idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation.’

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal –

 

an ‘image’ is a proposal –

 

a proposal does not ‘involve’ affirmation or negation

 

affirmation and denial are not properties of proposals – of propositions

 

affirmation and denial are proposals – proposals put in relation to a subject proposal

 

a proposal can be affirmed – can be denied –

 

any proposal of affirmation or denial – like the subject proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

‘fabrications which we in invent by our own free will’ –

 

will simply be proposals we put – proposal open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘free will’ – here can only refer to the fact of putting proposals – of putting propositions –

 

and in so far as the basis or ground of this action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – it is – ‘free’

 

our freedom rests in propositional uncertainty

 

(Note continued)

 

These few warnings I think will suffice. I shall now pass of to the objections I mentioned.

 

The first of these is that they take it as an axiom that the will can be further extended than the intellect, and is therefore different from it. But the reason why they think the will can be further extended than the intellect is, they say, that they find that we do not need a greater faculty of assenting or of affirming and denying than we have now in order to assent to infinite things which we do not perceive, but that we need a greater faculty of understanding. The will is then thus distinguished from the intellect, that the latter is finite and the former infinite. The second objection to us is that experience seems to teach us nothing more clearly than that we can suspend judgment in order not to assent to things which we perceive: that this confirmed by the fact that

no one is said to be deceived in so far as he perceives anything, but in so far as he

assents or dissents to it. For example, he who feigns a winged horse does not thereby grant that there is such a thing as a winged horse, that is, he is not thereby deceived unless he admits at the same time that there is such a thing as a winged horse. Therefore experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that will, or the faculty of assenting, is free, and different from the faculty of understanding. The third objection is that one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another, that is, we do not seem to need more power to affirm what is true than to affirm what is false to be true. But we have seen that on idea contains more reality or perfection than another; for as some objects are more excellent than others, so are some ideas more perfect than others: and from this also may be inferred the difference between will and intellect. The fourth objection is: if man does not act from free will, what happens if he remains in equilibrium between incentives to action, like Buriden’s ass? Will he perish of hunger or thirst? If I admit that he will, I shall seem to have in my mind an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man: but if I deny it, he would then determine himself, and consequently would have the faculty of going and doing whatever he wished. Besides these, other objections may be raised; but as I am not obliged to make a demonstration of whatever anyone can dream, I shall take the trouble of answering these objections only, and with the greatest possible brevity.

As for the first point, I concede that the will can be further extended than the intellect, if by intellect they only understand clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will can be further extended than the perceptions or the faculty of conceiving.  Nor do I see how the faculty of conceiving should be called infinite before the faculty of feeling, for just as we can by that faculty of willing affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we by the faculty of feeling, feel or perceive an infinite number of bodies (one after the other). Then if they say that there are an infinite number of bodies which we cannot perceive, I retort that we cannot attain to that number by any manner of thought, and by any manner of thought, and consequently by any manner of willing; but if they say that God wished to bring it to pass that we should perceive these things, he would have to give us a greater faculty of perceiving but not a greater faculty of willing than he gave us. This the same as if they said that God wished to bring it to pass that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, that it would be necessary that that he should give us a greater intellect but not a more general idea of entity than he gave us before, in order to grasp such infinite entities. For we have shown that the will is a general being or idea whereby we explain all individual volitions. Since then they believe that this common or general idea of all volitions is a faculty, it is not to be wondered at if they say that that this faculty is extended beyond the limits of the intellect to infinity; for what is universal or general can be said alike of one, of many, and of infinite individuals. I answer the second objection by denying that we have free power to suspend judgment. For when we say that one suspends his judgment, we say nothing else than that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately. Therefore a suspension of judgment is in truth a perception and not a free will. To make this more clear, conceive a boy imagining a winged horse and perceiving nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse (Coroll., Prop. 17, Part II.), and the boy does not perceive anything that could take away from the horse its existence; he will necessarily regard the horse as present, nor will he have any doubts about its existence, although he may not be certain of it. We have daily experience of this in dreams, and I do not think that there is anyone who thinks that while he sleeps he has the free power of suspending judgment concerning what he dreams, and of bringing it to pass that he

should not dream what he dreams he sees; and yet it happens in dreams also that we

can suspend our judgments, namely when we dream that we dream. Further, I grant no one is deceived in so far as he perceives, that is, I grant that the imaginations of the mind considered in themselves involve no error (Note, Prop. 17, Part II.); but I deny that a man affirms nothing in so far as he perceives. For what else is it to perceive a winged horse than to affirm wings on a horse? For if the mind perceives nothing else save a winged horse, it will regard it as present to itself; nor will it have any reason for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissenting, unless the imagination of the of a winged horse be joined to an idea which removes existence from the horse, or unless he perceives that the idea of a winged horse that he has is inadequate, and then he will necessarily deny the existence of the said horse or necessarily doubt it. And thus I think I have also managed to answer the third objection, namely that the will is something general, which is predicated of all ideas, and which only signifies that which is common to all ideas, namely an affirmation whose adequate essence therefore, in so far as it is conceived abstractly, must be in each idea, and the same in all in this respect only; but not in so far as it is considered to constitute the idea’s essence: thus far individual affirmations differ one from the other equally as much as ideas. E.g., the affirmation that is involved by the idea of the circle differs from the idea of a triangle just as the idea of circle differs from the idea of triangle. Then again, I absolutely deny that we need equal power of thought for affirming that what is true is true, than for affirming what is false is true. For these two affirmations, if we look to the mind, have the same reciprocal relation as a being to a non-being; for there is nothing positive in ideas which can constitute the form of falsity (vide Prop. 35, Part II., with its Note, and Note on Prop. 47, Part II.). It must therefore be noted how easily we are deceived when we confuse general entities with individual one, and abstract entities and those of reason with realities. As for the fourth objection, I confess that I am prepared to admit that a man placed in such a position of equilibrium (namely that he perceives nothing save hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink equally distant from him), will perish of hunger and thirst, If they ask whether I  do not consider that such a man should rather be regarded as an ass than a man, I answer that I do not know, as also I do not know how a man should be regarded who hangs himself, or how children, fools, or madmen are to be considered.

 

any so called ‘clear and distinct idea’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the ‘intellect’ –.is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘will’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘intellect’ and ‘will’ are different descriptions of propositional action

 

propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and it is out of such critical investigation of propositional action that different descriptions emerge

 

no propositional action is infinite

 

an ‘infinite propositional action’ is one that cannot be defined – because it has no end point – and really no starting point

 

and in such a case there is no proposal / proposition and there is no action

 

infinite propositional action is a fantasy

 

all propositional action is finite

 

affirming proposals – however they are described – ‘one after the other’ – is not affirming an infinite number –

 

it is to be engaged in a process that will have a natural end – however long the process goes on for –

 

and this is acknowledged by Spinoza

 

the notion of an infinite number of entities is a fraud –

 

there is no ‘infinite number’ – of anything –

 

an infinite number cannot be counted –

 

and therefore – is not a number

 

a so called ‘infinite sequence of numbers’ – is an unfinished sequence –

 

it is not a genuine mathematical game – for it has no resolution –

 

the truth is you can’t play a so called ‘infinite game’ –

 

a so called ‘infinite game’ is one you have to step away from – for it has no conclusion

 

and a game without conclusion is a ‘game’ – that cannot be played – is not a game

 

the ‘will’ – is not a ‘general being’ – the will is a proposed description of propositional action

 

‘individual volitions’ – are proposals / propositional actions

 

‘the common or general idea of all volitions’ – is simply – the proposal

 

any perception / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it is not a question of deception – rather of uncertainty –

 

if you propose a ‘winged horse’ – your proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to assenting – any proposal of assent – is open to question –

 

and any proposed ‘understanding’ – likewise – is open – open to question

 

there is no adequate – as in certain – perception

 

any perception – is open to question –

 

therefore – logically speaking – suspension of judgment – is rational –

 

existence is open to question –

 

the existence of a winged horse – is open to question

 

that the boy may not be certain of it – is all that needs to be said

 

dreams are proposals put –

 

critical evaluation of any proposal – comes after a proposal is put –

 

can you question your dream – in your dream?

 

if you have experienced lucid dreaming – I think the answer is yes

 

proposals described as ‘imaginations’ – are not in error – but they are uncertain

 

to ‘perceive’ a winged horse – is to put a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

affirmation or denial of any proposal – is not ‘contained in’ the proposal –

 

affirmation and denial are separate propositional response to a proposal –

 

if you act logically – you will see that any proposal you put – is uncertain

 

and whether you call that ‘adequate’ or ‘inadequate’ – is beside the point

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal – and any ‘idea’ can be investigated – put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored –

 

it is not that one proposal has more reality than other –

 

it is rather that each ‘idea’ / proposal – is open to exploration –

 

and the extent to which an idea is critically explored – is a contingent matter

 

talk of ‘perfection’ and ‘excellence’ – is rhetoric – plain and simple

 

there is no difference between one proposal and the next in terms of the possibility of critical exploration

 

‘will’ is a particular characterization of propositional action –

 

what is in each proposal / idea – is the logical possibility of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

there is no affirmation ‘in’ any proposal / idea

 

affirmation is a propositional action in response to a subject proposal

 

there is no ‘essence’ – to an idea / proposal

 

or put it this way – any proposed ‘essence’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

circles and triangles do not ‘involve’ affirmation –

 

circles and triangle are rule governed propositional games –

 

to understand a circle or a triangle – to be able to use a circle or a triangle – is a matter of understanding and following the rules of their respective games

 

a proposal that is denied – is not a proposal that doesn’t exist

 

if there is no proposal – there is nothing to affirm or deny

 

our reality is propositional – and propositional action can be – is open to – different descriptions

 

propositional reality is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the case of Buriden’s ass?

 

any choice involves uncertainty – nevertheless we make choices – choices that are uncertain –

 

that is – we take action – propositional action – that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to how a man who hangs himself – or how children – fools – or madmen – are to be considered –

 

the actions of these people should be regarded with an open mind –

 

and as with the actions of any other propositional actor – critically evaluated

 

(Note continued)

 

It remains I should point out how much this doctrine confers on us advantage for the regulating of life which we shall easily perceive from the following points: I. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God and to the partakers of the divine nature, the more according as our actions are more perfect and more and more understand God. The doctrine, therefore, besides bringing complete peace to the mind, has this advantage also, blessedness, namely, in the knowledge of God, by which we are induced to do those things which love and piety persuade us. Whence we clearly understand how far those are astray from a true estimation of virtue who expect for their virtue and best actions, as if it were the greatest slavery, that God will adorn them with the greatest rewards; as if virtue and serving God were not the happiness itself and the greatest liberty. II. Insomuch as it teaches us in what

manner we should act with regard to the affairs of fortune or those which are not in

our own power, that is, with regard to those things which do not follow from our nature: namely, that we should expect and bare both faces of fortune with an equal mind; for all things follow by the eternal decree of God in the same necessity that it follows from the essence of a triangle are equal to two right angles. III. This doctrine confers advantages on social life, inasmuch as it teaches us not to despise, hate, or ridicule any one: to be angry or to envy no one. Further, it teaches us that each one should be satisfied with what he has and ready to help his neighbour, not from effeminate pity or partiality or superstition, but by mere guidance of reason, according as the time or thing demands, as I shall show in the third part. IV. Then this doctrine confers advantages on the state in common, inasmuch as it teaches us in what manner citizens should be governed, namely, that they should not be slaves, but should do what is best. Thus I have fulfilled what I promised at the beginning of this note, and now come to the end of the second part, in which I think I have explained the nature of the human mind and its properties at sufficient length, having regard to the difficulty of the subject, and that I have brought with me many things which from which excellent conclusions of great use and most necessary to be known may be drawn, as will be seen in part from what follows.

 

‘I. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God and to the partakers of the divine nature, the more according as our actions are more perfect and more and more understand God. The doctrine, therefore, besides bringing complete peace to the mind, has this advantage also, blessedness, namely, in the knowledge of God, by which we are induced to do those things which love and piety persuade us. Whence we clearly understand how far those are astray from a true estimation of virtue who expect for their virtue and best actions, as if it were the greatest slavery, that God will adorn them with the greatest rewards; as if virtue and serving God were not the happiness itself and the greatest liberty.’

 

the ‘doctrine’ is to act in accordance to the degree of God

 

in so far as – for Spinoza – ‘all is of God’ – and God is all – we cannot in Spinoza’s terms act in any other way

 

and any action taken – therefore is consistent – with this so called ‘decree’ of this God –

 

and so – our actions cannot be ‘more perfect’ – than they are – the more we understand this God – according to Spinoza – the more we understand our reality

 

which means in fact – however we understand reality

 

as to peace of mind –

 

peace of mind – as with any propositional state is uncertain – and furthermore – open to question – open to doubt

 

‘blessedness’ comes off as being – any state of the mind – any propositional state

 

love and piety – are descriptions of human propositional behaviour

 

in a reality in which there is no determination except what does happen and what can happen – love and piety – are logically no different to any other propositional state

 

if love and piety are preferred by a propositional actor – so be it

 

but equally if hate and impiety are preferred – so be it

 

in Spinoza’s system whatever persuades us – in one way – has the same logical status – as whatever persuades us in another

 

‘true virtue’ – is anyone’s guess – anyone’s decision

 

how to behave – and any rewards you receive from your behaviour – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

in Spinoza’s terms – you have no choice but to be what you are – and whatever you become

 

his argument for blessedness – for virtue – has no basis at all –

 

unless you want to say everything – everyone does is blessed – and virtuous

 

Spinoza it seems wants to maintain the moral authority and dictates of the personal God –

 

while holding that there is no such God

 

what we are left with from Spinoza is platitude and rhetoric

 

‘II. Insomuch as it teaches us in what manner we should act with regard to the affairs of fortune or those which are not in our own power, that is, with regard to those things which do not follow from our nature: namely, that we should expect and bare both faces of fortune with an equal mind; for all things follow by the eternal decree of God in the same necessity that it follows from the essence of a triangle are equal to two right angles.’

 

‘those things that do not follow from our nature’?

 

there is nothing that human beings do – that does not of their nature

 

‘for all things follow by the eternal decree of God in the same necessity that it follows from the essence of a triangle are equal to two right angles.’

 

if all things follow from the eternal decree of God – then what follows from our nature – all and everything that human beings do – follows from the eternal decree of God

 

the ‘essence’ of a triangle is the rule-governed propositional game –

 

Spinoza’s necessity – is nothing but a game

 

human beings construct and play rule-governed games – for their use and pleasure

 

Spinoza’s God – ‘infinite an eternal’ – comes out as – the unknown

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown does not ‘decree’ – it makes no rules

 

‘III. This doctrine confers advantages on social life, inasmuch as it teaches us not to despise, hate, or ridicule any one: to be angry or to envy no one. Further, it teaches us that each one should be satisfied with what he has and ready to help his neighbour, not from effeminate pity or partiality or superstition, but by mere guidance of reason, according as the time or thing demands, as I shall show in the third part.’

 

what Spinoza’s ‘doctrine’ – his philosophy – shows us is that that to despise – hate – ridicule – be angry – or to envy – are – as with their opposites – propositional behaviours that are of our nature –

 

as to the morality of any human behaviour – Spinoza’s doctrine teaches us nothing

 

Spinoza might think – ‘imagine’ – that he has put forward an ethic based on his metaphysics – but no such ethic is forthcoming –

 

there is nothing in Spinoza’s metaphysics to distinguish being satisfied with what you have from being dissatisfied – there is nothing to distinguish ‘helping your neighbour’ from sabotaging your neighbour –

 

pity – (which by the way – is not exclusively feminine) – partiality and superstition – are as much a part of human nature as reason or rationality

 

reason is the activity of question – of doubt and the exploration of uncertainty –

 

unreason – or irrationality – is characterized by dogmatism – prejudice – and pretence

 

human beings are both rational and irrational –

 

as to rationality and irrationality – there is nothing in Spinoza’s metaphysics – in his God – in his reality – that gives more weight to one than to the other

 

‘IV. Then this doctrine confers advantages on the state in common, inasmuch as it teaches us in what manner citizens should be governed, namely, that they should not be slaves, but should do what is best’

I find this to be an extraordinary statement coming from Spinoza –

 

he would have it that no human action is undetermined – that we are expressions of the necessity of his ‘God’ – and yet we should not be slaves

 

my question for Spinoza is – given his metaphysics – what else can we be?

 

 

THIRD PART                

 

CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

 

 

Most who have written on the emotions, the manner of human life, seem to have dealt not with natural things which follow from the general laws of nature, but with things that are outside the sphere of nature: they seem to have conceived man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe that man disturbs rather than follows the course of nature, and that he has absolute power in his actions, and is not determined in them by anything else but himself. They attribute the cause of human weakness and inconstancy not to the ordinary power of nature, but to some defect or other in human nature, wherefore they deplore, ridicule, despise. or, what is most common of all, abuse it: and he that can carp in the most eloquent or acute manner at the weakness of the human mind is held by his fellows as almost divine. Yet excellent men have not been wanting (to whose labour and industry I feel myself much indebted) who have written excellently in great quantity on the right manner of life, and left to men counsels full of wisdom: yet no one has yet determined, as far as I know, the nature and force of the emotions and what the mind can do in opposition to them for their constraint. I know that the most illustrious Descartes, although he also believed that the human mind had absolute power in its actions, endeavoured to explain the human emotions through their first causes, and to show at the same time the way in which the mind could have complete control over the emotions: but in my opinion, he showed nothing but the greatness and ingenuity of his intellect, as I shall show in its proper place. For I wish to revert to those who wish to abuse and ridicule the emotions and actions of men than to understand them. It will doubtless seem most strange to these that I should attempt to treat on the vices and failings of men in a geometrical manner, and should wish to demonstrate with accurate reasoning those things which they cry out against as opposed to reason, as vain, absurd and disgusting. This however is my plan. Nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a defect of it: for nature is always the same and one everywhere, and its ability and power of acting, that is, the laws and rules of nature according to which all things are made and changed from one form into another, are everywhere and always the same, and therefore one and the same manner must there be of understanding the nature of all things, that is, by means of the universal laws and rules of nature. For such emotions as hate, wrath, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and ability of nature as other individual things; and therefore they acknowledge certain causes through which they are understood, and have certain properties equally worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, the contemplation alone of which delights us. And so I shall treat of the nature and force of the emotions, and the power of the mind over them, in the same manner as I treat of God and the mind in the previous parts, and I shall regard human actions and desires exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies.

 

‘Most who have written on the emotions, the manner of human life, seem to have dealt not with natural things which follow from the general laws of nature, but with things that are outside the sphere of nature: they seem to have conceived man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom.’

 

‘a kingdom within a kingdom’ – is a nature within nature?

 

‘For they believe that man disturbs rather than follows the course of nature, and that he has absolute power in his actions, and is not determined in them by anything else but himself.’

 

man’s natural actions – will effect his natural environment –

 

whether you call any such a ‘disturbance’ – is really just rhetoric

 

‘not determined by anything but himself’ –

 

if man is regarded as ‘of nature’ – then the actions that he ‘determines’ – will be natural – will be of nature

 

is anyone actually arguing that man is not a part of nature?

 

if the argument is that man is supernatural or that man has a supernatural dimension – then Spinoza will simply discount such a view – as incomprehensible

 

‘They attribute the cause of human weakness and inconstancy not to the ordinary power of nature, but to some defect or other in human nature, wherefore they deplore, ridicule, despise. or, what is most common of all, abuse it: and he that can carp in the most eloquent or acute manner at the weakness of the human mind is held by his fellows as almost divine.’

 

if you accept Spinoza’s perspective – that all human actions – are one with any other nature event – then there is no ‘weakness’ or ‘inconstancy’ – there is simply what happens

 

in terms of Spinoza’s metaphysics – ‘weakness’ and ‘inconstancy’ are mistaken and inappropriate descriptions of natural events or natural states – and should be seen as rhetorical expressions – as indeed should ridiculing – despising and abusing

 

it seems though that Spinoza is quite happy to ‘argue’ against this rhetorical game

 

while at the same time playing it himself

 

‘Yet excellent men have not been wanting (to whose labour and industry I feel myself much indebted) who have written excellently in great quantity on the right manner of life, and left to men counsels full of wisdom: yet no one has yet determined, as far as I know, the nature and force of the emotions and what the mind can do in opposition to them for their constraint.’

 

‘for their constraint’?

 

where does this idea of ‘constraining’ natural states come from?

 

is Spinoza suggesting that nature constrains itself?

 

isn’t it rather that nature expresses itself?

 

I would think it is only those who hold that there is something above and beyond nature – who can argue that there are constraints on nature

 

it seems that Spinoza wants to argue against a non-natural reality – but he wants to hold on to the idea that in some sense nature can be constrained

 

‘I know that the most illustrious Descartes, although he also believed that the human mind had absolute power in its actions, endeavoured to explain the human emotions through their first causes, and to show at the same time the way in which the mind could have complete control over the emotions: but in my opinion, he showed nothing but the greatness and ingenuity of his intellect, as I shall show in its proper place.’

 

Descartes held that the mind was a distinct and different substance to the body –

 

and in a sense Descartes offers a different perspective on just what ‘nature’ is –

 

in relation to Spinoza’s view – you can say that Descartes raises the question – just how are to define nature?

 

for the ‘nature of nature’ – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – is an on-going critical issue –

 

as indeed is the question of the ‘nature’ of human nature –

 

to simply say that man acts according to nature – or according to his nature – tells us nothing –

 

these are empty statements –

 

for what ‘nature’ amounts to is a matter for further proposal – further description

 

and any description of ‘nature’ – or of the ‘nature’ of man – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

these issues – logically speaking – are never finalized

 

and this is a logical reality – that has escaped both Descartes and Spinoza – who both opt for the delusion of certainty

 

and a result both Spinoza and Descartes’ perspectives fail dismally

 

‘For I wish to revert to those who wish to abuse and ridicule the emotions and actions of men than to understand them. It will doubtless seem most strange to these that I should attempt to treat on the vices and failings of men in a geometrical manner, and should wish to demonstrate with accurate reasoning those things which they cry out against as opposed to reason, as vain, absurd and disgusting.’

 

given Spinoza’s view that nothing human beings do – is unnatural – then – ‘abuse and ridicule’ – are natural reactions and responses – in nature

 

he concludes that those who abuse and ridicule are vain absurd and disgusting –

 

and Spinoza’s reaction – must be seen as logically no different to the responses he is reacting to 

 

‘This however is my plan. Nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a defect of it: for nature is always the same and one everywhere, and its ability and power of acting, that is, the laws and rules of nature according to which all things are made and changed from one form into another, are everywhere and always the same, and therefore one and the same manner must there be of understanding the nature of all things, that is, by means of the universal laws and rules of nature

 

if there is no defect in nature – and man is a natural phenomenon – then there are no defects in man

 

‘For such emotions as hate, wrath, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and ability of nature as other individual things; and therefore they acknowledge certain causes through which they are understood, and have certain properties equally worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, the contemplation alone of which delights us.’

 

hate wrath envy etc – are – in Spinoza’s terms – natural affectations – natural states – and natural responses –

 

the real issue however is to understand that any description of an emotional state – is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

furthermore – these terms ‘wrath’ and ‘envy’ – as with – ‘abuse’ – ‘ridicule’ – ‘vain’ and ‘disgusting’ – etc. – in common propositional practise – are evaluative terms

 

it appears that Spinoza’s plan is to explain evaluative responses – in terms of their causes in nature

 

for – it seems that for Spinoza – evaluation – determining what is acceptable – and what is not acceptable – what is to be praised – and what is to be condemned – what is right – and what is wrong – must be and can only be a naturalistic argument causally explained

 

is there any place for ‘should’ in Spinoza’s ethics?

 

Spinoza’s ‘should’ – can only be a natural response – that is to be accounted for causally

 

there is no moral imperative here – there is only natural reactions – and rhetorical descriptions

 

and so moral judgments and statements – are simply vehicles of persuasion –

 

I want you to see the world in this way – so I describe your view as wrong – hoping that will result in you – coming across to my way of seeing things –

 

I would argue that ‘morality’ for Spinoza – is nothing more than rhetorical pressure – and the battle for dominance – in nature –

 

‘should’ – for Spinoza – is a term of persuasion – ‘should’ – is rhetorical

 

as a matter of propositional fact – we put ‘should’ proposals – and proposals expressing what we regard as ‘good’ – or ‘evil’ – and proposals regarding what we regard as the right way to live – or the wrong way to live

 

and the logical reality is – that any such proposal – as with any other proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our moral reality – is an uncertain reality

 

and it is in this uncertain propositional reality that we operate and we proceed

 

‘And so I shall treat of the nature and force of the emotions, and the power of the mind over them, in the same manner as I treat of God and the mind in the previous parts, and I shall regard human actions and desires exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies.’

 

again – ‘the power of the mind over them’ –

 

as far as I can see – ‘power’ – in Spinoza’s terms – is just the state of nature – the reality of nature

 

to suggest that the mind has a power over the emotions – is to give the mind a special status within nature – that is to say – the mind here – comes off as – surprise surprise – the kingdom within the kingdom

 

as to ‘dealing with lines, planes, and bodies’

 

here Spinoza adopts a mathematical model –

 

mathematics is a rule governed propositional game –

 

if you play such a game – its rules are not open to question – open to doubt – or uncertain

 

you play in accordance with the rules – or there is no game played

 

this model will be of no use in understanding the emotions – that is – propositional action described as ‘emotional’ –

 

human emotional activity – is not a rule-governed game

 

human emotional activity is propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

DEFINITIONS

 

 

I. I call that an ADEQUATE CAUSE (adequata causa) whose effect can clearly and distinctly be perceived through it. I call that one INADEQUATE or PARTIAL (inadaequata seu partialis) whose effect cannot be perceived through itself.

 

 

a causal proposal – is open to question

 

that is to say any proposed cause – or proposed effect – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and any claim of clear and distinct perception – is likewise open to question – is uncertain

 

if by adequate cause – is meant a causal proposal that is not open to question – then there is no adequate cause

 

a so called ‘inadequate or partial cause’ – is a causal proposal that has been opened up to question – to doubt – its uncertainty explored –

 

and if an effect / proposal cannot be perceived – then there is no basis for claiming there is a cause

 

no proposal – is ‘perceived through itself’ –

 

if a proposal is dealt with rational – it is put to question – its uncertainty explored

 

 

II. I say that we act or are active when something takes place within us or outside of us whose adequate cause we are, that is (prev. Def.), when from our nature anything follows in us or outside us which can be clearly and distinctly understood through that alone. On the other hand, I say we suffer or are passive when something takes place in us or follows from our nature of which we are only the partial cause.

 

 

we act or are active – when we propose – when we put a proposal

 

anything that ‘takes place within us or outside of us’ – is a proposal – open to question

 

if by ‘adequate cause’ here – is meant a ‘cause’ – not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain –

 

there is no ‘adequate cause’

 

any proposed ‘cause’ – is open to question – is uncertain

 

we don’t need a causal analysis here –

 

what we can say is that the propositional actor – puts proposals – and engages in propositional action

 

and that any proposal put – that is any proposal enacted – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘understanding’ – is not ‘clear and distinct’ – understanding is uncertain

 

to understand anything through ‘that alone’ – is to understand nothing –

 

we understand when we critically evaluate our proposals / propositional actions –

 

that is – when we put proposals / propositional actions to question to doubt – and explore their uncertainty

 

and that is to say – we understand when we explore propositional possibility

 

‘On the other hand, I say we suffer or are passive when something takes place in us or follows from our nature of which we are only the partial cause.’

 

logically speaking – the propositional reality is an active reality – an active state of affairs

 

a passive state of affairs is a non-critical state of affairs –

 

in so far as we are passive – we are ignorant

 

‘where’ a proposal takes place – is logically irrelevant –

 

and as to ‘suffering’ –

 

whether a propositional action results in suffering – or joy – is logically speaking –

 

open to question open to doubt and uncertain

 

and in fact – what counts as ‘suffering’ – or its opposite – is never certain

 

suffering and joy – as with any propositional state – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

i.e. – there are those who hold that it is through suffering that one attains enlightenment –

 

and so – for those mystics and ascetics who hold to some form of this view – the question is – are they suffering – or is their so called ‘suffering’ – actually a practise best described as ‘joyous’?

 

clearly the matter is open to question

 

it is reported that Spinoza himself had abstemious habits –

 

as to whether these habits were a source of joy or suffering – or neither – the matter – I would say – for Spinoza – would have been – open to question

 

 

III. By EMOTION (affectus) I understand the modifications of the body by which the power of action in the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the idea of these modifications.

 

 

any propositional action will have an effect – and an affect

 

a propositional action will have an affect – on the propositional actor who initiates the action – and on other actors affected by the action

 

a propositional affect is an emotion – is a propositional action

 

any ‘emotion’ / propositional affect – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

for Spinoza – the affect / emotion – modifies the body and the mind

 

which is only to say that the propositional actor is affected –

 

we can – instead of couching the matter in terms of body and mind – simply refer to the propositional actor –

 

and – how that affect is explained is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the division of the propositional actor into body and mind – is unnecessary

 

‘body’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

‘mind’ – a name for propositional action –

 

which is to say – an affect – is propositional action –

 

and again – how that is explained – is open to question

 

and – whether or not a propositional actor is enhanced or diminished – aided or restrained by a propositional affect –

 

likewise – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Explanation. – Thus if we can be the adequate cause of these modifications, then by the emotion I understand an ACTION (actio), if otherwise a PASSION (passio).

 

 

‘adequate cause’ – in Spinoza’s terms – is ‘clear and distinct’ understanding

 

logically speaking – there is no clear and distinct understanding – and no ‘adequate cause’ –

 

any causal proposal / explanation – is open to question – and is uncertain

 

and we do not need a causal explanation to see that a propositional actor puts proposals / engages in propositional action

 

or to understand that any proposal put – any propositional action initiated – is open to question - open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no distinction between action and passion

 

‘passion’ is a name for propositional action

 

propositional activity – however named or described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

POSTULATES

 

 

I. The human body can be affected in many ways whereby its power of acting is increased or diminished, and again in others which neither increase nor diminish its power of action.

 

Thus postulate or axiom is dependent on Post.1 and Lemmas 5 and 7, which see. post Prop. 13, Part II.

 

 

the focus is not the ‘the human body’ as some object –

 

the focus is the propositional actor – undivided – un-partitioned

 

the ‘human body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

any proposal put – any propositional action initiated – by a propositional actor – will affect that propositional actor –

 

and may well affect other propositional actors –

 

how that affect is understood – whether the propositional actor – is enhanced – diminished – or there is no enhancement or diminution – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the same applies to any other propositional actors affected by the action

 

 

II. The human body can suffer many changes and yet retain the impressions or traces of objects (Post. 5. Part II.), and consequently the same images of things (Note, Prop. 17, Part II.).

 

 

the human propositional actor can undergo many changes

 

‘yet retain the impressions or traces of objects’

 

an ‘impression’ is a form of – or description of – a proposal

 

‘the same images of things’ –

 

an image – is a proposal – or a description of – a proposal

 

a ‘thing’ can be proposed as an image

 

a proposal – ‘impression’ / ‘image’ – is ‘retained’ – for as long as it is entertained

 

a proposal put at one place and time – is logically distinct from a proposal put at another place and time

 

proposals / propositions – do not leave a ‘trace’ –

 

if a proposal ceases to be entertained – it ceases to be

 

 

PROPOSITIONS

 

 

PROP.1. Our mind acts certain things and suffers others: namely in so far as it has adequate ideas, thus far it necessarily acts certain things, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, thus far it necessarily suffers certain things.

 

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

the propositional actor – acts

 

any proposal put is a propositional action

 

a so called ‘adequate idea’ – is a proposal – that is regarded as certain

 

logically speaking – no proposal / proposition is ‘certain’ –

 

a proposal / proposition is open to question – open tot doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘inadequate ideas’ – is meant proposals – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

then all ideas / proposals / propositions – are inadequate

 

for Spinoza – suffering is passivity –

 

all suffering is active –

 

whether we suffer or not – we are passive to the extent that we do not critically evaluate our proposals / propositional actions / propositional states

 

our reality and our experience – is uncertain –

 

and it is in this lived uncertainty that we experience suffering and we experience joy

Proof. – The ideas of every human mind are some adequate and some mutilated and confused. (Note, Prop. 40, Part II.). But the ideas which are adequate in the mind of any one are adequate in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of that mind (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.) and those again which are inadequate in the mind of anyone are also in God but adequate (same Coroll.), not in so far as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind, but in so far as he contains the minds of other things at the same time. Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (Prop. 36, Part I.), and of this affect God is the adequate cause (Def. 1, Part III.), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by that given idea (Prop. 9. Part II.). But of that effect of which God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in the mind of someone, that same mind is the adequate cause (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.), Therefore our mind (Def. 2 Part III.), in so far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts certain things: which was the first point. Then whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in God, not in so far as he has in himself the mind of one man only, but in so far as he has in himself the minds of other things at the same time as the mind of this man, of that effect (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II, the mind of that man is not the adequate but merely the partial cause. And so (Def. 2, Part II.) the mind, in so far as it has inadequate ideas, necessarily suffers certain things: which was the second point. Therefore our mind, etc.

 

‘The ideas of every human mind are some adequate and some mutilated and confused.’

 

from a logical point of view the ideas of every human mind are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

this ’adequate / inadequate’ distinction – is logically irrelevant

 

‘But the ideas which are adequate in the mind of any one are adequate in God in so far as he constitutes the essence of that mind (Coroll., Prop, 11, Part II.), and those again which are inadequate in the mind of any one are also in God, but adequate (same Coroll.), not in so far as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind, but in so far as he contains the minds of other things at the same time.’

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown has no ideas

 

the unknown does not constitute anything

 

the unknown ‘contains’ – nothing

 

Spinoza’s view is that an inadequate idea – is adequate – in God – in so far as ‘God contains’ – other minds – at the same time –

 

which is to say other ideas / proposals – at the same time

 

is this to say that the God ‘containing’ – other – inadequate ideas – renders any one’s inadequate ideas – adequate – in God?

 

how can an inadequate idea be made adequate – by more inadequacy?

 

Spinoza’s problem is how to explain inadequacy – given that God – is adequate – and is the source of all ideas

 

for if God has inadequate ideas – God is inadequate

 

Spinoza’s solution here seems to be that all the inadequate ideas ‘add up’ to adequacy – for God –

 

and ‘inadequacy’ seems to come down to partiality –

 

God’s ideas are adequate – but the ideas of individual minds – only share in part of the adequacy – and are therefore inadequate

 

so then how can Spinoza then claim that individual minds have adequate ideas – when by definition – an individual mind is only part of ‘God’s mind’?

 

should not all the ideas of an individual mind therefore be inadequate?

 

and if so – then at the human level – adequacy collapses –

 

and you might draw from this – that therefore God for all his adequacy – has no effect or place in human affairs

 

‘Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (Prop. 36, Part I.), and of this affect God is the adequate cause (Def. 1, Part III.), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by that given idea (Prop. 9. Part II.). But of that effect of which God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in the mind of someone, that same mind is the adequate cause (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.)’

 

God – here – is the adequate cause of an idea – because he is affected by the idea

 

strange argument – for it completely torpedoes the cause / effect distinction – renders it – incomprehensible

 

‘But of that effect of which God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in the mind of someone, that same mind is the adequate cause (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II.).’

 

if God – as the cause of the effect – is affected by an adequate idea in an individual mind – then the individual mind – is the adequate cause

 

so again – God is the cause of an adequate idea – and the individual mind which has the adequate idea – is also the cause – (and God is affected)

 

two causes?

 

I think Spinoza has finally pushed his causal argument over the cliff

 

‘Therefore our mind (Def. 2 Part III.), in so far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily acts certain things: which was the first point.’

 

if action is reliant on adequacy – there is no action – full stop.

 

we act when we propose – and our propositional actions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Then whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in God, not in so far as he has in himself the mind of one man only, but in so far as he has in himself the minds of other things at the same time as the mind of this man, of that effect (Coroll., Prop. 11, Part II, the mind of that man is not the adequate but merely the partial cause.’

 

the question is – how is it that ‘the mind of man’ – is a partial cause – that is an inadequate cause – of an idea which is adequate in God?

 

if the idea is adequate in God – it is adequate in man – or if it is inadequate (a ‘partial cause’) in man – how can this idea be anything but inadequate in God – for it ‘follows from’ – an idea in God?

 

the point is that this adequate / inadequate distinction – is a statement of the problem in Spinoza’s thinking – not the solution

if – ‘all is of God’ – and God is ‘adequate’ – then – all – is adequate

if man has inadequate ideas – and God is adequate – then all is not of God – or – alternatively – ‘all is of God’ – and God is inadequate

in any case we have a division in Spinoza – which puts to question his central idea that ‘all is of God’

the logical reality is that ‘God’ is a name – a name for the unknown

and the unknown is neither adequate or inadequate – it is unknown.

‘And so (Def. 2, Part III.) the mind, in so far as it has inadequate ideas, necessarily suffers certain things: which was the second point. Therefore our mind, etc. Q.e.d.

our ideas / proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

suffering is not necessary – suffering is a contingency –

propositional uncertainty may lead to suffering – or it may not – propositional uncertainty may lead to joy – or it may not –

 

our experiences of suffering – and our experiences of joy – are propositional – and as such – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

much depends on how one proposes one’s self – and the world –

 

i.e. – if you propose yourself as a victim – or others propose you as a victim – and you accept their proposal – it is likely that you will suffer –

 

however – any such proposal – is open to question –

 

the point is we are critically empowered to change how we are affected

 

it may well be that propositional change is complex and difficult

 

nevertheless – it is possible – it is doable

 

in general – we can say that to maintain emotional health – one needs to be critically engaged

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that the mind is more or less subject to passions according as it has more or less inadequate ideas, and on the other hand, to more action the more adequate ideas it has.

 

 

the propositional actor – can be described as ‘passionate’

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

‘passion’ – is a name for – or description of – action – of propositional action

‘passionate’ or ‘dispassionate’ – our actions are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

so called ‘adequate ideas’ – in so far as they are not open to question – open to doubt – and certain – are logically dead –

‘inadequate ideas’ / proposals / propositional actions – however further described – in so far as they express uncertainty – are active

 

PROP. II. The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor the mind the body to maintain in motion, or at rest, or in any other state (if there be any other).

 

 

the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘thinking’ – is the critical activity of the propositional actor

 

critical propositional activity – is not determined

 

propositional action of any description – is not determined

 

all propositional is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the propositional actor is not determined

 

 

Proof. – All modes of thinking have God for their cause, in so far as he is a thinking thing and not in so far as he is explained through another attribute (Prop. 6, Part II). Therefore that which determines the mind to think is a mode of thinking and not of extension, that is (Def. 1, Part II). it is not a body: which was the first point. Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, and absolutely everything which arises in a body must have arisen from God in so far as he is

considered as affected by some mode of extension and not some mode of thinking

 (Prop, 6, Part. II.) that is, it cannot arise from the mind which (Prop. 11, Part II) is a mode of thinking: which is the second point. Therefore the body cannot, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown is not a cause of anything

 

the unknown does not think

 

the unknown does not determine

 

nothing arises from the unknown

 

the unknown is not affected – nor does it effect

 

‘All modes of thinking have God for their cause, in so far as he is a thinking thing and not in so far as he is explained through another attribute.’

 

it is clear here that Spinoza’s ‘God’ is no more than a reformulation or restatement of his attribute proposal

 

he would have it that his God explains the attribute of thought – when in fact all his ‘God’ amounts to is a restatement of the idea / proposal

 

it seems that for Spinoza ‘explanation’ comes down to restatement and reformulation

 

a proposal can be put – and it can be restated and reformulated –

 

effectively nothing changes – there is no real advance in restatement and reformulation

 

all you have here is a word game

 

‘explanation’ for Spinoza – comes off as non-critical propositional repetition

 

‘Therefore that which determines the mind to think is a mode of thinking and not of extension, that is (Def. 1, Part II). it is not a body: which was the first point.’

 

‘thinking’ – is a name for propositional activity –

 

the hard logical reality is that the ground – basis – ‘cause’ – if you like – of propositional activity – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and I would suggest quite obviously so

 

Spinoza’s proposal here – is fair enough – but it is only one of many possible proposals regarding the basis or origin of propositional activity

 

clearly there are competing theories on this matter –

 

we have materialist / physicalist proposals regarding the ‘mind’ and ‘thought’ – regarding that is – propositional activity – i.e. – the mind-brain identity thesis –

 

in my view the different accounts of the ‘mind’ – of ‘thinking’ – of propositional activity – have a place – to the extent that they have a use in various and different propositional contexts

 

‘Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, and absolutely everything which arises in a body must have arisen from God in so far as he is considered as affected by some mode of extension and not some mode of thinking (Prop, 6, Part. II.) that is, it cannot arise from the mind which (Prop. 11, Part II) is a mode of thinking: which is the second point.’

 

again – here in respect of the ‘body’ – ‘God’ – ‘in so far as he is considered as affected by some mode of extension and not some mode of thinking’ is nothing but a restatement of Spinoza’s extension attribute proposal –

 

and he thinks that because he gives it a different description – a different name (‘God’) – therefore he has an explanation of it – an account of it–

 

when really – all it is in fact – is a proposal – like any other – hanging in uncertainty –

 

and of course – there are in this area of philosophy different account of the nature of the ‘body’ –

 

and Spinoza knows this – i.e. – for he is well aware of Descartes’ interactionism

 

Spinoza’s proposal here – is valid – but as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and it is his failure to recognize propositional uncertainty that turns his philosophy into pretence and dogmatism

 

the same can be said of Descartes –

 

and the same can be said of many other western philosophers –

 

in fact – the majority of western philosophers –

 

and by the way eastern philosophers have not fared any better

 

we have created a world of competing dogmas – and competing pretences

 

I think much human suffering could be avoided if human beings put their propositional actions to question – put them to doubt – and explored their uncertainty

 

 

Note. – These points might be more clearly understood from what is said in the Note on Prop. 7. Part II, namely, that the mind and the body are one in the same thing, which, now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension, is conceived. Where it comes about that the order and concatenation of things is one, or

nature is conceived now under this, now under that attribute, and consequently that

the order of the actions and passions of our body are simultaneous in nature with the order and actions and passions of the mind. This also is clear from the manner in which we proved Prop. 12, Part II. And although these things are so determined that no reason of doubt can remain, yet I scarcely believe, unless I prove the matter by experience, that men can be induced to consider this with a well-balanced mind: so firmly are they persuaded that the body is moved by the mere will o0f the mind, or kept at rest, and that it performs many things which merely depend on the will or ingenuity of the mind. No one has thus far determined what the body can do, or no one has yet been taught by experience what the body can do merely by the laws of nature, in so far as nature is considered merely as corporeal or extended, and what it cannot do, save when determined by the mind. For no one has yet had a sufficiently accurate knowledge of the construction of the human body as to be able to explain all its functions: in addition to which there are many things observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity, and many things which sleep walkers do which they would not dare, were they awake: all of which sufficiently shows that the body can do many things by the laws of its nature alone at which the mind is amazed. Again, no one knows in what manner, or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of motion it can give to the body, nor with what speed it can move it. Whence it follows that when men say that this or that action arises from the power of the mind over the body, they know not what they say, or confess with specious words that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action, and have no wonderment in it. But they will say, whether they know or not, how the mind moves the body, that they have found by experience that unless the mind is apt for thinking the body remains inert: again, that it is in the power of the mi9nd alone to speak or be silent, and many other things they therefore believe to depend on the decision of the mind. But as for the first point, I ask them whether experience has not also taught them that that when the body is inert the mind likewise is inert for thinking? For when the body is asleep, the mind, at the same time, remains unconscious, and has not the power of thinking that it has when awake. Again, I think all have discovered by experience that the mind is not at all times equally apt for thinking out its subject: but according as the body is more apt, so that the image of this or that object may be excited in it, so the mind is more apt for regarding the object. But they will say it cannot come to pass that from the law of nature alone, in so far as nature is regarded as extended, that the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of this kind, which are made by human skill alone, can be deduced, nor can the human body, save if it be determined and led thereto by the mind, build a temple, for example. But I have already shown that they know not what a body can do, or what can be deduced from mere contemplation of its nature, and that they have known of many things which happen merely by reason of the laws of nature, which they would never have believed to happened save by the direction of the mind, as those things which sleep-walkers do at which they would be surprised were they awake; and I may here draw attention to the fabric of the human body, which far surpasses any piece of work made by human art, to say nothing of what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, considered under whatsoever attribute, infinite things follow. As for their second point, surely human affairs would be far happier if the power in men to be silent were the same as that to speak. But experience more than sufficiently teaches that men govern nothing with more difficulty than their tongues, and can moderate their desires more easily than their words. Whence it comes about that many believe that we are free in respect only to those things which we desire only moderately, for then we can restrain our desires for those things by the recollection of something else which we frequently recollect: and with respect to those

things which we desire with such affection that nothing can obliterate them from the

mind we are by no mean free. But in truth, if they did not experience that we do many things for which we are sorry afterwards, and that very often we strive with adverse emotions we “se the better, yet follow the worse,” there would be nothing to prevent them from believing that we do all things freely. Thus an infant thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry child thinks that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child thinks that it freely choses flight. Again, a drunken man thinks that he speaks from the free will of the mind those things which, were he sober, he would keep to himself. Thus a madman, a talkative woman, a child, and people of such kind, think they speak by the free decision of the mind, when, in truth, they cannot put a stop to the desire to talk, just as experience teaches us as clearly as reason that men think themselves on account of this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes of them; and moreover that the decisions of the mind are nothing save their desires, which are various according to various dispositions of the body. For each one moderates all his actions according to his emotions, and thus those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they want; those who are assailed by none are easily driven to one or the other. Now all these things clearly show that the decision of the mind and the desire and determination of the body are simultaneous in nature, or rather one and the same thing, which when considered under the attribute of thought and explained through the same we call decision (decretum), and when considered under the attribute of extension ad deduced from the laws of motion and rest we call determination (determinatio), which will appear more clearly from what will be said on the subject. For there is another point which I wish to be noted specially here, namely, that we can do nothing by a decision of the mind unless we recollect having done so before, e.g., we cannot speak a word unless we recollect having done so. Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to recollect or forget anything. Wherefore it must only be thought within the free power of the mind in so far as we can keep to ourselves or speak according to the decision of the mind the thing we recollect. But when we dream that we speak, we think that we speak from the free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or if we do, it is due to a spontaneous motion of the body. We dream again that we conceal something from men, and think that we do so by the same decision of the mind as that by which, when we are awake, we are silent concerning what we know. In the third place, we dream that we do certain things by a decision of the mind which were we awake we would dare not; and therefore I should like to know whether there are in the mind two sorts of decision, fantastic and free? But if our folly is not so great as that, we must necessarily admit that the decision of the mind, which is thought to be free, cannot be distinguished from imagination or memory, nor is it anything than the affirmation which an idea, in so far as it is an idea, necessarily involves (Prop. 49, Part II.). And therefore these decrees of the mind arise in the mind from the same necessity as the idea of things actually existing. Those therefore, who believe that they speak, are silent, or do anything from the free decision of the mind, dream with their eyes open.

 

‘These points might be more clearly understood from what is said in the Note on Prop. 7. Part II, namely, that the mind and the body are one in the same thing, which, now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension, is conceived.’

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are different names for propositional action

 

‘Where it comes about that the order and concatenation of things is one, or nature is

conceived now under this, now under that attribute, and consequently that the order

of the actions and passions of our body are simultaneous in nature with the order and actions and passions of the mind.’

 

the logical focus is not ‘mind’ or ‘body’ – but the propositional actor –

 

the propositional actor – uncompromised – undivided

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are names for propositional action

 

propositional action is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

any ‘ordering’ of propositional action – is a proposal – open to question

 

Spinoza’s focus on ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – despite his view that they are one and the same – misses the unity that is the propositional actor

 

we need to begin and end with the propositional actor

 

and once this is understood and appreciated – the so-called mind / body problem – disappears

 

it has only ever emerged due to the failure to see the essential unity that is the propositional actor – and to begin with that unity

 

it’s the failure to see the tree for the forest

 

‘And although these things are so determined that no reason of doubt can remain, yet I scarcely believe, unless I prove the matter by experience, that men can be induced to consider this with a well-balanced mind: so firmly are they persuaded that the body is moved by the mere will of the mind, or kept at rest, and that it performs many things which merely depend on the will or ingenuity of the mind. No one has thus far determined what the body can do, or no one has yet been taught by experience what the body can do merely by the laws of nature, in so far as nature is considered merely as corporeal or extended, and what it cannot do, save when determined by the mind.’

 

‘no reason of doubt can remain’ –

 

this is no more than pretentious rhetoric – and Spinoza full well knows that on this matter – and indeed any philosophical matter – there is as matter of course – the possibility of genuine doubt

 

if Spinoza’s idea is to knock out doubt – then he is living in alternative reality

 

‘yet I scarcely believe, unless I prove the matter by experience, that men can be induced to consider this with a well-balanced mind’

 

there is ‘no proof by experience’ –

 

any proposal – described as based on experience – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘proof’ – is a rhetorical notion –

 

it is the pretention people come to when they stop questioning – stop doubting – and rest in the ignorance of certainty

 

‘so firmly are they persuaded that the body is moved by the mere will of the mind, or kept at rest, and that it performs many things which merely depend on the will or ingenuity of the mind’

 

human beings should not be ‘firmly persuaded’ of anything – any proposal – at any time – is open to question – is uncertain

 

as to the proposal that the body is moved by the will of the mind’ etc. –

 

all we need to understand here is that the propositional actor – acts –

 

and any so-called – ‘mind / body explanation’ – confounds – what is a straightforward matter

 

philosophers love rabbit holes – and it seems – and some never come out of them

 

‘No one has thus far determined what the body can do, or no one has yet been taught by experience what the body can do merely by the laws of nature, in so far as nature is considered merely as corporeal or extended, and what it cannot do, save when determined by the mind.’

 

yes – exactly – ‘no one has determined’ – the propositional actor

 

the point here is that any proposal described as ‘of the body’ – is – and always will be – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – if we proceed logically

 

and as to what is ‘determined by the mind’ –

 

any proposal described as ‘of the mind’ – is likewise open to question –

 

you can forget ‘of the body’ – ‘of the mind’ – and go straight to the propositional actor – and propositional action

 

‘Whence it follows that when men say that this or that action arises from the power of the mind over the body, they know not what they say, or confess with specious words that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action, and have no wonderment in it.’

 

well – they do know what they say –

 

but what they say – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and as for – ‘being ignorant of the cause of said action’ –

 

if by that is meant that they have open minds on the matter – then they are proceeding logically

 

wonderment –

 

yes – wonderment is the door to critical evaluation

 

does Spinoza experience wonderment here?

 

I doubt it

 

‘But they will say, whether they know or not, how the mind moves the body, that they have found by experience that unless the mind is apt for thinking the body remains inert: again, that it is in the power of the mind alone to speak or be silent, and many other things they therefore believe to depend on the decision of the mind.’

 

what we know – is what we propose – and what we propose is open to question – is uncertain

 

as is any ‘experiential’ – proposal

 

I should note – it is all very well for Spinoza to rail against the intransigence of others

 

he seems though to have no understanding of his own dogmatism

 

‘But as for the first point, I ask them whether experience has not also taught them that that when the body is inert the mind likewise is inert for thinking? For when the body is asleep, the mind, at the same time, remains unconscious, and has not the power of thinking that it has when awake.’

 

‘the power of thinking’ – when asleep – is different to the ‘power of thinking’ – when awake – and the power of action (of the ‘body’) is of a different kind when asleep to when we are awake –

 

which is to say our propositional activity when asleep – is in a different setting or propositional context to propositional activity when we are awake –

 

we can and do critically evaluate the propositional actions described as ‘of the mind’ – and actions described as ‘of the body’ – be they when awake or when asleep –

 

further – science – physical and behavioural – takes great interest in both

 

‘Again, I think all have discovered by experience that the mind is not at all times equally apt for thinking out its subject: but according as the body is more apt, so that the image of this or that object may be excited in it, so the mind is more apt for regarding the object. But they will say it cannot come to pass that from the law of nature alone, in so far as nature is regarded as extended, that the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of this kind, which are made by human skill alone, can be deduced, nor can the human body, save if it be determined and led thereto by the mind, build a temple, for example.’

 

Spinoza needed to find a way for image and imagination – which he regards as inferior ‘knowledge’ – to not be ‘of the mind’ – and to make the mind the home of only rational thinking –

 

his idea is to put that image and imagination – are in fact not of the mind at all – but rather ‘of the body’ – ‘but according as the body is more apt, so that the image of this

 

or that may be excited in it’ –

 

the obvious problem here is that an image – perhaps ‘excited by the body’ – nevertheless – would be described by most as a mental entity – a proposition – described as ‘of the mind’

 

for Spinoza the question is – would there be image – if there was no mind?

 

if you understand that all we deal with here is propositional action – open to question – Spinoza’s mind / body problem does not arise – and neither does his ‘image problem’

 

‘But they will say it cannot come to pass that from the law of nature alone, in so far as nature is regarded as extended, that the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of this kind, which are made by human skill alone, can be deduced, nor can the human body, save if it be determined and led thereto by the mind, build a temple, for example.’

 

the propositional reality is that anything can be variously described – i.e. – you can describe a building as coming into being as a result of a proposal described as an ‘idea’

 

and you can describe the existence of a building – in terms of a physical proposal – i.e. – give it a causal explanation

 

the point is – we face and deal with propositional uncertainty – and it is out of this uncertainty – that different proposals arise – and different propositional explanations arise

 

‘But I have already shown that they know not what a body can do, or what can be deduced from mere contemplation of its nature, and that they have known of many things which happen merely by reason of the laws of nature, which they would never have believed to happened save by the direction of the mind, as those things which sleep-walkers do at which they would be surprised were they awake; and I may here draw attention to the fabric of the human body, which far surpasses any piece of work made by human art, to say nothing of what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, considered under whatsoever attribute, infinite things follow.’

 

any proposed object – the ‘human body’ included – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

nature too – of course – is open to question –

 

as to ‘infinite things follow’

 

no proposal / proposition ‘follows’ another

 

proposals / propositions can be put in relation – to each the other

 

any proposal regarding ‘nature’ – is open to question – and logically speaking there is no end to the propositional possibilities that may result from critical endeavour

 

as to ‘infinite things’ – a thing if it is a ‘thing’ – has definition – albeit – uncertain

 

an ‘infinite thing’ can only mean an undefined thing – which of course is not a ‘thing’ at all

 

‘As for their second point, surely human affairs would be far happier if the power in men to be silent were the same as that to speak.’

 

on what does Spinoza base this claim?

 

and really is there a lack of power when it comes to being silent –

 

I doubt it

 

this strikes me as Spinoza – simply having a personal preference for silence –

 

I am of much the same persuasion –

 

however – I think we have to recognise that people are different – and try at times to enjoy that difference

 

‘But experience more than sufficiently teaches that men govern nothing with more difficulty than their tongues, and can moderate their desires more easily than their words.’

 

this is a weak argument – put really to bolster Spinoza’s own prejudice in this matter

 

one man’s experience – is not another’s

 

and as far as men moderating desires – well let’s be realistic here – who can make a firm call here?

 

sometimes we moderate – sometimes we don’t – there are people who are practised in moderation – and others who celebrate lack of moderation

 

I myself have experience of both

 

just a personal opinion here – but I think moderating desires is way more difficult than moderating words

 

‘Whence it comes about that many believe that we are free in respect only to those things which we desire only moderately, for then we can restrain our desires for those things by the recollection of something else which we frequently recollect: and with respect to those things which we desire with such affection that nothing can obliterate them from the mind we are by no means free. But in truth, if they did not experience that we do many things for which we are sorry afterwards, and that very often we strive with adverse emotions we “see the better, yet follow the worse,” there would be nothing to prevent them from believing that we do all things freely.’

 

our actions are proposals – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and it is propositional uncertainty that is the ground of our freedom

 

how we interpret / evaluate our action – logically speaking – is open to question – and

 

open to doubt

 

i.e. – we might look back on ourselves – as we were – operating in a particular propositional context – and from the standpoint of our current propositional setting – regard our past actions in a negative light –

 

or we may reinterpret those actions at a later date – in a different propositional context – and see them in a positive light

 

our freedom rests in – the logical capacity – of question – of doubt and the exploration of uncertainty

 

‘Thus an infant thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry child thinks that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child thinks that it freely choses flight. Again, a drunken man thinks that he speaks from the free will of the mind those things which, were he sober, he would keep to himself.

 

does an infant think it freely desires milk? – does an angry child think it freely desires vengeance? – does a timid child think it freely choses flight? does a drunken man think he speaks from the free will of the mind?

 

my point is – how much thinking is going on in these cases?

 

peoples’ actions – their propositional actions and reactions – do not necessarily involve thinking

 

to think – is to put it to question – put to doubt and explore propositional possibilities

 

we are free to the extent that we engage in this logical activity

 

when we don’t – it is not that we are unfree – or determined –

 

when we don’t engage in the critical evaluation of our propositional actions – we act in ignorance

 

‘Thus a madman, a talkative woman, a child, and people of such kind, think they speak by the free decision of the mind, when, in truth, they cannot put a stop to the desire to talk, just as experience teaches us as clearly as reason that men think themselves on account of this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes of them; and moreover that the decisions of the mind are nothing save their desires, which are various according to various dispositions of the body.’

 

freedom – does not rest in a so called ‘free decision of the mind’ – freedom rests in the critical appraisal of proposals / propositions put

 

freedom – does not rest in consciousness – you can – of course be conscious of your proposals – of your propositional actions – without putting them to question

 

‘desires’ – are descriptions of proposals put and proposals put into action

 

how such proposals are explained – i.e. – as ‘various dispositions of the body’ – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

propositional explanation in any context – is back story –

 

the issue – front and centre – is the critical evaluation of proposals – however they are described –

 

and as for women being talkative – for those who are – more power to them –

 

on the other hand – I have known many women who are measured and discrete in their speech and use of language

 

I don’t think anyone has a problem with being able to stop talking –

 

and the fact that some talk more than others – so what?

 

you don’t have to listen – you don’t have to engage – if it doesn’t suit you to do so

 

it’s pretty clear Spinoza has it in for women –

 

I guess – he just never came across the right one – or perhaps he did – and it didn’t work out for him –

 

in his philosophy regarding the nature of man – there is no basis for his negative view of women

 

I get the impression of a man who was deeply wounded by a female –

 

the above statement as regards women – would be in his terms – ‘emotional’ – not rational

 

‘For each one moderates all his actions according to his emotions, and thus those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they want; those who are assailed by none are easily driven to one or the other.’

 

any moderation of action – is a result of a critical evaluation of the action in question

 

‘emotions’ are propositions – proposals / propositional actions – so described –

 

propositions do not as such moderate propositions – or propositional actions –

 

question doubt – the exploration of propositional uncertainty – is how proposals / actions / emotions are ‘moderated’

 

being ‘assailed by conflicting emotions’ – is to find yourself in a critical state of affairs – where how to proceed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

engaging in question – doubt – and uncertainty – is to proceed rationally –

 

we make decisions on how to proceed – and any such decision – is open to question –

 

logically speaking there is no final resolution to any critical state – be that described as emotional or otherwise –

 

we proceed in uncertainty

 

as to those who are ‘assailed by none’ – a logical calm before the critical storm

 

it is not a matter of being ‘driven’ to this or that –

 

it is rather a matter of having an open mind – and exploring one’s propositional landscape

 

‘Now all these things clearly show that the decision of the mind and the desire and determination of the body are simultaneous in nature, or rather one and the same thing, which when considered under the attribute of thought and explained through the same we call decision (decretum), and when considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest we call determination (determinatio), which will appear more clearly from what will be said on the subject.’

 

all proposals – all propositional actions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

‘the decision of the mind’ – and ‘the desire and determination of the body’ – are different descriptions of a propositional action

 

different descriptions – open to question

 

and the ‘attribute of thought’ – and the ‘attribute of extension’ – are propositional explanations of the different descriptions

 

propositional explanations – open to question

 

‘For there is another point which I wish to be noted specially here, namely, that we can do nothing by a decision of the mind unless we recollect having done so before, e.g., we cannot speak a word unless we recollect having done so.’

 

a surprising statement from Spinoza –

 

for it says we can do nothing that we have not already done –

 

and this means – that in his view – there can be nothing new –

 

no new ideas – no new theories – no new proposals –

 

which of course is plainly wrong

 

as to not being able to speak a word unless we recollect doing so – again – wrong

 

when I look for a meaning in a dictionary – I may well come upon a word I have never used before

 

a poet – may well make up a word – that has never been used before –

 

as indeed – may a scientist –

 

and possibly even a ‘talkative woman’ – God forbid

 

‘Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to recollect or forget anything’

 

who hasn’t been stuck for a name to put to a face – and after some propositional concentration – come up with the name?

 

purposeful forgetting – is perhaps more complex – but there is the psychological phenomenon of a buried memory – and a whole area of psychology devoted to uncovering such memories

 

‘Wherefore it must only be thought within the free power of the mind in so far as we can keep to ourselves or speak according to the decision of the mind the thing we recollect’

 

we can propose not only what we have proposed in the past – but we can put forward new proposals – proposals that have never been put before –

 

a case in point is Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’

 

‘But when we dream that we speak, we think that we speak from the free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or if we do, it is due to a spontaneous motion of the body’

 

when we dream – we propose –

 

and it is possible to question within a dream – to doubt within a dream – and to be aware of the propositional uncertainty we experience in the dream state

 

in any case it is quite common to question – to doubt – and to deal with the uncertainty of dreams – or dreams proposals – when we are awake

 

and as to the nature of dreams – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘We dream again that we conceal something from men, and think that we do so by the same decision of the mind as that by which, when we are awake, we are silent concerning what we know’

 

it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain – whether the reason for concealing during a dream – would be the same as the reason for concealing when we are awake 

 

‘In the third place, we dream that we do certain things by a decision of the mind which were we awake we would dare not; and therefore I should like to know whether there are in the mind two sorts of decision, fantastic and free?’

 

perhaps there are

 

‘But if our folly is not so great as that, we must necessarily admit that the decision of the mind, which is thought to be free, cannot be distinguished from imagination or memory, nor is it anything than the affirmation which an idea, in so far as it is an idea, necessarily involves’

 

‘decisions of the mind’ or decisions of the ‘imagination or memory’ – are propositional explanations of proposals put –

 

point being – regardless of any propositional description or explanation – from a logical point of view – we are always dealing with proposals – proposals open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘And therefore these decrees of the mind arise in the mind from the same necessity as the idea of things actually existing. Those therefore, who believe that they speak, are silent, or do anything from the free decision of the mind, dream with their eyes open.’

 

what exists – is what is proposed – and what is proposed / exists – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘arising in the mind’ – is no more than an a propositional explanation of the proposal

 

and an explanation – open to question

 

whether you speak or are silent – a so called ‘decision of the mind’ – is no more than – a proposals put –

 

our ‘freedom’ – is logical – it rests in the capacity to put our proposals – our propositions – to question – to put them to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty

 

when you dream – eyes open or shut – you put proposals – proposals – open to question

 

 

PROP. III. The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone, but passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.

 

 

any proposal put – can be variously described – and any description proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

an ‘action of the mind’ – is a simply a proposal – a propositional action – described as ‘of the mind’ –

 

this description holds up because it has proved to be useful across propositional contexts

 

an ‘idea ‘is a proposal –

 

any idea / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

if by ‘adequate’ is meant – beyond question – beyond doubt and certain – then there are no ‘adequate’ ideas / proposals –

 

and so – in Spinoza’s terms – it must follow – that all ideas / proposals – are passionate

 

in my view – an ‘inadequate idea’ – if it means anything – is any proposal that is not put to question – is not put to doubt – its uncertainty – unexplored

 

nevertheless – once it is understood that any idea / proposal – is open to question –

 

this adequate / inadequate distinction falls by the way as of no use

 

 

Proof. – The first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing else than the idea of the body actually existing (Prop, 11 and 13, Part II.), which (Prop. 15, Part II) is composed of many other ideas of which (Coroll., Prop. 38, Part II) certain are adequate and certain (Coroll., Prop. 29, Part II.) inadequate. Therefore whatever follows from the nature of the mind is the proximate cause through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow from an idea adequate or inadequate. But in so far as the mind (Prop. 1. Part III) has inadequate ideas, thus far it is necessarily passive. Therefore the actions of the mind follow from adequate idea alone, and the mind is passive therefore merely because it has inadequate ideas. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the mind’ –is a name for propositional action

 

‘the body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

once this understood ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are no longer relevant

 

what is relevant – and primary in consideration – is the propositional actor

 

all propositional action is open to\ question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

what exists is what is proposed –

 

and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘adequate idea’ is meant a proposal that is beyond question – that is certain

 

logically speaking – there is no ‘adequate idea’ –

 

any proposal is an action

 

passivity is the failure to critically evaluate proposals / propositional activity

 

that is – the failure to question – to doubt – and to explore propositional uncertainty

 

there is no necessity in propositional reality

 

 

Note. – We see thus that passions have no reference to the mind in so far as it has something which involves negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature which through itself and without others cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived;

and by this system of argument I could show that the passions are referred to

individual things in the same manner as they are referred to the mind, nor can they be perceived in any other manner. But it is my purpose to treat of the human mind alone.

 

 

‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

passions – are propositional actions –

 

and as with any propositional action – however described – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any proposal can be affirmed or negated – and any proposal of affirmation or negation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

logically speaking there is no clear and distinct perception –

 

all perceptual proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘clear and distinct’ – is a rhetorical notion

 

what any proposal / propositional action refers to – is open to question

 

‘We see thus that passions have no reference to the mind …’.

 

on the face of it – this is a strange statement

 

if you are going to pursue a mind / body dualism – most would think – that passions do have reference to the mind – and – to the body

 

Spinoza’s statement comes out of his failure to see that passions are propositional actions – and his closet dualism –

 

and by implication – this is confirmed in his final statement here –

 

‘But it is my purpose to treat of the human mind alone’

 

one gets the impression – that Spinoza wants to completely dismiss passions – and passionate action

 

is Spinoza saying – he is not interested in passions – or is he in effect saying that he has nothing to say regarding passions?

 

it looks like he has thrown the baby out with the bath water

 

in any case – he has backed himself into a corner by trying to write off passions as inadequate ideas – as passive – as non-active

 

all ideas / proposals – are actions –

 

propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

and if you were to say that a ’passionate’ action is a logically uncertain action – open to question – open to doubt –

 

then any proposal – any propositional description or explanation – can be regarded as – can be described as – passionate

 

and just by the way –

 

what is active about a so called ‘adequate idea’ – that is not open to question – not open to doubt – and dead – in its pretence of certainty?

 

 

PROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed save by an external cause.

 

 

as to an ‘external cause’ –

 

if ‘all is of God’ – as Spinoza maintains – then if there is causation – all causation is internal to God – and if so – there is no external cause –

 

and therefore – nothing can be destroyed by an external cause –

 

does Spinoza still want to say that something can be destroyed?

 

if so – in his terms – it must be an ‘internal cause’ that destroys –

 

and if he holds that an internal cause cannot destroy a thing –

 

then nothing is destroyed –

 

and therefore – the above proposition – is effectively contradicted

 

what exists is what is proposed –

 

propositions are not ‘created or destroyed’ –

 

propositions are put – or not put –

 

to say they are ‘created or destroyed’ – is to embellish the logic with rhetoric

 

propositions can be critically evaluated – and as a result may be proceeded with – or not proceeded with –

 

and as to why a proposal is proceeded with – or why it is dropped –

 

the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and a proposal can – as a result of critical evaluation – be modified and reformulated –

 

and any such modification or reformulation will be open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and a proposal may be dropped from consideration

 

Proof. – The proposition is self-evident. For the definition of anything affirms its essence and does not deny it: or it imposes the essence of a thing and does not take it away. And so while we regard the thing alone, and not the external cause, we can find nothing in it which can destroy it

 

 

no proposition is self-evident –

 

this notion of ‘self-evidence’ – is nothing but pretentious rhetoric –

 

a definition is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

a proposal /definition – does not ‘affirm’ itself – or ‘deny’ itself –

 

a proposal / definition is put –

 

affirmation and denial are propositional responses to a proposal put –

 

responses – that like the proposal put – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to ‘essence’ –

 

if by essence is meant – a description of a proposal – that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain –

 

then – there is no essence

 

what we deal with is proposals

 

‘the thing alone’ – is a proposal

 

as to the ‘cause’ – or origin – or basis of any proposal – that is a matter open to question

 

there is nothing in a proposal as such – that can ‘destroy’ it – and there is nothing external to a proposal that can ‘destroy’ it

 

a proposal is put – or it is not put –

 

if it is not proposed – it is not there –

 

if it is put – and then dropped from consideration – then it is not there

 

a proposal may have a currency of use – and it may be modified – reformulated – or indeed – just dropped from use altogether –

 

whatever the case in terms of use – the proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

PROP. V. Things are contrary by nature, that is, that is they cannot exist in the same subject in so far as one can destroy the other.

 

 

this is a vague statement from Spinoza –

 

the logical reality is that a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the point being – that how a proposition is interpreted – is open to question

 

i.e. – how one person interprets a proposal could well be ‘contrary’ to another person’s interpretation

 

and any such propositional conflict – or contrariness – only points to the very logical nature and reality of the proposition

 

 

Proof. – If they could agree one with the other, or exist at the same time in the same subject, then something could be found in the subject which could destroy it, which (prev. Prop.) is absurd. Therefore a thing, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

different interpretations of a proposal – do not ‘destroy’ a proposition –

 

to the contrary – it brings it to life

 

 

PROP. VI. Everything in so far as it is in itself endeavours to persist in its own being.

 

 

if ‘x’ is in itself – then ‘itself’ – that which ‘x’ is in – is something other than ‘x’ –

 

and if so ‘x’ is not itself

 

we don’t need to need to get tied up with this contradiction

 

we can quite happily proceed with ‘x’ – as proposed

 

a proposal does not ‘endeavour to persist in its own being’ –

 

for if it did – this would mean that a proposal proposes itself –  

 

and proposes itself as ‘that which endeavours to persist in its own being’

 

the idea of a ‘proposal proposing itself’ – is ridiculous

 

a proposal is put by a propositional actor – not by ‘itself’ –

 

a proposal put – of whatever form – exists as long as it is entertained by a propositional actor

 

 

Proof. – Individual things are modes in which the attributes of God are expressed in a determined manner (Coroll., Prop. 25, Part I), that is (Prop. 34, Part I.) they are things which express in a certain determined manner the power of God whereby he is an acts. Nor can a thing have anything within itself whereby it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence from it (Prop. 4 Part III.); but on the other hand, it is opposed to everything that could take its existence away (prev. Prop.). Therefore as much as it can, and is within itself, it endeavours to persist in its being. Q.e.d.

 

‘Individual things are modes in which the attributes of God are expressed in a determined manner (Coroll., Prop. 25, Part I), that is (Prop. 34, Part I.) they are things which express in a certain determined manner the power of God whereby he is an acts.’

 

‘whereby he is’ – so the individual thing – is – God

 

which raises the question – why is there a distinction between ‘God’ – and the ‘individual thing’ at all?

 

for Spinoza – ‘God’ – as in ‘everything’ – cannot be destroyed – or have ‘its’ existence taken away from ‘it’

 

in the absence of proposal – reality is unknown –

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

we put proposals in response to the unknown – we put proposal to make known

 

our proposals – which include proposals of ‘individual things’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Nor can a thing have anything within itself whereby it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence from it (Prop. 4 Part III.); but on the other hand, it is opposed to everything that could take its existence away’

 

the proposal doesn’t create itself – maintain itself – or destroy itself –

 

there is no ‘self’ – to a proposal –

 

a proposal does not ‘propose itself’–

 

proposals are put by propositional actors – and proposals are dropped from use – by propositional actors

 

a proposal – a proposition – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

a proposition’s ‘existence’ – is uncertain –

 

nevertheless – in our propositional lives – we proceed – and we proceed in uncertainty

 

 

PROP. VII. The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in its being is nothing else than the actual essence of the thing.

 

 

the ‘thing’ – as such – is a proposal –

 

a proposal does not ‘endeavour’ –

 

for a proposal ‘to endeavour’ – the proposal would have to propose itself – and propose itself as an endeavour

 

to suggest that a proposal ‘proposes itself’ – is ridiculous

 

proposals are put by propositional actors

 

to suggest that a ‘proposal proposes itself’ – is to confuse the action with the actor

 

it is to conflate the two – and it is to fail to distinguish the proposer and that proposed

 

the ‘essence’ of any proposal – can only be a proposed description of the proposal

 

a propositional description – as with the proposal itself – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – From the given essence of a thing certain things necessarily follow (Prop. 36, Part I.) nor can things do anything else than that which follows necessarily from their determined nature. (Prop. 29, Part. I.). Wherefore the power or endeavour of anything by which it does, or endeavours to do, anything, either alone or with others, that is, the power or endeavour by which it endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else than the given or actual essence of that given thing. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘From the given essence of a thing certain things necessarily follow (Prop. 36, Part I.) nor can things do anything else than that which follows necessarily from their determined nature. (Prop. 29, Part. I.).’

 

there is no ‘given’ essence of a thing

 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal – and any so called ‘essence’ can only be a proposed description of the thing / proposal

 

a proposed description – as with the proposal described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if your idea of an ‘essence’ – is that which is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain – there is no essence

 

nothing ‘necessarily follows’ from anything –

 

if anything follows from a proposal – then it is proposed that it follows –

 

and any such ‘follows on’ proposal – is open to question

 

our proposals are all contingent – which is to say – uncertain

 

any determination – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Wherefore the power or endeavour of anything by which it does, or endeavours to do, anything, either alone or with others, that is, the power or endeavour by which it endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else than the given or actual essence of that given thing.’

 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal

 

a proposal – as such – is not ‘powerful’ – does not ‘endeavour’ –

 

for a proposal to ‘power’ or ‘endeavour’ – it would have to propose itself – and then describe itself as ‘powerful’ or ‘endeavouring’– which is absurd

 

proposals do not propose themselves

 

a propositional actor puts a proposal – and can further describes it – e.g. – describes its action as ‘powerful’ or ‘endeavouring’ –

 

any such propositional description – is – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if we understand ‘essence’ as a propositional description –

 

a propositional description – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

then – however ‘essence’ is proposed – it is – from a logical point of view – open to question – open to doubt and – uncertain

 

if so – the so called – ‘given or actual essence of that given thing’ – however proposed – is uncertain

 

PROP. VIII. The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in its own being involves no finite time but an indefinite time.

 

 

Proof. – If it involves a limited time which must determine the duration of the thing, then it would follow from the power alone by which the thing exists, that the thing after that limited time could exist no longer, but must be destroyed. But this (Prop. 4, Part III.) is absurd. Therefore the endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to exist involves no definite time; but on the other hand, if (Prop. 4 Part III.) it is destroyed by no external cause, by the same power by which it now exists it will continue to exist for ever: therefore this endeavour involves no definite time. Q.e.d.

 

 

that which exists – is that which is proposed –

 

a ‘thing’ – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a proposal does not ‘endeavour’ –

 

for a proposal to ‘endeavour’ – it would have to propose it itself – and – describe itself – as an endeavour – which is absurd

 

therefore – the idea that a proposal endeavours to exist for a finite time or an indefinite time – is likewise – absurd

 

proposals are put by propositional actors

 

as to finite and indefinite time –

 

‘time’ – is a calculation of duration – it is the calculation ‘duration’ –

 

a ‘calculation’ is a rule governed propositional game –

 

the rule of any calculation game is that the calculation can be made –

 

which is to say that the calculation – if it is a calculation – is definite

 

if not – there is no calculation

 

therefore – there is no ‘indefinite calculation’ –

 

a so called ‘indefinite calculation’ – is no calculation at all –

 

the idea of an ‘indefinite calculation’ – is a misuse and misunderstanding of calculation

 

a proposal put – exists as long as it is entertained – by propositional actors

 

and we can apply the calculation game to the question of how long a proposal is entertained –

 

and if we do so – any result – will be definite – which is to say – finite

 

and let’s be clear – there is no ‘indefinite’ – or infinite number

 

further – any game of calculation is a finite propositional action

 

 

PROP. IX. The mind, in so far as it has both clear and distinct and confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and is conscious of this its endeavour.

 

 

‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

propositional action – is not ‘clear and distinct’ – propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

an idea / propositional action – does not ‘endeavour to persist in its being’

 

for a propositional action to ‘endeavour to persist in its own being’ – it would have to propose itself – and – and further – describe itself as ‘a persistent endeavour’ – which is plainly ridiculous

 

proposals are put by propositional actors – and described by propositional actors

 

an ‘indefinite period’?

 

there is no ‘indefinite’ period – a ‘period’ – is definite

 

‘conscious of its endeavour’

 

a propositional actor is conscious – is aware of his / her proposals – his / her propositional actions

 

‘consciousness’ is a proposal –

 

the proposal ‘consciousness’ is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

that is to say – how we account for consciousness – for awareness – is open to question

 

 

Proof. – The essence of the mind is constituted of adequate and inadequate ideas (as we showed in prop. 3, Part III.), and therefore (Prop. 7, Part III.), inasmuch as it has the first and second, it endeavours to persist in its being, and that for an indefinite period (prop. 8 Part III.). But since the mind (Prop. 23 Part II.) is necessarily conscious of itself through ideas of the modification of the body, so the mind (Prop.7. Part III) is conscious of its own endeavour. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ’mind’ – is a name for propositional activity

 

it is ‘constituted of’ – proposal –

 

proposals – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the distinction ‘adequate / inadequate’ – is strictly speaking irrelevant here – as all proposals are uncertain

 

call uncertainty ‘adequate’ or ‘inadequate’ – it doesn’t matter

 

a proposal does not ‘endeavour to persist in its being’ –

 

a proposal exists as long as it is entertained by a propositional actor

 

there is no ‘indefinite period’ –

 

if there is a ‘period’ – if a period is calculated – it is by definition – definite

 

a proposal is not conscious of itself – that is absurd

 

a proposal – i.e. – the proposal of mind – is a conscious action of a propositional actor

 

‘consciousness’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – This endeavour, when it has reference to the mind alone, is called will (voluntas); but when it refers simultaneously to the mind and body it is called appetite (appetitus), which therefore is nothing else than the essence of man, from the nature of which all things which help in its preservation necessarily follow; and therefore man is determined for acting these things. Now between appetite and desire (cupidatis) there is no difference but this, that desire usually has reference to men in so far as they are conscious of their appetite; and therefore it may be defined as appetite with consciousness thereof. It may be gathered from this, then, that we endeavour, wish, desire, or long for nothing because we deem it good; but on the other hand, we deem a thing good because we endeavour, wish for, desire, or long for it.

 

 

‘will’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

the action of a propositional actor –

 

the propositional actor is not determined – propositional action is not determined

 

‘appetite’ – is a propositional explanation of propositional action –

 

appetite is propositional action

 

and as with any propositional explanation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as for desire –

 

desire is a description of propositional action –

 

desire is propositional action

 

the thing is good if we desire it – wish for it – long for it?

 

what is ‘good’ – is whatever propositional actors propose as good

 

and whatever is proposed as ‘good’ – for whatever reason – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. X. The idea which cuts off the existence of our body cannot be given in our mind, but is contrary thereto.

 

 

the ‘idea’ – that is the proposal – that ‘cuts off’ – or ends – the propositional actor’s existence – is a proposal that is natural to human beings

 

who doesn’t think of death?

 

and let’s be clear – the proposal of the death of the propositional actor – is – and always has been – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to ‘given in our mind’ –

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

what is ‘given’ in propositional life – is whatever is proposed

 

 

Proof. – Whatever can destroy our body cannot be granted in the same (Prop. 5. Part III.). therefore the idea of the thing cannot be granted in God in so far as he has the idea of our body (Coroll., Prop. 9, Part II.), that is (Prop.11 and 13, Part II.) the idea of the thing cannot be granted in the mind; but on the other hand since (Prop. 11 and 13, Part II) the first thing that forms the essence of the mind is the idea of the body actually existing, the first and principal endeavour of our mind is to affirm (Prop. 7. Part III.) the existence of our body. And therefore the idea which denies the existence of our body is opposed to the mind, etc. Q.e.d.

‘Whatever can destroy our body cannot be granted in the same (Prop. 5. Part III.).’

 

 

‘Whatever can destroy our body cannot be granted in the same (Prop. 5. Part III.).’

 

the proposal that the propositional actor’s health will dimmish over time – due to natural degeneration – and will end with death – is a commonly put proposal

 

and this proposal – as with any other dealing with the health of the propositional actor – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no mind opposed to body here

 

the propositional actor exists as long as he / she – acts

 

‘therefore the idea of the thing cannot be granted in God in so far as he has the idea of our body’

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown – the unknown has no ideas / proposals

 

‘ideas’ / proposals – are put in response to – and in reaction to – the unknown

 

‘the first thing that forms the essence of the mind is the idea of the body actually existing’

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action

 

propositional action exists as the expression of the propositional actor

 

the ‘essence’ – if you wish to use this term – of the propositional actor – is propositional action

 

‘the first and principal endeavour of our mind is to affirm (Prop. 7. Part III.) the existence of our body’

 

any endeavour of the propositional actor – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XI. Whatever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of action of our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thinking or our mind.

 

 

‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘body’ is a name for propositional action

 

so – the focus is propositional action

 

we are not dealing here with a duality of mind and body

 

our focus is the undivided unity that is the propositional actor

 

whether a propositional action helps or hinders a propositional actor –

 

is a matter clearly open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and what counts as a ‘help’ or ‘hinder’?

 

to one propositional actor – what is a ‘help’ – to another may be regarded as a hindrance

 

the point being that these proposals of ‘help’ and ‘hinder’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – This proposition is clear from Prop. 7, Part II. or even from Prop. 14, Part II.

 

 

Note. – We see then that the mind can suffer great changes, and can pass now to a state of greater or lesser perfection; these passions explain to us the emotions of pleasure (laeitiza) and pain (tristitia). In the following propositions I shall understand by pleasure the passion by which the mind passes to a higher state of perfection, and by pain the passion by which it passes to a lower state of perfection. Again, the emotion of pleasure relating simultaneously to the mind and the body I shall call titillation or excitement (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas); the emotions of pain, however, grief (dolor) or melancholy (melancholia). But it must be noted that

titillation and grief have refence to man when one part above the rest is affected; but

merriment or melancholy when all parts are equally affected. Now what was desire I have explained in the Note of a Prop. 9, Part III., and besides these I do not acknowledge any primary emotion, for I shall show that all others follow from these in the following propositions. but before proceeding any further I must more concisely explain Prop. 10 of this part, so that it may be more clearly understood in what manner one idea can be contrary to another.

 

‘greater or lesser perfection’ – is a confused notion

 

perfection – I would think by definition – is not a relative notion –

 

for if it is – you have imperfect perfection – and perfection that exceeds perfection – which doesn’t make any sense at all

 

‘In the following propositions I shall understand by pleasure the passion by which the mind passes to a higher state of perfection, and by pain the passion by which it passes to a lower state of perfection.’

 

so – Spinoza’s analysis of pleasure and pain is based on his incoherent concept of relative perfection

 

and as for ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ – I see no reason to see pleasure and pain in these terms

 

‘higher’ and ‘lower’ – make sense in a geometrical context – but not in the context of sensation and experience

 

furthermore – and most importantly – just how we describe the proposals – ‘pleasure’ – and ‘pain’ – and how we distinguish them – are matters – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Again, the emotion of pleasure relating simultaneously to the mind and the body I shall call titillation or excitement (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas); the emotions of pain, however, grief (dolor) or melancholy (melancholia).’

 

‘simultaneously to the mind and body’

 

if mind and body are one – as Spinoza proposes – there is no simultaneity

 

there is just the affect on the person / propositional actor – that is the person / propositional actor as an undivided unity

 

and given this – then the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are philosophically irrelevant

 

‘But it must be noted that titillation and grief have refence to man when one part above the rest is affected; but merriment or melancholy when all parts are equally affected.’

 

titillation – grief – merriment and melancholy are descriptions of propositional states –

 

descriptions – and though quite useful – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

i.e. – are titillation and grief – descriptions that apply ‘to man when one part above the rest is affected?

 

can you really talk here in terms of ‘parts’ being affected?

 

would it not be the case that the whole person is affected?

 

and isn’t this division into parts – whatever they are supposed to be – if you are going to go that way – logically speaking – quite arbitrary?

 

and just an observation – but from what I have seen – grief can be all consuming – as indeed can be excitement or titillation

 

strictly speaking there is nothing against Spinoza’s proposal here – or for that matter any other proposal on the subject –

 

but the logical reality is that any proposal – any description or account of emotional states – is open to question

 

‘Now what was desire I have explained in the Note of a Prop. 9, Part III., and besides these I do not acknowledge any primary emotion, for I shall show that all others follow from these in the following propositions. but before proceeding any further I must more concisely explain Prop. 10 of this part, so that it may be more clearly understood in what manner one idea can be contrary to another.’

 

what we desire – is what we propose – to ourselves or others –

 

and so ‘desire’ – is a description of propositional action – of propositional behaviour – and as such – open to question

 

Spinoza’s analysis of pleasure and pain – is based on his incoherent notion of perfection

 

he may well wish to explain ‘all other’ emotions – in terms of pleasure and pain – but in so doing he just extends the incoherence to ‘all other’ emotions –

 

not a good result

 

(Note continued)

 

In the Note on Prop. 17, Part II., we showed that the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body as long as the body exists. Again, it follows from what we showed in Coroll., Prop. 8, Part II., and its Note, that the present existence of our minds depends on this alone, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Then we showed that the power of the mind by which it imagines and remembers things depends (Prop. 17 and 18, Part II., and its Note) on this, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining is taken away as soon as

the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. But the cause on account of which the mind ceases to affirm the existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (Prop. 4, Part III.), nor the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (Prop. 6, Part

II.) the cause on account of which the mind affirms the existence of the body is not that the body begins to exists, wherefore by the same argument it cannot cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but (Prop. 8, Part II.) this arises from another idea which cuts of the existence of our body, and consequently of our mind, and which, therefore, is contrary to the idea which constitutes the essence of our mind.

 

‘In the Note on Prop. 17, Part II., we showed that the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body as long as the body exists. Again, it follows from what we showed in Coroll., Prop. 8, Part II., and its Note, that the present existence of our minds depends on this alone, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.’

 

‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional activity –

 

‘the body’ is a name for propositional activity –

 

the present existence of the propositional actor – ‘involves’ propositional activity

 

‘Then we showed that the power of the mind by which it imagines and remembers things depends (Prop. 17 and 18, Part II., and its Note) on this, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining is taken away as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body.’

 

‘imagination’ and ‘memory’ are descriptions of propositional actions

 

actions of the propositional actor

 

these propositional actions are possible / exist – as long as the propositional actor – is propositionally active –

 

 

PROP. XII. The mind, as much as it can, endeavours to imagine these things which increase or help the power of acting.

 

 

‘the mind … as much as it can’

 

‘as much as it can’ – basically leaves the matter uncertain

 

that is the first point here –

 

secondly – how do we know propositional action will increase the power of acting?

 

there is no certainty there

 

thirdly – as to what the end of any action is –

 

is not this a matter that is – logically and existentially – a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain?

 

finally – it is not at all clear to me – that human propositional action is always directed to the end of increasing the power of action

 

the fact – the brute fact is – we propose – that is the bottom line

 

and as to ends and goals – will yes – we do propose such –

 

however – I would put that a good deal of propositional action – is not goal directed –

 

it is rather just propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and in the end – what is ‘power’ – but any propositional action?

 

yes – you can boost your propositional action with rhetoric – or down play it with rhetoric – but all that this amounts to – is pretension and hyperbole

 

 

Proof. – As long as the human body is affected in a mode which involves the nature of an external body, so long the human mind regards the same body as present (Prop. 17, Part II.); and consequently (Prop, 7. Part II.), as long as the human mind regards any external body as present, that is (Note on that Prop.), as long as it imagines, so long the human mind is affected in a mode which involves the nature of the external body. And therefore as long as the human mind imagines those things which increase or help the power of acting of our body, so long the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of acting (Post. 1, Part III.), and consequently (Prop. 11, Part III.) so long the power of thinking in the mind is increased or helped. And therefore (Prop. 6 or 9, Part III.) the mind as much as it can endeavours to imagines those things. Q.e.d.

 

‘As long as the human body is affected in a mode which involves the nature of an external body, so long the human mind regards the same body as present (Prop. 17, Part II.); and consequently (Prop, 7. Part II.), as long as the human mind regards any external body as present, that is (Note on that Prop.), as long as it imagines, so long the human mind is affected in a mode which involves the nature of the external body.’

 

firstly – an ‘external’ body is a proposal –

 

a proposal put by a propositional actor

 

and what exists – is what is proposed –

 

and exists – as long as the proposal is entertained

 

‘And therefore as long as the human mind imagines those things which increase or help the power of acting of our body, so long the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of acting (Post. 1, Part III.), and consequently (Prop. 11, Part III.) so long the power of thinking in the mind is increased or helped. And therefore (Prop. 6 or 9, Part III.) the mind as much as it can endeavours to imagines those things. Q.e.d.’

 

our power rests in critical activity –

 

that is – in putting our proposals / propositional actions to question to doubt – and in exploring propositional uncertainty

 

 

PROP. XIII. When the mind imagines things which diminish or hinder the power of acting of the body, it endeavours as much as it can to remember things which will cut off their existence.

 

 

that which diminishes or hinders the propositional actor’s power of acting – is non-critical thinking

 

the rational propositional actor will – will endeavour to avoid the trap of non-critical thinking

 

 

Proof – As long as the mind imagines any such thing, so long the power of the mind and the body is diminished or hindered (as we have shown in the prev. Prop), and, nevertheless, it will imagine it until the mind recalls some other thing which cuts off its present existence (Prop. 17 Part II.), that is (as we have just shown), the power of the mind and body is decreased or diminished until the mind imagines some other thing which cuts off its existence, which, therefore the mind (Prop. 9, Part III.) as much as possible endeavours to imagine or recall. Q.e.d.

 

 

we don’t have from Spinoza – an account of just what ‘diminish’ or ‘hinder’ amounts to –

 

what I regard as a hindrance to my action – may well be seen in a different light by another

 

i.e. – what I regard as a hindrance – may be proposed as an opportunity by another –

 

and therefore – be proposed in a positive light

 

and I may even come to this view – on reflection – that is – critical reflection

 

so – my point is that – how we describe our propositional action – is at base – uncertain

 

and it is this uncertainty that enables us to proceed rationally – in whatever propositional circumstance we find ourselves

 

recalling ‘some other thing’ which cuts off its existence – is to say no more than that – if we are to behave rationally – we will behave critically

 

but logically speaking – it is not as simple as Spinoza makes out –

 

for recalling ‘some other thing which cuts of its existence’ – may in Spinoza’s terms – not improve the situation – however that is assessed

 

our critical approach to propositional action – logically speaking – is an on-going process

 

at some point in any evaluation – we adopt a view – an interpretation of our propositional state

 

even so – the matter is still open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that the mind is averse to imagining those things which diminish or hinder its power and that of the body.

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action – the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action –

 

there is no power of one propositional action over another

 

propositional actions – however described – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Note. – From this we clearly understand what is love (amor) and what hatred (odium),

namely, that love is nothing else than pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause; and hate pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. we see again that he who loves necessarily endeavours to keep present and preserve that which he loves; and, on the other hand, he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the thing he hates. But concerning these there are will be more to say later on.

 

‘love’ and ‘hate’ are proposals open are open to interpretation

 

‘love’ and ‘hate’ are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

an external cause is a proposal – open to question and uncertain

 

a lover may endeavour to keep present and preserve that which he loves – however it is possible that he decides to let it go

 

and one may hate – without endeavouring to remove or destroy

 

PROP. XIV. If the mind were once affected at the same time by two emotions, when afterwards it is affected by one of them it will also be affected by the other.

 

this is an argument for machines – for robots –

 

as in – rule-governed – propositional games – in the form of functioning mechanisms  

 

if applied to human beings – it is misapplied

 

firstly – the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity –

 

which is to say the ‘mind’ – is any proposal put

 

and ‘emotion’ – a description of – or category of – propositional activity

 

it is a description – that has become entrenched in our propositional behaviour – presumably because it is useful

 

but the point is – any so called ‘emotion’ – is a proposal – a proposition put –

 

if we experience an ‘emotion’ – we have put a proposal – which we describe as ‘emotion’ –

 

secondly – a proposal put – is not two proposals put –

 

we do not put – or experience – two proposals at the same time –

 

one proposal may follow another – but there is no such thing – as proposals put simultaneously –

 

and of course – there is no guarantee that if P1 is followed by P2 at T1 – that P2 will follow P1 at T2 –

 

no one can predict future propositional activity

 

and furthermore – there is no necessity regarding what happens in propositional reality

 

propositional activity is contingent – which is to say – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Proof. – If the human body was affected once by two bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines one of them it will immediately recall the other (Prop. 18, Part II.). But the imaginations of our mind indicate rather the modifications of our body than the nature of external bodies (Coroll, 2, Prop. 16 Part II.). Therefore if the body, and consequently the mind (Def. 3, Part II.), was once affected by two emotions, when afterwards it may be affected by one it will also be affected by the other. Q.e.d.

 

‘But the imaginations of our mind indicate rather the modifications of our body than the nature of external bodies’

 

the ‘imaginations of our mind’ – are simply proposal puts – described – classified as ‘imaginations’

 

and what they indicate – what any proposal ‘indicates’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the ‘nature’ – of anything – is no more than a proposal described – and as such – open to question

 

‘external bodies’ – is a proposal – open to question

 

in any case – what we are dealing with here is different proposals – different propositional descriptions – different ‘propositional categories’ – and therefore – what we have – is a clear-cut critical state of affairs –

 

and that state of affairs – from a logical point of view – is on-going – that is – never finally resolved

 

‘Therefore if the body, and consequently the mind (Def. 3, Part II.), was once affected by two emotions, when afterwards it may be affected by one it will also be affected by the other. Q.e.d.’

 

the body is a name for propositional action

 

the mind is a name for propositional action

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ are cancelled out here –

 

and what is left – what we have – and what we deal with is – propositional action

 

it does not follow if the propositional actor is affected by an emotion / propositional action (E1) – and then by another emotion / propositional action put (E2) – that afterwards – when affected by E1 – he will be affected by E2 – or vice versa –

 

the propositional actor is not a machine

 

propositional action is uncertain – propositional experience – is uncertain

 

one cannot predict future propositional activity

 

 

PROP. XV. Anything can accidentally be the cause of pleasure, pain or desire.

 

 

the experience of pleasure – is the proposal of pleasure – the experience of pain – the proposal of pain – the experience of desire – the proposal of desire

 

as to the ‘cause’ of these proposals – of these experiences –

 

the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

logically speaking – it is not a matter of accident – rather – uncertainty

 

Proof. – Let us suppose the mind simultaneously affected by two emotions, by which one neither increases or diminishes the power of acting, and the other which increases or diminishes it (Post. 1, Part III.). It is clear from the previous proposition that when the mind is afterwards affected by that one through its true cause which neither increases (by hypothesis) nor diminishes through itself the power of thinking, it will be affected at the same time by the other which increase or diminishes its power of thought, that is (Note, Prop. II, Part III.), it will be affected by pleasure or pain; and therefore the former, not through itself, but accidentally, will be the cause of pleasure or pain. And in this way it may easily be shown that that thing could accidentally be the cause of desire. Q.e.d.

 

the propositional actor affected by two emotions simultaneously –

 

is to say that two proposals are put simultaneously –

 

one proposition may follow another – but two at the same time – makes no sense –

 

and the supposed proposal / emotion – which Spinoza says comes from a ‘true’ cause – is one that has no effect – which means – it is a proposition that has no effect –

 

and a proposition that has no effect – is not a proposition put – is not a proposition

 

and Spinoza makes the odd and I would say ridiculous claim that this supposed proposition – which has no effect – can in fact be the cause of the proposition / emotion which does have effect – which increases or diminishes the power of thinking

 

and that this ‘proposition’ of no effect – will be – can be – the cause of pleasure or pain

 

and therefore could ‘accidentally’ cause desire

 

this is such a shambles – it is hard to know where to start

 

the propositional reality is that our emotions are what we propose –

 

and as to the cause of our propositions – described as ‘emotional’ – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we just do – experience pleasure and pain –

 

and saying this – is to just state a fact about human beings – and indeed other animals

 

how we account for this fact – is open to question

 

but the idea that these emotional proposals – come out of a so called ‘non-emotional’ proposal – a proposal that has no effect – makes no sense

 

for any proposal – any emotional proposal – has effect –

 

if there is no effect – there is no proposal – and where there is no proposal – there is no emotion

 

 

Corollary. – From the fact alone that we have regarded something with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though it were not the effecting cause, we can love or hate that thing.

 

 

yes – we can love or hate that thing – but love or hate are not the only propositional / emotional options

 

we can – i.e. – regard it with rational disinterest –

 

‘that thing’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain

 

and – any description of it – i.e. – in terms of ‘love’ – in terms of ‘hate’ – will be open to question

 

and – if one should go for ‘love’ or ‘hate’ – these proposals – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain.

 

as a natural fact we propose / experience pleasure and pain – and how we interpret – understand – and explain these proposals / emotions – is open to question

 

there is no necessity in any of this –

 

and that I think is no more than common sense

 

 

Proof. – From this alone it comes to pass (Prop. 14, Part III.) that the mind, after imagining the said thing, is affected by the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (Note, Prop, 11, Part III.), that the power of the mind or body is increased or diminished: and consequently (Prop. 12, Part III.) that the mind is desirous of, or averse to, imagining it. (Coroll., Prop. 13, Part III.), that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.). that it loves or hates it. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the mind after imagining the said thing is affected by the emotion of pleasure or pain,’

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity

 

‘imagination’ is a name for propositional activity

 

what we ‘imagine’ – is what we propose

 

‘the emotion of pleasure or pain’ – is the proposal of pleasure or pain

 

and the only ‘power’ here – is just the fact of proposal – and it its critical evaluation

 

propositional power – is rational power

 

just how the proposals of pain and pleasure are understood – is no straightforward matter –

 

‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

just as – what we love and hate – and how we understand ‘love’ and ‘hate’ – are matters – that from a rational point of view – are open to question – and are uncertain

 

 

Note. – Hence we understand how it comes to pass that we love or hate certain things without having any known cause for it, but only what they call sympathy (sympathia), and antipathy (antipathia). To this we should also refer those objects which affect us with pleasure or pain merely owing to the fact that that they have something in common with something that is wont to affect us with pleasure or pain, as I shall show in the following proposition. I know that certain writers who first introduced these terms, sympathy and antipathy, wished to signify thereby certain occult qualities; but nevertheless I think we may by the same terms understand known or manifest qualities.

 

‘Hence we understand how it comes to pass that we love or hate certain things without having any known cause for it, but only what they call sympathy (sympathia), and antipathy (antipathia).’

 

yes – the cause of why we hate or love anything is unknown in a final sense

 

in practise we can and do propose causal explanations – explanations – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and we proceed with such explanations – if they serve a proposed purpose – and we proceed in propositional uncertainty

 

the proposal put by Spinoza as to how we come to love or hate certain things – is fair enough in itself – it is as good as any other such proposal

 

his argument for it is logically confused – but nevertheless – the idea that we love what gives us pleasure – and hate what causes us pain – prime facie – has sense to it

 

my point is not that this view of the matter is wrong – but rather that it is a proposal that is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

Spinoza cannot accept this propositional reality – he holds that his proposal has the imprimatur of certainty – that it follows from premises that are certain

 

the argument fails at every step

 

 

PROP. XVI. From the fact alone that we imagine anything which has something similar to an object which is wont to affect the mind with pleasure or pain, although that in which the thing is similar to the object be not the effecting cause of these emotions, nevertheless we shall hate or love it accordingly.

 

 

there is no guarantee that one’s propositional reaction in one circumstance – will be the same in a different circumstance –

 

why should it be?

 

the propositional reality here – is uncertain

 

‘we will hate or love it accordingly’ –

 

only if we have no critical capacity –

 

which is to say – only if we cannot think –

 

that is – cannot recognise – discriminate and evaluate – different propositional circumstances

 

Spinoza seems to think – that what he calls the ‘mind’ – has no critical capacity –

 

and so – we can ask – well – what in his view does the ‘mind’ – do?

