Introduction
In this work I offer a critical appraisal of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘The Book Blue'. My argument is that we operate with propositions or proposals in all facets of human endeavour. There are two modes of propositional activity: the critical mode and the game mode.
In the critical mode our propositions are open to question open to doubt and uncertain.
In the game mode our propositions are rule governed.
In this work I explore this view of the proposition in relation to Wittgenstein’s argument in ‘The Blue Book’.
In what follows I will present each of Wittgenstein’s remarks and follow each with my response.
The Blue Book
‘What is the meaning of a word?
Let us attack the question by asking, first, what is an explanation of the meaning of a word; what does the explanation of the meaning of a word look like?
Wittgenstein begins with the question – what is the meaning of a word?
and he attacks the question – with the further questions – what is an explanation of the meaning of a word? – and – what does the explanation of a word look like?
this approach I think will take us right back to where we began – for we can just as easily ask – what is the meaning of an explanation?
what is clear is that in asking ‘what is the meaning of ….’ – any answer will leave open the question of meaning
what does this tell us?
that there is no answer to this question? – that the question – if it can’t be answered – is not a genuine question? – or something else?
the fact is we give answers to this question – but we realise quickly that any answer does not dispel the question –
the question remains – and we see that the business of answering it is – ongoing –
so – what we have is what we propose – at any point in time – in response to such a question
and what we have – at any point in time is – is a response that is – open to question
what we have is this propositional activity –
an activity – that in a logical sense – is on-going
for practical purposes – we might decide to bring the propositional responses to a halt – but logically speaking there is no end
and what can we say of this in relation to the question of meaning?
it strikes me that what we have is the search for meaning – and that for all intents and purposes that that search is meaning – is what is meaningful
‘The way this question helps us is analogous to the way the question “how do we measure a length?” helps us understand the problem “what is length?”’
one could say here that in order to measure a length – we must already know what a length is – or if not ‘know’ in any final sense – have a working idea of a length –
the point being that what is a length – and what is the measurement of a length – are really two different questions
granted – measuring a length – will enable us to use this notion of length –
we use many things without a clear understanding – a comprehensive understanding – of what they are
and even when we have an idea of a what a thing or concept is – that we are using –
any such idea is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘The question, “What is length?”, “What is meaning?”, “What is the number one” etc., produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can’t point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.)’
Wittgenstein says that a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it –
it is the looking that is the action of meaning –
‘substantives’ comes and go – they are best seen as rest spots on the propositional journey
and we can drop ‘journey’ here too – if it is meant to imply a logical end point
what we have is propositional exploration – and really – we only halt the inquiry when we need a breather – or we need to act –
knowing that the ‘meaning’ – of any action taken – will be open to question
as to this ‘great source of philosophical bewilderment’ –
the ‘bewilderment’ only occurs if one expects that there will be an answer to these questions that is beyond further question –
and of course – there is no such answer – and any critical discussion of ‘length’ – of ‘meaning’ – of ‘number’ – reveals – that any answer is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the ‘cramp’ is the failure to understand this propositional reality
and by the way we can and do point to – propose answers to the above questions –
for example – you can open your hands and move your arms out and in to represent length – you can point to a written sentence – to define meaning – and you can give an ostensive definition of number – by writing a series of numbers
these proposals – are a pointing to –
our ‘pointing to’ – is propositional
and yes – as soon as these proposals are put – we see – or we can see – their inadequacy – their uncertainty
the ‘substantive’ – is no big deal – it just one window into propositional uncertainty
and it is this uncertainty that we face – deal with – operate with – and out of which we make our propositional realities
‘Asking first “What is an explanation of meaning?” has two advantages. You in a sense bring the question “What is meaning?” down to earth. For, surely, to understand the meaning of “meaning” you ought also to understand the meaning of “explanation of meaning”. Roughly: “Let us ask what the explanation of meaning is, for whatever that explains will be the meaning. “Studying the grammar of the expression “explanation of meaning” will teach you something about the grammar of the word “meaning” and will cure you of the temptation to look about you for some object which you might call “the meaning”.’
I have already mentioned that giving an explanation of the meaning of a word – just takes you back to the question – for we can ask what is the meaning of the explanation?
here though we need to investigate this notion of explanation –
at its base an explanation is a proposal –
and the idea is that the explanation / proposal gives us knowledge –
the logical reality is that any so-called knowledge here – is – as with any proposal – open to question –
and if you are happy with that – then what you have with the explanation is an investigation into the propositional uncertainty of that which is to be ‘explained’
the standard idea is that an explanation – brings the matter to a close
that only occurs if you bring critical examination to an end
to do this is not logical – but it is done for pragmatic reasons
it is worth noting that not all propositional activity is strictly speaking logical
a good deal of our propositional action – as a matter of fact – is action without question – doubt – or uncertainty –
and this is not to suggest some fault or failing – human beings do not always act logically
as to the ‘grammar of the word’ –
the grammar of the word is its accepted use
studying the grammar of the word – if it is a logical study – is to put the use to question – to doubt –
it is to explore its uncertainty
any exploration here is propositional
we never leave propositional reality
even should you propose an object as meaning – you are putting a proposition – a proposition – open to question
‘What one generally calls “explanations of the meaning of a word” can , very roughly, be divided into verbal and ostensive definitions. It will be seen later in what sense this division is only rough and provisional (and that it is, is an important point). The verbal definition, as it takes us from one verbal expression to another, in a sense gets us no further. In the ostensive definition however we seem to make a much more real step towards learning the meaning.’
this ‘very rough division’ – into verbal and ostensive – falls away as inadequate – when you understand that any definition is a proposal –
a verbal definition is a proposal – and an ostensive definition is a proposal
the ostensive proposal is a non-verbal – action – proposal –
as to the ostensive definition – as a ‘more real step’ –
our reality is propositional – and we operate with different propositional forms –
no form is ‘more real’ – than any other
our ostensive proposals – like our verbal proposals – are open to question
both forms of proposal – both definitions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
on the ground – when it comes to proposal – verbal or non-verbal – you are dealing with circumstance –
whatever definition is proposed – and however it is received – the proposal will be open to question
aren’t we really talking here about conventional propositional practise?
consider –
within a particular propositional practise e.g. – teaching – we might decide to have an object – a physical piece like a chess piece – representing ‘one’ – or a series of such pieces to represent ‘number’ – and a colour – say black – to represent ‘not’ –
that is – we can create a new ostensive definition convention – within a particular propositional context
propositional uncertainty is the ground of propositional innovation
‘Question: Need the ostensive definition itself be understood? Can’t the ostensive definition be misunderstood?’
any definition is a proposal – and a proposal open to question
logically speaking there is no misunderstanding –
there is only – different propositional responses to a subject proposal – in this case to an ostensive definition
and any response – is open to question
“This is a pencil”,
“This is round”
“This is wood”,
“This is one”,
“This is hard”, etc. etc.
One might object to this argument that all these interpretations presuppose another word-language. And this objection is significant if by “interpretation” we only mean “translation into a word-language”. --- Let me give some hints which might make this clearer. Let us ask ourselves what is our criterion when we say that someone has interpreted the ostensive definition in a particular way. Suppose I give to an Englishman the ostensive definition “this is what the Germans call ‘Buch’”. Then in the majority of cases at any rate, the English word “book” will come into the Englishman’s mind. We may say he has interpreted “Buch” to mean “book”. The case will be different if e.g., we point to a thing which he has never seen before and say: “This is a banjo”. Possibly the word “guitar” will then come into his mind, possibly no word at all but the image of a similar instrument, possibly nothing at all. Supposing then I give him the order “now pick a banjo from amongst these things”. If he picks what we call a “banjo” we might say “he has given the word ‘banjo’ the correct interpretation”; if he picks some other instrument – he has interpreted ‘banjo’ to mean ‘string instrument’.
We say “he has given the word ‘banjo’ this or that interpretation”, and are inclined to assume a definite act of interpretation beside the act of choosing.’
yes – there will be a definite act of interpretation of the definition / proposal –
but as with any proposal – this proposal will be open to question – open to doubt – and from a logical point of view – uncertain
uncertain as it is – in a particular context – the interpretation / proposal may be useful
‘Our problem is analogous to the following:
If I give someone the order “fetch me a red flower from the meadow”, how is he to know what sort of flower to bring, as I have only given him a word?’
‘how is he to know what sort of flower to bring?’ –
perhaps he doesn’t know – and in that case he can question the order / proposition
you could say he does know – if he performs the act as anticipated
as to how he knows – all you can do here – is ask him –
perhaps he has an account of how he knows – perhaps not
the point is that his propositional response to the question of how he knows –
whatever his response – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Now the answer one might suggest is that he went to look for a red flower carrying a red image in his mind, and comparing it with the colour of the flowers to see which of them had the colour of the image. Now there is such a way of searching and it is not at all essential that the image that we use should be a mental one. In fact the process may be this: I carry a chart co-ordinating names and coloured squares. When I hear the order “fetch me etc.” I draw my finger across the chart from the word “red” to a certain square, and I go and look for a flower that has the same colour as the square. But this is not the only way of searching and it isn’t the usual way. We go, look about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, without comparing it to anything. To see that the process of obeying an order can be of this kind, consider the order “imagine a red patch”. You are not tempted in this case to think that before obeying you must have imagined a red patch to serve you as a pattern for the red patch which you were ordered to imagine.’
as to this this method of carrying a chart that enables one to co-ordinate names and coloured squares
the first thing to say here is that any comparison – and act of co-ordination – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
there is no guarantee that what I call a ‘red flower’ is what he ends up calling a ‘red flower’
there is no guarantee that what I call ‘red’ – is what he identifies as red – or for that matter what I call a ‘flower’ – is what he picks out as a flower –
and when he does pick out what I mean by a ‘red flower?’
what we have here is a proposed correspondence –
now any such correspondence –– as with any propositional action – is open to question –
however – where we have agreement – uncertain as that might be – we have a reason for moving forward
‘We go, look about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, without comparing it to anything.’
this case – from a logical point of view is really no different to the process of comparing names and coloured squares
here we have the propositional action of picking out the flower –
and as with any action – logically speaking – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘To see that the process of obeying an order can be of this kind, consider the order “imagine a red patch”. You are not tempted in this case to think that before obeying you must have imagined a red patch to serve you as a pattern for the red patch which you were ordered to imagine.’
I don’t think we can generalise here
perhaps a red patch has been imagined before the order is obeyed – perhaps not –
you can always ask – and see what response you get
there are no ‘musts’ in propositional life
furthermore – we do what we do – we perform propositional acts
how we explain our propositional actions – is another matter
propositional action – does not require explanation –
explanation is after the fact – and in response to a call for it
you may or may not be able to explain yourself –
others perhaps will put their two bits in
whatever the case – any explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Now you might ask do we interpret the words before we obey the order? And in some cases you will find that you do something which might be called interpreting before obeying, in some cases not.’
the point is – whether you ‘interpret’ or not – what you do – your propositional action – is open to question
‘It seems that there are certain definite processes bound up with the working of language, processes through which alone language can function. I mean the processes of understanding and meaning. The signs of our language seem dead without these mental processes; and it might seem that the only function of the signs is to induce these processes and that these are the things we ought really to be interested in. Thus, if you are asked what is the relation between a name and the thing it names, you will be inclined to answer that the relation is a psychological one, and perhaps when you say this you think in particular of the mechanism of association – We are tempted to think that the action of language consists of two parts: an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an organic part, which we call understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting them, thinking. These latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of medium, the mind: and the mechanism of the mind, the nature of which, it seems, we don’t understand, can bring about effects which no material mechanism could. Thus e.g. a thought (which is such a mental process) can agree or disagree with reality. I am able to think of man who isn’t present; I am able to imagine him, ‘mean him’ in a remark which I make about him, even if he is a thousand miles away or dead. “What a queer mechanism”, one might say, “the mechanism of wishing must be if I can wish that which will never happen”.’
that there are ‘certain definite processes bound up with the workings of language’ – is a proposal –
a proposal – we can put to question – a proposal we can raise doubts in relation to – and a proposal – the uncertainty of which we can explore –
such a proposal is an explanatory proposal – and as with any explanatory proposal – a philosophical back story
the point being that language works – language functions – whatever back story we go with – whatever back story we critically evaluate
in relation to this proposal that the workings of language are bound up with the processes of understanding and meaning –
we can ask does pointing to ‘processes of understanding and meaning’ – do anything more than just elaborate on ‘language’ – on the use of language – that is to say just ‘fill out’ the fact of language?
I think any such elaboration can be of interest if it leads to further questions –
but it is an elaboration – an exploration of the proposal ‘language’ –
and this I would suggest is the case with any so called ‘explanation’
what I am suggesting is that there is no depth to exploration –
explanation is an exploration of propositional surface – of the propositional landscape
the propositional landscape is what there is – we can limit it – or we can expand on it – we can explore it
and any such exploration is a creative enterprise – the landscape is only there when it is created – when it is proposed
‘the signs of our language seem dead without these mental processes’?
or could it be that the signs of our language – are alive – regardless of how one explains them – regardless of what account is given of them?
the point being – they are alive – because they have been proposed – because they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the relation between a name in the thing it names – is propositional
‘the thing it names’ – is a proposal – the ‘name’ – a proposal
the function of the name proposal is to identify – to propose an identification – of the thing in question
what we are talking about here is propositional action – propositional relations
yes – you can describe the ‘handling of signs’ – in terms of ‘understanding’ – ‘meaning them’ – ‘interpreting them’ – and ‘thinking’ – etc. –
you can use whatever description suits your purpose – that you find useful
however – any such description – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘these latter activities’ – are descriptions / explanations of propositional action –
these later activities just are the action of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
a thought is a proposal – if you wish to further propose ‘a mental process’ – if that suits your purposes – your view of the world – fair enough –
however – this proposal of ‘mental process’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Thus e.g., a thought (which is a mental process) can agree or disagree with reality’ –
firstly – reality – is propositional – it is what we propose
proposals are put in relation to one another –
we can propose correspondence – non-correspondence – between proposals
the relations of correspondence – or non-correspondence – are relational proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and proposals of affirmation – or denial – are likewise – open to question –
we propose what we propose – and we affirm or deny – in uncertainty
an imaginative proposal – is logically speaking no different to any other – it is open to question –
put it this way – such a proposal – is a proposal described as ‘imaginative’ –
a wish is a proposal
as to mind – this ‘mechanism of mind’ – this ‘queer mechanism’ –
if you want to propose such – for whatever reason – by all means go ahead –
‘mind’ is a propositional back story – and yes – worth exploring
it is a propositional field ripe with question – doubt – and uncertainty
‘There is one way of avoiding at least partly the occult appearance of the process of thinking, and it is, to replace in these processes any working of the imagination by acts of looking at real objects. Thus it may seem essential that, at least in certain cases, when I hear the word “red” with understanding, a red image should be before my mind’s eye. But why should I not substitute seeing a red piece of paper for imagining a red patch? The visual image will only be the more vivid. Imagine a man always carrying a sheet of paper in his pocket on which the names of colours are co-ordinated with coloured patches. You may say that it would be a nuisance to carry such a table of samples about with you, and that the mechanism of association is what we use instead of it. But this is irrelevant; and in many cases is not even true. If, for instance, you are ordered to paint a particular shade of blue called “Prussian blue” you might have to use a table to lead you from the word “Prussian Blue” to a sample of the colour, which would serve you as your copy.’
there is nothing ‘occult’ about thinking –
proposals – propositions – are put – either publicly or privately – and these proposals are put to question – put to doubt – and their uncertainty explored –
it is this critical activity – that is thinking –
the action of thinking is logical – not occult
you might want to explain seeing a red piece of paper by proposing a red image –
this is to propose an explanation of the act – it is not the act –
and any such explanatory proposal – as with what it purports to explain – is open to question
carrying a sheet of paper in your pocket on which the names of colours are co-ordinated with coloured patches – is carrying a proposal in your pocket
(is that a proposal – or are you just glad to see me?)
whether it is useful or not will depend on the circumstance
and yes – it is a proposal – that is open to question
‘We could perfectly well, for our purposes, relace every process of imagining by a process of looking at an object or by painting, drawing or modelling: and every process of speaking to oneself by speaking aloud or writing.’
you don’t have to replace imagining –
to imagine is to propose
any such proposal will be primarily private to the proposer – but it may well have a secondary public expression
Wittgenstein goes on to discuss Frege’s criticism of formalism –
‘Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the important, the meaning. Surely, one wishes to say, mathematics does not treat of dashes on a bit of paper. Frege’s idea could be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematic, if they were just a combination of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of life. And the same, of course, can be said of any proposition: Without a sense, or without the thought a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing. And further it seems that no adding of inorganic signs can make the proposition live. And the conclusion which one draws from this is that what must be added to the dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immaterial, with properties different from all mere signs.’
whether a mathematical proposition – or a proposition of any other description – what we have – what we deal is proposal –
now someone could look at a sign – mathematical or otherwise – and it registers nothing with them –
and I am not making a criticism here of anyone who has this experience – that the sign is dead – this can happen
the point is we establish a connection – a relation to a sign by putting it to question – raising doubts regarding it – considering its uncertainty
this is the natural – and logical approach to any proposal – any proposition – whether or not it strikes us as significant – on first approach –
we engage logically with a proposal – we engage critically with a proposal –
and through this engagement the proposal – becomes a sign –
and you will ask – a sign of what?
it becomes – at base – a sign of logical uncertainty –
and it is this experience of uncertainty that we investigate – and it is out of such an investigation that we may propose significance – function and use
here I am talking about what you might call a logical state of nature –
more often than not we come to proposals – propositions – propositional signs – with some idea – with some kind of experience – some kind of experience of significance – function and use
however – even in such a case – the proposal – the proposition – the sign – is only alive – is only made alive – with question – with doubt – and with the exploration of its uncertainty
regardless of how a proposal – a proposition – a sign – manifests –
what we are dealing with at base is a logical entity one open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘But if we had to name anything that is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it is its use.’
the life of the sign is the question – the doubt – the uncertainty – out of which can emerge a use
‘If the meaning of a sign (roughly that which is of importance about the sign) is an image built up in our minds when we see or hear the sign, then first let us adopt the method we just described of replacing this mental image by some outward object seen, e.g. a painted or modelled image. Then why should the written sign plus the painted image be alive if the written sign alone was dead? – In fact as soon as you think of replacing the mental image by, say, a painted one, and as soon as the image loses its occult character, it ceases to impart any life to the sentence at all. (It was in fact just the occult character of the mental process which you need for your purposes.)
The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: we are looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it was an object co-existing with sign. One of the reasons for this mistake is again that we are looking for a “thing corresponding to a substantive.”)’
a mark – which may become a sign – a sign of something – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and as such – uncertain
we propose in relation to the mark – and in so doing – the mark can be seen as signifying something – signifying what?
could it signify an image you have in your mind – or a painted or modelled image you have in front of you?
why not?
from a straight-out logical point of view – the image you have in your mind or the painted and modelled image before you – are proposals –
proposals put to transform a mark into a sign
and could someone not see mathematics as providing an image – a picture – of reality?
perhaps in critically evaluating the mark / sign – what you propose is not an image – not as a picture – but rather – a use
this too – is a fair enough proposal –
and this proposal – this ‘use proposal’ – as with ‘the picture / image proposal’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Wittgenstein – in effect – argues above that we are actually always looking for a use of a sign
and that there is no other valid interpretation of the sign –
when I put a painting on my wall – do I see it – regard that action as a use of the painting – or do I see it – propose it – as a presentation of the painting?
is all propositional action to be regarded as use?
if you define it that way – yes – however there is no necessity to do so –
and isn’t more likely that in practise – we will work with a more limited – tailored – conception of use?
the point is I think – that not everyone would regard all their actions – all their propositional actions – in terms of utility
the idea that all propositional action is to be seen in terms of ‘use’ – strikes me as too narrow a way of understanding how we can and do respond to propositional reality
the sign is no substantive – and no substantive corresponds to it
the sign is a propositional uncertainty –
and any proposal put in relation to it – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language.’
a sign – a sentence – is a proposal
a proposal gets its significance from the system of proposals – to which it belongs?
a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what a sign – a proposal – signifies – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
to understand a sentence – is to put the sentence / proposal – to question – to doubt – to explore its uncertainty
understanding a language?
let us be clear – there is no complete understanding of anything –
what we have is proposals put – and these proposals are open to question – they are uncertain
our understanding is uncertain
understanding is being able to put the proposals of a language – to question – to doubt
and it is being able to explore the uncertainty of the proposals put
‘As part of the system of language, one may say, the sentence has life. But one is tempted to imagine that which gives the sentence life as something in an occult sphere, accompanying the sentence. But whatever accompanied it would for us be just another sign.’
what gives a ‘system of language’ – a language – life – is that it is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty is explored
and yes – ‘whatever accompanied it would be for us another sign’ – a proposal – another proposal
we propose – and proposing in relation to proposals
and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘It seems at first sight that that which gives to thinking its peculiar character is that it is a train of mental states, and it seems that that which is queer and difficult to understand about thinking is the process which happen in the medium of the mind, processes only possible in this medium. The comparison which forces itself upon us is that of the mental medium with the protoplasm of a cell, say, of an amoeba. We observe certain actions of the amoeba, its taking food by extending arms, its splitting up, each of which grows and behaves like the original one. We say “of what a queer nature the protoplasm must be to act in such a way”, and perhaps we say no physical mechanism could be behave in this way, and that the mechanism of the amoeba must be of a totally different kind. In the same way we are tempted to say “the mechanism of the mind must be of a most peculiar kind to be able to do what the mind does”. But here we are making two mistakes. For what struck us as being queer about thought and thinking was not at all that it had curious effects which we were not able to explain (causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one: but a muddle felt as a problem.’
logically speaking – we begin and we end with proposals – with propositions
propositional action – is the action of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
when we think – we propose – and when we think we put our proposals – our propositions – to question – to doubt
the critical action that is thinking – is the exploration of propositional uncertainty
‘mental state’ – is a propositional description of proposing – of thinking
‘mental state’ – is an explanatory proposal – in the same way as ‘mind’ is an explanatory proposal – of thinking – of propositional action
‘mental state’ – and ‘mind’ – are proposals that have currency and have proved very useful in any number of propositional contexts
these and similar explanatory proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
once it is understood that what we have with ‘mental state’ – and ‘mind’ –
are not queer existences – but proposals – Wittgenstein’s problem / muddle disappears
as for the amoeba – any proposal regarding the amoeba – and description of the amoeba – as with any other proposal – or any other propositional description – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Supposing we tried to construct a mind-model as a result of psychological investigation, a model which we should say, would explain the action of the mind. This model would be part of a psychological theory in the way in which a mechanical model of the ether could be part of a theory of electricity. (Such a model, by the way, is always part of the symbolism of a theory. Its advantage may be that it can be taken in at a glance and easily held in the mind. It has been said that a model, in a sense dresses up pure theory; that the naked theory is sentences or equations. This must be examined more closely later on.)