 

 

Proof. – We have regarded that which is similar to the object itself (by hypothesis) with the emotion of pleasure or pain; and therefore (Prop. 14, Part III.) when the mind is affected with its image, at the same time it is also affected with this or that emotion,

and consequently a thing which we see to have this will be (Prop. 15, Part III.)

accidentally the cause of pleasure or pain. And therefore (prev. Coroll.), although that

in which it is similar to the object is not the affecting cause of these emotions, we nevertheless will love or hate. Q.e.d.

 

‘image’ – is a description of a proposal

 

and ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –

 

and a proposal put – effects – has an effect in propositional reality

 

pleasure and pain are propositional descriptions of propositional effects / affects

 

whether a proposal has the effect of pleasure – pain – or the absence of either – is an uncertain matter

 

and any propositional effect / affect – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we don’t necessarily love what gives us pleasure – or hate what gives us pain

 

the propositional descriptions ‘love’ and ‘hate’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a so called ‘similar’ thing – is a different thing –

 

both may give me pleasure – but I may love one – and not the other –

 

or not love either

 

 

PROP. XVII. If we imagine a thing that is wont to affect us with the emotion of sadness to have something similar to another thing which equally affects us with the emotion of pleasure, we shall hate and love that thing at the same time.

 

 

prime facie – to hate and love a thing at the same time – is to be involved in a contradiction

 

a contradiction is not a proposal – a contradiction does not assert – a contradiction does not propose

 

a contraction in so far as it is put forward as a valid or meaningful proposition – is a logical fraud –

 

we do not love and hate – at the same time

 

we may propose love – and in the next instant propose hate

 

love may follow hate – hate may follow love

 

even in the moments of passion – we can critically evaluate our propositional responses –

 

we put our propositional responses to question – to doubt – and we explore their uncertainty

 

and if we do not critically evaluate our emotional propositions – we act irrationally

 

 

Proof. – This thing (by hypothesis) is through itself a cause of pain, and (Note, Prop. 15, Part III.) in so far as we imagine with that emotion we hate it; and in so far as we imagine it to have something similar to another thing which is wont to affect equally with an emotion of pleasure, we love it equally with an impulse of love (pre. Prop.). And therefore we hate and love it at the same time. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘This thing (by hypothesis) is through itself a cause of pain’

 

‘the thing’ – is a proposal

 

pain – is a proposal – a propositional response to it – or more generally – to a propositional circumstance

 

the cause of any such response is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

pain is uncertain

 

if we hate a ‘thing’ – but love ‘something similar’ – we hate one thing – and love another – even if it is ‘similar’

 

there is no – ‘it at the same time’ –

 

what you have – and I would have thought this is obvious – is different ‘its’ – different proposals – and different propositional responses to these proposals

 

 

Note. – The disposition of the mind, which arise from two contrary emotions, is called wavering of the mind (animi fluctuatio), and it has the same relation to the emotions as doubt has to imagination (Note, Prop. 44, Part II.); nor is doubt any difference between wavering of the mind and doubt save that of magnitude. But it must be noted that I have deduced in the previous propositions these waverings of the mind from causes which cause one emotion through itself and of the other accidentally. I did that in order that they might the more easily be deduced from those which went before; and not because I deny that the waverings of the mind generally arise from an object which is the affecting cause of either emotion. For the human body (Post. 1, Part II.) is composed of many individuals of different nature, and therefore (Ax. 1, after Lemma 3, which see after Prop. 13, Part II.) it may be affected by one and the same body in many different modes; and, on the other hand, because one and the same thing can be affected in many modes, therefore it can affect one and the same part of the body in different ways. From which we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of contrary emotions.

 

‘The disposition of the mind, which arise from two contrary emotions, is called wavering of the mind (animi fluctuatio), and it has the same relation to the emotions as doubt has to imagination (Note, Prop. 44, Part II.); nor is doubt any difference between wavering of the mind and doubt save that of magnitude’

 

a propositional action described as an ‘emotion’ – may be followed by a contrary propositional action describe as an emotion

 

this will occur when the uncertainty of the first propositional response – is explored –

 

or when – in the absence of critical exploration – we behave irrationally

 

these different propositional responses do not occur simultaneously

 

what Spinoza refers to as ‘wavering of the mind’ – is uncertainty

 

uncertainty is logical and natural

 

proposals – described as ‘of the imagination’ – as with any proposal – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘doubt’ – is the door to the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

if ‘wavering of the mind’ – is to have any teeth – it means the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

in logical behaviour – there is no ‘magnitude of doubt’ – there is only the logical fact of doubt – and its exploration

 

‘But it must be noted that I have deduced in the previous propositions these waverings of the mind from causes which cause one emotion through itself and of the other accidentally. I did that in order that they might the more easily be deduced from those which went before; and not because I deny that the waverings of the mind generally arise from an object which is the affecting cause of either emotion.’

 

‘more easily deduced from those that went before’ –

 

here Spinoza – effectively – shows us that he cannot maintain his ‘simultaneous’ fiction

 

an object as the affecting cause of either emotion?

 

an object is a proposal –

 

an object / proposal – critically explored will reveal its uncertainty –

 

in response to propositional uncertainty – we propose – we put forward different proposals

 

‘For the human body (Post. 1, Part II.) is composed of many individuals of different nature, and therefore (Ax. 1, after Lemma 3, which see after Prop. 13, Part II.) it may be affected by one and the same body in many different modes; and, on the other hand, because one and the same thing can be affected in many modes, therefore it can affect one and the same part of the body in different ways. From which we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of contrary emotions.’

 

the human body is a name for propositional action –

 

propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any propositional action – can be seen as an endless domain of propositional contexts – of explorations of uncertainty

 

propositions – are a result of critical logical activity – question – doubt – and the exploration of logical uncertainty

 

‘one and the same thing’ – that is a proposal – can be given any number of propositional interpretations –

 

all of which are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XVIII. A man is affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a thing past or future as from the image of a thing present.

 

 

as a ‘necessary’ proposition (as with all such propositions) – this is plainly false

 

any proposal – described as ‘of pleasure or pain’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

in plain terms – circumstances change – what was regarded with pleasure or pain in the past – may not be so regarded in the present – or in the future –

 

in fact – the idea that there cannot be any change in what gives us pleasure or pain – confounds common sense

 

this might sound harsh – but I have to say –

 

Spinoza’s ethics – his psychology – if anything it is a denial of human emotions

 

 

Proof. – As long as a man is affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a thing, he regards the thing as present, although it may not exist (Prop. 17, Part II., with its Coroll.), nor will he regard it as past or future save in so far as its image is connected with the image of time past or future (Note, Prop. 44. Part II.), Wherefore the image of the thing considered in itself is the same whether it refers to time present, past, or future, that is (Coroll.2 Prop. 16, Part II.), the disposition of the body or the same whether the image of the thing be present, past or future. And so the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same whether the image of the thing be present,

past, or future. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘As long as a man is affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a thing, he regards the thing as present, although it may not exist (Prop. 17, Part II., with its Coroll.), nor will he regard it as past or future save in so far as its image is connected with the image of time past or future (Note, Prop. 44. Part II.)’

 

‘the same emotion of pleasure or pain’?

 

it will not be the same emotion of pleasure or pain –

 

here we are dealing with different proposals – different emotional propositions –

 

in practise they may fall under the same description – and this is not unknown in day- to-day language use – e.g. – the colour grey – apparently fifty shades – at least –

 

there are many different greys – and yet we commonly use the one term ‘grey’ to cover all variations

 

critical analysis will show that while the same description is often convenient and useful – it is not logically precise

 

different circumstances – different times and different places – mean different proposals – different descriptions – different propositional contexts –

 

‘Wherefore the image of the thing considered in itself is the same whether it refers to time present, past, or future, that is (Coroll.2 Prop. 16, Part II.), the disposition of the body or the same whether the image of the thing be present, past or future. And so the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same whether the image of the thing be present,

past, or future,’

 

this ‘image considered in itself’ – is a philosophical fiction

 

no image / proposal – is separate to its propositional context –

 

and any propositional context is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

quite clearly past present and future are different propositional contexts – and should be recognised as such

 

 

Note I – I call a thing past or future in so far as we were or shall be affected by it. E.g., in so far as we saw it, it refreshed us or shall refresh us, it hurt us or shall hurt us, etc. For in so far as we imagine it in this manner, thus far we affirm its existence, that is, a body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing; and therefore (Prop. 17, Part II.) the body is affected by the image the thing in the same manner as if it were present. But in truth as it often happens that those we have great experience waver when they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt as to the event of it (see Note, Prop. 44, Part II.), hence it comes about that emotions which arise from similar images of things are not constant, but are usually disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured of the issue of the thing.

 

‘I call a thing past or future in so far as we were or shall be affected by it. E.g., in so far as we saw it, it refreshed us or shall refresh us, it hurt us or shall hurt us, etc.’

 

‘in so far as we were or shall be’ –

 

a past proposal – is a remembered proposal – a remembered propositional state

 

a future proposal – is an expected proposal – and expected propositional state

 

such proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘For in so far as we imagine it in this manner, thus far we affirm its existence, that is, a body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing; and therefore (Prop. 17, Part II.) the body is affected by the image the thing in the same manner as if it were present’

 

what exists is what is proposed – what is proposed – is what exists

 

what does not exist – is not proposed –

 

a remembered proposal / image – has a different propositional context to an expected proposal / image – or to a proposal put that does not have a memory context – or to a proposal put that is not based in a context of anticipation

 

these propositions are the same – only in so far as they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘But in truth as it often happens that those we have great experience waver when they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt as to the event of it (see Note, Prop. 44, Part II.), hence it comes about that emotions which arise from similar images of things are not constant, but are usually disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured of the issue of the thing.’

 

what Spinoza calls ‘wavering’ here – is uncertainty

 

uncertainty is the ground of all propositional activity

 

whether ‘disturbed by the images of other things’ – (that is – other proposals) – or not

 

any proposal put – in any propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

‘until men become assured of the issue of the thing’

 

‘the issue of the thing’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

logically speaking there is no assurance

 

assurance – is pretention

 

we proceed with a proposition – if we think it will be useful – or more useful than other propositions put

 

this decision to proceed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we proceed in uncertainty

 

 

Note II. – Now from what has been said we understand what is hope (spes), fear (metus), confidence (securitas), despair (desparito), joy (gaudium) and disappointment (conscientiae morsus). For hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure arisen from the image of a thing future or past, or whose even we are in doubt; fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant sadness arisen from the image of a doubtful thing. Again, if doubt be removed from these emotions, hope becomes confidence, and fear despair, that is, pleasure or pain arisen from the image of a thing which we fear or hope. Joy, again, is pleasure arisen from the image of a thing past, of whose event we were in doubt. Disappointment is this with pain substituted for pleasure.

 

 

hope – is grounded in propositional uncertainty – as is fear –

 

‘if doubt is removed from these emotion’?

 

in so far as confidence – is without doubt – and despair is without doubt –

 

these emotions – these propositional states – are pretensions

 

human beings are pretentious – and it seems – need to be –

 

which is just another way of saying we are rational and irrational animals

 

joy and disappointment – as with any propositional / emotional state – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

I think there is a lot to be said for Spinoza’s view that sadness is a loss of power – that is – of propositional power – and that we experience joy when we are propositionally empowered

 

in my view – pain is a result of propositional blockage – or ‘bondage’ – to use a Spinozistic term – and pleasure – a result of an absence of propositional restraint – of propositional freedom

 

our propositional / emotional experience – is open to different propositional descriptions – i.e. – ‘hope’ – ‘fear’ – ‘confidence’ – ‘despair’ – ‘sadness’ – ‘joy’ – ‘painful’ – ‘pleasurable’ –

 

these propositional descriptions have proven useful in our attempt to map and navigate or emotional lives – and in propositional use – they are descriptions which have been shown to have staying power

 

however – at base they are proposals – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XIX. He will be saddened who imagines that which he loves to be destroyed; if he imagines it to be preserved he is rejoiced.

 

 

perhaps he will be saddened

 

however – he may have a different perspective – a different propositional response

 

he may take the view that he has had the use of that which he loves – but accepts that when it is gone – so be it

 

so – no sadness here – rather something of a stoic equanimity

 

or he could be actually pleased to see it go – loved as it was – it had become a burden for whatever reason

 

Spinoza’s attempt to strait-jacket emotional responses – just does not accord with the fact of human emotional action and responses

 

when it comes to how we propose our emotional responses – it is just not the case that one size fits all

 

Spinoza’s psychology is naïve – simplistic – dogmatic – and false

 

 

Proof. – The mind in so far as it can, tries to imagine those things which increase or help the power of acting of the body (Prop. 12, Part III.), that is (Note, Prop. 13), those things which it loves. But the imagination is aided by those things which impose existence on a thing, and, on the other hand, hindered by those things which cut off existence from a thing (Prop. 17, Part II.). Therefore the images of things which impose the existence of a thing that is loved, help the endeavour of the mind wherewith it endeavours to imagine the thing that is loved, that is (Note, Prop.11, Part III.), they affect the mind with pleasure; and, on the other hand, those things which cut off the existence of a thing that is loved, hinder the endeavour of the mind, that is (same Note), they affect the mind with pain. And so he will be saddened who imagines that which he loves to be destroyed. etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘The mind in so far as it can, tries to imagine those things which increase or help the power of acting of the body (Prop. 12, Part III.), that is (Note, Prop. 13), those things which it loves.’

 

‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional activity –

 

power – is the ability to put our proposals to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty

 

the propositional actor critically engaged – is exercises his / her propositional power

 

‘those things it loves’ – are – as with anything else – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

love – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘But the imagination is aided by those things which impose existence on a thing, and, on the other hand, hindered by those things which cut off existence from a thing.’

 

what exists is what is proposed – whether that which is proposed – is described as ‘of the imagination’ – or not

 

‘those things which cut off existence from a thing’ –

 

this is a rather crude statement

 

what doesn’t exist is what is not proposed –

 

existence is a propositional uncertainty

 

‘a thing’ – is a proposal – a proposal is put – and if put exists – nothing ‘cuts it off’ –

 

the proposal is put – or it is not – it is considered – or it is not –

 

if not considered – it drops out of the propositional picture

 

‘Therefore the images of things which impose the existence of a thing that is loved, help the endeavour of the mind wherewith it endeavours to imagine the thing that is loved, that is (Note, Prop.11, Part III.), they affect the mind with pleasure; and, on the other hand, those things which cut off the existence of a thing that is loved, hinder the endeavour of the mind, that is (same Note), they affect the mind with pain.’

 

my proposal is that pleasure is a result of propositional flow – of propositional freedom –

 

and pain – a result of propositional blockage – of propositional restraint –

 

and this proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XX. He will be rejoiced who imagines what he hates to be destroyed.

 

 

in the Note to Prop. 13, Part III, hatred is defined as pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause

 

now we can go with this – but it must be pointed out that this definition of hatred – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

i.e. – I may well experience pain – and propose an external cause for the pain – but not hate that which I regard as the external cause

 

I may just see the external cause as a natural fact – that is to be neither loved or hated – approved of or disapproved of –

 

and so – regard it with acceptance and tolerance

 

just what hatred is – is not a straightforward matter –

 

‘hatred’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

you will find different definitions of hated – different understandings –

 

and from a logical point of view – that is as it is – and – is as it should be

 

a person may rejoice in the destruction of what causes his pain – but he may not –

 

i.e. – his enemy – who has caused him pain – dies – however he doesn’t ‘rejoice’ in the others demise – perhaps he wishes they could have found some resolution to their differences before his death – and so – he suffers because of the death

 

and that is just one possible response –

 

there are any number of other propositional /emotional responses in such a situation – as is the case in any propositional situation

 

and any response – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – the mind (Prop. 13, Part III.) endeavours to imagine those things which cut off the existence of other things by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or hindered. that is (Note on same Prop.), it endeavours to imagine those things which cut off the existence of such things as it hates. And therefore the image of a thing which cuts off the existence of that which the mind hates, helps that endeavour of the mind, that is (Note, Prop. 11. Part III.), affects the mind with joy. And so he will be rejoiced who imagines the destruction of that which he hates. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘mind’ – is propositional activity

 

we know – both from a logical point of view – and empirically – that propositional activity is multifarious

 

so yes – the propositional actor – may –

 

‘imagine those things which cut off the existence of other things by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or hindered. that is (Note on same Prop.), it endeavours to imagine those things which cut off the existence of such things as it hates’ –

 

but there is no necessity in this –

 

the basic fact is we don’t know – how any propositional actor will propose / imagine – until they do –

 

objectively speaking the possibilities are endless –

 

what we do know is that propositional activity – cannot be forecast – cannot be predicted with any certainty

 

and what we do know is that any propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

however – I want to say that the strategy of avoiding propositional action which is deemed to diminish or hinder – our propositional activity – makes perfect sense to me

 

and I came to this view after reading Spinoza

 

why burden yourself with proposals that will not enable you to proceed in a positive manner?

 

bear in mind I am talking about a propositional / psychological strategy here –

 

and I am not arguing that it has any certainty about it –

 

on balance I think it is a rational way to proceed – however – as with any propositional strategy – it is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

and we do know as a matter of empirical fact that it is not a strategy that is universally employed –

 

we know that propositional actors adopt different strategies –

 

you will find arguments – for exactly the opposite perspective – and you will find the opposite perspective practised – i.e. – there are those who see pain and suffering as the ground of knowledge and wisdom

 

I do not take this view – and like Spinoza – I would argue against it –

 

unlike Spinoza though – I do not think that his view is all there is to propositional possibility – to propositional activity – to propositional life –

 

or as Aristotle put it in the Nicomachean Ethics (1098a 18) -

 

‘one swallow does not a summer make’

 

 

PROP. XXI. He who imagines that which he loves to be affected by pleasure or pain, will also be affected by pleasure or pain: and these will be greater or lesser in the lover according as they are greater or lesser in the thing loved.

 

 

‘that which he loves’ –

 

we propose love – and any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

which is to say – we love without any certainty – without any certainty as to what the proposal of love amounts to –

 

‘love’ – is a propositional exploration

 

nevertheless – we love – and propose love in relation to other proposals

 

‘He who imagines that which he loves to be affected by pleasure or pain, will also be affected by pleasure or pain’

 

this is quite wrong – as it stands –

 

yes – I may feel / propose pleasure when i.e. – someone I love feels pleasure – but just easily – I may not –

 

i.e. – I may regard their proposed pleasure – as based on a failure to really understand their circumstance – and so regard it as something to be pitied

 

would I always be pained by another’s pain?

 

what if I saw their pain as being a means to the end of them achieving better understanding?

 

my point here is that Spinoza’s ‘analysis’ – is fatally simplistic and rigid

 

we cannot predict – emotional responses –

 

the best we can do is map out possible propositional responses – and even then – keep an open mind –

 

Spinoza wants to strait-jacket human propositional responses –

 

the propositional reality – the empirical reality – is that any such attempt is false from the start

 

‘and these will be greater or lesser in the lover according as they are greater or lesser in the thing loved.’

 

not necessarily so –

 

one’s propositional response to the ‘thing loved’ – could well be one of rational disinterest – that is – without pleasure or pain

 

 

Proof. – The images of things (as we showed in Prop. 19, Part III.) which impose existence on the thing loved, help the mental endeavour by which it tries to imagine the thing loved. But pleasure imposes existence on the thing feeling pleasure, and the more so according as the emotion of pleasure is greater, for it is a transition to a greater state of perfection (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.). Therefore the image of pleasure in the thing loved helps the mental effort of the lover, that is (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) it affects the lover with pleasure, and the more so according as this emotion was greater in the thing loved: which was the first point. Then in so far as the thing is affected with pain. thus far it is destroyed, the more so according to the greatness of the affecting pain (same Note, Prop. 11. Part III.): and therefore (Prop. 19, Part III.) he that imagines what he loves to be affected with pain will also be affected with pain, and the more so according as the emotion was great in the object loved. Q.e.d.

 

‘The images of things (as we showed in Prop. 19, Part III.) which impose existence on the thing loved, help the mental endeavour by which it tries to imagine the thing loved.’

 

the thing loved – is a proposal – images are proposals –

 

existence is proposed – that which exists is that which is proposed –

 

‘the mental endeavour’ – if it is logical – is the action of putting our propositional actions – to question – to doubt – an is the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

‘tries to imagine the thing loved’ –

 

there is no ‘tries to imagine’ – you imagine / propose – or you don’t

 

‘But pleasure imposes existence on the thing feeling pleasure, and the more so according as the emotion of pleasure is greater, for it is a transition to a greater state of perfection (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.).’

 

one’s pleasure – is a propositional response – to the that loved

 

and love – a propositional response – to a proposal

 

pleasure as with any proposal is open to question – open to description –

 

what is ‘greater pleasure’?

 

presumably – it is a relative proposal

 

as to – ‘a greater state of perfection’ – ‘perfection’ – is a synonym for certainty

 

there is no certainty – there is no perfection

 

these notions of ‘perfection’ and certainty – are pretentious – and cynical

 

they show a contempt for the propositional world

 

‘Therefore the image of pleasure in the thing loved helps the mental effort of the lover, that is (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) it affects the lover with pleasure, and the more so according as this emotion was greater in the thing loved: which was the first point.’

 

‘the image of the pleasure in the thing loved’

 

the thing loved – is a proposal – the image of pleasure – is a proposed description of the proposal

 

it doesn’t ‘help’ the mental effort of the lover – it is the ‘mental effort’ – that is the propositional action of the ‘lover’ – the propositional actor

 

the emotion – is not the ‘thing loved’ – the emotion – is the propositional action of the propositional actor

 

pleasure is pleasure – in different circumstance – pleasure will have different descriptions

 

‘Then in so far as the thing is affected with pain. thus far it is destroyed, the more so according to the greatness of the affecting pain (same Note, Prop. 11. Part III.): and therefore (Prop. 19, Part III.) he that imagines what he loves to be affected with pain will also be affected with pain, and the more so according as the emotion was great in the object loved’

 

pain – as a propositional response to a proposal – does not ‘destroy’ the proposal –

 

and as for the ‘more so here’ – if – a thing is destroyed – it is destroyed – there is no ‘more so’

 

and again – the emotion is not the object / proposal – loved –

 

the emotion is the propositional response to the object / proposal

.

 

PROP. XXII. If we imagine anything to affect with pleasure what we love, we are affected with love towards it: and on the other hand, if we imagine anything to affect it with pain, we are affected with hatred towards it.

 

 

I may be involved in a relationship with someone – and that relationship – does not give me any pleasure – nevertheless I love that person –

 

and – the relationship may cause me pain – but I don’t hate that person

 

how we propose love – and how we propose hate – and how we propose the relationships of pleasure and pain – love and hate – are clearly – obviously – matters of circumstance – matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza it seems – wants to reduce propositional / emotional action to a propositional rule governed game – where the rule is i.e. – x = y – and that is the end of the matter

 

in so doing – sadly – he shows he has no understanding of propositional reality and no understanding of the nature of the emotions –

 

his black and white view of these matters is not only wrong – it is – in my opinion – dangerous –

 

it takes all the humanity out of human beings – out of propositional reality

 

the human being is not a machine

 

 

Proof. – He who affects a thing we love with pleasure or pain, likewise affects us with pleasure or pain, that is, if we imagine that the object loved is affected with pleasure or pain (prev. Prop.). But this pleasure or pain is supposed to be given in us accompanied by the idea of an external cause. therefore (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), if we imagine anything to affect what we love with pleasure or pain, we are affected with love or hatred towards it. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘this pleasure or pain is supposed to be given in us accompanied by the idea of an external cause’

 

any proposal – is ‘given in us’ – if by that is meant – is proposed by us –

 

as to ‘by an external cause’ –

 

it is likely that we propose an external cause – but it can be that we experience pleasure or pain – without proposing an external cause

 

and further – any proposed ‘external cause’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Note. – Prop. 21 explains to us what is pity (commiseratio), which we may define as pain arisen from the hurt of another. But from what name to call pleasure arisen from another’s good I know not. Then again, we call the love we bear towards him who benefits another, favour (favor), and, on the other hand, the hatred of him who misuses another, indignation (indignatio). It must also be noted that we pity not only a thing that we have loved (as we showed in Prop. 21). but also one which we have regarded hitherto without emotion, merely because we judge it similar to ourselves (as I shall show later on): and so we favour him who benefits something similar to ourselves, and, on the other hand, are angry with him who works it evil.

 

 

‘But from what name to call pleasure arisen from another’s good I know not’ –

 

how about ‘joy’?

 

‘Then again, we call the love we bear towards him who benefits another, favour (favor), and, on the other hand, the hatred of him who misuses another, indignation (indignatio).’

 

yes – you can call it that

 

‘It must also be noted that we pity not only a thing that we have loved (as we showed in Prop. 21). but also one which we have regarded hitherto without emotion, merely because we judge it similar to ourselves (as I shall show later on)’

 

what can ‘similar to ourselves’ – actually mean?

 

similar to our own emotional reaction?

 

if so – you would think that it is not regarded ‘without emotion’

 

‘and so we favour him who benefits something similar to ourselves, and, on the other hand, are angry with him who works it evil’?

 

we favour him who has a positive reaction – and celebrates – something we value – and on the other hand – we are angry with him who has a negative reaction – and who denigrates it

 

that might be the case –

 

however – it could also be the case that we don’t – for whatever reason – favour he who celebrates what we value – or – indeed – are not angered by he who denigrates what we value –

 

we just might not be interested in what the other thinks on these matters –

 

and so have neither a positive or negative reaction to him –

 

that is – we have an open mind on these matters

 

Spinoza doesn’t get that it is not necessary to be approving or disapproving or another’s emotional / propositional reaction –.

 

you can observe a propositional / emotional state of affairs – with rational disinterest –

 

you are not obliged to get into the ring

 

just a note here –

 

in the George Eliot translation of the ‘Ethics’ – the last part of this note goes as follows –

 

‘we shall also feel approbation towards one who does good to his fellow, and on the contrary indignation toward one who does him harm’

 

we can ask here – just what is to count as good’ – and what is to count as ‘harm’?

 

i.e. – one may regard giving to a beggar – a good act – in that it helps someone in distress –

 

and another may see it as perpetuating a hopeless dependency – and as such – a harmful act

 

the point being – what is good – and what is harmful – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

I am reminded here – of Nietzsche’s view on the question of beggars in ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’ –

 

‘Truly, it annoys one to give to them and it annoys one not to give to them’

 

 

PROP. XXIII. He will be rejoiced who imagines that which he hates to be affected with pain; if, on the other hand, he imagines it to be affected with pleasure, he will be saddened: and these emotions will be greater or less according as the contrary emotions were greater or less in the things hated.

 

 

not necessarily –

 

i.e. – seeing someone he hates in pain – he might pity that person – and seeing the person in pain – may cease to hate him –

 

it’s possible

 

and seeing him experiencing pleasure – may not sadden him – but rather leave him – nonplussed – again – it is possible

 

what Spinoza does not understand is possibility – psychological possibility – emotional possibility – ethical possibility

 

his philosophy is deterministic – and as such is unrealistic – simplistic –

and pretentious

 

 

Proof. – In so far as a hateful thing is affected with pain, thus far it is destroyed, and the more so as according it is affected with more pain (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.). Who, therefore (Prop. 20, Part III.) imagines a thing that he hates to be affected with Pain, is inversely affected with pleasure, and the more so according as he imagines the thing hated to be affected with greater pain.: which is the first point. Again, pleasure imposes existence of the thing affected with pleasure (same Note, Prop. 11. Part III.), and the more so according as more pleasure is conceived. If any one imagines that which he hates to be affected with pleasure, this imagination (Prop. 13, Part III.) will hinder his endeavour, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), he who hates will be affected with pain, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘In so far as a hateful thing is affected with pain, thus far it is destroyed, and the more so as according it is affected with more pain’

 

‘Again, pleasure imposes existence of the thing affected with pleasure’

 

a thing is a proposal –

 

proposals put in relation to a thing / proposal – such as ‘affected with pain’ or ‘affected with pleasure’ – don’t ‘destroy it’ or ‘impose existence’ on it – they describe it – they elucidate it

 

they are descriptive proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

pain may depilate – and pleasure strengthen –

 

but there is no necessity here –

 

it is conceivable that pain could be a sustaining and even invigorating force – regardless of love or hate

 

and that pleasure – could in certain circumstances – have a depilating and destructive impact – regardless of love or hate

 

the reality is – we cannot say with any certainty what the impact of any emotional response will be

 

and even when we have an idea – any proposal put in this regard – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – This pleasure can scarcely be found complete, and without any conflict of mind. For (as I shall soon show in Prop. 27, Part III.) a man is saddened in so far as he imagines a thing similar to himself to be affected with pain: and, on the other hand, he is rejoiced if he imagines it to be affected with pleasure. But here we are regarding only hatred.

 

 

‘This pleasure can scarcely be found complete, and without any conflict of mind.’

 

a slip-up from Spinoza –

 

here – for the first time – Spinoza acknowledges uncertainty –

 

no propositional response – in any context – is ever ‘complete’ –

 

and what Spinoza here refers to as ‘conflict’ – is question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –

 

that is the logical activity that is propositional reality

 

 

PROP. XXIV. If we imagine anyone to affect a thing we hate with pleasure, we are affected with hatred towards that person. If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect it with pain, we are affected with love towards him.

 

 

the argument is – if a person causes pleasure to someone we hate – we will hate that person as well – and if that person causes pain to someone we hate – we will love that person

 

the picture we get here of human beings from Spinoza – is that of people with unreflective – uncritical – emotional reactions –

 

these human beings are at the bottom of the emotional barrel – they are literally brutes

 

and Spinoza wants to champion such people as exemplars of human behaviour – when in fact what they represent is ignorance and stupidity

 

Spinoza’s view of human beings is entirely unrealistic –

 

people are not robots with predetermined emotional / psychological reactions –

 

people are free agents – able to critically evaluate their propositional responses – to put them to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty

 

here’s a question for Spinoza –

 

if someone doesn’t react in the manner he prescribes – what is he going to say?

 

will he say they are wrong?

 

Spinoza’s problem is that reality – propositional reality defies his psychological / emotional determinism –

 

yes – there may be some poor bastards in his emotional strait jacket – but even they have the means to be free of his bondage

 

 

Proof. – This proposition is proved in the same manner as Prop. 22, Part III., which we see.

 

 

Note. – These and such emotions as hatred have reference to envy (invidia), which therefore nothing else than hatred itself, in so far as it is regarded as so disposing man

that he rejoices at the pain of another, and is saddened at the pleasure of another.

 

 

Spinoza’s view that you hate that which causes you pain – or love that which gives you pleasure – is I think naïve and simplistic

 

‘love’ and ‘hate’ – as with any proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain concepts

 

someone or something may cause you pain – do you necessarily hate them?

 

is hate – your response?

 

likewise – we don’t always equate love with pleasure –

 

someone may give you pleasure – would you then say – you love them?

 

Spinoza’s psychological / emotional equations here – may well apply with some propositional actors – in some propositional contexts – but to suggest that in all circumstances they apply – does not accord with reality – with propositional / emotional reality

 

you might say that Spinoza has a biblical – view of human beings – and their interactions – Spinoza as an Old Testament prophet?

 

what we get from Spinoza is a prescriptive ethic – not a descriptive ethic

 

and as with any prescription – worth a look – but then you move on to deal with the complexities it hides

 

and we can ask – why should you or I adopt Spinoza’s prescription as universally applicable?

 

because it’s naive – simplistic – and dogmatic?

 

as for envy and hate – I might well envy another’s success – but not hate them –

 

i.e. – I might just wish that I was that lucky

 

‘envy’ – is an open and fluid concept –

 

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves or what we love, everything that we imagine to affect what we love or ourselves with pleasure; and on the other hand, we endeavour to deny, concerning ourselves and the object loved, everything that we imagine to affect us or the object loved with pain.

 

 

how we propose ourselves – and how we propose others or other things – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we propose ourselves in many and varied ways – in many and varied propositional contexts –

 

if we are rational – we do not ‘endeavour’ to propose or affirm ourselves in any one way –

 

yes – pleasure will be sought – but not in all circumstances –

 

and love proposed – is open to question –

 

which is to say – in reality – in practise – love is put to question – is put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

we may endeavour to deny pain – but there will be circumstances when pain is not denied – but rather faced – explored and dealt with

 

 

Proof. – What we imagine to affect a loved thing with pleasure or pain affects us also with pleasure or pain (Prop. 21, Part III,). But the mind (Prop.12, Part III.) endeavours to imagine as much as it can these things that affect us with pleasure, that is (Prop. 17, Part II, and its Coroll.), to regard it as present; and on the other hand (prop. 13, Part III), to cut off the existence of those things which affect us with pain. Therefore we endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves or the thing loved, what we imagine will affect us or the thing loved with pleasure, and contrariwise. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘What we imagine to affect a loved thing with pleasure or pain affects us also with pleasure or pain’

 

perhaps – but not necessarily so –

 

we may love someone – see that they are experiencing pleasure – but not feel pleasure – if i.e. – we think that their experience of pleasure will not advantage them – i.e. – we might propose that it will lead them down the wrong path

 

and again – seeing someone we love in pain – it might well be that we think their experience of pain – is to their advantage – i.e. – in a case where they are in denial regarding an illness – and when they experience the pain – they begin to face facts – and then seek appropriate medical attention

 

‘But the mind (Prop.12, Part III.) endeavours to imagine as much as it can these things that affect us with pleasure, that is (Prop. 17, Part II, and its Coroll.), to regard it as present; and on the other hand (prop. 13, Part III), to cut off the existence of those things which affect us with pain.’

 

this strikes me as an overblown view of the value of pleasure – and of the significance of pain – in people’s lives –

 

it suggests we always seek pleasure – and always avoid pain –

 

yes – we enjoy what gives us pleasure – but it is not always what we seek

 

and yes – we do try to avoid pain – but we are not always trying to avoid pain

 

this pain / pleasure dichotomy of Spinoza’s – is just too limited a view of human endeavour

 

people may put a premium on seeking and acquiring knowledge – and yes – there may be pleasure and pain along the way – but the end is knowledge

 

and also – there are those who think that the best way to live – is to achieve a state of consciousness that transcends pleasure and pain altogether

 

how human beings live – their relationship to the experience of pleasure and pain – and the psychological – emotional – and ethical ends that they operate with – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and I think that in these matters – uncertainty is always at the heart of propositional experience

 

 

PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning a thing that we hate, that which we imagine will affect it with pain, and on the contrary, to deny all that we imagine will affect it with pleasure.

 

 

Proof. – This proposition follows from Prop. 23, as the last one follows Prop. 21.

 

 

Note. – From this we see that it may easily come to pass that a man may think too highly of himself or an object of his love, and contrariwise concerning a thing hated. This imagination, when it refers to a man’s thinking too highly of himself, is called pride (superbia), and is a kind of madness wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can do all things which he achieves only in imagination, and which therefore he regards as real, and exults in them as long as he cannot imagine those things which cut off their existence and determines his own power of action. Pride is therefore pleasure arising from a man’s thinking too highly of himself. Pleasure which arise from a man’s thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem or partiality (existimatio): and that is called disdain (despectus)which arises from the fact that he thinks too lowly of another.

 

 

firstly – for Spinoza – hate = pain – pain = hate = love = pleasure = pleasure = love

 

what we have here from Spinoza is a rule governed propositional game –

 

and what we get in this section of the ‘Ethics’ – is variations of the play – variations only within the rules of this psychological ethical game

 

Spinoza’s ethics is a game just as dominoes is a game just as chess is a game –

 

every move is governed by the pleasure-love – pain-hate equations

 

if you think there is or could be more to love than pleasure – or more to hate than pain – you are not playing the game – and Spinoza has nothing to offer you

 

Spinoza has got psychology and ethics all wrong

 

how we deal with emotional reality is not a game – not a game with set rules – set equations

 

our emotional reality is a matter of question – of doubt – and of the exploration of uncertainty

 

our emotional reality is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to Prop. XXVI and its Note –

 

ok – let’s accept this proposition on face value – i.e. – someone you hate – you would like to see suffer – and you don’t want to see them experiencing pleasure

 

what has that got to with someone thinking too highly of himself – or ‘too lowly’ of another?

 

there is no connection that I can see

 

and here we have a pretty dodgy account of pride

 

why is ‘pride’ – thinking too highly of yourself?

 

what if I put that pride is having something like a balanced view of yourself – a realistic view – where you recognise your abilities and recognize your failings?

 

but the real question for Spinoza here – how does one determine what he calls ‘thinking too highly of yourself’?

 

who makes the call – and on what grounds?

 

how we regard ourselves – our sense of identity – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

uncertain – is the key point here

 

in an absolute or final sense – we don’t know how to regard ourselves – or others – for that matter –

 

in practise we operate with uncertain conceptions / proposals – which experience tells us will change over time –

 

our propositional / emotional reality – is a moving feast – moving in an uncertain propositional reality

 

 

PROP. XXVII. By the fact that we imagine a thing that is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion to be affected with any emotion, we are also affected with a like emotion.

 

 

what this proposition puts – is that if someone – to which we have had no emotional response to – has an emotional response – we will have that emotional response – because we are like them –

 

this may be so if you were talking about humans who are identical and have no critical capacity

 

firstly – human beings are not identical with each other – and secondly – we do not react to the experiences of others without thought and consideration

 

any emotional proposal put by ourselves or others – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and it is this uncertainty – that is the ground and basis of difference –

 

and the ground and basis of the possibility of an undetermined propositional / emotional response

 

 

Proof. – The images of things are modifications of the human body the idea of which represent to us external bodies as present (Note, Prop. 17, Part II.), that is (Prop. 16, Part II,), the ideas of which represent the nature of our body and at the same time the nature of the external body as present. If, therefore, the nature of the external body is similar to that of our own, then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve a modification of our body similar to the modification of the external body: and consequently if we imagine anyone similar to ourselves to be affected with any emotion, this imagination will express a modification of our body similar to that emotion, And therefore from the fact that we imagine a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are affected in company with it by that emotion, And if we hate a thing similar to ourselves, we shall to that extent (Prop. 23, Part III.) be affected with it by a contrary emotion not a similar one. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘If, therefore, the nature of the external body is similar to that of our own, then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve a modification of our body similar to the modification of the external body’

 

Spinoza is here saying what happens in another will happen in us – because the other is similar to us

 

what is clear here is that Spinoza is about trashing individuality – on the notion of similarity

 

his ‘similarity’ can only mean ‘identical’

 

human beings are not identical – the idea is monstrous – we are not clones

 

and if Spinoza’s ‘similarity’ means anything less than ‘identical’ – he must make room for dissimilarity – and if he was to do that – his argument falls apart

 

yes – we can propose similarity between individuals – but at the same time we must account for dissimilarity – for difference

 

and the reality – the logical and empirical reality – is that how one human being reacts to another – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

our emotions are uncertain – and reactions – that is our emotional proposals put in relation to others – are uncertain

 

uncertainty is at the heart of the emotions

 

 

Note I. – This imitation of emotions when it refers to pain, is called compassion (commiseratio) (see Note, Prop. 22, Part III.); when it has reference to desire it is called emulation (aemulation), which then is nothing else than the desire of anything engendered in us by the fact that we imagined others similar to us to have that desire.

 

 

you don’t need to experience another’s pain and suffering to recognize it or understand it and respond to it

 

how one responds to another’s pain – is open to question – is uncertain

 

compassion is a positive response to another’s pain –

 

and just what that positive response amounts to – will depend of the people involved and the circumstances –

 

in general – we can say – if you are compassionate – you will recognize the other’s suffering – have some understanding of what it means for them – and do whatever you can to help them

 

and further – genuine compassion – is not an imitation of another’s pain –

 

imitation here – is false compassion

 

does my desire spring from another’s desire?

 

any such desire will involve thought – and critical thought at that – it will come from me – not another

 

and whether my desire is ‘similar to’ another’s – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

desire is not an emulation

 

a so called ‘emulated desire’ – is a fake desire

 

 

Corollary I. – If we imagine any one, whom we have regarded hitherto with no emotion whatever, to affect a thing similar to ourselves with pleasure, we are affected with pleasure towards that person, If, on the other hand, we imagine him to affect it with pain, we are affected with hatred towards him.

 

 

‘a thing similar to ourselves’ – if it is to mean anything – can only mean – ‘another human being’

 

it is possible that when I see a human being affected with pleasure by another – that I regard the other (who – it appears – is the source of that pleasure) – favourably

 

it is just as possible that I regard him in a disinterested manner – or indeed – for whatever reason – unfavourably

 

and if I see another – affected with pain – then I may regard with hatred – the one who it seems causes that affect – (though ‘hatred’ here seems a little strong) –

 

but once again – I may not –

 

i.e. – not knowing the other – his motives and intentions – I may well be uncertain as to how regard his action – and so suspend judgment – and therefore view him without pleasure or pain

 

 

Proof. – This is shown from the prev. Prop. in the same manner as Prop. 22 from Prop. 21.

 

 

Corollary II. – We cannot hate a thing which we pity because its misery affects us with pain.

 

 

I think it is possible to ‘pity’ – someone you hate – if by ‘pity’ is meant – acknowledging another’s pain and having some understanding of it – while hating them – or at least – regarding them negatively

 

if pity is thought to be the ‘taking on’ of another’s pain – as if it is your own – then pity is a pretence –

 

an emotional pretence –

 

this I think is what Spinoza’s view comes to

 

 

Proof. – For if we could hate it, then (Prop. 23, Part III.) we should be rejoiced at its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

 

 

a sadist may well hate another and rejoice in another’s pain –

 

Spinoza’s ‘hypothesis’ – is frankly – too limited

 

 

Corollary III. – We endeavour as much as we are able to liberate a thing we pity from its misery.

 

 

some do – and some don’t

 

 

Proof. – That which affects a thing we pity with pain, affects us also with a similar pain (Pre. Prop.); and therefore we endeavour to recollect everything that can take away its existence or which would destroy it (Prop. 13, Part III), that is (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.) we desire to destroy it or we are determined for its destruction; and therefore we try to liberate a thing we pity from its misery. Q.e.d.

 

 

I imagine most people would agree with this on first sight

 

however – when the matter is put to question – put to doubt – and seen in a particular propositional context – it may not be that straightforward –

 

e.g. – I may ‘pity’ – a mass murderer incarcerated for life – as in – ‘recognise and have some understanding of his suffering’ – but not have any desire to liberate him from his suffering

 

and here is the difference between pity and compassion –

 

a compassionate person recognizes – understands – and acts to alleviate another’s suffering

 

one who just ‘pities’ another – while recognizing their pain – and having some understanding of it – does not act to alleviate it

 

pity is a form of psychological / moral inaction –

 

pity is a moral dead end

 

 

Note II. –The will or appetite of working good which arises from the fact that we pity the thing to which we wish to do good, is called benevolence (benevolentia), which is nothing else than the desire arisen from pity. Concerning love and hatred towards him who worked for good or evil to what we imagined similar to ourselves, see Note, Prop. 22, Part III.

 

 

‘pity’– in Spinoza’s terms – is a pretence

 

and tying benevolence to a pretence is all wrong

 

i.e. – I may see another suffering – acknowledge it – and work to relieve their suffering – not because I experience their pain – and ‘pity’ them – but rather because I think the world would be a better place without that suffering –

 

here you have benevolence without pity

 

‘benevolence’ – as with any proposal – any proposal of virtue – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

finally – our emotional propositional responses – from a logical point of view – are not ‘the taking on’ of another’s pleasure or pain – for this we cannot do –

 

rather our emotional propositional responses are based on – recognizing the other’s emotional / propositional action or state – critically evaluating it – and on the basis of such an evaluation – proposing a course of action

 

any evaluation of the other’s emotional state – and any response to it – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to promote the being of everything that we imagine conducive to pleasure; but what we find repugnant to it or conducive to pain we endeavour to remove or destroy.

 

 

if I see someone who I regard as beautiful – and their beauty gives me pleasure – do I promote their being?

 

I don’t think so – I recognize their being – and appreciate it –

 

and really what would promoting their being amount to?

 

and if I see someone who I regard as ugly and repugnant – and watching them in action is painful – do I try to remove or destroy them?

 

no – I leave them alone – and I move on

 

once again – Spinoza’s pleasure / pain analysis – is shown to be inadequate and limited – not to mention – small-minded

 

there is more to our propositional lives than this simplistic pleasure / pain calculus –

 

how we propose what we experience – is always open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

we may assess a beautiful person or thing – or an ugly person or thing in any number of ways –

 

from any number of different propositional perspectives –

 

perhaps I see the beautiful person or thing – or the ugly and repugnant person or thing – not in terms of my own pleasure – or pain – but rather as expressions of the great variety in the natural world

 

pleasure and pain are part of the propositional picture – but they do not represent the whole propositional landscape

 

we are conscious – and self-conscious beings with critical capacity –

 

we are not pleasure / pain automatons

 

 

Proof. –  We endeavour to imagine as much as possible what we imagine to be conducive to pleasure (Prop. 12, Part III.), that is, (Prop. 17, Part II.), we endeavour as much as possible to regard it as present or actually existing. But the mind’s endeavour or its power of thinking is equal and simultaneous in nature with the body’s endeavour or power in acting (as clearly follows from Coroll., Prop. 7, and Coroll., prop.11, Part II.); therefore we endeavour absolutely to bring about its existence, or (what is the same Note., Prop. 9, Part II.) we desire and strive for it: which was the first point. Again, if that which we think to be the cause of pain. that is (Note, Prop.13. Part II.), that which we hate, we imagine to be destroyed, we are rejoiced (Prop.20, Part III); and therefore (Prop. 11, Part III.) remove it from us, lest we should regard it as present: which was the second point. Therefore everything that is conducive to pleasure, etc. Q.e.d

 

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action

 

there is no ‘simultaneous’ propositional action

 

there is only the propositional action of the propositional actor – however that is further described

 

and if there is endeavour – it is the endeavour of the propositional actor

 

the question is – does the propositional actor endeavour as much as possible to bring about a state of pleasure – and endeavour as much as possible to remove or avoid anything that results in pain and suffering

 

is this what we do?

 

no one would deny that there are circumstances when we do just that –

 

but Spinoza is saying this endeavour – is all we do – that it is the sum of our thought and action

 

and as an empirical fact – this is not the case

 

not all my actions – are an ‘endeavour’ – and not all my endeavours are directed at maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain

 

our propositional activities – are far more diverse and complex than Spinoza proposes – and I think – that he understands –

 

he wishes to discipline human beings to a way of thinking and acting which he regards as natural and morally appropriate

 

and in in this respect he is no different to any other idealogue who attempts to pin down reality – and in so doing misses it completely

 

the big picture – is complex and varied – and most importantly – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s philosophy is an attempt to close down this reality

 

 

PROP. XXIX. We also endeavour to do everything which we imagine men (let it be understood in this and the following propositions that we mean men for whom we have no particular emotion) to regard with pleasure, and, on the other hand, we shall be averse to doing what we imagine men turn away from.

 

 

I fail to see how the definition here of ‘men’ – as those to whom we have no particular emotion – is relevant – makes any difference – to the argument here

 

for if the idea is that we endeavour to do everything we imagine men to regard with pleasure and we are averse to doing what we imagine men turn away from – you would think that that would apply to men – whether or not we have any particular emotion towards them

 

and then the question – do we do this?

 

if Spinoza’s idea in this section of the ‘Ethics’ – is to propose an outline of what men actually do – that is provide a naturalistic description of propositional behaviour – which is what many commentators have thought – then he has missed the target by a long shot – for as a matter of fact – of observation – it is clear that not all propositional action – propositional behaviour is in fact directed at increasing pleasure and minimizing pain –

 

we can and do relate to others in many and varied ways –

 

and our propositional actions in relation to others may have nothing to do with maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain

 

i.e. – our relations with others – our concern – may be epistemological – what they know – and in turn their interest in us may be what we know

 

here it might be put – well – that maximizes pleasure – or minimizes pain etc. – and yes – that kind of reductive argument can always be put – but in the case as I am putting – this not what is actually happening – it is not what the propositional action of either party is in fact directed at

 

any reductive analysis of human propositional behaviour is philosophically seductive – just because it is so simplistic – just because it leaves out all other possibilities –

 

it is time philosophers got away from this trap – though I am not confident we will ever see it –

 

we need to be open to different possibilities – to the great range of possible propositional perspectives – if we wish to genuinely describe ‘natural’ propositional behaviour

 

and the only way we can do this with any confidence – is if we recognize the fundamental uncertainty that is at the heart of propositional behaviour

 

the point is – any ‘fixed’ analysis fails on logical grounds

 

 

Proof. – From the fact that we imagine men to love or hate something, we shall love or hate the same thing (Prop. 27, Part III.), i.e., we are rejoiced or saddened at the presence of that thing (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.); and therefore (prev. Prop.) we endeavour to do everything which we imagine men to love and to regard with pleasure.

 

 

I may love or hate what I imagine others love or hate – but just as equally I may not

 

 

Note. – This endeavour of doing or leaving out something, merely because we may thus please men, is called ambition (ambitio) especially when we try so eagerly to please the mob that we do or omit something to the hurt of ourselves or someone else. Otherwise it is called philanthropy (humanitas). Again the pleasure wherewith we imagine the action of another by which he endeavoured to please us I call praise (laus); but the pain wherewith we turn away from his action I call blame (vituperium)

 

 

so – to the definition of ambition –

 

this is a very limited view of ambition –

 

it fails to take account of the fact that I may have an ambition which has nothing to do with pleasing others

 

I think here – of this very work of Spinoza’s – the ‘Ethics’ –

 

a most ambitious and excellent undertaking –

 

and I think just from the fact that he did not publish it in his life time – that he had questions and doubts – was uncertain about how it would be received –

 

the history of the ‘Ethics’ – backs this up

 

I think Spinoza was ambitious for the ‘Ethics’ because he believed it was a statement of truth – and that is why he completed it –

 

would Spinoza have been concerned if it turned out that nobody read his work –

 

maybe – maybe not

 

‘truth’ – I think was his ambition – not a desire to ‘eagerly please the mob’ –

 

was the ‘Ethics’ – and act of philanthropy – I would say so –

 

and as to praise – I may well praise another not because he has pleased me – but because what he has done – I consider to be – good in itself –

 

and I may ‘blame’ another for his action – not because it is painful to me – but because I think he is responsible for the act –

 

my point here is that how the terms ‘praise’ and ‘blame’ are used – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

there will be different uses – different meanings – of these terms – in different propositional contexts

 

 

PROP. XXX. If anyone has done anything which he imagines to affect others with pleasure, he will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as the cause, or he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he imagines to affect others with pain, he regards himself then with pain.

 

 

Proof. – He who imagines that he has affected others with pleasure or pain is himself affected with pleasure or pain (Prop. 27, Part III.). But as a man (Prop.19 and 22, Part II.) is conscious of himself by modifications by which he is determined for action, whoever has done anything which he imagines to affect others with pleasure, will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, or he will regard himself with pleasure, and, on the other hand, the contrary follows. Q.e.d.

 

 

I may imagine that I have done something that affects another with pleasure – but it may not be the case that what I have proposed explains another’s pleasure –

 

it may appear that way at first sight – but it may turn out that their apparent pleasure has a different source –

 

or it could be that I have misconstrued the effect of my action altogether –

 

or indeed that their apparent pleasure is a pretence

 

and any pleasure that I feel – that I propose in relation to myself – as a result of my actions in relation to another – as with any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

the same applies – in the case of pain

 

 

Note. – As love (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause, therefore this pleasure or pain will be a species of love or hatred. But as love or hatred have reference to external objects, we shall signify these emotions by other names. We shall call pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external (internal?) cause (gloria), and the contrary emotion of pain shame (pudor) – be it understood when this pleasure

or pain arises from the fact that a man thinks himself praised or blamed; otherwise I

shall call the pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external (internal?) cause self-complacency (acquiescentia in seipso), but the contrary emotion of pain I shall call repentance (poenitentia). Again, as it may happen that (Coroll., Prop. 17, Part II.) the pleasure with which anyone imagines he affects others is only imaginary, and (Prop. 25, Part III.) as everyone endeavours to imagine concerning himself that which he imagines to affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a vain man may become proud and imagine himself pleasing to all when he is in reality a universal nuisance.

 

 

‘As love (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause, therefore this pleasure or pain will be a species of love or hatred.’

 

love is whatever it is proposed to be – hate is whatever it is proposed to be –

 

and any proposal regarding love or hate – any proposal at all – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

as to the proposals that love is pleasure or pain accompanied by a proposed external cause –

 

such an explanation of love is clearly open to question

 

firstly – such a proposal – as a generalization – prohibits different conceptions of love – i.e. – that love can occur without an external cause – where its basis is ‘internal’ –

 

it might be put that love is a natural human response to others or other things under certain conditions – or propositional contexts

 

 the same applies to hate –

 

our use and understanding of the proposal of love and of the proposal of hate – can take many and varied forms – and all our expressions of love and hate are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

secondly – we can ask too – whether love is always a matter of pleasure –

 

experience tells us this is not always the case

 

and likewise hate – there are those who hate with pleasure – not with pain

 

and thirdly – do we always have and operate with an explanation – of love or hate?

 

I don’t find it difficult to understand that propositional actors can and do operate with these proposals – without knowing or claiming to know – their origin or nature

 

Spinoza does say –

 

‘this pleasure or pain will be a species of love and hate’ –

 

and this reference to ‘species’ of love or hate – might suggest some flexibility in his view of the nature of love and hate

 

though straight after this statement – he goes right back to the external cause idea –

 

‘But as love or hatred have reference to external objects, we shall signify these emotions by other names.’ –

 

so – it is not clear – what the point is – of the ‘species’ qualification

 

and as he proceeds there is a further complication –

 

he says –

 

‘We shall call pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external (internal?) cause (gloria), and the contrary emotion of pain shame (pudor) – be it understood when this pleasure or pain arises from the fact that a man thinks himself praised or blamed; otherwise I shall call the pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external (internal?) cause self-complacency (acquiescentia in seipso), but the contrary emotion of pain I shall call repentance (poenitentia).’

 

here he raises the possibility of internal cause –

 

which I think is fair enough in itself – but it leaves his theories of love and hate – ambiguous – if not confused –

 

some uncertainty here?

 

people do feel praised or blamed by others at certain times –

 

but do I feel praised or blamed without a second thought – without question – doubt or uncertainty?

 

and who but a fool can be ‘complacent’ without doubt?

 

as for repentance – I think that too – is a propositional state that one is not likely to experience without question or doubt – without some uncertainty

 

‘Again, as it may happen that (Coroll., Prop. 17, Part II.) the pleasure with which anyone imagines he affects others is only imaginary, and (Prop. 25, Part III.) as everyone endeavours to imagine concerning himself that which he imagines to affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a vain man may become proud and imagine himself pleasing to all when he is in reality a universal nuisance.’

 

it is not so much that – ‘the pleasure with which anyone imagines he affects others is only imaginary ‘

 

really what we have here is someone who does not regard his propositional actions critically – that is – does not consider the possibility that he is not pleasing to all – or possibly not pleasing to anyone

 

is he nuisance to all?

 

perhaps he is – perhaps not

 

who is to say how the ‘all’ – the others – will regard him?

 

and as to vanity – is it a positive – or a negative? 

 

I don’t think we can say with any certainty – everything depends on circumstance – and circumstance is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXI. If we imagine anyone to love, desire, or hate anything which we ourselves love, hate, or desire, by that very fact we shall love, hate or desire it the more. But on the other hand, if we imagine that what we love is avoided by someone then we undergo a wavering of the mind.

 

 

‘If we imagine anyone to love, desire, or hate anything which we ourselves love, hate, or desire, by that very fact we shall love, hate or desire it the more.’

 

what this assumes is that you can quantify love – that you can quantify emotions –

 

that they are measurable quantities – that we can talk sensibly about more or less love – more or less hate etc. –

 

our emotions are not quantities – they are better described as qualities – propositional qualities

 

granted people sometimes speak about their emotions as if they are quantities – but there is no logical basis for this – it is just loose talk –

 

and to those who might still say that the emotion of love is measurable – my question is –

 

ok – how do you measure it?

 

the logical reality is that measurement is a rule-governed – propositional game –

 

here we have to ask – in relation to emotions – what are the rules?

 

if there are no rules – then there is no game – there is no measurement

 

you might be able to measure – i.e. – a rise or fall in some physical process – like say blood pressure – but are you then going to say that changes in blood pressure are a measurement love?

 

can you measure the effort someone puts into a loving relationship? 

 

possibly – but then all you measure is effort

 

the quality of their love – relative to another – for whom there is no effort – will be a matter open to question –

 

if we imagine others to love – desire – hate – what we do –

 

then what we are doing is proposing that others have the same response to what we desire – love – or hate

 

such a proposal is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

‘But on the other hand, if we imagine that what we love is avoided by someone then we undergo a wavering of the mind.’

 

that someone else does not love what I love etc – may have no impact whatsoever on my love for the object of my love

 

as for this ‘wavering of mind’ – what Spinoza is referencing here – though he is not going straight to it is – uncertainty –

 

a propositional uncertainty that is the logical reality of any proposal –

 

any propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Proof. – From the very fact that we imagine anyone to love anything, we shall also love it ourselves (Prop. 27, Part III). But we suppose ourselves to love it without this; there is then brought to play a new cause of love whereby our emotion is fostered: and therefore that which we love we shall love with more emotion. Again, from the fact that we imagine anyone to turn away from anything, we shall also turn away from it (Prop. 27, Part III.). But if we suppose that we love it at the same time, then at the same time we shall love and turn away from a thing, or (Note, Prop. 17, Part III.) we shall undergo a wavering of the mind. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘From the very fact that we imagine anyone to love anything, we shall also love it ourselves (Prop. 27, Part III).’

 

this is just plainly wrong –

 

anyone who thinks their propositional reality is simply determined by the propositional reality of others – suffers from idiocy –

 

we might be influenced by another’s proposal – but that influence will – in most cases – be critically reviewed – and reviewed in relation to our own propositional response

 

‘But we suppose ourselves to love it without this; there is then brought to play a new cause of love whereby our emotion is fostered: and therefore that which we love we shall love with more emotion’

 

‘we shall love with more emotion’ –

 

again – our emotion – in this case love – is not quantifiable – love is not a quantity – and therefore cannot be measured –

 

love – and hate – can be put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty – critically explored

 

 

Corollary. – Hence, and from Prop. 28, Part III., it follows that everyone endeavours as much as he can to cause everyone to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates: as in the words of the poet, “As lovers let us hope and fear alike: of iron is he who loves what the other leaves”, (Ovidii Amores, lib.2, eleg.19, vv, 4 and 5).

 

this – as a matter of empirical fact – just doesn’t happen –

 

everyone does not endeavour as much as he can to cause everyone to love what he himself loves

 

and furthermore – anyone on that path would have to regarded as delusional

 

as to the Ovid quote – ‘As lovers let us hope and fear alike’ –

 

lovers who hope and fear alike – suffer from co-dependency

 

healthy love – and love between healthy lovers – is not some attempt at mutual imitation –

 

healthy lovers will be prepared to put their love for each other to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty –

 

for it is only through such exploration that lovers will come to terms with their differences and difficulties – and find a way forward

 

‘of iron is he who loves what the other leaves’

 

this suggests to me that Ovid is saying – those who stick to their guns – even when rejected – those who are not imitators and pretenders – are the ones of real moral strength

 

however – Ovid is wrong here too – for being obstinate in your view – is ignorant and pretentious

 

if we operate logically and rationally – we have – or – strive to have – an open mind – on how we propose our relations with others – on how we propose the world

 

 

Note. – This endeavour of bringing to pass that every one should approve of what anyone loves and hates is in truth ambition (Note, Prop. 29. Part III.); and therefore we see that each one desires that all should live according to his disposition. When this is equally desired by all, they all oppose each other, and while all wish to be praised or loved, they hate each other.

 

 

‘This endeavour of bringing to pass that every one should approve of what anyone loves and hates is in truth ambition.’

 

any endeavour – can be seen as ambition –

 

however – this endeavour – of bringing about that everyone should approve of what anyone loves and hates – is fanciful and ridiculous

 

for a start – we cannot know what everyone loves and hates

 

and as to when we do know what another loves and hates – that is – the other proposes to us what he / she loves and hates –

 

whether we should endeavour to bring that about – will be a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘and therefore we see that each one desires that all should live according to his disposition’ –

 

this may be the case for an ignorant person – but even here – I have my doubts –

 

anyone with basic intelligence – of any understanding – and who has experience of others – recognizes individual difference –

 

and will therefore not expect others to live in accordance with his / her disposition

 

‘When this is equally desired by all, they all oppose each other, and while all wish to be praised or loved, they hate each other.’

 

this doesn’t happen –

 

for in reality – it is not ‘equally desired by all’ –

 

I suspect – it is not in fact – desired by anyone

 

 

PROP. XXXII. If we imagine anyone to enjoy anything which only one can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it to pass that he does not possess it.

 

 

is Spinoza really saying that this is how everyone acts?

 

yes – this is exactly what he is saying –

 

if he was to say some people act in this way – react in this way – one would think that he can have a point –

 

however – his generalization is ridiculous –

 

he cannot know how everyone acts or reacts –

 

and further – experience will show that there are people who simply don’t act – and react – in this manner

 

I would count myself among this number

 

 

Proof. – From the fact alone that we imagine anyone to enjoy anything (Prop. 27, Part III., and its Coroll, 1), we shall love that thing and desire to enjoy it. But (by hypothesis) we imagine there to be an obstacle to this pleasure inasmuch as another may possess it: we shall therefore endeavour to bring it to pass that another should not possess it. Q.e.d.

 

just because someone enjoys something – it just does not follow that ‘we’ – presumably – everyone – will love that thing – or desire to enjoy it –

 

I can enjoy the fact that someone else enjoys something – and indeed – hope that they will continue to enjoy it

 

there may well be someone who wishes to possess what the other enjoys – and who endeavours to bring it to pass that they lose possession of it –

 

but to suggest that this is how everyone is so disposed – is without foundation

 

 Note – We thus see that it is equally the case with most men that their nature is so constituted that they pity those who fare badly and envy those who fare well, and (pre. Prop.) with a hatred proportionate to the love we bear to the thing which we imagine some one else to possess. We see, again, that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that men are pitiful we find they are also envious and ambitious. Now if we would wish to consult experience, we find that she teaches us all this, more especially if we pay attention to the early years of our life. For that we find that children, inasmuch  as their bodies are, so to speak, in equilibrium, will laugh and cry merely because they see others laugh or cry; and whatever they see any one do they immediately desire to imitate, and they desire all things for themselves which they see give pleasure to others: clearly because the images of things, as we said, are they very modifications of the human body or modes in which the human body is affected by external causes and disposed for this or that.

 

 

‘We thus see that it is equally the case with most men that their nature is so constituted that they pity those who fare badly and envy those who fare well, and (pre. Prop.) with a hatred proportionate to the love we bear to the thing which we imagine some one else to possess’

 

Spinoza qualifies here – he goes from ‘all’ to ‘most’ –

 

and really there goes the argument of Prop. XXXII.

 

‘We see, again, that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that men are pitiful we find they are also envious and ambitious.’

 

just how we describe people’s behaviour – in any propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

how these terms ‘envious’ and ‘ambitious’ – are defined – are used – if in fact they are used – is a matter – open to question

 

different propositional actors – in different propositional contexts – will invariably define their terms – their usages – in different ways

 

and any definition – any usage – in any propositional context – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Now if we would wish to consult experience, we find that she teaches us all this, more especially if we pay attention to the early years of our life. For that we find that children, inasmuch  as their bodies are, so to speak, in equilibrium, will laugh and cry merely because they see others laugh or cry; and whatever they see any one do they

immediately desire to imitate, and they desire all things for themselves which they see

give pleasure to others: clearly because the images of things, as we said, are they very modifications of the human body or modes in which the human body is affected by external causes and disposed for this or that.’

 

even if what Spinoza says about how children behave is so – the idea that children’s behaviour can function as a model for all human behaviour – is naïve – and simplistic

 

further – it does not follow that because some children may behave as Spinoza here suggests – that therefore all children do so behave –

 

if the argument here is from experience – then quite clearly – we must keep an open mind – for experience – in all its manifestations – is uncertain

 

and any ‘image’ – however further explained – from a logical point of view – is a proposal –

 

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we endeavour as much as possible to bring it about that it should also love us.

 

 

this can be so – but it can also be – that it is not so

 

one may love another – knowing full well that they will not be able to return that love – for whatever reason –

 

i.e. – they may love another – and in that relationship their love is exclusive

 

in such a case – the lover here – may well just accept – that his / her love cannot be returned

 

 

Proof. – We endeavour to imagine a thing that we love as much as we can above all others (Prop. 12, Part III,). If, therefore, the thing is similar to us, we shall endeavour to affect it with joy above the rest (Prop. 29, Part III.), or we shall endeavour as much as possible to bring it about that the thing loved should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), that it should love us. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘We endeavour to imagine a thing that we love as much as we can above all others.’

 

‘above all others’?

 

we will propose love of others – in different ways – in different propositional contexts

 

and it is not that one love will be above others – rather that our proposals of love will be different

 

and strictly speaking ‘above’ – is a geometrical notion – and one not applicable to understanding emotional propositional states

 

‘or we shall endeavour as much as possible to bring it about that the thing loved should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), that it should love us.’

 

again – this can be so – but it may not be so – i.e. – I may love another – and for whatever reason – not expect – or endeavour to bring about – reciprocity

 

how we propose love for another – and what we expect of such a proposal – will be a matter of propositional context –

 

and even within any propositional context – any such proposal – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we imagine a thing loved to be affected towards us, the greater will be our vain-glory.

 

 

any proposal put – and any proposal to us – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

what this means – in the context of this proposition – is that how we react to what is put to us – is not determined – and is not determined by the propositional actor who puts the proposal to us

 

we may feel flattered by another’s emotional response to something or someone we love –

 

but equally – we may regard such a response in other ways –

 

i.e. – we may see it as well meaning – but overblown – or we could see it as an attempt at ingratiation

 

it is quite possible that we don’t give it any thought at all

 

as to ‘vain-glory’ –

 

if you are given a positive response – and you accept it – I don’t see why you wouldn’t enjoy it and feel affirmed

 

it is possible to make too much of such a response – to lose perspective – this happens 

 

however – you always have the possibility of critically evaluating how you have responded to another’s proposal

 

 

Proof. – We endeavour to imagine a thing that we love as much as we can to make the thing loved love us in return, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), to bring it about that the thing loved should be affected with pleasure accompanied with the idea of

ourselves. And so the more pleasure with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected on our account, the more this endeavour is assisted, that is (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note), the more we are affected with pleasure. But when we are pleased with the fact that we affect another thing similar to ourselves with pleasure, then we regard ourselves with pleasure (Prop. 30, Part III.). Therefore the greater the pleasure with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected on our account, the greater the pleasure with which we regard ourselves, or (Note, Prop. 30, Part III.) the more self-complacent or vain we become. Q.e.d.

 

‘We endeavour to imagine a thing that we love as much as we can to make the thing loved love us in return, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), to bring it about that the thing loved should be affected with pleasure accompanied with the idea of ourselves.’

 

well – we may do this – but we may not –

 

someone may love another – and not expect that love to be returned – or endeavour to have it returned

 

and there can be many different reasons for any such response

 

also – does Spinoza understand that there are people who are more than happy to show love for others – to help others – and remain anonymous?

 

‘And so the more pleasure with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected on our account, the more this endeavour is assisted, that is (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note), the more we are affected with pleasure.’

 

the ‘more’ here is irrelevant – ‘more’ here is just a piece of rhetorical dressing –

 

yes – one may be affected with pleasure – because another experiences pleasure –

 

but again – this may not be the case –

 

i.e. – one may regard another’s pleasure – without pleasure – i.e. – in a rational – disinterested manner

 

‘Therefore the greater the pleasure with which we imagine the thing loved to be affected on our account, the greater the pleasure with which we regard ourselves, or (Note, Prop. 30, Part III.) the more self-complacent or vain we become.’

 

I don’t see why experiencing pleasure because another experiences pleasure – is to be self-complacent – or vain

 

Spinoza speaks here of ‘the greater the pleasure’ –

 

I don’t think pleasure is quantifiable – pleasure is not a quantity – and is not measurable

 

the question for Spinoza here is – ok – how do you – determine what is a greater pleasure – as against a lesser pleasure?

 

we have nothing at all from Spinoza on this matter –

 

I don’t think he even recognizes that it is an issue – and an issue central to his argument

 

PROP. XXXV. If anyone imagines that the thing loved is joined to another than himself with the same or faster bond of love than that which binds it to him, he will be affected with hatred towards the object loved, and envy towards the other.

‘the same or faster bond of love’ –

‘faster’ – here is irrelevant rhetoric –

the ‘speed’ at which someone loves something or someone – is logically irrelevant

what is relevant is only that a proposal of love is put –

at best – this notion of a ‘faster bond of love’ – is poetic 

and as for the ‘same’ – how would you know that one person’s proposal of love – is the same – as another’s?

what you could know – is that another proposes love –

but just what that proposal amounts to – and how it might relate to your own proposal of love – is clearly a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the argument is that if person A proposes loves of an object or person – and finds that another – person B – also proposes love of that object or person – that person A will then hate the object or person – and envy person B –

why would you hate the thing that you supposedly love – just because another also loves it?

and if you both love the same thing – what ground for envy?

‘love’ – here – for Spinoza – is confused with ‘possession’

I might love another – but it makes no sense to say therefore that they are my possession

one does not ‘possess’ another object or person

love for Spinoza – is basically pleasure given or received 

you love that which gives you pleasure – but you don’t therefore possess the thing loved –

so – I think here – Spinoza is confused –

the logic of the matter is this –

‘objects’ are proposals – and we propose in relation to proposals

love – however it is further described – is a proposal put – in relation to an object / person proposal –

and any proposal put – or any proposed relation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

which is to say any propositional state – is uncertain –

and any propositional determination – is logically open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

our reality is the reality of propositional possibility –

Spinoza – it seems – has no concept of propositional possibility 

‘reality’ for Spinoza – is a rule-governed deductive game 

our reality – is not a deductive game – our reality is the reality of proposal – of propositional actional – and as such it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

Proof. – The greater the love towards himself with which the thing loved is affected, the greater his self-complacency (prev. Prop.), that is the greater his pleasure (Note, Prop. 30, Part III.); and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he will endeavour to imagine as much as possible thing loved to be bound to him in the tightest bond of love, and this endeavour or appetite will increase if he imagines any one else to desire the same for himself (Prop. 28, Part III.). But this endeavour or appetite is supposed to be hindered by the image of the thing loved, accompanied by the image of him the thing loved has joined to itself. Therefore (Note, Prop. 11, Part III) he will be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of the thing loved as the cause, and at the same time the image of the other, that is (Note Prop. 15, Part III.), which by reason (Prop. 23, Part III) that he enjoys the object loved, he will envy. Q.e.d.

‘The greater the love towards himself with which the thing loved is affected, the greater his self-complacency (prev. Prop.), that is the greater his pleasure.’

this is to say – the more you feel loved – the greater the pleasure you take in yourself

perhaps –

or could it be that you have your love – affirmed and endorsed – and naturally you take pleasure in this

and as for ‘self-complacency’ – just what that amounts to is open to question

it suggests to me – someone who does not critically evaluate their propositional reality

does not question – doubt – or explore their uncertainty 

someone who is logically asleep

the simple point here is that how you respond to another’s proposal of love – and how

you propose yourself – in response to the other’s proposal of love – is open to interpretation – interpretation that will likely be different – at least can be different – depending on circumstance – depending on propositional context

‘and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he will endeavour to imagine as much as possible thing loved to be bound to him in the tightest bond of love, and this endeavour or appetite will increase if he imagines any one else to desire the same for himself’

this is possible – but it is just one possible response to being loved

and the problem with Spinoza’s conception here – is that he does not take into account – does not consider the fact of circumstance – the fact of propositional context

propositional context just does not figure in his analysis of how people behave –

and for that reason – his analysis – never hits pay dirt

because I am loved – it just may be that given who I am – and given who – the person who loves me is – there is quite a different outcome to the one suggested by Spinoza

it may well be that I am not ‘bound in the tightest bond of love’ – but rather that I simply appreciate the other’s love – and do so without the pretence of exaggeration and rhetoric – or bondage

and that another may propose love of someone that I propose love to – may have no affect on the nature of my proposal

‘But this endeavour or appetite is supposed to be hindered by the image of the thing loved, accompanied by the image of him the thing loved has joined to itself.’

the point is that there may be no hindrance at all – no negative impact at all

‘Therefore (Note, Prop. 11, Part III) he will be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of the thing loved as the cause, and at the same time the image of the other, that is (Note Prop. 15, Part III.), which by reason (Prop. 23, Part III) that he enjoys the object loved, he will envy.’

the picture we get here from Spinoza is of someone who regards love as possession

you do not possess another if you love them –

for one – you can’t possess another – you can only relate to another

and if you think you are possessing another – that the other is your possession – then you completely misconstrue the nature of the other – and indeed of yourself –

there is no love in such a relationship –

any such relationship with the other – or with yourself – can only be destructive – for it is logically corrupt

Note – This hatred towards an object loved together with the envy of another is called jealousy (zelotypia), which therefore is nothing else than a wavering of the soul caused by love and hate at the same time accompanied with the idea of a rival who is envied. Further this hate towards the object loved will be greater according to the joy with which the jealous man was wont to be affected from the reciprocated love of the thing loved, and also according to the emotion with which he was affected towards him who now, he imagines, joins the thing loved to himself. For if he hated this person, by that very fact he will hate the object loved (Prop. 24, Part III.), for that he imagines it to affect with pleasure what he himself hates, and also (Coroll., Prop.15. Part 111.) from the fact that he is forced to join the image of the thing loved to that of whom he hates: this state of affairs generally comes about when a man loves a woman. For he imagines that a woman he loves prostitutes herself to another, is not only saddened by the fact that his own desire is hindered, but also, as he is forced to unite the image of the thing loved with parts of shame and excreta of his rival, he is turned from her. To this also must be added that the jealous man is not received with the same countenance with which the thing loved was wont to greet him, on which account as a lover he will be saddened, as I shall soon show. 

‘This hatred towards an object loved together with the envy of another is called jealousy (zelotypia), which therefore is nothing else than a wavering of the soul caused by love and hate at the same time accompanied with the idea of a rival who is envied.’

‘love and hate at the same time’?

this makes no sense – it is to propose a contradiction

yes – you might love someone – and then hate them – or hate them and then love them

but you cannot propose love and hate simultaneously-

Spinoza’s definition of jealousy – fails because it is based on a contradiction

‘wavering of the soul’ –

if this means uncertainty – propositional uncertainty – a ‘wavering of the soul’ – is understandable – is logical

and here we are talking about a situation where one is uncertain how to regard the other –

but again – this is not love and hate – ‘at the same time’

is the other a ‘rival’ and is the other ‘envied’? –

well – the other may be regarded this way –

however – if one – actually accepts that the lover – no longer loves – if one is at were at peace with that – is the ‘other’ a rival – and a rival to be envied?

it could also be that the lost lover – was more trouble than he or she was worth –

and in that case their new partner – is not a rival – and not to be envied

‘Further this hate towards the object loved will be greater according to the joy with which the jealous man was wont to be affected from the reciprocated love of the thing loved, and also according to the emotion with which he was affected towards him who now, he imagines, joins the thing loved to himself.’

the hate towards the object loved?

there may be hate towards someone – who was once loved – but is no longer loved –

and – there may be no hate at all – again – for whatever reason one might not hate –

one might still love – and accept the change of circumstance –

or one might simply accept the change of circumstance without love or hate

as to the hate being ‘greater’ according to the joy once received from the other –

I think this idea that you can ‘measure’ love and hate – is without foundation – and the claim that you can is best seen as rhetorical –

yes – you may hate the other – but you may have a different response

love and hate are not absolutes –

love and hate are propositional states –

love and hate are proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain 

whatever the circumstances in which they are proposed

I would suggest that lovers know this – and that haters know this – but it seems Spinoza does not

‘For if he hated this person, by that very fact he will hate the object loved (Prop. 24, Part III.), for that he imagines it to affect with pleasure what he himself hates, and also (Coroll., Prop.15. Part 111.) from the fact that he is forced to join the image of the thing loved to that of whom he hates: this state of affairs generally comes about when a man loves a woman.’

it just does not follow that if you hate the new lover of the one you loved – you will hate the one you loved

you may still love your ex-lover – or you may neither love or hate them –

it all depends on the people involved – the circumstances in which they find themselves

so – there is really no point at all in even attempting a generalization –

the best you can do is lay out possible propositional responses

I think whether it is hate or love that you propose – in reality – you will put your proposal to question – to doubt – you will explore its uncertainty

that is to say – if you behave rationally – you will be uncertain

‘this state of affairs generally comes about when a man loves a woman.’-

this state affairs can also come about when a woman loves a man – or a man loves a man – or a woman loves a woman –

really – logically speaking – the correct term here is neither ‘man’ or ‘woman’ – it is ‘propositional actor’

‘For he imagines that a woman he loves prostitutes herself to another, is not only saddened by the fact that his own desire is hindered, but also, as he is forced to unite the image of the thing loved with parts of shame and excreta of his rival, he is turned from her.’

from this it is clear that Spinoza regards a woman loved as a possession of the lover –

he doesn’t understand or accept that a woman can freely choose who she loves – and freely choose who she unites with

and he thinks a woman who chooses another partner should be termed a prostitute

interesting that he does not consider the reverse situation – that is when a man leaves a woman for another woman

has the woman left – lost a possession?

is the man who leaves a prostitute?

apparently not

I think it is fair to say here that Spinoza was a misogynist –

and the real shame of this is that his prejudice against women – really undercuts his metaphysics 

for from a metaphysical point of view – in Spinoza’s philosophy – there are not male and female modifications and modes of God 

metaphysically speaking gender is irrelevant

when it comes to women – Spinoza loses the plot –

he is not the first – and he won’t be last –

and of course – there are women who have lost the plot over men

I get the impression that Spinoza’s experience with Clara Maria – who as a young man he loved and lost – hit hard – and perhaps he never recovered from that experience –

also – his dealings with his sister Rebecca – over their inheritance – would not have left him over joyed

having your desire hindered – may well result in sadness – however that is not necessarily the case –

on reflection – one may i.e. – decide that all things considered – for whatever reasons – one is – or can be – better off – without that desire –

but here of course one must put one’s desire to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty

that is – one needs to be open and rational –

and it is not that difficult to be so

‘but also, as he is forced to unite the image of the thing loved with parts of shame and excreta of his rival, he is turned from her.’

this is some statement! – where to begin?

if you want any indication of Spinoza’s bitterness in relation to lost romantic / sexual love – it’s right here

the parts of shame?

presumably genitalia – but why is any part of the human body – male or female to be regarded as a ‘part of shame’?

I think Spinoza’s reason here is clouded and derailed by pain experienced

in any case – this statement – just doesn’t fit with his metaphysics of the body – the human body as a mode of extension

the ‘excreta of his rival’ –

I had to check out ‘excreta’ in the Oxford dictionary – just to make sure I had this right –

‘waste expelled from the body’

Spinoza is saying – that any man who has lost a lover to another – would ‘unite’ the image of the one loved with the rival’s genitalia and his shit –

a sick and perverse view

the logical reality is that we cannot know how anyone will react in such a situation – or for that matter any propositional situation –

and any proposal put – as to how someone does or will act or react – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

‘To this also must be added that the jealous man is not received with the same countenance with which the thing loved was wont to greet him, on which account as a lover he will be saddened, as I shall soon show.’

what if he was greeted ‘with the same countenance’ by his former lover?

it is possible –

would he no longer be saddened?

the point here is that all we have here from Spinoza is speculation –

and any speculation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

Spinoza conception of jealousy rests on the proposal that one can love and hate at the same time

this is to propose a contradiction – and therefore – this conception of jealousy – is at best – illogical and therefore – irrational

could we take it from this that Spinoza sees jealousy as irrational?

I don’t think so – if anything he believes that jealousy and his understanding of it – is logical within his deductive system

another question is – can one be jealous without hate of the ‘rival’ – and hate of the one – once loved?

yes – I think so –

one could see the loss of one’s lover to another – as a misfortune – and the ‘rival’ as being advantaged – by the misfortune –

and therefore – one would be ‘jealous’ – as in – wish for oneself the good fortune of the 'rival'

as to the one loved – are they advantaged or disadvantaged by their change of partner?

a good question

PROP. XXXVI. He who recollects a thing he once enjoyed, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as those which he first enjoyed it.

 

 

I could recollect / propose a thing enjoyed – but not desire to possess it under the same circumstances as those in which I first enjoyed it –

 

in my current propositional reality – I may regard the thing enjoyed – that is the proposal that I enjoy the thing – as a proposal I would not put

 

I may see that the circumstances – that is – the propositional context – in which I enjoyed something – as a context that at present – I would not wish to be involved in

 

 

Proof. – Whatever a man sees in conjunction with a thing which has delighted him will be accidentally to him a cause of pleasure (Prop. 15, Part III), and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III) he will desire to possess it at the same time as the thing which delights him, or he will desire to possess the thing under the same circumstances as when he first enjoyed it. Q.e.d.

 

 

what is seen in conjunction with a thing that has delighted – might in a different propositional context – lead one to question – to doubt – to be uncertain – regarding that thing – that proposal – that once delighted

 

someone might desire to possess – but such a desire is illogical and foolhardy

 

we don’t possess – we propose – and our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

further one propositional context is not the same as another –

 

propositional contexts are logically different

 

 

Corollary. – A lover will be saddened if he finds one of those attendant circumstances to be wanting.

 

 

the lover may – on reflection – not give much weight at all – to an ‘attendant circumstance’ that is ‘lacking’ – and may in fact regard it as insignificant – and thus not be saddened by its lacking

 

 

Proof. – Now in so far as he finds one circumstance to be wanting, thus far he imagines something which cuts of its existence. But as he is assumed as a lover to be desirous of that one thing or circumstance (pre. Prop.) therefore (Prop. 19, Part III.) in so far as he imagines it to be wanting he is saddened. Q.e.d.

 

 

he may not be desirous of that one thing or circumstance – but still love

 

 

Note. – This sadness, in so far as it refers to the absence of that which we love, is called regret (desiderium).

 

 

I may have loved someone who has passed away

 

do I regret their absence?

 

I may wish they were still alive – yes

 

on the other hand – instead of wishing they were still alive – I might remember the person and my love as it was – recognizing that to wish for what was – is not to face facts – but rather to propose a fantasy

 

is not regret – just this – the proposing of a fantasy?

 

is it not to wish that what was – was not – and what happened – didn’t happen?

 

people do regret – people do propose regret –

 

people propose fantasies

 

and as with any proposal – a proposed regret – a proposed fantasy – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXVII. The desire which arises by reason of sadness, joy, hatred, or love, is greater according as the emotion is greater.

 

 

the desire is greater if the emotion is greater?

 

for this to be the case as stated – it must be possible to measure emotion and to measure desire – and the relation between emotion and desire

 

measurement is a rule-governed propositional game

 

what rules are there for the calculation of emotion and desire?

 

clearly – the notion of measurement is misapplied in relation to emotion and desire

 

still – we have in common usage such phrases as ‘a great love’ – ‘a great’ (as in ‘all-consuming’) desire

 

what such phrases and the like amount to – what they mean – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and who is to say what a ‘great love’ amounts to?

 

a ‘true’ love – an ‘intense’ love – a ‘pure’ love? etc. etc. –

 

and then what does ‘true’ here – come down to?

 

what do we make of ‘intense’ – or ‘pure’ in this context?

 

and as for ‘desire’ – desire is a proposal

 

any proposal of desire – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and so – as it stands – what are to make of PROP. XXXVII?

 

Spinoza makes no attempt to elucidate ‘greater’

 

I suspect it never occurred to him that there was any need to do so

 

the result is that PROP. XXXVII. – is little more than a throw-away line

 

 

Proof. – Sadness diminishes or hinders a man’s power of action, that is (Prop. 7, Part III), it diminishes or hinders the endeavour with which a man endeavours to persist in his being, and therefore (Prop. 5, Part III.) it is contrary to this endeavour, and whatever the power of man affected by pain is, is directed to remove that pain. But (def. pain) the greater the pain the greater it must be opposed to the man’s power of acting. Therefore the greater the pain the more the man endeavour by his power of acting to remove it, that is (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.), the more the desire or appetite with which he will endeavour to remove it. Again, since pleasure (Note, Prop. 11, Part III. increases or helps a man’s power of acting, it can easily be shown in that way that a man affected by pleasure desires nothing else than to preserve that pleasure, and that with the greater desire according as the pleasure is greater. Then since love and hatred are emotions of pleasure and pain, it follows in the same manner that the endeavour, appetite, or desire which arises by reason of love or hatred will be greater according to the love or hatred. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘Sadness diminishes or hinders a man’s power of action, that is (Prop. 7, Part III), it diminishes or hinders the endeavour with which a man endeavours to persist in his being, and therefore (Prop. 5, Part III.) it is contrary to this endeavour, and whatever the power of man affected by pain is, is directed to remove that pain. Therefore the greater the pain the more the man endeavour by his power of acting to remove it, that is (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.), the more the desire or appetite with which he will endeavour to remove it.’

 

 

does sadness diminish or hinder a man’s power of action – his propositional power – and his endeavour to persist?

 

well – it may do –

 

but on the other hand – it may have the effect of motivating him to achieve a different emotional state – and as a result – increase his resolve to persist

 

also – while it is true that we endeavour to remove pain – there can be circumstances where pain cannot be removed –

 

and circumstances where the experience of pain is explored and knowledge is gained from that exploration

 

and this will be the case – however we determine / describe pain – i.e. – as ‘greater’ – as ‘lesser’

 

sadness and pain are propositional states that are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Again, since pleasure (Note, Prop. 11, Part III. increases or helps a man’s power of acting, it can easily be shown in that way that a man affected by pleasure desires nothing else than to preserve that pleasure, and that with the greater desire according as the pleasure is greater.’

 

pleasure – does not always – in all propositional circumstances – increase a man’s power of acting –

 

in a state of pleasure – I might well be less inclined to act

 

or the experience of pleasure might cloud my judgment – and hence hinder my power of action

 

a man affected with pleasure desires nothing else that to preserve that pleasure?

 

not so –

 

a man may desire a break from the experience of pleasure – because he has had enough

 

or because – he feels the need to see the world from a different perspective

 

the experience of pleasure – the propositional state of pleasure – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Then since love and hatred are emotions of pleasure and pain, it follows in the same manner that the endeavour, appetite, or desire which arises by reason of love or hatred will be greater according to the love or hatred.’

 

love and hatred – emotions of pleasure and pain?

 

this is way too simplistic –

 

it fails to take into account that someone can love – and their love is – for whatever reason – painful

 

and hatred – there are those whose hatred gives them pleasure

 

and as for the ‘desire which arises by reason of love or hatred’ –

 

just what form any such desire takes will be a function of circumstance – propositional circumstance

 

objectively speaking – the best you can do here is propose or outline possible propositional scenarios –

 

the hard reality is – you just have to see what happens –

 

and let’s be clear here – ‘desire’ – is a proposal – and a proposal – open to question –

 

open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as indeed is any proposed relation between proposals of love and hate – and the proposal of desire

 

Spinoza – with his ‘greater’ – here – is proposing a rule-governed propositional game

 

it is as if he sees the relation between the emotions and endeavour as mathematically measurable – as a calculation –

 

human emotions are not rule governed – human emotions are not a game

 

human emotions are expressions of propositional uncertainty

 

 

PROP. XXXVIII. If anyone begins to hate a thing loved so that his love for it is clearly laid aside, he will bear greater hatred towards it on that very account than if he had never loved it, and the more so according as his former love was greater.

 

 

Spinoza’s opinions on love and hate – are no more than that – opinions –

 

and as with any opinion – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

he shuns uncertainty – as if by doing so he has established certainty –

 

in so doing – all he does is burrow down into ignorance and prejudice

 

one’s love for someone or something may be ‘clearly laid aside’ – without hate –

 

and ‘hate’ – as far as I can understand it – is nothing but an ignorant prejudice –

 

any emotional proposal – is – as a matter of logic – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

a negative response to someone or something – as with a positive response – cannot – logically speaking – be certain

 

in so far as hate or love – are held to be certainties – they are prejudices – and thus – irrational

 

even so – in the case where someone does hold a prejudice of hate – does it follow that because they once held a prejudice of love – that their hate will be greater?

 

what would ‘greater’ mean here?

 

I think a prejudice rooted in in the delusion of certainty – would – if it continues – be unchanged

 

for if it changed or altered in any respect – it would have been put to question – and if so – logically speaking – no longer would it be a prejudice –

 

we would no longer be talking about hate

 

if one puts one’s negative emotional response to question – we have the possibility of a different propositional outcome to that suggested by Spinoza

 

it is quite possible that the ex-lover puts his original love to question – and realises he was mistaken in his love – and therefore does not regard the other negatively

 

the ex-lover – may ‘lay aside’ his or her love – and simply accept that it has its day – and in so doing be prepared to deal with the new reality – without negativity

 

 

Proof. –  Now if one begins to hate a thing, more of his appetites are hindered than if he had not loved it. For love is a pleasure (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) which man, as much as he can (Prop. 28, Part III.) endeavours to preserve by regarding the thing loved as present (same Note), and affecting it with pleasure as much as he can (Prop. 21, Part III.); his endeavour is greater according as (prev. Prop.) his love is greater, and so is his endeavour to bring it to pass that the thing loved should love him in return (Prop. 33, Part III). But these endeavours are hindered by hatred towards the thing loved (Coroll. Prop. 13 and Prop. 23, Part III.). Therefore the lover (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) will be affected with sadness on this account, and the more so according as his love was greater, that is, besides the pain whose cause is hatred there is also another cause, namely, that he loved the thing; and consequently he will regard the thing loved with a greater emotion of pain, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), he will regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and the more so according as his former love was greater. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘Now if one begins to hate a thing, more of his appetites are hindered than if he had not loved it.’

 

could you hate something – without first having loved it?

 

hate for Spinoza is the consequence of pain – you hate that which cause you pain –

 

and you love that which gives you pleasure

 

could you experience pain in relation something – without first experiencing pleasure in relation to it

 

I think it is pretty clear that this is possible

 

one might be pained by another’s suffering – without having taken pleasure in them – without having loved them –

 

and of course – without hating them

 

would your appetites be hindered by such pain?

 

not necessarily – the experience of pain might sharpen or broaden your appetites

 

‘For love is a pleasure (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) which man, as much as he can (Prop. 28, Part III.) endeavours to preserve by regarding the thing loved as present (same Note), and affecting it with pleasure as much as he can (Prop. 21, Part III.); his

 

endeavour is greater according as (prev. Prop.) his love is greater, and so is his endeavour to bring it to pass that the thing loved should love him in return (Prop. 33, Part III).’

 

any pleasure proposed – is open to question

 

do we endeavour to maintain pleasure as much as possible?

 

I think not

 

pleasure comes and pleasure goes – and I think we all understand that it is not – in any propositional context – a permanent state

 

desiring it as a permanent state – proposing it as a permanent state is delusional

 

and yes – one may endeavour to bring about that the love / pleasure given – is reciprocated –

 

this would be quite natural – but it may not be the case

 

one may love and not expect one’s love to be returned

 

‘Therefore the lover (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) will be affected with sadness on this account, and the more so according as his love was greater, that is, besides the pain whose cause is hatred there is also another cause, namely, that he loved the thing; and consequently he will regard the thing loved with a greater emotion of pain, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), he will regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and the more so according as his former love was greater. Q.e.d.

 

‘beside the pain whose cause is hatred’?

 

up unto this point – my understanding has been that Spinoza is arguing that love is a form of pleasure – and hatred a form of pain

 

here we have it that pain is caused by hatred –

 

so – the question is – is pain caused by hatred – or hatred caused by pain?

 

prime facie – the experience of pain – is not the same as the experience of hatred

 

pain and hatred – are different propositions – different propositional states

 

yes – they may well be related – but they are different states –

 

they are not equivalent

 

and to suggest that they are – or to conflate the two – results in propositional confusion

 

the basic problem here is that Spinoza – in his analysis or definition of hatred – has avoided really dealing with the nature of hatred – and has gone the quick and easy path – and simply defined hatred as pain

 

the result being – we really don’t have an analysis of hatred from Spinoza – just a quick and easy equivalence

 

and it also means – that we don’t get any real analysis of pain –

 

where it looks like analysis is needed – he just conflates pain with hatred

 

and in any case – we have to ask – is hatred always associated with pain?

 

are there not those who take pleasure in hatred?

 

and are there not those who suffer in love?

 

the central concepts of Spinoza’s psychology – pleasure – pain – love – hatred – are not given anything like an adequate account – furthermore – as presented – they are confused

 

his psychology is naïve and simplistic – and simply fails to produce anything like a comprehensive account of human propositional behaviour

 

the best you can say here is that Spinoza has given voice to his own perceptions and prejudices

 

if that had been all that he had set out to do – he would have been eminently successful

 

however – in fact what he claimed to be doing – was outlining a universal theory –

 

there is no such thing

 

at the best we have different propositional perspectives on human behaviour – and any perspective – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him harm unless he fears to receive greater harm from him; and on the other hand, he who loves someone will by the same law endeavour to do him good.

 

 

Proof. – To hate anyone is the same (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) as to imagine him the cause of pain, and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he who hates anything will endeavour to remove or destroy it. But if thence he fears something more painful, or, what is the same thing, something worse, and thinks that he can avoid it by not inflicting that evil which he intended on the person he hates, he will desire to abstain from inflicting evil (Prop. 28, Part III.), and that (Prop. 37, Part III.) with a greater endeavour than that with which he intended to inflict evil, and therefore this error will prevail. The second part of the proof proceeds in the same manner as this. Therefore he who hates, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

here Spinoza effectively defines hate as that emotional state where the hater ‘endeavours to do harm to the hated’

 

is it not conceivable that someone may hate another – and not endeavour to do them harm?

 

i.e. – one might hate another – and simply decide not to have anything to do with them

 

and could it not be the case that if one fears ‘greater harm from him’ – that one would endeavour to do more harm to him?

 

furthermore – one may love another – without endeavouring to do him good –

 

i.e. – one might see one’s love for another as being a sufficient good in itself

 

in the NOTE Spinoza writes –

 

‘… and therefore this error will prevail’

 

which is to say that even if he refrains from inflicting pain on the other – because of the threat of more pain – his motive to do so – will remain –

 

again – this may be the case – but it may not

 

with the prospect of more pain from the other – one may drop one’s original intention to inflict pain on him –

 

and we can ask – why is it an ‘error’?

 

the nature of hate and of love – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

it is this uncertainty that Spinoza cannot face – and therefore cannot deal with

 

as a result – all we get from Spinoza is one view of what hate is – and one view of what love is –

 

he has no understanding of the possible complexities involved in these emotions

 

it is worth pointing out yet again that human beings are not rule governed propositional systems –

 

human beings are not structured as propositional games – human beings are not machines

 

and what this points to is that Spinoza’s geometric deductive methodology – is entirely misapplied when it comes to human beings and the understanding of human emotions

 

deduction is a game that human beings can play –

 

however – the understanding of human beings – is a critical process – an exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

Note. – By good (bonum) I understand here all kinds of pleasure and whatever may be conducive to it, and more especially that which satisfies our more fervent desires, whatever they may be; by bad (malum) all kinds of pain, and especially that which frustrates our desires. We have shown above (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.) that we do not desire anything because we think it is good, but that we think that it is good because we desire it: and consequently that from which we turn we call evil or bad. Wherefore each one judges or estimates according to his own emotion what is good or bad, better or worse, best or worst. Thus a miser considers an abundance of money for the best, and penury the worst. An ambitious man, on the other hand, holds nothing before honour, and turns away from nothing like shame. To an envious man nothing is more pleasing than another’s misfortune, and nothing more pleasing than his good fortune: and thus each one judge according to his emotion whether a thing is good or bad, useful or hurtful. As for that emotion through which a man is so disposed that he does not want what he wants, or wants what he does not want, it is called fearfulness (timor), which therefore is nothing else than fear whereby wherein a man is disposed to encounter a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater one which threatens him in the future (see Prop. 28, Part III.). But if the evil he fears be shame, then the fearfulness is called bashfulness (verecundia). Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil be hindered by the fear of another, so that the person know not what to do, then the fear is called consternation (consternation), especially if both evils feared are very great.

 

 

‘By good (bonum) I understand here all kinds of pleasure and whatever may be conducive to it, and more especially that which satisfies our more fervent desires, whatever they may be; by bad (malum) all kinds of pain, and especially that which frustrates our desires.’

 

we use terms such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ – and these terms – as with any other term – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain _

 

can anyone say with certainty what ‘good’ means?

 

the fact is – the logical reality is – we can’t –

 

and so – any proposal as to the meaning of ‘good’ – is uncertain

 

it is in the face of this logical reality that human beings propose different accounts of ‘good’ –

 

and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

in practice – what this means is that we do operate with different propositional accounts of ‘good’ –

 

and what is behind this differential use – is like the accounts themselves – open to question –

 

one might propose that with changes in circumstances – changes in propositional contexts – one account against another – for whatever reason – comes into play

 

it might also be that one quite consciously changes one view of what is good – as a result of critical analysis

 

and indeed – one may adopt a new view of what is good – without knowing why

 

Spinoza’s definition of ‘good’ – is fair enough

 

what we have to ask though – is does such a definition – cover all uses of ‘good’?

 

Spinoza would probably agree that it doesn’t – but would argue that all this means is that any other use – any different definition – is invalid –

 

Spinoza view is ‘one definition fits all propositional contexts’ – and he is not alone in this –

 

however – any such view is logically flawed – and its only value is rhetorical –

 

the empirical reality is that we have different understandings of good – at different times – and in different propositional contexts – for different reasons –

 

our understandings of ‘good’ – are an exploration of propositional possibility – an exploration of propositional uncertainty –

 

the psychological / ethical life is the on-going discovery of different understandings

 

‘We have shown above (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.) that we do not desire anything because we think it is good, but that we think that it is good because we desire it: and consequently that from which we turn we call evil or bad.’

 

yes – we may think that what we desire is what is good –

 

however – this view takes no account of the fact that humans can desire something –they regard as evil or bad

 

if we only desire what is good – how then evil and bad?

 

if what is evil and bad has no connection with desire – how does it come about?

 

does it just come out of nowhere?

 

‘Wherefore each one judges or estimates according to his own emotion what is good or bad, better or worse, best or worst.’

 

what Spinoza fails to understand here is that judgment – is a critical process – a process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

‘Thus a miser considers an abundance of money for the best, and penury the worst. An ambitious man, on the other hand, holds nothing before honour, and turns away from nothing like shame. To an envious man nothing is more pleasing than another’s misfortune, and nothing more pleasing than his good fortune: and thus each one judge according to his emotion whether a thing is good or bad, useful or hurtful.’

 

perhaps a miser regards an abundance of money as a good in his circumstance – but does not regard poverty as an evil as such

 

one may be ambitious – and have no real regard for honour – and so – not be threatened by shame

 

and I think one can be envious – without wishing for another’s misfortune

 

what is good bad useful or hurtful – is not set in stone – these matters are open to question – to doubt – and are uncertain

 

‘As for that emotion through which a man is so disposed that he does not want what he wants, or wants what he does not want, it is called fearfulness (timor), which therefore is nothing else than fear whereby wherein a man is disposed to encounter a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater one which threatens him in the future (see Prop. 28, Part III.).’

 

if a man does not want what he wants – he does not want it

 

to be fearful – is to in some way to feel threatened –

 

fear is a natural and rational response to threat

 

and could one take a view that encountering a lesser threat – is a way of avoiding a greater threat?

 

well – it would all depend on the circumstances involved –

 

the lesser of two evils may well be a rational choice in some circumstances –

 

but just what is the lesser will always be open to question

 

‘But if the evil he fears be shame, then the fearfulness is called bashfulness (verecundia).’

 

I don’t think this follows at all

 

there are different responses to the prospect of shame –

 

one may bury one’s head in the sand – and wait for what seems to be inevitable –

 

or one may take some action designed to mitigate the prospect – or take action which avoids it altogether

 

‘Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil be hindered by the fear of another, so that the person know not what to do, then the fear is called consternation (consternatio), especially if both evils feared are very great.’