We may find that such a model would have to be very complicated and intricate in order to explain the observed mental activities: and on this ground we might call the mind a queer kind of medium. But this aspect of the model does not interest us. The problems which it may set are psychological problems, and the method of their solution is that of natural science.’
we begin with proposals – propositions – and further propose the description – the proposal – ‘mind’
so – a model of the ‘mind’ – is what?
a proposal in relation to the description – the proposal – ‘mind’
the model is a representative proposal
this so called ‘explanation’ – is a representative proposal – a representation of the original proposal – or set of proposals
as such – it is the original proposal – reconfigured
does such a reconfiguration – such a description – take us any further than the original proposal?
in a strict logical sense – no
and it is for this reason that we should drop talk of ‘explanation’ –
what is put up as an ‘explanation’ is in fact an ‘alternative description’
this is not to say that such is without value –
an alternative description – may well raise different and interesting questions – which could lead to interesting lines of inquiry – and further questions
Wittgenstein is still pushing this ‘queer argument’ – and I think it is running out of puff
why on earth would you say a complicated and intricate model – is ‘queer’?
and yes – he thinks of ‘mind’ – as a medium – this not remarkable
however – if you understand propositional logic – mind is a proposal –
in this connection he says –
‘But this aspect of the model does not interest us. The problems they may set are psychological problems, and the method of their solution is that of natural science.’
this is a traditional way of seeing things – proposing some kind demarcation between empirical science and non-science – i.e. – logic – or metaphysics
it is the argument that the method of empirical science is logically distinct from the methods of non-scientific activities
the argument is wrong
any proposal – be that a proposal described / proposed as – / ‘empirical’ – or a proposal given a different description – is – logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
whatever is put – however simple – or complex – and – however it is further described – i.e. – ‘empirical’ – ‘logical’ – ‘metaphysical’ etc. – and – in whatever context it is put – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and – uncertain
Wittgenstein goes on to say –
‘Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us. And when we are worried about the nature of thinking, the puzzlement which we wrongly interpret to be about the nature of a medium is a puzzle caused by the mystifying use of our language. This kind of mistake recurs again and again in philosophy: e.g., when we are puzzled about the nature of time, when time seems to be a queer thing. We are most strongly tempted to think that here are things hidden, something we can see from the outside but we can’t look into. And yet nothing of the sort is the case. It is not new facts about time which we want to know. All the facts that concern us lie open before us. But it is the use of the substantive “time” which mystifies us. If we look into the grammar of that word, we shall feel that it is no less astounding that a man should have conceived of a deity of time than it would be to conceive of a deity of negation or disjunction.’
‘the puzzlement which we wrongly interpret to be one about the nature of a medium is the puzzlement caused by the mystifying use of our language’
I think this view of the issue could not be more wrong
language is not ‘mystifying’ – ‘language is proposal – proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what we deal with is not ‘mystification’ – rather uncertainty – logical uncertainty
and the fact is – there is nothing ‘mystifying’ – about uncertainty –
uncertainty is our propositional reality –
uncertainty is our daily bread –
it is what we deal with – and grapple with – at every propositional turn
‘This kind of mistake occurs again and again in philosophy; e.g., when we are puzzled about the nature of time, when time seems to be a queer thing.’
‘time’ – is not a ‘queer thing’ – time is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the history of the philosophy of time – is testament to just this
‘We are most strongly tempted to think that here are things hidden, something that we can see from the outside but which we cannot look into.’
I have no problem with any proposal – so long as it is seen for what it is – a proposal – and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘But it is the use of the substantive time that mystifies us.’
if this ‘substantive time’ – is put as a proposal – and put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored – then the proposal – is logical – and being dealt with logically
we are not ‘mystified’ here – we are engaged in a critical propositional investigation –
and the substantive – loses its substantiveness –
logically speaking there are no ‘substantives’ – the substantive – strictly speaking – is a rhetorical device
‘It is misleading then to talk of thinking as a “mental activity”. We may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs. The activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures. I can give you no agent that thinks. If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be an agent in writing.’
propositional action is logically speaking – ground zero
how we further describe / propose – in relation to propositional action – is open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
nevertheless – we do this – we further propose in relation to our propositional action
the proposal ‘thinking’ – is one such further proposal –
a proposal designed to describe propositional action
the proposal ‘thinking’ – is one that has great currency – human beings regard it as a very useful proposal / description
however – as Wittgenstein’s discussion shows – it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
which is to say those that find the proposal ‘thinking’ useful may well speculate in relation to it –
may wish to give a description of it
one such description – is the proposal – mind
again – a proposal – that has proven to be very useful in a whole range of propositional contexts –
but as with ‘thinking’ – logically speaking – mind is nothing more than a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Wittgenstein says it is misleading to talk of thinking as a ‘mental activity’
thinking – can be described – in any number of ways –and any description – i.e. – ‘mental activity’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
however – if this is understood – and the description ’mental activity’ serves a propositional purpose – has propositional function – there is nothing against it
as to agency –
a proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and my point here is that such is the logical state of affairs – regardless of who or what puts the proposal –
its ‘origin’ – if you like – is logically irrelevant –
however – I have no problem with people proposing agency – where it makes sense to them to do so –
and agency – as with any other proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If again we talk about the locality where the thinking takes place we have a right to say that this locality is the paper on which we write or the mouth which speaks. And if we talk of the head or the brain as the locality of thought, this is using the expression “locality of thinking” in a different sense. Let us examine what are the reasons for calling the head the place of thinking. It is not our intention to criticize this form of expression, or to show that it is not appropriate. What we must do is: understand its working, its grammar, e.g., see what relation this grammar has to that of the expression “we think with our mouth’, or “we think with a pencil on a piece of paper”.’
a proposal put – a proposition – the action – described – as thinking –
the proposal – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the description of the propositional action as ’thinking’ – or any other description – is logically irrelevant
what is relevant is the critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
the description ‘thinking’ – is a way – a useful way – a convenient way – a commonplace way – of talking about the proposition –
as to locality – this has no bearing on the matter at all
again – at best – a useful way of describing the propositional action –
but in no way logically necessary or relevant –
if you find it useful – for your reasons – to describe the logical action of propositional action as ‘thinking’ – and further to propose a locality for this action – i.e. – the paper on which we write – the mouth which speaks – the head – the brain – the big toe on your right foot – etc.– by all means – go for it –
such a description has no bearing on the logical action of question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
strictly speaking any such description is properly termed – rhetorical
as for understanding the grammar of a description – and its relation to the grammar of another description –
really all you are talking about here is different propositional contexts – contexts which suit different people – different purposes – at different times – in different places – for whatever reasons
again – at base – this is a rhetorical matter – not a logical issue
Wittgenstein goes on to consider ‘why we are so strongly inclined to talk of the head as the locality of our thoughts’
he says the reason is this –
‘Perhaps the main reason why we are so strongly inclined to talk of the head as the locality of our thoughts is this: the existence of the words “thinking” and “thought” alongside of the words denoting (bodily) activities, such as writing, speaking, etc., makes us look for an activity, different from these but analogous to them, corresponding to the word “thinking”. When words in our language have prime facie analogous grammars we are inclined to try and interpret them analogously: i.e., we try to make the analogy hold throughout. We say, “The thought is not the same as the sentence; for an English and a French sentence, which are utterly different can express the same thought.” And now, as the sentences are somewhere, we look for a place for the thought. (It is as though we looked for a place of the king of which the rules of chess treat, as opposed to the places of the various pieces of wood, the kings of the various sets.) – We say, “surely the thought is something; it is not nothing”; and all one can answer to this is, that the word “thought” has its use, which is of a totally different kind from the use of the word “sentence”.’
look – the point is we have these words – these proposals ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ –
these are proposals that we use to describe – to elaborate on propositional action
they exist because they have a use –
philosophically – that is really the end of matter
as to this analogy argument – of ‘making us look for an activity, different from these analogous to them’
this is a fair enough proposal – but whether in fact it is what happens – is an empirical matter –
at best it is a neat little linguistic argument – in my opinion – going nowhere
and I really can’t see how it has anything to with the proposal that the head is the ‘locality of our thoughts’
‘And now, as the sentences are somewhere we look for a place for the thought’
ok – you can do this – it is quite harmless – a piece of imaginative philosophy – all very well – but logically – a sideshow – irrelevant
the issue which can be easily lost in this heaping on of description – is the proposal – and its critical assessment
‘We say, “surely, the thought is something; it is not nothing”; and all one can answer to this is, that the word “thought” has its use, which is of totally different kind from the use of the word “sentence”.’
yes – the word ‘thought’ – has its use – and its use will be different to the use of the word ‘sentence’ – they are different words
still – I think we can indeed say – thought is something – it is not nothing –
and what is it?
‘thought’ is a description – and what it describes – logically speaking – is proposal
now you might well ask – just what is a proposal? –
my answer here is that what a proposal is – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
and as to the question – where is it? –
the hard point is – it doesn’t matter – where it is – where it is – is not logically relevant
what is logically relevant – is that in fact – proposals are put – and put to question –
propositional action is just what we do – and it is all of what we do
however – if you need location – if you want location – you can propose location –
and any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Now does this mean that it is nonsensical to talk of a locality where thought takes place? Certainly not. The phrase has sense if we give it sense. Now if we say “thought takes place in our heads”, what is the sense of this phrase soberly understood? I suppose it is that certain physiological processes correspond to our thoughts in such a way that if we know the correspondence we can, by observing these processes, find the thoughts. But in what sense can the physiological processes be said to correspond to thoughts, and in what sense can we be said to get the thoughts from the observation of the brain?’
Wittgenstein is correct in saying – ‘The phrase has sense if we give it sense’ –
but it is after this that he goes astray – which as far as I know – all philosophers dealing with this issue have done –
the locality of thought – strictly speaking – is the question – where is the locality of the description ‘thought’?
if you see the matter as a question of the locality of a description – all the angst goes out of the is the issue
the locality of the description – is just wherever the description is proposed
and where the description is proposed – is logically irrelevant to any assessment of it
and this question of the correspondence of certain physiological processes and thought?
putting the matter in this way – is all wrong
we are not dealing with different ontological entities – and asking – how could they correspond?
what we have is different proposals – different propositional descriptions – so the issue is – are these different descriptions complimentary?
if the context is commonplace – i.e. – non-philosophical – then the answer is likely to be – yes
that is – if people use the two descriptions as corresponding – well that is a use
if on the other hand – the two descriptions represent radically different philosophical / ontological perspectives – then the answer is – no – or perhaps yes – with a very convoluted argument
there is a third way –
you have the ‘argument’ of Jack Smart – which is that there are only physiological processes – ‘thought’ – therefore is a physiological process – and such a process is located in the brain
basically – it comes down to saying – thought just is a brain process
on this view – you straight out adopt a physicalist world view – and say – well there just is no other reality – therefore – no other description
I regard such an approach – the idea that there is only one description – one kind of description – as philosophically narrow minded – and empirically ignorant –
not to my mind – what I would term – ‘scientific’
if by ‘scientific’ – we mean – open to question – open to doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
‘I suppose we imagine correspondence to have been verified experimentally. Let us imagine such an experiment crudely. It concerns looking at the brain while the subject thinks. And now you may think that the reason why my explanation is going to go wrong is that of course that the experimenter gets the thoughts of the subject only indirectly by being told them, the subject expressing them in some way or other. But I will remove this difficulty by assuming that the subject is at the same time the experimenter, who is looking at his own brain, say by means of a mirror. (The crudity of this description by no means reduces the force of the argument.)
Then I ask you, is the subject-experimenter observing one thing or two things? (Don’t say that he is observing one thing both from the inside and from the outside; for this does not remove the difficulty. We will talk of inside and outside later.) The subject-experimenter is observing a correlation of two phenomena. One of them he perhaps calls the thought. This may consist of a train of images, organic sensations, or on the other hand of a train of various visual, tactual and muscular experiences which he has in writing or speaking a sentence. – The other experience is one of seeing his brain work. Both these phenomena could correctly be called “expressions of thought”; and the question “where is the thought itself? had better, in order to prevent confusion, be rejected as nonsensical. If however we do use the expression “the thought takes place in the head”, we have given this expression its meaning by describing the experience which would justify the hypothesis that the thought takes place in our heads, by describing the experience which we call “observing thought in our brain”.
by describing the experience which we call ‘observing thought in our brain’
the subject-experimenter is proposing a correlation of two proposals
one proposal – he calls his thought – the other proposal – his brain activity
the proposed correlation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
i.e. – we can ask – is there in fact a correlation at all – perhaps we just have two different proposals put – one after the other?
yes – you can propose a correlation – but you must understand that this proposal – is – open to question – is – logically speaking – uncertain
we need to remember here – any ‘observation’ – is a proposal –
as to both of these – the two proposals – being proposed as ‘expressions of thought’
well – if you take that view – what is the point of the experiment?
by taking such a view – you sabotage the experiment
the idea of the experiment was to locate thought – if both proposals – the thought proposal – and the brain proposal – are both ‘expressions of thought’ – effectively – ‘thought’ – there is no issue – no issue to begin with
on the basis of this ‘expressions of thought’ – proposal – Wittgenstein says – the question of ‘where is thought itself?’ – should be rejected as nonsensical
well actually – it’s not nonsensical –
if you have two expressions of thought – the question – where is the thought – is still live
ok – you’ve decided that your so called ‘thought’ – is an expression of thought – and the brain activity is proposed as an expression of thought – you can still ask – where is the thought itself?
on the face of it – it looks like your so called ‘thought’ – is not thought in itself – and your brain activity proposal – is not thought in itself – so – if you are still wanting to know where – you would need to look elsewhere
we need to come down to earth here –
what we are dealing with is proposal
yes – you can put that thought is brain activity – if that suits your purpose – your view of the world
this is all that Jack Smart and the mind-brain identity theorists – have done
fair enough – but such a proposal – as with any other – must be seen as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
as indeed with any other ‘location’ proposal
Wittgenstein says – we have given meaning to the expression – ‘thought takes place in the head’ – by describing the experience that would justify the hypothesis – by describing the experience we call ‘observing thought in our brain’ –
there is no justification – here – there is only proposal – proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and the proposal ‘observing thought in the brain’ – is nothing more than a proposal
one that might suit certain purposes – and one that is – open to question
‘We easily forget that the word “locality” is used in many different senses and that there are many different kinds of statements about a thing, which in a particular case, in accordance with general usage, we may call specifications of the locality of the thing’. Thus it has been said of visual space that its place is in the head; and I think one has been tempted to say this, partly by a grammatical misunderstanding.’
I can say: “in my visual field I can see the image of a tree to the right of the image of the tower” or “I see the image of the tree in the middle of the visual field”. And now we are inclined to ask “and where to you see the visual field?” Now if the “where” is meant to ask for a locality in the sense in which we have specified the locality of the image of the tree, then I would draw your attention to the fact that you have not yet given this question sense; that is you have been proceeding by a grammatical analogy without having worked out the analogy in detail.’
firstly – the proposal of ‘image’ – is what is put – in the attempt to explain – to account for – what is seen –
it is an explanatory proposal –
but what we know is that in propositional logic and practise – no explanation is beyond question – beyond doubt – or certain –
if you have a critical mind – a logical approach to propositional reality – no explanation – satisfies
it is in this connection that the notion – ‘visual field’ – is proposed –
one use of the proposal ‘visual field’ – is to explain – give account of the proposal – ‘visual image’
‘visual field’ – is an explanation of an explanation
this explanation of explanation – can conceivably go on indefinitely –
and such a process is interesting – productive – creative –
what it does is expand and explore the propositional field –
which is to say expand and explore our propositional reality – our knowledge
the point to be made in this current discussion is that all we deal with here – all we deal with – with proposal – with ‘explanation’ of proposal – with explanation of explanation – etc – just is proposal
from a logical perspective – this question of ‘location’ – doesn’t come up
it is not there
ok – you want to step out of the logical perspective – and play monopoly – fair enough – have fun
Wittgenstein goes on to say –
as to a ‘grammatical misunderstanding’ –
there is no ‘misunderstanding’ in propositional action –
propositions and propositional relations are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
at base what you have here is different proposals
different proposals – out of different propositional contexts – having different propositional usages
that a relationship is proposed between different propositions – is no more than normal propositional activity
we propose propositional relations – and we put them to a critical test
the ‘visual field proposal’ is a proposed explanation of sight – of seeing something
and ‘the brain proposal’ – is an account of – an explanation of the visual field –
and no doubt there are further explanations of this matter – of sight – in terms of the structure and chemistry of the brain – etc
and from a logical point of view this propositional action – this explanatory action – can go on indefinitely
and any explanatory proposal put – at any stage of such a critical investigation –
will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘And if we now ask the question “Where do you see the image of the book?” the answer could be (as above) “To the right of that pencil”, or “In the left-hand part of my visual field”, or again “Three inches behind my left eye”.’
the point here is that different explanatory proposals – different explanatory models – will give different answers to the question –
and these different answers – will be of use in different propositional contexts –
different circumstances
‘But what if someone said “I can assure you I feel the visual image to be two inches behind the bridge of my nose”; – what are we to answer him? Should we say that he is not speaking the truth, or that there cannot be such a feeling? What if he asks us “do you know all the feelings there are? How do you know there isn’t such a feeling?”
what are we to answer him?
my answer is that any proposal put is not ‘assured’ – it is rather – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to the ‘truth’ of the matter
a proposal is true if – for whatever reason – it is affirmed – false – if for whatever reason – if denied
he affirms it – ‘we’ deny it –
the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘that there cannot be such a feeling’?
a ‘feeling’ – is a proposal –
and if the person in question – puts his feeling / proposal – well – there it is –
this feeling / proposal – should be for him – and anyone else – open to question –
but it has been put – and therefore – is –
quite ridiculous then – to say – it cannot be –
once this is understood – his replies / questions – ‘do you know all the feelings there are?’ – ‘how do you know there isn’t such a feeling?’ – are all quite irrelevant –
they miss the logical point – that ‘feeling’ – is just a description – applied to certain proposals
‘What if the diviner tells us that when he holds the rod he feels that the water is five feet under the ground? or that he feels that a mixture of copper and gold is five feet under the ground? Suppose that to our doubts he answered: “You can estimate a length when you see it. Why shouldn’t I have a different way of estimating it?
If we understand the idea of such an estimation, we shall get clear about the nature of our doubts about the statements of the diviner, and of the man who said he felt the visual image behind the bridge of his nose.’
the diviner in his statement of what he feels – from a logical point of view – when you strip away the propositional packaging – is simply putting a proposal –
and the same is true of his assertion that he can estimate length in a different way
these proposals – along with any opposing or alternative proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we can I think presume his proposals – in some way – work for him –
the logical point to put to him – is that he would be wise to put his proposals to question – to doubt – and to regard them as – at best – uncertain – in short – to keep an open mind
‘There is the statement “this pencil is five inches long”, and the statement, “I feel that this pencil is five inches long”, and we must get clear about the relation of the grammar of the first statement to the grammar of the second. To the statement “I feel in my hand that the water is three inches under the ground” we should like to answer: “I don’t know what this means”. But the diviner would say: “Surely you know what it means. You know what ‘three feet under the ground’ means, and you know what ‘I feel’ means!” But I should answer him: I know what a word means in certain contexts. Thus I understand the phrase, “three feet under the ground”, say in connections “The measurement shows that the water runs three feet under the ground”, “If we dig three feet under the ground we are going to strike water”, “The depth of the water is three feet by the eye”. But the use of the expression “a feeling in my hands of the water being three feet under the ground” has yet to be explained to me.’
‘I feel in my hand that the water is three inches under the ground’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
just as is the proposal – ‘The measurement shows that the water runs three feet under the ground’ –
and it could be said of either proposal – ‘I don’t know what this means’ –
we have two different proposals – open to question
perhaps the diviner does not succeed in explaining to his doubter – what his proposal means
and perhaps the one putting the measurement proposal – does not manage to explain his proposal
Wittgenstein mentions ‘certain contexts’ –
clearly here – in relation to these two different proposals we are dealing with different contexts
these propositional contexts – the diviner’s context and the measurement context – can be seen to be radically different –
the two proposals – different as they are – and different as their contexts are – are logically equivalent – in that they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a statement’s ‘grammar’ – reveals – is an indication of – is a pointer to – its propositional context or contexts –
conflicts of grammar – are conflicts of context
we face the propositional reality of ‘not knowing what this means’ – at every turn –
and at every turn we have to grapple with different propositional contexts –
and this grappling with different propositional contexts can and does lead to a broader – more complex understanding of the world we live in
I think the diviner is right – Wittgenstein does know what he means – but Wittgenstein does not accept the diviner’s context –
when Wittgenstein asks for an ‘explanation’ – he wants it to be in the context that he is operating in –
and expressed in the grammar of that context
that’s not going to happen here – and so Wittgenstein feigns ‘not knowing’ what the diviner is proposing
this is to be philosophically cute – if not – pig headed –
the propositional reality that we face – that we deal with is that of different ways of seeing – different ways of proposing – different ways of understanding
to deny this – or to argue against – is to fly in the face of the world as it is
of course – you can do this – but in the end – you miss out –
you miss out on the extraordinary variety of propositional understandings – and you turn your back on the great energy and creativity of propositional reality
‘We could ask the diviner “how do you learn the meaning of the word ‘three feet’? We suppose by being shown such lengths, by having measured them and such like. Were you also taught to talk of a feeling water being three feet under the ground, a feeling, say, in your hands? Supposing we had been estimating lengths by the eye, but had never spanned a length. How could we estimate a length in inches by spanning it? I.e., how could we interpret the existence of spanning in inches? The question is: what connection is there between, say, a tactual sensation and the experience of measuring a thing by means of a yard rod? This connection will show us what it means to ‘feel that a thing is six inches long’. Supposing the diviner said “I have never been taught to corelate the depth of water under the ground with feelings in my hand, but when I have a certain feeling of tension in my hands, the words ‘three feet’ spring up in my mind”. We should answer “this is a perfectly good explanation of what you mean by “feeling the depth to be three feet” and the statement that you feel this will have neither more, nor less meaning than your explanation has given it. And if experience shows that the actual depth of the water always agrees with the words ‘n feet’ which comes into your mind, your experience will be useful for determining the depth of water”. – But you see the meaning of the words “I feel the depth of water to be n feet”; had to be explained; it was not known when the meaning of the words “n feet” in the ordinary sense (i.e., in the ordinary contexts) was known. – We don’t say that the man who tells us that he feels the visual image behind the bridge of his nose is telling a lie or talking nonsense. But we say we don’t understand the meaning of such a phrase. It combines well known words, but combines them in a way we don’t yet understand. The grammar of this phrase has yet to be explained to us.’