 

whether in the face of fear or not – we can find ourselves not knowing what to do

 

this is a perfectly natural logical state

 

what Spinoza calls ‘consternation’ is in fact uncertainty –

 

one way or another – we are always in a state of uncertainty –

 

and it is in response to uncertainty that we put forward proposals in order to proceed

 

at the end of any day – we act as we act – and any action taken – is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XL. He who imagines himself to be hated by another, and believes he has given the no cause for hatred, will hate that person in return.

 

 

I may not hate the other at all –

 

I may instead regard him as quite simply – mistaken – and in line with that view – dissociate myself from him – and as it were – move on

 

alternatively – I may engage with him – and to try and understand why he hates me – with the idea of making clear to him – that as far I know – he has no cause to hate me

 

and it is also possible that as a result of such an engagement – I come to see that in fact I have offended him without realising it –

 

in which case – it is I who have been mistaken –

 

and if so – an apology from me would be appropriate

 

it is possible too – that the whole matter comes down to a misunderstanding – and one that can be amicably resolved

 

or indeed it could be that nothing gets resolved – and the matter is left hanging

 

as to simply hating him as Spinoza proposes –

 

that is possible – but it strikes me as ignorant and stupid –

 

and by and large – unrealistic

 

because I suspect that most people in this situation – would put the matter to question – to doubt – and engage with the uncertainty of it all

 

 

Proof. – He who imagines any one to be affected with hatred will also be affected with hatred (Prop. 27, Part III.), that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III), with sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But he (according to the hypothesis) imagines no cause of this pain save the person who hates him. Therefore from the fact that he imagines himself to be hated by anyone, he will be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of the person who hates him, or (by the same Note) he will hate that person. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘He who imagines any one to be affected with hatred will also be affected with hatred that is with sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause’

 

I see someone who it appears is animated by hatred –

 

does it follow that I will feel hatred too – or is it that I may simply recognise the hatred in the other?

 

and is that recognition – an affect?

 

if you have too broad a definition of affect – i.e. – it covers everything from awareness to feeling – and then your definition of affect – loses its effect

 

I can be aware of another’s emotional state without being in that state

 

‘with sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause’

 

here it seems Spinoza is defining hatred as ‘sadness accompanied by an external cause’

 

are we to equate hatred with sadness?

 

this I think is a strange definition of hatred – and frankly one that just doesn’t work

 

and in any case – it just does not follow that if I am aware of someone who it seems is full of hatred – that I will be sad –

 

I may be saddened by this – but equally I may have other emotional reactions –

 

i.e. – I may just be surprised – I may be dismissive etc. –

 

hatred is different to sadness – sadness different to hatred –

 

in George Eliot’s translation of this sentence – we have ‘pain’ instead of ‘sadness’ –

 

‘pain’ does fit with Prop XXII. Part III –

 

‘If we imagine anything to affect with pleasure what we love, we are affected with love towards it: and, on the other hand, if we imagine anything to affect it with pain, we are affected with hatred towards it’

 

but again – it just does not follow that I will be in pain – because someone else is full of hatred

 

it is possible that I may be entirely disinterested – i.e. – feel nothing

 

pain does not account for hatred – and sadness – misses the boat altogether

 

the result is that Spinoza’s definition of hatred fails

 

‘But he (according to the hypothesis) imagines no cause of this pain save the person who hates him’

 

well – if so – he lacks imagination – or more to the point – seems to have no critical capacity – for surely one would question the basis of a perceived hatred – and in so doing consider different possibilities

 

just saying ‘it’s the person’ – is dumb – it goes nowhere – it is not an explanation

 

I may not know why someone hates me – and in that case – the matter stays open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘Therefore from the fact that he imagines himself to be hated by anyone, he will be affected with pain accompanied by the idea of the person who hates him, or (by the same Note) he will hate that person.’

 

if I think someone hates me – I would be more curious than anything else – but that’s just me

 

one might be saddened yes – but sadness is not the only possible emotional propositional response

 

and as for hating someone because they hate you – I would think that such `hate’ would be pretty hollow – and more rhetorical than logical

 

 

Note I. – He who thinks he has given some just cause for hatred will (Prop, 30, Part III., and its Note) be affected with shame. But this (Prop. 25, Part III.) rarely happens. Moreover, this reciprocation of hatred can also arise from the fact that hatred follows the endeavour to inflict evil on him who we hate (Prop. 39, Part III.) He, therefore, who imagines he is hated by anyone, will imagine the other as the cause of some evil or pain, and therefore will be affected with sadness or fear accompanied by the idea of him who hates as the cause, that is, he will be affected with hatred against him.

 

 

‘He who thinks he has given some just cause for hatred will (Prop, 30, Part III., and its Note) be affected with shame’

 

he who thinks he has given just cause for hatred may be affected with shame –

 

it depends on the circumstance

 

and can Spinoza say with justification that this ‘rarely happens’?

 

how often it ‘happens’ is an empirical matter – where is his evidence for it happening rarely?

 

alternative to the same argument – one may be hated – and regard the other’s hate as a vindication of his actions

 

and – of course – one may be hated – and not care less

 

‘Moreover, this reciprocation of hatred can also arise from the fact that hatred follows the endeavour to inflict evil on him who we hate’

 

here we have hatred following an act of hatred –

 

the act is the act of hatred – it doesn’t really make sense to say hatred follows hatred

 

‘He, therefore, who imagines he is hated by anyone, will imagine the other as the cause of some evil or pain, and therefore will be affected with sadness or fear accompanied by the idea of him who hates as the cause, that is, he will be affected with hatred against him.’

 

he may think the other is the cause of some evil or pain

 

or he may think the other – in hating him – is mistaken – got it all wrong

 

sadness – fear – and hate are possible affects – but not the only ones –

 

one might – in a given circumstance – laugh it off – or indeed – just simply dismiss it

 

the point is – any emotional affect – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Corollary I – He who imagines that one who he loves hates him, is prey to the conflicting passions of love and hatred; for in so far as he imagines himself to be hated by any one, he is determined also to hate him (prev. Prop.). But (by the hypothesis he loves him nevertheless. Therefore he is prey to the conflicting passions of love and hatred.

 

 

‘conflicting passions of love and hatred’ – is emotional / propositional uncertainty –

 

which is the natural / logical reality of any emotional state – of any propositional state

 

and this propositional uncertainty is the ground for question – for doubt

 

it is not a ground for determinism – quite the opposite

 

 

Corollary II. – If anyone imagines that an ill has been inflicted on him by a person whom he bore no good or evil before, he will immediately endeavour to repay that evil to the person in question.

 

 

he may instead decide to investigate why the evil has been inflicted on him

 

 

Proof. – He who imagines any one to be affected with hatred towards himself will hate that person in turn (prev. Prop.), and (Prop. 26, Part III.) he will endeavour to remember everything that can affect him with pain, and will endeavour, moreover, to inflict this injury on the person (Prop. 30, Part III.). But (by the hypothesis) the first evil he recalls is that one done to himself. Therefore he immediately endeavours to inflict that one in return. Q.e.d.

 

 

he may not hate the person – instead he may try to understand that person

 

as to remembering everything that can inflict him with pain – so as to inflict injury –

 

this is possible –

 

but again – it is not the only possible response –

 

i.e. – he may decide there is no value to him in retribution –

 

and that the evil inflicted on him is something he can live with – he can write off

 

 

Note II. – The endeavour to inflict evil on him whom we hate is called anger (ira): but the endeavour to inflict in return the evil done to us is called revenge (vindicta).

 

 

one can be angry without endeavouring to inflict evil

 

revenge can be the endeavour to inflict the evil done to us

 

however – revenge can be much more sophisticated than that –

 

i.e. – one may take the view that in not responding in kind – one actually wins the day

 

these matters cannot be settled by fiat –

 

different circumstances will elicit different responses –

 

and any response is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XLI. If anyone imagines himself to be loved by someone else, and does not believe that he has given any cause for this love (which in view of Coroll. Prop.15, and Prop. 16, Part III, can come to pass), he shall love that person in return.

 

 

it does not follow that if love is put to you – that you will propose love to the one who has proposed it to you

 

you may regard the love proposed to you – for whatever reason – as love you cannot return

 

as to a ‘cause’ for love –

 

any explanation – any account – or analysis of love given or received – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and as to ‘imagining’ being loved –

 

well – if another person puts that they love you – that is a propositional reality – not an imagination –

 

and whether the proposition is described as imaginary or real – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The proof of this proposition proceeds in the same manner as that of the previous one: see also its note.

 

 

Note I. – If he believes he has given just cause for love, he will exult in it (Prop. 30, Part III, and its Note): that is what most frequently happens (Prop. 2, Part III.); and the contrary of this we said happens when anyone imagines that someone hates him (see Note, prev. Prop.). This reciprocal love, and consequently (Prop. 30, Part III.) the endeavour of working good to him who loves us, and who (Prop. 39, Part III.) endeavours to do us good, is called gratitude (gratia seu gratitudo). It is thus apparent that men are far more ready to take revenge than repay a benefit.

 

 

what is a ‘just cause for love’?

 

anything and everything?

 

if someone has a positive response to your proposal of love (however that came about) you would most likely be pleased

 

but as to the basis of their response – that is open to question –

 

probably a question you will leave to another time

 

are we grateful when someone responds positively to our proposal of love?

 

more relieved than grateful – I would think

 

if someone endeavours to do us good – and it is for us a good – then yes – we will be grateful

 

but it can also be the case that the way to hell is paved with good intentions –

 

and so – it could turn out – depending on the circumstances – that what was proposed as a good – turns out not to be

 

what counts as a good – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘It is thus apparent that men are far more ready to take revenge than repay a benefit.’

really this is an empirical issue – and in so far as we are presumably talking about all men – and presumably all women – there really is no way you could say one way or the other – you just can’t know –

 

Spinoza’s statement here is just rhetoric

 

 

Corollary. – He who imagines he is loved by one whom he hates is prey to the conflicting emotions of hatred and love. This shown in the same way as was the corollary of the previous proposition.

 

 

if by ‘one he hates’ – is meant – someone who has given him pain – will the love proposed – that is the pleasure proposed – as it were – cancel out the pain?

 

that is possible –

 

and if so – where are you at?

 

some kind of emotional neutrality?

 

it is also possible that the proposed love has no effect

 

whatever the case – ‘he who imagines he is loved’ – whether he ‘hates’ the other or not – will – if he is rational – put the proposed love to question – and indeed the proposed hate –

 

for any emotional proposal or propositional / emotional state – is from a logical point of view – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note II. – If hatred prevails over love, he will endeavour to inflict evil on the person who loves, and this is called cruelty (crudelitas), more especially if he who loves is thought to have given no special cause for hatred.

 

 

cruelty may have nothing to do with the person who loves

 

the cruel person may neither love nor hate the object of his cruelty – but inflict pain for no reason – except perhaps to gain pleasure from the act

 

how we understand cruelty – as with any emotional / propositional state – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XLII. He who confers a benefit on anyone, if moved by love, or by the hope of honour, will be saddened if he sees that the benefit is received with ingratitude.

 

 

if the one proposing the benefit – moved by love or the hope of honour – recognizes the uncertainty inherent in any proposal of love – or in any hope – he may not be saddened if the benefit is received with ingratitude

 

i.e. – a parent may see that the benefit he proposes to a child – may not be understood – and in fact may be misunderstood – and he may regard the child’s ingratitude – as ignorance that in time hopefully will be replaced with understanding –

 

and so – he will not be saddened – rather pleased that there will be – as a result of the benefit given – an opportunity for the education of the child

 

 

Proof. – He who loves something similar to himself endeavours as much as possible to bring it about that he is loved in turn by that thing (Prop. 23, Part III.). Therefore anyone who confers a benefit on anyone through love, does so with the desire which

holds him to be loved in return, that is (Prop. 34, Part III), by the hope of honour or (Note. Prop. 30, Part III.) of pleasure: and therefore (Prop. 12. Part III.) he will endeavour as much as possible to imagine this cause of honour, or regard it as actually existing. But (by the hypothesis) he imagines something that cuts off the cause of its existence. Therefore by that very fact he will be saddened. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘He who loves something similar to himself endeavours as much as possible to bring it about that he is loved in turn by that thing’

 

just what loving amounts to – what it involves – how it is proposed – is open to question

 

people can love in different ways – with different perspectives

 

what Spinoza puts here is one perspective on the matter – but it is not the only one

 

there is such a thing as a love without expectation of return

 

i.e. – you love another because you see it as the right thing to do –

 

or you love another because it gives you pleasure

 

 

PROP. XLIII. Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and, on the other hand, can be destroyed by love.

 

 

hatred is a proposal – a proposed emotional state

 

emotional states are not measurable – and so it makes no logical sense to say that an emotional state is increased – or decreased

 

measurement is a rule-governed propositional game –

 

emotional states are not rule-governed

 

any statement to the effect that emotional states are measurable – is to be regarded as rhetorical

 

emotional states are proposals –

 

proposals are not destroyed – proposals are either put or not put

 

one emotional propositional state can be replaced by another – one proposal replaced with another

 

as to the what happens when this occurs – how it is explained or accounted for – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – He who imagines that one whom he hates is affected with hatred towards him will feel to arise in himself a new hatred (Prop. 41, Part III.) while the first hatred

still remains. But if, on the contrary, he imagines that one whom he hates is affected with love towards him, in so far as he imagines this he will regard himself with pleasure (Prop. 30, Part III.) and (Prop. 29, Part III.) will endeavour to please the object of his hatred, that is (Prop. 40, Part III.) he will endeavour not hate him and not to affect him with pain: and this endeavour will be greater or less according to the emotion from which it arises (Prop. 37, Part III.). And so if it be greater than that which arose from hatred, and through which he endeavoured to affect the thing which he hated with pain (Prop. 26, Part III.). it will prevail and remove hatred from his mind.

 

 

‘He who imagines that one whom he hates is affected with hatred towards him will feel to arise in himself a new hatred (Prop. 41, Part III.) while the first hatred still remains.’

 

it is pretentious to presume how anyone will react to any emotional circumstance

 

one needs to see what happens – and even then – to have a critical eye to the matter

 

Spinoza’s psychology / ethics – is pretension writ large

 

if someone you hate hates you back – there are any number of emotional responses possible –

 

i.e. – their hating you back may serve as a justification of you hating them

 

or you may simply see that their hating you – as fair enough – given that you hate them

 

you could even decide – enough is enough – and the time for hating is over

 

‘But if, on the contrary, he imagines that one whom he hates is affected with love towards him, in so far as he imagines this he will regard himself with pleasure (Prop. 30, Part III.) and (Prop. 29, Part III.) will endeavour to please the object of his hatred, that is (Prop. 40, Part III.) he will endeavour not hate him and not to affect him with pain: and this endeavour will be greater or less according to the emotion from which it arises (Prop. 37, Part III.).’

 

someone you hate starts to love you –

 

perhaps you take pleasure in this – or perhaps you regard their proposed love as odd – and really out of place

 

will their proposed love make any difference to how you regard them?

 

maybe – maybe not

 

‘And so if it be greater than that which arose from hatred, and through which he endeavoured to affect the thing which he hated with pain (Prop. 26, Part III.). it will prevail and remove hatred from his mind.’

 

how we explain a change in emotional response – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

human beings are propositional – open to question – and uncertain

 

human beings are not rule-governed geometric structures –

 

to present them as such – as Spinoza does – is at base – illogical –

 

and therefore – a misrepresentation of human nature

 

 

PROP. XLIV. Hatred which is entirely conquered by love passes into love, and love on that account is greater than if it had not been preceded by hate.

 

 

logically speaking – there is no ‘conquering’ of propositional / emotional states – and one state does not ‘pass into’ another –

 

emotional states are propositional –

 

where there is a change from one state to another – what you have is one proposal – one propositional state being replaced by another

 

which is to say one proposal is discarded and another is put –

 

the reason for any such change – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘conquering’ and ‘passing into’ – are rhetorical descriptions of the logical action of question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

emotional / propositional states are not measurable –

 

measurement is a rule governed propositional game

 

when it comes to the emotions there are no rules 

 

for a rule to be – for a rule to function – it must be objectively established and agreed to –

 

this does not happen in the emotional life of propositional actors –

 

any so called ‘measurement’ of propositional / emotional states – is not logical – rather it is rhetorical

 

all we have from Spinoza in Prop. XLIV. – is rhetoric – plain and simple

 

it is quite clear that there are all kinds of differences in emotional states that go by the same name – i.e. – ‘love’ – ‘hate’ – etc.

 

which is only to say – that one’s experience of any emotional state is open to description

 

and further – that any proposed description is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

Proof. – The proof proceeds in the same manner as that of Prop. 38, Part III. For he who begins to love a thing which he hated, or which he was wont to regard with pain, by the very fact that he loves will rejoice: and to this pleasure which love involves (def., Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) is added that which arises from the fact that the endeavour to remove pain which hatred involves (as we showed in Prop. 37, Part III.) is aided, accompanied by the idea of him whom he hated as cause.

 

 

‘hated’ – or ‘want to regard with pain’ –

 

aren’t these the same thing according Spinoza – so why the disjunction?

 

if you love what you once hated – and you are behaving rationally – presumably you have subjected your hate to a critical analysis – and a result of this process – changed your mind on the matter

 

perhaps – you regard ‘him whom you hated’ as the cause – or perhaps not

 

after a critical consideration of the matter – you may come to the view that he was not the cause

 

i.e. – perhaps it was misunderstanding or prejudice on your part?

 

these matters are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – Though this is so, none will endeavour to hate anything or be affected with pain in order to enjoy this increased pleasure, that is, no one desires to work evil to himself with the hope of recovering from this evil, nor desires to be ill for the sake of recovering. For each one will endeavour to preserve his being and remove as much as possible all pain. But if the contrary is conceived, that a man can desire to hate some one in order to love him subsequently with greater love, he will always desire to hate him. For the greater the hatred may be, the greater the subsequent love, and therefore he will always desire that his hatred should become more and more; and by the same system of reasoning, a man would wish to become more and more ill in order to enjoy more pleasure from the subsequent convalescence, and therefore he would always desire to be ill, which is absurd (Prop. 6, Part III.).

 

‘Though this is so, none will endeavour to hate anything or be affected with pain in order to enjoy this increased pleasure, that is, no one desires to work evil to himself with the hope of recovering from this evil, nor desires to be ill for the sake of recovering.’

 

yes – you would think this so – but what of the case of religious zealots who subject themselves to all kinds of privation – and even self-harm – with a view to obtaining a ‘higher consciousness’?

 

and are there not be medical procedures which are painful which people are prepared to undergo – because they hold out the hope of recovery from an illness?

 

‘For each one will endeavour to preserve his being and remove as much as possible all pain.’

 

it is not the case that ‘each one will endeavour to preserve his being’ –

 

there are those who decide to end their lives – for whatever reason –

 

and a common reason for this is to ‘remove’ pain

 

and furthermore – there are those – mainly of a religious bent – who regard pain and suffering as a way to knowledge and enlightenment

 

‘But if the contrary is conceived, that a man can desire to hate some one in order to love him subsequently with greater love, he will always desire to hate him.’

 

so – all we are talking about here is someone who hates another –

 

if you hate someone – you don’t love them

 

love and hate need not be confused

 

‘and by the same system of reasoning, a man would wish to become more and more ill in order to enjoy more pleasure from the subsequent convalescence, and therefore he would always desire to be ill, which is absurd (Prop. 6, Part III.).’

 

masochists gain pleasure from inflicting pain on themselves

 

and there are those who desire to be ill –

 

they are regarded as psychiatrically disturbed

 

unusual – yes – but not absurd

 

Spinoza’s psychology / ethics fails – simply because he fails to see the obvious – the great variety of propositional / emotional responses –

 

and this because he fails to understand propositional logic –

 

any proposal – and any proposal regarding human behaviour – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XLV. If one imagines that anyone similar to himself is affected with hatred towards another thing similar to himself whom he himself loves, then he will hate the first of these two.

 

 

if someone hates someone I love – it does not follow necessarily that I will hate the person who hates the one I love –

 

i.e. – it may be that I regard the hater’s reaction – as having nothing to do with me – or my emotional response

 

and it could be that when the situation is critically investigated – I take the view that the hater – for his or her reasons – is justified in his emotional response to the one I love

 

or – it might turn out – that I regard the hater’s response as mistaken – and without any basis

 

the point here is that any emotional action or response is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

emotionally – we operate in and with uncertainty

 

 

Proof. – The thing loved has reciprocal hatred towards him who hates it (Prop. 40, Part III.), And therefore the lover who imagines that anyone who the thing he loves, by that very fact imagines the thing beloved to affected by hatred, that is (Note, Prop, 13, Part III,), by pain: and consequently (Prop. 21, Part III.) he will be saddened, and that accompanied by the idea of him who hates the thing beloved as the cause, that is (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.), he will hate that person.

 

 

‘the idea of him who hates the beloved as the cause’ –

 

the hater is the propositional vehicle of the hatred – but is the hater the cause of the pain?

 

any proposal regarding propositional cause – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

i.e. – could it be that the hater’s emotional state – is best explained by his propositional back ground?

 

and if so – we could be looking at many and varied ‘causes’ – all open to question –

 

the notion of cause – is simplistic – and generally used to shut down critical consideration

 

cause may appear to have a logical basis – but in truth – its function is rhetorical

 

any emotional state – including hate – if dealt with rationally – is put to question – put to doubt and its uncertainty explored

 

 

PROP. XLVI. If anyone has been affected with pleasure or pain by another person or a class or nation different to his own, and that accompanied by the idea of that person under the general name of that class or nation as the cause of the pleasure or pain, he will love or hate not only that person but all of that class or nation.

 

 

Proof. – the proof of this is clear from Prop.16, Part III.

 

 

this is nothing more than an argument for prejudice –

 

in a sense it is a clear statement of all that has come before in Part III of the Ethics – and I suspect a declaration of what is to come

 

it is an argument for class and national prejudice

 

he does not mention race here – but presumably that would fall under nation

 

furthermore – it is plainly wrong that all people who experience pain – and hate of an individual will therefore hate the class or nation of that individual

 

bigots and racists – yes – but not reasonable – thinking human beings

 

this argument for bigotry and prejudice – is a direct outcome of Spinoza’s refusal to acknowledge that emotional propositions – emotional states – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

I find it hard to believe that he doesn’t see this propositional reality –

 

it strikes me that he has decided to argue against it – in his attempt to secure a dogmatic metaphysics –

 

and in so doing – he shows himself to be blind to propositional reality and the emotional reality of human beings

 

there are those who regard the psychology / ethics of Part III as naturalistic – as a statement of what is the case as distinct from a statement of what ought to be the case

 

what is the case – is always open to question – this something Spinoza does not get

 

and if you think these matters are better dealt in the terminology of ought – and whatever goes with that – the same applies

 

what ought to be the case – as with what is the case – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and once this is understood – you can dispense with the is / ought distinction – as indicating little more than a difference in propositional orientation – or indeed – language use –

 

rational naturalism – is being open – open to question – open to doubt – and open to the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

‘Spinoza’s naturalism’ – is no more than a detailed well-constructed prejudice – wrapped up in a pretence of logic and rationality

 

the best you could say of it is that it is just another piece of rhetoric

 

 

PROP. XLVII. Joy which arises from the fact that we imagine a thing that we hate to be destroyed or affected by some evil never arises without some pain to us.

 

 

I see no reason to assume that if joy arises ‘from the fact we imagine a thing that we hate to be destroyed’ – this joy is always accompanied by some pain

 

perhaps in some cases it is –

 

however – I can well imagine someone simply rejoicing – and not experiencing any pain at all –

 

and further – it is quite possible that joy is not what is experienced –

 

joy is possible – but just as equally someone may simply be relieved –

 

we cannot determine or predict with certainty – any emotional / propositional response

 

it is not a matter of rationalistic fiat –

 

what we are dealing with is propositional contingency –

 

you have to see what occurs – as a first step

 

and then recognise that any propositional / emotional occurrence – is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain

 

 

Proof. – This is clear from prop. 27, Part III. For in so far as we imagine a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain we are saddened.

 

 

Note. – This proposition can also be shown from the Coroll., Prop. 17. Part II. For as often as we recall a thing. although it may not actually exist, we still regard it as present, and the body is affected in the same manner. Wherefore so far as the memory of that thing is strong, man is determined to regard it with pain, which determination, while the image of this thing lasts, is hindered by the recollection of those things which cut off its existence, but it is not removed. And therefore the man is only rejoiced in so far as this determination is hindered; and hence it comes about that this pleasure which arises from the evil suffered by the thing which we hate is repeated as often as we recall the thing, it determines the man to regard it with the same pain with which he was wont to regard it when it existed. But inasmuch as he joins the images of other things to the image of this thing, and these things cut off its existence, so this determination to be affected with pain is hindered at once, and the man rejoices again, and this as often as the repetition takes place. And this the very reason why men rejoice as often as they recall past evils suffered by any one, and why they delight to relate perils from which they have escaped. For when they imagine any peril, they regard the same as future and are determined to fear it; but this determination is coerced by the idea of freedom, which they annexed to the idea of this peril when they were delivered from it, and which renders them secure again: and once more they are rejoiced.

 

‘And therefore the man is only rejoiced in so far as this determination is hindered; and

hence it comes about that this pleasure which arises from the evil suffered by the thing which we hate is repeated as often as we recall the thing, it determines the man to regard it with the same pain with which he was wont to regard it when it existed.

 

the argument here is that in so far as we recall an evil – we will experience the pain of that evil – even if we rejoice in it is absence

 

that I recall the experience of pain – does not mean that I re-experience the pain –

 

I may recall the fact of the pain without being in pain

 

can the recollection be painful? – maybe so –

 

and if so – this experience of pain – that is the recollection – is a different experience to original experience of pain

 

what we are dealing with here is two different propositional states

 

with any emotional issue – in any emotional situation – there is always the question – how are we to respond?

 

in this context we can ask – do we respond with joy or do we respond with pain?

 

this is to put our emotional response to question – to doubt – and explore the uncertainty –

 

this is quite rational

 

however – to suggest – as I think Spinoza does – that we experience some kind of mishmash of joy and pain – is to cancel out both joy and pain – and to propose an emotional state that is neither one thing or the other – that is in fact – a logical confusion –

 

this – I would think – was not Spinoza’s intention – but it is the result

 

‘But inasmuch as he joins the images of other things to the image of this thing, and these things cut off its existence, so this determination to be affected with pain is hindered at once, and the man rejoices again, and this as often as the then repetition takes place.’

 

when we ‘rejoice again’ – we are in a different place and time – and the ‘experience’ of rejoicing again – is a different experience

 

and really do we actually keep rejoicing – every time we remember?

 

I think that is unlikely –

 

I think it more accurate to simply say that we remember rejoicing –

 

and if we express and demonstrate this memory – we are ‘acting out’ how we remember rejoicing at the time –

 

and you could say that this ‘acting out’ – is a form of rejoicing – but again – this joy is not the joy originally experienced

 

‘And this the very reason why men rejoice as often as they recall past evils suffered by any one, and why they delight to relate perils from which they have escaped. For when they imagine any peril, they regard the same as future and are determined to fear it; but this determination is coerced by the idea of freedom, which they annexed to the idea of this peril when they were delivered from it, and which renders them secure again: and once more they are rejoiced.’

 

do men always rejoice as often as they recall the peril escaped?

 

I doubt it – I think perhaps after a while – the rejoicing wears thin – and in any case – it is a remembered joy – not the joy itself as first experienced

 

bear in mind too – any memory – any proposed memory – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

and as to regarding ‘the same as future’ and being ‘determined to fear it’ – perhaps yes – perhaps no

 

as a result of the evil being ‘destroyed’ – one may cease to fear it –

 

and as to the future – rationally speaking – who can say?

 

we are better to leave it as an unknown

 

‘but this determination is coerced by the idea of freedom, which they annexed to the idea of this peril when they were delivered from it, and which renders them secure again: and once more they are rejoiced’

 

yes – if you are free of it – you may rejoice at the time – but on the other hand – you might simply be relieved

 

and I don’t think you are likely to experience any pain from being free of it –

 

and in recalling it – you may very well see clearly that the matter is in the past – and be content to leave it there – and move on

 

 

PROP. XLVIII.  Love and hatred, for example, towards Peter, are destroyed, if the pain which the latter involves, and the pleasure which the former involves, are connected to the idea of another thing as a cause; and each of them will be distinguished in so far as we imagine Peter not to be the only cause of either.

 

 

Proof. – This is obvious from the mere definition of love and hatred, which are in the Note on Prop. 13, Part III. For pleasure is called love towards Peter, and pain hatred towards him merely on this account, that he is regarded as the cause of this or that effect. When this then is either wholly or partly removed, the emotion towards Peter is either wholly or partly removed.

 

 

on the face of it there is a contradiction here –

 

Spinoza begins here by saying that – if love or hatred towards Peter are connected to ‘another thing as cause’ – they are ‘destroyed’

 

and then goes on to say ‘wholly or partly removed’

 

‘wholly or partly removed’ – is not ‘destroyed’ –

 

‘wholly or partly’ – leaves the matter uncertain

 

the cause of love or hatred towards Peter can be differently understood –

 

as any proposal of ‘cause’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

but it does not follow that the love or hatred is therefore removed –

 

it may be – or it may not be –

 

the good news here is that Spinoza seems to have realised that the so called ‘cause’ of love or hatred – is a critical matter –

 

that is – open to question – open to doubt –

 

he doesn’t go so far as to say ‘uncertain’ –

 

however – that is the only logical conclusion that can be drawn from a genuinely critical consideration

 

one gets the impression that Spinoza’s tightly wound dogmatic line may be starting to fray

 

 

PROP. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing which we imagine to be free must be greater than the love or hatred towards a necessary thing, provided both are subject to the same cause.

 

 

Proof. – A thing which we imagine to be free must (Def. 7, Part I) must be perceived through itself without any others. If therefore we imagine it to be the cause of the aforesaid pleasure or pain, by that very fact (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) we shall love or hate it, and that (prev. Prop.) which the greatest love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion. But if we imagine the thing which is the cause of the given effect to be necessary then (Def. 7 Part I.) we shall imagine it not alone, but together with other things, to be the cause of the given effect and therefore (pre. Prop.) our love or hatred towards it will be less. Q.e.d.

 

 

Note. – Hence it follows that men, inasmuch as they consider themselves free, prosecute with greater reciprocal love or hatred than other things: to this is added the imitation of emotions, of which see Prop. 27, 34, 40, and 43, Part III.

 

 

a thing – is a proposal –

 

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘necessary’ here – is a synonym for ‘certain’

 

all propositional actors are ‘free’ – all propositional action is ‘free’

 

and – any so called ‘cause’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘greater love or hatred’ –

 

‘greater’ – presumes that love and hatred – are measurable

 

‘measurement’ – is a rule-governed propositional / logical game

 

there are no ‘emotional rules’ – logically speaking – and so – there is no emotional game – therefore – emotions are not measurable

 

any such statement as – ‘greater love or hatred’ – is rhetorical

 

rhetorical propositions play a part in our propositional lives –

 

I would suggest they play a far greater (excuse the rhetoric here) part than do logical proposals –

 

however – rhetoric is not logic – and is no substitute for it

 

logic is critical evaluation –

 

that is – we put it to question – put it to doubt – and explore its uncertainty

 

and as to emotional proposals – any love or hatred that you propose – in relation to a proposed thing – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. L. Anything can be accidentally the cause of hope or fear.

 

 

Proof. – This proposition is shown in the same way as Prop. 15, Part III, which see, together with the note on Prop. 18, Part III.

 

 

Note. – Things which are accidentally the cause of hope or fear are called good or bad omens (bona aut mala omina). Now in so far as these omens are the cause of hope or fear they are (see def. hope and fear, Note 2, Prop. 18, Part III.) they are cause of pleasure or pain, and consequently (Coroll., Prop. 15, Part III.) thus far we love or hate them, and (Prop. 28, Part III.) we endeavour to attract them as means to obtain that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear. Moreover, it follows from Prop. 25, Part III., that we are so constituted by nature that we easily believe what we hope, but with difficulty what we fear, and that we form too high or too low estimates of these things. From this has arisen superstition, by which men are assailed on all sides. However I do not think it worthwhile to point out here the

waverings of the mind which arise from hope or fear, since it follows merely from the definitions of these emotions that fear cannot be granted without hope nor hope without fear (as I shall explain in more detail in its proper place), and since in so far as we hope or fear anything we love or hate it. And therefore whatever we have said concerning love and hatred any one can apply to hope or fear.

 

 

hope and fear are grounded in propositional uncertainty

 

to hope is to propose a state of affairs that will be to our advantage

 

to fear is to propose a state of affairs that will be to our disadvantage

 

do we hope in relation to the past? – I don’t think so –

 

and what we fear is not what has occurred – but what we imagine could or will occur

 

however – what will occur is unknown

 

and so – hope and fear are really propositional projections against the unknown

 

what Spinoza refers to as ‘waverings of the mind’ – is propositional uncertainty

 

in the absence of a critical approach to hope and fear – we are in the realm of the irrational – and that is where ‘omens’ come in

 

an omen is some kind of reification of the hope or fear –

 

and it is seen to be the cause of an individual’s hope or fear

 

for those who believe in omens – is it necessary that they love good omens – and hate bad omens?

 

I don’t think so –

 

one could simply recognize an omen – without love or hate

 

Spinoza argues omens are a form of superstition

 

however – my point would be that even superstitions such as omens – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

irrational proposals are an ever-present reality and possibility in our propositional lives

 

however – a proposal is only irrational – if not critically evaluated – if not put to question – not put to doubt – and its uncertainty left unexplored

 

(it should be noted too that philosophical theories – such as Spinoza’s – if not held open to question – if not open to doubt – and if their uncertainty is left unexplored – when all is said and done – are no more than sophisticated superstitions)

 

the fact is we don’t need to propose omens to explain hope and fear

 

hope and fear are natural propositional responses to the future

 

and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza says here that ‘that fear cannot be granted without hope nor hope without fear’

 

here as always – we are dealing with propositional circumstance –

 

under some circumstances – yes – we may fear an outcome – and hope that it will not come to pass

 

and there will be circumstances where we hope for a certain outcome – but fear that it will not come to pass

 

however – I think it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that one can hope for a better future – without fearing that it will not be so

 

and likewise with fear –

 

I may fear and outcome and be without hope that it will not come to pass

 

finally –

 

‘And therefore whatever we have said concerning love and hatred any one can apply to hope or fear.’

 

the point here is that love and hatred – as with hope and fear – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. LI. Different men can be affected by one and the same object in different manners, and one and the same man can be affected by one and the same object in different ways at different times.

 

 

an object is a proposal –

 

different men may propose an object in different ways

 

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

therefore – an object proposal can be understood differently – that is – can be proposed and critically evaluated differently – at different times

 

 

Proof. – The human body (Post. 3 Part II.) is affected by external bodies in many ways, Therefore two men can be affected in different ways at the same time, and therefore (Ax. 1 after lemma 3, after Prop, 13, Part II.) they can be affected in various

ways by one and the same object. Again (Post. 3 Part II.), the human body can be affected now in this mode and now in that, and consequently (same axiom) it can be affected by one and the same object at different times in different ways.

 

 

the propositional actor – propose objects

 

a proposal put – can be differently understood by different men at the same time –

 

as any such proposal – logically speaking is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

 

Note. – We thus see that it can come to pass that what one loves another hates: and what one fears another fears not; and that one and the same man may now love what before he hated, and now dares what he feared before, etc. Again, inasmuch as each forms an opinion according to his emotion as to what is good or bad, or what is better or worse (see Note, Note Prop. 30, Part III.)  it follows that men can vary both in opinion and in emotion (this can be although the human mind is a part of the divine intellect, as we have shown in the Note on Prop. 13, Part II.); and hence it comes about that when we compare some people with others, we distinguish them by the difference of their emotions, and that we call intrepid, some timid, and some by some other name. E.g., I call that intrepid (intrepidus) who despises danger who I am wont to fear; and moreover, if I pay attention to the fact that his desire to work evil to him who he hates, and good to him who he loves, is not hindered by fear of the danger which is great enough to restrain me, I call him daring (audax). Then, again, he appears to me timid (timidus) who fears some danger which I am wont to despise; and if I pay more attention to this, that his desire is hindered by the fear which cannot restrain me, I call him pusillanimous (pusillanimis), and thus all will pass judgment. Again, from this nature of men and instability of judgment, namely that man often forms opinion of things merely from his emotion, and that the things which he thinks make for pleasure or pain, and which therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he endeavours to promote into happening or remove, are often only imaginary, to say nothing of the other points I showed in Part. II., on the uncertainty of things, we can easily conceive that man can easily be the cause both that he is rejoiced or saddened, or, in other words, he can be affected with pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of himself as the cause. And therefore we can easily understand what repentance and self-complacency are, namely that repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause, and self-complacency is pleasure accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause: and these emotions are most strong because men think themselves free (vide Prop. 49, Part III.).

 

 

‘We thus see that it can come to pass that what one loves another hates: and what one fears another fears not; and that one and the same man may now love what before he hated, and now dares what he feared before, etc. Again, inasmuch as each forms an opinion according to his emotion as to what is good or bad, or what is better or worse (see Note, Note Prop. 30, Part III.)  it follows that men can vary both in opinion and in emotion (this can be although the human mind is a part of the divine intellect, as we have shown in the Note on Prop. 13, Part II.); and hence it comes about that when we compare some people with others, we distinguish them by the difference of their emotions …’

 

love and hate are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

and hence what one loves – another may hate

 

and likewise – what is good and what is bad – is open to question

 

propositional uncertainty – is the ground of diversity and difference

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown – has no intellect

 

‘when we compare people with others’ –

 

any comparison – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘and that we call intrepid, some timid, and some by some other name. E.g., I call that intrepid (intrepidus) who despises danger who I am wont to fear; and moreover, if I pay attention to the fact that his desire to work evil to him who he hates, and good to him who he loves, is not hindered by fear of the danger which is great enough to restrain me, I call him daring (audax). Then, again, he appears to me timid (timidus) who fears some danger which I am wont to despise; and if I pay more attention to this, that his desire is hindered by the fear which cannot restrain me, I call him pusillanimous (pusillanimis), and thus all will pass judgment.’

 

these terms / proposals – ‘intrepid’ – ‘timid’ – ‘daring’ – ‘pusillanimous’ etc. – are descriptions of behaviour – and as with any propositional description – they are open to question

 

any non-contextual definition or understanding – can only be an indication of meaning – an uncertain guide to meaning

 

any judgment as to what is ‘intrepid’ or ‘timid’ etc. – in actual practise – will be a function of propositional context – and even then – will be open to question

 

‘Again, from this nature of men and instability of judgment, namely that man often forms opinion of things merely from his emotion, and that the things which he thinks make for pleasure or pain, and which therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) he endeavours to promote into happening or remove, are often only imaginary, to say nothing of the other points I showed in Part. II., on the uncertainty of things, we can easily conceive that man can easily be the cause both that he is rejoiced or saddened, or, in other words, he can be affected with pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of himself as the cause.’

 

‘things which he thinks make for pleasure or pain’ –

 

clearly – here – Spinoza finally recognizes – that pain and pleasure – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

as to ‘imaginary’ pleasure and pain – again – this just points to the fact that any proposal of pleasure or pain – is open to question

 

as to this – ‘uncertainty of things’ –

 

it is rather – the uncertainty of proposals

 

for any proposal – in any propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –

 

Spinoza concedes uncertainty here – however his greatest and most fundamental failure is not recognizing the uncertainty of his metaphysical system

 

‘And therefore we can easily understand what repentance and self-complacency are, namely that repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause, and self-complacency is pleasure accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause: and these emotions are most strong because men think themselves free (vide Prop. 49, Part III.).’

 

‘repentance as pain accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause’?

 

if you propose that you are cause of your own pain – do you necessarily repent or regret it?

 

I don’t think so –

 

you may do so – but it all does depend on context – propositional context

 

for we can imagine that someone may regard the pain they have caused themselves – as a ‘wake-up call’ – so to speak – which leads them to reform – and to live a better life – and therefore it will not be something they repent or regret

 

as to self-complacency –

 

perhaps complacency does come about when you see yourself as the cause of your pleasure –

 

but really – what it indicates is the absence of a critical intelligence

 

‘and these emotions are most strong because men think themselves free’

 

men are free –

 

and our freedom consists in our critical capacity to question – to doubt and to explore propositional uncertainty

 

 

PROP. LII. We cannot regard an object which we have seen before together with others, or which we imagine to have nothing that is not common to many, as long as one which we imagine to have something singular about it.

 

 

Proof. – As long as we imagine the object we have seen with others, we immediately recall the others (Prop. 18, Part II., with its Note), and thus from regarding one we immediately pass to the regarding of another. And this is the case with an object

which we imagine to have nothing that is not common to many. For we suppose by that very fact that we are regarding in it nothing that we have not seen in the others. But when we suppose that we imagine something singular in any object, something that we have never seen before, we say nothing else than that the mind, while it regards that object, has nothing else in itself to the regarding of which it may pass from the regarding of this object. And therefore it is determined for the regarding of that alone.

 

any proposed object is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we may propose an object in relation to other proposed objects –

 

or propose it – without any propositional relations

 

these options exist because any proposal – is open to question –

 

and however proposed the ‘object’ is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – This modification of the mind or admiration of an individual thing is called, in so far as it happens in the mind alone, wonder (admiratio); but if called up by an object which we fear it is said to be consternation (consternatio), for wonderment at something evil holds man suspended in regarding it, that he cannot think of other things by means of which he may liberate himself from it. But if that at which we wonder be the prudence, industry or anything of this kind of any man, inasmuch as we regard that man as excelling by far in this, then the wonder is called veneration (veneratio), otherwise horror (horror), if we wonder at a man’s rage, envy, etc. Again, if we admire the prudence, etc., of a man whom we love, our love by that very fact will become greater (Prop. 12, Part III.), and this love joined to wonder we call devotion (devotio). And in a like manner we may conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and other emotions joined to wonder; and thus we could deduce more emotions than could be deduced in our ordinary vocabulary. hence it is apparent that the names of the emotions are taken rather from vulgar use than from the accurate knowledge of them.

 

 

‘This modification of the mind or admiration of an individual thing is called, in so far as it happens in the mind alone, wonder (admiratio)’

 

‘in so far as it happens in the mind alone’?

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

that is – the propositional action – of the propositional actor

 

nothing happens in the ‘mind alone’

 

if – as Spinoza argues – the mind and body are two aspects of the one substance – that nothing happens in the mind that does not occur in the body – that is not reflected in the body – and visa versa – what sense then can we make of this idea of the ‘mind alone’?

 

with Descartes’ dual substances – yes – but not Spinoza’s monism

 

furthermore – ‘this modification of the mind’ – is at base a propositional option

 

proposes object – ‘an individual thing’ – without admiring it –

 

we experience wonder when we are faced – fair and square – with the unknown –

 

and it is in response to this that we critically explore the possibilities for understanding

 

To wonder is opposed [to] contempt (contemptus), of which this for the most part is the cause, namely, that inasmuch as we see some wonder at, love, or fear something, or something seems at first sight similar to things which we wonder at, love, or fear (Prop. 15, with its note, and Prop. 27, Part III.) we are determined to wonder at, to love or fear that thing etc. But if from the presence or accurate scrutiny of that thing we are forced to deny all that concerning the same thing which could be the cause of wonder, fear or love etc., then the mind remains determined to think rather of those things which are not in the thing than of those which are in it. Now as devotion arises from the wonder at the thing which we love, so derision (irrisio) arises from the contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and disdain (dedignatio) arises from the contempt of foolishness, just as veneration arise from the wonder of prudence. We can, moreover, conceive love, hope, honour, and other emotions joined to contempt, and thence deduce other emotions which we are wont to know by particular names.

 

 

firstly – this idea that the contempt is opposed to wonder I find to be very strange –

 

I would think that the opposite of ‘wonder’ – would be – i.e. – ‘disinterest’ or ‘apathy’

 

so – at the outset I think Spinoza has got this wrong

 

to wonder – is to recognise – to experience – the unknown

 

the ‘cause’ of wonder – is not knowing

 

and the cause of any propositional response to wonder – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what we wonder at – is what we don’t know –

 

devotion – derision and disdain – may arise – as responses to what we do know – what we do propose –

 

not to what we don’t know

 

and veneration – may be a response to prudence – but there may be any number of other responses to prudence

 

‘We can, moreover, conceive love, hope, honour, and other emotions joined to contempt, and thence deduce other emotions which we are wont to know by particular names’

 

love – hope – honour – may be viewed with contempt – but just as equally – they may not

 

deduction is a rule-governed propositional game –

 

the rule of the game is that the proposal / proposition ‘deduced’ – is presupposed – ‘contained’ – in its premises

 

all you get from the deduction game – is the application – the playing out – of its rule

 

deduction is a word game

 

‘particular names’ – are proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

which is to say any emotion – named – is open to question open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

PROP. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its power of acting it is rejoiced, and the more so, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting

 

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘power of the mind’ – is the power of propositional action

 

yes – you can rejoice – if that is your thing –

 

however – logically speaking – propositional action is just that – action plain and simple – with no bells and whistles –

 

‘imagination’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘the mind imagining itself and its power of action’ – just is propositional action

 

 

Proof. – Man does not know himself save through the modifications of his body, and the ideas of these modifications (Props. 19 and 23, Part II). Therefore when it happens that that mind can regard itself, it is assumed by that very fact to pass to a greater state of perfection, that is (Note, Prop. II, Part III.), to be affected with pleasure, and the more so according as it can imagine itself and its power of acting more distinctly. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the mind regarding itself’ – is a propositional actor speculating on the ground or basis of propositional action –

 

there is no ‘pass to a greater state of perfection’ – there is just a propositional speculation –

 

and propositional speculation is no different to any other propositional action –

 

as for pleasure – yes – I suppose some regard such propositional action as pleasurable

 

logically speaking it is just run in the mill

 

there is no ‘distinct’ imagining –

 

all ‘imaginings’ are propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

uncertain – not ‘distinct’

 

 

Corollary. – The pleasure is more and more fostered the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others, the greater, by that very fact, the pleasure with which he imagines other to be affected, and that accompanied by the idea of himself as cause (Note, Prop. 29, Part III). And therefore (Prop.27, Part III.) the greater will be the joy accompanied by an idea of himself with which he is affected. Q.e.d.

 

 

the more a man imagines himself to be praised by others – the more stupid he is –

 

what a rational man should be doing – is not basking in imagined praise – but rather – putting himself – his proposals – to question – to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty

 

 

PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to imagine those things only which impose its power of action on it.

 

 

‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

propositional action is not an ‘endeavour’ –

 

propositional action is natural human activity

 

to ‘imagine’ – is to propose

 

propositional actors propose whatever they propose

 

the ‘power of action’ – is propositional action

 

 

Proof. – The endeavour or power of the mind is the same as the essence of the mind (Prop. 7 Part III.), But the essence of the mind (as is self-manifest) only affirms that which the mind is and can do; and not that which it is not and cannot do. And therefore it endeavours to imagine only that which affirms its power of acting. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘endeavour or power of the mind’ – is propositional action

 

the ‘essence of the mind’ – is propositional action

 

what the mind can and cannot do –

 

what we do is propose – what we cannot do – is propositionally irrelevant – it is not in the picture

 

propositional action does not ‘affirm’ itself –

 

a propositional actor can affirm – deny – or leave undecided – any proposal put

 

and any truth value given to a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. LV. When the mind imagines its want of power it is saddened by the fact.

 

 

‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

a functioning human being will not lack the ‘power’ to propose

 

if – due to illness one is unable to function propositionally in the manner they expect – one may be saddened by this fact

 

however – if someone is able to accept this diminution – they may not be saddened

 

 

Proof. – The essence of the mind affirms only that which is and can do, or it is the nature of the mind only to imagine those things which impose its power of acting (prev. Prop.). When therefore we say that the mind, while regarding itself, imagines its weakness, we say nothing else than that, while the mind endeavours to imagine something which imposes its power of acting, that endeavour is hindered or (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) that it is saddened.

 

 

‘the essence of the mind’ – is propositional action

 

propositions are affirmed – denied – or left undecided – by propositional actors

 

any truth value ascribed to a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘imagination’ – is a propositional activity –

 

‘the power of acting’ – is propositional activity

 

propositional power – is human beings acting –

 

there is no weakness in propositional activity – only diversity –

 

any proposal / proposition is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

in a functional human there is no ‘hindrance’ to propositional activity

 

as to sadness –

 

one may be saddened when one’s proposals – one’s propositional action – does not deliver as expected

 

sadness – as with any emotional experience – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

sadness when experienced needs to be critically investigated

 

 

Corollary. – This pain or sadness is fostered more and more if one imagines himself to be reviled by others, which can be proved in the same manner as Coroll., Prop. 53. Part III.

 

 

you might not be saddened by being ‘reviled by others’ –

 

i.e. – you might feel vindicated – or you might not care less

 

it will all depend on the circumstances involved –

 

which is to say any attempt at a generalization here – is foolhardy

 

and if you are saddened – you can always put that reaction to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty

 

Note. – This pain, accompanied by the idea of our weakness, is called humility (humilitas); the pleasure, on the other hand, the pleasure on the other hand which arise from the contemplation of one-self is called self- love (philautia) or self-complacency. And as this is repeated as often as a man regards his virtues his power of acting, it therefore comes to pass that everyone is fond of relating his own exploits and displaying the strength of his body and his mind, and that men on this account are a nuisance one to the other. From which it likewise follows that men are naturally envious (see Note, Prop. 24, and Note, Prop. 32, Part III.), or, in other words, prone to rejoice at the weakness of their equals and to be saddened at their strength. For as often as one imagines his actions he is affected with pleasure (Prop. 53, Part III.), and the more so according as he imagines them more distinctly or to express more perfection, that is (by what was said in Note 1, Prop. 40, Part II.) according as he can the better distinguish them from others and regard them as singular. Wherefore each person will derive the greatest pleasure from the contemplation of himself when he regards something in himself which he denies in others. But if that which he affirms in himself has reference to the general idea of man and beast, he will not be so greatly pleased; and on the other hand, he will be saddened if he imagines his actions, when compared to those of others, to be weaker, which sadness (Prop. 28, Part III.) he will endeavour to remove by wrongly interpreting the actions of others, or by adorning his own as much as possible. It is therefore apparent that men have a natural proclivity to hatred and envy, which moreover, is aided by their education. For parents are want to encourage their children to virtue solely by the promise of honour or the fostering of envy. Yet perhaps some will hesitate at this point, saying very often we wonder at the virtues of men and venerate them. In order to remove this scruple, I shall add this corollary.

 

 

‘This pain, accompanied by the idea of our weakness, is called humility (humilitas); the pleasure, on the other hand, the pleasure on the other hand which arise from the contemplation of one-self is called self-love (philautia) or self-complacency.’

 

there is no propositional weakness

 

humility – as with any term – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s definition of here – is one possible use of the term ‘humility’

 

another proposal – and one that does not involve ‘weakness’ and ‘pain’ – is that humility describes an emotional state where one is unpretentious

 

this ‘self-love’ – which Spinoza equates to ‘self-complacency’ – is an emotional state where one views oneself uncritically

 

an uncritical view of oneself – is not rational

 

‘And as this is repeated as often as a man regards his virtues his power of acting, it therefore comes to pass that everyone is fond of relating his own exploits and displaying the strength of his body and his mind, and that men on this account are a nuisance one to the other’

 

not everyone is – ‘fond of relating his own exploits and displaying the strength of his body and his mind’

 

and some who do – may well be entertaining and engaging – and not a nuisance to others

 

‘From which it likewise follows that men are naturally envious (see Note, Prop. 24, and Note, Prop. 32, Part III.), or, in other words, prone to rejoice at the weakness of their equals and to be saddened at their strength. For as often as one imagines his actions he is affected with pleasure (Prop. 53, Part III.), and the more so according as he imagines them more distinctly or to express more perfection, that is (by what was said in Note 1, Prop. 40, Part II.) according as he can the better distinguish them from others and regard them as singular.’

 

seeing another as weak – to my mind – is really a failure of understanding

 

others are different – and there is no need for a pecking order

 

and in any case – if the other is an equal – how then are they ‘weaker’ – or ‘stronger’?

 

any pleasure at another’s supposed inferiority – or pain – at their supposed superiority – is indicative of failure to appreciate and understand the other – as well as a failure to appreciate and understand oneself

 

every individual is singular

 

‘Wherefore each person will derive the greatest pleasure from the contemplation of himself when he regards something in himself which he denies in others’

 

such a person is vain and pretentious –

 

such a person is one who pretends a superiority to others – and who takes pleasure in the pretence

 

pretension is the mark of ignorance

 

the real point here is that it is just not the case – that everyone who sees something in themselves – that is not in others – will be pretentious and take pleasure in their pretension

 

many will simply appreciate the difference

 

‘But if that which he affirms in himself has reference to the general idea of man and beast, he will not be so greatly pleased; and on the other hand, he will be saddened if he imagines his actions, when compared to those of others, to be weaker, which sadness (Prop. 28, Part III.) he will endeavour to remove by wrongly interpreting the actions of others, or by adorning his own as much as possible.

 

yes – a description of a vain and pretentious person –

 

the point is not strength or weakness – but difference –

 

‘strength’ and ‘weakness’ – in this context – are rhetorical terms

 

as to this – ‘general idea of man’ – any such idea is open to question

 

man is a propositional actor –

 

and any propositional activity of men – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to sadness – it is rational – if put to question – irrational – if not

 

there are no wrong interpretations of the actions of others – there is only proposals / propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘It is therefore apparent that men have a natural proclivity to hatred and envy, which moreover, is aided by their education. For parents are want to encourage their children to virtue solely by the promise of honour or the fostering of envy. Yet perhaps some will hesitate at this point, saying very often we wonder at the virtues of men and venerate them. In order to remove this scruple, I shall add this corollary.’

 

you can ascribe ‘a natural proclivity’ to anything humans do – or other animals do

 

this ‘natural proclivity’ – explains nothing

 

in fact – an ‘explanation’ – of anything – is nothing more than a restatement of the proposal ‘to be explained’ – and as with the proposal to be explained – it is open to question

 

humans do what they – and what they do is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as for what parents do – it is not logically sound to even attempt a generalization

 

we do see – ‘the promise of honour and the fostering of envy’

 

and yes – people do in fact – wonder at the virtues of men – and venerate them –

 

if understood and appreciated rationally – propositional behaviour – in all its difference – in all its variety – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Corollary II. – No one envies the virtue of any one save his enemy.

 

 

Proof. – Envy is hatred itself (see Note, Prop. 24, Part III.) or (Note, Prop. 13, Part III.) sadness, that is (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.), a modification by which a man’s power of acting or endeavour is hindered. But man (Note, Prop. 9. Part III.) endeavours or desires to do nothing save what can follow from his given nature. Therefore man desires to attribute to himself no power of acting or what is the same thing) no virtue which is proper to another nature and alien to his own. And therefore his desire cannot be hindered nor he himself saddened by the fact he regards some virtue in someone dissimilar to himself, and consequently he cannot envy him: but he can envy his equal who is supposed to be of the same nature as himself. Q.e.d.

 

‘envy is hatred itself’?

 

‘envy’ – as with any description of an emotional state is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

i.e. – could I not envy another – without hating them?

 

that is – might I not wish for another’s good fortune – without any ill feeling towards them?

 

I think so

 

and do we envy an ‘equal’?

 

the idea that we do – makes no sense to me

 

as I see it – you would only envy another – if you believe the other has some advantage that you do not have –

 

and he who has an advantage that I do not have – is not my equal

 

of course – whether or not in fact – the other has an advantage I do not have – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to ‘the same nature’ –

 

we have the ‘same nature’ only in the sense that – we are propositional actors – and our actions – our proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. –  When we said in the Note on Prop. 52, Part III., that we venerate a man by reason of the fact that we wonder at his prudence, courage etc., we meant that comes about (as can be seen of the Prop. itself) because we imagine those virtues to be possessed by that person alone and not common to nature; and therefore we do not envy them any more than we envy height in a tree or courage in a lion, etc.

 

 

it is not about appealing to ‘what is common in nature’ – that will always be open to question –

 

it is rather about seeing and appreciating individual difference – as and when it occurs

 

and finally – someone might wish that he or she had the courage of a lion – and if i.e. – one is short in stature – who knows – one might envy the height of a tree?

 

 

PROP. LVI. There are as many species of pleasure, pain, desire, and consequently any emotion that is composed of these, such as wavering of the mind, or which is derived from these, such as love, fear, hope, hate, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

 

 

this ‘many species of pleasure, pain, desire’ – are proposals – different proposals

 

an ‘emotion’ is a propositional action –

 

and what Spinoza calls ‘wavering of the mind’ – is propositional uncertainty

 

an ‘object’ – is a proposal –

 

‘species of objects’ – are proposals – of various descriptions

 

at the beginning – and at the end – of the ontological / epistemological / metaphysical day – all there is – is the proposal –

 

and any proposal of any description is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions which are composed or derived from these, are passions (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.); we also are passive in so far as we have inadequate ideas (Prop. I, Part III.), and in so far as we have them alone are we passive (Prop. 3, Part III.), that is (see Note1, Prop. 40, Part II.), we are only necessarily passive in so far as we imagine, or (see Prop. 17, Part II., with its Note) in so far as we are affected by an emotion which involves the nature of our body and the nature of an external body. The nature therefore, of each passion must so be explained necessarily that the nature of the object by which we are affected may be expressed. The pleasure which arises from the object, e.g. A, involves the nature of

the object A, and the pleasure which arise from the object B involves the nature of that object B: and therefore these two pleasures are of different nature because they arise from causes of different nature. Thus also the emotion of sadness which arises from one object is different in nature from the sadness that arises from a different cause, which also must be understood of love, hate, hope, fear, wavering of the mind, etc.: and therefore there are as many species of pleasure, pain. love, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected. But desire is the is the essence or nature of everyone in so far as it is conceived as determined from any given disposition of the person to do anything (see Note, Prop. 9, Part III.). Therefore, according as each one is affected by external causes with this or that kind of pleasure, pain. love, hatred, that is, according as his nature is constituted in this or that manner, so will his desire be this or that, and the nature of one desire necessarily different to the nature of another as much as the emotions from which each one has arisen, differ one from the other. Therefore there are as many species of desires and there are species of pleasure, pain, love, etc., and consequently (from what has already been shown) as there are species of objects by which we are affected. Q.e.d.

 

‘Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions which are composed or derived from these, are passions (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.); we also are passive in so far as we have inadequate ideas (Prop. I, Part III.), and in so far as we have them alone are we passive (Prop. 3, Part III.), that is (see Note1, Prop. 40, Part II.), we are only necessarily passive in so far as we imagine, or (see Prop. 17, Part II., with its Note) in so far as we are affected by an emotion which involves the nature of our body and the nature of an external body.’

 

pleasure and pain – are propositional states –

 

an emotion here – is a propositional action – in response to – the propositional states of pleasure or pain

 

the logic of it is that we have propositional responses to propositional states

 

a proposal – is an action

 

a propositional response to proposals – is an action

 

a propositional state – is an active state of affairs –

 

any propositional activity is active – not passive –

 

‘passion’ – is a description of – an explanation of propositional action –

 

a passion – is an action

 

as to ‘inadequate ideas’ –

 

if by ‘inadequate ideas’ – is meant ideas / proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – then all ‘ideas’ – are inadequate

 

it is only in the notion of ‘adequate idea’ – that is an idea for which certainty is claimed – an idea – not open to question – not open to doubt – and not – uncertain – that there is no activity – only passivity

 

the adequate idea is passive – and furthermore – logically dead – and useless – except in the service of ignorance – prejudice – and pretence

 

what we deal with is proposals – and propositional relations

 

‘the human body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

an ‘external body’ – is a proposal

 

‘The nature therefore, of each passion must so be explained necessarily that the nature of the object by which we are affected may be expressed. The pleasure which arises from the object, e.g. A, involves the nature of the object A, and the pleasure which arise from the object B involves the nature of that object B: and therefore these two pleasures are of different nature because they arise from causes of different nature. Thus also the emotion of sadness which arises from one object is different in nature from the sadness that arises from a different cause, which also must be understood of love, hate, hope, fear, wavering of the mind, etc.: and therefore there are as many species of pleasure, pain. love, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.’

 

the nature of any proposal – of any ‘propositional state’ – is open to question

 

the propositional states of pleasure – or sadness – are likewise – open to question

 

(do we contrast ‘pleasure’ with ‘sadness’ – or rather ‘pleasure’ with ‘pain’ – and ‘sadness’ with ‘joy’?)

 

pleasure is a propositional state – an ‘object’ is a proposal –

 

it is fair enough to propose a relation between the two –

 

however – any proposed relation is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

pleasures of a different nature?

 

we might use the same general term (‘pleasure’) for both –

 

however – regardless of the question of cause – the logical reality is that we are dealing with different propositional circumstances –

 

and the pleasure in circumstance A – is not the pleasure of circumstance B

 

and the same applies to sadness

 

it is not that different objects – decide the issue –

 

it is rather the difference in propositional circumstance or context – which distinguishes propositional states

 

‘and therefore there are many species of pleasure, pain. love, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.’

 

it is not a question of species of pleasure etc. – and species of objects

 

it is rather that any proposed pleasure – and any proposal relating the proposed pleasure to a proposed object – is a matter that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘But desire is the is the essence or nature of everyone in so far as it is conceived as determined from any given disposition of the person to do anything (see Note, Prop. 9, Part III.). Therefore, according as each one is affected by external causes with this or that kind of pleasure, pain. love, hatred, that is, according as his nature is constituted in this or that manner, so will his desire be this or that, and the nature of one desire necessarily different to the nature of another as much as the emotions from which each one has arisen, differ one from the other. Therefore there are as many species of desires and there are species of pleasure, pain, love, etc., and consequently (from what has already been shown) as there are species of objects by which we are affected. Q.e.d.’

 

‘desire’ here functions as a name for propositional action

 

yes – there are different propositional actions – and different proposals of pleasure – pain – love etc. – and there will be different object proposals

 

propositional actions – different as they are in different propositional contexts – are – regardless of context – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

in any critical analysis of pleasure – pain – love etc – an object may be proposed –

 

however – its relation to these ‘emotions’ – these proposals – is a matter open to question –

 

i.e. – perhaps the object is best understood as not the cause of the pleasure – but rather as the focus of the pleasure?

 

in any case – any causal proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – Among the species of emotions which (prev. Prop.) are of great number, the best known are luxury (luxuria), drunkenness (ebrietas) and ambition (ambitio), which are only varieties of love or desire: which explain the nature of this or that emotion according to the objects to which they refer. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition we understand nothing else than an immoderate love or desire for feasting, drinking, lechery, riches and honour. Moreover, these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects to which they refer, have no opposites. For temperance, sobriety, chastity, which we are wont to contrast with luxury, drunkenness, lust, etc. are not emotions or passions, but indicate strength of mind which moderates these emotions. The remaining species of emotions I cannot explain here (for there are as many as there are objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary. For it suffices for what we have in view, namely, to determine the strength of the emotions and the power of the mind in moderating them, to have a definition of each emotion of universal application. It suffices, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the emotions and the mind, so that we may be able to determine

of what kind of quantity is the power of mind in moderating and checking the emotions. And so, although there is a great difference between this and that emotion of love, hate, desire, e.g.., as the love of children and the love for a wife, it is not our place to take note of these differences or inquire any further into the origin and nature of the emotions.

 

 

‘Among the species of emotions which (prev. Prop.) are of great number, the best known are luxury (luxuria), drunkenness (ebrietas) and ambition (ambitio), which are only varieties of love or desire: which explain the nature of this or that emotion according to the objects to which they refer. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition we understand nothing else than an immoderate love or desire for feasting, drinking, lechery, riches and honour.’

 

who decides what is moderate and immoderate?

 

what for one might be moderate – for another – immoderate

 

these matters are relative and uncertain

 

i.e. – what one counts as luxury in one propositional context – may in a different context be regarded as a necessity

 

also – drunkenness may have a physiological cause – and have nothing to do with so called ‘immoderate’ love or desire

 

and ambition – I would think is quite natural – not ‘immoderate’ – in any number of propositional contexts –

 

we can ask – is ‘luxury’ an emotion – or is it just a pretence? –

 

and consider too that drunkenness may be the result of an emotional state – and lead to emotional states – but is it an ‘emotion’? –

 

and ‘ambition’ – too – is it best described as an emotion – or is it in fact a conduit of emotional states?

 

‘Moreover, these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects to which they refer, have no opposites. For temperance, sobriety, chastity, which we are wont to contrast with luxury, drunkenness, lust, etc. are not emotions or passions, but indicate strength of mind which moderates these emotions’

 

I would suggest that anyone in pursuit of a so-called luxury item – is not as it were a victim of that item – and that as much as the proposed item ‘attracts’ them – they will put it to question – to doubt – and so deal with the uncertainty of acquiring it

 

and it can be the case that one thinks critically about whether to get drunk or not

 

lust too – is not without its uncertainties

 

temperance and sobriety – like luxury – drunkenness and lust – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘strength of mind’ – rests in critical capacity and action – the ability to put any proposal – any ‘emotional’ proposal – to question – to doubt and explore its uncertainty

 

‘The remaining species of emotions I cannot explain here (for there are as many as there are objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary. For it suffices for what we have in view, namely, to determine the strength of the emotions and the power of the mind in moderating them, to have a definition of each emotion of universal application. It suffices, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the emotions and the mind, so that we may be able to determine of what kind of quantity is the power of mind in moderating and checking the emotions. And so, although there is a great difference between this and that emotion of love, hate, desire, e.g.., as the love of children and the love for a wife, it is not our place to take note of these differences or inquire any further into the origin and nature of the emotions.’

 

logically speaking – we are not dealing with ‘strength’ and ‘quantity of power’ –

 

the issue with any emotional proposal – is critical –

 

is the matter of putting our emotions – our proposals – however described or explained – to question – to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty

 

this ‘strength’ and ‘quantities of power’ – simply miss the point –

 

focus on ‘strength and ‘quantities of power – will only lead to confusion

 

reading Spinoza here – I get echoes of Quakerism – and traditional / conservative –Judaic- Christian psychological perspectives –

 

nothing wrong with that per se –

 

and be that as it may – my problem with Spinoza here – is his failure to put his psychology / ethics to the critical test – to put it to question – to doubt – and to explore its uncertainty

 

 

PROP. LVII. Any emotion of every individual differs from the emotion of another only in so far as the essence of one differs from the essence of another.

 

 

firstly – this notion of ‘essence’ –

 

in so far as it is supposed to be some fixed identifier – of whatever –

 

we can dispense with it immediately

 

any notion – is open to question – open to doubt and is – uncertain

 

‘essence’ – if it is to play any sort of role in our propositional lives – must be seen as uncertain

 

as regards Prop. LVII –

 

we can ask – is the ‘essence’ of one – different from the essence of another?

 

in terms of Spinoza’s metaphysics – you might well say – “no” –

 

for on his view everything and anything is a manifestation of his God –

 

and there is a sense that if this so – nothing can be essentially differentiated from anything else

 

Spinoza’s ‘essence’ argument here – looks like a last-ditch attempt to rescue differentiation and individuation from his metaphysics – and it fails

 

and in a very real sense his whole house of cards collapses at this point

 

what differentiates one individual from another – is not essence – but rather propositional context

 

one’s emotional propositional state will be a function of one’s whole propositional context at the time

 

no two individuals occupy the same propositional space –

 

no two individuals have the same propositional context

 

 

Proof. – This Prop. is clear from Ax. 1, which see after Lemma 1, Note, Prop. 13, Part II. But nevertheless we shall prove it from the definitions of the three primary emotions.

 

All emotions have reference to desire, pleasure or pain, as the definitions which we gave them show. But desire is the nature and essence of everything (see its def. in Note, prop. 9 Part III,): therefore the desire of one individual differs from the desire of another only inasmuch as the essence of one differs from the essence or nature of the other. Pleasure and pain are passions by which the power or endeavour of every person to persist in his own being is increased or diminished, aided or hindered (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note). But by endeavouring to persist in its being, in so far as it refers to the mind and body at the same time, we understand appetite and desire (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.); therefore pleasure and pain are desire itself, or appetite, in so far as it is increased or diminished by external causes, help or hindered, that (same Note), they are the nature of everyone. And therefore the pleasure or pain of one person differs from the pleasure or pain of another; and consequently any emotion of an individual. etc. Q.e.d.

 

‘But desire is the nature and essence of everything’

 

the claim that human beings desire – is fair enough

 

but do have evidence that all things – everything – desires?

 

on the face of it – no

 

is there any evidence that the inanimate world desires?

 

we see that inanimate entities persist – and as long as they do – this we can observe

 

but do we observe desire in the inanimate world?

 

no

 

of course – if you regard any persistence as desire – if you define ‘persistence’ as ‘desire’ –

 

then yes – there is desire in the inanimate world –

 

but this conclusion is definitional – not observational –

 

and here we can ask why define persistence as desire?

 

why not just leave ‘persistence’ – as persistence – that at least can be observationally verified –

 

and then we come to the question of just how to understand natural persistence

 

well – that is a matter for science – and any theory advanced to explain or account for natural persistence – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘therefore the desire of one individual differs from the desire of another only inasmuch as the essence of one differs from the essence or nature of the other’

 

if ‘desire’ – is the essence of every thing

 

then there can be no distinction between any thing – in terms of desire –

 

or in terms of ‘essence’ – unless there are different essences

 

and really if there are different ‘essences’ – what is the use of the term ‘essence?

 

‘different essences’ – really – amounts to different characteristics

 

you can drop the notion of ‘essence’ altogether –

 

so what we end up with is different desires –

 

essence doesn’t account for difference – or different desires

 

how then are we to explain different desires?

 

firstly then – what is a desire?

 

as I see it ‘desire’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

and – one propositional action is distinguished from another in terms of its propositional context

 

one propositional context is not the same as another

 

and any propositional action – and any propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Pleasure and pain are passions by which the power or endeavour of every person to persist in his own being is increased or diminished, aided or hindered (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note)’

 

‘the power or endeavour of every person to persist in his own being?’

 

yes – human beings endeavour to persist – but the endeavour may or may not be relevant to how long we persist

 

and it is the case that we don’t know how long we will live / persist?

 

so – endeavour or not – the nature of persistence – is an unknown –

 

and any explanation or account of natural persistence – is a matter for science

 

and here we will have theories – theories / proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

pleasure and pain are passions – which aid or hinder human persistence?

 

whether pleasure and pain – aid or assist persistence – is really an empirical question

 

there are people who have very painful lives – who live long lives

 

there are those who have very pleasurable lives – and die young

 

the effect of pleasure or pain on persistence on longevity – is uncertain

 

‘But by endeavouring to persist in its being, in so far as it refers to the mind and body at the same time, we understand appetite and desire (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.); therefore pleasure and pain are desire itself, or appetite, in so far as it is increased or diminished by external causes, help or hindered, that (same Note), they are the nature of everyone.’

 

pleasure and pain – desire itself?

 

desire – as propositional activity – may result in pleasure – or pain – or neither –

 

but desire itself – is not pleasure – desire – is not pain

 

and is anyone going to say that desire is pleasure and pain?

 

that just does not make sense at all

 

and pleasure and pain – increased or diminished – is the nature of everyone?

 

this is very confused –

 

we do experience pleasure and pain – but do such experiences account for our nature?

 

such a view is a very limited view of human beings –

 

and it really doesn’t fit with Spinoza’s grand theory of the nature of everything –

 

in any case – it is a view that is well and truly – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it seems to me that Spinoza here – has got rather sloppy with his concepts desire – pleasure – pain –

 

his reduction of pleasure and pain to desire –

 

suggests a conceptual collapse

 

‘And therefore the pleasure or pain of one person differs from the pleasure or pain of another; and consequently any emotion of an individual. etc. Q.e.d.’

 

yes – there are emotional differences between individuals –

 

but these differences are the differences in propositional context

 

 

Note. – Hence it follows that the emotions of animals, which are called irrational (for we can in no wise doubt that brutes feel now we know the origin of the mind), differ only from the emotions of man inasmuch as their nature differs from the nature of man. Horse and man are filled with the desire for procreation; the desire of the former is equine, while that of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fish and birds must vary. Thus although each individual lives content and rejoices in the nature he has, yet the life in which each is content and rejoices is nothing else than the idea or soul of that individual; and therefore the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another in so far as the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Again, it follows from the previous proposition that there is a considerable difference between the joy of e.g., a drunkard and that which possesses a philosopher: which I wished to mention here by the way. This is what I have to say of the emotions which refer to man in so far as he is passive. It remains that I should add a few points which refer to him in so far as he is active.

 

‘Hence it follows that the emotions of animals, which are called irrational (for we can in no wise doubt that brutes feel now we know the origin of the mind), differ only from the emotions of man inasmuch as their nature differs from the nature of man.’

 

do animals have a critical capacity?

 

perhaps – I have observed my cat lily – it seems – deciding whether to have food or go outside – some sort of question – some sort of doubt – looks to be involved

 

and some sort of decision seems to get made

 

or perhaps – that is not the case – I don’t know –

 

I keep an open mind on lily –

 

as for other animals – I couldn’t say

 

I suspect that there is some kind of critical capacity in any functioning consciousness – but that is really an open question

 

be that as it may – the important thing to recognize here is that Spinoza is making the point that animals and humans do not differ emotionally – the difference is a difference of species

 

and so – it would seem he makes – by implication – an early statement of what many now term ‘animal rights’ –

 

in our time – a philosophy of animals – was most notably introduced to the public by the utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer in his book – ‘Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals’

 

Singer’s work in this area has been revolutionary

 

‘Thus although each individual lives content and rejoices in the nature he has, yet the life in which each is content and rejoices is nothing else than the idea or soul of that individual; and therefore the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another in so far as the essence of one differs from the essence of another.’

 

is Spinoza just talking about humans here – or is this a follow on from his discussion of animals – insects – fish – and birds?

 

anyway – do we humans rejoice in ourselves – in the ‘idea’ of ourselves – which Spinoza here terms the ‘soul’?

 

well – we can do

 

‘Again, it follows from the previous proposition that there is a considerable difference between the joy of e.g., a drunkard and that which possesses a philosopher: which I wished to mention here by the way’

 

I wonder what prompted him to mention this – ‘by the way’?

 

perhaps he had a premonition of Russell’s comment that he – Spinoza – was a ‘God intoxicated man’?

 

 

PROP. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passions, there are other emotions of pleasure and desire which refer to us in so far as we are active.

 

 

in so far as any passion – is regarded critically – that is – put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored – we are active

 

we are passive – if we do not put our proposals passions to question – to doubt – and if we fall into the delusion of certainty

 

 

Proof. – When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting it rejoices (Prop. 53, Part III.). But the mind necessarily regards itself when it conceives a true or adequate idea (Prop. 43, Part II.). But the mind conceives certain adequate ideas (Note 2, Prop.

40, Part II.). Therefore it will also rejoice in so far it conceives adequate idea, that is (Prop. 1, Part III.), in so far as it is active. Again, the mind endeavours to persist in its being (Prop. 9, Part III.) in so far as it has both clear and distinct ideas and confused ones. But by endeavour we understand desire (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.). Therefore desire also has reference to us in so far as we understand, or (Prop. 1, Part III.) in so far as we are active. Q.e.d.

 

‘When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting it rejoices (Prop. 53, Part III.).’

 

this is to say – that when we propose that our propositional activity – is powerful – we rejoice

 

if this happens – we are proposing self-aggrandisement – which is a form of vanity

 

and really – the ‘power’ of propositional activity – is just the activity itself – a natural fact of human beings –

 

we do not need to dress it up as ‘powerful’ –

 

and – do we rejoice in just being?

 

we can – but the real issue is critical – that is – putting our proposals / our propositions to question – to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty

 

there is some ‘power’ I guess in this – the power of rational / logical thinking –

 

but in so far as rational / logical thinking is the meat and potatoes of living – any rejoicing is really just rhetoric

 

‘But the mind necessarily regards itself when it conceives a true or adequate idea’

 

this ‘the mind regards itself’ – is not what this is about

 

we propose and we critically evaluate our proposals

 

a true ‘idea’ – is simply a proposal – that we assent to – nothing to get too excited about

 

and any proposal of assent – or for that matter – dissent – is open to question

 

as for ‘adequate idea’ –

 

an idea is a proposal – and in a sense any proposal is ‘adequate’ – but no proposal – if regarded rationally is beyond question – beyond doubt – or certain

 

our ideas / proposals – are logically – uncertain

 

this is just a logical fact – nothing to rejoice about

 

‘Again, the mind endeavours to persist in its being (Prop. 9, Part III.) in so far as it has both clear and distinct ideas and confused ones.’

 

the reality is – we propose – and we deal with our propositional realities critically

 

there is some endeavour in this – but it is not the ‘endeavour to persist in being’

 

we can be propositionally active – because we have being – because we exist

 

as for ‘clear and distinct ideas’ –

 

any ‘clear and distinct idea’ – is only a proposal – a proposition that has not been critically examined – its uncertainty unexplored

 

and a ‘confused idea’ – is a proposal that begs for critical appraisal

 

‘But by endeavour we understand desire (Note, Prop. 9, Part III.). Therefore desire also has reference to us in so far as we understand, or (Prop. 1, Part III.) in so far as we are active’

 

we understand to the extent that we recognise the uncertainty of our proposals

 

‘desire’ – as in the ‘endeavour’ to understand our propositional reality – comes down to – propositional activity

 

and we understand – our propositional activity – in so far as we put it to question – to doubt – and deal with its uncertainty

 

 

PROP. LIX. Among all the emotions that have reference to the mind, in so far as it is active, there are none which have not reference to pleasure or desire.

 

 

‘that have reference to the mind’ – this is vague

 

Spinoza claims not to be dualist – and yet his argument here – on the face of it – implies a dualism

 

if he had said ‘in reference to the person’ or ‘in reference to the propositional actor’– instead of ‘in reference to the mind’ – his statement – would be consistent with his monism

 

it looks like he thinks he can have the best of both worlds – when in fact – all he really does here – is undermine his metaphysics –

 

‘in so far as it [the mind] is active’

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity

 

it is not – ‘in so far as’ – rather – the mind is propositional activity –

 

and when the ‘mind’ is critically active – proposals / propositions – are put to question – put to doubt – and their uncertainty is explored

 

all emotions – propositional activity – ‘has reference to’ – pleasure or desire?

 

‘desire’ – is a name for propositional activity – and any propositional activity can be described as a form of desire –

 

furthermore – any propositional activity can be described as ‘emotional’

 

as for ‘pleasure’ – and – or ‘pain’ –

 

pleasure and pain – are possible propositional consequences of propositional activity

 

however – not all propositional activity will result in pleasure or pain

 

propositional activity can be neutral with respect to pleasure and pain – and much of our propositional activity is pleasure / pain neutral

 

 

Proof. – All emotions have reference to pleasure pain or desire, as the definitions er gave of them show. But we understand by pain that the mind’s power of thinking is diminished or hindered (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note), and therefore the mind in so far as it is saddened has its power of understanding, that is, its power of acting (Prop. 1, Part III.), diminished or hindered. And therefore no emotion of pain can be referred to the mind in so far as it is active, but only emotions of pleasure or desire which (prev. Prop.) thus far have reference to the mind.

 

 

the ‘mind’s power’ – is propositional action –

 

pleasure and pain are possible consequences of propositional activity –

 

pleasure and pain are not the ground of propositional activity

 

propositional activity may or may not be enhanced by pleasure – and may or may not be diminished by pain

 

the ‘mind’ / the propositional actor – is active – whether or not the consequence of its / his / her activity is pleasure or is pain

 

sadness – may be a consequence of propositional activity

 

the mind’s activity – that is propositional activity – may or may not be diminished by sadness

 

the proper reference for pleasure or pain – joy or sadness – is not the ‘mind’ –  but the propositional actor

 

 

Note. – All actions which follow from the emotions which have reference to the mind, in so far as it is active or understands, I refer to fortitude (fortitdudo). which I distinguish into two parts, courage or magnanimity (anomosoitas) and nobility (generositas). For I understand by courage the desire by which each endeavours to preserve what is his own according to the dictate of reason alone. By nobility I understand the desire by which endeavours according to the dictate of reason alone to help and join to himself in friendship all other men. And so I refer those emotions

which work out the good of the agent to courage, and those which work out the good of others to nobility, Therefore temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, etc., are all species of courage; but modesty, clemency etc., are species of nobility. And thus I think I have explained and shown through their primary causes the principle emotions and waverings of the mind which arise from the composition of the three primary emotions, namely pleasure, pain, and desire. And it is apparent from these propositions that we are driven about by external causes in many manners, and that we, like waves driven about by contrary winds, waver and are unconscious of the issue and of our fate. But I have said I have shown not all that can be given, but only the principle contradictions of the mind. For proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to repentance, disdain and shame, etc. But I think it will be clear to all from the preceding propositions that the emotions can be compounded one with the another in so many ways, and so many variations can arise from these combinations, that it were impossible to express them by any number. But for my purposes it suffices to have enumerated the principle ones; for the rest which I have omitted would be to satisfy the curious, not those who seek the profit of this. It remains, however, to be noted concerning love what very often happens while we are enjoying the thing we desired, that the body from the enjoyment acquires a new disposition, by which it is determined in another way, and these images of things are aroused in it, and at the same time the mid begins to imagine and desire other things. E.g., when we imagine something that is wont to delight us with its flavour, we desire to enjoy it, that is, to eat it. But as soon as we enjoy it the stomach is filled and the body’s desire is turned in another direction. But if while the body is in this condition the image of this food, inasmuch as it is present, be stimulated, the new condition of the body will feel disgust of the food which before we desired will now be odious to us, and this what we call satiety or weariness (fastidium aut taedium). For the rest, I have neglected the external modifications of the body which are observable in emotions such as tremor, pallor, sobbing, and laughter, because they refer to the body without any relation to the mind. Again, as definitions of the emotions, I shall repeat them in this order, with such notes as I think necessary

.

 

yes – ‘according to the dictates of reason’ –

 

on the face of it here ‘according to the dictate of reason’ – means nothing

 

‘according to the dictates of reason’ – here – is just rhetoric

 

reason does not ‘dictate’ – reason questions – doubts – and explores propositional uncertainty

 

and so – these terms ‘courage’ – ‘magnanimity’ – ‘nobility’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and as for whether temperance – sobriety – presence of mind are species of courage –

 

and modesty and clemency – are species of nobility –

 

these claims are open to question –

 

any definition – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

‘And thus I think I have explained and shown through their primary causes the principle emotions and waverings of the mind which arise from the composition of the three primary emotions, namely pleasure, pain, and desire

.

nothing of the sort has been shown

 

any propositional action can be described in terms of desire –

 

any emotional / propositional activity – is active

 

pleasure and pain are possible propositional consequences of propositional activity

 

and furthermore –

 

not every emotional / propositional action will have pleasure or pain as a consequence

 

there are propositional consequences that are neutral with respect to pleasure or pain –

 

i.e. – a propositional consequence might be described as ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’

 

‘And it is apparent from these propositions that we are driven about by external causes in many manners, and that we, like waves driven about by contrary winds, waver and are unconscious of the issue and of our fate. But I have said I have shown not all that can be given, but only the principle contradictions of the mind.’

 

 

‘internal’ and ‘external’ – are proposals – propositional categories – proposals – that are useful in mapping propositional activity

 

however – what we are ‘driven about by’ is propositional conflict –

 

what we are ‘driven about by’ is uncertainty

 

this propositional uncertainty is what we live with – is what we deal with

 

and we deal with it through question and doubt – and the exploration of the uncertainty

 

decisions get made – and we proceed – and proceed in uncertainty

 

we are not ‘unconscious’ of the issue – the very conflict – the propositional conflict – is our consciousness – is the issue

 

and as for ‘fate’ – fate is a supposed predetermined state of affairs –

 

our propositional reality is not determined – is not predetermined – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it might be countered here – is not the death of the propositional actor predetermined?

 

death is not a necessity – it is a contingency

 

it is conceivable that science could overcome death

 

‘For proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to repentance, disdain and shame, etc. But I think it will be clear to all from the preceding propositions that the emotions can be compounded one with the another in so many ways, and so many variations can arise from these combinations, that it were impossible to express them by any number.’

 

here – what Spinoza is talking about is propositional relations – and the fact that any number of proposals – of propositions – can be related one to the other –

 

propositional life is just this

 

‘It remains, however, to be noted concerning love what very often happens while we are enjoying the thing we desired, that the body from the enjoyment acquires a new disposition, by which it is determined in another way, and these images of things are aroused in it, and at the same time the mind begins to imagine and desire other things.

 

here once again we have Spinoza’s dualism of mind and body –

 

if his monism is genuine – then the terms ‘mind’ and ‘body’ should be dropped – should have no place

 

the fact that he cannot find a way of explaining his monism without resorting to dualism – suggests – at the very least that his monism is not workable

 

the best we could say here – if we were sticking to Spinoza’s monism is that it is the person / propositional actor that enjoys – and that with any propositional enjoyment there is ‘personal’ propositional affect and effect

 

‘E.g., when we imagine something that is wont to delight us with its flavour, we desire to enjoy it, that is, to eat it. But as soon as we enjoy it the stomach is filled and the body’s desire is turned in another direction. But if while the body is in this condition the image of this food, inasmuch as it is present, be stimulated, the new condition of the body will feel disgust of the food which before we desired will now be odious to us, and this what we call satiety or weariness (fastidium aut taedium).’

 

when we desire to eat – we propose to eat

 

‘disgust’ – and ‘odious’ – is overdoing it here –

 

it is more likely that most would look upon food – similar to that just consumed – with disinterest –

 

and again – Spinoza – if he was to maintain his monism – needed to find language that expresses it without reference to ‘mind and body’

 

i.e. – the propositional actor is satisfied after eating his or her fill – and yes – other proposals will come in to play

 

‘For the rest, I have neglected the external modifications of the body which are observable in emotions such as tremor, pallor, sobbing, and laughter, because they refer to the body without any relation to the mind. Again, as definitions of the emotions, I shall repeat them in this order, with such notes as I think necessary.’

 

‘refers to the body without any relation to the mind’ –

 

well – there goes the neighbourhood

 

 

DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS

 

 

I. Desire (cupiditas) is the very essence of man in so far as it is conceived as determined to do something by some given modification of itself.

 

 

‘the very essence of man’?

 

any claim of ‘essence’ – is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘determined to do something by some given modification of itself’?

 

determined to do something – effectively means ‘anything’ –

 

so – the essence of man is – whatever man does –

 

and whatever man does – is whatever man proposes – is – human propositional action

 

what we propose – and our propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it is not ‘determined’

 

we can drop talk of ‘essence’ altogether –

 

what we are dealing with is propositional actors – and their proposals – their propositional actions

 

as for ‘desire’ –

 

yes – you can describe human activity – in terms of ‘desire’ – but really what is the point?

 

the description – ‘propositional action’ – is logically superior – simply because it is not wedded to emotionalism

 

and thus – it allows for – gives space to – different descriptions – let us say non-emotional perspectives to have a place

 

 

Explanation. – We said above in the Note on Prop. 9, Part III., that desire was appetite with a consciousness of itself: and that appetite was the very essence of man in so far as it is determined to do such things as will serve for its preservation. But in the same note I also gave warning that in truth I recognize no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or whether he be not, his appetite remains the same notwithstanding; and therefore, lest I seem guilty of a tautology, I do not want to explain desire by means of appetite, but I endeavoured at the same time to define it in such a way that I might comprehend in one and all the endeavours of human nature which we signify by the name of appetite, will desire, or impulse. I might indeed have said that desire is the very essence of man in so far as it is conceived as to do something; but from this definition (Prop. 23, Part II.) it would follow that the mind could be conscious of its appetite or desire. Therefore, in order to involve the cause of its consciousness, it was necessary to add (same Prop.), in so far as it is conceived as determined by a modification of itself. For by modification of human nature we understand any disposition of that nature, whether it be innate, or whether it be conceived under the attribute of thought or extension alone, or whether it have reference to both at the same time. Hence by the nature of desire I understand any endeavours, impulses, appetites, or volitions, which are various, according to the various dispositions of the said man, and often opposed one to the other as a man is drawn in different directions and knows not wither to turn.

 

‘But in the same note I also gave warning that in truth I recognize no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or whether he be not, his appetite remains the same notwithstanding;’

 

conscious and unconscious?

 

this so called ‘unconscious’ – is really one of the great logical frauds –

 

for we can only propose it – once we are conscious of it – and then it is not an ‘unconscious’ –

 

and if instead of ‘unconscious’ – you propose ‘non-conscious’ – the same applies

 

the ‘unconscious’ is a determinist ploy – basically a trick to pretend a foundation to propositional life

 

the logical reality is that there is no foundation to propositional activity – but propositional activity itself –

 

so – forget ‘foundation’ –

 

all we have – is proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘and therefore, lest I seem guilty of a tautology, I do not want to explain desire by means of appetite, but I endeavoured at the same time to define it in such a way that I might comprehend in one and all the endeavours of human nature which we signify by the name of appetite, but I endeavoured at the same time to define it in such a way that I might comprehend in one and all the endeavours of human nature which we signify by the name of appetite, will desire, or impulse.’

 

appetite and desire?

 

Spinoza’s problem here is that he realises that ‘desire’ really doesn’t do the job that he wants it to do –

 

for he wants it to cover appetite – and on the face of it desire and appetite are different

 

might I not desire a particular food – but not have an appetite for it?

 

he puts his problem in terms of avoiding a tautology

 

for if a tautology – then really you have no definition – just a pleonasm

 

to get around this problem of desire / appetite – he ends up going for an unrestricted definition of ‘desire’ –

 

‘but I endeavoured at the same time to define it in such a way that I might comprehend in one and all the endeavours of human nature which we signify by the name of appetite, will desire, or impulse’

 

and one could argue here that whatever meaning ‘desire’ had or might have had – is now lost

 

in any case it is clear that though Spinoza sees a problem with his use of desire – he carries on regardless

 

‘I might indeed have said that desire is the very essence of man in so far as it is conceived as to do something; but from this definition (Prop. 23, Part II.) it would follow that the mind could be conscious of its appetite or desire. Therefore, in order to involve the cause of its consciousness, it was necessary to add (same Prop.), in so far as it is conceived as determined by a modification of itself. For by modification of human nature we understand any disposition of that nature, whether it be innate, or whether it be conceived under the attribute of thought or extension alone, or whether it have reference to both at the same time. ‘

 

the so called ‘cause of its consciousness’ – that is the ‘cause’ of propositional activity is a critical propositional matter –

 

that is to say – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘For by modification of human nature we understand any disposition of that nature’ –

 

that is any propositional action –

 

any propositional action – whatever its propositional explanation

 

‘Hence by the nature of desire I understand any endeavours, impulses, appetites, or volitions, which are various, according to the various dispositions of the said man, and often opposed one to the other as a man is drawn in different directions and knows not wither to turn.

 

‘desire’ as – any endeavour – impulses – appetites – volitions –

 

that is – proposal and propositional action –

 

‘and often opposed to one another as a man is drawn in different directions and knows not wither to turn’ –

 

that is to say – ‘man’ – the propositional actor – puts proposals – and takes propositional action – proposals and propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we live with and in logical uncertainty – and we act in response to logical uncertainty

 

and any action we take – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

II. Pleasure (Laetitia) is man’s transition from a less state of perfection to a greater.

 

 

‘pleasure’ – is a possible propositional consequence or affect/ effect of a proposal – of propositional action –

 

and the experience of pleasure – as with any propositional experience – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to this ‘transition from a lesser state of perfection to a greater’

 

Spinoza’s idea of perfection is a total confusion

 

if we take ‘perfection’ on face value – it is quite clearly not a relative notion – it is an absolute – so there is no ‘lesser’ or ‘greater’

 

and as an ‘absolute’ – it makes no logical sense –

 

‘perfection’ – as with any concept – is a proposal – and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the notion of perfection is best dispensed with as a throw-back to authoritarian and dogmatic metaphysics

 

 

III. Pain (tristitia) is man’s transition from a greater state of perfection to a lesser.

 

 

pain is a possible propositional consequence or affect / effect of propositional action

 

there is no perfection or imperfection in propositional action or the possible effects of propositional action

 

proposal / propositional action is either rational or irrational –

 

if rational – it is held open to question – open to doubt – and understood as uncertain

 

if irrational – it is not put to question – not put to doubt – and regarded as certain

 

pleasure and pain are possible natural affects / effects of propositional action –

 

and are proposals – open to question

 

 

Explanation. – I say transition, for pleasure is not perfection itself; for if a man was born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the emotion of pleasure; and the contrary of this makes it still more apparent. For that pain consists in a transition from a greater to a lesser perfection, and not that of less perfection itself, no one can deny, since man cannot thus far be saddened in so far as he participates in any perfection. Nor can we say that pain consists in the privation of a greater perfection, for privation is nothing. But the emotion of sadness or pain is an action (actus), which therefore cannot be anything else than the action of passing to a lesser state of perfection, that is, an action by which the power of action of a man is lessened or hindered (see Note, Prop. II, Part III.). As for the definitions of laughter, giggling, melancholy, and grief, I omit them inasmuch as they have reference rather to the body, and are only species of pleasure or pain.

 

 

human beings do not participate in perfection

 

human beings participate in propositional uncertainty

 

‘But the emotion of sadness or pain’

 

as to whether sadness is pain – and pain sadness –

 

this is a matter open to question

 

I think you can be sad without being in pain – and be in pain without being sad

 

pleasure and pain – are not transition to higher or lower states of perfection

 

higher or lower of states of perfection – makes no sense

 

pleasure and pain are possible propositional consequences – possible propositional affect / effects

 

Spinoza defines pleasure and pain as emotions

 

it should be noted that these proposals are open to question –

 

i.e. – some would define pleasure and pain – not as emotions per se – but as sensations

 

‘As for the definitions of laughter, giggling, melancholy, and grief, I omit them inasmuch as they have reference rather to the body, and are only species of pleasure or pain.’

 

this statement is a total capitulation to dualism –

 

I would have thought that if Spinoza was a genuine monist – he would have analysed laughter – giggling – melancholy and grief as simultaneous expressions of the mind and body

 

i.e. – there is no laughter without a mental dimension

 

can there be any emotional reaction that does not involve what for Spinoza is a ‘mental process’?

 

Spinoza I would say has a very shallow view and understanding of grief

 

 

IV. Wonder (admiratio) is the imagination of anything, in which the mind accordingly remains without motion because imagination of this particular thing has no connection with the rest (see Prop. 52, with its Note).

 

 

‘wonder’ – is a proposal – a propositional state – where what is proposed – is unknown

 

‘no connection with the rest’ –

 

‘the rest’ – here – is any propositional context

 

in the propositional moment of wonder – the unknown will be the focus

 

however as soon as wonder is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

relations between other proposals and propositional contexts will be put forward

 

wonder is often where we start – and sometimes – where we end –

 

for any propositional activity will come out of and return to the unknown

 

 

Explanation. – In the Note on Prop. 18, Part II, we showed that what was the reason that the mind from contemplation of one thing passes at once to the contemplation of another, namely, because the images of those things were so intertwined and so arranged that one followed the another, which therefore cannot be conceived if the image be new; but the mind will remain transfixed in the contemplation of that thing until it is determined by other causes for thinking of other things. The imagination of a new thing, therefore, considered in itself, is of the same nature as other imaginations, and on that account I do not count wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should do so, since this distraction of the mind arises from no positive reason which attracts the mind from other things, but only from the fact that the cause is wanting why the mind, from the regarding of one thing, should pass to the thinking of others. I recognise, therefore (as I intimated in the Note of Prop. 11, Part III.), only three primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain and desire; nor have I spoken of wonder for any other reason than that it is customary to speak of certain emotions which arise from the three primary ones by other names when they have reference to objects which we wonder at; and this same reason moves me to put forward also a definition of contempt (contentus).

 

 

‘we showed that what was the reason that the mind from contemplation of one thing passes at once to the contemplation of another, namely, because the images of those things were so intertwined and so arranged that one followed the another, which therefore cannot be conceived if the image be new’

 

how one proposal leads to another – is a matter open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

‘wonder’ – is a propositional state – where what is proposed – is unknown

 

the proposal – as proposed – will not be in a relation with another proposal – or other – proposals

 

‘but the mind will remain transfixed in the contemplation of that thing until it is determined by other causes for thinking of other things’

 

all this means is that our propositional action will not be fixed – that we move from one proposal to another

 

the ground or basis for this propositional movement or motion – is not determined or fixed – but is rather a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘The imagination of a new thing, therefore, considered in itself, is of the same nature as other imaginations, and on that account I do not count wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should do so’ since this distraction of the mind arises from no positive reason which attracts the mind from other things, but only from the fact that the cause is wanting why the mind, from the regarding of one thing, should pass to the thinking of others’

 

an ‘imagination’ is a proposal – a propositional action

 

any proposal / propositional action will have an affect

 

an affect – is an emotion – therefore ‘wonder’ – is an emotion – or an emotional state

 

‘since this distraction of the mind arises from no positive reason which attracts the mind from other things, but only from the fact that the cause is wanting why the mind, from the regarding of one thing, should pass to the thinking of others’

 

‘the cause’ – is always wanting ‘why the mind, from the regard of one thing, should pass to thinking of other things’ –

 

this is just to say – why one proposal leads to another – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘propositional motion’ – propositional activity – is uncertain

 

‘only three primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain and desire; nor have I spoken of wonder for any other reason than that it is customary to speak of certain emotions which arise from the three primary ones by other names when they have reference to objects which we wonder at’

 

any propositional affect – is an emotion – an emotional / propositional state

 

and any ‘classification’ of the emotions – in the final analysis – is purely arbitrary

 

pleasure and pain are possible propositional consequences – or affects / effects

 

a propositional effect will have affect – and as such – be an emotional state

 

pleasure and pain are propositional affects / effects –

 

as for desire – ‘desire’ is simply a name Spinoza has given to propositional activity

 

any propositional activity will be affective and effective

 

as to the argument that there are primary emotions – and that all other emotions ‘arise from’ the three primary emotions –

 

Spinoza is here proposing a foundation to the emotions – and a relation between emotions and the proposed foundation

 

the emotions – however described – however classified – are proposals – proposals open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

the ‘ground’ or ‘foundation’ – (if we are to continue use these terms) – of emotional / propositional life – is uncertainty

 

Spinoza’s description / classification / explanation of the emotions is as good as any other such proposal –

 

and as with any such proposal – or indeed any proposal in any propositional context – it is open – open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

V. Contempt is the imagination of anything which touches the mind so little that the mind is moved by the presence of that thing to think rather of things which are not contained in the thing than those which are contained in it (see Note, Prop. 52, Part III.).

 

 

contempt here – is therefore – firstly – denial – denial of what something or someone is –

 

and secondly – it is to regard what it is not – or what is ‘not contained in it’ – as what it is – or – what is ‘contained in it’ –

 

in logical terms – it is to contradict – a thing or person

 

a contradiction is a pretend or dummy proposition – for – in fact in a contradiction – nothing is proposed

 

therefore – on this definition – I would say – contempt is illogical

 

and so – the one who ‘holds another in contempt’ – is doing no more than demonstrating (their) irrationality

 

the one who is contemptuous has fallen into a pit of ignorance

 

‘The definitions of veneration and scorn I pass over here, for I know not any emotions which arise therefrom.’

 

what emotion arises from what emotion – is nothing more than speculation

 

I would think that to venerate is at the very least – is to hold in high regard –

 

and thus – you might say it is an expression of approval?

 

and scorn – to vehemently disparage?

 

and as to disparagement – would it not come down to disapproval?

 

and then to whatever account you might give of disapproval?

 

these so-called emotions of contempt – veneration and scorn – are no different to any other propositional action or behaviour they are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

VI. Love (amor) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

 

 

‘love’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘the idea of an external cause’?

 

love – can be proposed as a propositional relation

 

A loves B –

 

is a relation between proposals – between propositions – between propositional actors – or a propositional actor and a sentient creature – or proposed object

 

and the relation – as with the propositions related – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

as indeed is any so-called ‘cause’ – causal argument

 

‘pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause’?

 

we can reasonably ask here – does pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause equal love?

 

or is it just – pleasure?

 

and does anyone with a critical mind think that all there is to love is pleasure?