‘We should answer “this is a perfectly good explanation”’ –
what you have here – with this ‘explanation’ – is – effectively – a restatement of the original proposal –
and this is the case with any ‘explanation’ –
an explanation is not a duplicate of the original – \rather a restatement – and you might say an ‘amplification’ of the original – an elaboration of the original
one way of putting it – is to say – there is no depth – in explanation –
what you get with explanation – is breadth – propositional breadth
and as for – ‘a perfectly good explanation’ – there is no ‘perfectly good’ – in propositional activity
any proposal – any proposed ‘explanation’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
the diviner’s ‘explanation’ – is no different to any ‘explanation’ – it is a proposal we can put to question –
it is no more than a propositional response – to a proposition –
that is all we have – that is all we ever have
yes – the meaning of the words – “I feel the depth of the water to be n feet’ – ‘had to explained’ – which is to say – the proposal is open to critical evaluation – and discovery
as to ‘ordinary’ contexts – let’s get real here –
what we have in propositional experience is different contexts –
what is ‘ordinary’ to one – my well be mystifying to another –
in certain cultures – with certain groups of people – there will be what they call ‘ordinary usage’ – but you don’t have to look too far in this wide world to see that ‘ordinary usage’ is a fragile matter –
and of course – usage ‘ordinary’ or not – is constantly being modified and changed –
in any usage we operate with question – with doubt – and with uncertainty –
that is our daily bread
that you don’t get another’s usage – because it is not ‘ordinary’ – is no big deal – it just means you need to broaden your perspective –
‘walk a mile in my shoes’ –
and you can do this – if you have an open and critical mind
‘The importance of investigating the diviner’s answer lies in the fact that we often think we have given a meaning to a statement P if only we assert “I feel (or believe) that P is the case” (We shall talk at a later occasion of Prof. Hardy saying that Goldbach’s theorem is a proposition because he can believe that it is true.) We have already said that by merely explaining the meaning of the words “three feet” in the usual way we have not yet explained the sense of the phrase “feeling that water is three feet etc.” Now we should not have felt these difficulties if the diviner had said that he had learnt to estimate the depth of the water, say, by digging for the water when he had a particular feeling and in this way correlating such feelings with measurement of depth. Now we must examine the process of learning to estimate with acts of estimating. The importance of this examination lies in this, that it applies to the relation between learning the meaning of a word and making use of the word. Or, more generally, that it shows the different possible relations between a rule given and its application.’
‘The importance of investigating the diviner’s answer lies in the fact that we often think we have given a meaning to a statement P if only we assert “I feel (or believe) that P is the case” (We shall talk at a later occasion of Prof. Hardy saying that Goldbach’s theorem is a proposition because he can believe that it is true.) We have already said that by merely explaining the meaning of the words “three feet” in the usual way we have not yet explained the sense of the phrase “feeling that water is three feet etc.”
‘I feel I believe P is the case’ –
if we analyse or deconstruct this proposal we have –
the proposal – ‘P is the case’ – and – the additional proposal put in relation to it – ‘I feel I believe’
logically speaking – ‘P is the case’ – is all that is required –
the additional proposal ‘I feel I believe’ – is essentially rhetorical –
the point of this rhetorical addition is – to ‘explain’ – to justify – to persuade –
if you put the proposal ‘I feel that I believe P is the case’ –
with the ‘I feel I believe’ – you can be said to be – explaining the proposal ‘P is the case’ – justifying it – or persuading – yourself – or others – of its significance – or perhaps its veracity
the rhetorical addition has no logical significance
the essential proposal – ‘P is the case’ – is – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – whether – ‘you feel you believe’ – or not –
the rhetorical dimension of the proposal – is logically irrelevant
you don’t ‘explain’ the meaning of the words – ‘three feet’ – outside of a propositional context –
outside of a propositional context – they have no meaning
‘learning the meaning of word and making use of the word’ –
words are proposal – a form of proposal –
any proposal – be it a proposal in the form of language – in the form of action or gesture – in the form of an artistic expression – be it in the form of a man-made physical construction – or be it in the form of a feature or fact of nature – has meaning
a proposal of any form – is meaningful
another way of putting it is to say that in the absence of proposal – there is no meaning
in the absence of proposal – the world is meaningless
the world we come into is ready made with proposal – full of proposal – and we learn to deal with the world as proposed – with proposal and with a critical approach to what is given to us in proposal – and what we propose in relation to what is given
the issue is – recognizing that the meaning of a proposal – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
meaning is uncertain
we learn the meaning – and the use of words – through question – through doubt – and through the exploration of propositional uncertainty
and any meaning that we discover – that we propose – is a proposal –
and any use we put a proposal to – is a proposal –
and these proposals of meaning – of use – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a word – a proposal – has meaning –
what we do is explore the uncertainty that is the proposal – that is meaning
there is no distinction between proposal and meaning – they are one in the same
the question of meaning – as a separate issue to proposal – only comes about because – people / philosophers – present proposals / propositions – as if they have no context
as if they can be understood – outside of context
the real question – is not what is the meaning of a proposal – the question is – what is the context of the proposal?
and proposed context is the ground of propositional use – the logical space for propositional use
‘Let us consider the process of estimating a length by the eye: It is extremely important that you should realise that there are a great many different processes which we call “estimating by the eye”.
Consider these cases: –
(1) someone asks “How did you estimate the height of this building?” I answer “It has four storeys; I suppose each storey is about fifteen fee high; so it must be about sixty feet.’
(2) In another case: I roughly know what a yard at that distance looks like; so it must be about four yards long.”
(3) Or again: “I can imagine a tall man reaching to about this point, so it must be about six feet above the ground.”
(4) Or: “I don’t know; it just looks like a yard.”
This last case is likely to puzzle us. If you ask “what happened in this case when the man estimated the length?” The correct answer may be: he looked at the thing and said ‘it looks one yard long’. This may be all that has happened.’
as to the last case –
this is to say – he put up a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and he put this proposal – without ‘explanation’ –
in fact – he puts in the proposal that he has no explanation –
you can regard his proposal in one of two ways –
firstly – as of little use – if estimating the length was to have very definite and practical implications
secondly – as possibly quite profound – if you take the view that we don’t actually explain any proposal – in the sense of grounding it once and for all – that any so called ‘explanation’ – is just rhetorical packaging – designed to booster confidence in the proposal – and its use
point being – that what you have to deal with is the proposal – and in so doing determine in what context or contexts it has function – and take it from there –
recognizing that the proposal – and any proposal for its use – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘We said before that we should not have been puzzled about the diviner’s answer if he had told us that he had learnt how to estimate depth. Now learning to estimate may, broadly speaking, be seen in two different relations to the act of estimating: either as a cause of the phenomenon of estimating, or as supplying us with a rule (a table, a chart, or some such thing) which we make use of when we estimate.
Supposing I teach someone the use of the word “yellow” by repeatedly pointing to a yellow patch and pronouncing the word. On another occasion I make him apply what he has learnt by giving him the order “choose a yellow ball out of this bag”. What was it that happened when he obeyed the order? I say “possibly just this: he heard my words and took a yellow ball from the bag. Now you may be inclined to think that this couldn’t possibly be all: and the kind of thing you would suggest is that he imagined something yellow when he understood the order, and then chose a ball according to his image. To see that this is not necessary remember that I have given him the order: “Imagine a yellow patch”. Would you still be inclined to think that he first imagines a yellow patch, just understanding my order, and the imagines a yellow patch to match the first? (Now I don’t say that this is not possible. Only, putting it this way shows that it need not happen. This, by the way, illustrates the method of philosophy.)’
‘What was it that happened when he obeyed the order? I say “possibly just this: he heard my words and took a yellow ball from the bag.’
stripped or its rhetorical content – an order is a proposal
a proposal is put – and in response – acted on –
and the action is itself a proposal –
logically speaking – that’s all we have – a proposal put – a proposal in response
you can also say – that that is all we have empirically –
what an observer experiences – is the proposal put – the proposal acted on –
that is all that actually happened
so ‘explanation’ is called for – and some kind of analysis is proposed –
this changes nothing – as to what happened
and any number of explanations could be proposed –
they make no difference to what happened
you might say – well the ‘explanations’ do provide – understanding – understanding of what happened
any ‘understanding’ here is really in the dark – what is in the light – is just what happened
why not – as Wittgenstein suggests – simply understand the relation between the two propositional acts – as just being – one in response to the other?
the call for ‘explanation’ – is really the idea that there is – that there can be – a deeper dimension to what happened –
and the idea that once you find that deeper dimension – you have understanding
any explanation will be – like the propositional acts in question – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
I think Wittgenstein’s sentiment here is that – it does no real harm to pursue the explanation route – but the fact – the logical fact is just that it is not necessary
yes – ‘explanation’ adds something to process of understanding – but really what it adds is unnecessary baggage
if you go down this rabbit hole of ‘explanation’ – you do run the risk of missing the tree for the forest
to my mind – so called ‘explanation’ simply muddies the logical waters
we can see clearly – if we just look at what we see
if we look at what we can’t see – if we look at what is not there – but pretend that it is – we simply miss the point –
and in so doing we can lose our way – we can get lost
and I am thinking here not just about a matter of logic – but about human lives – and how we live –
I think we can very easily make more difficulties for ourselves – by pursuing the so called ‘deeper understanding’ – there is a risk
‘If you are taught the meaning of the word “yellow” by being given some sort of ostensive definition (a rule of the usage of a word) this teaching can be looked at in two different ways.
A. The teaching is a drill. This drill causes us to associate a yellow image, yellow things, with the word “yellow”. Thus when I give the order “Choose a yellow ball from this bag” the word “yellow” might have brought up a yellow image, or a feeling of recognition when the person’s eyes fell on the yellow ball. The drill of teaching could in this case be said to have built up a psychical mechanism. This however would only be a hypothesis or else a metaphor. We could compare teaching with installing an electric connection between a switch and a bulb. The parallel to the connection going wrong or breaking down would then be what we call forgetting the explanation, or the meaning, of the word. (We ought to talk further on about the meaning of forgetting the meaning of a word a word’*
[*this he never does. – Edd.]
In so far as the teaching brings about the association, feeling of recognition, etc. etc., it is the cause of the phenomenon of understanding, obeying, etc.; and it is a hypothesis that the process of teaching should be needed to bring about these effects. It is conceivable, in this sense that all processes of understanding, obeying, etc., should have happened without the person having been taught the language. (This, just now, seems extremely paradoxical.)’
‘A. The teaching is a drill. This drill causes us to associate a yellow image, yellow things, with the word “yellow”.’
first off – ‘drilling’ – is not teaching –
teaching is a critical enterprise characterized by question – by doubt – and exploration of uncertainty
a teacher can put a proposition – and ‘drill’ it into his students – if this is all the teacher does – all that the students will have is a proposal – that is going nowhere – has nowhere to go
by all means put the proposal – but the teaching comes when the teacher shows the students that the proposal is open to question – open to exploration
just simply associating a yellow image – yellow things with the word ‘yellow’ – might suffice if you are dealing with a machine – but as far as teaching human beings – if this is all you have – you teach them nothing
and it is clear from what follows – with Wittgenstein’s metaphor of installing an electric connection with a switch and a bulb – that his idea of ‘teaching’ and ‘learning’ – only applies to machines –
non-conscious entities that cannot be said to propose anything –
‘It is conceivable, in this sense that all processes of understanding, obeying, etc., should have happened without the person having been taught the language. (This, just now, seems extremely paradoxical.)’
the issue is not ‘language’ per se – the issue is proposal / proposition –
and if you get this – you see that language is just one form of proposal –
and yes – a person may learn understanding – without language – if that person can and does respond to non-language proposals – i.e. – signs – sounds – gestures – actions
and if that person can put what is put to him – to question – to doubt – without language – and explore the uncertainty of the proposals put to him –
he will begin the critical process of understanding –
with or without language – what is essential to learning is a critical capacity –
and it is my view that the critical capacity – is natural to a functioning human being
‘B. The teaching may have supplied us with a rule which is itself involved in the processes of understanding, obeying, etc.; “involved”, however, meaning that the expression of this rule forms part of these processes.
We must distinguish between what one might call “a process being in accordance with a rule”, and, “a process involving a rule” (in the above sense).
Take an example. Someone teaches me to square cardinal numbers; he writes down the row
1 2 3 4,
and asks me to square them. (I will in this case again, replace any processes happening ‘in the mind’ by processes of calculation on the paper.) Suppose under the first row of numbers I then write:
1 4 9 16.
What I wrote is in line with general rule of squaring; but obviously is also in accordance with any number of other rules; and amongst these it is not more in accordance with one than with another. In the sense in which before we talked about a rule being involved in a process, no rule was involved in this. Supposing that to get
my results I calculate 1 x 1, 2 x 2, 3 x 3, 4 x 4 (that is, in this case wrote down the calculations); these would again be in accordance with any number of rules. Supposing, on the other hand, in order to get to my results I had written down what you may call “the rule of squaring”, say algebraically. In this case the rule was involved in a sense in which no other rule was.
We shall say that the rule is involved in the understanding, obeying, etc., if, as I should like to express it, the symbol of the rule forms part of the calculation. (As we are not interested where the processes of thinking, calculating, take place, we can for our purposes imagine the calculations being done entirely on paper. We are not concerned with the difference: internal, external.)
A characteristic example of the case of B would be one in which the teaching supplied us with a table which we make use of in understanding, obeying, etc. If we are taught to play chess, we may be taught rules. If then we play chess, these rules need not be involved in the act of playing. But they may be. Imagine, e.g., that the rules were expressed in the form of a table; in column the shapes of the chessmen are drawn, and in the parallel column we find diagrams showing ‘freedom’ (the legitimate moves) of the pieces. Suppose now that the way the game is played involves making the transition from the shape to the possible moves by running one’s finger across the table, and the making one of the moves.
Teaching as the hypothetical history of our subsequent actions (understanding, obeying, estimating a length etc.) drops out of considerations. The rule which has been taught and is subsequently applied interests us only in so far as it is involved in the application. A rule, so far as it interests us, does not act at a distance.’
there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode – and the game mode – which is to say that in our propositional lives we critically evaluate propositions – and we play propositional games
in the critical mode – we put our proposals – our propositions – to question – to doubt – and we explore their uncertainty
in the game mode – we operate with rules –
if we play the game – these rules – like the rules of chess for example or the rules of mathematics – are not open to question –
the point of the game – of the game mode of propositional activity – is to follow the rules
if you don’t follow the rules – there is no game –
if you put the rules to question – there is no game –
if you put the rules to question – you are involved in a critical process –
you have left the game mode – and gone into the critical mode –
the game is the rule – the rule is the game –
or as Wittgenstein himself puts it – ‘A rule, so far as it interests us, does not act at a distance.’
if you understand this – then the distinction of ‘a process being in accordance with a rule’ – ‘and a process involving a rule’ – falls away
any game – just is – ‘the process being in accordance with a rule’ – and – any game just is ‘a process involving a rule’
you can’t have a process – that is a game – that is not in accordance with a rule –
such a process – is not a game
and there is no game that does not ‘involve a rule’ – to suggest this – would be in my terms – to utter a contradiction
consider the example the example Wittgenstein gives of playing chess – rules expressed in a table – a column of shapes – the chessmen – and a parallel table – of legitimate moves – and the game played by running one’s finger across the table – and making the moves –
the table – and the action performed on it – is really no more than a description of following the rule –
or – the table – and the action performed on it – is really no more than a description of playing the game –
following the rule can be described in any number of ways – but if you play the game – you follow the rule – however described
and following the rule is playing the game – however the game is described
‘Suppose I pointed to a piece of paper and said to someone: “this colour I call ‘red’. Afterwards I give him the order: “now point me a red patch”. I then ask him: “why, in carrying out my order, did you paint just this colour?” His answer could then be “This colour (pointing to the sample which I have given him) was called red; and the patch I have painted has, as you see, the colour of the sample”. He has now given me a reason for carrying out the order in the way he did. Giving a reason for something one did or said means showing a way which leads to this action. In some cases it means telling the way one has gone one-self: in others it means describing a way which leads there and is in accordance with certain accepted rules. Thus when asked, “why did you carry out my order in painting just this colour?” the person could have described the way he had actually taken to arrive at this particular shade of colour. This would have been so if. hearing the word “red”, he had taken up the sample I had given him, labelled “red”, and had copied that sample when painting the patch. On the other hand he might have painted it ‘automatically’ or from a memory image, but when asked to give the reason he might still point to the sample and show that it matched the patch he had painted. In this case the reason given would have been of the second kind; i.e. a justification post hoc.’
Wittgenstein goes on to discuss the role of reasons in the carrying out of orders –
he gives the example of pointing to a piece of paper and saying to someone ‘I call this red’ – and then giving him the order – ‘paint me a red patch’
the person is then asked – ‘why, in carrying out my order did you paint just this colour?’ –
he answers – ‘the colour (pointing to the sample) was called red – the patch I have painted has the colour of the sample’ –
in saying this – Wittgenstein says – a reason has been given for carrying out the order in the way that it was
and that giving a reason – is showing a way – which leads to the action –
Wittgenstein gives further examples of reasons that could be given for the carrying out of the order
what we have with the order – minus its rhetoric – is a proposal –
and what we have in response to this ‘order’ / proposal – is a proposal of a different kind – what we have is an action / proposal
the giving of a reason for the action – likewise is a proposal –
all these proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
to illustrate this point in the case of the reason / proposal –
consider if a third party stuck their nose in – and said – no – the reason you carried out the action – the way you did is best explained in physical terms – i.e. your brain processes – motor reactions and actions – etc –
so yes – the action can be explained in other ways –
who knows – if the person concerned had given the matter more thought – he may well have come up with a different reason for his action?
nothing is set in stone here
reasons – as a form of explanation – as with any explanation – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what is clear is that in response to a proposal – the so called ‘order’ – there was a proposal – an action proposal –
the giving of a reason – of an explanation – is after the fact – after the fact of the propositional action –
logically speaking – the propositional actions involved – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the giving of a reason for a proposal – the giving of an explanation for a proposal – adds nothing to the logic of the situation
from a logical point of view – the best you can say is – that reasons and explanations – are propositional packaging – rhetorical packaging
when Wittgenstein asks the person concerned – ‘why in carrying out my order did you paint just this colour?’
ask yourself this – why does the person answer at all?
‘Now if one thinks there could be no understanding and obeying the order without previous teaching, one thinks of the teaching as providing a reason for doing what one did; as supplying the road one walks. Now there is the idea that if an order is understood and obeyed it is as we do; and, in fact, a chain of reasons reaching back to infinity. This is as if one said: “Wherever you are, you must have got there from somewhere else, and to that previous place from another place; and so on ad infinitum”. (If, on the other hand you had said, “wherever you are, you could have got there from another place ten yards away; and to that other place from a third, ten yards further away, and so on ad infinitum, if you had said this you would have stressed the infinite possibility of making a step. Thus the idea of an infinite chain of reasons arises out of a confusion similar to this: that a line of a certain length consists of an infinite number of parts because it is indefinitely divisible; i.e., because there is no end to the possibility of dividing it.)’
‘this obeying and understanding an order’ – is – responding to a proposal – with a proposal –
whether or not you are ‘obeying’ the order – or ‘understanding’ it – in responding to it with a proposal – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
as indeed is the order / proposal itself –
and as to the ‘teaching’ – just whether or not what you are taught – is what you understand – when you respond to the order / proposal – is likewise – open to question
one can propose the teaching – as providing a reason – as ‘supplying the road one walks’ – but this may or may not be the case – the matter – again – is open to question
this idea of ‘providing a reason’ – is really the idea that one’s action can be securely grounded – grounded in something – this something – the ‘reason’ –
and when all is said and done – what is a reason? – but a proposal – and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the idea of providing a ‘ground’ – a security – to the action / proposal – is essentially – illogical
this practise of providing a reason for what we propose – what we do – has more to do with persuasion – persuading ourselves or others of the significance – the validity – the truth – of what it is we do / propose
providing a reason for our propositional actions – is not logical – it is rhetorical –
and as to – ‘wherever you are, you must have got there from somewhere else’ –
we propose in relation to proposals –
we respond to what is put us – by others – by the world we live in –
and whatever is put to us and however we respond – is open to question
in reality we don’t respond to an infinite chain of proposals – we respond to what is put to us – whatever is actually put to us – at an actual time and place –
and what you have with this infinite number of parts of a line – indefinitely divisible – is a game – a mathematical game –
the rule of the game is that the line – the parts of the line – are indefinitely divisible –
that’s the rule –
and yes – you could play this game with propositions – proposals – with ‘reasons’
if you follow the rule – you play the game –
we play games – propositional games of many and varied kinds – in many and varied contexts
what defines a game – is that it is rule-governed –
when a game is played – the very point of it – is that the rule is followed – not questioned – put to doubt – or regarded as uncertain
if the game / rule is put to question – put to doubt – its uncertainty explored – you are no longer in the game mode of propositional action – you are no longer playing a game –
rather you are involved in the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
‘If on the other hand you realise that the chain of actual real reasons has a beginning, you will no longer be revolted by the idea of a case in which there is no reason for the way you obey the order. At this point, however, another confusion sets in, that between reason and cause. One is led into this confusion by the ambiguous use of the word “why”. Thus when the chain of reasons comes to an end and still the question “why?” is asked, one is inclined to give a cause instead of a reason. If, e.g., to the question, “why did you just paint this colour when I told you to paint a red patch?” you give the answer: “I have been shown a sample of this colour and the word ‘red’
was pronounced to me at the same time; and therefore this colour now always comes to mind when I hear the word ‘red’, then you have given a cause for your action and not a reason’
a ‘reason’ is a rhetorical device – and a well-used rhetorical device at that –
it is a rhetorical device that functions in many and varied propositional contexts –
however – as with any other form of rhetoric – it is not part of the logical picture – not part of it at all –we do not introduce reasons for any logical purpose –
reasons are introduced in the service of persuasion –
in the absence of this rhetoric – all and any proposals / propositions – are without reason
logically speaking – there is no reason
‘when the chain of reasons comes to and end and still the question “why?” –
whether or not a rhetorical chain comes to and end or not – is logically irrelevant –
and Wittgenstein’s contrast of reason and cause doesn’t work either –
unless you just want to be pragmatic – and cut-off at some point –
the question of cause – as with the question of reason – can go on indefinitely –
but if this is what happens – what you have with cause – is what you have reason – a game – a propositional game – a game that does not – because it is a game – bear on any critical issue regarding propositions –
and cause as a game?
the rule is – isn’t it? – that every event has a cause – which goes to – every cause has a cause –
a game by the way that Aquinas decided to stop playing – when he got to God –
and to this – as Wittgenstein points out – we can always ask – ‘why?’