 

and also – it seems Spinoza has no concept of love without pleasure –

 

there are circumstances where one may love another – but there is no pleasure to be had – where indeed the prevailing emotion is pain

 

now is Spinoza prepared to say that in such circumstance – there is no love?

 

and if he is to concede love in such circumstance – how does he explain that in terms of his definition of love?

 

tying love to pleasure – has only resulted in an extremely narrow and ultimately very unsatisfactory understanding of love

 

Spinoza’s definition of love fails

 

the hard truth is that love is whatever it is proposed to be –

 

and – any proposal of love – is open to question –

 

love is uncertain

 

 

Explanation. – This definition sufficiently explains the definition of love. That one given by authors who define that love is the wish of the lover to unite himself to the object loved, does not explain the essence of love, but a property thereof; and as the essence of love has not been perceived sufficiently by the authors in question, they accordingly have neither a clear conception of its property, and accordingly their definition is considered by all to be extremely obscure. But let it be remarked that when I say that it is a property of the essence of love that the lover wishes to be united to the object of his love, I do not understand by will or wish, consent, deliberation, or free decision (for this we have shown to be fictitious in Prop. 48, Part II), nor even the wish of the lover to be united with the object of his love when it is absent, nor of continuing in its presence when it is present (for love can be conceived without either of these desires); but by wish I understand the satisfaction which is in the love by reason of the presence of the object loved, by which the pleasure of the lover is maintained, or at least cherished.

 

 

‘This definition sufficiently explains the definition of love.’

 

any so-called ‘explanation’ must be more than a statement

 

a genuine explanation puts a proposal to question – puts it to doubt – an explores its uncertainty

 

and logically speaking – an ‘explanation’ is never final

 

‘That one given by authors who define that love is the wish of the lover to unite himself to the object loved, does not explain the essence of love, but a property thereof; and as the essence of love has not been perceived sufficiently by the authors in question, they accordingly have neither a clear conception of its property, and accordingly their definition is considered by all to be extremely obscure

 

the essence of any proposal – of any proposition – is logical uncertainty

 

as to ‘property’ –

 

a ‘property’ – is a propositional description –

 

a description – open to question

 

that ‘love is the wish of the lover to unite himself to the object love’ –

 

is to my mind a perfectly reasonable as a proposal regarding the nature of love –

 

and it is one of many possible ways of proposing and understanding the nature of love

 

and it is clear – not obscure

 

‘But let it be remarked that when I say that it is a property of the essence of love that the lover wishes to be united to the object of his love, I do not understand by will or wish, consent, deliberation, or free decision (for this we have shown to be fictitious in Prop. 48, Part II),’

 

in trying to avoid this alternative view of love – and defend his own definition – Spinoza is claiming that there is no will – or wish – or consent – deliberation – or free decision involved in love

 

which is to say there is no proposal involved in love –

 

for ‘will’ – ‘wish’ – ‘consent’ – deliberation’ – ‘free decision’ – are all propositional forms –

 

the logical reality is that any human action however described – is propositional –

 

to deny this is – in relation to ‘love ‘– or any other proposal – is to engage in illogicity

 

and to end up in absurdity

 

‘nor even the wish of the lover to be united with the object of his love when it is absent, nor of continuing in its presence when it is present (for love can be conceived without either of these desires); but by wish I understand the satisfaction which is in the love by reason of the presence of the object loved, by which the pleasure of the lover is maintained, or at least cherished.’

 

here Spinoza redefines ‘wish’ as ‘satisfaction’ – in the presence of the object loved

 

a wish – however you understand it – is not satisfaction

 

satisfaction – you might say – is the object of the wish

 

a wish is a proposal for satisfaction –

 

and clearly a proposal that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and satisfaction – is a propositional state – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

quite clearly Spinoza’s view of love – at the best – is extremely limited –

 

and one gets the impression from the above ‘Explanation’ – that he senses this – and has felt the need to try and put his misgivings to rest –

 

all he has done though is trample on and misconstrue a perfectly reasonable alternative proposal

 

 

VII. Hatred (odium) is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause

 

 

Explanation. – what must be noted here can easily be perceived from what was said in the explanation of the previous definition (see moreover, Note, Prop. 13, Part III.).

 

 

the one who hates may take pleasure in his or her hatred – and the one hated – may not be pained by being hated – i.e. – they may be surprised and without rancour – or even dismissive

 

and as for an ‘external cause’

 

the cause of any emotional state – is a matter open to question –

 

and even if we accept this internal / external distinction – is it not possible that one’s hatred for another – may come from one’s own self-loathing – and thus be of an ‘internal cause’?

 

the point here is that we must give up on this notion of definition – as some kind of final account of a proposal – or propositional state – i.e. – an ‘emotional state’ –

 

 no ‘definition’ – will be beyond question – beyond doubt – or certain

 

a ‘definition’ is nothing more than a proposal – a critical starting point – for question – for doubt – and for the exploration of uncertainty

 

 

VIII. Inclination (propensio) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of anything which by accident is the cause of pleasure.

 

 

an ‘inclination’ is a proposal – a proposal – the uncertainty of which is apparent before its form is decided

 

pleasure may be an affect or effect of such a proposal – pain may be an affect or effect of such a proposal – or there may be no pleasure or pain involved at all –

 

there is no ‘necessary’ ground to any proposal – and therefore – any proposal is ‘accidental’

 

 

IX. Aversion (aversio) is pain accompanied by the idea of anything which is accidentally the cause of that pain (see Note, prop, 15, Part III).

 

 

‘aversion’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the point being – just what aversion is – in any propositional context – is not a matter that can be determined out of context –

 

and even in context there will be questions – doubts – uncertainties

 

aversion may have a painful affect / effect – but it may not

 

i.e. – one may ‘turn away’ from a proposal – because it is not useful – or indeed – because it is regarded as irrational – without any pain involved

 

this too goes to the question of pain – specifically – Spinoza’s analysis of pain

 

now Spinoza defines pain – as a loss of power –

 

I would have thought that ‘turning away’ from a proposal deemed unacceptable for whatever reason – is in fact a positive action – which in Spinoza’s terms – can only be regarded as powerful

 

 

X. Devotion (devotio) is love towards him when we admire or wonder at.

 

 

one may be devoted – not out of love – admiration – or wonder – but from other motives

 

i.e. – one may be devoted out of duty – from a moral imperative – in which there is no love – admiration – or wonder

 

 

Explanation. – That wonder arises from the novelty of a thing we showed in Prop. 52, Part III. If, therefore, it comes to pass that we often imagine that which we wonder at, then we shall cease to wonder: and thus we see that devotion can easily degenerate into simple love.

 

 

wonder is a primary propositional response to the unknown

 

I don’t think there is necessarily any time limit on wonder

 

one’s devotion – may ‘degenerate’ into ‘simple love’ – but if so – we have a propositional shift

 

and propositional shifts are the natural order of the day

 

 

XI. Derision (irrisio) is pleasure arisen from the fact that we imagine what we despise to be present in what we hate.

 

 

despising and hating – what’s the difference?

 

and if we hate something – according to Spinoza – hate arises from pain –

 

so – on his definition of hate – there can be no pleasure – only pain in relation to hate

 

if we accept what Spinoza says here regarding derision – that it has the affect / effect of pleasure – then his psychological / ethical theory collapses

 

in any case – need there be any pleasure in derision?

 

there may be – but just as equally – there may not be –

 

derision – might be – in certain circumstances – just a form of dismissal

 

 

Explanation. – In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, thus far we deny its existence (Note, Prop, 52, Part III.), and thus we rejoice (Prop. 20, Part III.). But as we suppose that man hates what he derides, it follows that this joy is not very stable.

 

 

this ‘explanation’ – makes no logical sense –

 

firstly – just because you hate something – doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist

 

on the other hand – if we deny a thing’s existence – how do we rejoice in – ‘its’ – non-existence?

 

joy can only be a propositional response – to a positional reality – that exists –

 

is Spinoza prepared to say we can have joy – from nothing?

 

however – the final point – the conclusion? – to this ‘argument’ – is logically correct

 

‘joy’ – as with any proposal – any propositional state – is logically ‘unstable’ – for any proposal – any propositional state – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

XII. Hope (spes) is an uncertain pleasure arisen from the idea of a thing past or future, the event of which we still doubt somewhat (see Note 2, Prop. 18. part III.)

 

 

‘hope’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

in this respect it is no different to any other proposal

 

what distinguishes hope is that its uncertainty is manifest

 

as to being a pleasure –

 

pleasure may be a propositional affect or effect of a proposal of hope –

 

however – one can hope – without an expectation of pleasure or pain

 

one may just hope for an outcome – and be uncertain as to whether it will deliver pleasure – pain – or neither

 

Spinoza says hope is an idea that arises from a past or future event

 

clearly – hope is an expectation for a future state of affairs

 

the expectation is present – any propositional act is present

 

 

XII. Fear. (metus) is an uncertain pain arisen from the idea of something past or future of whose event we doubt somewhat (see Note 2. Prop. 18. Part III.).

 

 

fear as with hope – is a proposal open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

while we can – in emotional terms – describe hope as a positive uncertainty – fear is a negative uncertainty

 

hope and fear represent the emotional range of propositional uncertainty

 

in hope and fear we come face to face with uncertainty –

 

which in turn means – we come face to face with the unknown

 

 

Explanation. – It follows from these definitions that fear cannot be without hope nor hope without fear. For he that depends on hope and doubts the event of a thing, is supposed to imagine something which cuts off the existence of that thing in the future: and therefore thus far he is pained (Prop. 19, Part III.), and consequently, while he depends on hope he has fears as to the event of the thing. He, on the other hand, that is in fear, that is, who doubts concerning the event of the thing which he hates, imagines also something which cuts off the existence of the thing: and therefore (Prop. 20, Part III.) he rejoices, and consequently thus has hope that it will not come to pass.

 

 

this is really only to say that the success or failure of a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

you can describe emotional / propositional uncertainty in terms of hope and fear – or – as the relation between – hope and fear

 

‘For he that depends on hope and doubts the event of a thing, is supposed to imagine something which cuts off the existence of that thing in the future: and therefore thus far he is pained’

 

what we hope for is uncertain – and whether or not something will occur that thwarts our hope – is uncertain

 

to feel pain on the possibility of having one’s hope thwarted – is putting the cart before the horse – and is not sensible

 

and if one’s hope is thwarted – one may be pained – but this is not the only possible propositional response –

 

i.e. – one may have something of a stoic acceptance of the result

 

‘He, on the other hand, that is in fear, that is, who doubts concerning the event of the thing which he hates, imagines also something which cuts off the existence of the thing: and therefore (Prop. 20, Part III.) he rejoices, and consequently thus has hope that it will not come to pass.’

 

imagining that – which might give one hope – is only to propose a successful outcome

 

and any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any pleasure felt at the prospect of a hopeful outcome – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

XIV. Confidence (securitas) is pleasure arisen from the idea of a past or future thing of which the cause of doubt is overborne.

 

 

confidence is pleasure?

 

pleasure may be a propositional affect or effect of confidence –

 

however – I would think that genuine confidence has a rational basis –

 

if we are confident in our proposal – this will be because we have subjected it to critical analysis –

 

that is – we have put it to question – put it to doubt – explored its uncertainty – and as a result of this rational process – we have decided to proceed with it –

 

we decide to proceed with it knowing that it will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it is this knowledge – this knowledge of the critical process – that is the source of rational confidence

 

any confidence – rational confidence we have – arises not from the past or the future – but rather the present

 

that is the critical activity we engage in – in the present

 

if doubt is overborne – i.e. – overcome – then doubt has been overcome by ignorance and prejudice

 

logically – rationally – speaking – any proposal – any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

XV. Despair (desperation) is pain arisen from the idea of a thing past or future of which all cause of doubt is removed.

 

 

any idea of a thing past – is a present idea / proposal

 

any idea of a thing future – is a present idea / proposal

 

despair is an emotional / propositional state – open to question

 

its explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

logically speaking – ‘all cause of doubt’ – that is – doubt – is never removed

 

regardless of how ‘despair’ is defined – how it is described and further elaborated on – the logical reality is that we are dealing with a proposal – a propositional state – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

in any propositional state – question – doubt – uncertainty – will naturally ‘arise’

 

any denial of doubt – is irrational and false

 

where one feels that all hope is lost – that there is no way forward – I think this is likely due to physical and / or mental exhaustion – or – finding oneself in a circumstance that one cannot negotiate oneself out of – i.e. – a death sentence

 

however – if there is life – there is question – there is doubt – and there is uncertainty – even where and when one’s prospects appear to be beyond redemption

 

 

Explanation. – Confidence therefore arises from hope, and despair from fear, when all cause of doubt as to the event is removed, which takes place because a man imagines a thing past or future to be present, or because he imagines other things which cut off the existence of those things which brought about his doubt to him. For although we may never be certain as to the event of individual things (Note Prop. 31. Part II.), it can nevertheless come to pass that we have no doubt concerning their event. For we have shown that it is a different thing not to doubt concerning a thing (see Note, Prop. 49, Part II.) and to be certain about it: and therefore it may come to pass that we are affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a thing present, as we showed in Prop. 18, Part II., which see, together with its second note.

 

‘Confidence therefore arises from hope, and despair from fear, when all cause of doubt as to the event is removed, which takes place because a man imagines a thing past or future to be present, or because he imagines other things which cut off the existence of those things which brought about his doubt to him.’

 

confidence does not arise from hope –

 

confidence arises from engaging in the rational process of critical activity

 

does despair arise from fear?

 

if anything – despair – is an emotional state – that in some sense – is beyond hope – and beyond fear –

 

it can – I think – be described as a state of emotional desolation

 

and what it ‘arises from’ – how it comes about – is a matter open to question

 

bear in mind though – one can – despair – and engage in question – doubt – and uncertainty

 

despair can be dealt with rationally

 

‘For although we may never be certain as to the event of individual things (Note Prop. 31. Part II.), it can nevertheless come to pass that we have no doubt concerning their event.’

 

this is just a statement of contradiction

 

for if you can never be certain – you will doubt

 

‘For we have shown that it is a different thing not to doubt concerning a thing (see Note, Prop. 49, Part II.) and to be certain about it’

 

one may ‘not doubt’ – simply because one doesn’t think about what one is proposing or what one is doing

 

not doubting – is to not question – to not explore uncertainty – it is to presume certainty

 

and to be certain – or to presume certainty – is to be ignorant

 

‘and therefore it may come to pass that we are affected with the same emotion of pleasure or pain from the image of a thing present’

 

the image of the thing past – or the image of the thing future – is a proposal put – in the present

 

‘the image of the thing present’ – is a proposal put –

 

and a proposal put – may have a propositional affect – or effect – of pleasure – of pain – or the absence of both –

 

you just have to wait and see –

 

and whatever the propositional effect – it will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

XVI. Joy (gaudium) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of a past thing which surpassed our hope in its event.

.

 

‘the idea of a past thing which surpassed our hope in its event’ – is a present propositional state

 

if Spinoza – is trying here to confine joy to the remembrance of past events and their effects – he has a strange idea of joy –

 

for it is to say – you do not – or cannot – immediately and directly experience joy

 

it is to say that joy is only a backstory to past events

 

in effect this means – at best – your immediate experience must be joyless

 

such a view is odd indeed – and quite simply flies in the face of human / propositional experience

 

and yes – joy is a pleasure –

 

however – this only raises the question of the nature of pleasure –

 

is any pleasure – a joy?

 

if so – why this term ‘joy’?

 

presumably therefore joy is not just a synonym for pleasure – and if so – how is it to be further explained?

 

tying it to past experience ‘that surpassed our hope’ – will not do the job –

 

such a strategy – effectively – takes joy out of our direct experience –

 

the last thing we need

 

finally – it should be noted that the questions that need to be asked in relation to Spinoza’s concept of pleasure – apply equally to his concept of pain

 

 

XVII. Disappointment (conscientiae morsus) is pain accompanied by the idea of past thing which surpassed our hope in its event

 

 

again – we have from Spinoza – a propositional / emotional state that is tied to the past

 

whenever I am disappointed – I am disappointed – now

 

if I experience disappointment as a result of memory – I am disappointed now

 

our propositional / emotional states are present

 

as to pain here –

 

is ‘pain’ or ’painful’ – the right description for a disappointment?

 

and in any case – I may be disappointed – but as it were – ‘take it on the chin’ – accepting it as just another matter to deal with –

 

but what exactly counts as pain for Spinoza?

 

i.e. – we all understand physical pain – but is a psychological set-back – pain?

 

and do we count any circumstance that does not conform with our expectation – as ‘painful’?

 

‘pain’ – as with any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the real problem with Spinoza – is that there is no hint of question – of doubt – or uncertainty – with his notion of pain –

 

and as a result – of course there is no thorough-going exploration of the notion –

 

and this lack of critical analysis – I think really weakens his position

 

 

XVIII. Pity (commiseratio) is pain accompanied by the idea of an ill which happened to another whom we imagine similar to oneself (see Note, Prop. 22, and Note, Prop. 27, Part III.).

 

I pity what is happening to another –

 

and yes – I may be aware of what has happened to them – but my pity is a present emotional / propositional state

 

and – what is ‘pity’?

 

I would say it is the recognition of another’s suffering

 

and I don’t see recognition as ‘pain’ – or ‘painful’

 

as to – ‘another whom we imagine similar to oneself’ –

 

this is weak – similar in what respect? – will any respect do?

 

you recognise another’s suffering –

 

‘similarity’ – is neither here nor there –

 

it is the suffering that is psychologically / ethically relevant

 

 

Explanation. –  Between pity and compassion (misericordia) there seems to no difference save perhaps this, that pity has reference to a particular emotion while compassion to a habit.

 

 

I think pity is recognition of another’s suffering – whereas compassion – is recognition plus empathy

 

 

XIX. Favour (favor) is love towards someone who has benefited another.

 

 

do you love someone you favour?

 

here it depends – of course on how you define ‘love’ –

 

and ‘love’ – like any other proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and do you only favour someone who has benefited another?

 

you may indeed favour one who has benefited another –

 

but there will be many who confer their favour on those who are simply disadvantaged – with the hope of giving them a leg up

 

and of course – you may favour another – for other reasons

 

i.e. – you might simply like the way they conduct themselves –

 

and you might bestow a favour on someone just because it makes you feel good to do so

 

Spinoza’s definition of favour – as with the preceding definitions – is limited and inadequate

 

 

XX. Indignation (indignatio) is hatred towards someone who has maltreated another.

 

 

yes – perhaps –

 

still ‘hatred’ might be overdoing it in most cases –

 

‘indignation’ –

 

I don’t think that it is sensible to seriously think you can pin a term – or concept down to any one meaning or usage

 

in practise ‘indignation’ can be used to describe – an emotional response to any number of propositional circumstances

 

could I not be indignant about how an election has played out?

 

could I not be indignant about a change in the weather?

 

in such cases – there is no ‘maltreatment of another’

 

and – really – no maltreatment at all

 

Explanation. – I know that these names, according to common usage, have other meanings, but it is my purpose not to explain the meanings of the words, but the nature of the things, and to explain them in such words whose meanings, according to current use, are not entirely different from the meaning which I wish to attach to them: this warning should suffice once for all. As for the cause of these emotions, see Coroll. 1, Prop. 27, and Coroll., Prop. 22, Part III.

 

 

one gets the impression from this ‘Explanation’ – that Spinoza actually sees the inadequacy of his approach on these matters – but has decided to push on regardless

 

as to this argument regarding ‘the nature of things’ –

 

as with ‘names’ – ‘common usage’ – and ‘meanings’ – ‘the nature of things’ – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza cannot save himself from propositional uncertainty

 

however – it is as if he feels an obligation to defy it at all costs

 

 

XXI. Partiality (existimatio) is estimating something too highly by reason of love.

 

 

too high – too low – just right? –

 

these judgments will be made in terms of the circumstances one finds oneself in –

 

and any estimation will be uncertain –

 

that is open to question – open to doubt – and open to revision

 

‘by reason of love’?

 

can love lead to an overestimation?

 

yes – you might – as they say – be blinded by love –

 

however – even here – there will be question – doubt – and uncertainty

 

 

XXII. Disparagement (despectus) is estimating something too lowly by reason of hatred.

 

 

Explanation. – Partiality is therefore an effect or property of love, while disparagement is an effect of property of hate: and therefore partiality may also be defined as love in so far as it thus affects man so that he estimates a thing too highly. and on the other hand, disparagement as hatred in so far as it thus affects man that he underestimates him whom he hates (see on this point Note, Prop. 26, Part III.).

 

perhaps your hatred of another – does lead you to underestimate him or her –

 

but equally – your estimation might be the same – even if you didn’t hate

 

any ‘estimation’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

XXIII. Envy (invidia) is hatred in so far as it so affects man that he is pained at the good fortune and rejoiced at the evil fortune of another.

 

 

Explanation. – Envy is commonly opposed or contrasted with compassion (misericordia), which therefore may be thus defined the usual meaning of the word.

 

 

I think there are two kinds of envy

 

the envy of the man who is pained at the good fortune of the other – and who rejoices in the downfall of the other –

 

this is Spinoza’s envy – the envy of the XXIII.

 

however – I think you can be envious of another’s good fortune – celebrate it – while at the same time wishing that you too had that good fortune

 

that is an envy based on a joyous celebration of the good fortune of the other

 

Spinoza is aware of this –

 

but he has no term to describe it –

 

and he is not prepared to say that there can be a positive form of envy as well as the negative form of envy –

 

and so – he has tried to get out of this problem by cannibalizing compassion

 

it doesn’t work – for compassion – as commonly understood – is an emotional / propositional response – not to one’s good fortune – but rather to its opposite – one’s misfortune and suffering

 

 

XXIV. Compassion (misericordia) is love in so far as it so affects man that he rejoices at the good fortune of another and is saddened at his evil fortune.

 

 

Explanation. – For the rest concerning envy, see Note, Prop.14, and Note, Prop. 32, Part III. These are emotions of pleasure and pain which are accompanied by the idea of an external thing as cause, either through itself or by accident. I pass now on to those emotions which the idea of a thing internal accompany as a cause.

 

 

‘compassion’ as with any term – any idea – any concept – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

and consequently – we should be open to different definitions – different understandings

 

Spinoza here – has an unusual definition of compassion –

 

the key question is – do we feel compassion for the good fortune of another?

 

most I think would say – recognizing or celebrating the good fortune of another – is not what they would understand as compassion

 

Spinoza gives no explanation – in his ‘Explanation’ above – of this usage – and is obviously keen to move on

 

the fact is – his definition of envy is limited – and as such fails

 

perhaps he was hoping for compassion here

 

 

XXV. Self-complacency (acquiescentia in seipso) is pleasure arising from the fact that man regards himself and his power of acting.

 

 

regarding one’s power of acting –

 

if you regard it logically – you put it to question – put it to doubt – and explore its uncertainty

 

this is a logical activity – whether it gives you pleasure or not – is irrelevant

 

being self-satisfied – is harmless enough – if it is no more than a moment’s reflection –

 

however – there is a thin line between self-satisfaction on the one hand and logical laziness and ignorance on the other

 

 

XXVI. Humility (humilitas) is pain arising from the fact that man regards his want of power or weakness.

 

 

Explanation. – Self-complacency is opposed to humility in so far as by it we understand pleasure which arises from the fact we regard our power of acting; but in so far as we understand it by pleasure accompanied by the idea of some deed which we think we have done by the free decision of the mind, it is opposed to repentance, which can be defined by us as:

 

 

is humility a painful experience? –

 

if it comes out of sense of weakness – perhaps – yes

 

but there is another sense of humility – which I would suggest is not negative –

 

and here I have in mind someone – who neither has an inflated sense of himself – or regards himself as diminished – but is rather – accepting of his limitations and positive – though unpretentious – with regard to his achievements

 

such is a positive form of humility

 

Spinoza’s self-complacency – is not opposed to this positive humility – but yes – it is opposed to his (negative) view of humility

 

self-complacency – or self-satisfaction – as I have argued above – has to do with logical laziness and ignorance

 

and as such – self-complacency is opposed to any form of critical propositional / emotional activity

 

it is clear that Spinoza here gives no real ‘explanation’ of humility – that his concern is to revisit self-complacency – with a view to using it in his explanation of repentance –

 

it’s a quick turnover – and it suggests that he was not confident about his proposed contrast of self-complacency with humility – which in turn suggests he may have felt the limitation of his view of humility

 

‘but in so far as we understand it by pleasure accompanied by the idea of some deed which we think we have done by the free decision of the mind, it is opposed to repentance’

 

is Spinoza suggesting that if we ‘perform some deed which we think we have done by the free power of the mind’ – that such is to be regarded as ‘self-complacent’?

 

I fail to see how a perceived free act – need have anything to do with self-complacency

 

in any case – the idea that the opposite of self-complacency is repentance – suggests that we should repent the pleasure of our self-complacent perceived free action – as if such an act and perception is akin to something like sin

 

there is just a hint of philosophical desperation here –

 

and in any case Spinoza’s notion of self-complacency does not mesh with repentance

 

presenting self-complacency and repentance as opposites – does nothing for either concept – and in fact leaves both concepts in confusion

 

and his implied view that pleasure combined with the idea of freedom – is something we should repent – is strange to say the least

 

any decision of the mind is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

uncertainty is the ground of logic – uncertainty is the ground of freedom –

 

to repent freedom is to ‘repent’ logic –

 

it is in effect to deny logic

 

and in my view Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’ – is just that – a denial and argument against logic and against rationality –

 

and an argument for the ‘certainty’ of ignorance and prejudice –

 

it is an argument for the irrational cloaked in a deductive format

 

 

XXVII. Repentance (poenitentia) is pain accompanied by the idea of some deed which we think we have done by the free decision of the mind.

 

repentance is pain with the idea of a free action?

 

any propositional action – is ‘free’ – that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

pain is a possible affect / effect of propositional action –

 

what Spinoza’s definition here amounts to – is that we ‘repent’ – any action that has the consequence of pain

 

we repent pain?

 

the important thing to note here – is that from this ‘definition’ – we have no account of what repentance is – or what it is to repent

 

this ‘definition’ – only tells us what to repent

 

any action with a consequence of pain?

 

there will be acts where pain is an unintentional consequence – do we repent such actions?

 

and there will be actions where a painful consequence – in turn has a consequence that is positive or beneficial – do we repent such actions?

 

Spinoza has no answer – as he has no account of what repentance is

 

and so – we can only conclude that Spinoza’s use of ‘repentance’ – is without definition –

 

and for this reason – his notion of repentance is empty – is meaningless

 

in common parlance to repent is to regret or to be contrite

 

we may regret a painful consequence – and we may be contrite regarding a painful consequence – or we may not –

 

it will depend on circumstance –

 

and any propositional action of regret – or contrition – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Explanation. – We have shown the causes of these emotions in Note, Prop, 51, 53, 54, 55, and its Note, Part III. Concerning the free decision of the mind, however, see Note, Prop. 35. Part II. But here, moreover, this notable point arises, that it is not

wonderful that pain should follow all those actions which according to custom are called wicked (pravus), and those which are called right (rectus) should be followed by pleasure. For we can understand from what has been said above that this most certainly depends upon education. Parents, by reprobating wicked actions and reproving their children on the committal of them, and on the other hand, by persuading to and praising good or right actions, have brought it about that the former should be associated with pain and the latter with pleasure. This also is proved by experience. For custom and religion are not the same to all; but on the contrary, what is sacred to some is profane to others, and what is honourable to some is dishonourable to others. Therefore, according as each has been educated, so he repents or glories in his actions.

 

 

‘But here, moreover, this notable point arises, that it is not wonderful that pain should follow all those actions which according to custom are called wicked (pravus), and those which are called right (rectus) should be followed by pleasure.’

 

pain doesn’t always follow all those actions which according to custom are wicked –

 

so-called wicked acts are for some – a source of pleasure

 

and pleasure doesn’t always follow from those actions which according to custom are called ‘right’

 

so-called ‘right’ acts can have painful consequences

 

what is wicked and what is right – regardless of custom – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and whether the consequence of a so called ‘wicked’ act – is pleasure or pain – and whether the consequence of a so called ‘right’ act – is pleasure or pain – is uncertain

 

‘For we can understand from what has been said above that this most certainly depends upon education. Parents, by reprobating wicked actions and reproving their children on the committal of them, and on the other hand, by persuading to and praising good or right actions, have brought it about that the former should be associated with pain and the latter with pleasure. This also is proved by experience

 

how people are educated or trained does not cancel out propositional / logical uncertainty –

 

and this is also ‘proved’ by experience

 

‘For custom and religion are not the same to all; but on the contrary, what is sacred to some is profane to others, and what is honourable to some is dishonourable to others. Therefore, according as each has been educated, so he repents or glories in his actions’

 

yes – what is sacred and what is profane – what is honourable and what is dishonourable – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what you might glory in – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and still – we have no explanation or account of repentance from Spinoza

 

what we can say is that whatever repentance is proposed to be – it will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

 

 

XXVIII. Pride (superbia) is over-estimation of oneself by reason of self-love.

 

 

according to definition VI. above – ‘love’ – is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause

 

in terms of this definition – there is a question – as to whether the notion of self-love makes any sense at all –

 

self-love – is love of the self – by the self – where is the external cause?

 

and as to ‘over-estimation’ –

 

‘over-estimation’ – presumes measurement –

 

measurement is a rule-governed propositional game –

 

what are the rules here?

 

in this context – this emotional context – there is no rule-governed propositional game

 

there is no measurement –

 

love is not measurable

 

 

Explanation. – Pride is different from partiality, for the latter has reference to the over-estimation of an external cause, whereas the former has reference to self-over- estimation. However, as partiality is the effect or property of love, so pride is that of self-love (philautia), which therefore may be defined as love of self, or self-complacency, in so far as it thus affects man so as to overestimate himself (see Note Prop, 26, Part III.). There is no contrary to this emotion. For no one under-estimates himself in so far as he imagines that he cannot do this or that. For whatever a man imagines that he cannot do, he imagines it necessarily, and by that very imagination he is so disposed that in truth he cannot do what he imagines he cannot do. For so long as he imagines that he cannot do this or that, so log as he is determined not to do it: and consequently, so long as it is impossible to him that he should do it. However if we pay attention to these things, which depend solely on opinion, we shall be able to conceive that it is possible that a man should under-estimate himself. For it can well come to pass that any one, while sadly regarding his weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all, and that while other men are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. A man moreover may underestimate himself if he deny himself something in the present with relation to future time of which he is uncertain: as, for example, if he should deny that he can conceive anything certain, or desire to do anything save what is wicked and disgraceful, etc. We could, moreover, say that anyone under-estimates himself when we see that he dares not do certain things from

too great a fear of shame which others who are his equals do without any fear. We can therefore oppose this emotion to pride; I shall call it self-despising or dejection (abjecto). For self-complacency arises from pride, so self-despising arises from humility: and this therefore may be defined:

 

 

‘Pride is different from partiality, for the latter has reference to the over-estimation of an external cause, whereas the former has reference to self-over- estimation. However, as partiality is the effect or property of love, so pride is that of self-love (philautia), which therefore may be defined as love of self, or self-complacency, in so far as it thus affects man so as to overestimate himself (see Note Prop, 26, Part III.).’

 

any estimation – if it is not a genuine measurement – that is a rule governed – propositional exercise – is uncertain – is open to question – open to doubt

 

pride – is – self-love – ‘in so far as it thus affects man so as to overestimate himself’

 

but what if pride doesn’t ‘affect man so as to overestimate himself’?

 

in that case – Spinoza actually has no definition of ‘pride’

 

for his definition is just that pride is an overestimation of oneself by reason of self-love

 

there is – on this definition – no other kind of pride

 

in any case – as mentioned above – given Spinoza’s definition of love – there is no ‘self-love’ – for love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause – and the ‘self’ – is not an external cause

 

so – therefore – there can be no question of estimation – or ‘over-estimation’ –

 

Spinoza’s notion of pride – collapses on every count

 

‘pride’ as with any proposal – is open to question – open to interpretation – the concept is logically speaking – uncertain

 

which is to say in practise – there are various uses of the term ‘pride’

 

i.e. – I can take pride in my work – which is to say I regard what I have done as competent and worthwhile –

 

any propositional evaluation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

I will – if I am rational – be open to re-evaluation – and further re-evaluations –

 

so – I may at some point take the view that the original valuation is wrong – that the work has less value than first thought – or I may regard it as being of higher value than first thought

 

and any of these evaluations may be revised

 

it may be said of someone that they are ‘too proud’

 

this is not an over-estimation by reason of self-love – it is likely rather a description of one who has not put his actions to question – to doubt – and has not explored their uncertainty –

 

someone who prefers to avoid the question – or in fact – does not recognise it

 

as to ‘self-love’ –

 

as I see it – if to ‘love oneself’ means anything – it is to embrace one’s uncertainty – and to explore the possibilities of one’s propositional life with an open and critical mind

 

‘There is no contrary to this emotion. For no one under-estimates himself in so far as he imagines that he cannot do this or that. For whatever a man imagines that he cannot do, he imagines it necessarily, and by that very imagination he is so disposed that in truth he cannot do what he imagines he cannot do. For so long as he imagines that he cannot do this or that, so long as he is determined not to do it: and consequently, so long as it is impossible to him that he should do it’

 

one can in assessing one’s propositional actions – under-estimate their value –

 

but this will only occur relative to an accurate estimation – or an over-estimation

 

‘under-estimation’ – ‘over-estimation’ – ‘estimation’ – are best seen as relative terms

 

estimation – if it is not measurement – that is a rule-governed activity – is propositional – and is uncertain

 

an ‘imagination’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

 

uncertain – not ‘necessary’

 

there is no ‘imagining necessarily’ – there is no necessity in propositional life

 

what we imagine we cannot do – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘However if we pay attention to these things, which depend solely on opinion, we shall be able to conceive that it is possible that a man should under-estimate himself. For it can well come to pass that any one, while sadly regarding his weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all, and that while other men are thinking of nothing less than of despising him’

 

so – from – ‘For no one under-estimates himself’ – we go to – ‘it is possible that a man should under-estimate himself’

 

one gets the impression that Spinoza has had second thoughts here – either that or he is in a tangle

 

‘sadly regarding his weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all, and that while other men are thinking of nothing less than of despising him’

 

perhaps ‘sadly regarding a weakness’ – is not under-estimating oneself at all – perhaps it is just being realistic with a little sadness thrown in for good or bad measure

 

and whether or not others despise you or not – is not the issue

 

Spinoza’s argument for ‘under-estimation’ – is at the very least – doubtful

 

‘A man moreover may underestimate himself if he deny himself something in the present with relation to future time of which he is uncertain: as, for example, if he should deny that he can conceive anything certain, or desire to do anything save what is wicked and disgraceful, etc.’

 

any estimation is uncertain – past – present – future

 

recognizing uncertainty – the uncertainty of propositional life – is to live logically and rationally

 

if one thinks one can only desire that which is wicked or disgraceful –

 

one is not dealing with one’s desire in a rational or critical manner

 

desire is the gateway to propositional freedom and possibility

 

‘We could, moreover, say that anyone under-estimates himself when we see that he dares not do certain things from too great a fear of shame which others who are his equals do without any fear. We can therefore oppose this emotion to pride; I shall call it self-despising or dejection (abjecto). For self-complacency arises from pride, so self-despising arises from humility: and this therefore may be defined:’

 

‘too great a fear of shame’

 

and what is ‘too great’ – a fear of shame? –

 

‘fear of shame’ is neither too great – or not great enough – but is just fear – plain and simple

 

I may fear shame – that is to say – fear that others will see me in a negative light – (which might be on the money) –

 

however – estimation of oneself – is a different matter to the fear of another’s perception

 

and I don’t under-estimate myself – or am shamed – because I fear something others do not fear

 

my fear here might well be rational

 

we have seen that on Spinoza’s own definition of love – ‘self-love’ – makes no sense – therefore – as it stands – we have no definition of pride from Spinoza

 

self-complacency – occurs with a non-critical view of one’s action

 

one may be proud – as I see pride – without being self-complacent – that is one may value one’s activity – and have a critical attitude to it

 

and as for humility –

 

to be humble is to be unpretentious – to regard one’s activities as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

humility – as I see it – is rational

 

as to ‘self-despising’ –

 

if you have committed a vile act – then ‘despising yourself’ might be appropriate –

 

but this is not to be humble

 

and it is not to under-estimate yourself

 

 

XXIX. Self-despising or dejection (abjectio) is an underestimating oneself by reason of pain

 

 

‘self-despising’ or ‘dejection’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Explanation. – We are wont, nevertheless to contrast pride with humility, but then more when we regard their effects than their nature. For we are wont to call him proud who praises himself too much (see Note, Prop. 30, Part III.), who relates only his own great deeds and only the evil ones of others, and who lives with a gravity and adornment which is natural to those who are far above him in rank. On the other hand we call him humble who often blushes, who confesses his faults, and who relates the virtues and great deeds of others, who yields to all, who walks with a bowed head, and neglects to take upon himself any adornment of dress. But these emotions of humility and self-despising are very rare, for human nature considered in itself strives as much as possible against them (see prop. 15 and 54, Part III); and therefore those who are believed to be most abject and humble are usually most ambitious and envious.

 

there is no reference to pain in this ‘explanation’ – and it would seem from the definition that pain is key to self-despising

 

if by ‘self-despising’ is meant something like a low opinion of oneself – one can have a ‘low opinion of oneself’ due to one’s view of oneself in terms of one’s place in some social hierarchy or class system

 

such a view may not involve any pain at all – one may simply accept one’s perceived place – and live happily ever after – with no hint of self-despising

 

so – what is clear is that the term ‘self-despising’ – is open to question – is uncertain

 

to the ‘explanation’ –.

 

‘We are wont, nevertheless to contrast pride with humility, but then more when we regard their effects than their nature.’

 

so – from their being no ‘contrary’ to pride – we now have a ‘contrast’ –

 

what is the difference?

 

to now talk of a contrast – suggests – yet again – that Spinoza – hasn’t really got a handle on pride

 

Spinoza says the contrast has not to do with the nature of the emotions – but rather with their effect –

 

if you run with this nature / effects idea – then surely an effect reflects the nature –

 

which means there is no real distinction to be made

 

but Spinoza wants to make such a distinction – to try and salvage his definition of pride –

 

it doesn’t work

 

‘For we are wont to call him proud who praises himself too much (see Note, Prop. 30, Part III.), who relates only his own great deeds and only the evil ones of others, and who lives with a gravity and adornment which is natural to those who are far above him in rank.’

 

‘one who praises himself too much’ –

 

is ‘praising oneself too much’ – an ‘overestimation of oneself’ –

 

it could be –

 

but a question here – who decides what is ‘too much’ – what is an ‘over-estimation’?

 

consider one who states to others just what he honestly believes he has achieved –

 

others may see that as ‘too much’ – an ‘over-estimation’ –

 

so – the matter is open to question – just whether the person is proud or honest –

 

and whether the perception of the others is accurate – or indeed – perhaps an example of jealousy or disdain

 

‘who relates only his own great deeds and only the evil ones of others, and who lives with a gravity and adornment which is natural to those who are far above him in rank.’

 

‘relating only the evil deeds of others’ –

 

how is that an overestimation of oneself?

 

‘who lives with a gravity and adornment’ – that is above his rank

 

so pride is a matter of class distinction?

 

‘On the other hand we call him humble who often blushes, who confesses his faults, and who relates the virtues and great deeds of others, who yields to all, who walks with a bowed head, and neglects to take upon himself any adornment of dress

 

humility – as with any proposed emotional / propositional state – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and what we have here from Spinoza – is one proposal as to how to define or understand humility

 

and what we have here is a dispositional or behavioural characterization –

 

which may or may not apply to humble people –

 

so – it really is not much use – it is just one characterization – among many other possible descriptions

 

and that is ok – because what all this gets back to is that any emotion or emotional state – is open to question – open to doubt – open to interpretation and description – and uncertain

 

‘But these emotions of humility and self-despising are very rare, for human nature considered in itself strives as much as possible against them (see prop. 15 and 54, Part III); and those who are believed to be most abject and humble are usually most ambitious and envious’

 

how would Spinoza know that these emotions are very rare?

 

on what does he base this claim?

 

he offers no evidence for his view

 

and as for the claim that ‘human nature strives against them’ –

 

again – on what is this claim based on?

 

where is the evidence for it?

 

‘and those who are believed to be most abject and humble are usually most ambitious and envious’

 

at best this just speculation

 

it is all very well for Spinoza to ditch his ‘nature of the emotions’ argument’ – for a dispositional / behavioural argument –

 

the problem is – if you are going to go empirical – you have to have evidence for your proposals – your hypotheses –

 

I think Spinoza thought he could skip this step –

 

and as a result – all he has ended up with is common and garden observation – in the mask of ‘explanation’

 

 

XXX. Honour or glory (gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own which we imagine others to praise

 

 

you would think the praise need be actual – not imagined

 

and could one be honoured – experience the pleasure of praise – where others believe one has performed an action – when in fact the action was not performed?

 

that is – could one be honoured in the event of a mistake or a deception?

 

 

XXXI. Shame (pudor) is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own which we imagine others to blame

 

 

again – you would think the blame need be actual – not imagined

 

and could one be shamed – feel pain – when in fact one has not performed the action for which one is blamed?

 

 

Explanation – Concerning these see Note, Prop. 30, Part III. But this difference must be noted, namely the difference between shame and bashfulness (verecundia). For shame is pain that follows the deed of which we are ashamed; but bashfulness is the fear or dread of shame by which a man is prevented from committing a shameful action. To bashfulness prudence is usually opposed, which in truth is not an emotion, as I shall show in its place; but the names of emotions (as I have already pointed out) have more reference to use than nature. And thus I have completed what I proposed to explain, namely the emotions which arise from pleasure or pain, I now proceed to those which I refer to desire.

 

 

not an explanation of shame – rather a description of bashfulness

 

‘bashfulness’ – is open to question – open to doubt – its use and meaning is uncertain

 

and so – Spinoza’s description here – logically speaking is as good as any – as far as it goes

 

a bashful person may have a dread of shame –

 

however – ‘dread of shame’ – is a narrow view of bashfulness

 

the point being – one may be bashful – where there is no dread of shame

 

a bashful person may just be shy 

 

and as for opposing prudence to bashful – a person may be bashful and prudent –

 

Spinoza says here – prudence is not an emotion – and if so – how is it opposed to an emotion?

 

Spinoza’s analysis of bashfulness – is unsatisfactory – and ad hoc

 

 

XXXII. Regret (desiderium) is the desire or appetite of possessing something which is fostered by the memory of that thing, and at the same time hindered by the memory of other things which cut off the existence of the thing desired.

 

 

regret – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

in this definition – regret is the desire to possess something remembered – while at the same time remembering whatever it was that hindered the possession of that thing

 

firstly – we can’t have two different memory proposals at the same time –

 

if there are two memories – one follows the other –

 

in Spinoza’s terms here – the desire – and the desire thwarted

 

and so – regret is the propositional / emotional state that results from the conflict between the two

 

secondly – the above definition strikes me as a very limited delineation of regret

 

there seems no place here for the regret of action or lack of action –

 

i.e. – I remember some action I took – or something that I might have said – which I wish I hadn’t done or said –

 

or I remember an omission – something I didn’t do – didn’t say – which I now wish that I had done or said

 

these I would have thought are common forms of regret

 

one reflects on – and re-evaluates – one’s propositional actions –

 

and wishes that they were not taken at the time – or that certain actions were taken at the time –

 

and in re-evaluating them – sees them in a negative light

 

any propositional action – or lack of action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

open to re-evaluation

 

and the action or lack of action regretted – seen in a negative light – may in turn be re-evaluated – and as a result of the re-evaluation – not seen in a negative light – and so not regretted –

 

or at another time – re-evaluated – and once again – regretted

 

the point being – regret – is uncertain

 

and so – the moral of the story is – keep an open mind on regret

 

 

Explanation. –  When we remember anything, as I have already said often, we are so disposed by that act of remembering that we regard it with the same emotion as if it were present; but the disposition or endeavour, while we are awake, is very often hindered by the images of things which cut off the existence of that thing which we remember. When, therefore, we remember something which affects us with a kind of pleasure, by that very fact we endeavour to regard it as present with the same emotion of pleasure; but this endeavour is immediately checked by the recollection of things which cut off its existence. Wherefore regret is in truth pain which is opposed to that pleasure which arises from the absence of that thing which we hate, concerning which see Note, Prop. 47, Part III. But as the name regret seems to have reference to desire, I have therefore referred this emotion to emotions arising from desire.

 

‘When, therefore, we remember something which affects us with a kind of pleasure, by that very fact we endeavour to regard it as present with the same emotion of pleasure; but this endeavour is immediately checked by the recollection of things which cut off its existence’

 

any proposal is present – but this not to say that in a remembered proposal – the past is no longer the past – but is present

 

the remembered proposal or propositional situation or state – is cut off by time –

 

if it wasn’t – there would be no remembering

 

and when we remember – we know this

 

so – there is no ‘endeavour to regard it as present’ –

 

and as to this ‘immediate check by the recollection of things which cut off its existence’ –

 

if you understand that you are remembering – you know that that remembered is not present

 

and so – there is no ‘immediate’ check ‘by recollection of things which cut off its existence

 

its existence is cut off by time – and you know this as a condition of memory

 

‘Wherefore regret is in truth pain which is opposed to that pleasure which arises from the absence of that thing which we hate, concerning which see Note, Prop. 47, Part III. But as the name regret seems to have reference to desire, I have therefore referred this emotion to emotions arising from desire.’

 

regret as pain – that is opposed to the pleasure – that arises from the absence of something we hate?

 

a thing hated is absent – and we take pleasure in this?

 

pain is opposed to this pleasure – how ‘opposed’?

 

do we feel pain then because the thing hated – the absence of which – gave us pleasure – is now present – present – presumably in memory?

 

so – this is regret – as it were – to be faced with the thing hated – as no longer absent

 

and therefore – a source of pain

 

regret as remembering the thing hated?

 

recognising that a thing hated is absent – may not be a source of pleasure

 

it may just be a straight-out recognition of the fact –

 

and remembering the thing hated – may not be a source of pain –

 

we may remember the pain we experience – but not be in pain because of the memory

 

and in any case – where is the regret here?

 

things in or out of existence – is not what we regret

 

if we regret – we regret proposals made – or not made – propositional actions taken – or not taken

 

and furthermore – there may not be any hate involved in any of this

 

I don’t know what Spinoza was trying to do here – but whatever it was – it has nothing to do with regret

 

regret as a form of desire?

 

regret is a propositional focus on the past – desire – a propositional focus on the future

 

regret is not desire

 

if I regret a proposal – I have re-evaluated it – subjected it to question – to doubt – and explored its uncertainty – and come to the view that it would have been better if it had not been put

 

or I may remember and re-evaluate a propositional situation – where I take the view that I should have put a proposal – or should have taken a propositional action – when I didn’t

 

regret then is a re-evaluation of past proposals and propositional situations

 

and – any evaluation or re-evaluation – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

regret is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

XXXIII. Emulation (aemulation) is the desire of anything which is engendered in us from the fact that we imagine others to desire it also.

 

 

any such imagination – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

emulation – however described – is uncertain

 

 

Explanation. – He that runs away because he sees others do so, or who is afraid because he sees that others are, or also he who, because he sees some other burning his hand, draws his hand towards him and moves his body as if his open hand were burnt, is said to imitate the emotions of any other, but not to emulate him; not because we know any difference between the cause of imitation and the cause of emulation, but because it has become customary to call him who imitates what we think to be honourable, useful, or pleasant, emulous. As for the rest concerning the cause of emulation, see Prop. 27, Part III., with its Note. The reason why envy is generally united to this emotion can be seen from Prop. 32, Part III., with its Note.

 

 

Spinoza here distinguishes imitation from emulation –

 

an imitation that is honourable useful and pleasant – is emulous

 

whereas an imitation is not honourable useful or pleasant – it is not emulous

 

it follows from this that imitation is not honourable useful or pleasant

 

as I see it an imitation is just a copy – whether perceived to be honourable etc – or not

 

and by the same token – could not an emulation be perceived to be dishonourable etc?

 

so – this attempt by Spinoza to distinguish imitation and emulation fails – badly

 

according to the above definition – emulation is where we desire because others desire

 

imitation as such – on the other hand – would not necessarily involve desire

 

to imitate is to copy

 

you can copy what another does without desiring what they desire – or taking what you imagine they desire into account

 

but even if you do put desire into the equation – propose to ‘desire’ what the other desires – you are proposing a copy – you are imitating

 

emulation is a form of imitation –

 

as to desire –

 

‘desire’ – is a description of propositional action

 

so – when I ‘desire’ what the other desires – I propose to imitate his propositional action – which means to duplicate it

 

any proposed imitation / duplication – is of course – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

XXXIV. Gratefulness or gratitude (gratia seu gratitudo) is the desire or zeal for love by which we endeavour to benefit him who has benefited us from a similar emotion of love (see prop, 39, with the Note on prop, 41, Part III).

 

 

could I not be grateful to someone who has benefited me – even though their action did not come from love?

 

 

XXXV. Benevolence (benevolentia) is desire of benefiting those whom we pity (see Note, Prop. 27, Part III.).

 

 

pity is defined as ‘pain arisen from the hurt of another’ (Note, Prop. 23 Part III)

 

to benefit another who is in pain – is to exercise benevolence

 

however – I think you can be benevolent to others – not because they are hurt or in pain –

 

but because you think that their circumstances can be improved by your benefit

 

this is to be benevolent not from pity – but perhaps from something like a sense of social justice

 

 

XXXVI. Anger (ira) is the desire whereby through hatred we are incited to work evil to him who we hate (see Prop. 39, Part III).

 

 

this is a very limited definition of anger – and therefore unsatisfactory

 

one can be angry at oneself –

 

one can be angry – as they say – ‘at the world’

 

one can be angry at another – but not be incited to work evil

 

and one can be angry at someone – you don’t hate

 

you can be angry at someone you love

 

is anger a desire – that is a propositional action –

 

or is best seen as a propositional reaction?

 

in any case – how we understand ‘anger’ – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

XXXVII. Vengeance (vindicta) or revenge is the desire by which we are incited through reciprocated hatred to work evil to him who has worked evil to us from a similar emotion (see Coroll.2 Pro. 40, Part III., with its Note).

 

 

I think one could take vengeance on one who hates you – by not doing evil to them – but rather by outsmarting them or disarming them with a gesture of good will –

 

somewhat Machiavellian yes –

 

but I know from experience that this can work – and the result is revenge and peace and goodwill all round

 

so – the nature of vengeance – is open to question

 

 

XXXVIII. Cruelty or savageness (crudelitas seu saevitas) is the desire whereby any one is incited to work evil to whom they love or whom they pity

 

 

once again – a limited and unsatisfactory definition

 

yes – one can be cruel to those whom one loves or cruel to one whom one pities

 

I have witnessed where a person has committed a cruel act against someone they had no connection to – someone they didn’t know –

 

still the question – what is cruelty?

 

we use the term – but can we give a precise meaning?

 

I don’t think so –

 

cruelty as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

my own view is that cruelty occurs when one acts in such a way as to cause harm to another – for the pure pleasure of witnessing the other in pain

 

 

Explanation. –  Cruelty is opposed to clemency (clementia), which is not a passion, but a power of the mind wherewith man moderates his desire for anger and revenge.

 

 

one could moderate one’s desire for anger and revenge – and still be cruel

 

 

XXXIX. Timidity (timor) is the desire of avoiding a greater evil which we fear by encountering a lesser one (see Note, Prop. 39 Part III).

 

 

why encountering a lesser one?

 

timidity is a form of fearfulness

 

granted a person who is fearful would seek to avoid what he regards as a greater evil

 

but why would a fearful person prefer to encounter another – ‘lesser’ – evil at all?

 

one would think that if you are fearful – you would wish to avoid any evil

 

so – this definition from Spinoza is problematic

 

a timid person is fearful – and not just of evil – greater or lesser

 

a timid person may be fearful of any number of things –

 

i.e. – fearful of new places or situations – fearful of making decisions – fearful of the unknown

 

that Spinoza doesn’t see this – makes his understanding of timidity – unsatisfactory

 

one’s fears – as real and as crippling as they can be – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

if you begin with uncertainty – and embrace it – you give yourself emotional possibilities –

 

that is different ways of seeing – of understanding your fears –

 

and with those different possibilities – ways forward –

 

if you put your fear to the question – to the doubt – explore its uncertainty

 

you deal with your fear in a rational manner

 

 

XL. Daring (audacia) is the desire whereby anyone is incited to do anything with a danger which his equals dare not encounter

 

 

daring may well be a desire whereby one is incited to perform a dangerous act

 

but not all daring involves dangerous acts –

 

i.e. – there is creative daring – the daring of the artist – who creates something unique

 

the daring of the politician who proposes transformative legislation

 

the daring of the boy who declares his love to the girl 

 

we can find examples of daring in any number of propositional contexts

 

Spinoza’s definition of daring is limited and unsatisfactory

 

 

XLI. Cowardice (pusillanimitas) belongs to him whose desire is hindered by the fear or dread of a danger which his equals dare to undergo.

 

 

the key phrase here is ‘which his equals dare to undergo’ –

 

first up – forget about ‘equals’ here –

 

this notion of ‘equal’ – only makes sense in mathematics – and what it comes down to is substitution –

 

human beings cannot be ‘substituted’ one for the other – for no two propositional actors are identical –

 

to suggest such is to perpetrate a philosophical fraud

 

secondly – cowardice here comes down to an individual being intimidated by others – and accepting the intimidation

 

fear or dread of danger – is not a weakness

 

feeling inadequate because you wish to avoid a danger that others are to embark on – is to succumb to peer pressure – and to be morally weak

 

in such a case the so-called ‘coward’ – in falling into this intimidation – fails to question – and fails to doubt – the proposed actions of his peers – the uncertain action of his peers

 

the ‘coward’ – simply behaves irrationally

 

 

Explanation. – Cowardice therefore is nothing else than the fear of some evil which many are not want to fear: wherefore I do not refer it to the emotions of desire. I wished, however to explain it here, because in so far as we regard desire it is really opposed to the emotion of daring.

 

 

it could be said that if one defies the pressure to conform – then one is being daring

 

cowardice – is clearly – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s failure to engage with this uncertainty – has rendered his definition of cowardice inadequate

 

 

XLII. Consternation (consternatio) belongs to him whose desire of avoiding evil is hindered by his wonderment at the evil which he fears.

 

 

wonderment (at the fear of evil) – doesn’t really capture the psychological paralysis characteristic of a moment of consternation –

 

and furthermore – consternation is not confined to ‘fear of evil’

 

one may i.e. – experience consternation when faced with an unexpected state of affairs – that is neither good or evil – just unexpected

 

consternation – in common usage – has a more general meaning than that proposed by Spinoza

 

Spinoza’s failure to explore the uncertainty of ‘consternation’ – renders his ‘definition’ – inadequate

 

 

Explanation. Consternation is therefore a species of cowardice. But as consternation arises from a double fear, it can more conveniently defined as fear which holds a man stupefied or hesitating in such a manner that he cannot remove the difficulty in his way. I say stupefied in so far as we understand his desire of removing his evil to be hindered by wonder; I say hesitating on the other hand, in so far as we conceive that desire to be hindered by the fear of another evil which equally torments him: so that it comes about that he knows not which of the two to avoid. On this see Note, Prop. 39, and Note, Prop. 52, Part III. As for cowardice and daring, see Note, Prop. 51, Part III.

 

 

‘Consternation is therefore a species of cowardice’

 

‘consternation’ – is not a species of cowardice – ‘consternation’ – is a species of anxiety

 

‘But as consternation arises from a double fear, it can more conveniently defined as fear which holds a man stupefied or hesitating in such a manner that he cannot remove the difficulty in his way.’

 

there may be fear involved in consternation – but consternation as such is not a fear

 

stupefied or hesitating in such a manner that he cannot remove the difficulty?

 

one does not stay stupefied – forever – and difficulties don’t remain – forever

 

granted you might be stuck – and not see a way forward –

 

but it is just at such a moment that it is necessary to question – to doubt – and to explore that uncertainty that you face –

 

that is – get logical – and get going

 

‘I say stupefied in so far as we understand his desire of removing his evil to be hindered by wonder; I say hesitating on the other hand, in so far as we conceive that desire to be hindered by the fear of another evil which equally torments him: so that it comes about that he knows not which of the two to avoid.’

 

the introduction of a ‘another evil’ – is not necessary to Spinoza’s definition

 

stupefaction and hesitancy – is enough

 

consternation is an instance of anxiety – and anxiety a form or expression of uncertainty –

 

uncertainty is the logical ground of our propositional lives

 

 

XLIII. Politeness or modesty (humanitas seu modestia) is the desire of doing such things as please men and omitting such as do not.

 

 

here Spinoza argues that politeness is about pleasing others

 

I suppose someone who pleases others is unlikely to be accused of impoliteness –

 

however – I don’t think one needs to be pleasing another to be polite –

 

one may not be interested in pleasing another – and still be polite –

 

and by ‘polite’ here – I mean not doing anything that embarrasses the other – or in any other way disparages them

 

‘omitting such as do not’ – again – may not be about ‘not pleasing them’ – but rather about treating them with respect

 

and I would put that politeness is an expression of respect

 

Spinoza’s ‘pleasing the other’ – is to my mind a different matter to being polite

 

if you are setting out to please another – then you are primarily being benevolent – and perhaps – seeking approval form the other

 

‘being polite’ – is not I think about being benevolent – or is it seeking the other’s approval

 

I think Spinoza’s has misconstrued politeness

 

and we can ask is politeness equivalent to modesty?

 

my sense is that politeness may be a characteristic of modesty

 

but that modesty involves more than politeness

 

the modest person I would put – does not promote their own importance –

 

however – this is just one view of the matter

 

these notions of ‘politeness’ and ‘modesty’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

I think Spinoza’s account of politeness mistakes politeness for benevolence –

 

and his account of modesty – confuses modesty with politeness – and is too narrow

 

 

XLIV. Ambition (ambitio) is the immodest desire or glory or honour

 

 

Explanation. – Ambition is the desire by which all the emotions (prop.31 and 27, Part III) are fostered and encouraged: and thus this emotion can scarcely be overcome. For as long as man is held by any desire, he is also held by this. “The very best men”, says Cicero (pro Archia, cp. 2; cf. Tuscul. disput. I., cap 15), “are especially guided by glory. Philosopher, who write on the despising of glory, affix their names to their books,” etc.

 

 

‘ambition’ – the desire by which all emotions are fostered and encouraged?

 

any propositional action can be described as an emotion

 

propositional action can be described in terms of ambition –

 

ambition is a striving for distinction or success

 

however – not all propositional action is ambitious

 

propositional actions can be variously described

 

‘ambitious’ is just one description

 

as for Cicero –

 

I would suggest that if you use the description ‘best men’ – or for that matter ‘worst men’ – or indeed any other such value laden classification – all you are doing is giving voice to your own moral prejudices –

 

and who is to say what any man is guided by?

 

what guides men – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and as for signing your name to your book –

 

444.

 

no big deal to my mind –

 

readers do want to know who wrote it

 

as to being ‘guided by glory’ –

 

being ‘guided by glory’ – I would say – is being guided by pretention

 

 

XLV. Luxury (luxuria) is an immoderate desire or even love of feasting’

 

 

what is moderate to one man – may be immoderate to another –

 

and as for love of feasting – one could love feasting in a moderate way

 

and what is a luxury to one – may not be to another

 

‘luxury’ as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

XLVI. Drunkenness (ebrietas) is the immoderate desire and love of drinking.

 

 

again – what is moderate to one – may be immoderate to another

 

and in any case – intoxication – will depend on one’s chemistry –

 

someone with a low tolerance of alcohol – may drink – what they and others regarded as ‘moderately’ – and be intoxicated

 

and whether ‘love’ comes into it – is open to question –

 

someone addicted to alcohol – may not love drinking – but in fact may hate it

 

Spinoza’s definition here is simplistic – and I would say – clearly – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

XLVII. Avarice (avaritia) is the immoderate desire and love of riches

 

 

‘immoderate’ – ‘moderate’ – these terms will only make any sense in propositional context – and even then – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and what to one man are riches – to another will be seen as necessities

 

‘avarice’ – is open to question

 

 

XLVIII. Lust (libido) is desire and love of sexual intercourse

 

 

is all desire for sex lustful?

 

Spinoza defines it so –

 

one view of lust is that a lustful person is one who seeks sex purely for its pleasure – and for no other end

 

what of those who see sex as a means to procreation?

 

or those who regard sexual release as important for one’s emotional / psychological health?

 

and there are those who regard sex as a means to spiritual enlightenment

 

and of course – many would describe the sexual act as an act of love

 

are these people ‘lustful’ – or is it that they see sexual pleasure as a means to another end – or – relative to pleasure – a so called ‘higher’ end?

 

Spinoza’s definition of lust – as the love of sexual intercourse – is limited and inadequate

 

‘lust’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Explanation. – Whether this desire for sexual intercourse be moderate or not, it is wont to be called lust. Moreover, these last five emotions (as I gave notice in the Note, Prop. 56, Part III,) have no contraries. For modesty is a species of ambition (see Note, Prop. 29, Part III.). I also gave warning that temperance (temperantia), sobriety (sobrietas) and chastity (casititas) indicate strength of mind, and are not passions. It may, however, come to pass that that an avaricious man or an ambitious or timid one may refrain from over-eating, over-drinking, or sexual intercourse, yet avarice drunkenness and timidity are not contrary to luxury, drunkenness and chastity. For an avaricious man would wish to gorge himself on the meat and drink of another; an ambitious man will moderate himself in nothing provided that he think his excess is secret; and if he live among people drunken and lustful, the fact the he is ambitious will make him more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid man does what he does not wish to do. For although an avaricious man will throw all his wealth into the sea for the purpose of saving his life, he remains nevertheless avaricious; and if a lustful man is pained in such a way that he cannot indulge himself as usual, he does not thereby cease to be lustful. So that, to put it absolutely, these emotions have not so great regard for the acts themselves of feasting, drinking, etc., as for the desire or love for them. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these emotions save nobility and magnanimity (generositas et animositas), of which I shall speak presently..

 

 

‘Moreover, these last five emotions (as I gave notice in the Note, Prop. 56, Part III,) have no contraries. For modesty is a species of ambition (see Note, Prop. 29, Part III.).’

 

I would think that the contrary of modesty – is immodesty

 

Spinoza defines ‘ambition’ as ‘the immoderate desire of glory or honour’

 

so – the contrary – a moderate desire for glory or honour?

 

or – indeed the absence of desire for glory or honour?

 

as for luxury – 

 

Spinoza defines it as the immoderate desire for feasting –

 

I would have thought – the immoderate love of feasting – might better be termed ‘gluttony’

 

and further that luxury – is better defined as the desire for expensive things

 

as to a contrary –

 

there are those who shun luxury and wish only for the basics of life –

 

and there are religious people of various persuasions who believe in poverty (of material things) as means to spiritual purity

 

the contrary of drunkenness – is sobriety

 

Spinoza says sobriety is not an emotion – but indicates ‘strength of mind’

 

there might be something in this if you are already a drunk –

 

however – there are those who do not partake because it just doesn’t interest them –

 

so – no ‘strength of mind’ required

 

Spinoza defines avarice as the immoderate desire or love of riches

 

the contrary of avarice – as Spinoza has defined it – would be a moderate desire or love of riches

 

Spinoza’s view that there are no contraries to modesty – ambition – luxury – drunkenness and avarice – goes against common usage and understandings –

 

and at the very least it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘I also gave warning that temperance (temperantia), sobriety (sobrietas) and chastity (casititas) indicate strength of mind, and are not passions.’

 

temperance – sobriety – and chastity – are propositional behaviours – that like any other – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

for Spinoza – emotion or passion – is a ‘confused idea’ – or an inadequate idea –

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘passion’ – is a description of propositional action

 

a ‘passionate’ act – is a propositional action – so described –

 

and as with any propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

for Spinoza – ‘strength of mind’ – is no more than a cover for the absence of question – the absence of doubt – and the failure to explore uncertainty

 

‘strength of mind’ here – is nothing else than ignorance – and determined ignorance at that

 

‘It may, however, come to pass that that an avaricious man or an ambitious or timid one may refrain from over-eating, over-drinking, or sexual intercourse, yet avarice drunkenness and timidity are not contrary to luxury, drunkenness and chastity’

 

‘yet avarice drunkenness and timidity are not contrary to luxury, drunkenness and chastity

 

drunkenness is obviously not contrary to drunkenness

 

to straighten this out – I think the above quote should read:

 

‘It may, however, come to pass that an avaricious man or an ambitious or timid one may refrain from over-eating, over-drinking, or sexual intercourse, yet avarice ambition and timidity are not contrary to luxury, drunkenness and chastity.’

 

here I substitute the first ‘drunkenness’ with ‘ambition’

 

so – avarice – ambition and timidity – are not contrary to luxury, drunkenness and chastity

 

ps.

 

the translation I have been using is the ‘Everyman’ edition translated by Andrew Boyle 1910.

 

the George Eliot translation 2020 has the same mistake

 

the mistake is corrected in the ‘Everyman’ edition translated by Andrew Boyle and revised by G. H. R. Parkinson. 1989.

 

‘For an avaricious man would wish to gorge himself on the meat and drink of another; an ambitious man will moderate himself in nothing provided that he think his excess is secret; and if he live among people drunken and lustful, the fact the he is ambitious will make him more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid man does what he does not wish to do. For although an avaricious man will throw all his wealth into the sea for the purpose of saving his life, he remains nevertheless avaricious; and if a lustful man is pained in such a way that he cannot indulge himself as usual, he does not thereby cease to be lustful.’

 

so – ‘an avaricious man’ – ‘an ambitious man’ – ‘a timid man’ – ‘a lustful man’ –

 

it looks as if – once you have been tagged by Spinoza – as such and such a man – that’s it – no reprieve

 

any description of anyone’s propositional activity is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

what is regarded as an ambitious proposal by one – may be seen as anything but by another

 

and that someone behaves in a certain way on a day – does not warrant that they be so described at all other times

 

of course – you can be closed minded and prejudiced – and so a label will suit

 

if we are to be rational here – we give ourselves and others the benefit of the doubt –

 

and regard any description – as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘So that, to put it absolutely, these emotions have not so great regard for the acts themselves of feasting, drinking, etc., as for the desire or love for them.’

 

‘the desire or love for them’ – is not an ‘absolute’ –

 

one gets the impression that for Spinoza one’s character – is fixed –

 

when in fact we know that human beings can and do change how they act – can and do change what they love

 

in any case ‘the acts themselves’ – are open to interpretation – open to question – open to doubt –

 

any description applied is uncertain

 

‘Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these emotions save nobility and magnanimity (generositas et animositas), of which I shall speak presently.’

 

here we have Spinoza’s ‘distinction’ between ‘strength of mind’ and passions

 

for Spinoza – a ‘passion’ is passiveness –

 

any proposal – propositional action – any propositional state – is active

 

passion – is active – is an action

 

emotion – is active – is propositional action

 

any propositional action / emotion – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

nobility and magnanimity – are descriptions of propositional states

 

any propositional state can be described as an emotion – and any propositional state – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and as for ‘strength of mind’ – real strength of mind is logical strength – the ability to question – to doubt – and explore uncertainty

 

‘The definition of jealousy (zelotypia) and other waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, for they arise from emotions which we have already described, and many of the them have no names, which shows that for ordinary use it suffices to know them in general.’

 

if it has no name – it is not a proposal – it does not exist

 

‘It follows, however. from the definitions of the emotions which I have explained, that they all have arises from desire, pleasure, or pain, or rather only these three exist, each of which is wont to be called by various names, by reason of its various relations and extrinsic marks. If, therefore, we regard these three primary emotions and what we said above concerning the nature of the mind, we can thus define the emotions in so far as they have reference to the mind itself.’

 

‘desire’ – is a description of propositional action –

 

pleasure and pain are possible consequences of propositional action

 

furthermore – there are emotional / propositional states that are neither pleasurable or painful

 

‘The definitions of jealousy (zelotypia) and the other waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, for they arise from emotions which we have already described, and many of them have no names, which shows that for ordinary use it suffices to know them in general. It follows, however, from the definitions of the emotions which I have explained, that they all have arisen from desire, pleasure or pain, or rather only these three exist, each of which is wont to be called by various names, by reason of its various relations and extrinsic marks, If therefore, we regard these three primary emotions and what we said above concerning the nature of the mind, we can thus define the emotions in so far as they have reference to the mind itself.’

 

Spinoza’s claim that ‘many of them have no names which shows that for ordinary use it suffices to know them in general’ –

 

only points to the inadequacy of his analysis

 

he seems to think that some generalization (based on what?) – will ‘cover’ what his theory fails to explain –

 

and he is on safe ground here – because he says ‘many of them have no names’ –

 

so – we can’t say what is left out of his analysis –

 

but just in case anything is – it will fall under some ‘generalization’

 

as to his generalizations – desire – pleasure and pain –

 

‘desire’ – is a description of propositional activity – any propositional activity –

 

pleasure and pain are possible consequences of propositional action

 

pleasure and pain are not the ground – but the (possible) consequences of propositional / emotional action

 

ground and consequence

 

the ground of any propositional / emotional action – is uncertainty

 

 

 

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS

 

 

Emotion, which is called passiveness of the soul (pathema animi), is a confused idea wherewith the mind affirms a greater or lesser power of existing (vis existenda) of its body or any part of it than before, and which being granted, the mind is thereby determined to think of one thing rather than another.

 

 

an emotion – or emotional state – is a proposal – or propositional state – a propositional action – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

the propositional actor is the focus of propositional action

 

in logical terms – ‘power of existing’ – is the critical power – of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

‘a greater or less power of existing’ – will be a function of one’s critical capacity

 

it is not a so called ‘mind / body issue’ – it is rather a matter of propositional actors – critically evaluating proposals put – in an on-going manner

 

we are not determined in what we think – rather we have the freedom to critically evaluate our proposals – and explore propositional possibilities

 

 

Explanation. – I say, in the first place, that emotions, or passions of the soul, is a “confused idea”. For we have shown that the mind only thus far suffers or is passive (see Prop.5, Part III,) in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say again, wherewith the mind affirms a greater or lesser power of existing of its body or any part of it than before, for all the ideas of bodies which we have, indicate rather the actual disposition of our own body (Coroll. 2, Prop. 16, Part III.) than the nature of the external body; but this idea, which constitutes the form (forma) of the emotion, must indicate or express the disposition of the body, or of some part of it which the body or that part possesses by reason of the fact that its power of acting or existing is

increased or diminished, aided or hindered. But it must be noted that when I say “a

greater or lesser power of existing than before,” that I do not understand that the

mind compares the present condition of the body with the past, but that the idea which constitutes the form of the emotion affirms something concerning the body whereby more or less reality is really involved than before. And inasmuch as the essence of the mind involves this (Prop. 11 and 13, Part II.), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and as we understand by perfection the very essence of the thing, it follows, therefore, that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens to affirm something concerning its body, or some part of it, which involves more or less reality than before. When, therefore, I said above that the mind’s power of thinking was increased or diminished, I wished nothing else to be understood than that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or some part of it, which expressed more or less reality than it had affirmed concerning its body. For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thinking is estimated from the excellence of the object. I added, moreover, “and which being granted, the mind is thereby determined to think this or that,” in order that, besides the nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.

 

‘I say, in the first place, that emotions, or passions of the soul, is a “confused idea”. For we have shown that the mind only thus far suffers or is passive (see Prop.5, Part III,) in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas.’

 

is Spinoza saying here that ‘emotion’ – any emotion – is an inadequate idea – and is thus the source of suffering?

 

that emotion is a synonym for suffering?

 

it would seem so

 

what then of emotions that give pleasure?

 

this seems to be a one-sided view of the emotions – and a view that does not accord with experience

 

any ‘idea’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

whether an emotion (inadequate idea) has the consequence of pleasure or pain – is uncertain

 

‘I say again, wherewith the mind affirms a greater or lesser power of existing of its body or any part of it than before, for all the ideas of bodies which we have, indicate rather the actual disposition of our own body (Coroll. 2, Prop. 16, Part III.) than the nature of the external body; but this idea, which constitutes the form (forma) of the

emotion, must indicate or express the disposition of the body, or of some part of it which the body or that part possesses by reason of the fact that its power of acting or existing is increased or diminished, aided or hindered.”

 

so – the mind affirms the power of existing of the body –

 

all ideas indicate the ‘actual disposition’ of the body

 

and this idea constitutes the form of the emotion

 

which is to say – the emotion – expresses the disposition of the body – whether the body’s power of existing is increased or decreased

 

we can ask – how do we know whether the power of the propositional actor is increased or decreased?

 

presumably Spinoza would say pain indicates a decrease in the propositional actor’s power of existing – pleasure – an increase

 

the fundamental question here is – why would this be so?

 

and this comes back to just what ‘power of existing’ amounts to –

 

I don’t think we have an answer to this from Spinoza

 

‘But it must be noted that when I say “a greater or lesser power of existing than before,” that I do not understand that the mind compares the present condition of the body with the past, but that the idea which constitutes the form of the emotion affirms something concerning the body whereby more or less reality is really involved than before.’

 

well – even if we accept this idea of ‘more or less reality’ than before – I can’t see that ‘before’ can mean anything other than the past

 

‘more or less’ – will be an assessment – a calculation – in time – and so the ‘past’ cannot be avoided

 

we can also ask here – how can there be ‘more’ reality or ‘less’ reality’?

 

for Spinoza – reality is existence – and existence is substance – eternal and infinite

 

how can there be more or less eternity – more or less infinity?

 

‘And inasmuch as the essence of the mind involves this (Prop. 11 and 13, Part II.), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and as we understand by perfection the very essence of the thing, it follows, therefore, that the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens to affirm something concerning its body, or some part of it, which involves more or less reality than before.’

‘more or less reality than before’

 

‘reality’ is not increased or decreased

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

‘body’ – a name for propositional action

 

the propositional actor is the source of propositional action

 

propositional action – is the putting of proposal – and the critical evaluation of proposal

 

‘more or less reality’ – if it means anything – means more or less propositional action

 

‘than before’ – will mean an increase or decrease of propositional action – relative to a time past

 

‘When, therefore, I said above that the mind’s power of thinking was increased or diminished, I wished nothing else to be understood than that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or some part of it, which expressed more or less reality than it had affirmed concerning its body.’

 

when it comes to ‘power of thinking’ – what we are dealing with is the critical power of the propositional actor

 

‘For the excellence of ideas and the actual power of thinking is estimated from the excellence of the object. I added, moreover, “and which being granted, the mind is thereby determined to think this or that,” in order that, besides the nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.’

 

 “and which being granted, the mind is thereby determined to think this or that,” –

 

we are propositional actors

 

we propose against the unknown – and any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

propositional uncertainty is the ground of possibility

 

 

FOURTH PART

 

ON HUMAN SERVITUDE, OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS

 

 

PREFACE

 

 

Human lack of power in moderating and checking the emotions I call servitude. For a man who is submissive to his emotions is not in power over himself, but in the hands of fortune to such an extent that he is often constrained, although he may see what is better for him, to follow what is worse (see Ovid, Meiam., VII. 20). I purpose accordingly in this part to show the reason for this, and what there is good and bad in the emotions. But before I begin I must preface something concerning perfection and imperfection, and then good and bad.

 

 

our ‘emotions’ are propositional states – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

therefore – if we are to check or change an emotion in a rational manner – we put it to question – put it to doubt and explore its uncertainty

 

human beings do not lack the power to do this –

 

‘servitude’ – if it is to mean anything here – will be the failure to proceed critically in relation to our emotional states

 

‘servitude’ – is irrationality –

 

‘although he may see what is better for him, to follow what is worse’

 

we are all – always in the ‘hands of fortune’ – which is to say we face and deal with the unknown

 

our relation to the unknown is propositional

 

that is – we propose against the unknown or in relation to it –

 

with our proposals – our propositions – we make known

 

our knowledge – that is – our propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the issue is not what is ‘better or worse’ (whatever that is to be) – but rather what is rational and what is irrational

 

if you behave rationally – you put your proposal – your propositional states / emotions – to question – to doubt – and you explore their uncertainty

 

if you act irrationally – you do not question – you do not doubt – you act with the illusion of certainty

 

 

He that determines to do anything, and finishes it, calls it perfect, and that not only himself, but anyone else who rightly knows, or thinks he knows, the mind of the author of that work or his design. For example, if anyone sees some work (which I suppose not yet finished), and knows that the design of the author of that work is to build a house, he will call that house imperfect, and on the contrary, perfect as soon as he sees it brought to the finish which its author determined to give it. But if anyone sees some piece of work the like of which he had never seen, and does not know the mind of the artificer, he clearly will not know whether the work be perfect or not. This seems to have been the first meaning of these words. But afterwards, when we began to form general ideas and to think out general notions for houses, buildings, towers etc., and to prefer certain notions to ithers, it came to pass that everyone called that perfect which he saw to agree with the general notion which he had formed of that sort of thing, and on the contrary, imperfect what he saw less agree with the general notion, although in the opinion of the artificer it might be correct. There seems to be no other reason that men should call natural things which are not made with human hands perfect or imperfect: for men are wont to form general notions of natural as well as artificial things, which they regard as models to which nature looks to for guidance (for they think she does nothing without some end in view). When, therefore, they see something to take place in nature which less agrees with the exemplary notion which they have of that kind of thing, they think that nature has been guilty of error and has gone astray to have left that thing imperfect. We see thus that men have wont to call things of nature perfect or imperfect from prejudice rather than from true knowledge, for we showed in the appendix of the first part that nature does not act with an end in view: for that eternal and infinite being that we call God or nature acts by the same necessity as that by which it exists, for we showed that it acts from the same necessity of its nature as that by which it exists (see Prop. 16, Part I). Therefore the reason or cause by which God or nature acts, or why they exist is one and the same; therefor as God exists with no end in view, he cannot act with any end in view, but has no beginning or end either in existing or acting. A cause, then, that is called final is nothing save human appetite itself in so far as it is considered as the beginning or primary cause of anything. E.g., when we say that habitation is the final cause of this or that house, we understand nothing else than this, that man had a desire of building a house from his imagining the convenience of domestic life. Wherefore habitation, in so far as it is considered a final cause, is nothing save this individual appetite (or desire), which is truth is the effecting cause which is considered as primary because men are commonly ignorant of their appetites. For they are, as I have already said, conscious of their actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to desire anything. The common saying of the vulgar, that nature is sometimes guilty of error and goes astray and produces imperfect things, I count among the false beliefs which I dealt with in the appendix of Part I. Therefore perfection and imperfection are in truth only modes of thinking, namely notions, which we are wont to invent owing to the fact that we compare reciprocally individuals of the same species or kind. And on that account (see above, Def.6, Part II.) I said that by reality and perfection I understood the same thing. For we are wont to refer all individuals of nature to one class which we call general, namely, to the notion of being which appertains absolutely to all individuals of nature. In so far as we refer the individuals of nature to this one class, and compare them reciprocally, and find that some have more reality or perfection than others, thus far we call some more perfect than others; and in so far as we attribute to them something which involves negation, as term, end, weakness, etc., thus far we call them imperfect, inasmuch as they do not affect our mind as those which we call perfect, and not because there is

something wanting in them which is part of their nature, or that nature has gone

astray. For nothing belongs to the nature of anything except that which follows from the necessity of the effecting cause, and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the effecting cause, necessarily happens.

 

 

‘He that determines to do anything, and finishes it, calls it perfect, and that not only himself, but anyone else who rightly knows, or thinks he knows, the mind of the author of that work or his design.’

 

this is an empirical claim – and we have no evidence for it from Spinoza

 

furthermore – we finish many projects – but don’t call the finished project ‘perfect’ – we call it ‘finished’ – and most likely – we are cognisant of its imperfections

 

cognisant or not – any propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘perfection’ – is meant that which is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain – there is no perfection – such a notion is logically false and delusional

 

and any propositional action – is imperfect – in that – it is logically uncertain

 

‘But afterwards, when we began to form general ideas and to think out general notions for houses, buildings, towers etc., and to prefer certain notions to others, it came to pass that everyone called that perfect which he saw to agree with the general notion which he had formed of that sort of thing, and on the contrary, imperfect what he saw less agree with the general notion, although in the opinion of the artificer it might be correct.’

 

these ‘general notions’ are proposals – proposals – open to question

 

and whether or not – a propositional action agrees with a ‘general notion’ / proposal – is open to question

 

‘There seems to be no other reason that men should call natural things which are not made with human hands perfect or imperfect: for men are wont to form general notions of natural as well as artificial things, which they regard as models to which nature looks to for guidance (for they think she does nothing without some end in view).’

 

again – an empirical claim –

 

is it a fact that men form general notions / models – to which nature looks to for guidance – ‘for they think she does nothing without some end in view.’?

 

and we can ask – what evidence does Spinoza have for this claim?

 

‘When, therefore, they see something to take place in nature which less agrees with the exemplary notion which they have of that kind of thing, they think that nature has been guilty of error and has gone astray to have left that thing imperfect. We see thus

that men have wont to call things of nature perfect or imperfect from prejudice rather than from true knowledge, for we showed in the appendix of the first part that nature does not act with an end in view’

 

nature – guilty of an error –

 

I suspect it is most unlikely that there are many people in our day and age that would think this

 

in fact – at present – with the world-wide focus on the issue of global warming – it is more likely that men think they have committed the error against nature

 

in any case – logically speaking – there are no errors – there are only uncertainties

 

‘for that eternal and infinite being that we call God or nature acts by the same necessity as that by which it exists, for we showed that it acts from the same necessity of its nature as that by which it exists (see Prop. 16, Part I).

 

‘God’ or nature’?

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

‘nature’ – is a name for that proposed

 

the unknown is not that proposed – is not proposed reality – is not the world as proposed

 

‘that proposed’ – is a response to the unknown –

 

and however proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s ‘God or nature’ – is a failed equivalence

 

‘Therefore the reason or cause by which God or nature acts, or why they exist is one and the same; therefor as God exists with no end in view, he cannot act with any end in view, but has no beginning or end either in existing or acting.’

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

‘nature’ – is a name for ‘that proposed’

 

propositional actors – propose – and propose propositional actions

 

any ‘end in view’ – is a proposal –

 

that as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what exists is what is proposed

 

proposals are put by propositional actors

 

any proposal put exists as long as it is entertained

 

‘For they are, as I have already said, conscious of their actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to desire anything.’

 

yes – we are conscious of our actions and appetites – and our actions and appetites are propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any casual proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Therefore perfection and imperfection are in truth only modes of thinking, namely notions, which we are wont to invent owing to the fact that we compare reciprocally individuals of the same species or kind.’

 

‘only modes of thinking’ – only proposals

 

‘I said that by reality and perfection I understood the same thing. For we are wont to refer all individuals of nature to one class which we call general, namely, to the notion of being which appertains absolutely to all individuals of nature.’

 

reality – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘perfect’ is a synonym for ‘certain’

 

there is no propositional certainty

 

what exists – is what is proposed –

 

‘being’ – is a proposal – open to question – being is uncertain – is not an ’absolute’

 

‘In so far as we refer the individuals of nature to this one class, and compare them reciprocally, and find that some have more reality or perfection than others, thus far we call some more perfect than others; and in so far as we attribute to them something which involves negation, as term, end, weakness, etc., thus far we call them imperfect, inasmuch as they do not affect our mind as those which we call perfect, and not because there is something wanting in them which is part of their nature, or that nature has gone astray. For nothing belongs to the nature of anything except that which follows from the necessity of the effecting cause, and whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the effecting cause, necessarily happens.’

 

‘more reality – means what?

 

Spinoza – gives us no answer to this question

 

it looks to me – that this ‘more reality’ notion – is a dummy proposal designed as a substitute for differentiation

 

and it really is unnecessary – if you understand that any proposal regarding ‘things’ – individual things’ – is different –

 

that is the difference is propositional –

 

and the point of this is that if you understand difference – propositional difference – there is no logical basis for what Spinoza refers to as ‘term, end, weakness etc.’

 

and as a consequence – we can jettison his failed notions of perfection and imperfection

 

‘the necessity of the effecting cause’?

 

any casual explanation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and there is no necessity in what ‘happens’ –

 

yes – what happens – is what is proposed – and what happens is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

and any causal proposal / explanation – is open to question

 

 

As for the term good and bad, they also mean nothing positive in things considered in themselves, nor are they anything else than modes of thought, or notions, which we form from the comparison of things mutually. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good, bad and indifferent. E,g., music is good to the melancholy, bad to those who morn, and neither good nor bad to the deaf. Although this be so, these words must be retained by us. For inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human nature to which we may look, we must retain these words for our use in the sense I have spoken of. Therefore, in the following propositions I shall understand by good what we certainly know to be a means of our attaining that type of human nature which we have set before us; and by bad, that which we know certainly prevents us from attaining this type. Again we shall call men more perfect or imperfect in so far as they approach or are distant from this type, For most specially must it be noted that when I say a man passes from a less to a greater perfection, and on the contrary, that I do not understand that he has changed from one essence or form to another, e.g., a horse would be equally destroyed if it were changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect; but that this power of acting, in so far as this is understood by his nature, we conceive to be increased or diminished. Finally, by perfection in general I shall understand, as I said, reality, that is, essence of anything, in so far as it exists and operates in a certain manner, without any consideration of time. For no individual thing can be said to be more perfect because it has remained in existence longer: the duration of things cannot be determined by their essence, since the essence of things does not involve a certain and determined time of existing: but everything, whether it be more or less perfect, shall persist in existing with the same force with which it began to exist, so that in this all things are equal.

 

 

‘As for the term good and bad, they also mean nothing positive in things considered in themselves, nor are they anything else than modes of thought, or notions, which we form from the comparison of things mutually.’

 

‘good’ is a description of affirmation – ‘bad’ a description of denial

 

when faced with the question of what propositional action to take – we are faced with uncertainty

 

where we decide in favour of one course of action – we can describe that action as ‘good’

 

where we decide against a course of action – we can describe that action as ‘bad’

 

any decision as to good or bad – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘Therefore, in the following propositions I shall understand by good what we certainly know to be a means of our attaining that type of human nature which we have set before us; and by bad, that which we know certainly prevents us from attaining this type.’

 

we don’t ‘certainly know’ anything –

 

our knowledge is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘that type of human nature we have set before us’ – will be a proposal – and one open to question

 

invariably – at different times we operate with different proposals as to the type of human nature we wish to affirm or deny

 

‘Again we shall call men more perfect or imperfect in so far as they approach or are distant from this type, For most specially must it be noted that when I say a man passes from a less to a greater perfection, and on the contrary, that I do not understand that he has changed from one essence or form to another, e.g., a horse would be equally destroyed if it were changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect; but that this power of acting, in so far as this is understood by his nature, we conceive to be increased or diminished.’

 

again – Spinoza is pushing his discredited notion of perfection –

 

men do not pass from less to greater perfection

 

human beings deal with propositional uncertainty – and live out propositional uncertainty

 

one’s ‘power of acting’ – is one’s critical activity –

 

we increase our power of acting – if we question – doubt – and explore propositional uncertainty

 

we dimmish our power of acting – when we are non-critical

 

‘Finally, by perfection in general I shall understand, as I said, reality, that is, essence of anything, in so far as it exists and operates in a certain manner, without any consideration of time. For no individual thing can be said to be more perfect because it has remained in existence longer: the duration of things cannot be determined by their essence, since the essence of things does not involve a certain and determined time of existing: but everything, whether it be more or less perfect, shall persist in existing with the same force with which it began to exist, so that in this all things are equal.’

 

if we are to use the term ‘essence’ – the ‘essence’ of anything – of any proposal – is uncertainty –

 

no ‘thing’ exists – outside of time –

 

what exists is what is proposed

 

things / proposals exist – as long as they are entertained / proposed –

 

existence is uncertain

 

any proposal – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

DEFINITIONS

 

 

I. By GOOD (bonum) I understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us.

 

 

our knowledge is what we propose – and our proposals – our propositions are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

there is no certain knowledge

 

and are we going to say that what is ‘good’ – is what is useful?

 

what if – what is useful to me – is to act in such a way – that others are disadvantaged

 

and what if it is useful to me to cause pain to others?

 

is Spinoza OK with this?

 

it would seem so

 

 

II. But by BAD (malum) I understand that which we certainly know will prevent us from partaking in any good.

 

Concerning these definitions, see the foregoing preface towards the end.

 

 

we don’t ‘certainly know’ anything – all knowledge is uncertain

 

therefore – whether an action – a propositional action is good or bad – is uncertain

 

as to the definitions in the foregoing preface

 

first up –

 

‘As for the terms good and bad, they mean nothing positive in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thought, or notions, which we form from the comparison of things’ –.

 

I may propose an action as ‘good’ – without any comparison – or an action as ‘bad’ without any comparison involved

 

and if a good act is not a positive act – what is it?

 

and if a bad act is not a negative act – what is it?

 

secondly –

 

‘Therefore, in the following propositions I shall understand by good what we certainly know to be a means of attaining that type of human nature which we have set before us; and by bad, that which we know certainly prevents us from attaining the said type’

 

again – we don’t know anything with certainty –

 

and furthermore – ‘the type of human nature we have set before us’ –

 

may not be – useful to us –

 

and in fact – may be detrimental to ourselves and others –

 

‘good’ and ‘bad’ – as ‘the means of attaining the said type of human nature’ –

are undefined

 

we are given three different definitions of ‘good and bad’ – notions involved in the comparison of things – a means of attaining a said type of human nature – and that which is useful to us

 

there are holes in all these ‘definitions’ – and together they do not give us a consistent or coherent account of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ –

 

what we are left with is a mishmash of ideas

 

all up – Spinoza has failed to define ‘good’ and ‘bad’

 

 

III. I call individual things CONTINGENT (contingentes) in so far as while we regard there essence alone, we find nothing which imposes existence necessarily, or which necessarily excludes it.

 

 

an ‘individual thing’ – is a proposal –

 

a proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘contingent’ – is a name for uncertainty

 

what exists is what is proposed

 

in propositional reality – there is no necessity – only uncertainty

 

 

IV. I call the same individual things POSSIBLE (possibiles) in so far as we regard the causes by which they must be produced, we know not whether they are determined to produce them.

 

 

uncertainty is the ground of possibility

 

any proposed causal explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

‘In the Note 1, Prop, 13, Part I, I made no distinction between possible and contingent, because it was not necessary to distinguish them accurately there.’

 

 

any proposal is contingent – that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

uncertainty is the ground of possibility

 

 

V. In the following propositions I shall understand by CONTRARY EMOTIONS (affectus contraris) those which draw a man in different directions, although they may be of the same kind, as luxury and avarice, which are species of love, and are contrary not by nature but by accident.

 

 

an emotion is a propositional action –

 

how an emotion / propositional action is classified – is described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and any proposed relation between emotions – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

Spinoza’s ‘contrary’ emotions – are different emotions – different propositional actions regardless of how their relation is classified / described

 

on Spinoza’s definitions – luxury is an immoderate desire or love of feasting – and avarice an immoderate desire or love of riches

 

we can question these definitions – i.e. – isn’t the immoderate desire for feasting – gluttony? –

 

and isn’t luxury better described as the desire for riches – and if so – how does luxury differ from avarice?

 

and another question – who decides what is moderate and what is immoderate?

 

 

VI. What I understand by emotion toward a thing future, present, or past, I have explained in Notes 1 and 2, Prop. 18, Part III., which we see.

 

But it is the place here to note that we can only distinctly imagine distance of time, like that of space, up to a certain limit, that is, just as those things which are beyond two hundred paces from us, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly imagine, we are wont to imagine equally distant from us and as if they were in the plane, so also objects whose time of existing we imagine to be distant from the present by a longer interval than that which we are accustomed to imagine, we imagine all to be equally distant from the present, and refer them all to one moment of time.

 

 

a proposal put – is not put in the past or in the future

 

a proposal put is present

 

 

VII. By END (finis) with which in view we do anything, I understand as desire.

 

 

I would have thought that desire is a means to an end – not the end itself

 

and as for ‘desire’ – I see it as a name or description of propositional action

 

and – in fact – not all propositional action has an end in view –

 

where it does – the ‘end’ – is a proposal – and a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

VIII. By VIRTUE (virtus) and POWER (potentia) I understand the same thing, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), virtue, in so far as it has reference to man, is essence or nature in so far as he has the power of effecting something which can only be understood by the laws of that nature.

 

 

virtue = power = essence

 

what we get from Spinoza here is a word game

 

or a philosophical version of the three-cup magic trick –

 

only there is no ball under any cup

 

power is not defined – or explained by Spinoza – it is just asserted

 

likewise – with ‘essence’

 

and so – ‘virtue’ here – is an empty notion

 

‘power’ – is a proposal – and as with any proposal – is open to question

 

‘power’ – therefore – is logical – is propositional

 

as I see it – power is the critical capacity to put our proposals / propositions to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty

 

where we exercise that critical capacity – we act rationally –

 

where we do not exercise it – we act irrationally

 

‘essence’ – if this word is to be used – and to have a meaning – is ‘uncertainty’

 

man is a propositional animal – and propositions are uncertain

 

characteristically a ‘virtue’ is seen to be a particular moral or intellectual excellence –i.e. – temperance – prudence – justice – fortitude –

 

a ‘virtue’ therefore is a proposal / description – and as with any proposal / description – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

AXIOM. There is no individual thing in nature than which there is none more powerful and stronger; but whatever is given, there is also something stronger given by which that given thing can be destroyed.

 

 

the claim that there is always something stronger or more powerful –

 

and the claim that there is always something stronger or more powerful that can destroy a given thing – are empirical claims –

 

and as with any empirical claim – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROPOSITIONS

 

 

PROP. I. Nothing positive, which a false idea has, is removed by the presence of what is true in so far as it is true.

 

 

there is nothing in a proposition that is true – there is nothing in a proposition that is false

 

‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ – are propositional actions taken in relation to a proposal – a proposition

 

a proposition is true – if affirmed – is assented to – for whatever reason – false – if denied – if dissented from – for whatever reason

 

any propositional action of assent – or denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – Falsity consists solely of the privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate ideas (Prop. 35, Part II.). Nor do these have anything positive, by reason of which they are called false (Prop, 33, Part II.); but on the contrary, in so far as they have reference to God, they are true (Prop, 32. Part II.), If, therefore, that which is positive, possessed by a false idea, were removed by the presence of what is true so far as it is true, then a true idea would be removed by itself, which (Prop. 4, Part III) is absurd. Therefore nothing positive etc. etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

knowledge is proposal – proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no privation – or lack of knowledge – there is only proposal / knowledge – open to question

 

all ‘ideas’ / proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain and therefore – ‘inadequate’ –

 

as to – ‘they have reference to God’ –

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

any proposal is a response / reference to the unknown –

 

in putting proposals – we make known –

 

our proposals – our knowledge – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Note. – The proposition is understood more clearly from Coroll. 2, Prop. 16. Part II. For imagination is an idea which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of an external body, not indeed distinctly, but confusedly: whence it comes about that the mind is said to err. E.g., when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred paces distant from us, in which we are deceived as long as we are ignorant of the true distance. When the distance is known the error is removed, but not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun which explains its nature in so far only as the body is affected by it; and therefore, although we know the real distance, nevertheless we imagine that we are close to it. For as I said in the Note, Prop. 35, Part II., we do not think that the sun is near to us because we are ignorant of the true distance, but because mind imagines the magnitude of the sun in so far as the body is affected by it. Thus when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected to our eyes, then we imagine it as if it were in the water, although we know its proper place. And thus other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body or whether that its power of acting is increased or decreased, are not contrary to what is true, nor do they vanish at its presence. It happens indeed that when we falsely fear some evil, that the fear vanishes when we hear the true account; but the contrary also happens when we fear an evil that is certain to come, and our fear vanishes when we hear a false account. And therefore these imaginations do not vanish at the presence of truth in so far as it is true, but because other imaginations stronger than these arrive and cut off the present existence of the things which we imagine, as we showed in Prop. 17, Part II.

 

 

‘For imagination is an idea which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of an external body, not indeed distinctly, but confusedly: whence it comes about that the mind is said to err.’

 

we are not dealing here with imagination – we are dealing with perception

 

perceptual proposals / propositions – are not confused – they are uncertain

 

and the mind does not err –

 

the ‘mind’ explores propositional uncertainty – the mind explores propositional difference

 

‘when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred paces distant from us, in which we are deceived as long as we are ignorant of the true distance.’

 

here – we have different proposals regarding distance – and they come out of different propositional contexts –

 

the first proposal – out of a natural perceptual context – the second proposal out of a scientific / explanatory context

 

the second proposal – and indeed – its context – can be seen to have its origin in the question – doubt and uncertainty of the first proposal and context

 

different proposals in different contexts

 

if the question put is – how far does the sun appear to be from us – then the very question excludes a scientific / physicalist answer

 

and if the question is – how far is the sun from us – the question itself – excludes the perceptual context

 

we don’t here – have two questions dealing with the same issue – or the same propositional context

 

these are different questions in response to different contexts

 

‘When the distance is known the error is removed, but not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun which explains its nature in so far only as the body is affected by it; and therefore, although we know the real distance, nevertheless we imagine that we are close to it.’

 

logically speaking there is no error –

 

or if there is an error – it is the error of conflating different proposals and different propositional contexts

 

what Spinoza calls the ‘real distance’ – is a scientific / explanatory proposal – not in the perceptual context – but in the physicalist / scientific context

 

different propositional contexts

 

‘For as I said in the Note, Prop. 35, Part II., we do not think that the sun is near to us because we are ignorant of the true distance, but because mind imagines the magnitude of the sun in so far as the body is affected by it.’

 

here Spinoza recognizes propositional and contextual difference

 

what he doesn’t understand is that there is no over-riding truth

 

for the fact is – if I understand the different propositional contexts – I can assent to both the perceptual and scientific proposals – without contradiction –

 

‘And thus other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body or whether that its power of acting is increased or decreased, are not contrary to what is true, nor do they vanish at its presence.’

 

the argument from illusion – really comes about when propositional contextual difference is not understood

 

there is no illusion or deception – only difference – different proposals in different propositional contexts

 

‘It happens indeed that when we falsely fear some evil, that the fear vanishes when we hear the true account; but the contrary also happens when we fear an evil that is certain to come, and our fear vanishes when we hear a false account.

 

it is not that the fear vanishes when we hear ‘the true account’ –

 

the fear vanishes if we assent to an account of the situation which we do not fear

 

nothing is ‘certain to come’

 

our fear doesn’t vanish when we hear a false account –

 

our fear vanishes when we assent to an account of the situation which we do not fear

 

any proposal we give our assent to (or any proposal we dissent from) – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘And therefore these imaginations do not vanish at the presence of truth in so far as it is true, but because other imaginations stronger than these arrive and cut off the present existence of the things which we imagine, as we showed in Prop. 17, Part II.’

 

what Spinoza here calls ‘the presence of truth’ – is no more than an alternative proposal

 

as to why one proposal / proposition is accepted / affirmed and another rejected / denied– is always open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. II. We are passive in so far as we are part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others

 

 

we are passive – or we suffer – in so far as we are part of nature?

 

our reality – however further described – i.e. – as ‘part of nature’ – is propositional –

 

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the ground of human experience is logical uncertainty

 

we suffer uncertainty – yes

 

and – uncertainty is the ground of our joy

 

 

Proof. – We are said to be passive when something takes place in us of which we are only the partial cause (Def. 2, Part III.), that is (Def. 1, Part III.), that is something that cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive, therefore, in so far as we are part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without other parts. Q.e.d.

 

 

any account of suffering – any explanation of suffering – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. III. The force with which persists in existing is limited, and is far surpassed by the power of external causes.

 

 

existence is propositional – that is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – This is clear from the axiom of this part. For with a given man there is given something, say A, stronger than he, and given A, there is given something, say B, stronger than A, and so on to infinity. And therefore the power of man is limited by the power of some other thing, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.e.d.

 

 

A may be physically stronger than B – more powerful – and yet – for whatever reason B survives A

 

saying that one thing is more powerful than another – to infinity – tells us nothing about what actually occurs on the ground

 

and what actually occurs – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

existence is uncertain

 

 

PROP. IV. It cannot happen that a man should not be a part of nature, and that he should be able not to suffer changes, save those which can be understood through his nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.