‘The proposition that your action has such and such a cause is a hypothesis. The hypothesis is well founded if one has had a number of experiences which, roughly speaking, agree in showing that your action is the regular sequel of certain conditions which we then call causes of the action. In order to know the reason you had for making a certain statement, for acting in a particular way, etc., no number of agreeing experiences is necessary, and the statement of your reason is not an hypothesis. The differences between the grammars of “reason’ and “cause’ is quite similar to that between the grammars of “motive” and “cause”. Of the cause one can say that one can’t know it but can only conjecture it. On the other hand one often says “Surely I
must know why I did it: talking of the motive. When I say: “we can only conjecture the cause but we know the motive” this statement will be seen later on to be a grammatical one. The “can” refers to a logical possibility.’
a hypothesis is a form of proposal – and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
yes – you can propose – a regular sequence of certain conditions –
and this may be – in certain contexts – a useful proposal –
nevertheless – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any proposed ‘regular sequence of conditions’ – will be only one way of describing the act –
and if you take the view that every action – or any event – has a cause – you lock yourself into a rule-governed game –
and the hard truth here is that a game – does not explain – does not explain anything –
anything at all
a game is a play – not an explanation –
a game is not open to question – whereas any proposed explanation – is
Wittgenstein says – a reason is not a hypothesis –
a reason is a proposal – and like the hypothesis – is open to question – open to doubt – and – uncertain
on a ‘reason’ – Wittgenstein says –
‘On the other hand one often says “Surely I must know why I did it’
‘surely I must know why I did it’
our knowledge is propositional – our knowledge of anything – our knowledge of ourselves – is – as experience shows – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and further – if we are taking grammar –
‘surely I must know why I did it’ –
is a perfect example of a rhetorical use of language –
the point of such rhetoric – is persuasion
and here – you can legitimately ask – who is the speaker trying to convince?
the person he is speaking to – or himself?
my bet – is both
‘talking of the motive. When I say: “we can only conjecture the cause but we know the motive” this statement will be seen later on to be a grammatical one. The “can” refers to a logical possibility.’
the cause of an action or event – is a proposal – a propositional explanation – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
a motive too – is a proposed explanation –
does anyone believe – that motives – are not open to question – not open to doubt – and not uncertain?
and as to logical possibility –
what we can do is keep an open mind
the logic of ‘why’ – is that it is open – open to any consideration – open to any proposal –
in response ‘cause’ and ‘reason’ – are two propositional explanations – that can be put – in response to the question ‘why?’ –
they do not exhaust the possibilities of propositional response to ‘why?’
the propositional reality is that both explanations have use – have history – have currency
‘the idea that we can know; and not only conjecture’ –
our knowledge is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
our conjectures are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the point here is that there is no logical difference between knowledge and conjecture
‘motive as a cause seen from the inside’ –
we propose motive in certain propositional contexts – as an explanation for action –
what motive amounts to – is open to question – in the same way as ‘cause’ is open to question – and ‘reason’ – is open to question
these notions of cause – of reason – of motive – are effectively ‘propositional tie-offs’
if you settle on cause – or you settle on reason – or you settle on motive – it is as if you have come to a propositional resting place –
which is to say – if you decide on cause – on reason – on motive – you halt the process of question of doubt – and take a break from uncertainty
logically speaking it’s only a breather –
nevertheless cause – reason – motive – are propositional explanations which are useful in various propositional contexts –
they have pragmatic value
‘Giving a reason is like giving a calculation by which you have arrived at a certain result.’
a calculation is a rule governed propositional game
is giving a reason – playing a game?
I don’t think so – any reason proposed – is open to question – invites question – invites a critical response
can giving a reason be like playing a game?
perhaps for some it is like playing a game – but if so – ‘giving a reason’ – is just is a play
and as with any play in any game – has no logical value
‘Let us go back to the statement that thinking essentially consists in operating with signs. My point was that it is likely to mislead us if we say that ‘thinking is a mental activity’. The question what kind of activity thinking is is analogous to this: “Where does thinking take place?” We can answer: on paper, in our head, in the mind. None of these statement of locality gives the locality of thinking. The use of all these specifications is correct, but we must not be misled by the similarity of their linguistic form into a false conception of their grammar. As e.g., when you say: “Surely the real place of thought is in the head”. The same applies to thinking as an activity. It is correct to say that thinking is an activity of our writing hand, or our larynx, of our head, of our mind, so long as we understand the grammar of these statements. And it is furthermore, extremely important to realise how, by misunderstanding the grammar of our expressions, we are led to think of one in particular of these statements as giving the real seat of the activity of thinking.’
‘The question what kind of activity thinking is is analogous to this: “Where does thinking take place?”’
well is it? – is it analogous? – I suppose it is if you want it to be –
however – the two questions can be seen as separate and distinct – i.e. – an answer to one need not bear on any answer to the other –
we can readily answer the question – ‘what kind of activity is thinking?’ – without – as it were being forced into a consideration of the issue of locality – and visa-versa
if you propose – ‘thinking’ – and the question arises – ‘what kind of activity is thinking?’ – and in response you get the proposal – ‘thinking is a mental activity’ –
that proposal – ‘thinking is a mental activity’ – as with the original proposal ‘thinking’– is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and that is logical situation – whatever your response to the question – ‘what kind of activity is thinking?
‘We can answer: on paper, in our head, in the mind. None of these statement of locality gives the locality of thinking. The use of all these specifications is correct, but we must not be misled by the similarity of their linguistic form into a false conception of their grammar. As e.g., when you say: “Surely the real place of thought is in the head”.’
well they do give a locality – whether the localities proposed – are regarded as specific or not – will depend on the propositional context in which the proposals of locality are put
i.e. – for non-specialist propositional discussion – they may well be adequate
they are all ‘correct’ – because they are proposed answers to the question –
they are all ‘correct’ – because any answer is valid –they are all ‘correct’ – if they are all held open to question – open to doubt – and recognised as – uncertain –
and if they are not held open to question – they are all incorrect – of no logical value – and of no critical use
the statement – ‘Surely the real place of thought is in the head’ – is quite obviously a rhetorical statement – a statement deigned to persuade –
rhetoric has its place in our propositional lives – but from a logical point of view – it is just tiresome
‘a false conception of their grammar’?
different statements will have different uses – in different propositional contexts
it is not a matter of determining what is ‘true’ – what is ‘false’ – it is rather a question of working out where a statement – where a proposal – fits – where it has function – has use –
and it is always on the cards that you don’t figure this out –
that is – you are left – quite clearly – with question – with doubt – with uncertainty
‘And it is furthermore, extremely important to realise how, by misunderstanding the grammar of our expressions, we are led to think of one in particular of these statements as giving the real seat of the activity of thinking.’
‘the real seat of the activity of thinking’? –
if you are interested in this question – if you think the question of the ‘locality’ of thinking is important – or indeed relevant to whatever propositional context you are working in – by all means purse it –
however – the issue is not the grammar of our expressions –
it is recognising that logically speaking there is no final – as in certain – answer to this question – or for that matter – any question –
the ‘real seat of thinking’ – is uncertain – is uncertainty –
what ‘thinking is’ – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and that is the logical state of affairs – regardless of any answer you have to the question
here we must begin with the proposal – ‘thinking’ –
recognising that as a proposal – it is open to question – any sort of question – open to doubt – any sort of doubt – and uncertain – uncertain in every respect
this may not be how people commonly – or pragmatically – deal with ‘thinking’ – but it is the logical approach to the proposal – and as such the window to dealing with it – in a rational manner
ok – so we have the proposal ‘thinking’ – and in response to this proposal – the further proposal that ‘thinking is an activity of the hand’ –
this further proposal – is an explanatory proposal
however – given that the initial proposal – ‘thinking’ – is open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – any further proposal – from a logical point of view – has a place – is legitimate – is valid –
and as with the initial proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
that is really all there is to it –
ok – so the proposal ‘thinking is an activity of the hand’ – makes no sense to someone
you can leave it at that if you like – (not everyone will get what you are saying at any one time – and often what others propose to you – will only raise questions for you)
or you can elaborate on the proposal – give it propositional context – and perhaps dispel any bewilderment
if I was running this proposal ‘thinking is an activity of the hand’ – I would explain it in terms of the philosophical context – the very philosophical context that Wittgenstein – for one – has introduced here –
and hopefully anyone initially mystified by the statement – would come to see why it is proposed – and how it is to be understood
I would make the point that the proposal ‘thinking’ can be understood in various different contexts – in various and different ways – that ‘as an activity of the hand’ – is just one use – and a specialized use – in a specialized context
such a use does not stop anyone using ‘thinking’ – in any other way – and in other contexts –
it is just one use – among many – there are others – and there will be others –
and the reason is simple – the proposal ‘thinking’ – as with any proposal – in any form – is open to question – open to doubt – and is logically – uncertain
‘Thinking one wants to say, is part of our ‘private experience’. It is not material, but an event in private consciousness.’
an event in private consciousness – yes – this can be proposed – and it is a proposal that has use – that has currency – that has a well-established history
in many contexts ‘thinking’ – is so described – so understood –
and this description – this understanding – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
nevertheless – it has legs
but how we understand the proposal ‘thinking’ – is not an either / or proposition –
in different propositional contexts – ‘thinking’ will be proposed differently – described differently – understood and used differently –
Wittgenstein gives us a good example of this – when he proposes – ‘thinking as an activity of the hand’
just by the way – ‘thinking as an activity of the hand’ – it can be said – doesn’t quite sit right –
and the reason is we bristle at the idea of the hand as an agent –
we are much more comfortable with regarding the hand as an instrument – a tool –
nevertheless – the proposal is put as it is put – and in a certain context – from a certain point of view – it makes sense
as to ‘private experience’ – yes you can argue against the notion – the proposal –
but frankly I see no need to
we have private experience – whatever that amounts to –
and the thing is – our ‘private experience’ – can remain private – or it can be made public
as Wittgenstein suggests we can regard thinking – as a public event – if that suits our purpose –
and I say – we can see it as private –
as to the essence of the matter – what comes first the private – or the public – the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
but for practical purposes it makes sense to say there are two basic contexts for thinking – private and public –
and I would say the two can be actioned simultaneously – as when i.e. – when writing one can be said to be – ‘thinking on paper’
we can think in a private mode – and at the same time effectively – make our thinking public
as to whether we describe thinking in the private mode as ‘material’ – or not –
that is really a question of metaphysical perspective –
and what such amounts to – is just another proposal – another propositional perspective – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Could a machine think?’ – ‘Could a machine have toothache?’
what we propose – is our reality – what we propose – is our knowledge –
and the reality we propose – the knowledge we have – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
you can propose that a machine thinks – and when this proposition is put to question – you have the opportunity to explain it – to put forward additional proposals – to place it in a context that has use – that has function – that can make sense
are human beings and machines essentially different entities?
if so ‘thinking’ as applied to the human – will have a different propositional signature – to ‘thinking’ – as applied to a machine –
if your argument is that humans and machines share a common nature – then perhaps the argument will be that ‘thinking’ – however described and explained – will be essentially the same in both humans and machines –
the argument goes on
the tooth ache is somewhat different
for it to be said that a machine has a tooth-ache – you would be using a metaphor – where a part of the machine is called its ‘teeth’ – and a malfunction in that part of the machine is described as a ‘toothache’ –
and that might be a useful way of describing the matter – especially if the machine in question is a humanoid robot
clearly though – a human toothache – has a different description – to the humanoid toothache
‘If we say thinking is essentially operating with signs, the first question you might ask is: “What are signs?” – Instead of giving any kind of general answer to this question, I shall propose to you to look closely at particular cases which we should call “operating with signs”. Let us look at a simple example of operating with words. I give someone the order: “fetch me six apples from the grocer”, and I will describe a way of making use of such an order: The words “six apples” are written on a bit of paper, the paper is handed to the grocer, the grocer compares the word “apple” with labels on different shelves. He finds it to agree with one of the labels, counts from 1 to the number written on the slip of paper, and for every number counted takes a fruit off the shelf and puts it in a bag. – And here you have a case of the use of words. I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call language games. These are ways of using signs simpler to those in which we use the signs in our highly complicated everyday language. Language games are a form of language with which a child begins to make a use of words. The study of language games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages. If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption, and question we shall with great advantage look at the primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated processes of thought. When we look at such simple forms of language the mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears. We see activities, reactions, which are clear-cut and transparent. On the other hand we recognise in these simple processes forms of language not separated by a break from our more complicated ones. We see that we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms.’