 

 

propositional reality – is the reality of change

 

proposals are put – put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored –

 

it is the uncertainty of propositional reality that is the ground of change

 

 

Proof. – The power with which individual things, and consequently man, preserves his being is the very power of God or nature (Coroll., Prop. 24. Part I.) not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through actual human essence (Prop. 7, Part III.). Therefore the power of man, in so far as it is explained through his actual essence, is part of the infinite power of God or nature, that is, of his essence (Prop. 34, Part I): which was the first point. Again, if it can come to pass that man can suffer no changes save those that can be understood through the nature alone of that man, it would follow (Prop. 4 and 6, Part III.) that he cannot perish, and that he will live of necessity forever. But this must follow from a cause whose power is finite or infinite, namely from the mere power of man, that he would be able to remove changes which arise from external causes from him, or from the infinite power of nature by which all individual things are so directed that man can suffer no other changes than those which serve for his preservation. But the first point (from the prev. Prop, whose application is universal) is absurd. Therefore, if it could come to pass that man should suffer no changes save those that can be understood through the mere nature of man himself, and consequently, as we have already shown, that he should exist for ever, this would have to follow from the infinite power of God. Consequently (Prop. 16, Part I) the order of the whole of nature would have to be deduced in so far as it is considered under the attributes of thought and extension from the necessity of divine nature, in so far as it is considered as affected by the idea of some man. And therefore (Prop. 21, Part I.) it would follow that man was infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It cannot therefore happen that a man should suffer no changes save those of which he is the adequate cause. Q.e.d.

 

‘The power with which individual things, and consequently man, preserves his being is the very power of God or nature (Coroll., Prop. 24. Part I.) not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through actual human essence (Prop. 7, Part III.). Therefore the power of man, in so far as it is explained through his actual essence, is part of the infinite power of God or nature, that is, of his essence (Prop. 34, Part I): which was the first point.’

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown – is without power

 

the ‘power of man’ – rest in man’s critical capacity

 

‘nature’ is a name for that proposed

 

that proposed it is not the unknown – ‘that proposed’ – is what is known –

 

and any proposed knowledge – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s ‘God or nature’ – succinctly represents his failure to understand ‘God’ and his failure to understand ‘nature’

 

‘Again, if it can come to pass that man can suffer no changes save those that can be understood through the nature alone of that man, it would follow (Prop. 4 and 6, Part III.) that he cannot perish, and that he will live of necessity forever.’

 

it doesn’t follow – that man will live forever – that he cannot perish

 

what ‘follows’ here – is that what exists (i.e. – man) – exists in some form forever –

 

infinity – as I see it – is nothing more than a propositional game –

 

a game – the rule of which is that there is no end point to the play

 

it has no application in this context

 

‘But this must follow from a cause whose power is finite or infinite, namely from the mere power of man, that he would be able to remove changes which arise from external causes from him, or from the infinite power of nature by which all individual things are so directed that man can suffer no other changes than those which serve for his preservation. But the first point (from the prev. Prop, whose application is universal) is absurd.’

 

man cannot remove the uncertainty in his propositional existence –

 

he can only pretend the absence of uncertainty

 

‘Therefore, if it could come to pass that man should suffer no changes save those that can be understood through the mere nature of man himself, and consequently, as we have already shown, that he should exist for ever, this would have to follow from the infinite power of God’

 

if you hold with Spinoza’s idea of God and his idea of the ‘infinite power of God’ – then nothing ceases to exist – while everything that does exist – undergoes change

 

‘Consequently (Prop. 16, Part I) the order of the whole of nature would have to be deduced in so far as it is considered under the attributes of thought and extension from the necessity of divine nature, in so far as it is considered as affected by the idea of some man.’

 

an idea of God and ‘the order of the whole of nature’– just is – the ‘idea of some man’

 

‘And therefore (Prop. 21, Part I.) it would follow that man was infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It cannot therefore happen that a man should suffer no changes save those of which he is the adequate cause. Q.e.d.’

 

any change – ‘man should suffer’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that man is always necessarily liable to passions, that he always follows the common order of nature and obeys it, and that he accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things demands.

 

man’s passions – are proposals – propositional actions – open to question – open to

 

doubt – and uncertain

 

man proposes the ‘nature of things’ – and his proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. V. – The force and increase of any passion, and its persistence in existing, are not defined by the power whereby we endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared to our own.

 

a passion – is a proposal / propositional action

 

a proposal will persist – as long as it is entertained –

 

a propositional action will persist as long as it is enacted

 

I understand the force of a passion to be a function of non-critical propositional action in relation to it

 

the ‘increase’ of any passion / proposal – will be a function of non-critical activity in relation to it –

 

and any so called ‘measurement’ (presumed by ‘increase’) – will not be a genuine measurement – that is a rule-governed propositional game – rather it will be purely speculative and likely – rhetorical

 

we can propose an ‘external cause’ –

 

however – what we are dealing with is a propositional relation – a relation between proposals – the heart of which is – uncertainty

 

passion is propositional uncertainty

 

Proof. – The essence of passion, cannot be explained merely through essence (Def. 1 and 2 Part III), that is, (Prop. 7, Part III.), the power of passion cannot be defined by the power in which we endeavour to persist in our being; but (as in Prop. 16. Part II., as was shown) it must necessarily be defined by the power of some external cause compared with our own. Q.e.d.

 

the ’essence’ of passion – is propositional uncertainty

 

if we are to use the term ‘essence’ – then the ‘essence’ – is uncertainty

 

our being is propositional –

 

we don’t ‘endeavour’ to propose – we propose –

 

our existence is propositional

 

we can propose an external cause – but the reality is that all we are doing is proposing

a propositional relation

 

‘internal’ and ‘external’ – are proposals – propositional categories –

 

open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can so surpass the rest of the actions or the power of a man that emotion adheres obstinately to him.

 

when you adhere obstinately to any proposal / proposition / passion – you behave illogically and irrationally

 

if you put your passion to question – to doubt – and understand its uncertainty – its power as an irrational force dissipates

 

Proof. – The force and increase of any passion, and its persistence in existing, is defined by the power of an external cause compared to our (prev. Prop.): and therefore (Prop. 3. Part IV.) it can surpass a man’s power, etc. Q.e.d.

 

the force and increase of any passion – is not defined by an external cause – rather by a non-critical / illogical / irrational propositional response

 

man’s power rests in his critical capacity

 

 

VII. An emotion can neither be hindered nor removed save by a contrary emotion and one stronger in checking emotion.

 

 

an emotion is propositional – a proposal – a propositional state – a propositional action

 

and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a proposal is ‘hindered’ – if put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

it is ‘removed’ – if no longer entertained

 

in a critical process – different propositions / emotions will be proposed and explored

 

it is not a question of ‘strength’ – rather a question of critical activity

 

 

Proof. – An emotion, in so far as it has reference to the mind, is an idea wherewith the mind affirms a greater or less force of existing of its body than before (General Definition of the Emotions which will be found towards the end of the third part). When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the body is affected at the same

time by a modification whereby its power of acting is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body (Prop. 5, Part IV.) receives from its cause the force for

persisting in its being, which therefore can neither be restrained nor removed save by a

bodily cause (Prop. 4, Part III.) which affects the body with a modification contrary to that one (Prop. 5 Part III.) and stronger than it (Ax., Part IV.). And therefore (Prop. 12, Part II.) the mind is affected by the idea of a modification stronger and contrary

to the previous one, that is (Gen. Def. Emo,) the mind will be affected by an emotion

stronger and contrary to the former which cuts off the existence of or takes away the former: and thus the emotion can neither be checked nor removed save by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘An emotion, in so far as it has reference to the mind, is an idea wherewith the mind affirms a greater or less force of existing of its body than before (General Definition of the Emotions which will be found towards the end of the third part).’

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

‘body’ – is a name for – a propositional action –

 

propositional action – however named or described – is the action of the propositional actor

 

and an ‘emotion’ – is propositional action – of the propositional actor

 

if as Spinoza says that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are the same – we can ask – the same what?

 

and if the answer is – ‘the same modification of substance’ – why two terms – for the ‘one’ modification?

 

one is not the other – mind and body in Spinoza are presented as different realities –

 

different realities that leave man fundamentally divided –

 

and his proposed unity in his ‘substance’ – in his ‘God’ – is no answer

 

for it just begs the question – if his ‘substance’ / ‘God’ is a unity – why two attributes / descriptions – for the one ‘substance’?

 

and if there is no ‘substantial’ differentiation in his substance – then the two ‘attributes’ – have no ‘substance’ – and ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are no more than a word substitution game –

 

and a word substitution game – designed to deceive –

 

to peddle the deception that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are substantially different –

and yet – not so –

 

if his ‘substance’ – his ‘God’ – is one – then there is no differentiation –

 

and if there is a differentiation then this ‘substance’ is not one – is not a unity

 

his ‘substance’ collapses –

 

and his ‘God’ is a name for the differentiation – for division –

 

for the absence of unity

 

 

‘When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the body is affected at the same time by a modification whereby its power of acting is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body (Prop. 5, Part IV.) receives from its cause the force for persisting in its being, which therefore can neither be restrained nor removed save by a bodily cause (Prop. 4, Part III.) which affects the body with a modification contrary to that one (Prop. 5 Part III.) and stronger than it (Ax., Part IV.).’

 

we are not ‘assailed’ by any emotion – our emotions are proposals put – propositional states

 

any proposal has both a propositional affect and a propositional effect –

 

a propositional affect (or effect) – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what counts as an ‘increase’ – or a ‘diminishing’ – of propositional action – is open to question

 

our ‘power’ with respect to any propositional affect – is logical –

 

we can exercise our critical capacity in relation to any affect / emotion – or not

 

if put to question – an emotion / propositional affect – the emotion can be modified

 

and furthermore – can replaced by different propositional emotional responses –

 

a proposal of any kind can be abandoned – as a result of critical activity

 

our ‘strength’ lies in our critical activity

 

‘And therefore (Prop. 12, Part II.) the mind is affected by the idea of a modification stronger and contrary to the previous one, that is (Gen. Def. Emo,) the mind will be affected by an emotion stronger and contrary to the former which cuts off the existence of or takes away the former: and thus the emotion can neither be checked nor removed save by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.e.d.’

 

 

emotional / propositional states – when put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored – will be checked or removed – not by a ‘stronger emotion’ – but rather an alternative propositional response – which will have an alternative propositional affect

 

 

Corollary – An emotion, in so far as it has reference to the mind, can neither be hindered nor destroyed save through the idea of a contrary modification of the body and one stronger than the modification which we suffer. For the emotion which we suffer cannot be checked or removed save by an emotion stronger than it and contrary to it (prev. Prop.), that is (Gen. Def. Emo.). save through the idea of a modification of the body stronger than and contrary to the modification we suffer.

 

again – it is not a question of a ‘stronger emotion’ – but rather of a critical / logical response

 

 

PROP. VIII. The knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious of it.

 

 

our knowledge is propositional – what we know is what we propose

 

how we propose ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – is how we know good and evil –

 

any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our knowledge of good and evil – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

you can propose that our knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than the emotion of pleasure or pain –

 

this proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

the propositional reality is that there are many other proposals regarding the knowledge of good and evil –

 

and all of which are open to question

 

our knowledge of good and evil – is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – We call that good or evil which is useful to us or the contrary for our preservation (Def 1 and 2, Part IV), that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders our power of acting. And so, in so far as (see def. pleasure and pain, Note. Prop. 11, Part III.) we perceive anything to affect us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or evil; and therefore the knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the idea of pleasure or pain which follows necessarily from the emotion of pleasure or pain (Prop. 22, Part II.). But this idea is united to the emotion in the same manner as the mind is united to the body (Prop. 21, Part II), that is (as was shown in the Note on that Prop.), this idea is not diminished in truth from that emotion or (Gen. Def. Emo.) from the idea of the modification of the body save in conception alone. Therefore this knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than emotion itself, in so far as we are conscious of it.  Q.e.d.

 

‘We call that good or evil which is useful to us or the contrary for our preservation (Def 1 and 2, Part IV), that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders our power of acting.’

 

you can call good or evil this –

 

but even so just what this definition amounts to is open to question

 

what is useful or contrary to our preservation is not certain

 

what is useful or contrary to our preservation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

as to our ‘power of acting’ –

 

our actions are propositional – there can be an increase or diminishing of critical action

 

we will propose regardless of our circumstances – as long as we are functioning propositional actors

 

‘And so, in so far as (see def. pleasure and pain, Note. Prop. 11, Part III.) we perceive anything to affect us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or evil; and therefore the knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the idea of pleasure or pain which follows necessarily from the emotion of pleasure or pain (Prop. 22, Part II.).’

 

we may call that which affects with pleasure ‘good’ – and we may call that which affects us with pain ‘evil’ – but there is no certainty here

 

someone may regard certain pleasures as evil – and there are those who would regard pain – or forms of pain – as good

 

our knowledge of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – is uncertain – regardless of how we define these terms at any particular time

 

I think in our lives we explore the uncertainty of good and evil –

 

and so – at various times we will have different perceptions and understandings of good and evil

 

our knowledge of good and evil – is an on-going – propositional discovery

 

‘But this idea is united to the emotion in the same manner as the mind is united to the body (Prop. 21, Part II), that is (as was shown in the Note on that Prop.), this idea is not diminished in truth from that emotion or (Gen. Def. Emo.) from the idea of the modification of the body save in conception alone.

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ are proposed explanations of propositional activity –

 

we don’t need the mind / body explanations to deal with the question of good and evil

 

these are / logical propositional issues – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

however – there is nothing to stop anyone following Spinoza here

 

‘Therefore this knowledge of good and evil is nothing else than emotion itself, in so far as we are conscious of it.’

 

our ‘knowledge’ of good and evil is propositional – that is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain 

 

 

PROP. IX. An emotion whose cause we imagine to be with us at the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be present.

 

 

the ‘cause’ of any emotion is a proposal

 

what we ‘imagine’ – is what we propose –

 

‘imagination’ – is a name for propositional action

 

if the proposal is put – it is current

 

if we don’t put the proposal – the proposal is not there

 

 

Proof. – Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind regards a thing as present (see def. in Note, Prop. 17, Part II) which nevertheless indicates rather the disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body (Coroll. 2, Prop. 16, Part II). Imagination is therefore an emotion (Gen. Def. Emo.) in so far as it indicates the disposition of the body. For imagination (Prop. 17, Part II.) is more intense as long as we imagine which cuts off the present existence of the external object. Therefore an emotion also, whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present, is more intense and stringer than if we did not imagine it to be present with us. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘a thing’ regarded ‘as present’ – is a proposal – and what it ‘indicates’ is open to question

 

imagination is an emotion?

 

any proposal – however described – i.e. – as an ‘imagination’ – will have an effect – and an affect

 

an affect is an emotion

 

any proposal can be regarded / described as an emotion

 

propositional intensity – is a function of the lack of critical / rational engagement with the proposition

 

any proposal put is present –

 

and any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Note. – When I said above in Prop. 18, Part III., that we are affected with the same emotion by a future or past thing as if the thing which we imagine were present, I expressly gave warning that it is not true in so far as we regard the image alone of the thing (for it is of the same nature, whether we imagined things as present or not), but I did not deny that it becomes weaker when we regard other things as present to us which cut off the present existence of the future thing. I neglected to call attention to this then, as I had determined to treat on the force of the emotions in this part.

 

 

what Spinoza calls ‘the image alone’ – is the proposal – in whatever time frame it is placed

 

‘it becomes weaker when we regard other things as present to us which cut off the existence of the future thing’

 

it is not a question of ‘weakness’ here – rather of propositional focus

 

a proposal put stands – as long as it is entertained – and we may put and entertain a number of proposals in a critical exploration

 

what is in focus and what is not in focus – will change as a result of the critical activity

 

 

Corollary – The image of a thing future or past, that is, of a thing which we regard with reference to time future or past, to the exclusion of time present, is under similar conditions, weaker than the image of a thing present or past is, caeteris paribus, less intense than the emotion towards a thing present.

 

 

a proposal put in reference to time – future or past – is no different – to a proposal put in the present

 

logically speaking there is no time – past – present – or future

 

time is a form of propositional context –

 

propositional context – logically speaking – is secondary to the proposition as such

 

time – is a propositional description

as for ‘intensity’ –

 

a proposal / proposition – that is not critically evaluated – can be described as ‘intense’

 

when put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored – a proposition loses its so called ‘intensity’

 

what Spinoza calls ‘intensity’ here – is a measure of the lack of critical evaluation

 

 

PROP. X. Towards a future thing we imagine to be close at hand we are more intensely affected than if we imagine the time of its existing to be further distant from the present; and by the recollections of a thing which we imagine to have passed not long ago we are more intensely affected also than if we imagine it to have passed long ago.

 

you can propose a time difference in relation to a proposition put –

 

that is – place it in the past – the near past – to future – the near future

 

the point is – these time descriptions are irrelevant to the critical issue of the proposition in question

 

whether past – present – or future – the proposal / proposition – is to be critically evaluated – that is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored –

 

and once this critical activity is underway – the intensity of the proposal / imagination – dissipates

 

 

Proof. – For in so far as we imagine a thing to be close at hand or not to be long past, we imagine that which will exclude the presence of the thing less than if we imagine its future time of existing to be further away from the present, or if it had passed long ago (as if self-evident): therefore (prev. Prop.) we shall be affected towards it more intensely. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘thing’ as proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

whether we ‘imagine’ it / propose it – to be ‘close at hand’ – or in the future –

 

we will only be affected towards it ‘more intensely’ – if it is not critically examined

 

question – doubt – uncertainty – are not time dependent

 

 

Note. – From what we have noted in Def. 6, Part IV., it follows that we are affected equally mildly towards objects which are distant from the present by a longer space of time than we can determine by imagining, although we know them to be also distant by a long space of time one from the other.

 

 

what is a ‘mild affectation’? – how is it distinguished from a ‘strong’ or intense affectation?

 

and surely these matters cannot be settled by fiat – but are empirical –

 

and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XI. The emotion towards a thing which we imagine to be necessary is more intense, caeteris paribus, than towards a thing possible, contingent, or not necessary.

 

an ‘intense emotion’ is – one that is not critically evaluated – not put to question – put to doubt – or its uncertainty explored

 

and if you ‘imagine’ / propose a thing / ‘proposition’ – to be necessary – you are putting that it is certain

 

there is no proposal that is certain –

 

to suggest such is to proceed illogically and irrationally

 

actually – you are not dealing with a proposal at all – rather you are advocating a prejudice

 

any genuine proposal is contingent – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any proposal is possible – in propositional life we are always dealing with possibility

 

when critically evaluated any genuine proposal – will lose its so-called ‘intensity’

 

 

Proof. – In so far as we imagine anything to be necessary we affirm its existence, and on the contrary, we deny the existence of a thing in so far as we imagine it not necessary (Note I, Prop. 33, Part I,): and accordingly the emotion towards a thing necessary is more intense, caeteris paribus, than towards a thing not necessary. Q.e.d.

 

 

what exists is what is proposed – and what is proposed is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

existence is uncertain

 

to propose necessity – is to propose certainty – which illogical and irrational

 

in saying that we ‘deny the existence of anything that is not necessary’ – Spinoza demonstrates the depth of his illogicity and irrationality

 

his conception of reality is not rational – it is a philosophy of prejudice and ignorance

 

in the absence of question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

any proposal – is logically ‘dead’

 

 

PROP. XII. The emotion towards a thing which we know to be non-existent at the present time, and which we imagine possible, is more intense, caeteris paribus, than towards a thing contingent.

 

a thing proposed – is a thing existing –

 

a ‘non-existent thing’ – is a thing not proposed –

 

it makes no sense to speak of a non-proposed thing – of a non-proposed proposal

 

a thing proposed as possible – is logically no different to a thing proposed as contingent – as both are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

so called ‘affective intensity’ – is irrelevant to the logical / critical appraisal of any proposal / proposition –

 

and my question to Spinoza is – what is this ‘intensity’ that is central to his argument here?

 

he gives no account of it

 

and whatever it is – how is it measured?

 

he says – there is a more intense emotion towards a non-existent thing – than to a contingent thing –

 

if I had to – I would say the opposite –

 

and as it stands – Spinoza has no argument against this – as he has no account of intensity to begin with

 

 

Proof. – In so far as we imagine the thing as contingent, we are affected by no image of another thing, which posits its existence (Def. 3, Part IV.); but, on the other hand (according to the hypothesis), we imagine certain things which cut off its present existence. But in so far as we imagine the thing to be possible in the future, we imagine certain things which posit its existence. (Def. IV. Part IV.) , that is (Prop. 18, Part III.), which foster hope or fear: and therefore emotion towards a thing possible is more intense. Q.e.d.

 

any proposal put is contingent – that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any proposal put – logically speaking – is a possibility – that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to ‘certain things which cut off its present existence’

 

this is to put proposals that deny the proposal in question

 

well – what is it to be – a proposal put – or a proposal not put?

 

so called emotional intensity has nothing to do with any of this

 

 

Corollary. – Emotion toward a thing which we know to be non-existent in the present, and which we imagine to be contingent, is far more mild than if we imagine the thing to be present with us.

 

 

Proof. – Emotion towards a thing which we imagine to exist in the present is more intense that if we imagine it as future (Coroll., Prop. 9, Part IV.), and is far more intense if we imagine the future time to be far distant from the present (Prop.10, Part IV.). Therefore emotion towards a thing whose time of existing we imagine to be far distant from the present is far more mild than if we imagine it as present, and nevertheless is more intense (pre. Prop.) than if we imagine that the thing is contingent. Therefore the emotion towards a thing contingent is more intense than if we imagined the thing to be with us in the present. Q.e.d.

 

the intensity of an emotion / proposal / propositional action – is logically irrelevant

 

though I think it will be the case that an emotion – not put to question – its uncertainty left unexplored – will be more intense – than one that is critically examined

 

 

PROP. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is far more mild, caeteris paribus, than emotion towards a thing in the past.

 

 

Proof. – In so as we imagine a thing contingent, we are affected by the image of no other thing which posits the existence of that thing (Def. 3, Part IV.); but, on the contrary (by hypothesis), we imagine certain things which cut off its present existence. But in so far as we imagine it with reference to time past, we are supposed to imagine something which restores it to memory, or, which excites the image of the thing (see Prop. 18, Part II., with its Note), and thus far accordingly it brings it about that we regard it as if it were present (Coroll,. Prop. 17, Part II.). And therefore (Prop. 9, Part IV.)) emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is more mild, caeteris paribus, than towards a thing past. Q.e.d.

 

 

firstly – any proposal put is contingent – that is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

‘imagining things which cut off its existence’?

 

we do not propose non-existence – what exists – is what is proposed – non-existence – is the absence of proposal

 

if a proposal is placed / described – in the past – we give it a propositional context –

 

the proposal – regardless of propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any proposal put – is present –

 

whether the affect of a proposal is mild or not – is logically irrelevant

 

 

PROP. XIV. A true knowledge of good and bad cannot restrain any emotion in so far as the knowledge is true.

 

true knowledge of good and evil?

 

any proposed account of good and evil – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

emotions are propositional actions

 

the issue is not ‘restraining’ propositional action –

 

if we behave rationally – we put our propositional actions to question – to doubt – and we explore their uncertainty

 

a true proposition – is a proposition we assent to – a false proposition – a proposition we dissent from

 

any proposal of assent or dissent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Proof. –  An emotion is an idea whereby the mind affirms a greater or lesser force of existing of its body than before (Gen. Def. Emo.), and therefore (Prop. I, Part IV,) it has nothing positive which can be removed by the presence of what is true; and consequently a true knowledge of good or bad, in so far as it is true, cannot restrain

any emotion. But in so far as it is an emotion (Prop. 8 Part IV,).  it is stronger than the

emotion to be restrained, thus far only (Prop. 7, Part IV,) it can restrain an emotion, Q.e.d.

 

any proposition has an affect and an effect –

 

any proposition can be regarded as an emotion

 

an emotion is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza leaves ‘power of existing’ undefined

 

our power is propositional – and propositional power is logical – the power of question – the power of doubt – the power to explore propositional uncertainty

 

our power is the power of critical evaluation

 

existence is proposed – existence is a proposal

 

existence for human beings is the reality of propositional activity –

 

any propositional activity – affirms existence

 

a proposal / proposition is true if affirmed – false if denied

 

any proposal of affirmation or denial is open to question

 

any proposal regarding what is good – what is bad – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we don’t ‘restrain’ – proposals / propositions – we put them – and act on them –

 

if our action is rational – our propositions / emotions – are put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored –

 

proposals / emotions do not restrain proposals / emotions –

 

proposals are put in relation to proposals – and if dealt with rationally – critically evaluated

 

Spinoza’s restraint argument – is best understood in the context of irrational and illogical behaviour

 

 

PROP. XV. Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be destroyed or checked by many other desires which arise from emotions by which we are assailed.

 

‘desire’ – is a name for propositional activity

 

there is propositional activity / desire – before propositional affirmation

 

if there was not – then there could be no affirmation – i.e.  – nothing to affirm

 

‘true knowledge’ – is the proposal affirmed – affirmed by the propositional actor – for whatever reason –

 

and any proposal of affirmation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

in the definitions at the start of part IV Spinoza says –

 

‘By GOOD (bonum) I understand that which we certainly know to be useful to us’ and – ‘But by BAD (malum) I understand that which we certainly know will prevent us from partaking in any good’

 

there is no certain knowledge – all knowledge is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what is – or is not useful to us – is open to question –

 

we make decisions here – and our decisions – are open to question

 

emotions are propositional actions –

 

we are not ‘assailed’ by emotions / propositional actions –

 

we put – emotions / propositional actions– and emotions / propositional actions / emotion – are put to us

 

emotions / propositional actions – can be checked –

 

this checking’ – is the critical process of question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

emotions / propositional actions – are not ‘destroyed’ –

 

as with any propositional action – an emotion is entertained and acted on – or it is not

 

an emotion / propositional action can be replaced by another – as a result of critical action

 

 

Proof. – From a true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this (Prop. 8, Part IV.) is an emotion, there necessarily arises desire (Def, Eno. 1), which is the greater according as the emotion from which it arises is greater (Prop. 37, Part III.). But inasmuch as this desire (by hypothesis) arises from the fact that we truly understand something, it follows also that it is within us so far as we are active (Prop. 3, Part III.). And therefore it must be understood through our essence alone (Def. 2 Part III), and consequently (Prop. 7, Part III.) its force and increase must only be defined by human power. Again, the desires which arises from the emotions by which we are assailed are greater according as the emotions are more intense; and therefore their force and increase (Prop. 5, Part IV.) must be defined by the power of the external causes, which, if compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass our power (Prop. 3, Part IV.). And therefore the desires which arise from similar emotions can be more intense than that which arise from the knowledge of good and evil; and therefore (Prop. 7, Part IV,) they will be able to check or destroy it. Q.e.d.

 

 

desire as proposal – is knowledge – knowledge – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

one proposal is neither ‘greater’ or ‘lesser’ – than another –

 

all proposals / desires are open to question

 

any desire / proposal is put by us

 

a proposal is an action

 

we are not ‘assailed’ by emotions – emotion / propositional action – is put by us – and put to us

 

propositional / emotional intensity – is a ‘measure’ of irrationality

 

a so called ‘intense’ propositional action / emotion – is one not – critically investigated

 

‘external causes’ – are proposals entertained –

 

any proposal / knowledge – regarding ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – is open to question – is uncertain

 

proposals are ‘checked’ – through critical investigation

 

emotions / propositional actions – are not ‘destroyed’ –

 

proposals / propositional actions are put – entertained – critically examined – proceeded with – or not

 

the critical process may lead to the dropping of a proposal – the ending of propositional action – and the adoption of an alternative

 

any proposal – replaced – or proceeded with – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XVI. The desire which arises from the knowledge of good and bad, in so far as this knowledge has reference to the future, can more easily be checked or destroyed than the desire of things which are pleasing in the present.

 

 

any desire is a proposal / propositional action –

 

and where it ‘arises from’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

as indeed is any proposed knowledge of good and bad

 

proposals are not ‘destroyed’ – they are entertained – or not

 

and any proposal – whatever its reference in time – if rationally ‘checked’ – is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

 

Proof. – Emotion towards a thing which we imagine to be future is less intense than towards the thing present (Coroll., Prop 9, Part IV.). But the desire which arises from the knowledge of good and bad, although this knowledge should concern things which are good in the present, can be destroyed or checked by any haphazard desire

(Pre. Prop., whose proof is universal). Therefore the desire which arise from such knowledge, in so far as it has reference to the future, can be more easily destroyed or checked, etc. Q.e.d.

 

less intense – more intense – is really a question of whether a desire / proposal has been put to question or not

 

a proposal – not put to question – will be more ‘intense’ – than the proposal critically appraised

 

critical evaluation of a proposal – will dissipate any emotional / propositional intensity

 

and any desire / propositional action – can be haphazardly replaced by another desire / proposal – if there is no critical evaluation

 

where there is critical appraisal – any propositional change will be rational

 

 

PROP. XVII. Desire which arises from true knowledge of good and bad, in so far as this concerns things contingent, can be far more easily restrained than the desire for things which are present.

 

desire / proposal – ‘that arises from the true knowledge of good and bad in so far as this concerns things contingent’ – from a logical point of view is – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

as is ‘desire for things which are present’ – there is no logical difference

 

desire – of any description – if dealt with rationally – is not ‘restrained’ – rather it is explored

 

the exploration of any desire / proposal – is a critical activity

 

Proof. – This proposition is proved in the same manner as the previous one, Coroll., Prop. 12, Part IV.

 

 

Note. – Thus I think I have shown the reason why men are guided rather by opinion than by true reason, and why a true knowledge of good and bad often excites disturbances of the mind, and often yields to all manner of lusts. Whence is arisen the saying of the poet: Video meliora proboque, deteroria sequor – ‘The better course I see and approve, the worse I follow.’ This also Ecclesiastes seems to have in mind when he said, ‘He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.’ I do not say this, however, with the aim of proving therefrom that it is better to be ignorant than to have knowledge, or that a wise man has no advantage over a fool in moderating his emotions, but because it is necessary to know both the power and want of power of our nature, so that we may determine what reason can do in the moderating of the

emotions and what it cannot, and in this part I have said I shall deal only with the want of human power. for I have decided to treat of the power of reason over the emotions separately.

 

 

this ‘true knowledge of good and bad’ – has not been defined – or explained – by Spinoza –

 

he simply asserts it – and as such – it is little more than pretentious rhetoric

 

his idea of reason is a deductive system of propositions – that is beyond question –

 

and that is essentially nothing more than common and garden prejudice in the guise of philosophic wisdom

 

when he talks about ‘exciting disturbances of the mind’ – all this can mean is that this knowledge – which is nothing more than proposal – is uncertain

 

as to ‘all manner of lusts’ – what is that – but desires / proposals – propositional actions?

 

‘The better course I see and approve, the worse I follow’ –

 

anyone in this situation – I would suggest – is someone trapped in an ethical system that just doesn’t work for them – and so their understanding of good and bad – is confused

 

such a person needs to have a good hard critical look at themselves

 

‘He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow’ –

 

again – if your so called ‘knowledge’ – increases sorrow – then I would say you are not critically evaluating the proposals you are operating with – you are not dealing with your knowledge / proposals – in a rational manner

 

the consequence of any proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – so sorrow is always a possibility –

 

in my view – sorrow is not something that a rational man or woman – would seek to increase –

 

however – that is just my view – logically / rationally speaking – the matter is open to question –

 

there may well be people who see value in increasing sorrow – and proceed in a critical manner

 

as to – ‘being ignorant and having knowledge’ –

 

all ‘knowledge’ is proposal –

 

and we propose against – or in response to the unknown –

 

and any proposal put in relation to the unknown – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

in a final sense we never leave the unknown – we simply respond to it

 

‘the power and want of power of our nature’ – is the issue of human rationality

 

we are powerful to the extent that we are critically engaged in our propositional life

 

where there is no critical activity – there is no power

 

 

PROP. XVIII. Desire which arises from pleasure is stronger, caeteris paribus, than the desire which arises from pain.

 

 

this is a contingent issue

 

and any proposal in this regard is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and how is the strength of any desire to be measured?

 

any proposed measurement – can only be working hypothesis – and of course – open to question

 

it is not hard to imagine a circumstance where someone’s desire from pain trumps their desire from pleasure –

 

in such a case – there is a clear preference for pain

 

and if critically evaluated – such a preference is rational

 

 

Proof. – Desire is the very essence of man (Def. Emo. 1), that is (Prop.7, Part III) the endeavour wherewith man endeavours to persist in his being. Wherefore desire which arises from pleasure is helped or increased by the emotion of pleasure itself (def. pleasure in Note, Prop. 11, Part III.); but that desire which arises from pain is diminished or hindered by the emotion of pain (same Note). And therefore the force of desire which arises from pleasure must be defined by human power and, at the same time, by the power of the external cause; but that which arises from pain must only be defined by defined by human power; and therefore the former is stronger than the later. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘Desire is the very essence of man (Def. Emo. 1), that is (Prop.7, Part III) the endeavour wherewith man endeavours to persist in his being’

 

desire is propositional activity

 

and propositional activity happens whether or not one ‘is endeavouring to persist in his being’

 

‘Wherefore desire which arises from pleasure is helped or increased by the emotion of pleasure itself (def. pleasure in Note, Prop. 11, Part III.); but that desire which arises from pain is diminished or hindered by the emotion of pain’

 

whether more pleasure increases desire / propositional activity – is open to question

 

perhaps in certain circumstances – it has no real effect – i.e. – it is just more of the same

 

and whether pain increased by pain diminishes desire / propositional activity) is likewise a contingent issue

 

‘And therefore the force of desire which arises from pleasure must be defined by human power and, at the same time, by the power of the external cause; but that which arises from pain must only be defined by defined by human power; and therefore the former is stronger than the later. Q.e.d.’

 

the ‘force of desire’ – is the force of propositional action

 

pleasure – is an affect of propositional action

 

pain – is an affect of propositional action

 

if an ‘external cause’ is proposed – the ‘external cause’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

how is pleasure to measured against pain – or pain measured against pleasure?

 

 

Note. – In these few propositions I have explained the causes of human weakness and inconstancy, and why men do not follow the percepts of reason. It remains, however, that I should show what is that which reason prescribes for us, and which of the emotions agree with the rules of human reason, and which, on the other hand, are contrary to them. But before I begin to prove this in full by the geometrical method we follow, it would be well to show here briefly at first the dictates of reason, so that those things which I mean may be perceived more easily by all. Since reason postulates nothing against nature, it postulates, therefore, that each man should love himself, and seek what is useful to him – I mean what is truly useful to him – and desire whatever leads man truly to a greater state of perfection, and in absolute terms, that each one should endeavour to preserve his being as far as it in him lies. This is necessarily true as the whole is greater than the part (see Prop. 4, Part III.). Again as virtue is nothing else (Def. 8, Part IV.) than to act according to the laws of one’s nature, and no one endeavours to preserve his being (Prop. 7, Part III,) save according to the laws of his own nature, it follows hence, firstly, that the basis of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one’s own being, and that happiness consists in this, that a man is able to preserve his own being; secondly, that virtue should be desired by us on its own account, and there is nothing more excellent or useful to us on which account we should desire it; thirdly, that those who commit suicide are weak spirited, and that they are conquered by external causes repugnant to their nature. Again, it follows from Post. 4, Part II., that we can never bring it about that we need nothing outside ourselves for our preservation, and that in order to live we need have no commerce with things which are without us. If, moreover we consider our mind, our intellect

would be more imperfect if the mind were alone and understood nothing save itself.

Many things outside us which are useful to us, and therefore much to be desired. Of these, none can be considered more excellent than those which agree with our nature. For (to give an example) if two individuals of the same nature seem to combine, they would form one individual twice as strong as either individual; there is therefore nothing more useful to man than man. Nothing, I say, can be desired men more excellent for their self-preservation than that all with all should agree that they compose the minds of all as it were into one mind, and the bodies of all as it were into one body, and all endeavour at the same time as much as they can to preserve their being. and all seek at the same time what is useful to them in common. From which it follows that men who are governed by reason, seek what is useful to them, desire nothing for themselves which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and therefore they are just, faithful, and honourable.

 

These are the dictates of reason which I proposed in these few words to point out before I proceed to prove them in greater detail, which I did for this reason, that, if it were possible I might attract the attention of those who believe that this principle, namely, that each should seek out what is useful to himself, is the basis of virtue and piety, but of impiety. Therefore, now that I have shown briefly that the contrary is the case, I proceed to prove in the same manner as that in which we have proceeded so far.

 

 

‘Since reason postulates nothing against nature, it postulates, therefore, that each man should love himself, and seek what is useful to him – I mean what is truly useful to him – and desire whatever leads man truly to a greater state of perfection, and in absolute terms, that each one should endeavour to preserve his being as far as it in him lies. This is necessarily true as the whole is greater than the part (see Prop. 4, Part III.).

 

if reason postulates nothing against nature – and by ‘nature’ we understand – that which is proposed – then reason postulates nothing

 

which is the case –

 

reason postulates nothing – for ‘reason’ – is the critical activity – of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

‘therefore, that each man should love himself, and seek what is useful to him’

 

this might be seen as good advice – in certain contexts – but that is all it is –

 

it is no more than a proposal – that as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘I mean what is truly useful to him – and desire whatever leads man truly to a greater state of perfection, and in absolute terms, that each one should endeavour to preserve his being as far as it in him lies.’

 

what is ‘truly useful’ – in any circumstance – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as to – ‘a greater state of perfection’ – this is rubbish –

 

‘perfection’ – in so far as it an analogue of certainty – is an illogical and irrational notion

 

‘that each one should endeavour to preserve his being as far as it in him lies.’

 

why?

 

and who is to say what anyone should be doing?

 

and furthermore – there are those who decide not to preserve being – but to end it –

 

and if ‘reason postulates nothing against nature’ – and nature is just – ‘that proposed’

 

then on Spinoza’s own argument – not preserving one’s life – ending it – is not against nature or reason

 

‘This is necessarily true as the whole is greater than the part’

 

there is no necessity – what we have is uncertainty

 

and the ‘whole is greater than the part’ argument – has no relevance here at all

 

‘Again as virtue is nothing else (Def. 8, Part IV.) than to act according to the laws of one’s nature, and no one endeavours to preserve his being (Prop. 7, Part III,) save according to the laws of his own nature, it follows hence, firstly, that the basis of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one’s own being, and that happiness consists in this, that a man is able to preserve his own being; secondly, that virtue should be desired by us on its own account, and there is nothing more excellent or useful to us on which account we should desire it; thirdly, that those who commit suicide are weak spirited, and that they are conquered by external causes repugnant to their nature.’

 

there are no ‘laws’ of nature –

 

there are proposals put – propositions – hypotheses put – to describe / explain ‘that proposed’

 

the propositions / hypotheses / theories of the ‘natural world’ – of science – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

empirical science is a critical activity

 

empirical science is an exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

if virtue is nothing else than to act according to the laws of nature – then virtue is nothing other than the proposals / propositions put to describe ‘that proposed’ –

 

that is to say – virtue is just what happens – what is proposed

 

and if the idea is that virtue is something other than ‘just what happens’ / what is proposed – then virtue cannot be equated with ‘the laws of nature’

 

if you endeavour to preserve your being – then you will avoid any propositional activity that puts your being at risk

 

Spinoza here proposes that the basis of virtue is the preservation of one’s being

 

this proposal is as good as any other attempt to explain virtue

 

and like any proposal regarding the nature of virtue – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and he puts the further proposal – that happiness consists in being able to preserve one’s being

 

well – clearly if you are dead – you cannot be happy

 

however – this theory of happiness – again – is just one of many – and as with any proposal regarding the nature of happiness – open to question

 

that virtue should be desired by us on its own account?

 

if virtues is – nothing other than – what happens in nature – there is in fact nothing to desire –

 

for desire is just what we do – that is our propositional activity – in whatever form

 

as to the proposal that those who commit suicide are weak – and overcome by external forces –

 

as with any other proposal this is contentious –

 

and is a proposition that can only be investigated empirically

 

furthermore – as a generalization – it is prime facie – false

 

for it may take courage and determination to suicide – and in certain circumstances it may be regarded as not only desirable but virtuous

 

and according to Spinoza – (and he is right here) – how can anyone do anything that is contrary to their nature?

 

‘Many things outside us which are useful to us, and therefore much to be desired. Of these, none can be considered more excellent than those which agree with our nature. For (to give an example) if two individuals of the same nature seem to combine, they would form one individual twice as strong as either individual; there is therefore nothing more useful to man than man.’

 

if two individuals of the same nature seem to combine – they may form one individual twice as stupid as either individual

 

man can be useful to man – and man can be a hindrance and a danger to man

 

any form of human relationship is at base – uncertain –

 

in relation to each other – we constantly face – question – doubt and uncertainty

 

with a bit of luck – we find those who work to our benefit – and those who we can work to benefit

 

‘Nothing, I say, can be desired men more excellent for their self-preservation than that all with all should agree that they compose the minds of all as it were into one mind, and the bodies of all as it were into one body, and all endeavour at the same time as much as they can to preserve their being. and all seek at the same time what is useful to them in common.’

 

‘that all with all should agree that they compose the minds of all as it were into one mind’ –

 

is to my mind an illogical – irrational and dangerous idea

 

it is such an idea that finds currency in authoritarian and fascist ideologies

 

individuals are different one to the other – and it is individual difference that is the real strength of humankind

 

we are not one mind – and we are not one body

 

the idea that we are – is simply fanciful

 

we share a common humanity – and we can we develop common wealth – in many and varied forms

 

however – it is only out of individual initiative that any such common advantage can be created

 

it is also the case that commonality can be the ground of destruction – as in persecution – in whatever form that takes – and in war

 

and therefore – ‘commonality’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘From which it follows that men who are governed by reason, seek what is useful to them, desire nothing for themselves which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and therefore they are just, faithful, and honourable.’

 

men are not ‘governed by reason’

 

reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

men do not always seek out what is useful to them

 

and in any case what is ‘useful’ – is open to question – is uncertain

 

it is ridiculous to say that we do not desire anything for ourselves which we do not also desire for the rest of mankind

 

I desire may things – which I would not impose on the rest of mankind

 

I only speak for myself – not for everyone

 

those who think they speak for everyone – are megalomaniacs

 

‘just’ – ‘faithful’ – ‘honourable’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XIX. Each one necessarily desires or turns from, by the laws of his nature, what he thinks to be good or evil.

 

 

firstly – one’s nature is propositional – and there are no ‘laws’ to propositional activity – no ‘laws’ to one’s nature

 

there is no necessity in propositional activity – propositional activity is logically – uncertain –

 

desire is propositional activity – desire is uncertain

 

what one regards as good or evil – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

whether one desires what one regards as good – and turns from what one regards as evil – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

 

Proof – The knowledge of good and evil (Prop. 8, Part IV.) is the extension of pleasure or pain in so far as we are conscious of it; and therefore (Prop. 28, Part III.) everyone desires what he thinks to be good, and turns from what he thinks to be evil. But this desire is nothing else than the very essence or nature of man (def. desire, which see in Note, Prop. 9, Part III., and Def. Emo. 1). Therefore everyone, from the laws of his nature alone, necessarily desires or turns from, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘good’ and ‘evil’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

the propositional / logical reality is that we explore these proposals

 

the proposition that everyone desires what he thinks to be good and turns from what he thinks to be evil – cannot be established –

 

we just can’t say – what everyone does –

 

we don’t know what everyone does –

 

the suggestion that we can know – is plainly wrong and pretentious –

 

and furthermore – it is quite conceivable that in certain circumstances – in certain propositional contexts – people will desire what they think to be evil – and turn from what they think to be good

 

if by ‘desire’ – we understand ‘propositional activity’ – then yes – our nature is propositional –

 

our nature – our propositional activity – is not ‘law governed’ –

 

and there is no ‘necessity’ in propositional activity –

 

what we do and how we propose / understand what we do – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XX. The more one seeks what is useful to him, that is, the more he endeavours and can preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue; and , on the contrary, the more one neglects to preserve what is useful, or his being; he is thus far impotent or powerless.

 

 

‘useful’ – here is a blank check – it can mean anything

 

and ‘preserving one’s being’ – likewise – can mean anything –

 

and so ‘virtue’ – is left effectively – undefined

 

all we have here is a word substitution game

 

the logical reality is that what is ‘useful’ – and what ‘preserving one’s being’ amounts to – are matters – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and whether what is useful – and whether preserving one’s being is ‘virtuous’ –

 

again – is open to question

 

the problem with Spinoza’s analysis here is not the concepts that he proposes – it is that he fails to deal with them in a critical manner

 

and who is to say what is useful – and how one preserve’s one being?

 

there may well be as many answers to these questions as there are human beings

 

and any answer proposed – is open to question

 

 

Proof. – Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by the essence of man alone (Def. 8, Part IV.), that is, (Prop. 7 Part III.), which is defined by the endeavour alone wherewith he endeavours to persist in his own being. The more, therefore, the more he endeavours and succeeds in preserving his own essence, the more he is endowered with virtue, and consequently (Prop. 4 and 6, Part III.) in so far as he neglects to preserve his being he is thus far wanting in power. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the essence of man alone’

 

how is ‘the essence of man alone’ to be distinguished from the essence of man in relation to all of nature?

 

so – someone preserves his own being – and causes nothing but pain and suffering to his fellow man – a virtuous life?

 

yes – according to Spinoza –

 

for Spinoza – ‘virtue’ – amounts to something like survival of the fittest

 

we have no sense from Spinoza what a ‘good life’ amounts to – unless by ‘good life’ – you understand – a ‘long life’

 

there is no virtue in Spinoza’s outlook –

 

just endurance against the inevitable

 

 

Note. – No one therefore, unless he is overcome by external causes and these contrary to his nature, neglects to desire what is useful to himself and preserve his being. No one, I say, from the necessity of his nature, but driven by external causes, turns away from taking food, or commits suicide, which can take place in many manners. Namely, anyone can kill himself by compulsion of some other who twists back is right hand, in which he holds by chance his sword, and forces him to direct the sword against hi own heart; or, like Seneca by the command of a tyrant, he may be forced to open his veins, that is, to avoid a greater evil by encountering a less; or again, latent external causes may dispose his imagination and so affect his body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and of which an idea cannot be given in the mind (Prop. 10, Part III.). But that a man, from the necessity of his nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, or change himself into another form, is as impossible as it is for anything to be made from nothing, as every one with a little reflection can see.

 

 

‘No one therefore, unless he is overcome by external causes and these contrary to his nature, neglects to desire what is useful to himself and preserve his being. No one, I say, from the necessity of his nature, but driven by external causes, turns away from taking food, or commits suicide, which can take place in many manners.’

 

‘the necessity of his nature’?

 

the nature of human beings is propositional – and there is no ‘necessity’ in propositional life

 

‘necessity’ – is a concept designed to give logical force to prejudice –

 

it is rhetorical concept – not logical

 

as to ‘external causes’ –

 

any so-called external cause – is a proposal put –

 

and whether you accept and adopt any such proposal put to you – is a matter open to question

 

no one is compelled to adopt any proposal put to them

 

furthermore – there is a long history of fasting among spiritualists – and there are those who for their reasons are prepared to starve themselves to death

 

the empirical reality is that such actions are not contrary to human nature

 

and it is this empirical reality that defeats Spinoza’s ‘necessity’

 

‘suicide’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and as with any other proposal – uncertain

 

‘Namely, anyone can kill himself by compulsion of some other who twists back is right hand, in which he holds by chance his sword, and forces him to direct the sword against his own heart; or, like Seneca by the command of a tyrant, he may be forced to open his veins, that is, to avoid a greater evil by encountering a less; or again, latent external causes may dispose his imagination and so affect his body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and of which an idea cannot be given in the mind.’

 

as to the first example here – it’s murder – not suicide

 

Seneca had a choice – and made his choice – for his reasons – and no doubt there was uncertainty involved

 

as to assuming ‘a nature contrary to its former one’ – this is somewhat unclear –

 

however – if Spinoza is talking about an action taken by someone who is mentally ill –

 

one would have to consider the view that such an action was not rational

 

‘But that a man, from the necessity of his nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, or change himself into another form, is as impossible as it is for anything to be made from nothing, as every one with a little reflection can see.’

 

well – it is not impossible – it is actually quite possible and not uncommon –

 

‘as everyone with a little reflection can see’

 

 

PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act well, or live well, who at the same time does not desire to be, to act, and to live, that is, actually to exist.

 

 

is it not conceivable that someone could want to live well etc. – but at the same time think that not existing would be preferable to what life has given them?

 

 

Proof. – The proof of this proposition, or rather the thing itself, is self-evident, and appears from the definition of desire. For the desire (Def. Emo. 1) of being blessed, of acting well, and of living well, etc., is the very essence of man, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), the endeavour wherewith each one endeavours to preserve his own being, Therefore no one can desire, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

there are no self-evident propositions –

 

any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

desire is propositional action – in whatever form

 

‘being blessed’ – ‘acting well’ – ‘living well’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the ‘essence’ of man – if we are to use this term – is to propose – is propositional action

 

to exist is to propose

 

existing – is just the play of propositional action –

 

whether or not you ‘endeavour’ to exist – you will exist – as long as you can propose

 

this ‘endeavour to exist’ – is really just rhetoric

 

 

PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this virtue of endeavouring to preserve oneself.

 

 

what we conceive – that is propose – as a virtue – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the endeavour to preserve oneself can be proposed as a virtue –

 

but as with any proposal – it is open to question – is logically uncertain

 

logically speaking – there is no such thing as propositional priority –

 

proposals are put – as and when they are put – and any relation proposed between propositions – is open to question

 

 

Proof. – The endeavour of preserving oneself is the very essence of a thing (Prop. 7, Part III.). If, therefore, any virtue can be conceived as prior to this one, namely, this endeavour, the essence of the thing would therefore be conceived (Def. 8, Part, IV.) prior to itself, which, as is self manifest, is absurd. Therefore no virtue, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the very essence of a thing’ – is a logically stupid notion –

 

any ‘thing’ – that – is any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

there is no final or essential characterization of any ‘thing’ / proposal –

 

and characterization / definition etc. is logically speaking – provisional

 

‘the essence of a thing would therefore be conceived prior to itself’ –

 

there is no essence – so there is no question of it being proposed prior to itself

 

the ‘itself’ here – is no more than a proposal – a thing proposed –

 

and any conception of a thing – that is – any proposal of a thing – is open to question

 

so – any elaboration / explanation / description of a proposal – of any form – is open to question open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Corollary. – The endeavour of preserving oneself is the first and only basis of virtue, for prior to this principle nothing else can be conceived (pre. Prop.), and without it (Prop. 21, Part IV.) no virtue can be conceived.

 

 

there is no ‘first and only’ – in propositional logic –

 

we begin with whatever we begin with – on any day – at any time – and take it from there

 

the notion of virtue – is as with any proposal – open to question –

 

virtues can be – and I would say are proposed – in the absence of this notion of preserving oneself

 

however – there is nothing against proposing – the idea of preserving oneself – as a virtue

 

and of course – you could view all other proposed virtues in terms of this idea

 

this is what Spinoza is proposing –

 

however – such a proposed ‘ethic’ – as with any other – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

logically speaking – I don’t think it matters what you believe –

 

what does matter is whether or not you can critically evaluate what you believe –

 

understand the value it may have for you – but also understand the uncertainty inherent in any valuation – in any ‘virtue’

 

 

PROP. XXIII. Man in so far as he is determined to do anything by the fact he has inadequate ideas, cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue, but only in so far as he is determined by the fact that he understands.

 

 

man is not ‘determined’ to do anything –

 

human beings are free to put any proposal – any propositional action to question – to doubt – and to explore propositional uncertainty

 

‘inadequate ideas’ – are proposals –

 

proposals open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

virtue – is a proposal – open to question

 

our understanding is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – In so far as man is determined to do something by the fact that he has inadequate ideas, so far he is passive (Prop. I, Part III.), that is (Def. 1 and 2, Part III.), he does something which cannot be conceived through its own essence alone, that is (Def. 8, Part IV.) which does not follow from his virtue. But in so far as he is determined to do something by the fact that he understands, he is active (Prop. 1, Part III.) he does something which can be perceived through his own essence alone or, (De. 8, Part IV.) which follows adequately from his virtue. Q.e.d.

 

 

man’s ideas / proposals – are open to question – are uncertain –

 

and any response to these ideas / proposals – is active – is a propositional action

 

propositional activity – is not passive

 

anything a man does is propositional – is – logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

man’s virtue – however that is proposed – is not fixed – it is a propositional action – open to question

 

any proposal – any propositional action – is a form of understanding

 

if by ‘adequate’ – one means ‘certain’ – there is nothing that ‘follows adequately’ –

 

any ‘follow on’ from a proposition – or propositional action – is a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely according to virtue is nothing else in us than to act under the guidance of reason, to live so, and to preserve one’s being (these three have ethe same meaning) on the basis of seeking what is useful to oneself.

 

 

‘to act absolutely’ – is to act in ignorance

 

any action – virtuous or not – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

to pretend ‘absoluteness’ – is to defy / deny logic

 

so called ‘absolute action’ – is false and pretentious

 

‘to act under the guidance of reason’ – is to hold one’s proposals / propositions – open to question – open to doubt and to understand and explore their uncertainty –

 

Spinoza’s idea of reason – is the deductive argument of the ‘Ethics’ –

 

the propositions of the ‘Ethics’ are not regarded by Spinoza – as open to question – or open to doubt – they are regarded as certain

 

any such argument is the antithesis of reason

 

‘seeking what is useful to one’s self’ – as with any other ethical proposal – is rational – if it is held open to question – open to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

 

 

Proof. – To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else (Def. 8, Part IV.) than to act according to the laws of one’s nature. But we act only in so far as we understand (Prop. 2, Part III.). Therefore to act according to virtue is nothing else in us than to act, to live, and to preserve our being under the guidance of reason. 0n the basis of seeking what is useful to oneself. Q.e.d.

 

 

firstly – there are no ‘laws of one’s nature’ –

 

any proposal regarding ‘one’s nature’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we understand ourselves – the world – and our relation to the world – in terms of the proposals we operate with –

 

these proposals – these understandings – from a logical point of view ore never fixed – never ‘absolute’ – they are uncertain

 

understanding is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXV. No one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of anything else.

 

 

this is just plainly false –

 

it is not uncommon at all that people wish to stay alive for others – for the sake of those they love – for those they feel a responsibility for – for those they have an obligation to

 

here the facts of life – the facts of human propositional activity – defeat Spinoza’s proposition

 

 

Proof. – The endeavour wherewith each thing endeavours to persist in its own being is defined by the essence of the thing alone (Prop. 7, Part III.), and from this alone, and not from the essence of any other thing, it necessarily follows (Prop. 6, Part III,) that each one endeavours to preserve his own being. The proposition is also obvious from Coroll., Prop. 22, Part IV. For if man were to endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else, then that thing would be the primary basis of his virtue (as is self- manifest), which is (by that Coroll.) absurd. Therefore no one endeavours, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the essence of the thing alone’ – if we are still to use this notion of ‘essence’ – is propositional – a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a thing’s relation to any other thing – is a propositional relation – and is likewise a critical matter

 

nothing ‘follows necessarily’ in propositional life –

 

one may endeavour to preserve one’s being – but there is no necessity in this –

 

and as a matter of experience – of fact – we know there are those who do not endeavour to preserve their being

 

if by ‘primary basis is meant a certain or absolute basis – there is no ‘primary basis to virtue

 

any proposed ‘basis to virtue’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXVI. Whatever we endeavour to do under the guidance of reason is nothing else than to understand; nor does the mind, in so far as it uses reason, judge anything useful to itself save what is conducive to understanding.

 

 

reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

understanding is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what is useful – may not be understood – but nevertheless – useful

 

and just what is useful is open to question

 

 

Proof. – The endeavour to preserve oneself is nothing else than the essence of the thing itself (Prop. 7, Part III.) which, in so far as it exists as such, is conceived to have force for persisting in existing (Prop. 6, Part III.), and for doing those things which necessarily follow from its given nature (see the def. of appetite in Note, Prop. 9, Part

III.) But the essence of reason is nothing else than our mind in so far as it understands clearly and distinctly (see def, in Note2, Prop. 40, Part II.). Therefore (Prop. 40, Part II.), whatever we endeavour to do under the guidance of reason is nothing else than to understand. Again, as this endeavour of the mind, whereby, in so far as it reasons, it tries to preserve its own being, is nothing other than to understand (first part of this Prop.), therefore this endeavour to understand (Coroll., Prop. 22, Part IV,) is the first and only basis of virtue. Nor do we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any end, but, on the contrary, the mind, in so far as it has reasons, cannot conceive anything as good for itself save what is conducive to understanding (Def. I, Part IV.).

Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘essence’ – (if we use this term) – of anything – is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

nothing follows necessarily from the nature of anything –

 

any deduction – is open to question – is uncertain

 

any so called ‘clear and distinct’ understanding – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the endeavour to preserve one’s being – will be an uncertain activity

 

all propositional activity can be seen as understanding

 

the nature of virtue is open to question

 

‘Nor do we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any end, but, on the contrary, the mind, in so far as it has reasons, cannot conceive anything as good for itself save what is conducive to understanding’

 

I would have thought that for Spinoza – the ‘end’ of understanding – is the preservation of one’s being?

 

‘understanding’ – is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty – just as the question of what is ‘good’ – is a critical propositional exploration

 

 

PROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or bad save what is truly conducive to understanding or what can prevent us from understanding.

 

 

there is no certain knowledge on any matter –

 

all knowledge is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

there is no certain ‘good’ – there is no certain ‘bad’

 

any proposal regarding ‘good’ or ‘bad – is open to question – is uncertain – is a matter of critical / propositional exploration

 

understanding is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

without question – without doubt – and without the exploration of uncertainty – there is no understanding

 

what is conducive to understanding is an open mind and critical inquiry

 

what prevents us from understanding – is a dogmatic view of reality –

 

that is to say – a non-critical view on any matter

 

 

Proof. – The mind in so far as it has reasons, desires nothing else than to understand, nor does it judge anything useful to itself save what is conducive to understanding (prev. Prop.). But the mind (Prop. 41 and 43, Part II, with its Note) has no certainty of things save in so far as it has adequate ideas, or, (Prop. 40, Note 2 Part II.) is the same thing, in so far as it has reasons. Therefore we understand nothing to be certainly good save what is truly conducive to understanding, and, on the contrary, that to be bad which can prevent us from understanding. Q.e.d.

 

‘The mind in so far as it has reasons …’

 

‘reasons’ are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and ‘understanding’ – is propositional activity – the proposals we work with

 

what we find useful – may not be something that we can explain – but nevertheless – we regard as useful

 

and in any case – what is useful to us – is always a matter – open to question

 

furthermore – we may not see understanding in terms of utility –

 

we may seek to understand reality – rather in terms of how it is – i.e. – its structure – as a scientist might do – rather than in terms of its usefulness to us

 

or again we may seek – as artist might – to understand reality or any aspect of it – in terms of its beauty – rather than its utility –

 

the point being how we understand – how we propose – is logically speaking – open to propositional possibility

 

‘But the mind (Prop. 41 and 43, Part II, with its Note) has no certainty of things save in so far as it has adequate ideas ,,,’

 

I regard any proposal / idea – as adequate – if it is held open to question – open to doubt – and held to be uncertain

 

however – if by ‘adequate’ – one means – as Spinoza does – ‘certain’ – not open to question – not open to doubt – then any such proposal / idea – is illogical and irrational – and is nothing more than a prejudice

 

‘understanding’ – is propositional activity – put to question –

 

and I suspect only severe mental / physical illness would prevent propositional activity

 

 

PROP. XXVIII. The greatest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the greatest virtue of the mind is to know God.

 

 

in Spinoza’s terms – ‘the greatest good’ – and ‘the greatest virtue’ – amount to the most useful – the most useful knowledge

 

what will count as the most useful knowledge?

 

this is a contingent matter – and a matter open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

no proposal / proposition – has any logical precedence or superiority – over any other proposal

 

‘knowledge of God’ – however ‘God’ is defined – however ‘God’ is understood – is a proposal – a proposal like any other – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if the proposal / knowledge of ‘God’ – is useful to you – it will play a role in your propositional life – if it is not of any use to you – it won’t –

 

and such a proposal may be ‘the most useful’ to one propositional actor –

 

and of little use to another

 

in general – we can ask – is it knowledge that is ‘good’ – or is it action?

 

and are not virtues – merely generalized descriptions – of people’s actions?

 

could one act immorally or unethically – and according to Spinoza – still claim the greatest good and the greatest virtue – so long as he or she ‘knows God?’?

 

if so – all we have from Spinoza is ethical pretence

 

 

Proof. – The greatest thing that the mind can understand is God. that is (Def. 6, Part I.) a being absolutely infinite, and without which nothing can either be (Prop. 15, Part I.), or be conceived. Therefore (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.) the thing of the greatest use or good to the mind (Def. I, Part IV.) is the knowledge of God. Again, the mind, in so far as it understands, thus far only is active (Prop. 1 and 3, Part III.), and thus far (Prop. 23, Part IV.) can it be absolutely said that it acts according to virtue. To understand, therefore, is the absolute virtue of the mind. But the greatest thing that the mind can understand is God (as we have just proved). Therefore the greatest virtue of the mind is to understand or know God. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

Spinoza’s view of ‘God’ – as ‘absolutely infinite’ – etc – is as logically legitimate – as any other view

 

the point is that any interpretation of reality is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our knowledge is proposal –

 

is any proposal of the greatest use or good?

 

really this is at base an empirical issue – dependent on how individual propositional actors define – ‘greatest’ – ‘use’ and ‘good’ – and not one that can be determined by fiat –

 

‘greatest’ – ‘use’ and ‘good’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

the mind is propositional action

 

nothing can be ‘absolutely said’ –

 

anything ‘said’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

if the mind’s activity – is ‘virtuous’ – then any propositional action – is virtuous

 

‘understanding God’ – is facing the unknown

 

 

PROP. XXIX. No particular thing whose nature is altogether different from ours can aid or hinder our power of doing things, and absolutely nothing can be either good or bad for us save if it have something in common with us.

 

 

according to Spinoza everything that exists is an expression of the one infinite and eternal substance – therefore it follows that no thing is ‘altogether different’ from any other thing

 

 and given that – anything can be either good or bad for us –

 

assuming for the moment that Spinoza hasn’t ditched his whole metaphysics – we can ask what would be an example of a thing whose nature is ‘altogether different from us’?

 

so far – we have no answer from Spinoza

 

 

Proof. – The power of a particular thing, and consequently (Coroll., Prop. 10, Part I) the power of man, by which he exists and works, is determined only by another particular thing (Prop. 28, Part I.) whose nature (Prop. 6, Part II,) must be understood through the same attribute through which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of acting, in whatever way it may be conceived, can be determined, and consequently aided or hindered, by the power of some other particular thing which has something in common with us, and not by the power of something whose nature is altogether different from ours; inasmuch as we call that good or bad which is the cause of pleasure or pain (Prop. 8, Part IV.), that is (Prop. 11, Note, Part III.), which increases or diminishes, aids or hinders our power of acting, therefore the thing whose nature is entirely different from our can be neither good nor bad for us. Q.e.d.

 

 

I would have thought that for Spinoza the ‘power of man’ – is an expression of God

 

and again – what is this ‘other particular thing’?

 

our power of acting is logical – it rests in critical activity –

 

that is the activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

without this critical activity our propositional lives are stymied in dogmatism – ignorance – pretence and prejudice

 

‘some other particular thing’ – however described – is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what I call ‘good’ – is an open mind – a critical / rational outlook –

 

and what I call ‘bad’ – is a dogmatic / non-critical / irrational approach to propositional life

 

pleasure and pain – are no different to any propositional experience –

 

pleasure and pain – if dealt with rationally – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXX.  Nothing can be bad through that which it has in common with our nature, but in so far as it is bad for us, thus far it is contrary to us.

 

 

again – if reality – including the nature of human beings – is the one expression of God – as Spinoza proposes –

 

then there is nothing that is ‘contrary’ to us –

 

and as to what is common to our nature – is it not the infinite eternal substance – that is God?

 

our reality is propositional – our actions are propositional –

 

any propositional activity is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what any propositional actor describes as ‘bad’ – will be a matter open to question –

 

and any proposal – open to question – is not ‘contrary to our nature’

 

 

Proof. – We call that which is the cause of pain bad (Prop. 8, Part IV.), that is (by def., which see in Note, Prop. 11, Part II.), which decreases or diminishes our power of acting. If. therefore, anything through that which it has in common with us were bad for us, it would therefore be able to diminish or hinder what it has in common with us, which (Prop. 4, Part III.) is absurd. Therefore nothing through that which it has in common with us can be bad for us; but. on the other hand, in so far as it is bad, that is (as we have just shown), in so far it can diminish or hinder our power of action, thus far (Prop. 5, Part III.) it is contrary to us. Q.e.d.

 

 

pleasure may be the cause of pain

 

and pain may increase or enhance one’s power of acting – if pain is critically evaluated

 

given Spinoza’s view that anything and everything is an expression of God –

 

all things share a commonality

 

what counts as ‘bad’ – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what diminishes our power of acting – is the failure to critically examine the proposals / propositions that we operate with

 

what increases our power of acting is putting our proposals / propositions to question putting them to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty          

 

 

PROP. XXXI.  In so far as anything agrees with our nature, thus far it is necessarily good.

 

given his metaphysics – the question for Spinoza is – in so far as ‘our nature’ – as with the ‘nature’ of everything – is an expression of the one eternal and infinite substance – ‘God’ – what can disagree with our nature?

 

‘our nature’ – is propositional

 

anything that we do – that is any human propositional activity – is ‘of our nature’

 

our nature is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

our nature is uncertain

 

‘good’ and ‘bad’ – are proposals / descriptions that we use with respect to our propositional activity –

 

510.

 

their use and application – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

our reality is uncertain – not necessary

 

 

Proof. – In so far as anything agrees with our nature it cannot (prev. Prop.) be bad. It will therefore be either good or indifferent. If we suppose this, that it is neither good nor bad, then nothing (Ax., Part IV.) will follow from its nature which can serve for the preservation of our nature, that is (by hypothesis), which serves for the preservation of our nature of the thing itself. But this is absurd (Prop. 6, Part III,). It will therefore be, in so far as it agrees with our nature, necessarily good. Q.e.d.

 

 

as a matter of empirical fact – I think it is fair to say – that we don’t always operate with value judgements – i.e. – ‘this is good’ – ‘this is bad’

 

value judgment / proposals can and do play a major role in our propositional life –

 

but a good deal of our propositional activity is not the subject of a value judgment –

 

and so – a proposal / proposition – may be – relative to questions of value – indifferent or neutral–

 

Spinoza’s metaphysics cannot account for ethical neutrality

 

and where there is a genuine question of good or evil – ethical neutrality – is just where we start

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful or good it is for us, and, on the other hand, the more useful anything is to us, the more it agrees with our nature. For in so far as it does not agree with our nature it will necessarily be different from our nature or contrary to it. If it is different, then (Prop. 29, Part IV.) it can neither be good nor bad; if it is contrary, it will therefore be contrary to that which agrees with our nature, that is (prev. Prop,) contrary to good, i.e., bad. Nothing therefore, save in so far as it agrees with our nature, can be good; and therefore the more it agrees with our nature, the more it is useful to us, and contrariwise. Q.e.d.

 

given Spinoza’s view that all that exists is an expression of the one eternal and infinite substance (God) – what is it that does not agree with our nature?

 

Spinoza has no answer here –

 

this – ‘in so far as it does not agree with our nature’ – is a straw man argument – and duplicitous –

 

and that needs to called out

 

 

PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are liable to passions they cannot thus far be said to agree in nature.

 

 

man’s nature is propositional –

 

propositions are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

man’s propositional behaviour however described – i.e. – as ‘passionate’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

logically speaking –

 

in that propositional actors – operate in propositional uncertainty – they can be said to ‘agree in nature’

 

 

Proof. – Things which are said to agree in nature are understood to agree in power (Prop. 7, Part III.), but not in want of power, or negation, and consequently (see Note, Prop. 3, Part III.) in passion. Wherefore men, in so far as they are liable to passions, cannot be thus far said to agree in nature. Q.e.d.

 

 

human power is logical – is propositional – is critical

 

as a matter of fact – men differ in their critical behaviour

 

 

Note. –  This also is self-manifest, for he that says that black and white agree in this alone, that neither of them is red, absolutely affirms that black and white agree in nothing. Thus also, if anyone says that a man and a stone agree in this alone, that they are both finite, weak, or do not exist by the necessity of their own natures, or again, that they are indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, he absolutely affirms that man and stone agree in nothing. For those things which agree in negation alone, or in what they have not, in truth agree in nothing.

 

 

if the statements – ‘black and white agree in this alone’ – and ‘a man and a stone agree in this alone’ and ‘those things which agree in negation in truth agree in nothing’ – are presented as statements of certainty – as beyond criticism – beyond doubt – then they are not rational statements

 

the logical reality is that any proposal of agreement or any proposal of disagreement – between things – that is – between proposals – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘For those things which agree in negation alone, or in what they have not, in truth agree in nothing.’

 

a proposal put – can be assented to or dissented from –

 

where it is assented to – it has currency – where it is dissented from – it has no currency – it is dropped from consideration

 

if two proposals are negated – dissented from – they are both logically inactive – and not in consideration –

 

there is no basis for agreement – so long as they are dissented from

 

 

PROP. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions, and thus far one and the same man is variable and inconsistent.

 

 

men do not differ in nature – human beings are propositional actors

 

we are not assailed by emotions / passions

 

any so called ‘emotion’ or ‘passion’ is a proposal –

 

a proposal open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

‘variable and inconsistent’?

 

yes – human beings operate in propositional uncertainty

 

 

Proof. – The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained through our essence or nature alone Def. 1 and 2, Part III.), but must be defined by the power, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), by the nature of external causes compared with our own.

Whence it comes about that there are many species of each emotion as there are species of objects by which we are affected (Prop. 56, Part III.), and that men are affected by one and the same object in different manners (Prop. 51, Part III.), and thus far disagree in nature, and moreover, that one and the same man (Prop. 51, Part III.) is affected in different manners towards the same object, and thus far is variable, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

our nature is propositional – that is to say open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

our nature is uncertain

 

‘external causes’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘objects’ as with ‘emotions’ are proposals –

 

what we deal with in our propositional lives is the relation between different proposals

 

and any proposed relation is open to question

 

‘that men are affected by one and the same thing in different manners’ – and ‘that one and the same man is affected in different manners towards the same object and thus far is variable’ –

 

indicates – propositional uncertainty

 

 

PROP. XXXIV. Men in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions, can be contrary one to the other.

 

 

propositional actors are not assailed by emotions / passions –

 

‘emotion’ – ‘passion’ – are names for proposals / propositional actions –

 

we enact emotions / passions –

 

and any propositional action / emotion / passion – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

men – as propositional actors – operate in propositional uncertainty –

 

whether men are contrary one to the other or in tune with each other – they are dealing with propositional uncertainty

 

 

Proof. – A man, e.g., Peter can be the cause that Paul feels pain either because he has something similar to a thing which Paul hates (Prop. 16, Part III.), or because Peter alone possesses something which Paul also loves (Prop. 32, Part III. with its Note), or for other causes (for the principal ones, see Note, Prop, 55, Part III.). And therefore it comes about from this that Paul hates Peter (Def, Emo. 7), and consequently it may easily happen (Prop. 40, Part III., with its Note) that Peter on the other hand hates Paul and therefore (Prop, 39, Part III.) that they endeavour to work each other reciprocal harm, that is (Prop. 30, Part IV,), that they are contrary to each other, But the emotion of pain is always a passion (Prop. 59, Part III.): therefore men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions, can be contrary to each other. Q.e,d.

 

 

it just does not follow that because Peter has something that Paul hates – that Paul will hate Peter –

 

he may i.e. – pity Peter – or he may be disinterested in Peter’s affairs

 

and it does not follow that because Peter has something that Paul loves – he will hate Peter

 

he could i.e. – be pleased at Peter’s could fortune

 

there is no necessity in emotional / propositional possibility

 

how anyone will react to any propositional circumstance – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and yes – people can hate each other – but hate like any other emotional / propositional response – if dealt with rationally – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

men are not assailed by emotions and passions –

 

men operate in propositional uncertainty –

 

men can be contrary to each other – but any such contrariness – as with compatibility – is open to question

 

 

Note. – I said that Paul may hate Peter, inasmuch as he imagines him to possess what he loves. Whence at the first glance it seems that these two, from the fact that they love the same thing, and consequently agree in nature, are injurious to one another; and therefore if this is true, Prop. 30 and 32 of this part are false. But if we are willing to examine the matter fairly, we shall see that these statements entirely agree. For these two are not hateful to each other in so far as they agree in nature, that is, in so far as they both love the same thing, but in so far as they disagree one with the other. For in so far as they both love the same thing, by that very fact the love of each of them is fostered (Prop. 31, Part III.), that is (Def. Emo. 6) by that very fact the pleasure of each is fostered. Wherefore it is far from being the case that in so far as they love the same thing and agree in nature they are hateful one to the other; but the cause of this thing is, as I said, nothing else than that they are supposed to disagree in nature. For we suppose Peter to have the idea of the thing loved possessed by him, and Paul, on the other the other hand, the idea of the thing loved lost to him. Whence it comes about that the first is affected with pleasure, and the second with pain: and thus far they are contrary to one to the other. And in this manner we can easily show that the other causes of hatred depend on this alone, that men disagree in nature, and do not depend on that in which they agree.

 

 

men operate in propositional uncertainty –

 

and it is propositional uncertainty that is the logical / existential basis of any agreement or disagreement –

 

love and hate – pleasure and pain – are emotional / propositional states – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXV. In so far as men live under the guidance of reason, thus far only they always necessarily agree in nature.

 

 

men are propositional actors –

 

men act logically and rationally in so far as they critically evaluate their proposals –

 

however – critical evaluation – may not result is agreement between men – it may result in disagreement – in fact disagreement is more likely than agreement in any critical evaluation of a proposition – though agreement is possible

 

further – any agreement or disagreement – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions they can be different in nature (Prop. 33, Part IV.) and contrary one to the other (prev. Prop.). but men are said to be active only in so far as they live under the guidance of reason

(Prop. 3, Part III.), and therefore whatever follows from human nature, in so far as it

 is defined by reason, must (Def. 3, Part III.) be understood through human nature alone as its proximate cause.  But in so far as each one desires according to the laws of his own nature what is good, and endeavours to remove what he thinks to be good or bad, according to the dictates of reason, is necessarily good or bad (Prop. 41, Part II.), therefore men, in so far as they live according to the dictates of reason, do those things which are necessarily good to human nature, and consequently to each man, that is (Coroll., Prop. 31, Part IV.), which agree with the nature of each man. And therefore men also necessarily agree one with the other in so far as they live according to the mandates of reason. Q.e.d.

 

 

men are not ‘assailed’ by emotions / passions

 

emotions / passions are propositional states – enacted by men

 

men are propositional actors – their propositional actions can be varied and uncertain one to the other

 

any proposal put – is an action – whether rational or not

 

reason is the critical process of question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

anything that humans do – that is – any proposal put – any propositional action taken – whether rational or not – ‘follows human nature’

 

reason – rational behaviour plays a part in propositional life – but it is not the full story

 

much of what humans do – how they deal with their proposals / propositional actions – is illogical and irrational

 

this ‘laws of his own nature’ – is nothing more than an individual’s propositional action

 

as to whether an individual’s propositional actions are good or bad – that will depend on how that individual defines ‘good’ and ‘bad’ –

 

and the logical reality is that any definition of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

there is no necessity is propositional activity – no necessity in definitions of ‘good’ or ‘bad’

 

there are no ‘dictates of reason’ or ‘mandates of reason’ –

 

reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –

 

there are no things which are necessarily good –

 

what counts as good – for any man – is a matter open to question – is uncertain

 

there is no guarantee that men will agree with each other

 

men can and do agree with each other – just as they can and do disagree with each other

 

any agreement – or disagreement – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Corollary I – There is no individual thing in nature more useful to man than one who lives under the guidance of reason. For that is most useful to man which mostly agrees with his nature (Coroll., Prop. 31, Part IV.), that is (as is elf evident), man. But man is absolutely active according to the laws of his nature when he lives under the guidance of reason (De. 2, Part III.), and thus far only can he agree necessarily with the nature of another man (prev. Prop.). Therefore there is nothing more useful to man than man, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

reason is the critical evaluation of proposals

 

the critical evaluation of proposals / propositions – is logical and rational – and useful

 

however – it is open to question whether it is useful for all men – in all circumstances

 

a non-critical – irrational – dogmatic view – might well be regarded as useful by an individual in certain circumstances –

 

what is useful to someone may not be logical or rational –

 

the point being – what is useful – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

man is active – whether or not – he operates ‘under the guidance of reason’ – that is – whether or not he is critically engaged

 

men can and do agree with each – but there is no necessity in this –

 

any proposed agreement (or disagreement) between men – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

man can be useful to man – and man can be of no use to man – and furthermore – destructive of man

 

the logical reality is that how man relates to man – is uncertain

 

Corollary II. – As each man seeks that most which is useful to him, so men are most useful one to the other. For the more man seeks what is most useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more he is endowed with virtue (Prop. 20, Part IV.). the more power he is endowed with to act according to the laws of his nature, that is (Prop.3, Part III.), to live under the guidance of reason. But men must agree most in nature when they live under the guidance of reason (prev. Prop.). Therefore (prev. Coroll.) men are most useful one to the other when each seeks out what is useful to himself. Q.e.d.

 

 

it's easy to say that each man seeks what is most useful to him –

 

but the logical reality is that we often don’t know what is most useful to us –

 

the fact is we explore – explore propositional possibility –

 

and in any case – should we determine that a course of action is most useful to us –

 

that determination is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we do what we do – and we propose description of what we do

 

one such description is ‘useful’ – but it is only one of the many descriptions / names – we give to our propositional actions

 

it is up for grabs – in any circumstance – whether or not men are most useful one to the other

 

seeking what you believe to be most useful to yourself – may not result in preserving yourself

 

and we can ask – do people actually operate on the basis of preserving themselves?

 

I imagine that for some people in some circumstance – preserving themselves becomes a focus –

 

however – it can be the case that one is seeking to enjoy oneself – with no thought of preserving oneself

 

our motivations – are not set and determined – they are many and varied –

 

they are at base – uncertain

 

reason is not a ‘guidance’ – reason is a critical propositional activity –

 

those who question – doubt and explore uncertainty – that is those who act logically and rationally – may or may not agree with each other

 

and whether acting rationally is useful one to the other – is an open question

 

being rational – may not be useful

 

 

Note. – What we have shown is borne witness to by experience daily with such convincing examples that it has become a proverb: Man is a God to man. Yet it rarely happens that men live according tot the instructions of reason, but among them things are in such a state that they are usually envious of or a nuisance to each other. But nevertheless they are scarcely able to live a solitary life, so that to many the definition that man is a social animal must be very apparent; and in truth things are so ordered at human affairs, that from the common society of men far more conveniences arise than the contrary. Let satirists therefore laugh to their hearts content at human affairs, let theologians revile them, and let the melancholy praise as much as they can the rude

and barbarous isolated life: let them despise men and admire the brutes – despite all this, men will find that they can prepare with material aid far more easily what they need, and avoid far more easily the perils which beset them on all sides, by united forces: to say nothing of how much better it is, and more worthy of our knowledge, to regard the deeds of men rather than those of brutes.

 

 

‘man is a God to man’ or ‘men are usually envious or a nuisance to each other’?

 

man can be useful to man – and man can be envious and a nuisance – but these relationships – do not exhaust the possible ways men can and do relate to each other

 

in certain circumstances men may be of no use to each other – and may indeed hinder each other

 

and – men may relate to each other without being useful – envious or a nuisance –

 

i.e. – men may just simply enjoy each other company

 

how we relate to each – and how we describe any given relationship – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

even though one may ‘scarcely live a solitary life’ – there are those who have and do live with minimal contact with others – and there are individuals who have tried to avoid any contact with other men

 

we can ask – for such people – how useful is man to man?

 

‘far more conveniences arise than the contrary’?

 

I think for most people – this is true – but there can be exceptions to this

 

a barbarous isolated life – may suit some

 

yes – there are those who despise men and admire brutes – and I see no issue with this

 

just whether ‘united forces’ – always work to our advantage is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

war is a clear example of where ‘united forces’ – result in death and destruction

 

man can learn a lot from animals

 

 

PROP. XXXVI. The greatest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and all can easily enjoy it.

 

 

any idea of the ‘greatest good’ – will be some proposed ‘hierarchy of good’ – and any proposed hierarchy of good – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as will any proposal of ‘good’ –

 

presumably – ‘those who follow virtue’ – are just those who act in a way that they regard as good –

 

and acting in such a way – logically speaking – means putting any proposed ‘good’ to question – to doubt – and exploring the uncertainty of any proposed ‘good’

 

the logical reality is that propositional actors have different conceptions of ‘good’ –

 

and the empirical reality is that there is no practise of virtue that is common to all – that is enjoyed by all

 

Spinoza here demonstrates that he has no idea of the logic of ‘good’ – or the actual use and practise of the proposal of ‘good’

 

                                                                                                 

Proof. – To act from virtue is to act from the instruction of reason (Prop. 24, Part IV.), and whatever we endeavour to do from reason is understanding (prop.26, Part IV.). And therefore (Prop. 28 Part IV.) the greatest good of those who follow virtue is to know God, that is (Prop. 47, Part II., and its Note). the good which can be possessed equally by all men, in so far as they are of the same nature. Q.e.d.

 

reason is not an ‘instruction’ – reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

 

our ‘understanding’ is propositional – is uncertain

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown is just that – unknown –

 

to describe the unknown as ‘good’ – or the ‘greatest good’ – is vacuous

 

any proposal of ‘good’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

to be ‘good’ is to be virtuous – to be ‘virtuous’ is to be good – the terms are interchangeable

 

just ‘what of the same nature’ means – is open to question

 

you can say all men are of the same nature – otherwise they would not be men –

 

and according to Spinoza – anything that exists is an expression of God – therefore everything ‘is of the same nature’

 

if ‘of the same nature’ – means ‘agreement between men’ – it does not account for the natural – everyday fact of disagreement between men

 

so – if it means ‘agreement’ – it is simplistic and inadequate

 

human beings are ‘of the same nature’ in that they are propositional – that is they propose their reality – and they can put their proposals to question – to doubt – and explore their uncertainty

 

 

Note. – But if one ask, What if the greatest good of those who follow virtue were not common to all? would it not then follow as above (see Prop. 34, Part IV.) that men who live according to the mandate of reason, that is (Prop. 35, Part Iv.), men, in so far as they agree in nature, would be contrary to each other? He has this answer for himself, that it arises not accidentally but from the very nature of reason that the greatest good of man should be common to all, clearly because it is deduced from human essence itself in so far as it is defined by reason, and inasmuch as a man can neither be nor be conceived without the power of enjoying the greatest good. For it belongs (Prop. 47, Part II.) to the essence of the human mind to have adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

 

 

Spinoza’s answer to his question – ‘what if the greatest good of those who follow virtue were not common to all’ – is really no argument – it is rather nothing more than the assertion that the greatest good is common to all men –

 

the so-called ‘argument’ – is a mishmash of inter-related vague concepts – ‘human essence’ – ‘reason’ – ‘greatest good’ – ‘essence’ – ‘adequate knowledge’ – ‘eternal and infinite essence of God’

 

Spinoza has nothing here – but his assertion – and its background noise

 

human beings can propose ‘good’ – can propose ‘virtue’ – and their proposals are many and varied

 

furthermore – any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

what is common to all is propositional uncertainty –

 

and by the way – we can ask here – what of those who don’t follow virtue?

 

what place do they have in Spinoza’s cacophony?

 

 

PROP. XXXVII. The good which each one who follows virtue desires for himself, he also desires for other men, and the more so the more knowledge he has of God.

 

 

I may desire a good for myself – and take the view that I am not is a position to speak for anyone else

 

and as for ‘the more knowledge he has of God’ – what is that ‘more knowledge’?

 

let us say you accept Spinoza’s idea of God – what ‘more’ is there to it?

 

 

Proof. – Men is so far as they live under the guidance of reason, are most useful to men (Coroll. 1, Prop. 35, Part IV.); and therefore (Prop. 19, Part IV) we endeavour, under the guidance of reason, to bring it about that men live under the guidance of reason. But the good which each person who lives according to the dictates of reason, that is (Prop. 24, Part IV), who follows virtue, desires for himself, is understood (Prop. 26, part IV.); therefore the good which he desires for himself, he desires also

for other men. Again, desire, in so far as it has reference to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. Emo. i); but the essence of the mind constitutes of knowledge (Prop. 11, Part II) which involves knowledge of God (Prop. 47, Part II.), and without which (Prop. 15, Part I) it cannot exist or be conceived. And therefore, according as the essence of the mind involves greater knowledge of God, so the desire with which he who follows virtue desires the good which he desires for himself for others, will be greater. Q.e.d.

 

‘Men is so far as they live under the guidance of reason, are most useful to men (Coroll. 1, Prop. 35, Part IV.); and therefore (Prop. 19, Part IV) we endeavour, under the guidance of reason, to bring it about that men live under the guidance of reason.’

 

‘reason’ – is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

it is fair enough to suggest that this activity can be useful –

 

as to the proposal that it is ‘most useful’ to men – this proposal – as with any other – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we cannot ride roughshod over contingent reality with pretentious – so called ‘objective’ prescription

 

what is useful to men will be determined in context – contingent context – and any determination – will be open to question

 

‘But the good which each person who lives according to the dictates of reason, that is (Prop. 24, Part IV), who follows virtue, desires for himself, is understood (Prop. 26, part IV.); therefore the good which he desires for himself, he desires also for other men’

 

it just does not follow that the good which he desires for himself – ‘understood’ – or not – he therefore desires for other men

 

it is presumptuous and pretentious to hold that what I desire – everyone else desires

 

firstly – what I regard as good and what I desire – I may think is not for everyone

 

secondly – I don’t know what others regard as good or what they desire –

 

and should someone propose that what they desire is what I desire – well and good

 

however – any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘Again, desire, in so far as it has reference to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. Emo. i); but the essence of the mind constitutes of knowledge (Prop. 11, Part II) which involves knowledge of God (Prop. 47, Part II.), and without which (Prop. 15, Part I) it cannot exist or be conceived’

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional activity

 

‘body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

there is no ‘essence’ to propositional activity – or – propositional activity – is the essence of propositional activity

 

knowledge is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what can or does exist is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

there is no ‘greater knowledge of God’ –

 

the unknown – is unknown

 

‘knowledge’ is not a question of quantity –

 

knowledge is proposal – critically evaluated

 

 

Another Proof. – A man will love the good which he desires for himself and loves, with greater constancy, if he sees that others love it also (Prop. 31, Part III.). And therefore (Coroll., same Prop.) he will endeavour to bring it about that others also will like it. And as this good (prev. Prop.) is common to all, and all may enjoy it, he will endeavour, therefore (by the same reason) to bring it to pass that all enjoy it, and (Prop. 37, Part III.) the more so the more he enjoys it. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘A man will love the good which he desires for himself and loves, with greater constancy, if he sees that others love it also (Prop. 31, Part III.).’

 

perhaps so – but it is also quite possible that what others desire and love does not influence what a man desires and loves 

 

‘And therefore (Coroll., same Prop.) he will endeavour to bring it about that others also will like it.’

 

this is possible – but he may take the view that what others like – is up to them to decide

 

‘And as this good (prev. Prop.) is common to all, and all may enjoy it, he will endeavour, therefore (by the same reason) to bring it to pass that all enjoy it, and (Prop. 37, Part III.) the more so the more he enjoys it.’

 

it is pretentious to assume that what one considers as a good – is common to all

 

and it doesn’t follow that the more I enjoy something – that I will ‘endeavour to bring it about that all enjoy it’

 

in fact – anyone who takes this view is bordering on megalomania

 

 

Note I. – He who endeavours from emotion alone to bring it to pass that others love what he loves, and that others should live according to his liking, acts from impulse, and is hateful more especially to those whom other things please, and who accordingly endeavour with the same impulse to bring it about that others should live according to their idea of life. Again, as the greatest good which men desire from emotion is often that only one man possess it, it comes about that those who love are not constant in mind, and while they delight to praise the things they love, yet at the same time they fear to be believed. But he who endeavours to lead the rest by reason, not impulse, acts humanely and benignly, and is most constant in mind. Again. whatever we desire, and do of which we are the cause, in so far as we have the idea of God or in so far as we know God, I refer to Religion (religio). The desire, however, of doing good, which is engendered in us by reason of the fact that we live according to the precepts of reason, I call Piety (pietas). Again, the desire wherewith a man who lives according to the instruction of reason is so held that he wishes to unite others to him in friendship, I call Honesty (honestas), and that honest which mem who live under the guidance of reason praise; and, on the other hand, that base (turpe) which is opposed to the making of friendship. Besides this, I have shown what are the basements of a state. Now the difference between true virtues and weakness can easily be perceived from what has been said above, namely, that true virtue is nothing else than living according to the precepts of reason; and therefore weakness consists in this alone, that man allows himself to be led by things which are outside of him, and is determined by them to do things which the common disposition of external things postulates, and not those postulated by his own nature considered in itself. Now these are the things which I promised to prove in the Note of Prop. 18, Part IV., from which it is apparent that the law not to slaughter animals has its foundation more in vain superstition and womanish pity than true reason. The reason wherewith we seek what is useful to us teaches us the necessity of uniting ourselves with our fellow men, but not with brutes and things which are different from the human species in nature; but we have the same right over them as they have over us. Again, as everyone’s right is defined by his virtue or power, men have far more right over beasts than beasts over men. I do not deny that beasts feel; but I deny that on that account we should not consult our necessity and use them as much as we wish and treat them as we will, since they do not agree with us in nature, and their emotions are in nature different from human emotions (see Note, Prop. 57, Part III.). It remains that I should explain what is just and what unjust, what is sin and what is merit. On these points are the following note.

 

 

‘Again, as the greatest good which men desire from emotion is often that only one man possess it, it comes about that those who love are not constant in mind, and while they delight to praise the things they love, yet at the same time they fear to be believed.’

 

what men ‘desire from emotion’ – is what they propose –

 

and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by being ‘constant in mind’ – is being uncritical and dogmatic – then being constant is mind – is irrational

 

a critical mind – is an open mind – open to different understandings – different propositional possibilities

 

‘fearing to be believed’?

 

the hard logical reality is that the best you can do is put your proposal – and be open to critical analysis –

 

how your proposal is received – is really – anybody’s guess

 

‘But he who endeavours to lead the rest by reason, not impulse, acts humanely and benignly, and is most constant in mind.’

 

impulsive action – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

being open minded – and having a critical intelligence – is really an anathema to the ‘most constant in mind’ –

 

a critical intelligence – is open to inconstancy – and in fact – thrives on it

 

as to whether a critical / rational approach in propositional life is ‘humane’ and ‘benign’ – will depend on how ‘humane’ and ‘benign’ – are defined

 

‘Again. whatever we desire, and do of which we are the cause, in so far as we have the idea of God or in so far as we know God, I refer to Religion (religio).’

 

Spinoza’s idea of God is purely intellectual – and his metaphysics was not presented – by him – as a religion

 

religions do have an intellectual dimension – however characteristically they are non-critical – dogmatic – authoritarian based practises trading in fear and superstition

 

‘The desire, however, of doing good, which is engendered in us by reason of the fact that we live according to the precepts of reason, I call Piety (pietas).’

 

call it what you will – the fact is we operate with this notion of ‘doing good’ – and just what that amounts to is open to question – is uncertain

 

‘Again, the desire wherewith a man who lives according to the instruction of reason is so held that he wishes to unite others to him in friendship, I call Honesty (honestas), and that honest which mem who live under the guidance of reason praise; and, on the other hand, that base (turpe) which is opposed to the making of friendship.’

 

reason is not an ‘instruction’ – it is a critical activity

 

and yes – people do wish to unite in friendship – but just what friendship amounts to is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

however – I can’t see why desiring a friend – is any more ‘honest’ – than desiring anything else

 

‘Now the difference between true virtues and weakness can easily be perceived from what has been said above, namely, that true virtue is nothing else than living according to the precepts of reason; and therefore weakness consists in this alone, that man

allows himself to be led by things which are outside of him, and is determined by them to do things which the common disposition of external things postulates, and not those postulated by his own nature considered in itself.’

 

reason has no precepts – reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

whether you call the critical approach to life ‘virtuous’ – is neither here nor there

 

‘weakness’ – to my mind – consists in a non-critical view and approach to propositional life

 

the good news is that what we are affected by – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as is our ‘nature’ – that is – what we postulate – what we propose

 

‘Now these are the things which I promised to prove in the Note of Prop. 18, Part IV., from which it is apparent that the law not to slaughter animals has its foundation more in vain superstition and womanish pity than true reason.’

 

as to whether this so-called ‘law to not slaughter animals has its foundation in vain superstition and ‘womanish pity’ – is a matter open to question –

 

it may well have its foundation in a view regarding the ethical treatment of animals?

 

in any case – the ‘foundation’ of ‘true reason’ is the critical activity of question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

and ‘womanish pity’ – is yet another misogynistic mark against Spinoza

 

and really what he is referring to here – is sensitivity – which is characteristic of men and women – and might I add – non-human species

 

‘The reason wherewith we seek what is useful to us teaches us the necessity of uniting ourselves with our fellow men, but not with brutes and things which are different from the human species in nature; but we have the same right over them as they have over us.’

 

reason teaches us to keep an open mind –

 

and against Spinoza’s view here – is the view (ironically Spinozistic) that we can unite ourselves with all that is in nature

 

as for ‘rights’ – I go with Jeremy Bentham – ‘nonsense on stilts – rhetorical rubbish’

 

‘Again, as everyone’s right is defined by his virtue or power, men have far more right over beasts than beasts over men. I do not deny that beasts feel; but I deny that on that account we should not consult our necessity and use them as much as we wish and treat them as we will, since they do not agree with us in nature, and their emotions are in nature different from human emotions’

 

men can have more power over animals – but it depends on the circumstance – and the animal – re: Siegfried and Roy

 

man and animals are different species in the natural world – and as such share a commonality – a common nature

 

and once again – such a view is quite consistent with Spinoza’s metaphysic – and can be said to derive from it

 

Spinoza seems to have forgotten his own metaphysics when it comes to women and animals

 

how we use each other – and how we use animals – is not a matter of ‘rights’ –

 

it is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note II. – In the appendix of the first part I promised to explain what was praise and blame, merit and sin, just and unjust. As for praise and blame, I have explained them in the Note of Prop. 29, Part III. I must now say something concerning the rest; but before doing that I must say something concerning the natural and civil state of man.

 

Every man exists by consummate right of nature, and consequently every man does by reason of this right those things which follow from the necessity of his nature; and therefore each man judges for himself, by his consummate right of nature, what is good or bad, and consults his advantage according to his disposition (see Prop. 19 and 20, Part IV,) and revenges himself (Coroll. 2 Prop. 40, Part III.), and endeavours to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he hates (Prop. 28, Part III.). If men lived according to the dictates of reason, each one would possess (Coroll. 1. Prop. 35, Part IV.) his right without any loss to another; but because they are liable to emotions (Coroll., Prop. 4 Part IV.) which far surpass the power of virtues (Prop. 6, Part IV.), they are therefore often drawn in different directions (Prop. 33, Part IV.) and are contrary one to the other (Prop. 34, Part IV.), while they need each other’s help (Note, Prop. 35, Part IV). It is necessary, then, in order that men live in concord and be of help to each other, that they should give up their natural right and render themselves reciprocally secure, and determine to do nothing that will be injurious to another. The manner in which this can come about, namely, that men, who are necessarily liable to emotions (Coroll. Prop, 4 Part IV.), and inconstant and variable (Prop. 35, Part IV.), can make themselves mutually confident and have trust one with the other is clear from Prop.7, Part IV., and Prop. 39. Part III., namely that no emotion can be checked by another emotion stronger than the contrary to the emotion checked, and that everyone refrains from inflicting evil through fear of incurring a greater injury. By this law society (societas) can be held together, provided it keep for itself the right everyone has of vindicating wrong done to him, and judging what is good and evil, and if it also has the power of prescribing a common system of life and behaviour, and of making laws and forcing them to be respected, not by reason, which cannot check emotions (Note, Prop. 17, Part IV.), but by threats. This society, ratified by laws and power of keeping itself together, is called a state (civitas), and those who are protected by this right are called citizens (civies). From which we can easily understand that nothing can exist in a natural state which can be called good or bad by common assent, since everyman, who is in a natural state, consults only his own advantage, and determines what is good or bad according to his fancy and in so far as he has regard

for his own advantage alone and holds himself responsible to no one save himself by any law; and therefore sin cannot be conceived in a natural state, but only in a civil state, where it is decreed by common consent what is good  or bad, and each one holds himself responsible to the state. Therefore sin (peccatum) is nothing else than disobedience, which is thus punishable by right of the state alone; and on the other hand obedience is considered a merit in a citizen, because he who rejoices in the advantages of a state is thereby judged worthy. Again, in a natural state no one is master of anything by common consent, nor can there be anything in nature which can be said to belong to this man and not to that, but all things belong equally to all men; and accordingly in a natural state no wish of rendering to each man his own can be conceived, nor of taking away from a man what belongs to him, that is, in a state of state of nature nothing takes place that can be called just or unjust, but only in a civil state, where it is determined by common consent what belongs to this man or that. From this it is apparent that just and unjust, sin and merit, are merely extrinsic notions, not attributes which explain the nature of the mind. But I have said enough of this.

 

 

‘Every man exists by consummate right of nature, and consequently every man does by reason of this right those things which follow from the necessity of his nature; and therefore each man judges for himself, by his consummate right of nature, what is good or bad, and consults his advantage according to his disposition (see Prop. 19 and 20, Part IV,) and revenges himself (Coroll. 2 Prop. 40, Part III.), and endeavours to preserve what he loves and to destroy what he hates (Prop. 28, Part III.).’

 

every man exists because he does – there is no ‘consummate right of nature’

 

man is a propositional actor – there is no ‘necessity’ in this – man’s propositional activity – that is – man’s existence – is uncertain

 

what is good or bad for any man is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a man may revenge himself – and may endeavour to preserve what he loves – however he may forego revenge – and he may not endeavour to preserve what he loves – he may decide to let go of what he loves

 

whether to revenge – or whether to preserve what is loved – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and – as with any proposal – any propositional action – uncertain

 

‘If men lived according to the dictates of reason, each one would possess (Coroll. 1. Prop. 35, Part IV.) his right without any loss to another; but because they are liable to emotions (Coroll., Prop. 4 Part IV.) which far surpass the power of virtues (Prop. 6, Part IV.), they are therefore often drawn in different directions (Prop. 33, Part IV.) and are contrary one to the other (Prop. 34, Part IV.), while they need each other’s help (Note, Prop. 35, Part IV).’

 

there are no ‘dictates of reason – reason is the critical activity

 

critically evaluating one’s proposals – one’s propositional action – may incur a perceived loss

 

but any such perception – is logically speaking – open to question

 

our proposal and our propositional actions are open to question – so logically speaking we will be ‘drawn in different directions’

 

‘being contrary one to the other’ – is one with dealing with propositional uncertainty

 

if we need another’s help – how that need is to be addressed and understood – will be open to question – will be uncertain

 

‘It is necessary, then, in order that men live in concord and be of help to each other, that they should give up their natural right and render themselves reciprocally secure, and determine to do nothing that will be injurious to another.’

 

to live rationally does not mean to live in concord – if being in concord means living uncritically

 

security is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

being determined to do nothing that is injurious to another – is to my mind – a good starting proposal –

 

however just what that means – as with any proposal – is an uncertain matter

 

‘The manner in which this can come about, namely, that men, who are necessarily liable to emotions (Coroll. Prop, 4 Part IV.), and inconstant and variable (Prop. 35, Part IV.), can make themselves mutually confident and have trust one with the other is clear from Prop.7, Part IV., and Prop. 39. Part III., namely that no emotion can be checked by another emotion stronger than the contrary to the emotion checked, and that everyone refrains from inflicting evil through fear of incurring a greater injury.’

 

men can make themselves ‘mutually confident and have trust one with the other’ – but any such confidence and trust if it is rational needs to be understood as based in critical thinking

 

emotions are propositional actions – propositional actions – if dealt with rationally – are put to question – not ‘checked’

 

‘fear of incurring a greater injury’ – may be a reason for not inflicting evil – but it is not the only possible reason –

 

i.e. – one may refrain from inflicting evil – whatever that may amount to – because it is evil

 

‘By this law society (societas) can be held together, provided it keep for itself the right everyone has of vindicating wrong done to him, and judging what is good and evil, and if it also has the power of prescribing a common system of life and behaviour, and of making laws and forcing them to be respected, not by reason, which cannot check emotions (Note, Prop. 17, Part IV.), but by threats.’

 

a ‘society’ – is a propositional complex – of propositional complexes –

 

it is ’held together’ – or not – by the propositional action of its propositional actors

 

there is no ‘right’ to vindicate wrong – though wrongs do get vindicated –

 

and regardless of what form a society takes – any proposal by any propositional actor as to what is good and evil – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

a society – whatever its form – as with any individual in it – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

a society – is an uncertain proposal – an uncertain state of affairs

 

any prescription of a common system of life and behaviour – will always be – in reality – open to question

 

laws are proposals – and clearly open to question – as is any enforcement of laws

 

a society based on threat – is logically and rationally inferior – to a society – open to question

 

‘From which we can easily understand that nothing can exist in a natural state which can be called good or bad by common assent, since everyman, who is in a natural state, consults only his own advantage, and determines what is good or bad according to his fancy and in so far as he has regard for his  own advantage alone and holds himself responsible to no one save himself by any law; and therefore sin cannot be conceived in a natural state, but only in a civil state, where it is decreed by common consent what is good  or bad, and each one holds himself responsible to the state.’

 

human beings are propositional – however this propositional ‘state’ is described –

 

i.e. – as ‘natural’ or ‘civil’

 

what is called ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – is open to question –

 

and assent – ‘common assent’ – as with any propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

‘sin’ – is a notion that has its origins in authoritarianism

 

‘authoritarianism’ – is a logical corruption of the notion of authority

 

the only genuine / logical ‘authority’ – is authorship – propositional authorship –

 

there is no ‘sin’ in authorship –

 

no ‘sin’ in the authorship of any proposal –

 

no ‘sin’ in any proposal put

 

civil society is based on the rule of law – and the enforcement of its laws

 

any ‘law’ – and any enforcement of law – as with any other proposition or propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘Therefore sin (peccatum) is nothing else than disobedience, which is thus punishable by right of the state alone; and on the other hand obedience is considered a merit in a citizen, because he who rejoices in the advantages of a state is thereby judged worthy.’

 

if by ‘obedience’ – is meant blind assent – uncritical assent – to a ‘law’ – a proposal – then obedience is irrational

 

as for being ‘judged worthy’ – this is just pretence and rhetoric

 

the civil state can be advantageous to its citizens – but it can also be disadvantageous

 

how the actions of any civil state are interpreted – and valued – is a matter – open to question – for any rational citizen

 

‘Again, in a natural state no one is master of anything by common consent, nor can there be anything in nature which can be said to belong to this man and not to that, but all things belong equally to all men; and accordingly in a natural state no wish of rendering to each man his own can be conceived, nor of taking away from a man what belongs to him, that is, in a state of state of nature nothing takes place that can be called just or unjust, but only in a civil state, where it is determined by common consent what belongs to this man or that.’

 

again – in the propositional state – any proposal put – and propositional action taken – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

possession of anything – at any time – can be put to question – can be put to doubt – and is – logically speaking – uncertain –

 

what is ‘just’ and what is ‘unjust’ – is always a matter open to question

 

‘common consent’ – is the rule of the mob – for better or worse – and is always subject to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘From this it is apparent that just and unjust, sin and merit, are merely extrinsic notions, not attributes which explain the nature of the mind. But I have said enough of this.’

 

‘just’ and ‘unjust’ – proposals – open to question

 

‘sin’ and ‘merit’ – pretence and rhetoric

 

 

PROP. XXXVIII. That which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many different ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways is useful to man, and the more so according as it renders the body more apt to be affected in many ways or to affect other bodies so; and, on the contrary, that is harmful (noxious) to man which renders the body less apt for this.

 

 

Proof. – The more the body is rendered apt for this, the more the mind is rendered apt for perceiving (Prop.14, Part II.): and therefore that which disposes the body in that way and renders it apt for this, is necessarily good or useful (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.), and more useful and more apt it renders the body for this, and on the contrary (by the same Prop. 14, Part II., inverted, and Prop. 26 and 27 Part IV.), that is harmful which renders the body less apt for this. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘That which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many different ways or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways’ –

 

is propositional action –

 

a proposal put – a propositional action – has affect –

 

a proposal put affects the propositional actor – and affects those to whom it is put to

 

‘external bodies’ – are proposed realities

 

we live and operate in propositional complexes

 

what is ‘more apt’ or ‘less apt’ – and how we understand ‘harmful’ – is relative to propositional context – and as such – uncertain

 

propositional action / propositional affect – is just what happens –

 

whether a propositional affect is useful – or not – will be – in whatever propositional context or circumstance – open to question

 

there is no ‘necessary good’ – any proposed ‘good’ – is uncertain

 

furthermore – to focus on ‘body’ – is to fall into the dualist trap – the mind / body trap – and to miss the central unity that is the person – the propositional actor

 

we begin and end with – the propositional actor – however explained or described

 

 

PROP. XXXIX. Whatever brings it about that the proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the human body have to each other is preserved, is good: and contrariwise, that is bad which brings it about that the parts of the human body have another proportion mutually of motion and rest.

 

 

here we are talking about the health of an individual / propositional actor

 

the reality is that one’s health is not certain

 

one’s health is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

as to the ground of health – what ‘brings it about’ – that is a question for science – just as is the basis of illness and disease

 

medicine is a science – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

most would say that health is a good thing and illness a bad state of affairs

 

perhaps though – it is not that simple

 

from time to time you here of those who say that an illness or a disability has been the best thing that has happened to them – for as a result of dealing with their malady they have discovered strengths they never knew they had – or that as a result of the experience of sickness they have come to a new and better understanding and appreciation of themselves and of others and of life

 

and what of the case of an individual who wreaks havoc – and can only do so because he is healthy enough to do so?

 

what is good and what is bad – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The human body needs for its preservation many other bodies (Post. 4, Part II.); but that which constitutes the form of the human body consist of this, that its parts convey one to the other their motions mutually in a certain proportion (Def. before lemma 4, which see after Prop. 13, Part II.), Therefore that which brings it about that the proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the body have one to the other is preserved, preserves the form of the human body, and consequently brings it about (Post. 3 and 6 Part II.) that the human body can be affected in many ways, and also that it can affect external bodies in many ways: and therefore (prev. Prop.) it is good. Again, that which brings it about that the parts of the human body assume some other proportion of motion and rest, brings it about (same Def., Part II.) that the human body assumes another form, that is (as is self-evident, and as we stated towards the end of the preface of this part), that the human body is destroyed, and consequently rendered entirely unsuitable for being affected in many ways: and therefore (prev. Prop,) it is bad. Q.e.d.

 

 

that a functioning propositional actor affects and effects – can be seen as neither ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – but simply its natural state –

 

just as a propositional actor who is ‘rendered unsuitable for being affected in many ways’ – likewise can be seen as being in its natural state – neither good nor bad

 

and it should be remembered that how the proposal ‘natural state’ is to be understood and explained – is open to question

 

furthermore – where we do propose a value on any natural state – any proposed value is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – What harm or good this can do to the mind is explained in the fifth part. But it must be noted here, that I understand the body to suffer death when its parts are so disposed that they assume one with other another proportion of motion and rest. For I do not dare deny that the human body can be changed into another nature entirely different from its own, although the circulation of the blood and other features on

account of which the body is thought to live is preserved. For there is no reason which obliges me to state that a body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse; indeed experience seems to persuade the contrary. For it comes about at times that a man suffers such changes that it is difficult to say he is the same, as I have heard it related of a Spanish poet who had been seized with a certain sickness, and although he recovered from it, remained oblivious of his past life that he did not think that the tales and tragedies he had written were his own, and could easily have been mistaken for a grown-up infant had he forgotten how to speak. And if this seems incredible, what shall we say of infants, whose nature a man of advanced age deems so different from his own that he could not be persuaded that he ever was one if he did not make a conjecture about his own case from the example of others? But lest I gather material for the superstitious to raise new objections about, I had rather leave this question without further discussion.

 

 

‘What harm or good this can do to the mind is explained in the fifth part. But it must be noted here, that I understand the body to suffer death when its parts are so disposed that they assume one with other another proportion of motion and rest.

 

underlying this statement is a clear mind / body distinction

 

Spinoza does not here refer to the death of the person – of the propositional actor –

 

he speaks only of the death of the body – and leaves the mind out of consideration here

 

the logical / propositional reality is that just what death is – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we should note here that there are those dualists who hold that the death is not the end of human life – that a ‘soul’ survives the death of the body

 

and if we substitute mind for soul here – perhaps this is not far from Spinoza’s view –

 

we will wait and see what the fifth part holds

 

‘For I do not dare deny that the human body can be changed into another nature entirely different from its own, although the circulation of the blood and other features on account of which the body is thought to live is preserved. For there is no reason which obliges me to state that a body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse; indeed experience seems to persuade the contrary’

 

and in modern times we have the phenomena of people regarded a brain dead – who are kept ‘alive’ – by machines

 

in bringing up the case of the Spanish poet – and childhood – Spinoza it seems is suggesting that all we are really talking about is changes of form in the body

 

and he makes this point above at the start of the note when he says –

 

‘I understand the body to suffer death when its parts are so disposed that they assume one with other another proportion of motion and rest.’

 

another proportion of motion and rest – is not the end of the relation of motion and rest –

 

and the end of the relation of motion and rest would be what most would regard as death

 

this raises the question – does Spinoza believe in death?

 

from what he has written here – it doesn’t look like it

 

 

PROP. XL. Whatever is conducive to the common society of men, or, whatever brings it about that men live together in agreement, is useful, and on the contrary, that is bad which induces discord in a state.

 

 

Proof. – Whatever brings it about that men live together in agreement, brings it about at the same time that they live under the guidance of reason (Prop. 35, Part IV.) it is good: and (by the same argument) that, on the other hand, is bad which fosters discord. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the common society of men?

 

is there a ‘common society of men’?

 

at any time – any survey of societies – will show that there are different social and political structures

 

and what is ‘common’ to them? –

 

probably only men and women

 

in any case – any proposal regarding what is ‘common to the society of men’ – will be open to question – open to doubt and uncertain – as will be any proposal regarding what is conducive to any so called ‘common society of men’

 

‘men living together in agreement’?

 

as with the common society of men’ – ‘living together in agreement’ is vague – and a notion of no logical use – but perhaps it has rhetorical value – politicians seem to think so anyway

 

the logical reality is that men and women – propositional actors – live and operate in logical uncertainty

 

yes – men and women agree on this and that – but at the same time they disagree on many matters

 

a world where everyone agrees – is not useful to human beings – in fact such a world would spell propositional death –

 

and such a state of affairs – where there is no critical activity – or critical activity is suppressed – would only be ‘useful’ to a dictator

 

the only ‘guidance of reason’ – is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

we need to be able to put our proposals – our propositional actions – to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty – in order to operate rationally –

 

therefore – disagreement and discord have a legitimate place in any rational social structure – in the ‘common society of men’

 

 

PROP. XLI. Pleasure is not directly bad but good; but pain, on the contrary, is directly bad.

 

 

Proof. – Pleasure (Prop. 11, Part III., and its Note) is an emotion by which the power of acting of the body is increased or aided; but pain contrariwise is an emotion whereby the body’s power of acting is diminished or hindered; and therefore (Prop. 38, Part IV,) pleasure is directly good, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

pleasure and pain – are possible propositional consequences of propositional action

 

and pleasure and pain are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘good’ and ‘bad’ – are proposals – evaluative proposals –

 

open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

how one proposes and understands the value of pleasure – the value of pain – will depend on one’s propositional circumstance – one’s propositional context –

 

i.e. – pleasure – may be seen – in a particular propositional context – as dulling one’s capacity to deal with issues that one regards as more important than the experience of pleasure – and therefore pleasure in such a context is not ‘directly good’ –

 

and there could be a circumstance where the experience of pain is not ‘directly bad’ – but rather good – because it leads to a better understanding

 

one’s power of acting – is one’s capacity to critically evaluate proposals and propositional actions

 

how pleasure and pain affect and effect our critical activity will depend on circumstance – on propositional context

 

 

PROP. XLII. There cannot be too much merriment, but it is always good; but on the other hand, melancholy is always bad.

 

 

we can’t speak of ‘too much’ – as if it is an absolute – clearly – the matter is relative and uncertain – i.e. – what is ‘too much’ for one – may be ‘not enough’ for another – or ‘just right’ – for yet another

 

and is merriment always ‘good’?

 

what if there is merriment regarding a violent act against another?

 

that is the merriment is sadistic

 

is Spinoza prepared to say – ‘nevertheless it is good’?

 

the point is – that any emotional affect or effect – and the value placed on any emotional affect or effect – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and melancholia – may be a bad experience for some – but can it not have consequences – regarded as ‘good’?

 

i.e. – the melancholic poet – who as a result of his melancholia – writes a marvellous poem – perhaps even about melancholia?

 

furthermore – where a propositional outlook is seen to be not to our benefit – we can adopt a different propositional perspective – one that enables us to change our emotional experience

 

to do this – one needs to approach one’s emotional / propositional experience in a critical manner – put it to question – put it to doubt – and explore its uncertainty

 

how we value any emotional experience is open to question

 

 

Proof. – Merriment (see def. in Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) is pleasure which, in so far as it has reference to the body, consists of this, that all the parts of the body are affected, that is (Prop. 11, Part III.), that the body’s power of acting is increased or aided in such a way that all the parts preserve the same proportions of motion and rest one with the other; and therefore (Prop 39, Part IV.) merriment is always good, and can have no excess. But melancholy (whose def. see in the same Note. prop. 11, Part III.) is pain which, in so far as it has reference to the body is absolutely diminished or hindered; and therefore (Prop. 38, Part IV.) it is always bad

 

 

‘all parts of the body are affected’ –

 

so when I’m merry – my big toe on my left foot is affected – is perhaps – merry?

 

what is meant here by ‘all parts of the body’?

 

Spinoza does not explain this –

 

really what we have here is a lazy statement –

 

and one that would not have fitted with 17^th century understanding of how the body works – let alone a modern understanding of the science of the body – of ‘body parts’

 

and why does Spinoza say – ‘as it has reference to the body’?

 

is he just interested in the physical affects of merriment – or is that he is here simply assuming a mind / body dichotomy?

 

and what does this come to?

 

emotional affects – are affects on the whole person – on the propositional actor –

 

and as such – as with any propositional affect – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

that merriment is always good – is a naïve and simplistic statement

 

merriment as with any propositional / emotional affect – is open to question

 

whether it is regarded as good or not will depend on the individual propositional actor – and his or her circumstance –

 

i.e. – one might be a drug addict or alcoholic and full of merriment –

 

would we regard merriment in such a circumstance as ‘good’?

 

Spinoza apparently thinks so

 

as to melancholy –

 

we know as a matter of experience that it cannot be ‘objectively’ defined as bad –

 

what value we give it will depend on the individual propositional actor and his / her propositional circumstance

 

it is not hard to argue that in certain cases melancholy can have a good affect –

 

i.e. – it may result in creative activity – or it may be the source of a better and even positive understanding of whatever is that is at stake

 

 

PROP. XLIII. Titillation can be excessive and be bad; but grief may be good in so far as titillation or pleasure is bad.

 

 

‘excessive’ is not an absolute – it is a relative notion – which is to say that what one regards as excessive – may be seen by another as moderate

 

and why regard any emotional action that is seen as excessive – as bad?

 

again – ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not absolutes – they are relative notions – evaluation proposals that are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

titillation or pleasure – however defined – i.e. – as excessive – or moderate – or whatever – depending on circumstance – can be given different valuations –

 

and – likewise grief – its affect – is open to question – is uncertain

 

a question here – why this contrast with or comparison of titillation and grief?

 

yes – titillation is a form of pleasure and grief a form of pain –

 

however – would we not say that grief is the pain of loss?

 

are we going to say that titillation is a gain – a gain in response to – or against the loss that is grief?

 

I think one could well experience titillation – while experiencing grief – and the titillation have no effect on the grief –

 

a strange comparison from Spinoza

 

 

Proof. – Titillation is pleasure which, in so far as it has reference to the body, consists of this, that one or several parts of the body are affected beyond the rest (see its def. in Note, Prop. 11, Part III.); the power of this emotion can be so great that it surpasses the remaining actions of the body (Prop. 6, Part IV.), and becomes firmly fixed to it, and accordingly prevents the body from being affected in other ways; and therefore (Prop. 38, Part IV.) it can be bad. Again, grief which, on the other hand, is pain, considered in itself alone cannot be good (Prop. 41, Part IV.). But inasmuch as its force and increase is defined by the power of its external cause compared with our own (Prop. 5, Part IV.), we can therefore conceive infinite degrees and amounts of the strength of this emotion (Prop. 3, Part IV.); and so we can conceive it to be such that it can restrain titillation so that it is not excessive, and thus far (by the first part of this Prop.) bring it about that the body is not rendered less apt; and thus far it will be good. Q.e.d.

 

 

the propositional actor is not paralysed by titillation – he / she will continue to be affected in many ways

 

and even if it was the case that titillation prevented the propositional actor from being affected in other ways – why would this be ‘bad’?

 

one gets the impression here that for Spinoza – an affect is only good if the whole body – and not just a part or parts – is affected

 

just what the ‘whole body’ for Spinoza – amounts to is not clear – he has not elucidated this notion

 

and in any case – the issue is not ‘the body’ – but rather the ‘person’ – the propositional actor

at the very least we can say that Spinoza’s focus on the body – apparently with the exclusion of the mind – is lobsided – and is defective – by his own account

 

as is his whole mind / body analysis

 

really – the focus needs to be on the whole person – the propositional actor – however further described

 

what is clear is that affective experience – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

furthermore – I was under the impression that for Spinoza – what is bad is pain

 

clearly – titillation is not pain

 

and in any case whether an affect is good or bad will be open to question – open to doubt – and open to interpretation

 

‘But inasmuch as its force and increase is defined by the power of its external cause compared with our own (Prop. 5, Part IV.), we can therefore conceive infinite degrees and amounts of the strength of this emotion’

 

any so called ‘external cause’ – is a proposal

 

and how we describe any affect – is open to question

 

‘and so we can conceive it to be such that it can restrain titillation so that it is not excessive, and thus far (by the first part of this Prop.) bring it about that the body is not rendered less apt; and thus far it will be good. Q.e.d.’

 

as an affect / emotion – is uncertain – how it is proposed / understood – and dealt with – is open to question

 

 

PROP. XLIV. Love and desire can be excessive.

 

 

Proof. – Love is a pleasure accompanied (Def. Emo, 6) by the idea of an external cause. Therefore titillation (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.) accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love; and therefore love (prev. Prop) can be excessive. Again, desire is the greater according as the emotion from which it arose is greater (Prop. 37, Part III). Wherefore, as an emotion (Prop. 6, Part IV.) can surpass the greater actions of man, so also can desire which arises from that emotion surpass other desires, and so it can have the same excess as we proved in the previous proposition titillation to have. Q.e.d.

 

 

for Spinoza – any pleasure ‘accompanied by the idea of an external cause’ – is by definition – ‘love’ –

 

the advantage of such a definition is its generality and comprehensiveness – you love anything that gives you pleasure

 

however – ‘love’ is a proposal – and one that is clearly open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

and I think many would question the proposal that titillation – is love

 

‘excessive’ here – can only be relative to what? – some other emotion?

 

and if there is no other emotion enacted – then all you can say is that the so called ‘excessive’ emotion is just the emotion in play

 

and can there be a genuine measurement of any emotion – of any emotional / propositional action?

 

measurement is a rule governed propositional game –

 

emotional actions – are not rule governed – are not a game

 

as to desire having ‘the same excess as we proved in the previous proposition titillation to have.’

 

I don’t see a dominant emotion or a dominant desire as being ‘excessive’

 

it is simply the desire or emotion that is in play –

 

and how it is described – how it is regarded – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – Merriment, which we said to be good, can be more easily conceived than observed. For emotions by which we are daily assailed have reference to some part of the body which is affected beyond the others, and so the emotions as a rule are in excess, and so detain the mind in the contemplation of one object that it cannot think of others; and although men are liable to many emotions, and therefore few are found who are always assailed by one and the same emotion, yet there are not wanting those to whom one and the same emotion adheres with pertinacity. We see that men are sometimes so affected by one object that, although it is not present, yet they believe it to be present with them; when this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or insane; nor are they thought less mad who are fired with love, and who spend night and day in dreaming of their ladylove or mistress, for they tend to provoke laughter. But when a miser thinks of nothing save money or profit, or an ambitious man of nothing save glory, these are not thought to be insane, for they tend to be harmful, and are thought worthy of hatred. But in truth, avarice, ambition, lust, etc., are nothing but species of madness, although they are not enumerated among diseases.

 

 

‘For emotions by which we are daily assailed have reference to some part of the body which is affected beyond the others, and so the emotions as a rule are in excess, and so detain the mind in the contemplation of one object that it cannot think of others’

 

we are not ‘assailed’ by emotions – emotions are proposals / propositional actions we put and enact – and any proposal however described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

that one propositional action / emotion – at one point in time – is dominant – does not

 

mean that it is in excess

 

yes – one may be experiencing a dominant emotion – but one is not thereby incapable of thinking of other things – of putting other proposals – and dealing with whatever else is proposed – in a critical manner

 

no propositional state is fixed – our promotional life is open – and that means that any propositional state can be modified – or indeed replaced – as a result of critical activity

 

‘and although men are liable to many emotions, and therefore few are found who are always assailed by one and the same emotion, yet there are not wanting those to whom one and the same emotion adheres with pertinacity.’

 

where the same emotion ‘adheres with pertinacity’ – this could simply mean that it has proven to be fruitful – or it may just mean that it has not been put to question – not been put to doubt – and its uncertainty – not explored

 

‘We see that men are sometimes so affected by one object that, although it is not present, yet they believe it to be present with them; when this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say that he is delirious or insane’

 

where one is not able – for whatever reason – to operate critically – and is in a state of propositional fixation – such a person – however further described – is logically incapable

 

‘nor are they thought less mad who are fired with love, and who spend night and day in dreaming of their ladylove or mistress, for they tend to provoke laughter.’

 

clearly Spinoza thinks that those ‘who are fired with love’ – are mad – and he laughs at them

 

such a view does strike me as somewhat unkind and cynical

 

in any case this is not the only possible response to such a love and to such lovers –

 

i.e. – there are those who would see such behaviour as quite natural – and furthermore take pleasure in witnessing it

 

more generally – any propositional behaviour – is open to question – open to interpretation – and as such – is logically – uncertain

 

‘But when a miser thinks of nothing save money or profit, or an ambitious man of nothing save glory, these are not thought to be insane, for they tend to be harmful, and are thought worthy of hatred.’

 

I think one could be described as a ‘miser’ – and think of other things – just as one may be ambitious in life – and at the same time – live a rational life

 

I fail to see how focusing on saving money and profit – need be ‘harmful’ – or ‘worthy of hatred’

 

or that ambition – whether it is for glory or some other end – is in itself – ‘harmful’ or ‘worthy of hatred’

 

some would see the acquisition of money and profit – and ambition in life – as beneficial and worthy of encouragement and indeed praise

 

hatred here – seems right out of place

 

‘But in truth, avarice, ambition, lust, etc., are nothing but species of madness, although they are not enumerated among diseases.’

 

and as for madness –

 

to be fixed to one view of reality – to not question – to not doubt – or to not appreciate the uncertainty of propositional reality – is the source of madness

 

 

PROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good.

 

 

‘hatred’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘uncertain’ – means that an absolute view of hatred – is illogical

 

and as to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – these proposals – likewise are open to question

 

i.e. – if one’s view of what is good or bad – is a question of consequence – then we can imagine a circumstance where hating another might have a good consequence –

 

consider –

 

a wrong is done – and the person wronged can be emotionally defeated by the action – or he can fight back –

 

hate may motivate him to fight back – and thus empower him –

 

and if he holds that being empowered is good – then that which empowers him is good

 

 

Proof. – We endeavour to destroy the man whom we hate (Prop. 39, Part III.) that is (Prop. 37, Part IV.), we endeavour to do something which is bad. Therefore, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

we may endeavour to destroy the man we hate – but we may not –

 

I may hate someone – but not wish to destroy them

 

I may hate someone – and simply wish to have nothing more to do with them

 

we may endeavour to destroy a man we hate – and this may be bad – or it may not be

 

what of the case where a person is hated – and is seen to be evil – i.e. – is a psychopath – is there not an argument for saying that destroying such a person is a good act?

 

how we understand hate – and how we understand what is good and what is bad – is open to question – will be dependent on circumstance and propositional context

 

and any view taken is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – Let it be noted that here and in the following propositions I understand by hatred only that towards men.

 

 

to my mind this shows that Spinoza recognizes a fault in his conception of hate

 

why limit it to hatred towards men?

 

the answer is that if we understand hatred in its broadest sense – then it would seem that there is a clear case where hatred may well be seen as ethical

 

i.e. – hatred toward a totalitarian regime

 

 

Corollary I. – Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions which have reference to hatred or arise from it, are bad, which is clear from Prop. 39, Part III., and Prop. 37, Part IV.

 

 

other emotions – if they arise from hatred – as with hatred – are open to question

 

and as to whether they are seen as good or bad – will likewise be open to question

 

how we interpret any emotion – will depend on propositional context –

 

and how we value any emotion – is not something that can rationally be determined outside of propositional context

 

these generalizations of Spinoza – are simply worthless

 

they may have rhetorical value – but they have no logical value

 

 

Corollary II. –  Whatever we seek owing to the fact that we are affected with hatred is base, and unjust in the state; which is also obvious from Prop. 39. Part III., and from the definitions of base and unjust, which we see in the Note on Prop, 37, Part IV.

 

 

if hatred of a political regime – is a ground for change or even revolution – it will be seen by those who support the regime as vicious and unjust –

 

but for those who wish for a change – it will be seen as justified and liberating

 

 

Note. II – Between derision (which we said to be bad in the first Coroll.) and laughter (risus) I admit there is a great difference. For laughter and also jocularity are merely pleasure; and therefor provided they are not in excess, they are good in themselves (Prop. 41, Part IV.). Nothing, therefore, save gloomy and mirthless superstitions prohibits laughter. For why is it more becoming to satisfy hunger and thirst than to dispense melancholy? My reason is this, and I have convinced myself of it: No deity, nor anyone save the envious. is pleased with my wont of power or my misfortune, nor imputes to our virtue, tears, sobs, fear and other things of this kind which are significant of a weak man; but on the contrary, the more we are affected with pleasure, thus we pass to a greater perfection, that is we necessarily participate in divine nature. To make use of things and take delight in them as much as possible (not indeed to satiety, for that is not to take delight) is the part of a wise man. It is I say the part of a wise man to feed himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and to take pleasure with perfumes, with the beauty of growing plants, dress, music, sports, and theatres, and other places of this kind which man may use without any hurt to his fellows. For the human body is composed of many parts of different nature which continually stand in need of new and varied nourishment, so that the body as a whole may be equally apt for performing those things which can follow from its nature, and consequently so that the mind also may be equally apt for understanding many things at the same time. This manner of living agrees best with our principles and the general manner of life: from which it follows that this manner of life is the best of all, and in all ways to be commended, nor is there any need for us to be more clear or more detailed on this subject.

 

 

‘laughter’ as with any other propositional behaviour – is open to question

 

to say that ‘laughter and also jocularity are merely pleasure’ – really tells us nothing

 

in one context laughter may be an expression of joy – and yet in another context – laughter may be cynical – and derisive

 

nothing is good – or bad ‘in itself’ –

 

what is good or bad is a value – a proposed value – given to a proposal – or propositional situation

 

and any proposal here – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the idea that laughter is the answer to our emotional life – strikes me as naïve and superficial – and basically meaningless

 

as to ‘dispensing melancholy’ –

 

well – there may well be a circumstance – i.e. – where people are laughing away a serious issue – in order to get them to get them back to a hard reality – a dose of melancholy might be called for

 

like Spinoza I do not want to see others with a wont of personal power – or to suffer misfortune – however this not to say that there isn’t a place for melancholy in our lives

 

and tears – sobs – and fears – are signs of what?

 

people in distress

 

Spinoza’s ‘weak man argument’ here – is dismissive of human suffering

 

the old chestnut ‘greater perfection’ –

 

if the notion of ‘perfection’ – makes sense – the notion of ‘greater perfection’ – does not

 

‘participating in divine nature’ –

 

if God is all – and all is God – as Spinoza argues – then anything we do participates in divine nature

 

I agree – to make use of things and to take delight in them is the mark of a wise person

 

moderate food and drink – is a good idea

 

as to perfumes – I’ll pass on that one

 

growing plants – dressing well – enjoying music – sports and theatre – are all to my mind good things to do – if you are able to

 

again – Spinoza seems to think that we can divide the human being into body and mind – and at least in the present context – drop the mind altogether

 

any – body / mind division misses the central point – the person – the propositional actor

 

yes - there are good reasons to a have a focus – on body – on mind – for particular purposes – and for particular explanations – however it is really important to that any particular focus is not seen as the whole story

 

the whole story is the person – the propositional actor – however further described – or explained

 

and what follows from the nature of the person – of the human being – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s view that ‘this manner of life is the best of all’ – is fair enough – for Spinoza – and I would think – for many others

 

there are however – different views on the best manner of life – and they too have their place in any rational discussion

 

the point really is that – what the best manner of living is – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XLVI. He who lives under the guidance of reason endeavours as much as possible to repay his fellows hatred, rage, contempt, etc, with love and nobleness.

 

 

he who lives under the guidance of reason puts his proposals – and the proposals put to him – to question – to doubt – and he explores their uncertainty

 

perhaps ‘love and nobleness’ – works as a response to hatred – rage and contempt

 

whether it does or not will depend on the those involved –

 

and in any case – any response will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

one might take the view that you should fight fire with fire –

 

who knows what the result of such an approach might be – who can say?

 

 

Proof. – All emotions of hatred are bad (Coroll. 1, prev. Proof): and therefore he who lives according to the precepts of reason, will endeavour as much as possible to bring it to pass that he is not assailed by emotions of hatred (Prop. 19, Part IV.), and consequently (Prop. 37, Part IV.) he will endeavour he will prevent anyone else from suffering those emotions. But hatred is increased by reciprocated hatred, and on the contrary, can be demolished by love (Prop. 43, Part III.) in such a way that hatred is transformed into love (Prop. 44, Part III.). Therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay another’s hatred, etc., with love, that is nobleness (whose def. see in Note, Prop. 59, Part III.). Q.e.d.

 

 

‘he who lives according to the precepts of reason’ – will put his emotional / propositional states and actions – and those of others – whatever they may be – to question – to doubt and will explore their uncertainty

 

is hatred increased by reciprocal hated?

 

or is it rather that hatred meets its equal?

 

love may mitigate hatred – may ‘demolish’ it – but it may also be the case that love comes up against a brick wall of hatred

 

 

Note. – He who wishes to revenge injuries by reciprocal hatred will live in misery. But he who endeavours to drive away hatred by means of love, fights with pleasure and confidence; he resists equally one or many men, and scarcely needs at all the help of fortune. Those whom he conquers yield joyfully, not from want of force but increase thereof. All those things follow so clearly from the definitions alone of love and intellect that there is no need for me to point them out.

 

 

whether ‘he who wishes to revenge injuries by reciprocal hated will live in misery’ – will depend on who he is – how he proposes himself and the world

 

is it not conceivable that one finds strength and joy in their hatred?

 

as to the lover fighting with pleasure and confidence – well that too – is up for question

 

the one fighting with love may have a hard time of it

 

‘That those who he conquers yield joyfully, not from want of force but increase thereof’ –

 

what fairytale does this come from?

 

 

PROP. XLVII. The emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good.

 

 

any emotion / proposal is open – open to question – open to evaluation

 

an evaluation – i.e. – ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – is a proposal / propositional action

 

there is no ‘in itself’ to any proposal –

 

a proposal is a field of possibility – of critical possibility

 

hope and fear are not good in themselves or bad in themselves

 

fear and hope are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any propositional evaluation put to a proposal of fear – or a proposal of hope – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The emotions of hope and fear are not given without pain. For fear is (Def. Emo.13) sadness or pain, and hope (see explanation of Def. Emo. 12 and 13) is not given without fear. And thus (Prop.41, Part IV.) these emotions cannot themselves be good, but only in so far as they can restrain an excess of pleasure (Prop. 43, Part IV.). Q.e.d.

 

fear is a natural propositional state – an expression of propositional uncertainty –

 

propositional uncertainty may or may not be painful

 

and pain – as with fear – is a natural propositional state –

 

hope – too a natural propositional state – and an expression of uncertainty

 

we can hope without fear

 

as to whether these emotions are valued as good or bad – will depend on the propositional actor involved – how he or she understands and assesses the propositional context he or she is dealing with – and how he or she proposes good or bad

 

and any decision on these matters will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – To this must be added that these emotions indicate a wont of knowledge and weakness of mind; and on this account, confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are significant of a weak mind. For although confidence and joy are emotions of pleasure, they imply that pain has preceded them, namely hope and fear. Therefore the more we endeavour to live under the guidance of reason, the less we endeavour to depend on hope, and the more to deliver ourselves and make ourselves free from fear and overcome fortune as much as possible, and finally to direct our actions by the certain advice of reason.

 

 

if by knowledge you mean certain propositions – then there is no knowledge –

 

certainty is a synonym for pretence and ignorance

 

our ‘knowledge’ –is proposal – and any proposal is uncertain –

 

the weak mind cleaves to the illusion of certainty –

 

a strong mind deals with uncertainty

 

confidence and joy may or may not presuppose pain – fear and hope

 

the more we endeavour to live under the guidance of reason – the more we put our emotions to question and to doubt – the more we explore their uncertainty –

 

we will not live without fear – and will not be able to defy all that fortune throws at us –

 

rationally speaking – the best we can do is deal with fear and fortune in a critical manner

 

 

PROP. XLVIII. The emotions of partiality and disparagement are always bad.

 

 

Proof. – Now these emotions (Def. Emo. 21 and 22) are opposed to reason, and therefore (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.) they are bad, Q.e.d.

 

 

Def. Emo. 21 –

 

‘Partiality (existimatio) is estimating something too highly by reason of love.’

 

Def. Emo. 22. –

 

‘Disparagement (despectus) is estimating something too lowly by reason of hatred.’

 

what one propositional actor regards as an ‘over-estimation’ – due to love – another may regard as an accurate estimation – or even an under-estimation

 

and the same applies with respect to disparagement due to hatred

 

and we can ask is love the only explanations for over-estimation?

 

i.e. – I may estimate something too highly – not because of love but rather because I fail to see it in a propositional context

 

and the same applies to disparagement – it may be contextual issue rather than a matter of hate

 

also – we can ask – is partiality bad?

 

an overestimation – may have a bad consequence – it may even have a good consequence – or it may – relative to good and bad – be neutral

 

and as for underestimating – who is to say how the effect is to be assessed?

 

the point is that partiality and disparagement – are not absolutes in any sense

 

and what counts as good or bad is open to question

 

partiality and disparagement are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – as indeed is any evaluation of these affects

 

reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

 

PROP. XLIX. Partiality easily renders the man who is over-estimated, proud.

 

 

Proof. – If we see any one praises more than justly what is in us through love we are easily exalted (Note, Prop. 41, Part III.), or we are affected with pleasure (Def. Emo. 30), and we easily believe whatever good we hear said about us (Prop. 25, Part III.). And therefore we esteem ourselves beyond the limits of justice through self-love, that is (Def. Emo. 28) we easily become proud. Q.e.d.

 

over-estimating someone may render them proud – even if it does – where is the harm?

 

however – another person may not be rendered proud as a result of an over-estimation

 

he may see it as a form of flattery which he does not take seriously

 

and it is possible that it is not interpreted as an ‘over-estimation’ – it may be regarded as an accurate assessment

 

the point here is that how praise is interpreted is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

we cannot generalise –

 

we need to have an appreciation of the circumstance – the propositional context – and even then – we deal with uncertainty

 

‘beyond the limits of justice through self-love’ –

 

how we regard ourselves – how we assess ourselves – is never fixed – but is rather variable –

 

we should not be too quick to judge ourselves as we should not be too quick to judge others –

 

we are all operating in propositional uncertainty

 

 

PROP. L. Pity in a man who lives under the guidance of reason is itself bad and useless.

 

 

if pity is seen as a form of empathy – it is not useless – for it may lead to an understanding of the other’s pain

 

however – if pity does not lead to a better understanding – and is simply an acknowledgement of the other’s suffering – then it has minimal value

 

also is it not possible that one may pity another – and regard them with contempt – contempt because they have failed to lift themselves up?

 

the point here is that pity – as with any other emotion / propositional affect – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

to understand any emotional / propositional action – one needs to appreciate the circumstances involved – and even then – to keep an open mind

 

 

Proof. – For pity (Def, Emo. 18) is pain and therefore (Prop. 41. Part IV.) is bad in itself. But the good which follows from it, namely that we endeavour to free the man whom we pity from his misery (Coroll, Prop. 27, Part III.), we desire to do from the mere command of reason (Prop. 37, Part IV.), nor can we do anything which we know to be good save under the guidance of reason Prop. 27, Part IV.). And therefore pity in a man who lives under the guidance of reason is bad and useless in itself. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘pain’ as with any natural propositional phenomena – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and how any natural propositional phenomena is assessed – what value it is given – is open to question

 

pain can be assessed as bad – but just as equally – it can be regarded as good – i.e.  if it is regarded as instructive

 

also – I can pity a man – and not endeavour to free him from his misery

 

and if I did endeavour to free from his misery – there is no guarantee that my endeavour will have a ‘good’ result –

 

there is no ‘command of reason’ – ‘reason’ is the critical evaluation of proposal –

 

Spinoza’s idea of reason – is some kind of authoritarian directive – and what that amounts to is – prejudice

 

Spinoza – I think is confused on the question of pity –

 

on the one hand he says its bad – always bad –

 

on the other hand – he speaks of ‘the good which follows from it’ –

 

so – what’s it to be – good or bad?

 

this confusion is a consequence of his absolutism in psychology and ethics –

 

and that – a consequence of his metaphysical absolutism

 

Spinoza is stuck – and the world he lived in – and the world we live in – is not –

 

the world is in motion – propositional motion –

 

which is to say – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain 

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that a man who lives according to the dictates of reason endeavours as far as possible not to be touched with pity.

 

 

a man who lives according to reason – puts emotional proposals – and propositional states to question

 

and when ‘touched with pity’ – puts pity to question – and investigates its uncertainty

 

 

Note. – He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come about according to the eternal laws and rules of nature, will find nothing at all that is worthy of hatred, laughter or contempt, nor will he feel compassion; but as far as human virtue allows, he will endeavour to act well, as people say, and to rejoice. To this must be added that he who is easily touched by the emotion of pity, and whom is moved to tears at the misery of another, often does something of which he afterwards repents: both inasmuch as we can do nothing according to emotion which we certainly know to be good, and inasmuch as we are easily deceived by false tears. I am speaking here expressly of a man who lives under the guidance of reason. For he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to help others is rightly called inhuman, for (Prop. 27, Part II.) he seems to be unlike a man.

 

 

‘He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come about according to the eternal laws and rules of nature, will find nothing at all that is worthy of hatred, laughter or contempt, nor will he feel compassion’

 

one can of course propose – ‘that all things follow from the necessity of divine nature and come about according to the eternal laws and rules of nature’ – but this proposal as with any – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

in propositional reality – there is no necessity – there is only uncertainty –

 

as to ‘divine nature’ – this is a propositional fiction – designed to avoid the hard reality of the unknown

 

any laws or rules of nature – are human proposals – that can only be formulated and understood in terms of context – propositional context – which is to say – circumstance

 

the reality – on the ground is that human beings do propose hatred –

 

laughter is a common and natural propositional action – as is contempt and compassion

 

to suggest that these natural propositional expressions amount to ‘nothing’ – is fanciful and delusional

 

as to – ‘he will endeavour to act well’ – here is a proposal that has no content – that does amount to nothing – and is little more than naïve rhetoric

 

‘To this must be added that he who is easily touched by the emotion of pity, and whom is moved to tears at the misery of another, often does something of which he afterwards repents: both inasmuch as we can do nothing according to emotion which we certainly know to be good, and inasmuch as we are easily deceived by false tears’

 

yes – on review – one might repent – feeling pity for another

 

however – this is not to say that there is no reality to pity – no place for pity

 

‘we can do nothing according to emotion which we certainly know to be good’ –

 

there is no emotional certainty – there is no certain good –

 

there is no certainty full stop.

 

knowledge is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and any proposal regarding what is ‘good’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and to suggest that our emotional life is somehow irrelevant to the question of what is ‘good’ – that is to say – irrelevant to ethics – effectively – negates emotional experience – and furthermore – it is to vanish morality from emotional experience

 

this is a lose / lose result for Spinoza

 

it is as if for Spinoza – the only genuine human reality is his undefined ‘guidance of reason’ – which despite sounding like something – and something important – is nothing more than an unarticulated prejudice

 

and finally – pity makes a reappearance and something of a recovery – from its pitiless dismal –

 

‘For he who is moved neither by reason or pity to help others is rightly called inhuman’

 

I think the penny has just dropped –

 

and Spinoza now sees the consequence of his argument –

 

and in order to be considered ‘human’ – does a quick double take

 

 

PROP. LI. Favour is not opposed to reason, but can agree with it and arise from it.

 

 

reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

out of a critical process anything may ‘arise’

 

 

Proof. – For favour is love towards him who has benefited another (Def. Emo. 19); and therefore it can have reference to the mind in so far as it is said to be active (Prop. 59, Part III.), that is (Prop. 3, Part III.), in as far as it understands; and therefore agrees with reason, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

love towards him – who has benefited another – strikes me a limited and restricted view of favour –

 

can I not favour another – regardless of whether they have benefited another?

 

any proposal put – is active – and any proposal is an understanding –

 

and understanding – agrees with reason if it is held open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

‘mind’ – is a name for propositional activity

 

 

Another Proof. – He who lives under the guidance of reason desires for others the good he desires for himself (Prop. 37, Part IV.). Wherefore, by the very fact that he sees someone benefit another, his own endeavour to benefit is aided, that is (Note, Prop. 11, Part III.), he will feel pleasure, and that (by the hypothesis) accompanied by the idea of him who benefited the other, and therefore (Def. Emo. 19) he favours him. Q.e.d.

 

 

whether or not the good I desire for myself – is to be desired for the other – is a matter open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

it may well be that I see my ‘good’ – as not being the other’s ‘good’

 

the argument here is – if I see Peter benefit Paul – I will be aided in my endeavour to also to benefit Paul – and as a result – favour Peter

 

this might be the case in a particular propositional context – but as a generalization it is simplistic and naïve

 

Peter’s action may have no impact on my own endeavour to benefit Paul

 

I may take no pleasure in Peter’s actions – even though I wish to benefit Paul –

 

and – I may recognise the benefit that Peter bestows on Paul – but not favour Peter because of it

 

 

Note. – Indignation, as defined by us (Def. Emo. 20), is necessarily bad (Prop. 45, Part IV.). But it must be noted that when the sovereign power with the desire for preserving the peace, punishes a citizen who has wrought another an injury, I do not say that it is indignant with the citizen, inasmuch as it is not moved by hatred to ruin the citizen, but punishes him out of piety.

 

 

indignation is defined by Spinoza as hate towards someone who has maltreated another –

 

and Spinoza argues that the state is not indignant with the citizen who has wrought an injury on another – for it punishes him out of ‘piety’ or duty

 

firstly – a ‘state’ does not hate – or love – or have any emotional content or expression

 

so – there is no question of a state being indignant

 

and furthermore – Spinoza’s definition of indignation – is extremely narrow – and I would suggest in general not applicable

 

do we hate – one who has maltreated another?

 

perhaps this occurs in some contexts – but hate is not the only application of indignation

 

I may be indignant in the sense that I disapprove of the offender’s actions – without hating the offender

 

and we may be indignant regarding the offence and the harm done – but also seek an understanding of the offender’s actions

 

perhaps too – there is a case for suspending judgment until the matter is thoroughly investigated

 

 

PROP. LII. Self-contentment can arise from reason, and only that self-contentment which arises from reason is the greatest that can exist

 

 

reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

there is no rational self-contentment –

 

a rational life – is a life of critical analysis and the exploration of propositional possibility

 

self-contentment – is non-critical – if you are content – you have no cause to question – to doubt – or to explore

 

self-contentment is irrational – as indeed – is much of human behaviour

 

rationality plays a small part in human behaviour –

 

as I see it – mostly human behaviour is irrational

 

 

Proof. – Self-contentment is pleasure arisen from the fact that man regards himself and his power of acting (Def. Emo. 25). But the true power of acting of a man or his virtue is reason itself (Prop. 3, Part III.), which man clearly and distinctly regards (Prop. 40 and 43, Part II.). Therefore self-contentment arises from reason. Again, man while he regards himself perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, save those things which follow from his power of acting (Def. 2, Part III.). that is (Prop. 3, Part III.), which follow from his power of understanding. Therefore from this self-regarding alone the greatest self-contentment possible arises. Q.e.d.

 

 

our power as human beings is rational power – is the rational process of question of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

self-contentment does not arise from reason – from the rational process –

 

self-contentment – is an anathema to rationality

 

 

Note. – Self-contentment is the highest thing we can look for. For (as we have shown in Prop. 25, Part IV.) no one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of some end; and inasmuch as this contentment is more and more cherished and encouraged by praise (Coroll., Prop. 35, Part III.), and, and the contrary (Coroll. 1, Prop. 55, Part III.), disturbed more and more by blame, we are led in life principally by glory, and under the burden of blame we can scarcely endure it.

 

 

Spinoza seems to have dropped his ‘rational’ argument here – and makes the point that human beings thrive on praise – and can hardly bear a life of disgrace –

 

a fair enough observation I would think

 

however – this observation really doesn’t bear on the nature of self-contentment –

 

except to say we would rather be content than shamed

 

 

PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or, does not arise from reason.

 

 

Proof. – Humility is pain that arises from the fact that a man regards his own want of power (Def. Emo. 26). But in so far as a man knows himself by true reason, thus far he is supposed to understand his essence, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.), his power. Wherefore if a man, while he regards himself, perceives any weakness of his, it arises not from the fact that he understands himself, but (as we showed in Prop, 55, Part III.), from the fact that his power of acting is hindered. But if we suppose that a man conceives his weakness from the fact that he understands something more powerful than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines his power of acting, then we conceive nothing else than that man distinctly understands himself (Prop. 26, Part IV.), or, that thus his power of acting is aided. Wherefore humility or pain, which arises from the fact that man regards his weakness, does not arise from contemplation, i.e., reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q.e.d.

 

 

it strikes me that understanding one’s power of acting from contemplation – is not incompatible with experiencing the pain of weakness –

 

the two could well go together

 

it does not follow that because you understand a propositional state – that you will not experience any pain

 

and understanding – may indeed – lead to the experience of pain

 

humility is not pain arising from the fact that a man regards his own want of power

 

as I see it humility comes from a balanced assessment of one’s power and one’s want of power

 

any such assessment cannot be absolute –

 

the matter is fluid – depending on propositional circumstance –

 

and any assessment of the relation of power to want of power is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

and we can ask here is humility a question of understanding one’s power?

 

you can frame it in terms of power as Spinoza has done here – but there are other ways of describing humility –

 

i.e. – we might say that humility is not underestimating or overestimating one’s importance – one’s significance – one’s ‘place’ – in any propositional context

 

the nature of humility is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza here – in discussing humility – defines a virtuous action as one that arises from contemplation – and a passionate action as one that arises from pain

 

reason is the critical evaluation of any proposal – any propositional action

 

if ‘contemplation’ – is critical – it is rational –

 

and if a painful propositional experience is critically evaluated – it is rational –

 

a ‘virtue’ – not critically examined – is irrational – is virtue-less

 

a painful experience – or for that matter a pleasurable experience – not critically assessed – is irrational

 

 

PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue. or, in other words. it does not arise from reason, but he who repents of an action is twice as unhappy or as weak as before.

 

 

Proof. – The first part of this proposition is proved by the same manner as the preceding proposition. The second part is clear from the definition of this emotion (see Def. Emo. 27). For the man allows himself to be overcome first by bad desire and then by pain.

 

 

Note. – Insomuch as men rarely live by the dictate of reason, these two emotions, namely humility and repentance, and besides these hope and fear, work more good than harm: and so, as we must do wrong, it is better to do wrong in that respect. For if men who are weak-spirited should all become equally proud, and should have no shame or fear of anything, wherewith could they be united as with chains and held together? If the mob is not in fear, it frightens in its turn. Wherefore it is not to be wondered at that the prophets, who consulted the advantage not of a few, but of the commonwealth, should have so greatly commended humility, repentance, and reverence. And in truth those who are liable to these emotions can be led far easier than others who live under the guidance of reason, that is, to be free and enjoy the life of the blessed.

 

 

what is repentance?

 

as with any proposal – any proposition – ‘repentance’ – is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

 

Spinoza defines repentance as – ‘pain accompanied by the idea of some deed which we think we have done by the free decision of the mind’

 

this definition is too vague – too indeterminate – and it could apply to any act that results in pain for the actor

 

we can still ask here – what is repentance?

 

‘some deed’ – ‘which we think we have done’?

 

I guess the first thing to note here is that Spinoza does not say we repent a bad deed – just ‘some deed’ –

 

and so – it could be a good act that we repent –

 

and further – it is not a deed we know we have done – only one that ‘we think we have done’ –

 

which opens up the possibility that we could – according to Spinoza – repent a deed we have in fact – not done

 

‘twice as unhappy’?

 

I don’t know about ‘twice as unhappy’ – more likely just confused – as to what has been done – and what value to place on it

 

for Spinoza – ‘repentance’ is a confusion – or he just doesn’t know what it is

 

it is clear at least – that Spinoza is basically dismissive of repentance

 

however – he has not done his ‘argument’ any service by failing to make sense of just what repentance is

 

I think it is fair enough to say that – as it is commonly understood – if we repent – we repent an action that we regard as bad or wrong

 

and is not repentance just that recognition that the act is bad?

 

if so – are we twice as unhappy?

 

first up I might not be unhappy – I might acknowledge that the act was bad – but regard this realization as instructive –

 

that is to say – that I can move forward with a better understanding of my action – of myself

 

if – however – I am unhappy – I am only unhappy once –

 

that is just when I see the act as bad

 

now – it is possible that one may see his act as bad – feel no pain – and no need to change one’s ways

 

in that case – there is no repentance

 

in general – I think – most would say that repentance – involves a decision to change one’s ways –

 

I don’t know that there need be any pain involved in that –

 

more likely one would have a sense of liberation

 

Spinoza says repentance does not arise from reason –

 

if we are acting rationally – we put the proposal to question – to doubt – and we explore its uncertainty

 

what is right and wrong is not fixed –

 

what is right or wrong – good or bad – moral – or immoral is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

in other words – to come to a moral decision we have to think it out – and it is always a complex matter

 

that is one thing

 

secondly – should I change my ways?

 

this is another issue that is complex and uncertain – and if we are to be rational about it – one that we have to examine critically –

 

so – the question of repentance – is a rational question

 

I have said that I think rational / critical behaviour is not as prominent in human behaviour – as non-critical irrational behaviour

 

this though is only an observation – and one open to question

 

it is quite possible people do put most – if not all their proposals and propositional actions to question

 

sometimes – it strikes me that this is how it is

 

I guess the truth is – that we don’t really know – we can only speculate on this matter

 

and I should keep an open mind on this matter

 

in the same way – it is speculation whether or not – humility – repentance – hope and fear – ‘work more good than harm’

 

as to ‘we must do wrong’ – what we can say is that propositional actors do make the assessment – at various times that they do wrong

 

however – there is no ‘must’ – or necessity in any propositional behaviour

 

‘If the mob is not in fear, it frightens in its turn’

 

the argument from fear here – is simplistic and naïve

 

we can interpret social and political behaviour in terms of fear –

 

however – when any mass behaviour – is examined critically – much more than fear can come to light

 

social and political change – and especially violent social and political change – can be understood in terms of many different emotions – and a whole range of different ideas

 

mass social and political activity – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – ‘uncertain’ – is the key here

 

as to prophets – hard to say

 

Spinoza’s view is most interesting – and one that ought to be taken into account any biblical / political analysis

 

I think it is the case that those who are simply prepared to follow the direction of some supposed authority are more easily led –

 

those who question and doubt and explore the uncertainty of any proposal put to them are not easily led and pose a constant threat to ignorance in the mask authoritarianism in all its forms

 

 

PROP. LV. The greatest pride or self-abasement is the greatest ignorance of all.

 

 

Proof. – This clear from Def. Emo. 28 and 29.

 

 

Spinoza defines pride as overestimating oneself by reason of self-love – and self-abasement as underestimating oneself by reason of pain –

 

who is to say what ‘overestimating yourself’ – or ‘underestimating yourself’ – amounts to?

 

the ‘self’ is not a measurable quantity – it is a proposal – open to question

 

how we see ourselves is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain –

 

these terms ‘pride’ and ‘self-abasement’ – are descriptions of character – which really only have rhetorical significance – and in that sense they are logically – quite worthless

 

‘the greatest ignorance of all’?

 

this strikes me as rather emotive –

 

the ground of ignorance – is certainty

 

and in any case – ignorance is not a quantity – and is not measurable

 

 

PROP. LVI. The greatest pride or self-abasement indicates the greatest weakness of spirit

 

 

in logical terms – a ‘weakness of spirit’ has to do with critical activity

 

the weak spirited – I would say – are those who are able to critically evaluate propositions and propositional activity – but do not due to indolence

 

 

Proof. – The primary basis of virtue is self-preservation (Coroll., Prop. 22, Part IV.), and that under the guidance of reason (Prop. 24, Part IV.). He, therefore, who knows not himself, know not the basis of all virtues, and consequently is ignorant of all virtues. Again, to act from virtue is nothing else than to under the guidance of reason (Prop. 24, Part IV.), and he who acts under the guidance of reason necessarily knows that he acts under the guidance of reason (Prop. 43, Part II.). He, therefore, who has the greatest ignorance of himself, and consequently (as we have just shown) of all virtues, acts the least from virtue, that is (as is clear from Def. 8), he is most weak in mind; and therefore (prev. Prop.) the greatest pride or dejection indicates the greatest weakness of spirit. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘The primary basis of virtue is self-preservation’ –

 

there is no basis – ‘primary’ – or otherwise – to anything – let alone virtue

 

our reality is propositional – which is to say – any proposal put – be it of ‘virtue’ – or anything else – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

the point being – there is no basis or foundation – to the proposal – to propositional activity

 

as to self-preservation –

 

if regarded as a virtue – it is open to question –

 

we have many examples of where an individual has been prepared to sacrifice themselves – for what they regard as a greater good – a greater virtue –

 

‘He, therefore, who knows not himself, know not the basis of all virtues, and consequently is ignorant of all virtues.’

 

an individual is a propositional actor – and ‘knows’ himself in terms of his propositional activity –

 

knows himself as uncertain – in an uncertain world

 

‘virtues’ are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

you know that you propose – and you know what you propose

 

‘Again, to act from virtue is nothing else than to under the guidance of reason (Prop. 24, Part IV.), and he who acts under the guidance of reason necessarily knows that he acts under the guidance of reason (Prop. 43, Part II.).’

 

reason is the critical evaluation of proposal

 

and yes – if you put your proposals – and those put to you – to question – to doubt – and you explore their uncertainty – you are acting rationally – and you know it

 

‘He, therefore, who has the greatest ignorance of himself, and consequently (as we have just shown) of all virtues, acts the least from virtue, that is (as is clear from Def. 8), he is most weak in mind; and therefore (prev. Prop.) the greatest pride or dejection indicates the greatest weakness of spirit. Q.e.d.’

 

 

the logical reality is that we are propositional actors –

 

whether we act from virtue or not – is open to question

 

no propositional action is either virtuous or not virtuous in itself

 

‘weakness of mind’ – is not being able to critically evaluate proposals

 

‘weakness of spirit’ – I would suggest – is being able to critically evaluate one’s propositional actions – but being logically lazy – and not doing so

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows most clearly that the proud and self-abasing, are most liable to emotions.

 

 

‘emotions’ – are proposals – propositional actions

 

we are all ‘liable to emotions’ –

 

we are propositional actors – in a propositional reality

 

the point is to act rationally – to put proposals and propositional actions to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty –

 

and to not be distracted by rhetorical labels

 

 

Note. – However, self-abasing can be more easily corrected than pride, since the later is an emotion of pleasure, while the other is an emotion of pain; and therefore (Prop. 18, Part IV.) pride is the stronger of the two.

 

 

underlying this – seems to be some notion of balance –

 

Spinoza sees pride as an overestimation of self – and self-abasement as the under-estimation of the self.

 

again – the ‘self’ – is not a measurable quantity – so these notions of ‘over-estimation’ and ‘under-estimation’ – do not apply to the self – just as some notion of a mean point – or ‘balance’ – is not applicable

 

and the issue is not ‘correcting’ the self – it is rather critically investigating one’s propositional actions and propositional relations – be they to do with pleasure or to do with pain – and dealing with the uncertainty

 

 

PROP. LVII. A proud man loves the presence of parasites or flatterers, but the presence of the generous he hates.

 

 

this may well be a genuine observation by Spinoza – but whether it holds beyond that is the question

 

could I not be a proud man – and be dismissive of parasites and flatterers?

 

and could it not be that a proud man recognizes generosity and appreciates it?

 

at the heart of this is how we understand pride

 

is there not a sense in which pride is a self-affirming propositional state?

 

if I have worked hard and achieved what I set out to do – should I not be proud of my achievement?

 

is pride not a fair estimate of oneself?

 

the crucial point in all this is that ‘pride’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s view of pride – is one understanding of it – but his view is not the only one possible – and his view is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it might here be said that Spinoza over-estimates his view of pride

 

 

Proof. – Pride is pleasure arisen from the fact man over-estimates himself (Def. Emo. 28 and 6); this opinion a proud man endeavours as much as possible to foster (see Note, Prop. 13, Part III). And therefore he will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (the definitions of these are omitted, for they are too well known), and he will shun the presence of the generous, who see through him. Q.e.d.

 

Spinoza it seems has no concept of false pride – and false pride is deception

 

that is – where I present myself in a manner that I know is false – in order to take advantage of others in some way or another

 

those who fall for this deception – would be the parasites and flatterers Spinoza refers to –

 

in a sense – parasites and flatterers are created by the deception as well as being victims of it

 

do the generous see through Spinoza’s proud man?

 

maybe they do – but I can’t see why being generous enables them to do so –

 

being generous doesn’t mean you are perceptive

 

 

Note – It would take too long to enumerate here all the evils of pride, for the proud are liable to all emotions, but to none less than to the emotions of love and pity. But I must not be silent concerning the fact that a man is called proud who underestimates his fellows; and therefore pride in this case must be defined as pleasure arisen from a false opinion whereby a man considers himself above his fellows. And the self-abasement contrary to this pride must be pain arisen from the false opinion whereby a man thinks himself below his fellows. But this being posited we can easily conceive that a proud man is necessarily envious (see Note, Prop. 55, Part III.), and hates those who are most praised by reason of virtue, nor can his hatred be easily overcome by their love or benefit (Note Prop. 41, Part III.), and that he delights only in the presence of those who humour his weak spirit and from being merely foolish make him mad.

 

 

‘and therefore pride in this case must be defined as pleasure arisen from a false opinion whereby a man considers himself above his fellows.’

 

are there not grounds and circumstances – when one can quite rightly regards oneself as ‘above his fellows’ – without denigrating them?

 

I have in mind i.e. – the teacher in relation to his students – or the doctor in relation to his patients

 

people do have knowledge – talents and experience that others don’t – and these differences are just a fact of life –

 

and the opposite – I would say equally holds –

 

in terms of nearly all fields of knowledge I would place myself below those who have expertise –

 

and that is not self-abasement – it is just being realistic

 

as I see it – a proud man can be seen as one who understands and appreciates his achievements –

 

such a person is not necessarily envious of anyone else – or upset that others are praised for their virtue

 

and the person whose pride is false – may not ‘delight’ – in those who pander to his false pride –

 

he may actually view them with contempt 

 

as to making him ‘mad’ – it is not clear what this is supposed to mean

 

the logical reality here – is that we cannot prescribe – how any propositional actor – of any description – acts or reacts in any propositional context or circumstance –

 

the matter is uncertain –

 

the best we can do as observers and analysts – is consider possible interpretations – and keep an open mind

 

 

Although self-abasement is contrary to pride, yet a self-abasing man is nearest to a proud one. For since the pain arises from the fact that he compares his weakness with the strength or virtue of others, his pain will be removed, that is, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in the contemplation of the vices of others, whence the proverb has arisen: It is a comfort to the unhappy to have companions in misery; and on the other hand, he will feel the more pain the more he thinks himself beneath others: whence it comes about that none are more prone to envy the self- abasing, and that these, more than others, endeavour to observe the deeds of men with the object of carping at them rather than of correcting them, and that they praise and glory in self-abasement alone, but in such a way that they will seem to abase themselves. Now these things follow from this emotion with the same necessity as it does from the nature of triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and I have already said that I call these and like emotions bad in so far as I have regard for human advantage alone. But the laws of nature concern the common order of nature of which man is a part, which I have paused to mention in passing lest anyone should think me to wish to relate the vices of men and their absurd deeds, and not to show the nature and properties of things. For as I said in the preface of Part III., I regard human emotions and their properties in the same manner as other natural objects. And surely human emotions indicate, if not human power, at least the power and artifice of nature, no less than many other things which we wonder at and in whose contemplation we delight. But I pass on to note these things about the emotions which bring advantage to men or which bring them harm.

 

 

the picture Spinoza paints of the self-abasing man – is perceptive

 

as I observe there are those who fit this description to a tee

 

however – I would put that as there is a false pride – there is a false humility

 

Spinoza’s self-abasing man – is one who engages in false humility – that is he operates with a false sense of himself – and does so because he sees advantage in such a pretence

 

whether or not he is advantaged – is open to question

 

a humble individual – I suggest – is one who can be seen as having a realistic understanding of his or her capacities – virtues and vices –

 

in this respect such a person is not so different to the proud individual – who has a realistic appreciation of his achievements

 

on my account – this humble individual does seem to have a more complete understanding of himself – for while he recognizes his strengths he also understands his failings – whereas we would say the proud man is one whose focus is just on his strengths

 

I do recognize Spinoza’s description of the self-abasing individual –

 

however – I would also say that as with any description – a critical investigation will bring to life different perspectives –

 

and that while we might start with such a description – once critically evaluated –our understanding will go beyond it –

 

the point is that from a logical point of view – any account of any propositional actor is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘Now these things follow from this emotion with the same necessity as it does from the nature of triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and I have already said that I call these and like emotions bad in so far as I have regard for human advantage alone’

 

firstly – nothing in propositional life follows with necessity –

 

propositional life is uncertain

 

as to the nature of the triangle –

 

the triangle is an example of a propositional game –

 

a propositional game is a rule-governed propositional exercise –

 

the point of any propositional game is that you follow the rule of the game –

 

if you play a propositional game – the rules are not open to question

 

the rules of a propositional game – determine the game – determine the play

 

if you don’t follow the rule of the game – there is no game

 

the rule of the triangle game is that its three angles are equal to two right angles

 

if you don’t follow the rule of the triangle game – there is no game – there is no triangle –

 

there are two modes to propositional life –

 

the critical mode and the game mode

 

human beings critically evaluate their proposals – and human beings play propositional games

 

human emotions and human propositional behaviour – are not rule-governed propositional exercises – are not propositional games

 

human emotions and human behaviour – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and as to whether any emotion is ‘bad’ – this will depend on how the emotion / propositional action is evaluated –

 

any propositional evaluation is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our concepts of good and bad – are uncertain

 

‘For as I said in the preface of Part III., I regard human emotions and their properties in the same manner as other natural objects. And surely human emotions indicate, if not human power, at least the power and artifice of nature, no less than many other things which we wonder at and in whose contemplation we delight. But I pass on to note these things about the emotions which bring advantage to men or which bring them harm’

 

human emotions are proposals – natural objects are proposals –

 

proposals are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

whatever human emotions ‘indicate’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘nature’ – is a proposal – open to question

 

and ‘wonder’ – is a springboard for all critical propositional thinking

 

 

PROP. LVIII. Glory is not opposed to reason but can arise from it.

 

 

Proof. – This is clear from Def. Emo. 30, and from the definition of honourable, which we see in Note 1, Prop. 37, Part IV.

 

 

Def. Emo. 30 is as follows –

 

‘Glory (gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of ours which we imagine others to praise’

 

Note I Prop. 37, Part IV –

 

here I use the Edwin Curley translation –

 

‘The desire by which a man who lives according to the guidance of reason is bound to join others to himself in friendship, I call honourable, and I call that honourable which men who live according to the guidance of reason praise; on the other hand, what is contrary to the formation of friendship, I call dishonourable’

 

to live in accordance with reason is to question – to doubt – and to explore propositional uncertainty

 

we are not bound to do anything by reason

 

friendship – if dealt with rationally – is critically explored

 

glory – or self-esteem – can arise from a critical process

 

 

Note. – What is called vainglory is the self-contentment which is fostered only by the opinion of the mob; and when this ceases, so also does the self-contentment cease, that is (Note, Prop. 52, Part IV.), the greatest good which each person loves. Whence it comes about that he whose feeling of glory depends on the opinion of the mob, must day by day strive with the greatest anxiety, act and scheme in order to retain his reputation. For the mob is fickle and inconstant, and therefore if a reputation is not carefully preserved it dies quickly. Everyone desires to obtain for himself the applause of the mob, so each one is ready to decry the reputation of the other, from which, since the struggle is for what is esteemed the greatest good, an enormous desire arises of suppressing one another in whatever manner is possible, and he that comes out victor has more glory from having done harm to others than from having profited himself. This glory or contentment is in truth vain, for it is nothing.

 

 

Spinoza view is that self-contentment is fostered by the opinion of the mob

 

and as he notes – if it is based on the opinion of the mob – it is destructive of a healthy view of the self – and results in no contentment –

 

so – what is he on about here?

 

he proposes ‘self-contentment’ – and as a result of his definition – decides there is no self-contentment –

 

there is bitterness somewhere in this mix

 

if one is rational – one’s sense of self – and one’s ‘self-contentment’ – however that is understood – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if not critically evaluated ‘self-contentment’ – is ‘self-ignorance’ –

 

and if critically evaluated self-contentment is replaced with critical self-awareness

 

Spinoza says ‘everyone desires to obtain the applause of the mob’

 

he is wrong about that

 

I for one have never desired the applause of the mob – and it is doubtful that Spinoza himself ever desired the applause of the mob

 

and not everyone who desires the applause of the mob – is ready to decry the reputation of the other –

 

all we have here is Spinoza’s prejudice against those who wish for approval

 

and the claim that human beings have an ‘enormous desire’ ‘of suppressing one another in whatever manner is possible’ – is a very bleak view of humanity –

 

as to that those who it seems have more glory from having done harm to others than they profited themselves –

 

we can make this observation – have this opinion – but as with any observation and as with any opinion – it is open to question

 

 

What must be noted concerning shame can be easily gathered from what we said of pity and repentance. This only will I add, that just as compassion so also shame, although it is not a virtue, is nevertheless good in so far as it indicates in the man who is overcome with shame a desire to live honourably, just as pain is good in so far as it shows that the injured part is not yet purified. Wherefore, although a man is ashamed of some deed is in truth pained, he is nevertheless more perfect than a shameless person who has no desire of living honourably.

 

 

how we understand ‘living honourably’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the first thing to note here – is that one might be shamed – but actually have no desire to reform – to – as Spinoza put it – ‘to live honourably’ – but instead decide to continue acting in the way that has brought shame –

 

and such a person is not shameless

 

there is no such thing as ‘more perfect’ –

 

propositional actors can live rationally – by putting their actions to question – to doubt – and exploring their uncertainty

 

or they can live irrationally – and not engage in critical evaluation –

 

as to which manner of living is preferable –

 

the matter – to my mind – is open to question

 

 

And these are the points which I undertook to note concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain. As for desires, these are either good or bad in so far as they arise from good or bad emotions. But all in truth, in so far as they are engendered in us by emotions which are passions, are blind (as can easily be gathered from what has been said in Note. Prop. 44, Part IV.), nor would they be of any use at all if men could easily be led to live according to the dictates of reason alone, as I shall now show in a few words.

 

 

‘As for desires, these are either good or bad in so far as they arise from good or bad emotions’

 

‘desires’ – are propositional actions

 

‘emotions’ – are propositional actions

 

how a propositional action – however described – is valued – i.e. – as ‘good’ as ‘bad’ – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a propositional action described as a ‘passion’ – if not put to question – if not put to doubt – its uncertainty left unexplored – is irrational

 

a ‘passion’ is of use – if put to a use

 

there are no ‘dictates of reason’ – reason is the critical evaluation and investigation of proposals and propositional actions

 

men can be easily led to operate rationally

 

all that is needed is for men and women to understand – that when they question – when they doubt – and when they explore propositional uncertainty – they are acting rationally

 

being rational is a natural human behaviour – and it is commonplace

 

 

PROP. LIX. To all actions to which we are determined by an emotion which is a passion we can be determined without that emotion by reason alone.

 

 

firstly – no proposal – no propositional action – is ‘determined’

 

any propositional action – is uncertain – and as such undetermined

 

any so called ‘causal’ analysis of a propositional action – as with any other explanatory proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

‘determined’ is a synonym for ‘certainty’ –

 

any notion of certainty is a failure of logic – a failure to understand or accept the logic of the proposal –

 

the proposal / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

certainty is the refuge of ignorance

 

secondly ‘emotion’ – and ‘passion’ – are descriptions of propositional action –

 

thirdly – reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

 

Proof. – To act from reason is nothing else (Prop. 2 and def. 2, Part III.) to do those things which follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself. But pain is bad in so far as it hinders our power of acting (Prop. 41, Part IV.). Therefore from this emotion we can be determined to no action which we could not do if we were led by reason. Moreover, pleasure is bad in so far as it prevents man from being ready for action (Prop. 41 and 43, Part IV.). And therefore we can be determined to do no action which we could not do if we were led by reason. Again, in so far as pleasure is good it agrees with reason (for it consists of this, that man’s power of acting is increased or aided), nor is it a passion save insofar as it does not increase man’s power of acting to the extent that he conceives himself and his actions adequately (Prop. 3, Part III. with its Note). Wherefore if a man affected with pleasure is led to such perfection that he conceives himself and his actions adequately, he will be as apt, nay more apt, to those actions which he was determined by emotions which are passions. But all emotions have reference either to pleasure, pain, or desire (see explain. Def. Emo. 4), and desire (Def. Emo. 1) is nothing else than the endeavour to act. Therefore to all actions to which we are determined by an emotion which is a passion we can be led by reason alone. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘To act from reason is nothing else (Prop. 2 and def. 2, Part III.) to do those things which follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself.’

 

if this is reason – there is no reason

 

our nature is uncertain – and reason is the critical exploration of that uncertainty

 

‘But pain is bad in so far as it hinders our power of acting (Prop. 41, Part IV.)

 

our power of acting rests is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

 

pain may or may not hinder our power of acting –

 

pain may enhance the critical process

 

the matter is open to question

 

‘Therefore from this emotion we can be determined to no action which we could not do if we were led by reason’

 

‘emotion’ – is propositional action

 

any action – however described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

reason does not lead – it is not an authority – it is not a directive

 

reason is a critical process – which propositional actors can choose to use – or not to use

 

if used – propositional actors behave rationally –

 

if not used – propositional actors behave irrationally –

 

people can and do behave irrationally and rationally

 

‘Moreover, pleasure is bad in so far as it prevents man from being ready for action (Prop. 41 and 43, Part IV.).’

 

whether pleasure prevents man from being ready for action – for critical analysis – or actually enables man to be ready for action – for critical analysis – will depend on circumstance

 

the matter is uncertain

 

‘Again, in so far as pleasure is good it agrees with reason (for it consists of this, that man’s power of acting is increased or aided), nor is it a passion save insofar as it does not increase man’s power of acting to the extent that he conceives himself and his actions adequately (Prop. 3, Part III. with its Note).’

 

pleasure – if it is not put to question – not put to doubt – its uncertainty left unexplored – is dealt with irrationally

 

what counts as ‘good’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

propositional actors – acting rationally do not conceive themselves or their actions as adequate –

 

if we operate rationally – we propose ourselves – and our actions – as uncertain

 

one’s power of acting – rests in the critical process

 

‘Wherefore if a man affected with pleasure is led to such perfection that he conceives himself and his actions adequately, he will be as apt, nay more apt, to those actions which he was determined by emotions which are passions.’

 

pleasure is a propositional action – open to question

 

there is no perfection – only uncertainty

 

if by ‘adequate’ is meant – beyond question – beyond doubt and certain – then to conceive adequately – is to conceive irrationally

 

if man behaves rationally – he conceives himself and his actions as uncertain

 

reason is not a determination – reason is a critical process

 

emotions – are proposal / propositional actions –

 

emotions / propositional actions do not determine – they invite question and doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –

 

as with ‘emotions’ – ‘passions’ – are descriptions of propositional actions –

 

propositional actions – open to question

 

‘But all emotions have reference either to pleasure, pain, or desire (see explain. Def. Emo. 4), and desire (Def. Emo. 1) is nothing else than the endeavour to act. Therefore to all actions to which we are determined by an emotion which is a passion we can be led by reason alone.’

 

the ground of any propositional action – or the reference of any propositional action – however described – is open to question

 

desire – is propositional action

 

propositional action – as such is not an ‘endeavour’ – it is the natural action of human beings

 

reason is not a determination – reason is the critical process –

 

any emotion / passion – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Another Proof. – Each action is said to be bad in so far as it arises from the fact the we are affected with hatred or any other bad emotion (see Coroll. 1, Prop. 45, Part IV.). But no action considered in itself is good or bad (as we showed in the preface of this part), but one and same action which is now bad, or which arises from some bad emotion, we can be led by reason (Prop. 19, Part IV.). Q.e.d.

 

 

no emotion / propositional action is good or bad in itself

 

‘good’ and ‘bad’ – will be proposed evaluations of proposals – of propositional actions –

 

and any such proposal / evaluation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

Note. – These points will be explained more clearly by an example. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we pay attention to this alone, that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist and brings his whole arm down violently, is a crime which is conceived from the construction of the human body. If, therefore, a man moved by hatred or rage is determined to clench his fist or move his arm, this comes about, as we showed in the second part, because one and the same action can be united to any images of things whatsoever, and therefore both from these images of things which we conceive confusedly and from which we conceive clearly and distinctly, we can be determined to one and the same action. It is therefore apparent that every desire which arises from an emotion which is a passion would be of no use if men were guided by reason. Let us see now why desire which arise from an emotion which is a passion is called blind by us.

 

 

‘These points will be explained more clearly by an example. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we pay attention to this alone, that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist and brings his whole arm down violently, is a crime which is conceived from the construction of the human body.’

 

‘considered physically, and in so far as we pay attention to this alone’

 

it is not a violent act – rather a motion

 

and ‘considered physically, and in so far as we pay attention to this alone’ – is not a ‘crime’

 

the action is only ‘violent’ or a ‘crime’ – if so interpreted – and such an interpretation goes beyond a purely physical description

 

‘If, therefore, a man moved by hatred or rage is determined to clench his fist or move his arm, this comes about, as we showed in the second part, because one and the same action can be united to any images of things whatsoever, and therefore both from these images of things which we conceive confusedly and from which we conceive clearly and distinctly, we can be determined to one and the same action.’

 

if by a ‘clear and distinct’ conception – is meant a conception beyond question – beyond doubt and certain – any such conception is irrational

 

a propositional action put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored – is a proposition conceived rationally

 

propositional actions can be conceived irrationally or rationally

 

‘It is therefore apparent that every desire which arises from an emotion which is a passion would be of no use if men were guided by reason. Let us see now why desire which arise from an emotion which is a passion is called blind by us.’

 

irrational desires and actions – may well be useful

 

just as desires / emotions / passions – critically explored – may well be useful

 

we cannot dictate what will be useful to human beings – but we can distinguish rational and irrational uses of proposals and propositional actions

 

what is clear from the foregoing is that Spinoza – in order to have a place for his view of reason and rationality – has had to accept propositional uncertainty –

 

for without this propositional uncertainty – there is no possibility of interpreting emotions and passions – and interpreting them as rational

 

I say he has had to accept propositional uncertainty – though I am sure he would rail against this

 

the point is – his theory demands propositional uncertainty – even though he fails to recognize or appreciate this logical reality

 

 

PROP. LX. Desire which arises from pleasure or pain which has reference to one or certain parts of the body but not all has no advantage to man as a whole.

 

 

this proposition is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a part is a part of whole – therefore – if desire that arises from pleasure or pain – which has reference to a part of the body – it will affect the whole –

 

if that is not the case – then the part is not a part of the whole

 

and what is to count as an ‘advantage’ – or for that matter – a ‘disadvantage’ to ‘man as whole’?

 

and as for ‘man as whole’ – what is going on here?

 

is Spinoza working with a mind / body distinction?

 

does he have an account of ‘man as a whole’ – or is this just an empty phrase?

 

and what is ‘man as whole’ – but the propositional actor

 

Spinoza – has nothing to say here – he has no argument here

 

his man as a whole – is an empty space

 

 

Proof. – Let it be supposed that a part, e.g., A, of a body is so aided by the force of some external cause that it overcomes the rest (Prop. 6, Part IV.). The part will not endeavour to lose its forces in order that the other parts may perform their functions, or it would then have the force or power of losing its forces, which (Prop. 6, Part III.) is absurd. The part will therefore endeavour, and consequently (Prop. 7 and 12, Part III.) the mind also will endeavour to preserve its condition; and therefore desire which arises from such an emotion of pleasure will not bring advantage to the body as a whole. Then if, on the other hand, it is supposed that the part A is hindered in such a way that the remaining parts overcome it, it may be proved in the same manner that the desire which arises from the pain will not bring advantage to the body as a whole. Q.e.d.

 

 

here ‘man as whole’ – it appears is the ‘body as a whole’ –

 

is that ‘man as a whole’?

 

be that as it may – the fact remains that a part that does not affect the whole – is not a part of the whole

 

and the desire that arises from pain that has reference to a part of the body – will affect the whole body – or the part is not a part of the whole

 

how is the body as a whole advantaged or disadvantaged by any desire that arises in the body?

 

the matter is uncertain – and is open to proposal – to speculation – and any answer here will be context dependent – and even then – open to question – and open to doubt

 

 

Note. – As pleasure has reference generally (Note, Prop. 44, Part IV.) to one part of the body, we therefore desire as a rule to preserve our being without having regard to our health as a whole. To which must be added that the desires by which we are usually held (Coroll., Prop. (, Part IV.) have regard only for present not future time.

 

 

pleasure may be proposed in such a way that it has reference to one part of the body –

 

but it can also be proposed as having a general affect on the body – on the health of the body as a whole

 

whether pleasure is an ‘advantage’ or not to the health of the body – will be a matter open to question – and again dependent on the circumstances of the body in question

 

desires have regard for present not future time?

 

I might see a desire that arises – as good – or bad – as not just for now – but also for the future

 

it is about thinking the matter out –

 

finally – Spinoza’s use of the part / whole argument is logically confused – and effectively undermines his argument –

 

he really has no concept of the person – of the propositional actor

 

he only understands man in terms of the division into mind and body

 

we have desires / propositional actions – and any account of how they arise – and what their affect is on the propositional actor is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

PROP. LXI. Desire which arises from reason can have no excess.

 

 

Proof. – Desire (Def. Emo. 1) absolutely considered is the very essence of man in so far as it is conceived as determined in any manner to do anything. Therefore desire which arises from reason, that is (Prop. 3, Part III.), which is engendered in us in so far we are active, is the very essence or nature of man in so far as it is conceived as determined to do those things which are adequately conceived through the essence of man alone (Def. 2, Part III.). If, therefore, this desire can have excess, then human nature considered in itself can exceed itself, or could do more than it can do, which is a manifest contradiction, And therefore this desire cannot have excess. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘desire’ – is propositional action –

 

propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no ‘absolute’ consideration – of anything –

 

any consideration – as in – any critical evaluation of any proposal / proposition put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘the very essence of man’ – as in – the nature of man – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘reason’ – is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

‘human nature’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the point being – we don’t know the limits of human nature – of propositional action

 

the matter is open to question – is uncertain

 

 

PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing according to the dictates of reason, it will be equally affected whether the idea of a thing present, past or future.

 

 

this ‘dictates of reason’ – has not been explained by Spinoza – as it stands – it is nothing more than a fantasy – a catch cry – a piece of rhetoric –

 

there are no dictates of reason

 

reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional activity –

 

any idea / proposal – regardless of whether it refers to the present – the past – or the future – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

 

Proof. – Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives entirely under a certain species of eternity or necessity (Coroll. 2, Prop. 44, Part II) and is affected with the same certainty (Prop. 43, Part II., and its Note). Wherefore, whether the idea be of a thing future, past or present, the mind will conceive it by the same necessity and will be affected by the same certainty; and whether the idea be of a thing present, past, or future, it will nevertheless be equally true (Prop. 41, Part II), that is (Def. 4, Part II.), it will have, nevertheless, the same properties of an adequate idea. And therefore in so far as the mind conceives of a thing according to the dictates of reason it is affected in the same manner, whether the idea of a thing future, past, or present. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives entirely under a certain species of eternity or necessity (Coroll. 2, Prop. 44, Part II) and is affected with the same certainty (Prop. 43, Part II., and its Note).’

 

 

‘a certain species of eternity’?

 

we conceive / propose in time –

 

the idea that we can conceive / propose outside of time – is fanciful

 

no proposal is necessary – or certain

 

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s ‘species of eternity or necessity’ – and his notion of certainty – is a denial of propositional reality

 

‘Wherefore, whether the idea be of a thing future, past or present, the mind will conceive it by the same necessity and will be affected by the same certainty; and whether the idea be of a thing present, past, or future, it will nevertheless be equally true (Prop. 41, Part II), that is (Def. 4, Part II.), it will have, nevertheless, the same properties of an adequate idea.’

 

whether the idea / proposal – be of a thing future – past – or present – it will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘adequate’ is meant ‘certain’ – any proposal put – is ‘inadequate’ – as in ‘uncertain’

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional activity

 

Note. – If we could have an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their times of existing, we should regard things future and present with same emotion, and the mind would desire, as if it were present, the good which it conceives as future: and consequently it would neglect necessarily a lesser present good for a future one, and it would desire in no wise what was good in the present, but the cause of future ill, as we shall soon show. But we can only have a most inadequate idea of the duration of things (Prop. 31, Part II.). and we must determine things’ time of existing by imagination alone (Note, Prop. 44, Part II), which is not equally affected by the image of a thing present and one future. Whence it comes about that the true knowledge of good and evil which we have is only abstract or general, and the judgment which we make of the order of things and the connection of causes, so as to be able to determine what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real. And therefore is it not wonderful that the desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this has reference to the future, can be more easily restrained by the desire of things which are pleasant in the present, concerning which see Prop. 18, Part IV.

 

‘If we could have an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their times of existing, we should regard things future and present with same emotion, and the mind would desire, as if it were present, the good which it conceives as future: and consequently it would neglect necessarily a lesser present good for a future one, and it would desire in no wise what was good in the present, but the cause of future ill, as we shall soon show.’

 

adequate / certain knowledge of the duration of things – is philosophical fantasy – with no basis in propositional logic

 

any proposal regarding a calculation of present good as against a future good – is open to question – is uncertain

 

‘But we can only have a most inadequate idea of the duration of things (Prop. 31, Part II.). and we must determine things’ time of existing by imagination alone (Note, Prop. 44, Part II), which is not equally affected by the image of a thing present and one future.’

 

we propose – a thing’s duration’ – whether the reference is to the past – the present or the future – and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘Whence it comes about that the true knowledge of good and evil which we have is only abstract or general, and the judgment which we make of the order of things and the connection of causes, so as to be able to determine what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real.’

 

‘true knowledge’ – of good and evil – is any proposal of good and evil that we affirm

 

and any proposal of affirmation – is open to question

 

whether ‘abstract and general’ or not – any judgment – is open to question – is uncertain

 

any proposal regarding ‘the order of things’ – and any causal explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any proposal regarding what is good or bad for us in the present – is real – not imaginary

 

‘And therefore is it not wonderful that the desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this has reference to the future, can be more easily restrained by the desire of things which are pleasant in the present, concerning which see Prop. 18, Part IV.’

 

we propose in relation to the present and in relation to the future –

 

it is open to any propositional actor to sacrifice a proposed present pleasure for a proposed future good

 

 

PROP. LXIII. He that is led by fear to do good in order to avoid evil is not led by reason.

 

 

‘led by reason’?

 

firstly – Spinoza’s ‘reason’ – is undefined – .

 

we have no clear statement from him as to what reason is – or what being ‘led by reason’ amounts to

 

reason is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

‘fear’ is a natural propositional response of the propositional actor to danger –

 

one may – in the critical / process of investigating one’s fear – rationally decide to avoid evil in order to do good

 

or one may decide that evil needs to confronted full on – and that any such confrontation is to the good –

 

these are two possible responses

 

my point is in any moral issue we are faced with possible responses

 

there is no correct or right propositional response –

 

the best we can achieve is a critical response

 

and a critical response is a rational response

 

 

Proof. – All emotions that have reference to the mind, in so far as it is active, that is (Prop.3, Part III), which have reference to reason, are none other than the emotions of pleasure and desire (Prop. 59, Part III). And therefore (Def. Emo 13) he that is led by fear to do good in order to avoid evil is not led by reason. Q.e.d.

 

 

ok – so here we do have something of a definition of reason

 

‘that is that which has reference to reason’ –

 

and that which has ‘reference to reason is the mind’ – ‘in so far as it is active’

 

and the emotions that have reference to the mind in so far as it is active are pleasure and desire

 

firstly – the mind is a name for propositional activity

 

any proposal / proposition put – is active – is an action

 

reason – is the application of the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

if – Spinoza is saying that reason is metal activity – propositional activity – then any propositional activity is rational

 

and if that is the case his theory of rationality – is wide of the mark – and a failure

 

reason / rational activity – is not propositional action – but rather the critical evaluation of propositional activity

 

pleasure and desire – are propositional states – propositional actions – that as with any propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

likewise – fear is a propositional state – a propositional action – and logically no different to pleasure and desire – and as such open to question

 

one gets the impression that Spinoza’s ethic is an attempt to circumvent evil – to in some way by-pass it – to not confront or deal with it

 

he seems to think we can over-ride evil simply by focusing on the good

 

 

Note 1. – The superstitious, who know better how to reprobate vice than to teach virtue, and who do not endeavour to lead men by reason, but to inspire them with fear that they avoid evil rather than love virtue, have no other intention than to make the rest as miserable as themselves; and therefore is it not wonderful that for the most part they are a nuisance and hateful to men.

 

 

the ‘superstitious’?

 

those who reproach others for their vice – rather than lead them to virtue – and inspire them to avoid evil rather than love virtue

 

I don’t see where superstition comes in here –

 

rather it seems that to focus on avoiding evil – rather than trumpeting virtue – is at base – a different moral approach or strategy

 

and such a strategy is as valid as any other – but as with any other – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

are those who adopt this approach ‘miserable’?

 

it seems they make Spinoza miserable – if not angry –

 

and this speaks to Spinoza’s failure to understand difference –

 

and is really no more than a statement of prejudice from Spinoza

 

whether those who adopt this different approach to moral issues are ‘a nuisance and hateful to men’ – if this comment is to be taken seriously – is an empirical matter

 

Spinoza does not provide any empirical evidence for this view

 

 

Corollary. – By reason of the desire which arises from reason we directly follow what is good and indirectly avoid what is evil.

 

 

‘indirectly avoiding evil’ –

 

doesn’t this amount to an ethic based on the failure to face and deal with evil?

 

all very well to have your mind on virtue – but if you can’t or don’t see evil – if you as it were – pass it by – and so fail to deal with it – what good is your virtue?

 

does this ‘virtue’ become nothing more than an avoidance of the moral reality?

 

a pretence

 

 

Proof. –The desire which arises from reason can only arise from the emotion of pleasure which is not a passion (Prop. 59, Part III.), that is, from pleasure which cannot be excessive (Prop. 61, Part IV,) and not from pain. And accordingly this desire (Prop. 8, Part IV.) from the knowledge of good, and not from that of evil. And therefore under the guidance of reason we directly desire what is good, and thus far only we avoid evil. Q.e.d.

 

 

any desire – that is – any propositional action – that arises from reason – from the critical process – be it in relation to pleasure or pain – will be a desire that is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

our knowledge – our proposals – is what we propose as good or what we propose as evil –

 

and that ‘knowledge’ will be rational – if it is critically evaluated

 

 

Note II. – This corollary can be explained by the example of a sick and healthy man. The sick man eats what he dislikes from fear of death; but a healthy man enjoys his food, and thus reaps more benefit from life than if he feared death and desired to avoid it directly. Thus a judge who is not imbued with hatred or rage etc., but merely with love for public safety, and condemns the guilty to death, is led by reason alone.

 

 

the idea of enjoying your food without fear of death – makes sense to me

 

however – there may be good reasons for eating what you dislike – at least for a time if that will improve your health

 

a lot depends on what you like and what you dislike –

 

if you like food that is unhealthy – too much of it – too much enjoyment – may lead to illness – not a happy outcome –

 

and healthy eating practices may result in a change in what you actually enjoy

 

pleasure / enjoyment – is open to question

 

there is nothing wrong with having an eye to death – we all do –

 

it is the reality we all face

 

though it does seem that Spinoza for one – proposes that we should and can avoid facing this reality –

 

and that I think is the death knell of his ethics

 

as to the judge who has a love of public safety –

 

if that judge was imbued with hatred and rage – and condemned the guilty man to death –

 

the result is the same

 

 

PROP. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.

 

 

Proof. – The knowledge of evil (Prop. 8, Part IV.) is pain itself in so far as we are conscious of it. But pain is a transition to a lesser state of perfection (Def. Emo. 3), which on account cannot be understood through the essence of man (Prop. 6 and 7, Part III,) And accordingly (Def. 2, Part III.), it is a passion which (Prop. 3, Part III.) depends on inadequate ideas, and consequently (Prop. 29, Part II.) the knowledge of evil is inadequate. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘evil’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘pain’ – is a propositional state – open to question -open to doubt – and uncertain

 

one can interpret pain as evil – but pain may be interpreted in others ways –

 

i.e. – it may be regarded as a natural phenomenon – neither good nor bad –

 

and it may be understood as good – in the sense that it indicates a problem that needs to be solved

 

there is no ‘lesser state of perfection’ – as there is no state of perfection 

 

‘perfection’ – as a form of certainty – is logically incoherent

 

the human state is one of logical uncertainty

 

as to – ‘the essence of man’ –

 

any proposal as to the nature of man – is valid – and is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

so – if we use the term ‘essence’ – it must be understood to be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a ‘passion’ is a ‘proposal / propositional action’ –

 

a passion is open to question

 

all our ideas / proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our knowledge is proposal – is uncertain

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that if the human had only adequate ideas it would form no notion of evil.

 

 

if by ‘adequate idea’ is meant an idea that is certain – is beyond question – beyond doubt – there is no adequate idea

 

the notion of the adequate idea has no basis in logic

 

it is an example of empty rhetoric

 

what is clear hear is that Spinoza’s aim is not to deal with evil – with proposals of evil – but rather to abolish it

 

his strategy is to avoid it with the empty argument of adequate ideas – and to propagate the pretence of the unreality of proposed evil

 

human beings make value judgments – we propose good and we propose evil – we enact good and we enact evil –

 

this is an empirical fact –

 

our value judgments are a reflection of – and response to – the uncertainty of our complex propositional reality

 

 

PROP. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we follow the greater of two things which are good and the lesser of two things which are evil.

 

 

Proof. – A good thing which prevents us from enjoying a greater good is in truth an evil, for good and bad is said of things (as we showed in the preface of this part) in so far as we compare them one with the other, and (for the same reason) a lesser evil is in truth a good. Wherefore (Coroll., prev. Prop) under the guidance of reason we desire to follow only the greater of two things which are good and the lesser of two which are evil. Q.e.d.

 

 

Corollary – We may follow under the guidance of reason the lesser evil as if it were the greater good and neglect the lesser good as the cause of a greater evil. For the evil which is here called lesser is in truth good, and, on the other hand, the good is evil. Wherefore (Coroll., previous Prop) we desire the former and avoid the latter. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘For good and bad is said of things as we showed in the preface of this part) in so far as we compare them one with the other, and (for the same reason) a lesser evil is in truth a good’

 

‘good’ and ‘bad’ are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain 

 

here Spinoza does not define ‘good’ and ‘bad’ – and prescribe how these terms are to be used – which is something of a departure from his foregoing approach to ethical terms

 

instead – he seems to recognise that these terms – can have whatever meaning they are given by whoever uses them –

 

and so – he seems to recognise the uncertainty of these terms

 

be that as it may –

 

the underlying issue here – in the face of logical uncertainty – is what propositional action to proceed with?

 

as I see it – we call a proposal ‘good’ – for whatever reason – that we decide to proceed with – and we call a proposal ‘bad’ – for whatever reason – which we decide not proceed with –

 

any action – however explained / accounted for i.e. – as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

‘greater’ and ‘lesser’ – are relative terms –

 

and any relative term is an expression of propositional uncertainty –

 

and relative terms do focus our attention on uncertainty

 

Spinoza holds that we will always choose a greater good over a lesser good – and a lesser evil over a greater evil

 

what this presumes is that propositional actors always think in these relative terms of greater and lesser –

 

he seems here – at least – not to see – that people may well not think in these terms –

 

and may i.e. – just opt for a good act – or be against a bad act – with no thought of greater goods – or lesser evils

 

when the greater / lesser comparison seems warranted – the question is how to distinguish a ‘greater good’ from a ‘lesser good’ – or a ‘greater evil’ from a ‘lesser evil’?

 

there are no rules here – these matters are uncertain –

 

we can put it this way –

 

what one person may regard as a ‘greater good’ – another may see as the ‘lesser good’

 

and can it be said that even when propositional actors operate with the greater / lesser relation – that they will always choose the greater good?

 

what if one chooses a lesser good – simply because it is more achievable?

 

Spinoza speaks of the ‘guidance of reason’ –

 

reason is the critical evaluation of proposals / propositions –

 

any decision on greater and lesser – good or evil – is ‘rational’ – if it is the result of a critical evaluation

 

if it is not a result of critical evaluation – it is not rational

 

 

PROP. LXVI. Under the guidance of reason we desire a greater future good before a lesser present one, and a lesser evil in the present “before a greater in the future” (van Volten’s version).

 

 

reason is the critical examination of any proposal put –

 

desire – is propositional action

 

as a result of a critical examination of a proposed greater future good as against a lesser present on – it may be that a propositional actor determines in favour of the lesser present good because it is more likely attainable than the greater future good

 

in the case of evil –

 

is it not possible that after a critical look at the possibilities – that a propositional actor decides against the lesser present evil – and takes the view that there is a possibility that the greater future evil will not eventuate or be overcome?

 

 

Proof. – If the mind could have adequate knowledge of the future thing, it would be affected with the same emotion towards a future thing as towards a present thing (Prop. 62, Part IV.). Wherefore, in so far as we have agreed to reason, as we are supposed to do in this proposition, whether the greater good or evil be supposed future or present, the thing is the same. And therefore, (Prop. 65, Part IV.) we desire a greater future good before a lesser present one. Q.e.d.

 

 

a future thing and a present thing – are proposals

 

and if dealt with rationally – are put to question – put to doubt – and their uncertainty explored

 

the point is that tense is logically irrelevant

 

it is the critical / logical process that underlies this – not the fiction of ‘adequate knowledge’

 

knowledge is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our desires – if dealt with rationally – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

we may after critical analysis – decide for a lesser present good – against a future greater good –

 

or we may choose the proposed greater future good – against the proposed present lesser good

 

the point is that any choice here is rational – if it is the result of a critical evaluation

 

if there is no critical evaluation – any choice is irrational

 

 

Corollary – We desire under the guidance of reason a lesser present evil which is the cause of a greater future good, and we would avoid a lesser present good, which is the cause of greater future evil. The proof of this collar bears the same relation to that of the previous proposition as the Coroll. of Prop. 65 bore to Prop. 65 itself.

 

 

‘under the guidance of reason’ – we critically evaluate proposals put

 

we can only speculate about the future – it is uncertain

 

so as to whether a present ‘lesser evil’ will be the cause of a greater good – is a speculative matter

 

we may indeed speculate – but we may also choose against a ‘lesser present evil’ – regardless of whether or not it might lead to a ‘greater good’

 

and whether a proposed ‘lesser present good’ leads to a ‘greater future evil’ – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

so – we might simply opt for the present good

 

 

Note. – If these statements are compared to what we showed concerning the force of the emotions in this part up to the eighteenth proposition, we shall easily see what is the difference between a man who is led by opinion of emotion and one which led by reason. The former, whether he will or not, performs things of which he is entirely ignorant; the latter is subordinate to no one, and only does those things which he knows to be of primary importance in his life, and which on that account he desires the most; and therefore I shall call the former a slave, but the latter free, concerning whose habits and manner of life we may here say a few words.

 

 

‘the opinion of emotion’ – will be rational – if that ‘opinion’ / proposal – is critically evaluated

 

anyone who puts proposals / propositions – is not ‘entirely ignorant’

 

our ‘knowledge’ just is proposal – and it is rational – if put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

the rational / critical propositional actor – has an open mind –

 

the non-critical actor – operates irrationally – and is close minded

 

 

PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but of life.

 

 

a ‘free man’ can think whatever he likes –

 

a free man is a propositional actor who questions – doubts – and explores propositional uncertainty –

 

a free man is one who thinks critically

 

‘nothing less than of death’ –

 

‘death’ – as with any other proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and wisdom – likewise – is open to question

 

and a rational propositional actor can ‘meditate’ – on whatever propositional state he chooses

 

 

Proof. – A free man, that is, one who lives according to the dictates of reason alone, is not led by the fear of death (Prop.63, Part IV.), but directly desires what is good (Coroll., same Prop.), that is (Prop.24, Part IV.), to act, to live, and preserve his being on the basis of seeking what is useful to him. And therefore he thinks of nothing less than death, but his wisdom is a meditation of life. Q.e.d.

 

 

Spinoza’s ‘dictates of reason’ – have not to my mind been defined

 

however – if what they are – amounts to Spinoza’s proposals as to what is good – and preserving of one’s being – and seeking that which is useful – fair enough –

 

but these are only proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and as such – logically – no different – to any other ethical proposals – that anyone else has advanced

 

furthermore – it does not follow – that if you follow Spinoza’s ‘dictates of reason’ – you will ‘think nothing less than death’

 

it might just be i.e. – that you think that a meditation on death is the key to the good life – to preserving your being – and figuring out what is useful

 

there is a switch here from the proposition to the proof –

 

Spinoza in the proposition speaks of thinking about death – in the proof – it is not thinking about death – but fearing death

 

firstly – thinking and fearing are different propositional actions – different propositional states

 

and secondly – fear is a natural emotion – and not to be written off as a weakness – or an evil

 

‘fear’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

depending on circumstance – propositional context – fear may have positive results or negative results

 

and fear of death – is not something that can be ‘written out’ of people’s experience by the idea of a ‘meditation on life’ –

 

fear of death is natural – and I suggest – is healthy –

 

without a healthy fear of death human beings would be without parameters –

 

and Spinoza’s ‘good’ – his ‘preservation of being’ – and his ‘being able to determine what is useful’ –

 

would be without definition – and as such – have no value

 

Spinoza of course does not deny death – but it is quite clear he wishes to avoid thinking about death

 

this fits with his view of evil – that he who operates in accordance with Spinoza’s ‘dictates of reason’ – can avoid evil

 

Spinoza’s ethic is an ethic of avoidance –

 

and as such it is lopsided – inadequate – and fails to deal with the ethical reality

 

 

PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free they would form no conception of good and bad as long as they were free.

 

 

men are free to the extent that they engage in the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

it is as a result of this critical process that they propose good and evil

 

this is a logical reality and an empirical reality

 

the idea that human beings have ever operated without value proposals is fanciful –

 

and bears no relation to human reality

 

Proof. – I said that he is free who is led by reason alone. He, therefore, who is born free and remains free has only adequate ideas, and accordingly has no conception of bad (Coroll., Prop. 64. Part IV.) and consequently (for good and bad are correlatives) none of good. Q.e.d.

 

the failure here – is Spinoza’s notion of ‘adequate idea’ –

 

his ‘adequate idea’ – is an idea – a proposal that is beyond question – beyond doubt and certain

 

there is no such idea / proposal –

 

the closest we come to it is blind prejudice

 

freedom is reason – the critical activity of question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

our notions of good and bad – are critical notions – critical proposals

 

our propositional reality constantly challenges us –

 

we can respond to this challenge critically – or we can ignore it –

 

if we respond critically – we act rationally – if we ignore it – our propositional actions are irrational –

 

even so – no functioning propositional actor – whether acting rationally or acting irrationally – operates without conceptions of good and bad

 

not even blind prejudice avoids the question of good and evil

 

 

Note. – That the hypothesis of this proposition is false and cannot be conceived save in so far as we have regard for the sole nature of man, or rather for God, not in so.  far as he is infinite, but in so far alone as he is the cause of man’s existence, is obvious from the fourth proposition of this part. And this and the other points which we have already demonstrated seem to have been meant by Moses in his history of the first man. For in that no other power of God is conceived save by which he created man, that is, a power by which he consulted only the advantage of man; and thus it is related that God prohibited free man of eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it, at once he began to fear death rather than desire to live; again, when man found a wife, who agreed most perfectly with his own nature, he knew there could be nothing nature more useful to him, but that afterwards, when he thought that the brute creation were similar to himself, he began at once to imitate their emotions (see prop. 27, Part III.) and lost his freedom, which the Patriarchs under the guidance of the spirit of Christ, that is the idea of God, afterwards recovered: on this idea alone it depends that man should be free, and that he should desire for other men the good which he desires for himself, as we showed above (Prop. 37, Part IV.).

 

 

‘That the hypothesis of this proposition is false and cannot be conceived save in so far as we have regard for the sole nature of man, or rather for God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far alone as he is the cause of man’s existence, is obvious from the fourth proposition of this part.’

 

the hypothesis of this proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – whichever way it is ‘explained’ – or ‘packaged up’ –

 

‘And this and the other points which we have already demonstrated seem to have been meant by Moses in his history of the first man.’

 

Spinoza here – puts that his proposition is reflected in the Moses story –and therefore it can be seen to have biblical authority –

 

be that as it may – the proposition is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘For in that no other power of God is conceived save by which he created man, that is, a power by which he consulted only the advantage of man; and thus it is related that God prohibited free man of eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he ate of it, at once he began to fear death rather than desire to live;’

 

this story or fantasy – is consistent with the idea of PROP. LXVIII. –

 

and as with this proposition it is based on logical and epistemological error

 

‘again, when man found a wife, who agreed most perfectly with his own nature, he knew there could be nothing nature more useful to him, but that afterwards, when he thought that the brute creation were similar to himself, he began at once to imitate their emotions (see prop. 27, Part III.) and lost his freedom, which the Patriarchs under the guidance of the spirit of Christ, that is the idea of God, afterwards recovered: on this idea alone it depends that man should be free, and that he should desire for other men the good which he desires for himself, as we showed above (Prop. 37, Part IV.).’

 

Spinoza’s interpretation of the biblical story of the creation of man in terms of his metaphysics – epistemology and ethics – and his more comprehensive work of biblical analysis in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is really quite ingenious – and still – after all this time – quite revolutionary 

 

 

PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man appears equally great in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them.

 

 

any proposed danger is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if one critically evaluates a proposed danger or dangerous act – one deals with it rationally –

 

if it is not subject to question – to doubt – and its uncertainty explored – it is not dealt with rationally

 

 

Proof. – Emotion cannot be hindered or negated save by a contrary emotion and one that is stronger (Prop. 7, Part IV.). But blind daring and fear are emotions which can be conceived equally great (Prop. 5 and 3, Part IV.). Therefore an equally great virtue or fortitude (see def., Note, Prop.59, Part III.) of mind is required to restrain daring as to restrain fear, that is (Def. Emo. 40 and 41), a free man avoids dangers with the same virtue of mind as that which he attempts to overcome them. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘emotion’ – is a name or description of propositional action

 

propositional action – is open to question –

 

and it is in the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty – that emotion / propositional action can be modified or negated

 

‘fortitude’ – if not critically assessed – is just another irrational propositional action

 

‘fear’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if critically assessed – it is dealt with rationally – if not – it is dealt with irrationally

 

‘danger’ is open to question –

 

if dealt with in a critical manner – it is rationally assessed

 

a free man critically evaluates dangers – and any response to danger is rational – if critically assessed

 

 

Corollary. – Therefore a free man is led by the same fortitude of mind to take flight in time as to fight; or a free man chooses from the same courage or presence of mind to fight or to take flight.

 

 

it is not a question of fortitude – courage or presence of mind

 

the ‘free man’ critically evaluates the circumstance – the propositional context – and makes his call – for his own reasons

 

reasons / proposals – that remain – open to question

 

 

Note. – What courage is, or what I understand by it, I have explained in the Note on Prop. 59, Part III. But I understand by danger all that which can be the cause of any evil, namely of pain, hatred, disagreement, etc.

 

 

what if the performance of a dangerous act has a good result – and is one that gives pleasure – and leads to agreement?

 

 

PROP. LXX. A free man, who lives among ignorant people, tries as much as he can to refuse their benefits.

 

 

Proof. – Everyone judges according to his own disposition what is good (see Note, Prop. 39, Part III.). Therefore an ignorant man who has conferred a benefit on anyone will estimate according to his own disposition, and if he sees it to be estimated less by him to whom he gave it, he will be pained (Prop. 42, Part II.). But the free man desires to join other men to him in friendship (Prop. 37, Part IV,), and not to repay men with similar gifts according to their emotion towards him: he tries to lead himself and others according to the free judgment of reason, and to do those things only which he knows to be of primary importance. Therefore a free man, lest he should become hateful to the ignorant, and lest he should be governed by their appetite, instead of by reason alone, endeavours as far as possible to refuse their benefits.

 

‘Therefore an ignorant man who has conferred a benefit on anyone will estimate according to his own disposition, and if he sees it to be estimated less by him to whom he gave it, he will be pained.’

 

bear in mind here – we have no definition of ‘an ignorant man’ – from Spinoza

 

and I would think that anyone – ‘ignorant’ or not – might well be disappointed if a gift given is ‘estimated less by him to who he gave it’

 

‘But the free man desires to join other men to him in friendship (Prop. 37, Part IV,), and not to repay men with similar gifts according to their emotion towards him:’

 

a free man has an open mind in relation to others – this may result in friendship or it may not

 

and as to reciprocation – or not – the free man will assess the matter critically

 

‘he tries to lead himself and others according to the free judgment of reason, and to do those things only which he knows to be of primary importance.’

 

a ‘free man’ – will question – doubt – and explore uncertainty –

 

as to leading others in this direction – that too – is open to question –

 

perhaps – in a given circumstance – to do so – would be assessed as appropriate –

 

just as equally though – it may well be seen as not appropriate or useful

 

the ‘free man’ – is not an evangelist

 

and as for what is of ‘primary importance’ – no critical thinker will be dogmatic on this matter

 

what is of ‘primary importance’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and whatever one’s view on ‘primary importance’ – it may have no relevance at all in relation to an act of gift giving

 

and we should note Spinoza does not give his view of ‘primary importance’

 

‘Therefore a free man, lest he should become hateful to the ignorant, and lest he should be governed by their appetite, instead of by reason alone, endeavours as far as possible to refuse their benefits.’

 

Spinoza’s ‘free man’ comes across as an intellectual snob

 

and for Spinoza – it seems ‘the ignorant’ – are simply those who do not view the world in the same way as he does

 

and if this is so – it is Spinoza – with all his vacuous talk of ‘reason’ – who is ignorant

 

for the ignorant man is he who does not question – does not doubt – the pretended certainty of his own propositions

 

the world is full of different appetites – and reason is the critical evaluation of proposals and propositional actions

 

yes – you can refuse a benefit from another – but don’t think that the pretence of superiority – is to be equated with reason

 

 

Note. – I say ‘as far as possible’, for although men are ignorant, they are nevertheless men and can confer human aid, greater than which there is none, in time of necessity. And it often happens that it is necessary to receive benefits from them, and consequently to repay them in kind. To which must be added that even in refusing benefits caution must be used lest we seem to despise or to refuse them out of avarice, for fear of having to repay them, and thus, while we are trying to avoid their hatred, incur their offence. Wherefore in refusing benefits we must have regard for use and honour.

 

 

‘I say ‘as far as possible’, for although men are ignorant, they are nevertheless men and can confer human aid, greater than which there is none, in time of necessity.’

 

it seems Spinoza’s so called ‘free man’ will deign to accept aid from his inferiors – if he is in need –

 

but if he is not in need – he will refuse it because they are not worthy of giving anything to him –

 

Spinoza’s ‘free man’ comes across as a conceited prig

 

‘And it often happens that it is necessary to receive benefits from them, and consequently to repay them in kind’

 

a quick line from Spinoza – with no elaboration – which effectively sinks his proposition

 

and what this makes clear – is that here – Spinoza is on very shaky ground here – and knows it

 

‘To which must be added that even in refusing benefits caution must be used lest we seem to despise or to refuse them out of avarice, for fear of having to repay them, and thus, while we are trying to avoid their hatred, incur their offence. Wherefore in refusing benefits we must have regard for use and honour.’

 

more back-tracking –

 

‘lest we seem to despise or to refuse out of avarice’

 

‘seem’ here – indicates that maintaining the pretence of good will is all-important to this so called ‘free man’

 

‘Wherefore in refusing benefits we must have regard for use and honour.’ –

 

so – in the end – nothing is left of Spinoza’s argument

 

 

PROP. LXXI. Only free men are truly grateful one to the other.

 

 

Spinoza’s ‘free man’ – he says – is led by reason – the dictates of reason –

 

there are no ‘dictates of reason’ – reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

the ‘dictates of reason’ – or ‘reason’ for Spinoza – amounts to his philosophical prejudices – his views on the nature of reality

 

his philosophical views / propositions are quite valid – as valid as any –

 

however – he fails to see that his conceptions and arguments – as with any other – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

it is reasonable to suggest that those who see the world in the same way are likely to be grateful one to the other in the same way –

 

no guarantee of this – but it might be expected

 

this however does not mean that those who have different outlooks cannot be grateful – one to the other

 

gratitude is simply appreciation of a gift given –

 

and one can appreciate a gift given – without knowing the other’s outlook on the world – without knowing whether the other is Spinoza’s so called ‘free man’

 

 

Proof. –  Only free men are truly useful to one another, and are united by the closest bond of friendship (Prop. 35, and its first Coroll.) and endeavour to benefit each other with an equal impulse of love (Prop. 37, Part IV.). And therefore (Def. Emo. 14) only free men are truly grateful one to the other. Q.e.d.

 

 

men and women – whether they have the same outlook as Spinoza’s ‘free man’ – or not – can be useful to one another

 

and people do not need to be united in the ‘closest bond of friendship’ – to be useful to each other

 

as to ‘the endeavour to benefit each other with an equal impulse of love’ –

 

I think it is only natural to try to reciprocate –

 

however – whether any reciprocation comes from ‘an equal impulse of love’ – will be open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

men and women can be grateful one to the other regardless of their circumstances – and regardless of how they see world

 

 

Note. – The gratitude which men who are led by blind desire have one to the other is usually a matter of bargain or a snare rather than gratitude. Moreover ingratitude is not an emotion. But ingratitude is nevertheless base, inasmuch as it indicates that man is affected with too great hatred, anger, pride, or avarice. For he who does not repay gifts by reason of foolishness is not ungrateful, and far less is he who is not moved by the gift of a courtesan to serve her lust, nor of a thief to hide his theft, or any other similar person. But, on the contrary, he shows that he has a constant mind, for he will not allow himself to be bribed by any gifts to bring ruin on himself and society.

 

 

‘The gratitude which men who are led by blind desire have one to the other is usually a matter of bargain or a snare rather than gratitude.’ –

 

this can be the case – but it may not be – as Spinoza’s ‘usually’ – indicates

 

‘Moreover ingratitude is not an emotion. But ingratitude is nevertheless base, inasmuch as it indicates that man is affected with too great hatred, anger, pride, or avarice.’

 

the actions of one affected with hatred – pride – or avarice – in the context of a gift given to them – may indicate ingratitude

 

and if so – ingratitude here – is a possible consequence of these emotions

 

however – is it not also possible that one’s hatred – pride – or avarice – is – as it were – ‘upstaged’ by the generosity – and that such a person finds himself – unexpectedly – grateful?

 

here we are in the realm of what might be termed ‘moral surprise’

 

‘For he who does not repay gifts by reason of foolishness is not ungrateful, and far less is he who is not moved by the gift of a courtesan to serve her lust, nor of a thief to hide his theft, or any other similar person’

 

the ‘gift of a courtesan’ – may be to serve her lust – but it will most likely be a gift at the service of her customer’s lust – and if so – if you are the customer – why not be grateful?

 

and if you are the courtesan – why not be grateful?

 

‘But, on the contrary, he shows that he has a constant mind, for he will not allow himself to be bribed by any gifts to bring ruin on himself and society.’

 

he who ‘will not allow himself to be bribed by any gifts’ – has a critical mind –

 

a ‘constant mind’ – is an uncritical mind –

 

and an uncritical mind – is a mind blind to propositional reality

 

 

PROP. LXXII. A free man never acts by fraud, but always with good faith.

 

 

Proof. – If a free man were to something by fraud in so far as he is free, he would act according to the dictates of reason (for thus far only we call him free); and therefore to act fraudulently would be a virtue (Prop. 24, Part IV.) and consequently (same Prop.) it would be most advantageous to each one to act fraudulently, that is (as is self-manifest), it would be most advantageous for men to agree only in what that say, but to be contrary one to the other in what they do, which (Coroll., Prop. 31, Part IV) is absurd. Therefore a free man, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

Note. – If it be asked, “If a man can liberate himself from present danger of death by deception, would not consideration for the preservation of his own being persuade him to deceive?” it may be answered in the same manner, “That if reason persuaded him that, it would persuade it to all men, and therefore reason would persuade all men not to unite all their forces and have laws in common save in deception one to the other, that is not to have common laws, which is absurd.”

 

 

reason is the critical process – of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

if a man decides – in a particular propositional context – to deceive in order to secure his life – his decision is rational – if it is the result of an engagement in the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

 

and that decision – as with any other – from a logical point of view – is open to question

 

if there is no engagement in the critical process – his decision is irrational

 

as to whether all men – if faced with the same circumstance – after engaging in the critical process – would come to the same decision – we cannot say –

 

for we cannot know that all men would face the same situation –

 

and we cannot know what decision all men would make – in any circumstance – as a result of engaging in the critical process

 

further – to suggest that one can speak for all men – or dictate to all men – is nothing less than the height of arrogance and pretension

 

 

PROP. LXXIII. A free man who is guided by reason is more free in a state where he lives according to common decision than in solitude where he obeys only himself alone.

 

 

a free man – is a critical man – a man who questions – doubts – and explores propositional uncertainty – whether his propositional context is that of common decision or he operates in solitude

 

 

Proof. – A man who is guided by reason is not led to obey by fear (Prop. 63, Part IV.), but in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is, (Note, Prop. 66, Part IV.) in so far as he endeavours to live freely, he desires to have regard for common life and advantage (Prop. 37, Part IV.) he desires to live according to the common decisions of the state. Therefore a man guided by reason alone desires, so as to live with more freedom, to keep the common laws of the state. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘common life’ – is a propositional state – ‘advantage’ – is a proposal –

 

for a free man – a critical man – propositional states and proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a free man – a critical man – may well desire to keep the common laws of the state –

 

however – he may just equally – as a result of critical evaluation and analysis – argue against the common laws of the state

 

anyone blindly accepting the common laws of the state – adopts the posture of a slave – not that of a free man

 

 

Note. – These and such things which we have shown of the true freedom of man have reference to fortitude, that is (Note. Prop. 59, Part III.), to courage and generosity. Nor do I think it worthwhile to show here separately all the properties of fortitude, and far less that a strong man hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, despises no one, and is in no wise proud. For these points, and all which relate to the true life and religion, are easily proved from Prop. 37 and 46, Part IV., namely, that hatred should be overcome by love, and that everyone led by reason desires for his fellows the good he desires for himself. To which must be added that we noted in Note of Prop. 50, Part IV., and in other places, namely, that a strong man considers this above all things, that everything follows from the necessity of divine nature; and accordingly, whatever he thinks to be a nuisance or bad, and whatever, moreover, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, or disgraceful, arise from

the fact that he conceives these things in a disturbed, mutilated, and confused manner:

and on this account he endeavours above all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove obstacles from true knowledge, as, for example, hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and other things of this kind which we have noted in the previous propositions: and therefore he endeavours as much as he can, as we said, to act well and to rejoice. How far human virtue lends itself to the attainment of this, and what it is capable of, I shall show in the next part.

 

‘These and such things which we have shown of the true freedom of man have reference to fortitude, that is (Note. Prop. 59, Part III.), to courage and generosity.’

 

the ‘true freedom of man’ is embedded in propositional logic

 

the proposition is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the idea that there are propositions that are certain – beyond question – beyond doubt – is the source of human bondage

 

‘Nor do I think it worthwhile to show here separately all the properties of fortitude, and far less that a strong man hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, despises no one, and is in no wise proud.’

 

rationality is our strength

 

one can be rational – with or without courage

 

anger – envy – indignancy – despising – and pride – are propositional states – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘For these points, and all which relate to the true life and religion, are easily proved from Prop. 37 and 46, Part IV., namely, that hatred should be overcome by love, and that everyone led by reason desires for his fellows the good he desires for himself.’

 

hatred may be overcome with love –

 

however – the rational approach here is to subject hatred to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty

 

I may well desire for my fellows a good I do not desire for myself

 

‘To which must be added that we noted in Note of Prop. 50, Part IV., and in other places, namely, that a strong man considers this above all things, that everything follows from the necessity of divine nature’

 

a rational man – puts any argument to question – to doubt – and explores its uncertainty

 

‘and accordingly, whatever he thinks to be a nuisance or bad, and whatever, moreover, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, or disgraceful, arise from the fact that he conceives these things in a disturbed, mutilated, and confused manner: and on this account he endeavours above all to conceive things as they are in themselves, and to remove obstacles from true knowledge, as, for example, hatred, anger, envy,

derision, pride, and other things of this kind which we have noted in the previous propositions: and therefore he endeavours as much as he can, as we said, to act well and to rejoice.’

 

we do not conceive in a disturbed – mutilated – or confused manner

 

our conceptions are proposals – propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘things as they are in themselves’ – are uncertain – and open to question 

 

‘true knowledge’ – is the proposal – the proposition – you affirm –

 

and any propositional affirmation – or denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

form a logical point of view – one lives well – if one has a critical view and an open mind

 

whether you rejoice or not is logically irrelevant

                                                                                                                                                       

 

APPENDIX

 

 

What I have said in this part concerning the right manner of life is not so arranged that it can be seen at one glance. but has been proved by me in parts, for then I could easily prove one from another. I have determined, therefore, to collect the parts here and reduce them to their principal headings.

 

 

Spinoza’s ‘proofs’ – are simply restatements of his propositions –

 

they have more to do with rhetoric than logic

 

the so called ‘deductive proof’ – is little more than a language-game – where the conclusion is contained in the premise

 

deductive arguments have more to do with poetry than logic

 

there are no ‘proofs’ – there are only proposals / propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

I. All our endeavours or desires follow from the necessity of our nature in such a manner that they can be understood either through this alone, as through their proximate cause, or in so far as we are a part of nature which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.

 

 

all our endeavours or desires are proposals / propositions / propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

this notion of necessity – is an empty notion – a rhetorical notion –

 

it has no basis in logic

 

our understanding is propositional – and as such – uncertain

 

‘nature’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘other individuals’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

how we understand ourselves – from a logical point of view – is open to question

 

 

II. Desires which follow from our nature in such a way that they can be understood through it alone are those which have reference to the mind in so far as this is conceived to consist of adequate ideas; the remaining desires have no reference to the mind save in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase are not defined by human power, but by power which is outside us. Therefore the first are called actions, while the second, passions. For the former always indicate our power, and the latter, on the contrary, indicate our want of power and our mutilated knowledge.

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity

 

ideas – are proposals / propositions / propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘adequate idea’ is meant a proposal that is certain – then there are no adequate ideas

 

what goes for ‘adequate ideas’ – are entrenched prejudices

 

all ideas – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

human power is logical power – human power rests in critical activity

 

any proposal / proposition put to us – logically speaking – is no different from any proposal / proposition that we put – it is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘passion’ – is a name given to propositional action

 

from a logical point of view – the name is not important – it is irrelevant – as all propositional action – however named – however described – is open to question –

 

all propositions are actions – action we take – or actions taken in relation to us –

 

and all propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our knowledge is proposal – is propositional action

 

our knowledge is not mutilated – it is uncertain

 

 

III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by the power or reason of man, are always good: the others can be both good and bad.

 

 

our propositional actions are rational – if critically evaluated – that is – put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored

 

an action may be proposed as ‘good’ – yet not critically examined

 

and an action may be proposed as ‘bad’ – and critically examined

 

there are any number of proposals as to what is good and what is bad

 

any such proposal is rational – if critically examined

 

 

IV. It is therefore extremely useful in life to perfect as much as we can the intellect or reason, and of this alone does the happiness or blessedness of man consist: for blessedness (beatitudo) is nothing else than the satisfaction of mind which arise from the intuitive knowledge of God. But to perfect the intellect is nothing else than to understand God and his attributes and actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore the ultimate aim of man who is guided by reason, that is, the greatest desire by which he endeavours to moderate all others, is that which brings him to conceive adequately himself and all things which can come within the scope of his intelligence.

 

 

‘the intellect or reason’?

 

the intellect here – for Spinoza is another name for reason

 

and his notion of reason – is the argument – the deductive argument of the Ethics –

 

any deductive argument is a language-game –

 

a language-game where the conclusion is contained in the premise –

 

which is to say the conclusion is a reconstitution of the premise

 

so effectively all you have with the deductive ‘argument’ is a restatement of the initial premise or proposal in a different form

 

Spinoza’s ‘proofs’ are restatements of his propositions

 

reason for Spinoza – is repetition

 

and if this is all ‘reason’ or ‘intellect’ comes to – then reason or intellect is little more than a pretence

 

‘intellect’ or reason?

 

‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional action

 

I put the view that reason is the critical capacity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

as to the happiness or blessedness of man –

 

one’s happiness may involve reason – that is – may involve critical activity – however one may be happy without critical activity

 

as to happiness or blessedness being tied to the intuitive knowledge of God –

 

firstly – what is intuitive knowledge – but knowledge that is not critically evaluated –

 

and knowledge of God –

 

‘God’ – is a name for known

 

we propose in relation to the unknown – in reaction to the unknown

 

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no perfection – or perfection of the intellect / propositional action

 

what we deal with ‘intellectually’ – is propositional uncertainty

 

as to the nature of God –

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown – is not a necessity – and nothing follows from it

 

human beings – propositional actors – have no ultimate aim –

 

any ‘aim’ is propositional – and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we do not conceive ‘adequately’ – our conceptions are uncertain

 

 

V. Accordingly no rational life is without intelligence, and things are only good in so far they help man to enjoy intellectual life, which is defined intelligence (intelligentia). But those things which prevent a man from perfecting his reason and enjoying a rational life – these things, I say, alone we call evil.

 

 

‘intelligence’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to interpretation

 

it is not the case that things are only good in so far as they help man to enjoy intellectual life

 

what is good – is open to question – open to doubt – and open to interpretation –

 

many would say that sensual experience – can be a non-intellectual good – and the source of enjoyment

 

a rational life – is a life of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

man has the capacity to challenge prejudice – pretence – and authoritarianism

 

by the same token – much of human activity and experience is non-critical – this does not make such human activity and experience ‘evil’ – it just makes it – irrational

 

furthermore – there is nothing good or bad in itself about irrational propositional behaviour – just as there is nothing good or bad in itself regarding rational propositional action

 

the rational and the irrational are propositional realities – propositional possibilities –

 

we live with and operate with the irrational and the rational

 

 

VI. But inasmuch as all things of which man is the affecting cause are necessarily good, therefore nothing evil can happen to man save from external causes, namely, in so far as he is a part of the whole of nature, to whose laws human nature is forced to submit, and to agree with which it is compelled in almost infinite ways.

 

 

in so far as man is a part of nature ‘all things of which man is the affecting cause’ – are natural

 

whether they are proposed as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ – depends on one’s propositional conceptions of good and evil

 

and any proposal put here is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as for ‘external causes’ –

 

any so called ‘external cause’ is a proposal put –

 

how it is evaluated is – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

so called ‘laws of human nature’ – are proposals – open to question –

 

‘in almost infinite ways’

 

 

VII. Nor can it come about that man is not a part of nature, nor follow its common order, but if he dwells among individuals which agree with him in nature, by that very fact his power of acting is aided and fostered. And if, on the other hand, he dwells among individuals who agree with him in no wise in nature, he will scarcely be able to accommodate himself with them without a great change in his nature.

 

 

just what man is a ‘part of’– and whether there is any ‘common order’ to what man is a ‘part of’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘but if he dwells among individuals which agree with him in nature, by that very fact his power of acting is aided and fostered’

 

‘our power of acting’ – ‘is aided and fostered’ – by critical thinking –

 

if there is no question – no doubt – no uncertainty – among those who we dwell with – there is no rational life to be had with them – and they will have nothing of rational significance to offer us –

 

the reality is – we dwell among people with different understandings and different perspectives

 

we live in a critical reality – a reality of question – of doubt – and uncertainty

 

dealing with those who do not agree with – is a common logical reality – and it is no bad thing – for it challenges us – and offers us different propositional perspectives

 

if we deal with those who do not agree with us in a rational manner – we will put them to question and we will put ourselves to question

 

and whatever the result – it too should be put to question

 

whether we are relating to those who agree with us – or those who do not – if we live rationally and effectively – we question – we doubt – and we explore the uncertainty of the propositions we put – and those propositions put us

 

VIII. Whatever exists in the universe which we judge to be bad, or capable of preventing us from existing and enjoying a rational life, we may remove from us in the way that seems the safest: and whatever, on the other hand, exists which we judge to be good or useful for the preserving of our being and the enjoyment of rational life, we may seize and use in whatever way we please. And in absolute terms everyone can do by the sovereign rights of nature whatever he judges will be of advantage to him.

 

 

a judgment is a proposal – open to question –

 

and this notion of ‘right’ – or ‘sovereign right’ – is just rhetoric – authoritarian rhetoric

 

all we have – is proposal – and there is nothing behind it – nothing to ground or guarantee it

 

the rational life is the critical life –

 

in order for it to flourish – critical activity does not require anything to be removed from the universe – or for that matter – added to it

 

the only ‘threat’ to the rational life – to critical activity – is the delusion of certainty – and the authoritarian structures that underpin – support – and benefit from it

 

yes – you can do whatever you judge / propose – to be of advantage to you –

 

but any such judgment – if rational – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –

 

i.e. – what you may judge is to your advantage – may disadvantage others

 

and in such a case – you may decide to forgo the advantage – so that others may not suffer

 

 

IX. Nothing can agree more with the nature of anything than other individuals of the same species: and therefore (No. 7) nothing exists that is more useful to a man for preserving his being and enjoying a rational life than a man who is led by reason. Again, inasmuch as we know nothing among particular things which is more excellent than a man who is led by reason, therefore everyone can show his skill and ingenuity in nothing better than in so educating men that they live according to the command of their own reason.

 

 

individuals – within a species – can and do disagree

 

a man who is led by reason – is a critical man – a man who questions – doubts and explores propositional uncertainty

 

a critical approach may or may not be useful to a man for preserving his being –

 

and it may be irrelevant to the matter of preserving one’s being

 

and a critical approach – logical as it is – might not be a source of enjoyment

 

calling a life of reason – that is the critical approach to life ‘excellent’ – strikes me as advertising and rhetoric

 

I think educating others to have an open mind and to think critically – is a good thing to do

 

 

X. In so far as men are affected with envy or any other emotions of hatred they are contrary to one another, and consequently they are more to be feared the more power they have than the other individuals of nature.

 

 

one fears what one cannot or does not deal with rationally –

 

that is what one does not put to question – does not put to doubt – and does not critically explore

 

our power rests in our critical capacity

 

one may be envious without hatred –

 

and the one who does hate will only have the pretence of power – if his hate is not put to question – not put to doubt – and its uncertainty unexplored

 

 

XI. But minds are conquered not by arms but by love and generosity.

 

 

to suggest that the minds of others are to be conquered – one way or the other – is to propose that the relation between men is one of aggression

 

love and friendship if true – and if rational is a gift – not a conquest

 

propositional actors are not to be conquered – they are to be put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored

 

 

XII. It is above all useful to men that they join together in companionship and bind themselves together with such bonds by which they can most easily make one being of them all, and absolutely do those things which serve for the purpose of confirming friendship.

 

 

companionship –

 

the company of others – is always open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

companionship can be productive – and it can be destructive

 

the idea that men can ‘make one being of them all’ – is a philosophical fantasy –

 

men are individual propositional actors –

 

and ‘friendship’ – again – as with any propositional relation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

a good friendship is a rational friendship –

 

friends should put each other to question – to doubt – and help other to explore their uncertainties

 

 

XIII. But for this skill and vigilance is required. For men are varied (for those are rare who live according to the rule of reason), and moreover they are generally envious and more prone to revenge than pity. There is need, therefore, of considerable strength of mind to regard each one according to his disposition and to constrain oneself and not to imitate the emotions of others. But those who are cavil at men and prefer rather to reprobate vices than to inculcate virtues, and those who do not strengthen, but weaken the minds of men – these, I say are a nuisance both to themselves and others. Wherefore many, owing to too great impatience of mind and a false zeal for religion, have preferred to live among beasts rather than among men: just as children or youths who cannot bear with equanimity the reproaches of their parents, run away to enlist and choose the inconveniences of war and the command of a tyrant rather than the conveniences of home and paternal admonition, and who will bear any kind of burden provided they may thereby spite their parents.

 

 

‘But for this skill and vigilance is required. For men are varied (for those are rare who live according to the rule of reason), and moreover they are generally envious and more prone to revenge than pity.’

 

yes – men and women are varied – and there is no ‘rule’ of reason –

 

a rule is a game concept –

 

a game can only be played in terms of its rules –

 

where there are no rules – there is no game –

 

‘reason’ – is not a game

 

reason is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

there are no ‘rules’ to the critical process

 

as to – ‘they are more generally envious and prone to revenge than pity’

 

this proposal / proposition – is of course open to question –

 

and what reason or evidence does Spinoza provide for this generalization?

 

‘There is need, therefore, of considerable strength of mind to regard each one according to his disposition and to constrain oneself and not to imitate the emotions of others.’

 

it is not a question of ‘strength of mind’ – it is rather a matter of critical openness and flexibility

 

how we regard ‘each one’ – rationally speaking – is a matter open to question

 

why would you want to ‘imitate’ the emotions of others?

 

‘But those who are cavil at men and prefer rather to reprobate vices than to inculcate virtues, and those who do not strengthen, but weaken the minds of men – these, I say are a nuisance both to themselves and others.’

 

those who find fault with others – are as rationally blind – as those who preach virtues

both are a nuisance and tiresome

 

the best we can do for others is to put their propositions and their propositional behaviour to question – and to help them explore their uncertainties

 

‘Wherefore many, owing to too great impatience of mind and a false zeal for religion, have preferred to live among beasts rather than among men: just as children or youths who cannot bear with equanimity the reproaches of their parents, run away to enlist and choose the inconveniences of war and the command of a tyrant rather than the conveniences of home and paternal admonition, and who will bear any kind of burden provided they may thereby spite their parents.’

 

men – women – children and youths – follow different paths in the exploration of an uncertain reality –

 

to understand and to assist our fellow travellers – we need an open mind – and a critical temperament

 

 

XIV. Therefore, although men are as a rule governed in everything by their lust, yet from their common society many more advantages than disadvantages follow. Wherefore it is preferable to bear their injuries with equanimity, and to be zealous for those things which produce harmony and friendship.

 

‘Therefore, although men are as a rule governed in everything by their lust, yet from their common society many more advantages than disadvantages follow.’

 

this is a proposition that requires empirical evidence – to even get off the ground –

 

and we have none from Spinoza –

 

men and women can be ‘governed’ by ignorance – dogmatism and prejudice

 

or they can exercise their freedom – and question – doubt – and explore propositional uncertainty

 

and how can it be established – that there are more advantages than disadvantages for men and women in common society?

 

any such proposal – is clearly open to question

 

‘Wherefore it is preferable to bear their injuries with equanimity, and to be zealous for those things which produce harmony and friendship.’

 

‘bearing injuries with equanimity’ – is really the philosophy of the slave

 

there is no advantage in submitting to injustice –

 

we should tackle injustice – not with equanimity – but rather with rationality

 

harmony and friendship – are no simple matters –

 

just what they amount to – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain

 

and furthermore – they should not be seen as a substitute for individual and social justice

 

 

XV. The things which give rise to harmony are those which have reference to justice, equity and honourable dealing. For men are ill pleased not only when a thing is unjust or injurious, but also when it is held to be disgraceful. or, when any one despises the customs of the state. But for procuring love those things are especially necessary which relate to religion and piety. On which points see Notes I and 2 Prop. 17, and Note: Prop. 46, and Note, Prop. 73, Part IV.

 

 

harmony – is a pretence – albeit – generally speaking – a pleasant pretence

 

it is a mask placed over propositional reality – the reality of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

justice – equity – and honourable dealing – are critical matters – and their status is uncertain

 

we might have an experience of harmony – if and when – we suspend critical thinking

 

and there is nothing wrong with this – we can all welcome a break from critical thinking

 

however – the propositional reality remains – and it is a critical reality

 

if a thing is unjust or injurious – we are best to deal with it rationally

 

and as for what is disgraceful – well that is a matter open to question

 

what is regarded as ‘disgraceful’ to one – will not be so – to another

 

the ‘customs of the state’ – are entrenched propositional practises – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

no intelligent citizen will simply submit to state customs

 

the point is not to despise – but rather to critically evaluate –

 

and this – I suggest – happens as a matter of course in any society

 

‘love’ – for some – may well be tied to religion and piety – but for others – not so

 

is Spinoza suggesting – only religious people love?

 

 

XVI. Harmony is often born of fear, but then it is not trustworthy. Moreover fear arises from weakness of the mind, and therefore does not appertain to the use of reason: nor does compassion, although it seems to present an appearance of piety.

 

 

the notion of harmony arises when critical thinking is suspended –

 

fear does not arise from ‘weakness of the mind’ –

 

fear is a natural propositional reaction to threat

 

can harmony arise out of fear – as a response to fear – I suppose so –

 

as for harmony being trustworthy or not –

 

any propositional response that is an avoidance of critical thinking – is irrational

 

and people do ‘trust’ the irrational –

 

however – any ‘trust’ – if it is to be rational – must be put to question

 

and so – it is with compassion –

 

a non-critical compassion – is irrational

 

‘harmony’ as I see it – is a notion that comes from music – and is then applied in other propositional contexts

 

and the ground of this notion of harmony is mathematical –

 

mathematics is a rule based propositional game –

 

and harmony a rule based propositional / mathematical structure in sound

 

the key point here is that – rationality is not a rule- based propositional game –

 

rationality is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

and so – this notion of harmony is misapplied in any discussion of rationality 

 

 

XVII. Men, moreover, are won over by open-heartedness (largitas) especially those who have not the wherewithal to purchase what is necessary for sustaining life. However, to give to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and advantage of a private man. For the riches of a private man are far too little for such a thing. Moreover, the ability of one man is far too limited for him to be able to unite all mem to himself in friendship: for which reason the care of the poor is incumbent on society as a whole, and looks to the general advantage only.

 

 

‘Men, moreover, are won over by open-heartedness (largitas) especially those who have not the wherewithal to purchase what is necessary for sustaining life.’

 

men and women may be ‘won over by open-heartedness’ – but there is no guarantee of this –

 

being ‘open’ to the other person – is rational – and is generous

 

but it may not win them over – if ‘winning them over’ – amounts to getting them to be open to you – being generous in return – or perhaps just agreeing with you – or accepting you

 

the other may not be won over – and may simply take advantage of you – of your open-heartedness – of your generosity

 

‘for which reason the care of the poor is incumbent on society as a whole, and looks to the general advantage only.’

 

there will always be those – who for whatever reason – are advantaged relative to their fellow citizens – and those who disadvantaged – for whatever reason – relative to others

 

however – in a just society – all citizens should be accorded basic social security –

 

I would think – all citizens should be guaranteed housing – health services – education – and employment –

 

how these basics of social security are to be ensured – is a question for each society – for each culture – and for the uncertain art of politics

 

 

XVIII. In accepting benefits and returning thanks our concern must be wholly different: concerning which see Note, Prop.7-. and Note, Prop. 71, Part IV.

 

 

the act of gift giving is propositional – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

and any propositional response to a gift – if it is to be rational – will be a critical assessment

 

I think one can be critically aware – and at the same time pragmatic –

 

ideally – I would say that a gift should be accepted and reciprocated

 

the point being that if accepted and reciprocated – there is no loss to either party

 

and if reciprocation is not possible – the best approach – I think – is to decline the gift

 

and to explain that it is declined – not because one is ungrateful – but rather because one cannot reciprocate –

 

having said that – gift giving and receiving – is an uncertain business – and we are best to understand it as such

 

 

XIX.  Moreover, meretricious love, that is the lust of generation which arises from beauty, and absolutely all love which acknowledges any other cause than freedom of the mind, passes easily into hatred, unless – what is still worse – it be a sort of madness, and then it is fostered more by discord than by harmony (see Coroll., Prop. 32, Part III.)

 

logically speaking – love – however characterized – i.e. – as ‘sensual’ – or ‘sexual’ – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

if not dealt with critically – it is irrational

 

and ‘madness’ I would suggest – is propositional action that is pursued without question – without doubt – and to those who are caught up in it – seen to be a driven certainty

 

madness – is not rational –

 

it can be destructive – it can be creative

 

 

XX. As for what concerns matrimony, it is certain that it is in concord with reason if the desire of uniting bodies is engendered not from beauty alone, but also from the love of bearing children and wisely educating them: moreover, if the love of either of them, that is, of husband or wife, has for its cause not only beauty, but also, and above all, freedom of mind.

 

 

‘not from beauty alone’ – why not?

 

and people marry who do not want to have children

 

the propositional / empirical reality is that people marry for any number of reasons –

 

and furthermore – they end marriages for any number of reasons –

 

marriage – as with any propositional relation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as for a rational marriage –

 

any intimacy between people will likely be characterized by a mixture of the irrational and rational

 

and freedom of mind?

 

a free mind is an open mind – a critical mind –

 

when we put our proposals to question – to doubt – and explore their uncertainty – and help the other to do the same – we share the gift of rationality

 

whether doing so results in a successful marriage or not – is itself – open to question

 

and what counts as a successful marriage?

 

this is a matter for the husband and wife to determine – for the husband and wife to come to understand –

 

and any determination – any understanding reached – will come – as the result of question – of doubt – and the exploration of each other’s uncertainties

 

 

XXI. Flattery also gives rise to harmony, but only by means of the abhorrent crime of slavery or by means of perfidy: none are more taken in by flattery than the proud, who wish to be the first and are not.

 

 

‘Flattery also gives rise to harmony, but only by means of the abhorrent crime of slavery or by means of perfidy’

 

I think the idea here – is that the one put in a disadvantaged position – due to subjugation or deceit – tries to achieve – and perhaps does – a sense of worthiness – through flattery of the one who dominants or persecutes

 

and if so – the sense of worthiness – or Spinoza’s so-called ‘harmony’ – achieved through flattery – is a deception – and illusion

 

perhaps – though – there are circumstances where one might need to deceive oneself in order to survive harsh realities?

 

in any case – any so-called ‘harmony’ – is really an avoidance of propositional reality – of rationality

 

the reality of question of doubt and of propositional uncertainty

 

‘none are more taken in by flattery than the proud, who wish to be the first and are not.’

 

one can be legitimately proud of one’s achievements –

 

however – false pride is a form of deception – where one credits oneself – for achievements that one has not secured

 

such a person – may well be ‘taken in’ by flattery –

 

or they may see it for what it is – a false response to their falseness

 

also – one may be flattered by another – without being proud – or without having a false pride

 

it may just be a means of the other ingratiating themselves –

 

and this can be quite harmless –

 

in any case flattery – as with any propositional action – if viewed rationally – should be put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

 

 

XXII. There is in self- abasement a false appearance of piety and religion; and although self-abasement is contrary to pride, yet one who abases himself is the nearest to the proud man (see Note, Prop. 57, Part IV,).

 

 

pride – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

Spinoza has a negative view of pride –

 

but we can ask – is there anything wrong with taking pride in oneself?

 

for pride can be seen as valuing oneself – and having a realistic view of one’s achievements

 

self-abasement – as with any propositional behaviour is open to question

 

humiliating or belittling oneself – one would think is neither a healthy or well-balanced view of oneself

 

however – self-abasement could be an attempt to maintain a sense of oneself – in the face of some form of oppression – and therefore – not without value as a survival strategy

 

 

XXIII. Shame also is conducive to harmony, but only in those things that cannot be hidden. Again, as shame is a sort of pain, it has no relation to the use of reason

 

 

‘Shame also is conducive to harmony, but only in those things that cannot be hidden.’

 

I can see that one may acknowledge shame in the hope of reconciliation –

 

however – whether or not that acknowledgment has the desired result – is open to question –

 

it would all depend on propositional circumstance and the propositional actors involved

 

it may work – or it may not –

 

i.e. – it may just result in dismissal or even ridicule by others

 

‘Again, as shame is a sort of pain, it has no relation to the use of reason’

 

any emotional / propositional action – has ‘a relation to the use of reason’

 

as any emotional / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

pain – is open to question – open to interpretation – is a logically uncertain experience

 

and any experience of shame – likewise – can be rationally assessed

 

 

XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed to justice, equity, honourable life, piety and religion, and although indignation seems to present an appearance of equity, yet life would be lawless in many a place where each one could pass judgment concerning the actions of another and enforce either his own right or the right of another.

 

 

our emotional / propositional experiences – be they of pain and sadness or pleasure and joy – are not opposed to justice – equity – an honourable life – piety or religion

 

emotional experience – uncertain as it is – is the ground of our notions of justice – equity – the honourable life – piety – religion – and other propositional constructions or ways of being that that we propose

 

for it is out of the uncertainty of our emotional experience that we propose and explore these notions

 

pain or sadness – is no different to any other emotional experience – it is open to question open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

as for ‘indignation’ – or anger provoked by injustice – its value is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

I suspect that there will be circumstances where a propositional actor puts his / her indignation to what he / she regards as a good use –

 

and there will be propositional contexts – where indignation is regarded as of no use or even counter-productive

 

 

XXV. Modesty (modestia), that is the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason, has reference (as we said in the first Note of Prop, 37, Part IV.) to piety. But if it arises from emotion, then it is ambition, or, a desire whereby men, under the false guise of piety, excite discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid others either by word or deed so that they may enjoy the greatest good – he, I will say, will strive above all to win over their love for himself, and not bring them to a state of wonderment so that a discipline may receive his name nor will he give any cause absolutely for envy. Moreover, in his every day conversation he will take care not to make reference to vice and to speak very sparingly of human want of power: but not at all of human virtue or power, and in what way it can be perfected, so that men endeavour to live not from fear or aversion, but moved only by an emotion of pleasure according to the dictates of reason, as far as in them lies.

 

 

a modest person – is unpretentious –

 

one may adopt a modest approach to life – as a way of being – regardless of whether it is pleasing to others

 

the desire to please others – is natural –

 

where is it is pretentious – it is irrational

 

emotion – and whatever proposal arises from it – is rational – if put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty – explored –

 

we aid others in a rational manner – if we give them the benefit of critical thinking

 

if one is rational – one is open – not restricted in one’s conversation –

 

as to not discussing ‘want of human power’ –

 

‘want of human power’ – is as legitimate a proposal for critical reflection – as any other

 

men do experience fear – to suggest that fear can be ‘philosophically eliminated’ – is unrealistic and fanciful

 

fear – as with any emotion – can be dealt with rationally – with question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

we are not moved – ‘only by an emotion of pleasure’ –

 

and pleasure – as with fear – is open to question – is uncertain

 

 

XXVI. Save men we do not know any particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice or which we may join to us in bonds of friendship or any other kind of association: therefore the consideration of our own advantage does not demand that we preserve whatever exists in nature besides men. Instead, it teaches us that we should preserve or destroy it according to its usefulness, or adapt it to our use in any manner we please.

 

 

‘Save men we do not know any particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice or which we may join to us in bonds of friendship or any other kind of association:’

 

Spinoza it seems doesn’t realise that human beings are not the only sentient creatures in nature

 

to not realise that there are other animals ‘in whose minds we may rejoice’ – is a singular and extraordinary failure of observation and understanding of the natural world

 

it is frankly hard to believe he could be so blind

 

‘therefore the consideration of our own advantage does not demand that we preserve whatever exists in nature besides men. Instead, it teaches us that we should preserve or destroy it according to its usefulness, or adapt it to our use in any manner we please.’

 

this statement to my mind – is beyond the pale

 

even if you accept that man’s only interest is his own advantage – it is blatantly obvious that conserving the natural world is to man’s advantage –

 

it is the natural world that nourishes and sustains man

 

how we preserve our natural environment in a manner that is to our advantage – and to the advantage of other natural creatures – is no simple matter

 

any proposal for preservation or destruction – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

and any proposal for any environmental action – requires our best science and our best critical thinking

 

it is clearly not simply a matter of acting ‘in any manner we please’

 

the idea that we should ‘act in any manner we please’ – is irrational – and to my mind immoral

 

finally – how does Spinoza square the proposal of XXVI – with his statement that ‘man is not a kingdom within a kingdom’?

 

the fact of it is – he cannot –

 

and as a result – either his ‘ethics’ is contradicted by his metaphysics – or his metaphysics is contradicted by his ethics –

 

in any case – the fabric of his philosophy – falls apart at the seams

 

 

XXVII. The advantage we reap from things which are outside us, together with the experience and knowledge we acquire from the fact that we observe them and change them from one form to another, is principally the preservation of the body; and in this respect those things are especially useful which we can so feed and nourish the body that all its parts can rightly perform their functions. For the more the body is apt to be affected in many ways, the more apt is the mind for thinking (see Prop. 38 and 39. Part IV). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature. Wherefore for the nourishment of the body as it is necessary to use many foods of different nature: for the human body is composed of many parts of different nature which need continuous and varied nourishment so that the whole body may be equally fit for all the things that can follow from its nature, and consequently that the mind may be equally fit for the conception of many things.

 

 

‘For the more the body is apt to be affected in many ways, the more apt is the mind for thinking’

 

the body – is a name for propositional activity –

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

and ‘thinking’ – is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of proposition uncertainty

 

it is not a question of being ‘affected in many ways’ –

 

however we are ‘affected’ – that is to say – whatever proposals / propositions – we put or are put to us – if we are being rational – we will engage in the critical activity

 

and furthermore – critical activity – does not depend on physical nourishment –

 

except to say – that if you are too weak and thus unable to function – you may not be able to engage in critical activity –

 

or it may be that with your last breath – you have a question – you have a doubt?

 

and again – the issue is not ‘the conception of many things’ – but rather the critical activity of question of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

 

XXVIII. But for providing these things the strength of one man would scarcely suffice if men did not exchange services. However money has provided a short way to all these things, whence it has come about that the image of money occupies the principal place in the mind of the vulgar, for they can scarcely imagine any kind of pleasure unless it is accompanied by the idea of money as its cause.

 

 

how does Spinoza know this – how can he know this without empirical evidence – evidence he does not have?

 

all we have here from Spinoza is intellectual prejudice –

 

and referring to those who may have a focus on money as ‘vulgar’ – shows Spinoza to be an intellectual snob

 

the logical reality is that any propositional focus is valid

 

and any propositional focus that is critically evaluated is dealt with rationally –

 

this applies to philosophers and their concerns – as much as does to anyone else

 

 

XXIX. But this vice is only theirs who seek to acquire money, not from need or reason of necessity, but because they have learned the arts of gain wherewith to raise themselves to a splendid estate. They feed their bodies of course according to custom, but sparingly, for they think they lose as much of their goods as they spend on the conservation of the body. But those who know the true use of money and moderate their desire of money to their requirement alone are content with very little.

 

 

‘But this vice is only theirs who seek to acquire money, not from need or reason of necessity, but because they have learned the arts of gain wherewith to raise themselves to a splendid estate.’

 

the reasons for acquiring money – are many and varied –

 

any acquisition – is rational – if put to question – put to doubt – the its uncertainty – explored

 

there are those who do acquire money ‘because they have learnt the arts of gain wherewith to raise themselves to a splendid state’ – and who is to say that this activity is a vice?

 

‘They feed their bodies of course according to custom, but sparingly, for they think they lose as much of their goods as they spend on the conservation of the body.’

 

here we get to see the depth of Spinoza’s prejudice against the rich

 

what he is saying here – is that the rich don’t eat much because they think they lose wealth by spending on food

 

I would like to know what evidence Spinoza has for his foray into the eating habits of the rich –

 

and by the sounds of it – Spinoza never met a rich fat person

 

in any case this comment is beneath Spinoza – for it has no basis in empirical evidence or rational argument – and is clearly a statement of straight-out prejudice

 

‘But those who know the true use of money and moderate their desire of money to their requirement alone are content with very little.’

 

the ‘true use of money’ – is any use that is affirmed by the user –

 

and any rational use of money – is a use put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

full marks to those who are ‘content with very little’ – but not everyone falls into that category

 

and let’s be clear the matter is relative –

 

what Spinoza might regard as very little – someone who has less than he has – may see him as being rich –

 

what people are ‘content with’ – is a matter for them –

 

and if their content is rational – it will have been put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

 

 

XXX. Since, therefore, those things which are good which aid the parts of the body to fulfil their functions, and since pleasure consists in the fact that the power of man, in so far as he consists of mind and body, is aided or increased – all these things then which bring pleasure are good. But since things do not act with the end in view of giving pleasure, and since their power of acting is not tempered according to our need, and moreover, since pleasure as a rule has reference to one part of the body in particular, most of our emotions of pleasure (unless we have regard for reason and keep watch over them) and consequently our desires also are excessive. To which must be added that when we follow our emotions, we count as primary that which is pleasure in the present, nor can we estimate a future thing with an equal emotion of mind (see Note, Prop. 44 and Note, Prop. 60, Part IV.).

 

 

‘Since, therefore, those things which are good which aid the parts of the body to fulfil their functions, and since pleasure consists in the fact that the power of man, in so far as he consists of mind and body, is aided or increased – all these things then which bring pleasure are good.’

 

the power of man – rests in man’s critical / rational capacity

 

‘pleasure’ – may or may not aid one’s rational capacity –

 

and ‘pleasure’ – as with any other propositional experience – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

not all things which bring pleasure – are assessed as ‘good’

 

‘But since things do not act with the end in view of giving pleasure, and since their power of acting is not tempered according to our need’

 

‘things’ are proposals –

 

‘things’ – do not act – it is propositional actors – that act

 

proposals are logical entities – which if critically investigated reveal logical / propositional possibility

 

‘our needs’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘and moreover, since pleasure as a rule has reference to one part of the body in particular, most of our emotions of pleasure (unless we have regard for reason and keep watch over them) and consequently our desires also are excessive.’

 

even if you accept that ‘that pleasure as a rule has reference to one part of the body’

and even with the qualification of ‘reason and keeping a watch over them’ – it does not follow that – ‘most of our emotions of pleasure and consequently our desires are excessive’

 

what grounds does Spinoza have here for saying our emotion of pleasure and our desires are excessive?

 

and how does Spinoza define ‘excessive’?

 

Spinoza’s ‘argument’ here – just strikes me as very incomplete – if not empty

 

‘To which must be added that when we follow our emotions, we count as primary that which is pleasure in the present, nor can we estimate a future thing with an equal emotion of mind (see Note, Prop. 44 and Note, Prop. 60, Part IV.).’

 

when we follow our emotions – is just when we act

 

do we always count as primary that which is pleasure in the present?

 

I don’t know – and Spinoza offers no evidence for this proposal –

 

at best we can say – the matter is open to question

 

and as to ‘a future thing’ – well – the matter – of course – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

XXXI. But superstition, on the contrary, seems to call that grand which brings pain and that bad which brings pleasure. But we have already said (see Note, Prop. 45., Part IV.), no one save an envious person takes pleasure in my wont of power and inconvenience. For the greater emotion of pleasure we are affected with, the greater perfection we pass on to, and consequently the more we partake of the divine nature: nor can pleasure ever be had which is guided by a true regard for our advantage. But he on the other hand, who is led by fear and does what is good in order to avoid what is bad, is not led by reason (see prop. 63, Part IV.).

 

 

‘But superstition, on the contrary, seems to call that grand which brings pain and that bad which brings pleasure.’

 

the propositional reality is that there are ethical / religious systems – and variations that see pain or suffering – as a way to salvation – and see the pursuit of pleasure – as immoral

 

the logical reality is that any view of pain – or of pleasure – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

pleasure and pain – are uncertain propositional states

 

‘But we have already said (see Note, Prop. 45., Part IV.), no one save an envious person takes pleasure in my wont of power and inconvenience.’

 

it does depend on who you are and what you have done –

 

I may take pleasure in another’s wont of power – if when he / she had power they disadvantaged me

 

‘For the greater emotion of pleasure we are affected with, the greater perfection we pass on to, and consequently the more we partake of the divine nature:’

 

firstly – there is no perfection –

 

perfection is just a reconfiguration of the notion of certainty –

 

and certainty is a delusion

 

pleasure if rationally assessed – leads to question – to doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty –

 

as to ‘partaking in divine nature’ –

 

what we ‘partake in’ – is propositional reality –

 

and propositional reality is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘nor can pleasure ever be had which is guided by a true regard for our advantage.’

 

I think this is a mistranslation

 

in the Curley edition of the ‘Ethics’ – we have instead –

 

‘Nor can joy which is governed by the true principle of our advantage ever be evil’ –

 

it is up for question whether the experience of joy is ‘governed by the true principle of our advantage’

 

I don’t know that you can say that joy is governed by any principle –

 

joy – however explained – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

there may well be propositional actors – in certain propositional contexts – who take a dark view of joy

 

‘But he on the other hand, who is led by fear and does what is good in order to avoid what is bad, is not led by reason (see prop. 63, Part IV.).’

 

again – fear is a natural propositional state – and if viewed rationally is put to question

 

and reason just is the critical process of question – of doubt and the exploration of uncertainty

 

I can well understand someone – who after critically evaluating a situation decides that doing good will avoid an evil –

 

now that decision and course of action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – but it is not irrational

 

 

XXXII. But human power is considerably limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, and therefore we have not absolute power of adapting things which are outside us for our usage. But we shall bear the equanimity of those things which happen to us contrary to that which a regard for our advantage postulates, if we are conscious that we have performed our duty and cannot extend the power we have to such an extent as to avoid those things, and moreover, that we are a part of nature as a whole, whose order we follow. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is called our understanding, or rather intelligence, that is, the best part in us, will acquiesce in this entirely, and will endeavour to persist in that acquiescence. For in so far as we understand, we can desire nothing save what is true; and therefore in so far as we understand this rightly, the endeavour of the best part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.

 

 

‘But human power is considerably limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, and therefore we have not absolute power of adapting things which are outside us for our usage.’

 

human power – is the power of rationality – the power of question – the power of doubt – the power of the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

‘things which are outside us’ – are proposals put

 

any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no ‘absolute power’ – any proposed power – is open to question – is uncertain

 

‘But we shall bear the equanimity of those things which happen to us contrary to that which a regard for our advantage postulates, if we are conscious that we have performed our duty and cannot extend the power we have to such an extent as to avoid those things, and moreover, that we are a part of nature as a whole, whose order we follow.’

 

what is to our advantage is always an uncertain matter

 

our power is rationality – question – doubt – the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

our nature / our reality – is propositional –

 

and any proposed order – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is called our understanding, or rather intelligence, that is, the best part in us, will acquiesce in this entirely, and will endeavour to persist in that acquiescence.’

 

the ‘best in us’ – is our rational / critical capacity –

 

and when we act rationally – we do not ‘acquiesce’ – we question – we doubt – we explore propositional uncertainty

 

‘For in so far as we understand, we can desire nothing save what is true; and therefore in so far as we understand this rightly, the endeavour of the best part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.’

 

our understanding – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what is true is what we give our assent to –

 

and any proposal of assent – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any proposed ‘order of the whole of nature’ –

 

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

                                                                                                                                  

 

FIFTH PART

 

CONCERNING THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT OR HUMAN FREEDOM

 

 

PREFACE

 

 

I pass on at last to that part of the Ethics which concerns the manner or way which leads to liberty (de modo sive via quae ad libertatem ducit). In this part then, concerning the power of reason. I shall endeavour to show what power reason has over the emotions, and moreover, what is mental liberty or blessedness (mentis libertas seu beaititudo): from which we shall see how far a wise man excels an ignorant. But in what manner or by what means the intellect must be perfected, and again, by what art the body must be completely cured so that it may perform its functions correctly, does not appertain to this part: for the latter relates to medicine and the former to logic. Here, therefore, I shall show, as I said, the power of the mind or reason, and above all how great and of what kind is its power over the emotions to restrain and moderate them. For we have not complete command over our emotions, as we have already shown. The Stoics, however, were of the opinion that the emotions depend absolutely on our free will, and that we have absolute command over them. But they were compelled by the outcry of experience, not by their principles, to confess that not little practise and zeal were required to restrain and moderate them. This someone has endeavoured to point out by the example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, one of a domestic dog and the other hunting: namely, that it can at length be brought about that the domestic dog hunts and the hunting dog refrains from hunting and chasing hares. This opinion is not a little favoured by Descartes, for he held that the soul or mind was particularly united to a certain part of the brain, called the pineal gland, by means of which it feels all the movements that take place in the external body and external objects, and which the mind by the very fact it wishes can move in various ways. He held that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in such a way that it can be moved by the least motion of the animal spirits. He held, moreover, that this gland is suspended in the middle of the brain in as many ways  as the animal spirits impinge on it, and moreover, that there are impressed on that gland as many marks as there were varied external objects propelling the animal spirits towards it: whence it comes about that if the gland is afterwards suspended by the will of the mind moving it in various ways, in this or that way, then the gland drives away and determines the animal spirits in the same way as they were repulsed before by a similar suspension of the gland. He held, moreover, that every wish or will of the mind is united to a certain motion of the gland, e.g., if anyone has a wish to see a distant object, this will bring it about that the pupil is extended; but if he thought only of the dilation of the pupil alone, it would profit him nothing to have the wish to see that thing, inasmuch as the motion of the gland which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a convenient way for contracting or dilating the pupil, is not joined in nature to the wish to contract or dilate it, but with the wish to see objects near or far. He held, finally, that although each motion of this gland seems to be connected by nature to a certain one of our thoughts at the beginning of our lives, yet it could be joined through habit to others: this he endeavours to prove inn the Passions de l’Ame, Part I., Art. 50. he thereby concludes that there is no mind so weak that it cannot, if well directed, acquire absolute power of its passions. For these as defined

by him are perceptions or feelings or disturbances of the mind which have reference to

its species, and which are produced, preserved, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits (see Descartes’ Passions de l’Ame, Part I., Art. 27). But since we can join each motion of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, to any will, the determination of the will depends on our power alone. If therefore, we determine our will by certain fixed decisions according to which we will to direct the actions of our life, and unite the movements of the passions which we wish to have to these decisions, we shall have absolute dominion over the passions. This the opinion of that illustrious man (as I gather it from his own words), which I would scarcely have believed to have been put forward by so great a man, were it less acute. I cannot sufficiently wonder that a philosophic man, who directly stated that he would deduce nothing save self-evident principles, and that he would assert nothing save what he perceived clearly and distinctly – one, moreover, who so many times reproved the schoolmen for wishing to explain obscure things by occult qualities, should put forward an hypothesis far more occult than all occult qualities. What does he understand, I ask, by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct conception, I say, has he thought closely united with a certain quantitative particle? Truly I should like him to explain this union through it proximate cause. But he conceived the mind so distinct from the body that he could not assign a particular cause for this union nor for the mind itself, but he had perforce to recur to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God. Again, I should like to know how many degrees of motion the mind can impart to the pineal gland, and with how much force it can hold it suspended? For I know not whether this gland is moved around more quickly or slowly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the movements of the passions which we have united securely to certain firm decisions cannot be disjoined from them again by corporeal causes: from which it would follow that although the mind have firmly proposed to go out against dangers and had joined to this decision the motions of daring, yet at the sight of the peril the gland would be so suspended  that the mind would only be able to think of flight. And clearly as there is no relation between will and motion, so also there can be no comparison between the power or strength of the mind and body; and consequently the strength of one cannot be determined by the strength of the other. Add to this that this gland is not found situated in the middle of the brain in such a way that it can be moved so easily and in such a number of ways, and that the nerves are not all extended to the cavities of the brain. Finally, I omit everything he asserts concerning the will and its freedom, since I have more than sufficiently shown that it is false. Therefore, inasmuch as the mind’s power, as I have shown above, is defined by understanding alone, the remedies for the emotions (which I think everyone experiences, but does not accurately observe nor distinctly see) we shall determine from mere knowledge of the mind and deduce therefrom all things which relate to blessedness.

 

 

‘I shall endeavour to show what power reason has over the emotions, and moreover, what is mental liberty or blessedness (mentis libertas seu beaititudo): from which we shall see how far a wise man excels an ignorant.’

 

reason is the critical evaluation of proposals / propositions

 

‘emotions’ – and ‘emotion’ – is propositional action

 

it is not a matter of reason having power over emotional proposals / propositional actions

 

rational evaluation – explores the uncertainty of propositional action

 

men question – men doubt and men explore uncertainty – as a matter of course

 

the ignorant man – is he who opts for the delusion of certainty –

 

and the ignorant man is one who holds to the delusion of propositional authority

 

any proposal / proposition put – however further described or explained – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

the only genuine authority – is authorship

 

‘Here, therefore, I shall show, as I said, the power of the mind or reason, and above all how great and of what kind is its power over the emotions to restrain and moderate them. For we have not complete command over our emotions, as we have already shown.’

 

Spinoza speaks as if the emotions are a threat to human beings

 

our emotions – are the proposals we put – in response to the unknown –

 

our emotions plot our way forward –

 

from a rational point of view – it is not a question of restraining our emotions –

 

and it is not a matter of having command over our emotions

 

it is rather a matter of critically evaluating and exploring our emotional / propositional actions

 

‘The Stoics, however, were of the opinion that the emotions depend absolutely on our free will, and that we have absolute command over them. But they were compelled by the outcry of experience, not by their principles, to confess that not little practise and zeal were required to restrain and moderate them. This someone has endeavoured to point out by the example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, one of a domestic dog and the other hunting: namely, that it can at length be brought about that the domestic dog hunts and the hunting dog refrains from hunting and chasing hares.’

 

the Stoics made the same mistake as Spinoza – the issue is not command – but critical evaluation and exploration

 

how domestic dogs and hunting dogs are to be trained – will be a determination that comes about as a results of question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

 

and any such determination – will itself be open to question

 

‘This opinion is not a little favoured by Descartes, for he held that the soul or mind was particularly united to a certain part of the brain, called the pineal gland, by means of which it feels all the movements that take place in the external body and external objects, and which the mind by the very fact it wishes can move in various ways’

 

Descartes – as with Spinoza – and the Stoics – fails to see that the issue is not command and control – but rather rational / critical evaluation –

 

the ‘mind’ and the ‘body’ – are names for propositional action –

 

the logical reality is propositional –

 

that is to say we operate with proposals / propositions – however they are further explained or described – and if we are dealing with them rationally – they are put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored –

 

seen in these terms – the mind / body issue – simply dissolves – into the issue of the critical evaluation of proposals put

 

our focus must be on the propositional actor – regardless of how he / she – is analysed or deconstructed – and on his / her propositional actions –

 

philosophers have got caught up and lost in their explanations – to the point where they no longer see what their explanations are explanations of –

 

and the best example of this mistake is in the work of Descartes –

 

for to him – his explanations – became real substances

 

and he was left with the problem of how to turn his two ‘substances’ – back into the one propositional actor

 

his ‘gland theory’ – fails to do this – for you still have two ‘substances’ – however they are supposedly ‘connected’ or however they are supposed to “interact’

 

in Descartes the unity of the propositional actor is lost – in a mish mash of substance interaction –

 

the Australian mind-brain identity theory – effectively – another ‘gland theory’ – avoids Descartes’ problem by simply hypothesizing the mind as brain –

 

it is just a straight our materialist / physicalist assertion – that does not recognize Descartes’ dualism –

 

however – as with Descartes and Spinoza – the mind-brain identity theorists make the mistake of substance

 

logically speaking our reality is not a substance or substances – it is a proposal or proposals – it is propositional

 

propositional actors engaged in critical inquiry have proposed / created / invented the mind proposal – and proposed / created / invented the body proposal –

 

and these proposals being useful – have become entrenched in our thought and language

 

the point is – we find it useful to have propositional focus

 

and we describe such foci – under different headings – with different descriptions – i.e. – under the description ‘mind’ – under the description ‘body’ –

 

and so – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are no more than efficient propositional descriptions or categories that have focus value –

 

whatever the focus – or its description – the issue is the critical evaluation of propositions put – of propositional action

 

that is proposals / propositions – put question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored

 

Spinoza goes on to critically evaluate Descartes’ gland theory – and in this connection says –

 

‘Truly I should like him to explain this union through it proximate cause. But he conceived the mind so distinct from the body that he could not assign a particular cause for this union nor for the mind itself, but he had perforce to recur to the cause of the whole universe, that is, to God.’

 

‘God’ has been a backstop for both Descartes and Spinoza

 

for both – ‘God’ – is the explanation that is the end of explanation –

 

what both philosophers have failed to face and deal with is the unknown –

 

and no amount of deductive argument or construction – can cover the fact that all our propositional action is a response to the unknown

 

and if the term ‘God’ – has any coherent meaning – then ‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

Spinoza continues to savage Descartes’ gland theory –

 

however – one thing that can be said for Descartes here – is that his interactionist theory – though in the end – beset with fatal problems – was innovative and valiant – and that it was a genuine attempt to map out the dynamics of the proposed interaction

 

and we might say of Spinoza’s attribute theory – the mind and body as two attributes of the one substance – that yes – it is elegant – and not as messy as Descartes’ interactionist dualism – but is it not – in the end – a mystical theory – and one without explanation – or any attempt at explanation?

 

‘Therefore, inasmuch as the mind’s power, as I have shown above, is defined by understanding alone, the remedies for the emotions (which I think everyone experiences, but does not accurately observe nor distinctly see) we shall determine

 

from mere knowledge of the mind and deduce therefrom all things which relate to blessedness’

 

the ’mind’s’ power is propositional –

 

and rests in the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

 

the emotions are not illnesses that require remedies

 

the ‘emotions’ – are the propositional actions we take in our attempts to construct a workable reality –

 

‘deduction’ is a propositional game – which has no critical value –

 

‘blessedness’ – is a mystical notion – and as with all such notions – an anathema to critical inquiry

 

 

 

AXIOMS

 

 

firstly – an ‘axiom’ is supposedly a self-evident truth

 

there are no ‘self-evident’ truths – no self-evident propositions –

 

a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

to represent a proposal / proposition as self-evident’ – is to perpetrate a logical fraud

 

where you have axioms in mathematics and symbolic logic – what you have is rules – rules to propositional games –

 

propositional games are determined by rules –

 

be it mathematics – symbolic logic – or AFL football – without rules – there is no game

 

as played – the rules – are not put to question – not put to doubt –

 

if their uncertainty is explored – there is no game –

 

there are two modes to propositional experience – to propositional life –

 

the critical mode – and the game mode

 

which is to say we critically evaluate proposals put – and we play propositional games

 

we can play propositional games for any number of reasons –

 

one reason I think is that it gives us some relief from propositional uncertainty –

 

and the main reason I would say is that human beings simply enjoy playing games –

 

be they games of mathematics – chess – or those played on the sporting field –

 

or any other rule based propositional activity

 

 

I. If in the same subject two contrary actions are excited, a change must take place in both or in one of them until they cease to be contrary.

 

 

this may happen – but it is not in any way ‘necessary’ –

 

‘contrary actions’ – point to propositional uncertainty –

 

and propositional uncertainty is the ground of rationality –

 

and the fact is human beings / propositional actors live with uncertainty –

 

it is the ground of our experience –

 

if propositional uncertainty is closed down – we descend into irrationality and ignorance and prejudice

 

 

II. The power of the effect is defined by the power of it cause in so far as its essence is explained or defined through the essence of the cause. This axiom is clear from Prop. 7, Part III.

 

 

any cause /effect analysis is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

firstly – by ‘effect’ – we are talking about a propositional action –

 

any proposed cause of a propositional action – is open to question

 

and ‘the power of its effect’ – is its propositional consequence –

 

and this can only be understood – if put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored

 

 

PROPOSITIONS

 

 

PROP. I. Just as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, so the modifications of the body, or, the images of things, are exactly arranged and connected in the body.

 

 

the first thing to note here is that we are still dealing with a dualism of mind and body

 

the arrangement and connection proposed here is a parallelism – not a unity –

 

and really – any claim of parallelism here – has to be more than just an assertion –

 

if there is no empirical evidence for it – then it has no actual reality

 

we have no empirical argument from Spinoza

 

Spinoza assumes an underlying unity of substance –

 

however – the parallelism argument can be proposed without the assumption of substantial unity

 

i.e. – two different substances may be ‘arranged and connected’ – operate – parallel to each other –

 

the unity – is assumed – but the logical reality is – that if you begin with a dualism – of any kind – the unity is fractured – and left as an empty assumption

 

on the other hand – if you start with the reality of unity – then any propositional division – comes as a result of propositional focus

 

and a propositional focus here is a focus on proposals / propositions put – not on the myth of substance

 

and any proposal / proposition put – however further described – i.e. of the body – of the mind – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

we can get on with the critical evaluation of proposal – and discard dualism – in whatever form – be it Descartes’ interaction of different substances – or Spinoza’s parallelism of ideas and modifications of the body

 

the mind / body problem only emerges as a result of not recognising that the issue is propositional

 

substance is the black hole of the failure of perspective –

 

it is the failure that comes about by not facing the propositional reality – and not dealing with it in a critical manner

 

 

Proof. – The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (Prop. 7, Part II.), and vice versa, the order an connection of things is the same (Coroll., Prop. 6 and 7, Part II.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore just as the order and connection of ideas in the mind is made according to the order and connection of the modifications of the body (Prop. 18, Part II.), so vice versa (Prop. II, Part III.), the order and connections of the modifications of the body is made according as thoughts and ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –

 

the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action –

 

‘ideas’ – are proposals – ‘things’ are proposals

 

an ‘idea of thing’ – is the thing / proposal – proposed–

 

‘things’ and ‘ideas’ are not separate logical entities – separate exists

 

they are one in the same – the proposal

 

there is only the proposal – and the proposal is that proposed

 

outside of the proposal / propositional reality – is the unknown

 

 

PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the mind, or an emotion from the thought of an external cause and unite it to other thoughts, then love or hatred towards the external cause, as well as waverings of the mind which arise from these emotions, are destroyed.

 

 

Proof. – For that which constitutes the form of love or hatred is pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. Emo. 6 and 7). When this is then removed, the form of love or hatred is also removed: and therefore these emotions and those which arise from them are destroyed. Q.e.d.

 

 

an ‘external cause’ – is a proposal –

 

that is to say an external cause only exists – if it is proposed –

 

and any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘a disturbance of the mind or emotion’ – in logical propositional terms – is a propositional conflict

 

which is to say that ‘a disturbance of the mind or emotion – results from propositional uncertainty

 

‘love or hatred’ – likewise – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

uniting it – the disturbance – to other thoughts – if this is a critical activity – will put the disturbance – and any love or hate to question – to doubt – and may facilitate an exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

we cannot say – as it were a priori – what the result of any such critical exploration will result in

 

there may well be resolution of the propositional conflict – but if so – any such ‘resolution’ will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

emotions are not ‘destroyed’ – emotions are proposed or not – enacted or not – and if proposed – if enacted – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

an emotion / proposal  can be replaced with another emotion / proposal – and an emotion /  propositional action – can be discontinued

 

 

PROP. III. An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.

 

 

an ‘emotion’ is a description of a propositional action – a ‘passion’ is a description of a propositional action

 

however described – a propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no logical distinction between an ‘emotion’ – and a ‘passion’

 

for all intents and purposes – these names / descriptions of propositional are interchangeable –

 

a ‘clear and distinct idea’ – is a proposal that has not been put to question – not been put to doubt – its uncertainty – left unexplored

 

such proposals are naïve – and of no logical value

 

 

Proof. – An emotion which is a passion is a confused idea (Gen. Def. Emo.). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of this emotion, this idea will be distinguished only conceptually (non risi ratione) from the emotion in so far as it has reference to the mind alone (Prop. 21, Part II., with its Note): and therefore (Prop. 3, Part III.) the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.e.d.

 

 

all ideas / proposals are logically uncertain

 

to form a clear and distinct idea of an emotion / passion – is to defy critical analysis

 

the mark of a clear and distinct idea / proposal – is ignorance

 

there is no ‘reference to the mind alone’ –

 

the reference of any propositional action – is the propositional actor

 

our emotional life is passionate –

 

if we examine or emotions / passions critically – we deal with them rationally

 

Corollary. Therefore the more an emotion becomes known to us, the more it is within our power and the less the mind is passive in regard to it.

 

our emotions / passions – are proposals – we put – propositional actions – we enact

 

there is no question of them not being ‘in our power’ –

 

and our power – rests in the critical capacity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional/ emotional / passionate – uncertainty

 

our propositional actions are not passive

 

and in so far as we are critically active – we are not passive

 

 

PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct conception.

 

 

a so called ‘clear and distinct conception’ – is a proposal that is not questioned – not doubt – and regarded as certain

 

any such ‘conception’ – is simply ignorant and irrational

 

one can be ignorant and irrational regarding anything at all

 

 

Proof. – Things which are common to all can only be adequately conceived (Prop. 38, Part II.) and therefore (Prop. 12, and Lemma 2, which is to be found after Prop. 13, Part II.) there is no modification of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q.e.d.

 

any proposal of ‘things common to all’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘adequate conception’ – is meant a conception / proposal – not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain –

 

there is no adequate conception

 

any conception / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any ‘modification of the body’ is a proposal / description put – again – open to question

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that there is no emotion of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (Gen. Def. Emo.), which on that account (prev. Prop.) must involve some clear and distinct conception.

 

 

an emotion – however described – i.e. – as an’ idea’ – or ‘modification of the body’ – is a propositional action –

 

if held to be ‘clear and distinct’ – it is held irrationally

 

 

Note. – Hence there is nothing from which some effect does not follow (Prop. 36, Part I,), and whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in us we understand clearly and distinctly (Prop. 40, Part II.), it follows everyone has power of understanding himself and his emotions clearly and distinctly, if not absolutely at least in part, and consequently of bringing it about that he is less passive in regard to them. For this purpose care must be taken especially that we understand clearly and distinctly each emotion as far as this may be possible, so that the mind may be determined by the emotion to think those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives and in which it acquiesces entirely; and thus the emotion is separated from the thought of an external cause and united to true thoughts. From which it comes about not only love, hatred. etc., are destroyed (Prop. 2 Part V.), but also that the appetites or desires which are wont to arise from such emotion can have no excess (Prop. 61, Part IV.). For it must be noted above all that that it is one and the same appetite through which a man is said to be both active and passive. E.g., we have shown that human nature is so

disposed that each one desires that others should live according to his way of thinking

(see Note, Prop. 31. Part III.): and this desire in a man who is not guided by reason is passion which is called ambition, and which differs very little from pride; and, on the contrary, in a man who is guided by reason it is an action or virtue which is called piety (see Note 1, Prop, 37, Part IV)., and the second part of that Prop.). And in this manner all appetites and desires are only passions in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas. and they are accredited to virtue when they are excited or generated by inadequate ideas. For all desires by which we are determined to do anything can arise from adequate and inadequate ideas (see Prop. 59. Part IV.). And this remedy for the emotions (to return from my digression), which consists in true knowledge of them, is excelled by nothing in our power we can think of, since there exists no other power of the mind than of thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we showed above (Prop. 3, Part III.).

 

 

‘Hence there is nothing from which some effect does not follow (Prop. 36, Part I,), and whatever follows from an idea which is adequate in us we understand clearly and distinctly (Prop. 40, Part II.), it follows everyone has power of understanding himself and his emotions clearly and distinctly, if not absolutely at least in part, and consequently of bringing it about that he is less passive in regard to them.’

 

‘Hence there is nothing from which some effect does not follow’

 

an ‘effect’ is a proposal

 

‘an effect follows’ – only if a ‘follow on’ is so proposed

 

an ‘adequate idea’ – is a proposal that is not put to question – not put to doubt – its uncertainty – not explored

 

a so called ‘adequate idea’ – is a proposal – held irrationally

 

everyone who is functional – has the power – the logical power – the critical power – to put an emotional proposal / propositional action – to question – to doubt – and the power to explore its uncertainty

 

we understand ourselves – through critical propositional exploration

 

and a question for Spinoza – if a clear and distinct understanding is not ‘absolute’ – then is it not – uncertain?

 

one is ‘passive’ – if one does not engage in critical activity

 

the hallmark of passivity is Spinoza’s adequate idea

 

‘For this purpose care must be taken especially that we understand clearly and distinctly each emotion as far as this may be possible, so that the mind may be determined by the emotion to think those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives and in which it acquiesces entirely; and thus the emotion is separated from the thought of an external cause and united to true thoughts’

 

‘as far as this may be possible’?

 

if the understanding is clear and distinct – where is the wriggle room?

 

to ‘acquiesce entirely’ to clear and distinct perception – is the mark of someone who

 

does not think – and who lives in deluded reality

 

an ‘external cause’ – is a proposal

 

an emotion is ‘tied’ to an external cause – if it is so proposed –

 

the issue is not ‘uniting’ an emotional propositional action to ‘true thoughts’ –

 

the issue is critically evaluating any emotional propositional action

 

‘true thoughts’ here – are Spinoza’s uncritical ‘adequate ideas’

 

‘From which it comes about not only love, hatred. etc., are destroyed (Prop. 2 Part V.), but also that the appetites or desires which are wont to arise from such emotion can have no excess (Prop. 61, Part IV.).’

 

this does not follow –

 

if anything results from adequate ideas and clear and distinct conceptions – it is avoidance and repression of appetites or desires

 

appetites and desires – are propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it is only through critical evaluation that appetites and desires will be understood in a rational manner

 

as to ‘excess’ – the matter is relative – what is an excess to one – may well be understood as a moderation to another

 

whatever the case – appetites and desires – however characterized – can be dealt with in a critical / rational manner

 

no emotional propositional action – is ‘destroyed’ –

 

love and hatred – are proposals –

 

proposals are put or not put – acted or not – critically evaluated – or not

 

‘For it must be noted above all that that it is one and the same appetite through which a man is said to be both active and passive. E.g., we have shown that human nature is so disposed that each one desires that others should live to his way of thinking (see Note, Prop. 31. Part III.): and this desire in a man who is not guided by reason is passion which is called ambition, and which differs very little from pride; and, on the contrary, in a man who is guided by reason it is an action or virtue which is called piety (see Note 1, Prop, 37, Part Iv., and the second part of that Prop.).’

 

a rationally active man is he who critically evaluates his appetites

 

a man who does not critically evaluate his appetites – is passive – is irrational

 

each man does not desire that others should live according to his way of thinking –

 

there are many people who are tolerant and even appreciative of different ways of thinking and different ways of living

 

the desire that others should live according to one’s way of thinking – is the mark of a narrow-minded – self-obsessed – ignorant individual

 

such a person is someone who does not have an open mind – and who does not critically evaluate his / her own way of thinking

 

if such a person did critically evaluate his / her way of thinking they would see that it

 

is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and it this uncertainty that frees us up to consider and appreciate different ways thinking – and different ways of living

 

Spinoza’s ‘guided by reason’ – amounts to – following his view on how to live

 

his view – logically speaking – as with any other view on how to live – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

for Spinoza though – there is no uncertainty –

 

he holds that his view on how to live can be shown to be ‘adequate’ and ‘clear and distinct’ – and thus – certain –

 

there is no propositional certainty – any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

certainty is a delusion

 

his ‘guided by reason’ – denies critical thinking –

 

it is irrational – it is pretentious – it is ignorant

 

‘And in this manner all appetites and desires are only passions in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas. and they are accredited to virtue when they are excited or generated by inadequate ideas. For all desires by which we are determined to do anything can arise from adequate and inadequate ideas (see Prop. 59. Part IV.).’

 

‘appetite’ and ‘desire’ – are names or descriptions – given to propositional actions – they are classifications of propositional actions

 

‘ideas’ – are propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

an ‘adequate idea’ – in Spinoza’s terms – is an idea that is logically certain – there are no such ideas – all proposals / propositional actions – are uncertain – or in Spinoza’s terms – ‘inadequate’

 

any proposal of ‘virtue’ – is open of question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

‘And this remedy for the emotions (to return from my digression), which consists in true knowledge of them, is excelled by nothing in our power we can think of, since there exists no other power of the mind than of thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we showed above (Prop. 3, Part III.).’

 

emotions do not need to be ‘remedied’ –

 

emotions are the propositional actions we employ to understand and negotiate our reality

 

our knowledge of the emotions – of emotional / propositional actions – or states – is an on-going propositional exploration

 

and at any point in such an exploration – any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

the ‘mind’s power’ – rest in the propositional actor’s capacity to critically evaluate any proposal put

 

so-called ‘adequate ideas’ – are presented as – beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain –

 

any such ‘idea’ – is a prejudice –

 

and as such – the very mark of illogical and irrational thinking

 

 

PROP. V. Emotion towards a thing which we imagine simply not as necessary nor possible nor contingent, is caeteris paribus, the greatest of all.

 

 

Proof. – Emotion towards a thing which we imagine to be free is greater than that towards one which is necessary (Prop. 49, Part III.), and consequently still greater than that towards a thing which we imagine as possible or contingent (Prop. 11. Part IV.). But to imagine a thing as free can be nothing else than to imagine it simply while we are ignorant of the causes by which it was determined for acting (from what we have shown in the Note of Prop. 35, Part II.). Therefore emotion towards a thing which we imagine simply is greater, caeteris paribus, than towards a thing necessary, possible, or contingent, and consequently the greatest. Q.e.d.

 

‘a thing’ – is a proposal – a proposition

 

to ‘imagine simply’ – is to propose – to put a proposition –

any proposition put – is ‘imagined simply’ –

 

complications – as it were – to this ‘simplicity’ – arise when the proposal / proposition is critically evaluated – put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

there are no necessary proposals / propositions – all proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what goes for ‘necessary propositions’ – are prejudices

 

‘possible propositions’?

 

either a proposition is put – or it is not –

 

if it is put – it is actual – if not put – it does not exist

 

a ‘contingent proposition’?

 

if by ‘contingent’ here – is meant a proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

then all propositions are contingent

 

‘greatest of all’?

 

our emotions are propositional actions put – in relation to proposals / propositions put

 

and yes – our propositional actions in response to a proposal / proposition put – can be further described –

 

any further description is open to question

 

‘great’ – or ‘greatest of all’ – is rhetoric

 

finally – we are free to put any proposal – and any proposal put is free –

 

any causal analysis – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a proposition’s ‘freedom’ rests in its logical uncertainty

 

 

PROP. VI. In so far as the mind understands all things as necessary it has more power over the emotions, or is less passive in regard to them.

 

 

a so called ‘necessary understanding’ – is a false understanding –

 

it is the claim that we understand things / proposals – as certain

 

how we understand ‘things’ / proposals – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

 

a false understanding – will in no way enable us to deal effectively with emotional propositions

 

and furthermore – the issue is not power – and ‘power over the emotions’ –

 

the issue is – critical evaluation of emotional / propositional action

 

critical evaluation is not ‘power over’ the emotions – it is the rational exploration of emotional / propositional uncertainty

 

any propositional activity – is active

 

we are passive to the extent that we do no not engage in critical evaluation of our emotional / propositional activity

 

 

Proof. –The mind understands all things to be necessary (Prop. 29, Part I.), and to be determined for existing an acting by an infinite connection of causes (prop. 28. Part 1.): and therefore (prev. Prop.) it brings it about that it is less passive in regard to the emotions which arise from them and (Prop.48, Part III.) that it is affected less towards them Q.e.d.

 

 

‘The mind understands all things to be necessary (Prop. 29, Part I.), and to be determined for existing an acting by an infinite connection of causes (prop. 28. Part 1.)’

 

‘the mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

there is no necessity in propositional action

 

propositional action is not determined

 

propositional action – is open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

as for an ‘infinite connection of causes’ –

 

if you take ‘infinite connection of causes’ on face value – there can be no final cause

 

and if you propose an infinite connection of causes – then the propositional action in question – is ‘infinitely’ – undetermined

 

Spinoza’s ‘infinite connection of causes’ – undermines his determinism – and as a result – his argument – is incoherent

 

‘and therefore (prev. Prop.) it brings it about that it is less passive in regard to the emotions which arise from them and (Prop.48, Part III.) that it is affected less towards them’

 

even if you were to accept Spinoza’s – ‘The mind understands all things to be necessary (Prop. 29, Part I.), and to be determined for existing an acting by an infinite connection of causes’ –

 

it just does not follow – that the mind is less passive in regard to the emotions – and is affected less towards them – in fact the opposite is the case

 

all that could be said to follow is that the mind has no understanding of the uncertainty of emotional / propositional actions – and is therefore – entirely passive in relation to them

 

Note – The more this knowledge, namely, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, which is borne witness to by experience. For we see the pain caused by the loss of some good to be lessened or mitigated as soon as he

who lost it considers that it could have been preserved in no manner. Thus also we see that no one pities and infant because it cannot talk, walk, reason, or lastly, that it lives so many years as if it was unconscious of itself. But if most were born full grown and only one now and then an infant, then we should pity each infant: for then we should regard infancy not as a thing natural and necessary, but as a flaw or mishap in nature. And we should note many other examples of this kind.

 

 

‘The more this knowledge, namely, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, which is borne witness to by experience.’

 

‘knowledge’ is proposal –

 

‘the mind’ is a name for propositional action –

 

whether a proposal is ‘distinct and vivid’ or not – it is not necessary – rather – it is uncertain

 

it is not a matter of ‘power over’ the emotions –

 

emotional propositions – can be critically evaluated – that is – put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored

 

‘For we see the pain caused by the loss of some good to be lessened or mitigated as soon as he who lost it considers that it could have been preserved in no manner.’

 

pain or loss – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

experience tells us – that to simply adopt the view that a loss is unavoidable – is unrealistic – uncritical – and as such irrational

 

‘Thus also we see that no one pities and infant because it cannot talk, walk, reason, or lastly, that it lives so many years as if it was unconscious of itself. But if most were born full grown and only one now and then an infant, then we should pity each infant: for then we should regard infancy not as a thing natural and necessary, but as a flaw or mishap in nature.’

 

from a rational point of view – there are no flaws or mishaps in nature

 

 

PROP. VII. Emotions that arise from or are excited by reason, if we regard time are greater than those which are referred to particular things which we regard as absent.

 

 

our emotions are proposals –

 

reason – is the critical evaluation of proposals put –

 

whether a proposal is the result of a critical evaluation of another proposal – or a proposal put without critical evaluation –

 

it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – We do not regard a thing as absent by reason of the emotion with which we imagine it, but by reason of the fact that the body is affected by another emotion which cuts off the existence of that thing (Prop. 17, Part II.). Wherefore an emotion which is referred to a thing which we regard as absent is not of such a nature that surpasses and overcomes the other actions and power of a man (concerning which we see Prop. 6, Part IV.), but contrariwise is of such a nature that it can be hindered in some manner by those modifications which cut off the existence of its external cause (Prop. 9, Part IV.). But an emotion which arises from reason has reference necessarily to the common properties of things (see def. of reason in Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II.) which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing to cut off their present existence), and which we always imagine in the same manner (Prop. 38, Part II.). Wherefore such an emotion remains the same always, and consequently (Ax. I Part V.) emotions which are contrary to it, and which are not aided by their external causes, must more and more accommodate themselves to it until they are no longer contrary, and thus far emotion which arises from reason is the stronger. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘We do not regard a thing as absent by reason of the emotion with which we imagine it, but by reason of the fact that the body is affected by another emotion which cuts off the existence of that thing (Prop. 17, Part II.).’

 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if we ‘imagine’ it – we propose it – if we propose it – it is not ‘absent’ – it is there –

it exists

 

and the proposal will exist as long as it is considered – as along as it is entertained

 

a proposal / emotion – dropped from consideration – for whatever reason – is not there

 

an emotion / proposal can be replaced by another emotion / proposal

 

‘Wherefore an emotion which is referred to a thing which we regard as absent is not of such a nature that surpasses and overcomes the other actions and power of a man (concerning which we see Prop. 6, Part IV.), but contrariwise is of such a nature that it can be hindered in some manner by those modifications which cut off the existence of its external cause (Prop. 9, Part IV.).’

 

if a’ thing’ is proposed – it is there – it is not ‘absent’ –

 

‘the other actions and power of a man’ – are other proposals – other propositional actions

 

any emotion / proposal / propositional action – can be overridden by other emotions / proposals / propositional actions

 

an emotion / proposal is not ‘hindered’ – by other proposals –

 

an emotion / proposal is either active – or dropped from consideration –

 

if dropped from consideration it can be replaced by other emotions / proposals 

 

an ‘external cause – is a proposal –

 

an ‘external cause’ – is irrelevant – in relation to whether a proposal is active or not

 

what is relevant here is critical evaluation – for critical evaluation will determine the status of the emotion / proposal / propositional action

 

‘But an emotion which arises from reason has reference necessarily to the common properties of things (see def. of reason in Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II.) which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing to cut off their present existence), and which we always imagine in the same manner (Prop. 38, Part II.).’

 

an emotion can ‘arise from reason’ – that is be proposed as a result of a critical propositional investigation

 

‘things’ are proposals –

 

any proposed ‘common properties of things’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any such proposal ‘exists’ – as long as it is entertained

 

and any such proposal can be ‘re-imagined’ – can be reformulated – or replaced

 

‘Wherefore such an emotion remains the same always, and consequently (Ax. I Part V.) emotions which are contrary to it, and which are not aided by their external causes, must more and more accommodate themselves to it until they are no longer contrary, and thus far emotion which arises from reason is the stronger. Q.e.d.’

 

an emotion / proposal – is active – as long as it is considered

 

no proposal / proposition – is beyond question – beyond doubt – or certain

 

so – any emotional proposition – critically evaluated – put to question – its uncertainty explored – will be challenged – and will likely be reconsidered –

 

Spinoza’s idea of an emotion that remains the same – fails to appreciate the uncertainty at the heart of any emotional propositional state

 

emotions / emotional propositions – do not ‘accommodate themselves’ –

 

emotional proposals / propositional actions are put – and if rationally considered – put to question

 

Spinoza’s argument – that emotion which arises from reason is stronger – is wrong –

 

emotional propositions however they come about – have the same logic – they are open to question – they are uncertain

 

reason – which is critical evaluation – is not in any way opposed to any form of emotional proposition

 

reason is the critical exploration of the emotional experience

 

critical exploration opens up our emotional experience – opens it up to possibility –

 

the possibility that is always present

 

 

PROP. VIII. The more an emotion is excited by many causes occurring at the same time, the greater it is.

 

 

an emotion is a proposal – a propositional action

 

any causal explanation – is open to question

 

an emotion / propositional action s open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘lesser’ / ‘greater’ – are rhetorical notions

 

 

Proof. – Many causes can do more at the same time than if they were fewer (Prop. 7, Part III.) And therefore (Prop. 5, Part IV.) the more an emotion is excited by many causes at the same time, the stringer it is.

 

 

how can an effect / affect have more than one cause?

 

the ‘cause’ of anything is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

but if you adopt a causal analysis – an effect / affect – will have one cause – not many

 

 

Note – This proposition is clear also from Ax. 2 of this part.

 

 

Ax. 2 – ‘The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, insofar as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause’

 

 

yes – one cause – one effect –

 

for the point of Prop. VII here – is really the point of Ax. 2 – that the power of the effect – comes from the power of the cause

 

the issue seems to be that Spinoza wants to say some emotions are ‘greater’ than others –

 

I think he need the many cause ‘argument’ to account for his idea that some emotions are ‘greater’ than others –

 

it doesn’t work for its an argument that is based on a misuse of the causal argument

 

in any propositional episode – that one emotion may predominate others – does that make it more powerful?

 

our power rests in our critical capacity

 

I think that for Spinoza it would have been better to have dropped this proposition altogether

 

 

PROP. IX. An emotion which has reference to many different causes which the mind regards at the same time as the emotion itself is less harmful, and we are less passive in regard to it and less affected towards each cause than another emotion equally great which has reference to one alone or fewer causes.

 

firstly – no emotion in itself is harmful –

 

an emotion – may be assessed as harmful – it may be assessed as harmless – it may be assessed as positive –

 

it can be given any kind of valuation –

 

but any such propositional assessment / valuation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

emotions are not harmful – they are – uncertain

 

‘an emotion with reference to many different causes’ –

 

any causal explanation is open to question – so – just what the cause (of an affect) is –

will be a critical matter – will be uncertain

 

however – if you do opt for a causal explanation – then an emotion – the affect – will have one cause – not many

 

 

Proof. – An emotion is bad or harmful only in so far as the mind is prevented by it from thinking (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.).  And therefore that emotion by which the mind is determined for regarding many objects at the same time is less harmful than another equally great which detains the mind in the contemplation of one alone or fewer objects in such a manner that it cannot think of the others: which was the first point. Again, in as much as the essence of the mind, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.) its power, consists of thought alone (Prop. 11, Part III.), therefore the mind is less passive to an emotion by which is determined for the regarding of many things than to an emotion equally great which holds the mind occupied in regarding one alone or fewer objects, which is the second point. Finally, this emotion (Prop. 48, Part III.), in so far as it has reference to many external causes, is less towards each one of them. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘An emotion is bad or harmful only in so far as the mind is prevented by it from thinking (Prop. 26 and 27, Part IV.).’

 

‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘thinking’ is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –

 

‘emotion’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

any emotion / propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

no propositional action prevents thinking –

 

one can chose not to engage in critical / logical activity –

 

however – no functioning propositional actor is prevented from such engagement

 

‘And therefore that emotion by which the mind is determined for regarding many objects at the same time is less harmful than another equally great which detains the mind in the contemplation of one alone or fewer objects in such a manner that it cannot think of the others: which was the first point.’

 

regarding many objects at once – Spinoza says – is less harmful – than regarding one or fewer – because in regarding one or fewer – the mind cannot think of the others –

 

this is an issue of propositional focus

 

our propositional / emotional focus – is open to question – is uncertain –

 

and so – we may go from considering many proposals – to focusing on one or fewer – or from one or fewer to many

 

it is never the case that we cannot think / critically evaluate – different propositional objects

 

we may decide to limit our focus – or broaden it –

 

and whatever the decision here – it is – logically speaking – open to question –

 

I see no reason to think that harm need be the consequence of a specific focus –

 

‘Again, in as much as the essence of the mind, that is (Prop. 7, Part III.) its power, consists of thought alone (Prop. 11, Part III.), therefore the mind is less passive to an emotion by which it is determined for the regarding of many things than to an emotion equally great which holds the mind occupied in regarding one alone or fewer objects, which is the second point.’

 

we are only passive if we don’t critically evaluate our emotional / propositional actions – be they one or many or a few –

 

 

PROP. X. As long as we are not assailed by emotions which are not contrary to our nature we have the power of arranging an connecting the modifications of the body according to the order of the intellect.

 

 

there are no emotions that are contrary to our nature –

 

our emotions are propositional actions –

 

our nature is propositional

 

there is no ‘order of the intellect’ –

 

the ‘intellect’ is a name for propositional action

 

and any ‘order’ proposed – logically speaking – is open to question – is uncertain

 

any change that people make to how they act – is rational – if it is a result of the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of their propositional uncertainty

 

 

Proof. – The emotions which are contrary to our nature, that is (Prop. 30, Part IV,) which are bad, are bad in so far as they prevent the mind from understanding (Prop. 27, Part IV.). As long, then as we are not assailed by emotions which are contrary to our nature, so long the mind’s power which it endeavours to understand things is not hindered; and therefore so long as it has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas and of deducing some from others (see Note 2, Prop. 40 and Note, Prop. 47, Part II.): and consequently so long (Prop. 1, Part V.) we have the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the order of the intellect. Q.e.d.

 

 

emotions do not prevent understanding – emotions are proposals – proposals for understanding

 

and any emotional / propositional action – is an understanding – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our nature is propositional –

 

no emotion is contrary to our nature

 

understanding is hindered when it is not put to question – not put to doubt – and regarded as certain

 

clear and distinct ideas – in so far as they are regarded as certain – are logically false

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal – open to question – and uncertain

 

any proposed ‘order of the intellect’ – that is a proposed way of being and behaving – logically speaking – is as good as any other

 

and any proposed ‘order of the intellect – is open to question – is logically – uncertain

 

 

Note. – By the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body we can bring about that we are not easily affected by bad emotions. For (Prop. 7, Part V.) greater force is required to hinder emotions arranged and connected according to the order of the intellect than if they were uncertain and random. The best thing that we can bring about, as long as we have no perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to

conceive some right manner of living or certain rules of life, to commit them to

memory, and to apply them continuously to the particular things that come to our way frequently in life, so that our imagination may be extensively affected by them and they may always be at hand for us. E.g., we stated among the rules of life (Prop. 46, Part IV, and its note) that hatred must be overcome by love or generosity, not requited by reciprocated hatred. But in order that this rule may be always at hand for us when we need it, we must think on and meditate on the common injuries done to men, and in what manner and according to what method they may best be avoided by

generosity. For thus we unite the image of the injury to the imagination of this rule,

and it will always be at hand (Prop. 18, Part II.) when an injury is done to us. If we always have at hand a regard for our true advantage and the good which follows from mutual friendship and common intercourse, and moreover, if we remember that complete contentment of mind (animi acquiescentia) arises from the right way of life (Prop. 52, Part IV.), and that men, like other things, act according to the necessity of nature – then the injury or hatred which is a wont to arise from it would occupy a lesser part of the mind and would be easily overcome, or if the anger which arises from the greatest injuries is not overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, although not without a wavering of the mind, in a far less space of time than if it had not previously meditated on these things, as is clear from Prop. 6, 7, and 8 of this part. We must think of courage in the same manner in order to lay aside fear, that is, we must enumerate and often imagine the common perils of life and in what manner they may be best avoided and overcome by presence of mind and courage.  But let it be noted that we must always pay attention in the ordering of our thoughts and images (Coroll. Prop. 63, Part IV., and Prop. 59, Part III.) to those things which are good in each thing, so that we may be determined always for action by an emotion of pleasure, E.g., if anyone sees that he seeks glory too early, let him think of the right use of it, to what end it should be sought, and by what means it may be acquired: and not of its abuse and the vanity and the inconstancy of men, or of other things of this kind, of which no one ever thinks save from an unhealthy mind. For those who are most ambitious assail themselves most with such thoughts when they despair of attaining the honour which they long for, and while they vomit forth their rage wish to appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those who are most desirous of glory who cry out loudest of its abuse and the vanity of the world. And this is not peculiar to the ambitious, but to all to whom fortune is unfavourable and who are of weak spirit. For a poor man who is greedy will not cease to talk of the abuse of money and the vices of the rich: by which he does naught else but afflict himself, and show others that he resents not only his own poverty but also other’s wealth. Again, those who are badly received by their sweethearts think of nothing save the fickleness, deception, and other often related faults of womanhood, all of which, however, they immediately forget as soon as they are received again. He therefore who tries to moderate his emotions and desires from a love of freedom alone – he, I say, endeavours as much as possible to obtain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with that joy which arises from a true knowledge of them, and by no means to regard the vices of men, to disparage his fellows and to rejoice in a false species of liberty. And he that will diligently observe what is said here (for it is not difficult) and make use of it. will be able in a short space of time to direct his actions for the most part according to the command of reason.

 

 

‘By the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body we can bring about that we are not easily affected by bad emotions.’.

 

this ‘power of arranging and connecting modifications of the body’ – is critically evaluating emotional propositional actions

 

there are no ‘bad emotions’ – there is only emotional propositional action –

 

human beings / propositional actors – make value judgements regarding propositional actions –

 

it is what we do –

 

and these value judgments are proposals put against – or in response to – our emotional propositional actions –

 

what ‘good’ amounts to – and what ‘bad’ amounts to – will be matters open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘For (Prop. 7, Part V.) greater force is required to hinder emotions arranged and connected according to the order of the intellect than if they were uncertain and random.’

 

it is not a question of ‘hindering’ emotions –

 

how we deal with our emotions is through critical evaluation

 

any proposed ‘arrangement and connection’ – is open to question –

 

just as is – any proposal that is viewed as ‘random’ – or unconnected

 

‘The best thing that we can bring about, as long as we have no perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive some right manner of living or certain rules of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them continuously to the particular things that come to our way frequently in life, so that our imagination may be extensively affected by them and they may always be at hand for us. E.g., we stated among the rules of life (Prop. 46, Part IV, and its note) that hatred must be overcome by love or generosity, not requited by reciprocated hatred.’

 

here – Spinoza finally recognises that we have no perfect knowledge –

 

something of a slip-up on his part

 

and yes – to conceive some right manner of living or certain rules of life …’ –

 

the ‘some’ – here – really leaves the question open – as to ‘right manner of living’

 

the empirical / propositional reality is that there are many and different conceptions of ‘right manner of living’

 

that the question of what is a ‘right manner of living’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –

 

this you would think – would be obvious to Spinoza

 

and given this any proposed ‘right manner of living’ – including Spinoza’s – is – logically valid

 

he goes on to say that hatred must be overcome by love

 

well – I don’t think hatred must be overcome

 

which is to say hatred as with any emotion – has a place in human experience –

 

i.e. – for an oppressed person – hatred may just be what sustains them in their suffering

 

and for those who do want to overcome hatred – whether love does the trick or not – is open to question

 

sometimes the best thing to do – and it’s not easy – is to just walk away from both love and hate

 

‘But in order that this rule may be always at hand for us when we need it, we must think on and meditate on the common injuries done to men, and in what manner and according to what method they may best be avoided by generosity. For thus we unite the image of the injury to the imagination of this rule, and it will always be at hand (Prop. 18, Part II.) when an injury is done to us.’

 

the problem with this rule is that it ties you into a particular outlook – which will not deal effectively with all circumstances

 

at best it is a rule of thumb

 

rules in general give people a false sense of security –

 

the logical reality is that any so called ‘rule’ – is no more than a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

generosity – may not avoid injury

 

and if generosity doesn’t avoid injury – where does that leave you – if all you have in your ethical tool kit is Spinoza’s ‘rule’?

 

‘If we always have at hand a regard for our true advantage and the good which follows from mutual friendship and common intercourse, and moreover, if we remember that complete contentment of mind (animi acquiescentia) arises from the right way of life (Prop. 52, Part IV.), and that men, like other things, act according to the necessity of nature – then the injury or hatred which is a wont to arise from it would occupy a lesser part of the mind and would be easily overcome, or if the anger which arises from the greatest injuries is not overcome, it will nevertheless be overcome, although not without a wavering of the mind, in a far less space of time than if it had not previously meditated on these things, as is clear from Prop. 6, 7, and 8 of this part.’

 

our ‘true advantage’ – is never clear cut – it is always an uncertain matter – nevertheless – we can propose a ‘true advantage’ – and see how it goes –

 

when ‘good’ does come from mutual friendship and common intercourse – it is to be appreciated – but it is not always the case that friendships are positive – or that common intercourse is beneficial

 

there is no ‘complete contentment of mind’ – the mind explores the notion of contentment – and explores its uncertainty

 

‘a right way of life’ – is a nice idea – but is somewhat fanciful –

 

the reality is that life is a struggle in uncertainty –

 

now and again – you hit on satisfaction – and it should be enjoyed while it lasts –

 

there is no necessity in human nature – our nature is propositional – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

anger – may in certain propositional contexts – be a positive affect – and have a positive effect –

 

good or bad – as with any emotion – it is open to question – it is uncertain

 

and what can a ‘wavering of mind’ be – but a critical look at the emotion

 

a ‘wavering of mind’ can lead to an exploration of uncertainty –

 

and what this means is that in spite of all that has preceded – Spinoza must bow to uncertainty

 

‘We must think of courage in the same manner in order to lay aside fear, that is, we must enumerate and often imagine the common perils of life and in what manner they may be best avoided and overcome by presence of mind and courage.’

 

it is always useful to propose strategies for dealing with the ‘common perils of life’ –

 

however – if they are to be of value – such propositional strategies – will be put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored

 

‘But let it be noted that we must always pay attention in the ordering of our thoughts and images (Coroll. Prop. 63, Part IV., and Prop. 59, Part III.) to those things which are good in each thing, so that we may be determined always for action by an emotion of pleasure, E.g., if anyone sees that he seeks glory too early, let him think of the right use of it, to what end it should be sought, and by what means it may be acquired: and not of its abuse and the vanity and the inconstancy of men, or of other things of this kind, of which no one ever thinks save from an unhealthy mind.’

 

rational behaviour is not about ‘ordering our thoughts and images’ – it is the business of critically evaluating our proposals and propositional actions

 

any proposal as to what is ‘good in each thing’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

any ‘determination’ for propositional action – is open to question

 

we may hope that our actions always result in pleasure – but this is just wishful thinking

 

and it is just not the case that we are determined always for action by an emotion of pleasure –

 

i.e. – we may act not to find pleasure – but rather to avoid pain – and we may act with no reference to pleasure or pain 

 

to ‘seek glory’ is like any other endeavour –

 

if we act rationally – we question – doubt – and explore the uncertainty of what we intend to do

 

a healthy mind is a critical mind

 

‘For those who are most ambitious assail themselves most with such thoughts when they despair of attaining the honour which they long for, and while they vomit forth their rage wish to appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those who are most desirous of glory who cry out loudest of its abuse and the vanity of the world. And this is not peculiar to the ambitious, but to all to whom fortune is unfavourable and who are of weak spirit. For a poor man who is greedy will not cease to talk of the abuse of money and the vices of the rich: by which he does naught else but afflict himself, and show others that he resents not only his own poverty but also other’s wealth. Again, those who are badly received by their sweethearts think of nothing save the fickleness, deception, and other often related faults of womanhood, all of which, however, they immediately forget as soon as they are received again’

 

here we have a number of observations by Spinoza –

 

but as with any observation regarding human behaviour – these are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

i.e. – it is not certain that those who are ‘most desirous of glory’ – ‘will cry out loudest of its abuse and the vanity of the world’ –

 

an intelligent person seeking glory – might keep his / her mouth shut –

 

and likewise with a greedy man

 

and there is the danger that our ‘observations’ are infected with prejudice –

 

Spinoza’s ‘observation’ here about women is a case in point –

 

that women are fickle – deceptive – and have other faults – is really just misogyny

 

‘He therefore who tries to moderate his emotions and desires from a love of freedom alone – he, I say, endeavours as much as possible to obtain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with that joy which arises from a true knowledge of them, and by no means to regard the vices of men, to disparage his fellows and to rejoice in a false species of liberty.’

 

moderation has its place – but much has been achieved by human beings whose emotions and desires are described as ‘immoderate’ or ‘excessive’

 

our endeavours are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any ‘knowledge’ of ‘virtues and their causes’ – will come as a result of critical reflection

 

all knowledge is propositional – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if the idea here is to not consider the vices of men – then any understanding of men will be entirely inadequate –

 

and once again we have from Spinoza an ethic of avoidance –

 

the avoidance of the so called ‘vices of men’ –

 

a ‘mind filled with joy’ runs the risk of failing to acknowledge and deal with the great variety and uncertainty of human emotional experience –

 

our liberty rests in our ability to question – to doubt – and to explore propositional uncertainty

 

‘And he that will diligently observe what is said here (for it is not difficult) and make use of it. will be able in a short space of time to direct his actions for the most part according to the command of reason.’

 

what Spinoza proposes as the right way of living – is as valid as any other such proposition – and as with any other – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

reason is the critical evaluation of proposals put – not the obedience to a command

 

 

PROP. XI. The more any image has reference to many things the more frequent it is, i.e., the more often it flourishes, the more it occupies the mind.

 

 

an image – is a proposal –

 

any reference that the image / proposal has – is proposed

 

if more than one propositional reference is proposed – this will be a result of a critical exploration – where the image / proposal is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

 

Proof. – The more an image or emotion has reference to many things, the more causes there are by which it can be excited and cherished, all of which the mind (by hypothesis) regards at the same tome with the emotion. And therefore the emotion is more frequent or more often flourishes, and (Prop. 8, Part V,) it occupies the mind more, Q.e.d.

 

 

the more references that are proposed – the more the uncertainty of the image is explored

 

we do not put multiple proposals ‘at the same time’ –

 

a proposal may be explored – and the exploration may in time result in other propositional references being put

 

it does not follow that because an image / emotion / proposal is explored – that it will be ‘more frequent’ or ‘more often flourish’ – or occupy more of our thinking –

 

it can reoccur – as often as it is proposed – or it may be just a ‘one-off’ proposal

 

 

 

PROP. XII. The image of things are more easily joined to images which have reference to things which we understand clearly and distinctly than to others.

 

 

images are proposals –

 

any proposal can be put in relation to any other proposal

 

images / proposals – however described – i.e. – as ‘clear and distinct’ – logically speaking – are no different to any other image / proposal – however described

 

there is no difficulty in putting image / proposals in relation to each other

 

so – the idea that it is easier to put so called ‘clear and distinct’ image / proposals in relation to each other – has no logical basis – and makes no logical sense

 

 

Proof. – Things which we clearly and distinctly understand are either the common properties of things or what we deduce from them (see def. of reason in Note 2. Prop 40. Part 1.), and consequently they are more often excited in us (prev. Prop.). And therefore it can more easily happen that we should regard things at the same time with these than with other things, and consequently (Prop. 18, Part II.) that they are joined with these more easily than with other things. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘clear and distinct understanding’ – is a logical fraud – a logical pretence

 

all understanding is propositional – and all propositional understanding is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –

 

uncertain – not ‘clear and distinct’

 

to ‘understand’ – is put proposals / propositions to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty

 

any proposed ‘common properties of things’ – is open to question

 

‘things’ are proposals – and the common logical property of proposals is uncertainty

 

as to ‘they (common properties) are more often excited in us’ –

 

what is ‘excited in us’ not – not logically irrelevant

 

there is nothing against ‘joining up’ proposals in terms of some proposed common property –

 

the fact remains the basis of any such ‘joining’ (i.e. common properties)

 

is open to question – is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XIII. The more an image is joined by many other things, the more often it flourishes.

 

 

this goes without saying – and one wonders why Spinoza bothered to say it

 

Proof. – The more an image is joined with many other things, the more causes there are (Prop. 18, Part II.) by which it can be excited. Q.e.d.

 

 

any ‘cause’ is a proposal – a propositional explanation –

 

and any causal explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

causal explanations can be proposed – but we don’t need causal explanations in order for propositional images to be related to other proposals –

 

we don’t need causal explanations in order for there to be propositional activity

 

causal explanations come after propositional actions – after the proposing of propositional relations

 

an image is a proposal – proposals are not ‘excited’ – they are put –

 

as to the ground or reason for any proposal – for any propositional image –

 

that is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about that all the modifications of the body have reference to the idea of God.

 

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

a ‘modification of the body’ – is a propositional action

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

any proposal / propositional action is a response to the unknown

 

Proof. – The is no modification of the body of which the mind cannot form a clear and distinct conception (Prop. 4, Part V.). And therefore it can bring it about (Prop.15, Part I.) that all the modifications have reference to the idea of God. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action

 

propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a ‘clear and distinct conception’ – is a proposal that has not been critically assessed –

and if held – is held irrationally

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

all ‘modifications’ / propositional actions are responses to – or reactions to the unknown

 

 

PROP. XV. He who understands himself and his emotions clearly and distinctly loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions.

 

 

Proof. – He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions, rejoices (Prop. 13, Part III.) accompanied with the idea of God (Prev. Prop.). And therefore (Def. Emp 6.) he loves God, and (by the same argument) the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions. Q.e.d.

 

 

any understanding is propositional – and as such is critical – that is to say – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and the more critical one is of oneself and one’s emotions – the more one understands oneself and one’s emotions

 

so called ‘clear and distinct understanding’ – is ‘understanding’ – that is not put to question – not put to doubt – its uncertainty – unexplored –

 

‘clear and distinct understanding’ – is not understanding anything –

 

and the absence of understanding – is nothing to rejoice in

 

it does not follow that as a result of a genuine – critical understanding – you will love anyone or anything

 

a critical understanding of yourself and your emotions – may lead you to love – but just as equally – love may not be the result

 

as to God –

 

if we take Spinoza’s view of God as substance – infinite and eternal –

 

we can ask the question – how can something so impersonal be the subject of human love?

 

perhaps such an understanding gives pleasure – but just as equally – it may leave one cold

 

and as to a critical understanding – of oneself – one’s emotions – i.e. love – and any conception one has of God –

 

any critical understanding will lead to question – to doubt – and to the exploration of uncertainty –

 

one may ‘rejoice’ in this understanding – or simply regard it – without fanfare – as logical and rational

 

 

PROP. XVI. This love of God must occupy the mind most.

 

 

Proof. – This love is joined with all the modifications of the body (Prop. 14, Part V.), by all of which it is cherished (Prop. 15, Part V.). And therefore (Prop.11, Part V.) it must occupy the mind most. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity

 

there is no necessity – no ‘must’ – in propositional activity

 

propositional activity is indeterminate and uncertain

 

what proposals ‘occupy the minds most’ – is not something that can be known –

 

for it presumes that we can know all propositional activity in all minds at all times –

 

which is fanciful

 

‘modifications of the body’ – are propositional actions

 

the idea that one proposal – ‘this love of God’ – as a matter of fact – is ‘joined with all modifications of the body’ – is frankly absurd

 

if Spinoza had said – that it is his view that love of God – as he has proposed ‘God’ -should occupy the mind the most –  

 

then at least his argument – would have made sense – for such is an ethical recommendation

 

instead – he presents this idea as a ‘must’ –

 

and there is no necessity – no ‘must’ – in human propositional action

 

‘God’- is a name for the unknown

 

recognizing the unknown – makes good epistemological sense –

 

loving it – I think – makes no sense

 

 

PROP. XVII. God is free from passions, nor is he affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain.

 

 

firstly – Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is substance – infinite and eternal –

 

this ‘God’ is not a ‘he’ – this ‘God’ – is an ‘it’

 

secondly – according to Spinoza – human beings are expressions of the eternal and infinite substance – expressions of God –

 

if so – then human passions – emotions of pleasure and pain – are expressions of this ‘God’ – of the eternal and infinite substance –

 

and therefore – Spinoza’s God is the source of human passion – and affected by emotions of pleasure and pain

 

on the other hand – if this God is free from passions – and not affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain – then this ‘God’ – has no connection with human beings

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – cannot be both the source of passion – and free of passion

 

Spinoza’s conception of ‘God’ – is a contradiction –

 

and therefore – a failed conception

 

 

Proof. – All ideas, in so far as they have reference to God, are true (Prop. 32, Part II.), that is (Def. 4, Part II.), they are adequate: and therefore (Gen, Def. Emo.) God is without passions. again, God cannot pass to a higher or lower perfection (Coroll. 2, Prop. 20, Part 1.): and therefore (Def. Emo. 2 and 3) he is affected with no emotion of pleasure or pain. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

an ‘idea’ is a proposal

 

any proposal can be seen as a response to the unknown

 

a proposal is true if it is affirmed – if it is assented to

 

and any proposal of affirmation or assent – is open to question

 

if by adequate idea – is meant a proposal that is not open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

then this so-called adequate idea – is nothing more than a prejudice –

 

the unknown – does not ‘pass to higher or lower perfection’

 

the unknown – has no emotion

 

 

Corollary. – God, to speak strictly, loves no one and does not hate any one. For God (prev. Prop.) is affected with no emotion of pleasure or pain, and consequently (Def. Emo. 6 and 7), loves no one and does not hate anyone.

 

 

if we are expressions of Spinoza’s God – the eternal and infinite substance – and we love and hate – then there is love and hate in God

 

 

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.

 

 

‘hate’ – in Spinoza’s terms is sadness or pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. VII. Part III.) –

 

‘God’ for Spinoza – is reality – substance – infinite and eternal –

 

a person may experience what can be described as ‘existential pain’ –

 

that is where they regard the world as such – as the source of their pain

 

and therefore – in Spinoza’s terms ‘hate God’

 

I think one can hate the world – but as soon as that proposal is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored – it is most likely that hating the world – will be seen to be lacking focus – and therefore of no actionable value –

 

and when put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored – any such hate may well become a propositional springboard for different emotions – different emotional understandings and actions

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

we can recognise the unknown

 

it makes no sense to hate it

 

 

Proof. – The idea of God in us is adequate and perfect (Prop.46 and 47 Part II.). And therefore in so as we regard God we are active (Prop. 3, Part III.) and consequently (Prop. 59, Part III.) there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, That is (Def. Emo. 7), none can hate God. Q.e.d.

 

 

no idea we have – that is – no proposal we put – is adequate and perfect

 

any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

yes – we can recognize the unknown as an epistemological reality – and in so doing we are active

 

I don’t know that there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God / the unknown

 

the unknown may well be painful for some

 

and as to hating the unknown –

 

if you reject the unknown (as Spinoza has done) – what’s to hate?

 

and if you accept the unknown – why would you hate it?

 

 

Corollary. – Love toward God cannot be changed into hatred.

 

 

any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

any proposal can be changed

 

 

Note. – But it may be raised in objection to this, that while we understand God as the cause of all things, by that very fact we consider him to be the cause of pain. But to this I make answer, that in so far as we understand the causes of pain it ceases to be a passion (Prop. 3, Part V.), that is (Prop. 59, Part III.), thus far it ceases to be pain: and therefore in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain we rejoice.

 

 

Spinoza does not succeed her in rebutting this objection that his God is the cause of pain

 

all he does here is propose that if you hold that his God is the cause of pain – you should ‘rejoice’ –

 

which to my mind is perverse and twisted

 

 

PROP. XIX. He who loves God cannot endeavour to bring it about that God should love him in return.

 

 

according to Spinoza –

 

‘God’ is reality – and for Spinoza reality is – substance – infinite and eternal

 

and ‘love’ – is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause

 

we can ask – is it not the case that people have the experience of feeling one with the world – feeling pleasure or joy from the world around them?

 

if so – given Spinoza’s definitions – man can feel love from Spinoza’s God

 

and we may wish to ‘bring it about’ – that is – put ourselves in the emotional state that enables that experience

 

I think we can have the experience of loving the world we live in –

 

and we can put ourselves in the emotional state where we feel that the world loves us

 

however – there is no ‘should’ involved in this – and there is no quid pro pro

 

if we feel love for the world we live in – or feel loved by the world –

 

I say that is a lucky moment

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the unknown does not love

 

we can recognise the unknown but it makes no sense to say we love the unknown –

 

there is nothing there to love

 

 

Proof. If man desired this, he would therefore desire (Coroll. Prop. 17, Part V.) that the God whom he loves should not be God, and consequently (Prop. 19, Part III.) he would desire to be pained, which (Prop. 28, Part III,) is absurd. Therefore he who loves God, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

it is fair enough to desire that the world brings you pleasure and joy –

 

and it is absurd to say that such a desire is a desire for pain

 

 

PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be polluted by an emotion either of envy or jealousy, but is strengthened the more, the more we imagine men to be bound to God by this bond of love.

 

if by God – we mean Spinoza’s God – substance – infinite and eternal – passionless and emotionless –

 

is it not conceivable that a person – finite – passionate and emotional – might at some point envy that state of being – which is not shadowed by death – and not plagued by passions and emotions?

 

and so – could such a person – at such a time – be jealous of such a ‘God’ –

 

I think so –

 

love towards God – strengthened – the more we imagine men to be bound to God?

 

if you imagine that man is bound to ‘God’ by love – the more you imagine this – the more you reinforce – what you imagine

 

just as equally – you can imagine that Spinoza’s God – infinite and eternal – emotionless and passionless – has no relation to man – and therefore – is unlovable –

 

and the more you imagine this – the more you keep proposing it – the more you reinforce it –

 

an image – an imagination – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

if you approach your images – your imaginations rationally – you do not reinforce them – you critically evaluate them –

 

and if you critically evaluate them – whatever they may be – you come face to face with uncertainty

 

 

Proof. – This love towards God is the greatest good which we can desire according to the dictates of reason (Prop. 28, Part IV.), and it is common to all men. (Prop. 36, Part IV.), and we desire that all should enjoy it (Prop. 37 Part. IV.). And therefore (Def. Emo. 26) it cannot be stained by the emotion of envy, nor again by the emotion of jealousy (Prop.18, Part V., and the def. of jealousy, which we see in Note, Prop. 35, Part III.), it must be strengthened the more, the more men imagine and enjoy it. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘This love towards God is the greatest good which we can desire according to the dictates of reason (Prop. 28, Part IV.), and it is common to all men. (Prop. 36, Part IV.), and we desire that all should enjoy it.’

 

firstly – Spinoza on a number of occasions refers to this ‘dictates of reason’ – but he offers no account of what these ‘dictates’ are –

 

at best – they come off as empty propaganda –

 

this ‘love towards God’ – Spinoza’s God – is not as a matter of fact – common to all men –

 

and – as a matter of fact – all men do not desire that all should enjoy it –

 

any proposal as to ‘the greatest good’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

and there may well be those who say there is no greatest good

 

‘And therefore (Def. Emo. 26) it cannot be stained by the emotion of envy, nor again by the emotion of jealousy (Prop.18, Part V., and the def. of jealousy, which we see in Note, Prop. 35, Part III.), it must be strengthened the more, the more men imagine and enjoy it.

 

Spinoza ‘God’ – is substance – infinite and eternal – passionless and emotionless

 

I think – in a moment of discontent or crisis – one could envy that state – and in a sense so be jealous of this ‘God’ – so called –

 

however – on reflection – critical reflection – realize that – (at least according to Spinoza) – such a state is not human – and therefore any emotional response to it is misguided

 

and we can ask – is such a ‘God’ – with apparently no human or animal characteristics – lovable?

 

what’s to enjoy?

 

 

Note. – We can show in the same manner that there is no emotion which is directly contrary to this love by which this love can be destroyed: and therefore we can conclude that this love towards God is the most constant of all emotions, nor can it be destroyed in so far as it has reference to the body, save with the body itself.

But of what nature it may be, in so far as it has reference to the mind alone, we shall see later. In the above propositions I have described all the remedies for the emotions, or everything which the mind considered in itself alone can do to restrain the emotions. From which it is apparent that the mind’s power over the emotions consists: 1st. In the knowledge of the emotions (see Note, Prop. 4, Part IV.). 2^nd. In the fact that the emotions are separated from the thought of the external cause we imagine confusedly (see Prop. 2. with its Note and Prop. 4. Part V.). 3^rd. In the time in which the emotions have reference to the things we understand surpass those which have reference to the things to things which we conceive confusedly and in a mutilated manner (see Prop. 7 Part V.). 4^th. In the multitude of causes which the emotions have reference to the common properties of things or to God are fostered (see Prop. 9 and 11, Part V.). 5^th. Finally, in the order in which the mind can arrange and connect one to the other its emotions (see Note, Prop. 10 and 12, 13 and 14, Part V.).

 

But in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may better be understood, it must first be noted that the emotions are called great by us when we compare the emotions of one man with that of another, and when we see one man to more assailed by an emotion than another man, or when we compare one with the other the emotions of one and the same man, and find him to affected or moved more by one emotion than another. For (Prop. 5 Part IV.) the force of any emotion is defined by knowledge alone: its weakness or passion is estimated solely by privation of knowledge, that is, by that where ideas are said to be inadequate. From which it follows that mind is most passive whose greatest part is constituted by inadequate ideas so that it is characterized by passivity rather than activity: and that on the other hand, is most active which is constituted for the most part of adequate ideas in such a way that although there are as many inadequate ideas in this as in the former, yet it is characterized rather through those which have reference to human virtue than those which show human weakness. Again, it is to be noted that these unhealthy states of mind and misfortunes owe their origin for the most part to excessive love for a thing that is liable to many variations, and of which we can never seize the mastery. For no one is anxious or cares about anything that he does not love, nor do injuries, suspicions, enmities, etc. arise from anything else than love towards a thing of which no one is truly the master. From this we can easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge, and principally that third kind of knowledge (concerning which we see Note, Prop. 47, Part II.), whose basis is the knowledge of God, can do with emotions,

namely, that if it does not remove them entirely in so far as they are passions (Prop. 3,

with Note, Prop. 4, Part V.), at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the mind (see Prop. 14, Part V.). Moreover, it gives rise towards a thing immutable and eternal (Prop, 15, Part V.), and of which we are in truth masters (Prop. 45, Part II.), and which cannot be polluted by any vices which exist in ordinary love, but which can become greater and greater (Prop. 15, Part V.) and occupy the greatest part of the mind (Prop.16, Part V.) and effect it extensively. And thus I have done with all that regards this present life. For what I have said in the beginning of this note, that I have summed up in these few words all the remedies of the emotions, anyone can easily see who pays attention to what we have said in this note, and at the same time to the definitions of the mind and its emotions, and finally to Prop.1 and 3, Part III. So it is now time that I should pass to those points which appertain to the duration of the mind with out relation to the body.

 

 

‘We can show in the same manner that there is no emotion which is directly contrary to this love by which this love can be destroyed: and therefore we can conclude that this love towards God is the most constant of all emotions, nor can it be destroyed in so far as it has reference to the body, save with the body itself.’

 

love towards – this ‘God’ – Spinoza’s God – can be directly opposed

 

it can be argued that this ‘God’ – is unlovable –

 

any proposal of love is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – and therefore is not logically constant – it can be dropped

 

human beings do not exist after death – they do not love after death

 

‘But of what nature it may be, in so far as it has reference to the mind alone, we shall see later. In the above propositions I have described all the remedies for the emotions, or everything which the mind considered in itself alone can do to restrain the emotions.’

 

the emotions do not need to be ‘remedied’

 

‘emotions’ – are propositional actions –

 

propositional action – is how we deal with our reality –

 

it is not a matter of ‘restraining’ emotions / propositional actions

 

any propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘body’ and ‘mind’ – are names for propositional action –

 

once it is realised that the logical focus is the propositional actor – and the actions of the propositional actor

 

‘body’ and ‘mind’ – are rendered irrelevant descriptions

 

‘From which it is apparent that the mind’s power over the emotions consists: 1st. In the knowledge of the emotions (see Note, Prop. 4, Part IV.). 2^nd. In the fact that the emotions are separated from the thought of the external cause we imagine confusedly (see Prop. 2. with its Note and Prop. 4. Part V.). 3^rd. In the time in which the emotions have reference to the things we understand surpass those which have reference to the things to things which we conceive confusedly and in a mutilated manner (see Prop. 7 Part V.). 4^th.’ In the multitude of causes which the emotions have reference to the common properties of things or to God are fostered (see Prop. 9 and 11, Part V.). 5^th. Finally, in the order in which the mind can arrange and connect one to the other its emotions (see Note, Prop. 10 and 12, 13 and 14, Part V.).’

 

1^st – any ‘knowledge of the emotions’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

2^nd – any proposed external cause – is open to question

 

propositional actors are not ‘confused’ – they are uncertain

 

3^rd –any conception is a proposal – regardless of time – and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

4^th –any proposal can have reference to any other proposal

 

proposed common properties are open to question – and are uncertain

 

5^th – proposals / propositional actions can be ordered in any number of ways –

 

any proposed order is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘But in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better be understood, it must first be noted that the emotions are called great by us when we compare the emotions of one man with that of another, and when we see one man to more assailed by an emotion than another man, or when we compare one with the other the emotions of one and the same man, and find him to affected or moved more by one emotion than another.’

 

any observation of others and their emotional states – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

it is not a question of ‘this power of the mind over the emotions’ –

 

but rather whether or not we deal with our emotions in a rational manner

 

a rational understanding of the emotions is a critical understanding

 

‘For (Prop. 5 Part IV.) the force of any emotion is defined by knowledge alone: its weakness or passion is estimated solely by privation of knowledge, that is, by that where ideas are said to be inadequate.’

 

any ‘knowledge’ is propositional – is proposal – and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

an emotional / propositional action that is not critically evaluated – is not more forceful – it is irrational

 

‘From which it follows that mind is most passive whose greatest part is constituted by inadequate ideas so that it is characterized by passivity rather than activity: and that on the other hand, is most active which is constituted for the most part of adequate ideas in such a way that although there are as many inadequate ideas in this as in the former, yet it is characterized rather through those which have reference to human virtue than those which show human weakness.’

 

any proposal put – is an action – is active

 

‘inadequate ideas’ – are proposals that are open to question – open to doubt – and regarded as uncertain

 

Spinoza’s so called ‘adequate ideas’ – are ideas / proposals that are not put to question – not put to doubt – that is regarded as certain – and are the best examples of propositional passivity

 

so called ‘human virtue’ and so called ‘human weakness’ – are propositional issues open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘Again, it is to be noted that these unhealthy states of mind and misfortunes owe their origin for the most part to excessive love for a thing that is liable to many variations, and of which we can never seize the mastery.’

 

healthy and unhealthy states of mind – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what one regards as a healthy state of mind – another may well regard as unhealthy 

 

‘excessive love’?

 

once again – how the description ‘excessive’ – is used – is applied i.e. – to love – will vary for different propositional actors – in different propositional contexts

 

any emotional state – is liable to many variations –

 

and the reason is that any emotion / propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

there is no ‘mastery’ to be ‘seized’ –

 

if we proceed rationally – we proceed critically – in relation to our proposal / propositional action – we question – we doubt – and we explore propositional uncertainty

 

‘For no one is anxious or cares about anything that he does not love, nor do injuries, suspicions, enmities, etc. arise from anything else than love towards a thing of which no one is truly the master.’

 

this statement is naïve –

 

I may not love the people of Gaza – but in face of an over whelming military assault from the Israelis – I am anxious for them and I care about them –

 

just as I was anxious for and cared for the Jewish people attacked by Hamas on October 7 2023

 

love may play a part in injuries – suspicions and enmities – but just as equally – love may have nothing to do with these issues –

 

various forms of propositional conflict – may be ‘explained’ in any number of ways –

 

i.e. – propositional misunderstandings – may have nothing to do with love or hate

 

injuries – suspicions – enmities – if not critically evaluated – are irrational

 

logically speaking there is no ‘mastery’ of propositional reality –

 

propositional reality is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘From this we can easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge, and principally that third kind of knowledge (concerning which we see Note, Prop. 47, Part II.), whose basis is the knowledge of God, can do with emotions, namely, that if it does not remove them entirely in so far as they are passions (Prop. 3, with Note, Prop. 4, Part V.), at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the mind (see Prop. 14, Part V.).’

 

the idea of ‘removing emotions entirely’ – is logically absurd

 

‘emotions’ – are propositional actions –

 

it is in terms of our propositional actions that we know and deal with our reality

 

to remove propositional actions – is to remove humanity

 

so – not only is this idea ridiculous – it is sick

 

‘passions’ – and ‘emotions’ – are descriptions of propositional action

 

our passions and our emotions cannot be ‘removed’ – however – we can deal with them rationally –

 

and to live rationally is to question – to doubt – and to explore – explore – the uncertainty of our passions and emotions

 

 

PROP. XXI. The mind can imagine nothing nor recollect past things save while the body endures.

 

 

Proof. – The mind does not express the actual existence of it body nor conceive the modifications of the body as actual save while the body endures (Coroll. Prop. 8 Part II.), and therefore (Prop. 28, Part II,) it conceives no body as actually existing save

while its own body endures. And thus it can imagine nothing (see def. imagination in Note, prop. 17, Part II.) nor recollect past things save while the body endures (see def. memory in Note, Prop. 18, Part II.). Q.e.d.

 

 

‘mind’ and ‘body’ are names for propositional action –

 

propositional action is open to question

 

once it is realised that there is no logical distinction between propositional actions – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are rendered unnecessary descriptions and can be dispensed with –

 

the human being is a propositional actor –

 

in our efforts to understand ourselves – our propositional actions – we do propose descriptive categories such and ‘mind’ and ‘body’ –

 

these descriptive categories – ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – have proven to be of useful and have become entrenched in our propositional practise

 

however – logically speaking – we only ever deal with propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

as to Prop. XXI. and its Proof –

 

if a proposal cannot be put – it cannot have reference –

 

if a proposal is put – any reference proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXII. In God, however, there necessarily exists the idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the species of eternity.

 

 

‘God is a name for the unknown

 

nothing exists or exists necessarily in the unknown

 

there are no ideas in the unknown

 

any logical reference to the human being is a reference to the propositional actor and propositional actions

 

‘under the species of eternity’ –

 

‘eternity’ – as Spinoza proposes it – is outside time

 

any proposal can be put with a reference to time – or without a reference to time

 

‘under the species of eternity’ – is a proposal put without a reference to time

 

‘eternity’ – is a temporal non-reference

 

 

Proof. – God is not only the cause of this or that human body’s existence, but also of their essence (Prop. 25, Part I.) which therefore must necessarily be conceived through the essence of God (Ax, 4, Part I.) and that with a certain eternal necessity (Prop. 16 Part I.): and this conception must necessarily exist in God (Prop. 3, Part II.) Q.e.d.

 

 

any causal proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the ‘essence’ of anything – is a proposal – open to question

 

there is no propositional necessity – only propositional uncertainty

 

eternity – is no more than a proposal that has no time stamp

 

 

PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the human body, but something of it remains which is eternal –

 

 

if the propositional actor dies – then his / her ability to propose – and to critically evaluate proposals put – dies too

 

proposals put – and evaluated – may remain after death – in memory and in record

 

there is no eternal memory – there is no eternal record

 

in Spinoza’s metaphysics extension and mind are two known attributes of the one infinite and eternal substance

 

 and so according to Spinoza – for the human being – body and mind are two aspects or expressions of the one nature

 

the question for Spinoza is – if one is ‘destroyed’ – how is it that the other is not?

 

for according to Spinoza – these two aspects are effectively mirror images of each other – i.e. – if one goes – the other is gone –

 

if Spinoza is going to hold that something of the mind remains when the body is ‘destroyed’ – then he has to accept some form of dualism

 

or is it that the mind and body – both exist after death – in some form or another?

 

Spinoza cannot have it both ways –

 

either mind and body are different ‘substances’ – something of the mind remains – and something of the body does not – and therefore – dualism –

 

or the body – as with the mind – is not ‘destroyed’ – something of it remains as with the mind – and therefore – monism –

 

what is it to be?

 

if I was Spinoza – I’d go with the view that something of the human being – mind and body remains –

 

but I think – when it comes down to it – Spinoza is a closet Cartesian

 

and in this Proposition XXIII. – the closet door – creaks open

 

 

Proof. – There is necessarily in God the conception or the idea that expresses the essence of the human body (prev. Prop,), which therefore is necessarily something which appertains to the essence of the human mind (Prop. 13, Part II.). But we attribute to the human mind no duration which can be defined by time, save in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the human body, which is explained by means of duration and can be defined by time, that is (Coroll., Prop 8, Part II.) we do not attribute duration to it save as long as the body lasts. But as there is nevertheless something which is conceived under a certain eternal necessity through the essence of God, this something, which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal.

 

 

‘There is necessarily in God the conception or the idea that expresses the essence of the human body (prev. Prop,), which therefore is necessarily something which appertains to the essence of the human mind (Prop. 13, Part II.).’

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown – is without characteristics – it is unknown

 

there is no ‘necessity’ in the unknown – no ‘conception’ – the unknown does not express ‘essence’ – the unknown – expresses – nothing –

 

these notions – ‘necessity’ – ‘conception’ – ‘essence’ – are proposals – human proposals – and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

a ‘necessary’ proposition – so called – is held to be certain

 

there are no certain propositions – certainty is a delusion –

 

a ‘conception’ – is a description of a proposal –

 

as to ‘essence’ – again – a proposed certainty –

 

and it should be noted that Spinoza gives no account of these notions central to his metaphysics –

 

he assumes them – and assumes them without explanation

 

and his idea of ‘God’ – if you strip away these false notions of ‘necessity’ and ‘essence’ – comes to nothing –

 

comes right back to the unknown

 

‘But we attribute to the human mind no duration which can be defined by time, save in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the human body, which is explained by means of duration and can be defined by time, that is (Coroll., Prop 8, Part II.) we do not attribute duration to it save as long as the body lasts’

 

the first statement here – that ‘we attribute to the human mind no duration…’ –

 

is to my mind – outrageous –

 

who attributes this to the human mind?

 

and if anyone does – what is their argument?

 

experience tells us that the lives of human beings – body and mind – - if you are a dualist – have a duration

 

that death is the end of life – ‘body’ and ‘mind’ – if you wish to describe human life in these terms

 

the human mind has duration – it lives and dies

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action

 

propositional action – ‘has duration’ – as long as the propositional actor is functioning and alive

 

propositional action

 

‘But as there is nevertheless something which is conceived under a certain eternal necessity through the essence of God, this something, which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal.

 

‘under a certain eternal necessity through the essence of God’ – is metaphysical gobbledygook –

 

and to say – ‘this something which pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal’– is no argument –

 

what is this ‘something’?

 

it is this unknown ‘something’ indicates how weak Spinoza’s argument is here

 

Spinoza has no argument for the above –

 

he simply states it and assumes it has meaning – and assumes further – that his readers will just fall for it –

 

his proposals here – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – but his ‘argument’ – if you can call it that – for these proposals – is weak – to say the least

 

 

Note. – This idea, we have said, which expresses under a certain species of eternity the essence of the body, is a certain mode of thinking which appertains to the essence of the mind, and which is necessarily eternal. It cannot happen, however, that we can remember that we existed before our bodies, since there are no traces of it in the body, neither can eternity be defined by time nor have any relation to time. But nevertheless we sense and experience that we are eternal.  For the mind no less senses those things which it conceives in understanding than those which it has in memory. For the eyes of the mind by which it sees things and observes them are proofs. So though we do not remember that we existed before the body, we sense nevertheless that our mind in so far as it involves the essence of the body under the species of eternity is eternal, and its existence cannot be defined by time or explained by duration. Our mind therefore can only be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a certain time, only in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body, and thus far only it has the power of determining the existence of things by time and of conceiving them under duration.

 

 

‘This idea, we have said, which expresses under a certain species of eternity the essence of the body, is a certain mode of thinking which appertains to the essence of the mind, and which is necessarily eternal.’

 

so – the argument is – that an idea which ‘expresses eternity’ (in relation to the ‘body’ and the ‘mind’) is ‘necessarily eternal’

 

an idea that is eternal – is eternal –

 

all we have here from Spinoza is a tautology –

 

this tells us nothing

 

‘It cannot happen, however, that we can remember that we existed before our bodies, since there are no traces of it in the body, neither can eternity be defined by time nor have any relation to time.

 

if you say ‘eternity’ is ‘timeless’ – or ‘time without end’ – then the term is defined by time and does have a relation to time –

 

if ‘eternity’ – cannot be defined by time or have any relation to it – what then is it?

 

again – from Spinoza – we have nothing

 

‘But nevertheless we sense and experience that we are eternal’ –

 

it will be said in response to this that all our sense and experience is in time –

 

and that even a proposal of ‘eternity’ – whatever that may mean – occurs in time

 

my view is that ‘time’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and in response to this logical reality – this uncertainty – we do have proposals of timelessness – and of time without end –

 

these proposals as with the proposal of time – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘For the mind no less senses those things which it conceives in understanding than those which it has in memory.’

 

yes – propositional actors propose – outside of memory –

 

any such proposal – is open to question

 

‘So though we do not remember that we existed before the body, we sense nevertheless that our mind in so far as it involves the essence of the body under the species of eternity is eternal, and its existence cannot be defined by time or explained by duration’

 

again – I ask – who senses this?

 

no doubt some claim to – but there are others who would regard this proposal as pure fantasy

 

‘Our mind therefore can only be said to endure, and its existence can be defined by a certain time, only in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body, and thus far only it has the power of determining the existence of things by time and of conceiving them under duration.

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional action –

 

the ‘body’ – is a name for propositional action -

 

‘the actual existence of the body’ – is – the actual existence of propositional action

 

propositional action can be defined by reference to time –

 

however – a proposal can be put without reference to time

 

 

PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more we understand God.

 

 

Proof. – This is clear from Prop. 25, Part I

 

 

we ‘understand’ when we put our propositions to question – to doubt – and when we explore their uncertainty

 

‘particular things’ – are proposals –

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

the more we deal with uncertainty – the more we come face to face with the unknown

 

 

PROP. XXV. The greatest endeavour of the mind and its greatest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

 

 

‘knowledge’ is proposal

 

there is only one ‘kind’ of knowledge – propositional knowledge –

 

to ‘understand things’ is to put our proposals – our propositional knowledge – to question – to doubt – and to explore its uncertainty

 

this is not I think a ‘great endeavour’ – it is rather a natural endeavour

 

I don’t see critical thinking as being virtuous or not –

 

however – it can be proposed as such –

 

and any such proposal – is – as with any other proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The third kind of knowledge proceeds from the adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its def. in Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II.), and the more we understand things in this manner, the more (prev. Prop.) we understand God. And therefore (Prop. 28, Part IV.) the greatest the virtue of the mind, that is (Def. 8, Part IV.), the mind’s power or nature, or (Prop. 7, Part III.) its greatest endeavour, is to understand things according to the third kind of knowledge, Q.e.d.

 

 

if by ‘adequate knowledge’ – is meant propositions that are not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain – then propositions held in such a way are not examples of knowledge – but rather examples of blind prejudice –

 

Spinoza’s ‘third kind of knowledge’ – is a prime example of uncritical thinking

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown – the unknown – has no known attributes –

 

if we use the term ‘essence’ in a logical manner – the ‘essence’ of anything – of any proposal – is uncertainty

 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

the more we understand things in a critical manner – the more we come face to face with the unknown

 

even if you accept Spinoza’s idea of this ‘third of kind of knowledge’ – I fail to see how or why such an understanding is ‘the greatest virtue of the mind’ –

 

any understanding – however described – is neither virtuous or not virtuous – it is simply a basic and natural action of human beings

.

 

PROP. XXVI. The more apt the mind is for understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this third kind of knowledge.

 

 

Proof. – this is clear. For in so far as we conceive the mind to be apt for understanding things by this kind of knowledge, thus far we conceive as determined to understand things by the same kind of knowledge, and consequently (Def. Emo. 1) the more apt the mind is for this, the more it desires it. Q.e.d.

 

the third kind of knowledge – a recap –

 

Note 2 Prop. 40, Part II. –

 

‘Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is a third, as I shall show in what follows, which we shall call intuition (scientia intuitiva). Now this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I shall illustrate these by one example. Let three numbers be given to find the fourth, which is in the same proportion to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first: either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from the school master without any proof, or because they have often tried it with very small numbers, or by conviction of the proof of Prop. 19, Book VII., of Euclid’s elements, namely the common property of proportional. But in very small numbers there is no need of this, for when the numbers 1, 2, 3, are given, who is there who could not see the fourth proportional is 6? and this is much clearer because we conclude the fourth number from the same ratio which intuitively we see the first bears to the second.’

put forward as certain

 

 

Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge is so called ‘intuitive knowledge’ –

 

in general – as proposed ‘intuitive knowledge’ – is not open to question – open to doubt – or uncertain – is put forward as ‘certain’

 

as such it is not ‘knowledge’ – it is ignorance –

 

in the example Spinoza gives of three numbers being given to find a fourth which is the same proportion to the third as the second is to the first – what we have is a propositional (mathematical) game – a rule-governed propositional action –

 

the ‘intuition’ here – is no more than familiarity with the rule –

 

if so – all we get from Spinoza is the rule that ‘knowledge of the essence of things’ follows from ‘an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God’

 

there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode and the game mode

 

in the critical mode – we put our proposals / propositions to question – to doubt – and explore their uncertainty

 

in the game mode our activity – our play is rule governed – we play according to the rule

 

and if we don’t play according to the rule – there is no game

 

human beings critically evaluate propositions and we play propositional games

 

the playing of games is not a critical activity –

 

any claim of knowledge is a critical issue – not a game issue –

 

Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge – is a propositional game – and as such has no epistemological significance

 

there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge – ‘knowledge’ – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXVII. From the third kind of knowledge the greatest possible content of mind arises.

 

 

this third kind of knowledge – amounts to Spinoza’s conception of God –

 

in logical terms – just another proposal

 

if we deal with our proposals / propositions in a rational manner – we put them to question – we put them to doubt – and we explore their uncertainty –

 

the point being that a critical / rational approach to whatever is proposed – challenges contentment

 

 

Proof. – The greatest virtue of the mind is to know God (Prop. 28, Part IV.), or, to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (Prop. 25, Part V.): and this virtue is the greater according as the mind knows more things by this kind of knowledge (Prop. 24, Part V.). And therefore he who knows things by this kind of knowledge, passes tot the greatest state of human perfection, and consequently (Def. Emo. 2) he is affected with the greatest pleasure, and that (Prop. 45, Part II.) accompanied by the idea of himself and his virtue: and therefore (Def. Emo 25.) from this kind of knowledge the greater contentment possible arises, Q.e.d.

 

 

Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge – as he proposes it – is not open to question – not open to doubt – and is certain

 

what we have here from Spinoza is a philosophical prejudice –

 

and to suggest that holding to this prejudice is ‘the greatest virtue of the mind’ and ‘the greatest state of human perfection’ – and ‘the greatest pleasure’ – leading to ‘the greatest contentment’ – is nothing more than rank propaganda

 

 

PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but can arise from the second kind of knowledge.

 

 

Proof. – This proposition is self-evident. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we either understand through itself or through something else that is conceived through itself: that is, the ideas which are distinct and clear in us, or which have reference to the third kind of knowledge (Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II.), cannot follow from ideas mutilated and confused which (same Note) have reference to the first kind of knowledge, but can follow from adequate ideas or (same Note) from the second and third kind of knowledge. And therefore (Def. Emo. 1) the desire of knowing them by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from knowledge of the first kind, but only of the second. Q.e.d.

 

 

no proposition is ‘self-evident’

 

a proposition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

a so called ‘self-evident proposition’ – is nothing more than a prejudice

 

a so called ‘clear and distinct’ proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

this concept of ‘clear and distinct’ – has no logical significance –

 

it is just a catch phrase used by those who either can’t think critically – or – who for their own reasons – wish to avoid any critical analysis of their propositions

 

we understand when we engage in the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge –

 

however a proposal / proposition is constructed – whatever meaning it is given – it is open to question

 

it is in terms of our proposals / propositions – and critical evaluation of them – whatever they may be – that we know the world –

 

and our knowledge is uncertain

 

for Spinoza ‘adequate ideas’ – are ideas not open to question – not open to doubt – and ideas that are certain

 

these ‘adequate ideas’ – so called – are held uncritically – and are therefore – prejudices

 

is there a desire – to know these ideas – these clear and distinct prejudices?

 

not if you think critically

 

 

PROP. XXIX. Whatever the mind understands under the species of eternity, it does not understand owing to the fact that it conceives the actual existence of the body, but owing to the fact it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity.

 

 

this ‘species of eternity’ – is the proposal that we consider things outside of time

 

the ‘body’ is a name for propositional action

 

‘the actual existence of the body’ – is propositional action–

 

and if you are not a dualist – and you shouldn’t be one –the focus here is the propositional actor

 

as to ‘the essence of the body’ –

 

the ‘essence’ of the body is propositional action

 

we can propose without reference to time –

 

we do propose without reference to time –

 

this is all ‘eternity’ is – the absence of a propositional reference to time

 

 

Proof. – In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, thus far it conceives duration which can be determined by time, and thus far only it has the power of conceiving things with relation to time (Prop. 21, Part V., and Prop. 26, Part II.). But eternity cannot be explained through duration (Def. 8, Part I., and its explanation). Therefore the mind thus far has not the power of conceiving things under the species of eternity. However, inasmuch as it is the nature of reason to conceive things under the species of eternity (Coroll. 2, Prop. 44, Part II.), and it appertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the species of eternity (Prop. 23. Part V.), and save these two nothing else appertains tot the essence of the mind (Prop. 13, Part II.), this power of conceiving things under the species of eternity appertains to the mind only in so far as it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, thus far it conceives duration which can be determined by time, and thus far only it has the power of conceiving things with relation to time (Prop. 21, Part V., and Prop. 26, Part II.). But eternity cannot be explained through duration (Def. 8, Part I., and its explanation).’

 

I can propose the actual existence of the body – or more correctly – the actual existence of the propositional actor – without reference to duration – without reference to time –

 

or I can propose the actual existence of the body – of the propositional actor – with reference to duration – with reference to time

 

‘time’ and ‘eternity’ are propositional options

 

‘However, inasmuch as it is the nature of reason to conceive things under the species of eternity (Coroll. 2, Prop. 44, Part II.), and it appertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the species of eternity (Prop. 23. Part V.), and

save these two nothing else appertains to the essence of the mind (Prop. 13, Part II.),

this power of conceiving things under the species of eternity appertains to the mind only in so far as it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity.’

 

again – ‘the nature of reason’ – is a concept Spinoza assumes – but has never explained –

 

and so – ‘the nature of reason’ or ‘reason’ in Spinoza – is an empty concept – a philosophical pretension

 

the logical reality is that ‘time’ and ‘eternity’ – are propositional options

 

you can propose in terms of time – or you can propose without reference to time –

 

there is nothing more to it than that

and saying that these propositional options ‘appertain to the essence of mind’ – and only these two options appertain to the essence of the mind –

 

is really only to say – if you propose in relation to time – then you can – if it suits you – remove that reference – and propose without reference to time

 

any proposal with reference to duration and time – as with any proposal without reference to duration and time – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

Note. – Things are conceived as actual in two ways by us, either in so far as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and space, or in so far as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of divine nature. But those that are conceived in this second manner as true or real we conceive under the species of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in Prop, 45, Part II.: see also its Note.

 

 

‘Things are conceived as actual in two ways by us, either in so far as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and space, or in so far as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of divine nature.

 

a ’thing’ is a proposal – and any proposal put – is actual

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

‘But those that are conceived in this second manner as true or real we conceive under the species of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in Prop, 45, Part II.: see also its Note.’

 

there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge –

 

any proposal put – with or without reference – is real –

 

and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXX. The human mind in so far as it knows itself and its body under the species of eternity, thus far necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it exists in God and is conceived through God.

 

 

‘the human mind’ – is a name – for propositional activity

 

there is no ‘itself’ to propositional activity –

 

there is the activity of proposal put – and the activity of proposals critically evaluated

 

what we propose – is what we know –

 

and what we know is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘the body’ – is a name for propositional activity –

 

and any such name / description / explanation – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

‘eternity’ – is absence of reference to time

 

‘under the species of eternity’ – is to propose that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – that is propositional activity – can be regarded as without reference to time

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

there is no ‘knowledge of God’ – ‘God’ – is the unknown –

 

‘the human mind … knows that it exists in God and is conceived through God’

 

‘the human mind’ – is propositional activity –

 

propositional activity – is a response to the unknown

 

 

Proof. – Eternity is the essence of God in so far as this involves necessary existence (Def, 8, Part I.), Therefore to conceive things under the species of eternity is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God. And therefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and its body under the species of eternity, has thus far necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, etc. Q.e.d.

 

‘Eternity is the essence of God in so far as this involves necessary existence (Def, 8, Part I.)’

 

‘eternity’ – is the absence of reference to time –

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

there is no necessary existence – all existence is contingent – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

existence is uncertain

 

‘Therefore to conceive things under the species of eternity is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God.’

 

‘things’ are proposals

 

‘to conceive things under the species of eternity’ –

 

is to propose things / proposals – without reference to time –

 

‘or in so far as they involve existences through the essence of God’ – they are proposed as unknowns

 

any proposal put is real –

 

‘And therefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and its body under the species of eternity, has thus far necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, etc.’

 

‘the mind’ and ‘the body’ – are names for propositional activity –

 

any propositional activity proposed under the species of eternity – is proposed without reference time

 

God – is a name for the unknown

 

‘knowledge of God’ – can only mean recognition of the unknown

 

 

PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal.

 

 

Spinoza’s ‘third kind of knowledge’ – is his proposal that there is knowledge that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain

 

there is no such ‘knowledge’ –

 

Spinoza – with his third kind of knowledge – mistakes knowledge for prejudice – philosophical prejudice

 

there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge – proposals / propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity

 

propositional activity is ‘eternal’ – if it is proposed without reference to time –

 

any proposal can be put without a time reference –

 

and any proposal can be put with a time reference

 

 

Proof. – The mind conceives nothing under the species of eternity save in so far as it conceives the essence of its body under the species of eternity (Prop. 29, Part V), that is Prop. 21 and 23, Part V,), save in so far as it is eternal. And therefore (prev. prop.) in so far as it is eternal it has knowledge of God, and this is necessarily adequate (Prop. 46, Part II.): and therefore the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is apt for knowing all those things which can follow from the given knowledge of God (Prop. 40, Part II.), that is, for knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see its def in Note 2, Prop. 40 Part II.): and therefore the mind (Def.1, Part III.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of this. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity –

 

eternity is a proposal put without reference to time

 

proposing ‘under the species of eternity’ – is to propose without reference to time

 

anything I propose can be put without reference to time

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown –

 

‘to know God’ – can only mean –to recognise the unknown

 

there is no adequate knowledge – if by ‘adequate knowledge’ – is meant knowledge – not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain

 

any proposal can be put without reference to time –

 

nothing follows from the unknown

 

this third kind of knowledge – is not knowledge – it is prejudice

 

any proposal advanced that is not open to question – not open to doubt – is a prejudice

 

propositional activity can be the formal cause of prejudice –

 

human beings – who do not critically evaluate their proposals – their propositions – will live in ignorance and prejudice –

 

propositional prejudice is not uncommon

 

 

Note. – The more advanced then everyone is in this kind of knowledge, the more conscious he is of himself and God, that is, the more perfect or blessed he is, which will be yet more clear from the following propositions. But it must be noted here that although we are now certain that the mind is eternal in so far as it conceives things under the species of eternity, we shall consider it (in order that what we wish to show may be explained the more easily and better understood) as if it had just begun to exist and just begun to understand things under the species of eternity, as thus far we have done: which we may do without any danger of error, if we take care to conclude nothing save from premises that are evident.

 

 

the more advanced then everyone is in this kind of prejudice – the more irrational and ignorant they are

 

we are not certain that the mind is eternal

 

we are not certain of anything – if we proceed critically and rationally in relation to how we propose ourselves and the world

 

and as for the mind being eternal –

 

the ‘eternal’ – is a proposal with a time stamp

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity –

 

any proposal put can be put without reference to time

 

or any proposal can be put with reference to time

 

what Spinoza calls ‘eternity’ – is a referential option

 

 

PROP. XXXII. Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we are pleased with, and that accompanied by the idea of God as the cause.

 

 

there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge –

 

any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

to say ‘whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge’ – suggests that our understanding of this proposal of knowledge God – is open to interpretation – and therefore – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if he was serious about ‘whatever’ – one might say that Spinoza in Prop. XXXII – had a moment of clarity

 

as to whether we are ‘pleased’ – with this knowledge – well that is open to question

 

one could well accept Spinoza’s proposal of knowledge of God – and regard it indifferently – or indeed feel let down by it

 

‘God’ – as the cause of this idea?

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown – the unknown does not ‘cause’

 

if we are going to use ‘cause’ here – then the propositional actor is the cause of any idea / proposal that he or she puts

 

and of course – you could ask – why does any proposal have to have a cause?

 

perhaps – propositional action – like Spinoza’s ‘God’ – can well be regarded as uncaused?

 

 

Proof. – From this kind of knowledge follows the greatest possible contentment of mind (Prop. 27, Part V.), that is (Def. Emo. 25), pleasure arises, and that accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently (Prop. 30, Part V.) accompanied also by the idea of God as the cause. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the greatest possible contentment of mind’ – does not follow from Spinoza’s ‘God’ proposal –

 

logically speaking – what does follow from it is question – doubt – and uncertainty –

 

one may get pleasure from Spinoza’s proposal – I imagine he did – and if so – I am glad for him –

 

from what I can gather – his life was austere and marked by few pleasures –

 

however – one can easily see that his proposal regarding God – may not be a source of pleasure – even for those who accept it –

 

it may be regarded indifferently – or even unfavourably –

 

again – any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Corollary. – From the third kind of knowledge arise necessarily the intellectual love of God. For from this kind of knowledge arise (prev. Prop.) pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as the cause, that is (Def. Emo. 6), the love of God, not in so far as we imagine him present (Prop.29. Part V.), but in so far as we understand God to be eternal: and this is what I call the intellectual love of God.

 

nothing arises necessarily from any knowledge – that is from any proposal –

 

any proposal – is ‘open’ – open to question –

 

what will come of that questioning is uncertainty – not necessity

 

‘intellectual love of God’ –

 

the ‘intellect’ – is a name for propositional action

 

for Spinoza love comes down to pleasure – so one could take pleasure in Spinoza’s proposal of God –

 

on the other hand – the proposal may affect one indifferently – or one may view it unfavourably

 

‘pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as the cause’ – and – ‘in so far as we understand God to be eternal’

 

in so far as we are of ‘God’ – and in ‘God’ – according to Spinoza – God is the cause of anything that happens in us and to us –

 

and so – the cause of any kind of pleasure

 

therefore – I don’t think ‘pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as the cause’ – distinguishes the ‘intellectual love of God’ – from any other pleasure

 

and understanding Spinoza’s ‘God’ as eternal –

 

any proposal that does not have a time reference – a time stamp – can be regarded as ‘eternal’ – if by eternal is meant outside of time

 

Spinoza fails to define this ‘intellectual love of God’

 

 

PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal.

 

 

firstly – even if you were to accept Spinoza’s ‘third kind of knowledge’ – knowledge of his God – ‘intellectual love of God’ – (or shall we just say for the moment ‘love of God’) – need not follow

 

the point being – that you may well understand and accept Spinoza’s idea of ‘God’ – without loving it – and without loving his ‘God’

 

his ‘God’ – may leave you cold

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown

 

as to this so-called ‘third kind of knowledge’ –

 

there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and as for ‘eternal’ –

 

our proposals can be put with or without a time stamp –

 

however – any proposal – with or without a reference to time – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Proof. – The third kind of knowledge (Prop. 31, Part V., and Ax. 3, Part I.) is eternal: and therefore (same Ax., Part I.) love which arise from it is also necessarily eternal. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘the third kind of knowledge’?

 

Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge – is knowledge of God – Spinoza’s God

 

a ‘God’ that for Spinoza – is beyond question – beyond doubt and certain

 

our knowledge is proposal – proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s proposal of ‘God’ – is illogical – irrational and ignorant

 

a proposal is ‘eternal’ – if it is proposed without a reference to time

 

there is no ‘necessity’ in this – ‘eternity’ is nothing more than a referential option

 

 

Note. – Although this love towards God has no beginning (prev. Prop) it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had arisen, as the corollary of previous propositions I supposed. Nor is there any difference here, save that the mind has had from eternity those same perfections which we have now supposed to accrue to it, and that accompanied by the idea of God as the external cause. Wherefore if pleasure consist in the transition to a greater perfection, blessedness must clearly consist in the fact that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.

 

 

this ‘intellectual love of God’? –

 

saying that ‘it has no beginning’ and that ‘it has all the perfections of love’ – requires explanation – otherwise these statements look like empty hubris

 

and saying that – it just follows – that it is ‘the corollary of previous propositions I supposed’ – is – in the absence of an explanation – or a demonstration of some kind – the weakest of arguments

 

one gets the sense here that Spinoza actually has no definition of the ‘intellectual love of God’

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity

 

for Spinoza to use the phrase ‘from eternity’ suggests he is putting that eternity is related to time –

 

such a view contradicts his stated view that eternity is not to be confused with time – that eternity is outside of time

 

and as for the mind’s ‘perfections’ –

 

propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

what we deal with in propositional activity is uncertainties – not perfections

 

‘perfection’ – as proposed by Spinoza – is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain –

 

and as such ‘perfection’ is a fine example of illogical – dogmatic – fanciful thinking

 

‘God as the external cause’?

 

if you hold to Spinoza’s metaphysics – all the exists – exists in God –

 

given this – there is no ‘external’ cause

 

pleasure is not ‘a transition to perfection’ –

 

pleasure is a propositional state – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if ‘blessedness’ consists in the fact that ‘the mind is endowered with perfection itself’

 

there is no blessedness

 

or ‘blessedness’ is just a ‘corollary’ of previous false concepts like ‘perfection’ – ‘adequate idea’ – and ‘God’ –

 

just another empty pretension

 

 

PROP. XXXIV. The mind is liable to emotions which are referred to passions only while the body endures.

 

 

if the mind survives death – death of the body – then it seems – the mind and body are (in Spinoza’s terms) different substances

 

on the other hand – if they are proposed as different descriptions of the one modification of substance – a human being – then then the death of the human being is the end of the modification –

 

or alternatively – both dimensions of the one mode survive death – in some form –

 

this I think would be the best argument for Spinoza – if he is to maintain a monism

 

however – it seems here – this is not what Spinoza wants – or is arguing for –

 

and so – we fall back to some form of mind / body dualism –

 

and we are left in the dark as to just what this means for Spinoza –

 

all in all – we are left with a mind / body confusion

 

the logical reality is that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ – are names for propositional activity

 

death then is the end of propositional activity

 

‘emotions’ – ‘passions’ – are propositional descriptions of propositional activity

 

 

Proof. – Imagination is the idea with which the mind regards anything as present (see def. in Note, Prop. 17, Part II), which nevertheless indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body (Coroll. 2, Prop.

16, Part II.). Therefore emotion is imagination (Gen Def. Emo.) in so far as it indicates

the present disposition of the body and therefore (Prop. 21, Part V.) the mind is only liable to emotions, which are referred to passions while the body endures. Q.e.d.

 

 

what is present – is that which is proposed

 

what any proposal indicates – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘the external body’ – is a proposal

 

‘emotion’ is a description of propositional action

 

‘imagination’ – is a description of propositional action –

 

any description of propositional action – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

you can refer to propositional actions in any way you wish

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal.

 

 

this does not follow at all

 

we still don’t have a coherent account of ‘intellectual love’ from Spinoza

 

as for ‘eternal’ –

 

any proposal put without reference to time – to duration – can be described as ‘eternal’

 

love – however described – is a propositional action – a propositional state

 

a propositional action – only exists – if the propositional actor is able to propose

 

 

Note. – If we pay attention to the common opinion of men we shall see that they are conscious of the eternity of their minds; but they confuse eternity with duration, and attribute it to memory or imagination, which they believe to remain after death.

 

 

‘common opinion’ – is at the bottom of the philosophical barrel –

 

or to be fair – common opinion – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with infinite intellectual love.

 

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no characteristics – no properties – it is unknown

 

so – to suggest that the unknown has a self – that it loves itself with an infinite intellectual love – is plainly ridiculous

 

there is no infinite love – intellectual or otherwise

 

love is a proposal – and any proposed love is finite –

 

love has a beginning – and love has an end –

 

as propositional actors have a beginning and have an end

 

 

Proof. – God is absolutely infinite (Def. 6. Part I.) that is (Def. 6, Part II.), the nature of God enjoys infinite perfection, and that (Prop. 3, Part II.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (Prop. 11 and Ax. I, Part I.), by the idea of its cause, and this is what we said to be intellectual love in Coroll., Prop. 32, Part V.

 

 

if – as Spinoza’s suggests – God – is reality – then he is here saying – reality ‘enjoys infinite perfection’ –

 

and in so far as human beings are in God and of God – according to Spinoza – then they ‘enjoy infinite perfection’ – as does a tree – a cat – and the wind –

 

if you are taking this line – I would have thought ‘perfection’ – is enough – and no real need for ‘infinite’

 

the logical reality is that the world as proposed – in any form – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

uncertain – not perfect –

 

uncertainty puts pay to this notion of ‘perfect’ –

 

as to ‘infinity’ –

 

‘infinity’ – is a propositional game concept

 

and the rule of the infinity game is that its play is without end –

 

this game is proposed and played most notably in pure mathematics and in cosmology

 

the notion is misapplied if taken out of the game context

 

‘the idea of himself’ –

 

in so far as – according to Spinoza – God is substance – infinite and eternal – ‘God’ – is not a ‘he’ – ‘God’ is an ‘it’ –

 

an ‘it’ cannot propose itself – an ‘it’ has no idea of itself – an ‘it’ – has no ‘self’ –

 

an ‘it’ – has no ‘intellect’ – and an ‘it’ cannot love – an ‘it’ cannot love itself –

 

consciousness is not a characteristic of all existents – rather it is a characteristic of specific types of existents –

 

are we to say that substance – infinite and eternal – that is reality – and all that exists in reality – is conscious – is aware?

 

this would have to be the case if Spinoza’s God – if his ‘substance’ – is to have an idea of itself and the idea of its cause

 

we have no observation / evidence that supports this proposal –

 

what this comes down to – is the projection of a human / animal characteristic – consciousness – on to the whole of nature –

 

and some would say – that to propose this – is a prime example of the so-called anthropomorphic fallacy –

 

nevertheless – this proposal that ‘God enjoys infinite perfection, and that accompanied by the idea of himself, that is by the idea of its cause …’ – is quite valid

 

as valid as any proposal

 

and as with any proposal put – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it is this uncertainty that brings down Spinoza’s metaphysical edifice

 

and with that collapse – his notion of ‘intellectual love’ lies in the ruins

 

 

PROP. XXXVI. The mental intellectual love towards God ‘is the very love of God with which God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be expressed through the essence of the human mind considered under the species of eternity, that is mental intellectual love towards God is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself.

 

 

‘love’ – however further described – i.e. – as ‘sensual’ – as ‘mental’ – as ‘intellectual’ etc. – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown

 

‘love of God’ – is – love of the unknown –

 

‘love of the unknown’ – is a strange notion to my mind – as I would think we only love what we know – and we do not love that which is unknown

 

though perhaps for those of mystical bent – there is something in it –

 

in any case this ‘love of God’ – love of the unknown – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘the very love of God which God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be expressed through the essence of the human mind considered under the species of eternity’

 

the unknown – is unknown – it has no characteristics – i.e. – it is not ‘infinite’ –

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is not a ‘he’ – Spinoza’s ‘God’ – is an ‘it’ –

 

an ‘it’ does not have a ‘self’ –

 

‘expressed through the essence of the human mind’ –

 

the human mind – is a name for propositional action

 

the ‘essence of the human mind’ – of propositional action is uncertainty

 

and that expressed through the essence of the human mind is propositional uncertainty

 

any proposal can be put with a reference to time – or without a reference to time

 

this ‘species of eternity’ – is any reference that does not have a time stamp

 

the unknown does not love – the unknown does not love itself

 

if by ‘infinite’ you mean ‘never ending’ – love is not ‘infinite’

 

our propositional actions are finite

 

human beings love and their love is finite –

 

love exists as it is proposed

 

love dies with the lover – if not before

 

 

Proof. – This mental love must be referred to the actions of the mind (Coroll., Prop. 32, Part V., and prop. 3 Part III.), which therefore is an action with which the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as a cause (Prop. 32, Part V., and its Note), that is (Coroll,. Prop. 25, Part I., and Coroll, Prop. 11, Part II.), and action which God, in so far as he may be expressed through the human mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself. And therefore (prev. Prop.) this mental love is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself.

 

 

‘mental love’ – is a description – a propositional elaboration of love proposed

 

the mind is a name for propositional action

 

as to the ‘cause’ of any proposal – the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

we do not need the notion of ‘cause’ – for propositional action and investigation –

 

‘God’ is a name for the unknown –

 

God is not a ‘he’ – God is an ‘it’ -

 

there is no ‘self’ to the unknown

 

the unknown – does not love

 

love is a human proposal – and love as with any proposal – is not ‘never ending’ – is not infinite

 

proposals – as with the propositional actors who propose them – are finite

 

love is finite

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves men, and consequently that the love of God for men and the mind’s intellectual love towards God is one and the same thing.

 

 

human beings can propose a ‘God’ – and love that ‘God’

 

Spinoza’s proposed God – likewise can be loved –

 

however – any proposal of God and any proposal of love of God – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

 

and in so far as Spinoza’s God – is not a ‘he’ – but an ‘it’ – one would think that it would be harder to love this ‘God’ – than ‘Gods’ that it is proposed have human characteristics –

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ – could well be deemed as unlovable –

 

but does not Spinoza play both sides of the fence with his ‘God’?

 

on the one hand he wants to say his ‘God’ is not a ‘God’ with human characteristics – but on the other hand he claims his ‘God’ loves –

 

really what we get from Spinoza is a duplicitous conception of ‘God’

 

and as a result – his ‘God’ – is a confusion

 

 

Note. – From this we clearly understand in what consists our salvation, blessedness, or liberty (salus nostra seu beaititudo seu libertas), namely, in the constant and eternal love of God, or the love of God for men. And this love or blessedness is called in the Scriptures “glory” – not without reason. For whether this love has reference to God, or the mind, it can rightly be called mental satisfaction, which is truth cannot be distinguished from glory (Def. Emo. 25 and 30). For in so far as it has reference to

God it is (Prop. 35, Part V.) pleasure, if I may use the term, accompanied by the idea

of himself, just as in so far as it has reference to the mind (prop. 27, Part V.). Again, in as much as the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, the beginning and the basis of which is God (Prop. 15, Part I. and Note, prop. 47, Part III.) it is hence quite clear to us in what manner and for what reason our mind follows with regard to essence and existence from divine nature and continually depends on God. I have thought it worth while to note this in order that I may show by this example how much the knowledge of individual things which I called intuition or knowledge of the third kind (see Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II,) is advanced, and more powerful than knowledge which I called universal or of the second class. For although I showed in the first part in general that all things (and consequently the human mind) depend on God with regard to essence and existence, that proof, though perfectly legitimate and placed beyond the reach of doubt, does not affect the mind in the same manner as when it is concluded from the essence of any individual thing which we may say depends on God.

 

 

‘From this we clearly understand in what consists our salvation, blessedness, or liberty (salus nostra seu beaititudo seu libertas), namely, in the constant and eternal love of God, or the love of God for men.’

 

‘our salvation’ – salvation from what?

 

human beings do not need to be saved –

 

unless of course they are in danger of injury or loss of life –

 

there is no ‘original sin’ – as the Bible claims –

 

and human beings do not commit ‘sins’ –

 

there is no ‘sin’ –

 

we face uncertainty – and we deal with it rationally or irrationally

 

the idea that people need to be saved – presumably from themselves – is the argument of authoritarians –

 

those who wish to make people think they are in some fundamental way – powerless –

 

they push this salvation rubbish – in the attempt to dominate and control

 

human beings are not powerless –

 

any human being – any propositional actor – has the ability to question – to doubt – and to explore propositional uncertainty –

 

and it is in this logical / rational capacity – that our power lies

 

as for ‘blessedness’ – in Spinoza – ‘blessedness’ – is little more than pretension and propaganda

 

and as for liberty – our liberty rests in our critical capacity to question to doubt – and to explore uncertainty

 

‘the constant and eternal love of God, or the love of God for men.’ –

 

what we have here is a myth – and a myth designed to strip men and women of their critical capacity –

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ is not the source of liberty –

 

human beings make their own liberty in the exercise of their critical capacities

 

‘And this love or blessedness is called in the Scriptures “glory” – not without reason. For whether this love has reference to God, or the mind, it can rightly be called mental satisfaction, which is truth cannot be distinguished from glory (Def. Emo. 25 and 30).’

 

this is a significant statement – for in it we see that Spinoza has never really left the Old Testament – that his ‘Ethics’ – is effectively a philosophical reworking – of what he believed was the ethical message of the Bible

 

that is – in the ‘Ethics’ – he has attempted to – as it were – ‘modernize’ what he regarded as the ethical message of the Bible – by translating it into philosophical terms

 

and if for no other reason – his ‘Ethics’ is a remarkable achievement –

 

and a great complement to his work in biblical analysis set out in his earlier book the ‘Theologico-Political Treatise’

 

a work that as with the ‘Ethics’ – is extraordinary and brilliant

 

it can be said – that to the end – Spinoza was true to the faith – the faith that had no faith in him

 

just a note on the argument here –

 

I suppose you can equate ‘glory’ to ‘mental satisfaction’ – but to my mind ‘glory’ has more to do with vanity

 

and ‘mental satisfaction’ I would think is to be found in rational understanding

 

‘For in so far as it has reference to God it is (Prop. 35, Part V.) pleasure, if I may use the term, accompanied by the idea of himself, just as in so far as it has reference to the mind (prop. 27, Part V.).

 

God pleasuring himself

 

‘Again, in as much as the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, the beginning and the basis of which is God (Prop. 15, Part I. and Note, prop. 47, Part III.) it is hence quite clear to us in what manner and for what reason our mind follows with regard to essence and existence from divine nature and continually depends on God.’

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity

 

the essence – if you wish to use that term – of propositional activity – is the proposal

 

our knowledge is proposal

 

it is human propositional activity that has proposed ‘divine nature’

 

and in that sense – ‘God’ – depends on us

 

‘I have thought it worth while to note this in order that I may show by this example how much the knowledge of individual things which I called intuition or knowledge of the third kind (see Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II,) is advanced, and more powerful than knowledge which I called universal or of the second class.’

 

‘intuition’ – is a non-critical – momentary prejudice – that gets elevated to a certainty

 

there is only one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge

 

the power of knowledge is critical power – the power of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

‘For although I showed in the first part in general that all things (and consequently the human mind) depend on God with regard to essence and existence, that proof, though perfectly legitimate and placed beyond the reach of doubt, does not affect the mind in the same manner as when it is concluded from the essence of any individual thing which we may say depends on God.’

 

the proof – was not ‘placed beyond reach of doubt’ –

 

from a rational point of view – no proposal – however described i.e. as a ‘proof’ – is beyond doubt –

 

any proposal – or so-called ‘proof’ is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

an ‘individual thing’ is a proposal –

 

and as with any proposal – it depends only on the propositional actor who puts the proposal

 

 

PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature which is contrary to this intellectual love or which can remove it.

 

 

‘this intellectual love’ – however explained – is a proposal –

 

and as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

and if critically evaluated –– it may well be ‘removed’ from consideration –

 

and furthermore – may well be replaced with a ‘contrary’ proposal

 

 

Proof. – This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind in so far as it is considered as an eternal truth through the nature of God (Prop. 33 and 29, Part V.). If, therefore, there be anything contrary to this, it must be contrary to what is true, and consequently whatever could remove this love would bring it about that what is true should be made false, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore there is nothing in nature, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

‘This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind in so far as it is considered as an eternal truth through the nature of God (Prop. 33 and 29, Part V.).’

 

here we have an account – an explanation from Spinoza of ‘this intellectual love’

 

this account / explanation – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘If, therefore, there be anything contrary to this, it must be contrary to what is true, and consequently whatever could remove this love would bring it about that what is true should be made false, which (as is self-evident) is absurd. Therefore there is nothing in nature, etc.’

 

contrary proposals can be put – and often are – in any rational propositional investigation –

 

a proposal / proposition – is true – if it is affirmed – false if it is denied

 

and any proposal of affirmation – and any proposal of denial – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

 

Note. – The axiom of the fourth part relates to individual things in so far as they are considered with relation to certain time and place, which I think no one will doubt.

 

 

an ‘individual thing’ is a proposal

 

a proposal – of an individual thing – or of anything else – can be ‘considered with relation to certain time and place’

 

and a proposed individual thing – or anything else proposed – can be considered without relation to time and place

 

whether you tag your proposals to time and place – or not – is a propositional option

 

 

PROP. XXXVIII. The more the mind understands things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less it will be passive to emotions which are evil, and the less it will fear death.

 

 

firstly – there is one kind of knowledge – propositional knowledge – knowledge open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza’s second kind of knowledge – is based on his notion of ‘common properties’

 

any so called ‘common property’ – is open to question

 

his so called ‘third kind of knowledge’ – is intuition –

 

intuition he says of the attributes of God which leads to adequate knowledge of the essence of things –

 

any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

secondly – ‘emotions’ – are descriptions or characterizations of propositional actions

 

emotions / propositional actions are not passive – they are active

 

we are passive to the extent that we do not critically evaluate or propositional actions

 

emotions as such – are not evil –

 

emotions / propositional actions are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

our moral evaluations – are proposals

 

and any evaluation of emotions / propositional actions – i.e. as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ – is open to question -

 

how we understand ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘and the less it will fear death’ –

 

‘death’ – is open to question –

 

that is to say – there are many different understandings – proposals – as to what death is –

 

from a logical point of view – death is no different to life –

 

both life and death are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

it is this uncertainty which challenges fear of death

 

 

Proof. – The essence of the mind consists of knowledge (Prop. 11, Part II.). The more things then the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be that part of it that remains (Prop. 29 and 23, Part V.), and consequently (pre. Prop.) the greater will the part of it that is not touched by emotions which are contrary to our nature, that is (Prop. 30, Part IV.), which are evil. The more then the mind understands things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be that part of it which remains unhurt, and consequently it will be less subject to emotions, etc. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action –

 

our ‘nature’ is propositional

 

no emotion is contrary to our nature –

 

‘emotion’ – is a description of propositional action

 

propositional action is emotional action –

 

our propositional actions / emotions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

Spinoza in putting this very odd idea that the mind remains ‘unhurt’ – is I think imagining that there is propositional action that can be – that is protected from –critical investigation

 

and I think he has in mind here – his ‘third kind of knowledge’ – which in truth is just plain philosophical prejudice

 

 

Note. – Hence we understand what I touched on in Note, Prop. 39, Part IV., and which I promised to explain in this part, namely that death is the less harmful the more the mind’s knowledge is clear and distinct, and consequently the more the mind loves God. Again, inasmuch as (Prop. 27, Part V.) from the third kind of knowledge arises the greatest possible satisfaction, it follows that the human mind may be of such a nature that the part of it which we showed to perish with the body may be of no moment to it in respect to what remains. But I shall deal with that more fully soon.

 

 

‘death’ – is not ‘harmful’ – it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any so called ‘clear and distinct knowledge’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘clear and distinct knowledge’ - amounts to philosophical prejudice

 

Spinoza’s ‘love of God’ – is love of this prejudice

 

‘it follows that the human mind may be of such a nature that the part of it which we showed to perish with the body may be of no moment to it in respect to what remains. But I shall deal with that more fully soon’

 

looking forward to that

 

 

PROP. XXXIX. He who has a body capable of many things, has a mind of which the greater part is eternal.

 

 

the ‘body’ is a name for propositional activity –

 

it is the propositional actor that is capable of many things

 

and whether ‘capable of many things’ – or capable of a few things –

 

propositional action – of any kind – is the action of understanding and negotiating the world

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity – the propositional activity of the propositional actor

 

there are no ‘parts’ – to propositional action

 

any and all proposals / propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

if by ‘eternal’ you mean – ‘outside of time’ –

 

any proposal can be put without reference to time

 

and any proposal can be put with reference to time

 

‘eternity’ and ‘time’ are referential options

 

 

Proof. – He who has a body apt for doing many things is less assailed by emotions which are evil (Prop. 38, Part. IV), that is (Prop. 30 Part IV.), by emotions which are contrary to our nature. And therefore (Prop. 20, Part V.) it has the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to intellectual order, and consequently of bringing it to pass (Prop. 14, Part V.0 that all the modifications of the body have reference tot the idea of God, from which it follows (Prop. 15, Part V.) that he is affected with love towards God, and this love must occupy or constitute the greater part of his mind (Prop. 16, Part V.): and therefore (Prop. 33, Part V.) he has a mind of which the greater part is eternal.

 

 

‘He who has a body apt for doing many things is less assailed by emotions which are evil (Prop. 38, Part. IV), that is (Prop. 30 Part IV.), by emotions which are contrary to our nature.’

 

emotions are propositional actions

 

‘our nature’ – is propositional

 

no emotion / propositional action – is ‘contrary to our nature’ –

 

we are not ‘assailed’ by emotions

 

no emotion is ‘evil’ -

 

our emotions / propositional actions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘And therefore (Prop. 20, Part V.) it has the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to intellectual order, and consequently of bringing it to pass (Prop. 14, Part V.0 that all the modifications of the body have reference to the idea of God, from which it follows (Prop. 15, Part V.) that he is affected with love towards God, and this love must occupy or constitute the greater part of his mind (Prop. 16, Part V.): and therefore (Prop. 33, Part V.) he has a mind of which the greater part is eternal.’

 

‘modifications of the body’ are proposals / propositional actions

 

one can propose an ‘order’ to proposals / propositional actions

 

any proposed order is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

one can propose and order to proposals / propositional actions which has reference to the idea / proposal of God

 

any such proposal is open to question – is uncertain

 

for Spinoza ‘God’ – is ‘reality’

 

it does not follow that if you order your propositional action in terms of this God – that you will love it –

 

and it does not follow that such a proposal will be the focus of one’s propositional actions

 

and it does not follow that the majority of one’s propositional actions will be proposed as ‘eternal’

 

‘eternity’ as Spinoza defines it is ‘outside of time’

 

any proposal can be put with or without a time stamp

 

 

Note. – Inasmuch as human bodies are capable of many things, there is no doubt that they may be of such a nature that they may be referred to minds which have a great knowledge of themselves and God, and of which the greatest or principal part is eternal, and that therefore that they should scarcely fear death. But in order that these points may be more clearly understood, it must be remarked here that we live subject to continual variation, and according as we change into a better or worse state we are called happy (felices) or unhappy (infelices). For he who passes from being an infant or child into being a corpse, is said to be unhappy, while, on the other hand, he is said to be happy who is enabled to live through the whole period of a life with a healthy mind and a healthy body. And in truth, he who has a body, as, for example, an infant or a child capable of the least number of things and mostly dependent of external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself, is conscious scarcely of itself, of God, or things. In this life then we principally endeavour to change the body of an infant, in so far as its nature allows and is conducive thereto, so that it is capable of many things, and so that it is referred to a mind which is most conscious of God, itself, and other things: or so that all that which has reference to its memory or imagination should be scarcely of any moment whatever with respect to its intellect, as I said in the Note, prev. Prop.

 

 

‘Inasmuch as human bodies are capable of many things, there is no doubt that they may be of such a nature that they may be referred to minds which have a great knowledge of themselves and God, and of which the greatest or principal part is eternal, and that therefore that they should scarcely fear death.’

 

‘death’ as with ‘life’ – is a proposal –

 

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

many would say death – as in the end of life – is a certainty –

 

however – the matter is open to question – and this – Spinoza well knows

 

there are proposals put by people of religious faith that death is not the end of life

 

and furthermore – it is empirically conceivable that medical science could one day defeat death –

 

as for fear of death –

 

fear of death is open to question –

 

‘fear’ is a natural emotion – and fear of death is common

 

and there will be those who say they do not fear death

 

there are propositional options in relation to death and fear of death

 

‘But in order that these points may be more clearly understood, it must be remarked here that we live subject to continual variation, and according as we change into a better or worse state we are called happy (felices) or unhappy (infelices).’

 

‘continual variation’ – is propositional uncertainty

 

strange that it is that late stage of his ‘Ethics’ – that Spinoza glimpses the light

 

what counts as ‘a better or worse state’ – as with ‘happiness’ and ‘unhappiness’ – is open to question

 

‘For he who passes from being an infant or child into being a corpse, is said to be unhappy, while, on the other hand, he is said to be happy who is enabled to live through the whole period of a life with a healthy mind and a healthy body.’

 

‘healthy body and healthy mind’ –

 

‘body’ and ‘mind’ are names for propositional action –

 

what we are dealing with here is a healthy propositional actor

 

and ‘healthy propositional action’ – is propositional action – put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored

 

‘In this life then we principally endeavour to change the body of an infant, in so far as its nature allows and is conducive thereto, so that it is capable of many things, and so that it is referred to a mind which is most conscious of God, itself, and other things: or so that all that which has reference to its memory or imagination should be scarcely of any moment whatever with respect to its intellect, as I said in the Note, prev. Prop.’

 

the best we can do for children is to enable and foster their critical capacity –

 

for in doing this – we prepare them for the uncertain world they have to deal with

 

 

PROP. XL. The more perfection anything has, the more active and less passive it is; and contrariwise, the more active it is, the more perfect it becomes.

 

 

‘perfection’ is a synonym for ‘certainty’ –

 

in propositional reality what we deal with is not ‘perfection’ – but uncertainty –

 

a ‘thing’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

 

we are propositionally active to the extent that we put our proposals / propositions to question – to doubt – and we explore their uncertainty

 

the more we explore propositional uncertainty – the more active we are

 

we are passive if we fall for the logical delusions of certainty and perfection

 

 

Proof. – The more perfect anything is, the more reality it has (Def. 6, Part II.), and consequently (Prop. 3, Part III., with its Note), it is more active and less passive: which proof can proceed in an inverted order; from which it may follow that a thing is more perfect the more active it is. Q.e.d.

 

 

reality is proposal

 

a ‘thing’ – is a proposal –

 

a propositional actor is more active – the more he / she critically evaluates his / her proposals

 

 

Corollary. – Hence it follows that the part of the mind which remains, of whatever size it is, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (Prop. 23 and 29, Part V.) is the intellect through which alone we are said to act (Prop. 3, Part III.); but that part which we see to perish is the imagination (Prop. 23, Part V.) through which alone we are said to be passive (Prop. 3, Part III., and Gen Def. Emo), And therefore (prev. Prop.) the first part, of whatever we size it may be, is more perfect than the other. Q.e.d.

 

 

the ‘mind’ is a name for propositional activity

 

there is no ‘perfect’ proposal – any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

 

we do not measure propositions

 

‘the intellect’ – is a name for propositional activity

 

any proposal – however named or described – is an action

 

‘the imagination’ – is a name for propositional activity

 

there is no logical distinction between the ‘intellect’ – and the ‘imagination’

 

‘intellect’ and ‘imagination’ – are different names for or different descriptions of propositional activity –

 

a propositional activity ‘perishes’ – with the propositional actor

 

 

Note. – This is what I had determined to show concerning the mind in so far as it is considered without relations to the existence of the body. From this and from Prop. 21, Part I., and other propositions, it is apparent that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity: so that they all constitute at the same time the eternal and infinite intellect of God.

 

 

‘This is what I had determined to show concerning the mind in so far as it is considered without relations to the existence of the body.’

 

‘mind’ and ‘body are names for propositional action

 

any division of propositional action into ‘mind proposals’ and ‘body proposals’ – is superficial

 

any proposal – however named or described – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

the propositional actor is not divided – and his actions – however named or described – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘…it is apparent that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking…’

 

our understanding is propositional –

 

for Spinoza – the ‘eternal’ is outside of time

 

a propositional understanding can be put with reference to time – or it can be put without reference to time

 

if you propose your understanding – without reference to time – you can describe the proposal as ‘eternal’ – but all that means is that you have not given it a time stamp

 

‘… which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity: so that they all constitute at the same time the eternal and infinite intellect of God.’

 

our proposals – our propositional actions are not determined – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

any causal proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘infinity’ – is a propositional game –

 

the rule of the game is that it has no end point

 

you can play the infinity game with propositions – but to what end?

 

Spinoza says it ends in ‘the eternal and infinite intellect of God’ –

 

if you play the infinity game – there is no end point – Spinoza’s ‘God’ proposal – can only be one step before the next

 

Spinoza’s ‘God’ is not a ‘person’ – Spinoza’s God is an ‘it’

 

an ‘it’ – does not have an intellect –

 

only humans – and perhaps some other species – have ‘intellect’ – that is – are propositionally active

 

‘God’ – is a name for the unknown –

 

the unknown has no characteristics

 

 

PROP. XLI. Although we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would behold before all things piety and religion, and absolutely all things which we have shown in Part IV., to have reference to courage and nobility.

 

 

the argument here is that if we did not know that our mind was eternal – nevertheless we would hold to piety and religion and those things which have reference to courage and nobility

 

this can mean that the argument of Part IV – stands on its own – and that the argument of Part V complements or enhances the Part IV argument –

 

this is how I think Spinoza wants us to see it

 

however – it can also be interpreted as indicating that the Part V argument – does not follow from the argument of Part IV – that it is not a logical consequence –

 

and if so – Spinoza’s grand deduction – is not ultimately successful –

 

that at least between Part IV and V – the supposed deductive chain has a break in it

 

 

Proof. – The first or only basis of virtue or a system of right living is (Coroll., Prop. 22 and 24, Part IV,) the seeking of what is useful to oneself. But to determine these things which reason dictates to be useful to us, we had no regard for the eternity of the mind, which we have only considered in this fifth part. Therefore although we were ignorant at the time that the mind is eternal, yet we held these things first which we showed to have reference to courage and nobleness. And therefore, though we were ignorant of it now, we should hold first these precepts of reason. Q.e.d.

 

 

again – this does suggest that Spinoza is now saying plainly that that the argument of Part V is a separate argument – and one that is not related to the argument of Part IV – and vice versa

 

and this I think is the case

 

his ‘system of right living’ – as presented in Part IV – is quite distinct from his overall metaphysical argument – and you could say – therefore irrelevant to it –

 

and therefore – that his metaphysical argument actually has no connection to his ethical argument –

 

furthermore – there is an issue with this notion of ‘precepts of reason’

 

the point is that his ‘precepts of reason’ – are really no more than his claim that his argument has the authority of reason

 

just what ‘reason’ is for Spinoza is never fully articulated –

 

basically – he assumes it as an authority – and leaves it at that – assuming too that his readers will make the same assumption

 

and really it is an assumption – based on nothing – nothing but pretence –

 

the only genuine authority is authorship – and that he can claim

 

 

Note. – The general notion of the vulgar seems to be quite contrary. For most seem to think that they are free in so far as they may give themselves up to lust, and that they lose their right in so far as they are obliged to live according to the divine laws. They therefore think that piety, religion, and all things which have reference to fortitude of mind are burdens which after death they will lay aside, and hope to receive a reward for their servitude, that is their piety and religion. Not by this hope alone, but also, and even principally, by the fear of suffering dreadful punishments after death, are they induced to live, as far as their feebleness and weak-mindedness allows them, according to divine laws, and if this hope or fear was not in men, but, on the other

hand, if they thought that their minds were buried with their bodies, and that there

did remain for the wretches worn out with the burden of piety the hope of a longer

life, they would return to life according to their own idea, and would direct

everything according to their lust, and obey fortune rather than their selves. This

seems no less absurd to me than if a man, when he discovered that he could not keep his body alive for ever with wholesome food, should straightway seek to glut himself with poison and deadly foods; or that a man, when he discovered that his mind was not eternal and immortal, should prefer to live without any mind at all; this all seems so absurd to me that it scarcely deserves to be refuted.

 

‘The general notion of the vulgar seems to be quite contrary. For most seem to think that they are free in so far as they may give themselves up to lust, and that they lose their right in so far as they are obliged to live according to the divine laws.’

 

what we have here is basically Spinoza’s view of those who do not live in terms of his ethical opinions

 

do most people who don’t follow Spinoza’s view of how to live think that their freedom consists in being able to give into their lusts?

 

what evidence does he have for this view?

 

he doesn’t provide any – and we are left wondering if all we have here from Spinoza is snobbery and prejudice

 

I can well imagine someone who does give into what Spinoza calls their ‘lusts’ – also holding the view that their freedom consists in having the choice of whether to give into lust or not

 

also – we can ask – does everyone recognise what Spinoza calls ‘divine laws’

 

and I think this the first time this notion of ‘divine laws’ has been introduced into the ‘Ethics’

 

and really – what are these so-called ‘divine laws’?

 

are they the moral strictures proposed in the bible – i.e. the ten commandments of Moses?

 

or does Spinoza think we will take his ethical opinions to be ‘divine laws’?

 

any ‘law’ is a proposal – a proposal put by propositional actors (i.e. Moses and Spinoza) – and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘They therefore think that piety, religion, and all things which have reference to fortitude of mind are burdens which after death they will lay aside, and hope to receive a reward for their servitude, that is their piety and religion…’

 

perhaps in some social and historical context – this a valid hypothesis regarding some people’s attitudes and behaviours –

 

but again – what evidence does Spinoza have for such a view?

 

none is forthcoming – so – in the end – all we have is Spinoza’s opinion –

 

and such is the case with regard to the other pronouncements and analyses in the rest of this Note

 

it is fair enough to make such ‘observations’ – and to have such opinions –

 

but Spinoza fails to critically challenge his own opinions – or it seems – to recognise that they are open to question

 

and as a result – his views bear the mark of prejudice and philosophical snobbery

 

‘This seems no less absurd to me than if a man, when he discovered that he could not keep his body alive for ever with wholesome food, should straightway seek to glut himself with poison and deadly foods; or that a man, when he discovered that his mind was not sternal and immortal, should prefer to live without any mind at all; this all seems so absurd to me that it scarcely deserves to be refuted.’

 

the overall point of this Note – it seems – is to denigrate those caught up in moral and ethical conflict – by describing them as ‘feeble and weak-minded’ – and their struggles as ‘absurd’ –

 

the fact is though – it is only out of such conflict and struggle that human beings have been able to discover their strengths – and it is only out of such conflicts and struggles that they have been able to propose solutions to their fundamental ethical problems

 

the best we can offer those caught up in moral conflict is not disparagement – but rather the possibility of rationality – the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

 

for it is in such exploration that human beings exercise and discover their freedom

 

and freedom from ignorance authoritarianism and prejudice

 

 

PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor should we rejoice in it for that we restrain our lusts, but, on the contrary, because we rejoice therein we can restrain our lusts.

 

 

Proof. – Blessedness consists of love towards God (Prop. 36, Part V, and its Note), and this love arises from the third kind of knowledge (Coroll., Prop. 32, Part V.). And therefore this love (Prop. 59 and 3, Part III.) must be referred to the mind in so far as it is active, and therefore it is a virtue itself (Def. 8, Part IV.): which is the first point. Again the more the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, the more it understands (Prop. 32, Part V.), that is (Coroll Prop. 3 Part V.) the more power it has over the emotions, and (Prop. 38, Part V.) the less passive it is to emotions which are evil. And therefore, by the very fact that the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, it has the power of restraining lusts, inasmuch as human power to restrain lusts consists of intellect alone. Therefore no one rejoices in blessedness because he restrained his lusts, but, on the contrary, the power of restraining lusts arises from blessedness itself.

 

 

‘blessedness’ is ‘love towards God’

 

so – ‘blessedness’ is a synonym for ‘love of God’ –

 

presumably the idea is that one who loves God – is blest –

 

we can ask – blest by whom?

 

Spinoza’s God is reality writ large – Spinoza’s God – is not a person – Spinoza’s God is an ‘it’ – and an ‘it’ does not bless

 

whatever ‘blessing’ amounts to – it is only a propositional actor who can bless

 

blest by themselves?

 

if so – ‘blessedness’ – comes off as a ‘love of oneself’

 

as to arising from the ‘third kind of knowledge’ –

 

does love arise from knowledge?

 

perhaps so – but also perhaps not

 

there is only one ‘kind’ of knowledge – propositional knowledge

 

you could well know Spinoza’s God – that is propose this God – without loving it

 

the ‘mind’ – is a name for propositional action

 

any proposed ‘love’ – is a propositional action –

 

and any propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

‘love of God’ – or love anything – is open to question – is open to doubt – and certain

 

which is the first point –

 

rejoicing in love – is one thing –

 

‘understanding’ – is a critical activity

 

the ‘emotions’ are proposed names for propositional actions

 

our power is logical and rests in the critical activity of question – doubt and the exploration of uncertainty

 

we are passive – to the extent that we do not put our proposals – propositional actions to question – to doubt – and do not explore their uncertainty

 

there are no evil emotions –

 

our emotions / propositional actions – are open to question –open to doubt and are uncertain

 

rejoicing in divine love or blessedness – is not a critical activity

 

and therefore – rejoicing in divine love or blessedness – is impotent

 

‘lusts’ – as with any propositional actions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

 

critical power does not arise from blessedness

 

 

Note. – Thus I have completed all I wish to show concerning the power of the mind over emotions or the freedom of the mind. From which it is clear how much a wise man is in front and how stronger he is than an ignorant one, who is guided by lusts alone. For an ignorant man, besides being agitated in many ways by external causes, never enjoys one true satisfaction of the mind: he lives almost unconscious of himself, of God, and things, and as soon as he ceases to be passive ceases to be. On the contrary, the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is scarcely moved in spirit: he is conscious of himself, of God, and things by a certain eternal necessity, he never ceases to be, and always enjoys satisfaction of the mind. If the road I have shown to lead to this is very difficult, it can yet be discovered. And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom found. For how could it be that it is neglected practically by all, if salvation were close at hand and could be found without difficulty? But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.

 

 

‘From which it is clear how much a wise man is in front and how stronger he is than an ignorant one, who is guided by lusts alone.’

 

Spinoza’s ‘wise man’ – is one who holds Spinoza’s proposed metaphysics – and holds it to be certain –

 

that is – does not put it to question – put it to doubt – and does not explore its uncertainty –

 

Spinoza’s ‘wise man is therefore – irrational

 

Spinoza’s ‘ignorant man’ – is guided by lusts alone –

 

if he does not put his lusts to question – or explore their uncertainty – he is likewise – irrational –

 

if he does critically evaluate his lusts – he is a step ahead of Spinoza’s ‘wise man’

 

‘For an ignorant man, besides being agitated in many ways by external causes, never enjoys one true satisfaction of the mind: he lives almost unconscious of himself, of God, and things, and as soon as he ceases to be passive ceases to be’

 

any propositional actor – deals with ‘external causes’ – that is – proposals put to him

 

if one is ‘agitated in many ways’ – one is most likely to put one’s actions to question

 

furthermore – is it not possible for the lustful man to achieve a ‘true satisfaction’ – if ‘true satisfaction’ for him – is to be found in his lustful exploits?

 

in any case – any ‘satisfaction’ – is uncertain

 

as to living ‘almost unconscious of oneself’ – what is that supposed to mean?

 

either you are conscious or you are not – there is no sense in ‘almost’

 

if one ‘ceases to be passive’ – I would assume that one starts to be active

 

as to Spinoza’s ‘ignorant man’ ‘ceasing to be’ – because he does not adopt Spinoza’s outlook – that’s rubbish

 

‘On the contrary, the wise man, in so far as he is considered as such, is scarcely moved in spirit: he is conscious of himself, of God, and things by a certain eternal necessity, he never ceases to be, and always enjoys satisfaction of the mind.’

 

the ‘wise man’ who is ‘scarcely moved in spirit’ – will be one who is scarcely logically alive – will be one who has little or no critical activity

 

as to – ‘he never ceases to be’ – this again is ridiculous

 

I think anyone can enjoy satisfaction of mind – in any number of ways – but I would suggest that any satisfaction – tends to be short lived

 

‘If the road I have shown to lead to this is very difficult, it can yet be discovered. And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom found. For how could it be that it is neglected practically by all, if salvation were close at hand and could be found without difficulty? But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.’

 

the road Spinoza has shown is the dogmatic road of certainty

 

it is not a road any rational man or woman would choose

 

dogmatic thought and practises are not hard to find – quite the opposite –

 

you can find them in philosophical systems - political systems - and in the opinions and actions of individuals

 

we have no need for salvation – only rationality

 

not all excellent things are difficult or rare

 

 

 

© greg t. charlton. 2024.