a ’sign’ of any form – is a proposal
operating with signs – is a critical activity
in the example given by Wittgenstein – the grocer receives the note with ‘six apples’ written on it –
he will put the proposal ‘six apples’ – to question – i.e. – which six apples? – the ones at the front of his stand? – the six ripest apples? – etc. –
and yes ‘here we have a use of the words’ – but the use of these words – of any words – of any proposal – if it is a logical use – (and it most often is) – is not without question –
any propositional use – begins with uncertainty
‘And here you have a case of the use of words. I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call language games. These are ways of using signs simpler to those in which we use the signs in our highly complicated everyday language. Language games are a form of language with which a child begins to make a use of words. The study of language games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages.’
language games –
a game is a rule governed propositional activity –
yes – we play propositional games
however – Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ – are not games
working out how to respond to the proposal – ‘six apples’ – is not a rule-governed propositional activity – it is not a game
it is a critical propositional activity
I think Wittgenstein would like all propositional activity to be a game – to be rule-governed – but of course it is not
that he never clearly defines a game – is the weak – and telling point of his argument
I suspect he knows a game is a rule-governed propositional activity – but knows there is a limit to how far you can push this model – and so leaves the notion vague – and undefined
he just misses the point of language –
he fails to see the obvious that language use – that propositional use is a critical activity
odd – because in many ways he is a master of critical thinking himself
simple or complicated – ‘primitive’ – or sophisticated – any propositional activity – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption, and question we shall with great advantage look at the primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated processes of thought.’
a true proposition – is a proposal affirmed or agreed to by whoever – whenever – wherever
a false proposition is a proposal – denied or dissented from – by whoever – whenever – wherever
proposals of affirmation or denial – are – as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
assertion and assumption are propositional modes
questioning is the logical activity that is integral to any propositional action –
so called ‘primitive forms of language’ – are just propositional constructions –
in relation to questions of truth and falsehood – the nature of assertion and assumption – or the logical action of questioning – so called ‘primitive forms of language’ – are no different to any other proposal –
they have no special significance
‘We see that we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms.’
it is often put confidently that this is how children learn language
it’s a neat little formula – but the fact is that how we learn language – just is a matter – open to question – is a matter open to doubt – is uncertain
this building up the complicated forms from the primitive – gradually adding new forms – is just an analytical proposal – which has nothing to do with actual language use – with actual critical propositional action –
it is a model that is logically irrelevant –
unless of course what you are on about is some kind of reductionist agenda –
and that is really just a waste of time –
and a waste of time – that occupied the brains of a good many twentieth century logicians and epistemologists
why reductionism is a waste of time – is that a reducted proposal is logically no different from the proposal it is supposed to ‘explain’ –
as with the proposal – to be ‘explained’ – any reduction is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
there is nothing against elaborating on a proposal –
but an elaboration – is a proposal in the same logical space as the subject proposal –
it is not a ‘deeper’ proposal –
there is no propositional depth –
there is no depth to propositional reality –
once you understand this – you see there is only surface – and that that surface is propositional –
the world is proposed to us – and we propose in relation to it –
there is only proposal –
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Now what makes it difficult for us to take this line of investigation is our craving for generality.
This craving for generality is the resultant of a number of tendencies connected with particular philosophical confusions. There is –
(a)
The tendency to look for something in common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term. – We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term “game” to various games; whereas games form a family the members of which have a family likeness. Some of them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows and others again the same way of walking and these likenesses overlap. The idea of a general concept being a common property of its particular instances connects up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language. It is comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of things which have the properties: e.g. that beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful things as alcohol is of beer and wine, and that we therefore could have pure beauty; unadulterated by anything that is beautiful.’
‘this craving for generality’? –
I doubt very much that there is this – ‘craving for generality’
by all means put for a propositional explanation for generality –
and any such proposal will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
you can do this – but the fact is – the fact remains – that we propose generality
as a natural fact of propositional reality – of propositional life – we propose propositions that are general – that propose generality –
it is not something we crave – it is what we do
a proposition – general or otherwise – is where we start –
where we start – in making sense of ourselves and our world
yes – you can analyse a ‘general proposition’ – as you would any other – but any analysis is a response to just what is put – what is there
we begin always with what is there – what is put – however it is further described
to say that this ‘craving for generality’ is a result of a number of tendencies - suggests that if you can master these tendencies – the craving for generality – the fact of generality – of propositions proposing generality – can be eliminated –
you can waste your time on such arguments –
the fact remains – we put – and we use – propositions that express generality
‘The tendency to look for something in common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term. – We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term “game” to various games; whereas games form a family the members of which have a family likeness.’
there is something common to all games – all games are rule-governed propositional actions –
as to ‘family likeness’ – this is the height of philosophical laziness – of philosophical slackness –
if you run with ‘family likeness’ – you really have nothing to say –
you are just in the business of connecting dots – or making up dots to connect
there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode and the game mode
a proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a game played – is rule governed –
if you play the game – in whatever context – you play – in accordance with its rule –
you follow the rule – you don’t question it or doubt it – the rule is not uncertain
if you question – if you doubt – if regard the rule as uncertain –
you are not playing the game
‘properties’ and ‘ingredients’ of things – are proposals – descriptions – that can be applied to proposals – described as ‘things’ –
logically speaking these proposals – these descriptions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we never leave propositional reality
‘beauty’ – is a proposal – that is applied to other proposals –
‘beauty’ – is a propositional description – that you might say – looks for application
the proposal of ‘beauty’ – as with any application of a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
(b)
‘There is a tendency rooted in our usual forms of expressions, to think that the man who has learnt to understand a general term, say, “leaf”, has thereby come to possess a general picture of a leaf as opposed to particular pictures of laves. He was shown different leaves when he learnt the meaning of the word “leaf”; and showing him the particular leaves was only a means to the end of producing ‘in him’ an idea which we imagine to be some kind of general image. We say that he sees what is common to all these leaves; and this is true if we mean that he can on being asked tell us certain feature or properties which they have in common. But we are inclined to think that the general idea of a leaf is something like a visual image, but one which only contains what is common to all leaves. (Galtonian composite photograph.) This again is connected with the idea that the meaning of a word is an image, or a thing correlated to a word. (This roughly means, we are looking at words as though they all were proper names, and we then confuse the bearer of a name with the meaning of the name.)’
I think it best to see general terms – as purely logical –
and by that – I mean – they are terms that propose a logical domain –
they are logical domain terms
we can ask – what does the domain of a general term cover – what does it leave out – and how and when do its boundaries alter and change?
the content of the domain – is uncertain – i.e. – what do we include in it?
and here we are really dealing with the kind of ‘explanations’ that Wittgenstein mentions above – pictures – images – things – and whatever else might be proposed
the general term proposes – provides – a domain of the possible –
possible understandings – possible uses
general terms are like a display of products in a shop – you are – as it were – presented with options –
what do you want to buy – why? –
you make a choice – what use will it have?
you might put the chosen item back on the shelf – you might choose another item –
you might walk away – still considering –
you might even ask – were you in the right shop?
the point is – as a natural fact of human language – we have these terms – and they function for us – they are useful –
and they place us right at the heart of uncertainty –
and in that sense – they are all too real –
I put this characterization of general terms – as logical domain proposals –
as a proposal – an explanatory proposal – recognizing full well that it – as with any explanation – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
Wittgenstein says –
‘We say that he sees what is common to all these leaves; and this is true if we mean that he can on being asked tell us certain feature or properties which they have in common. But we are inclined to think that the general idea of a leaf is something like a visual image, but one which only contains what is common to all leaves.’
yes – I don’t know about this idea of commonality – explaining generality
do we get anywhere with this idea?
what if I said – I explain commonality – in terms of generality?
really – isn’t it just that the terms are interchangeable?
it’s like the same person – on different days – wearing different clothes?
just different costumes – different versions – different presentations
and really what is ‘explained’ here by substituting commonality for generality
and as to the general of idea of a leaf – as something like a visual image – which only contains what is common to all leaves –
we can dismiss this immediately – you don’t have an image here –
what you have is a proposal
and really – will any proposal contain what is common to all leaves –
the idea is quite ridiculous
how would you ever know what is common to all leaves?
seriously – no one has experienced – or inspected – all of anything –
and any proposal of commonality – and in fact the very notion of ‘commonality’ itself – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
(c)
‘Again, the idea of what happens when we get hold of the general idea ‘leaf’, ‘plant’, etc., is connected with the confusion between a mental state, meaning a state of a hypothetical mental mechanism, and a mental state meaning a state of consciousness (toothache, etc.).’
what ‘happens’ when we get hold of a general idea – or if not general idea – general term – is open to question – open to doubt and is uncertain –
who can say?
my point is that the general term is uncertain – that it sets up a domain of possible understandings and uses
so – it is not a question of what ‘happens’ – it is rather the question of the logic of the term
as to a ‘mental state’ – and any confusion here between a hypothetical mental mechanism – and a state of consciousness –
the question of this confusion – is irrelevant to the question of the logic of a general term – a general proposal –
yes – you can ‘explain’ the general idea – the general term – in terms of a mental state
you can put such a proposal
but such an ‘explanation’ – doesn’t advance the matter – doesn’t take us anywhere – logically speaking
it just adds an irrelevant layer or covering on to the matter
the point is that the general term – the general proposal – is open to question – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
calling it a ‘mental state’ doesn’t change this
(d)
‘Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive laws: and in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.
the method of empirical science – is not reductionism –
in fact – there is no reduction in science – or for that matter – in any other propositional activity
the so called ‘reducted’ statement / proposal – is the result – the outcome – of a critical assessment of the initial statement
the method of science – is the critical method – the method of question – of doubt –
and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
and in that sense the method of science is no different to any logical / rational approach to propositional reality
the propositions of science are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive laws’
a question for the scientist is – which proposition – which proposal – or which set of propositions / ‘laws’ – are most functional – most useful –
it is a critical question –
the process of getting to this ‘smallest number of primitive laws’ – is a critical process
and yes – the smallest number of primitive laws / proposals – may well be regarded as most functional – as most useful –
we should keep in mind too – that whether a proposal – or set of proposals proves useful – will depend too on the propositional context to which they are addressed –
different contexts may well require different propositional sets
and any so called ‘law’ – or set of laws – primitive or not – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
to propose an account – an explanation of natural phenomena – is to put up general propositions
there is no mystery to this – how else could it be?
it is what we do – we propose – generalities –
and this proposing of generalities – is – and has been – the source of our general knowledge of the world – the propositional world – we inhabit –
and we understand that any proposition expressing a generality – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘and in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization.’
mathematics is a propositional game – that is – a rule governed propositional activity
mathematics can thus be seen as the study of propositional rules –
with different topics – you have different rules –
a ‘unifying treatment of different topics’ – will be a rule – a generalization – that covers the different topics – and from which the rules of those different topics can be deduced
any such rule will be the result of a critical investigation – and will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
however – when you employ the rule – when you play the rule governed game – the game that is mathematics – the rule is to be followed – not questioned –
the very point of the rule – is its execution – the very point of the game – is its play
‘Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.’
in so far as philosopher see – and have seen – the method of science as reduction – they have missed the fact and point of science altogether – just as some scientists have
the method of science is the critical method – the method of philosophy is the critical method – the method of any logical and rational inquiry – is the critical method
our propositional world – is what there is –
there is no other world to reduce it to –
proposals – propositions are put – not reduced
as to ‘complete darkness’ – I am not so pessimistic –
philosophy – and I think here particularly of twentieth century philosophy – is characterized by this reductivist bent of mind –
as I see it – reductivism is just a bad characterization of the rational process
within this mistaken ‘reductivist framework’ – nevertheless there was and is some good critical thinking
that is what we need to focus on – that is what is front and centre –
as to – ‘Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’ –
philosophy is propositional – and any proposal put can be regarded as a description –
but what philosophy shows us is that any proposal / description – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
philosophy reveals and explores propositional uncertainty –
and we can say philosophy provides the tools for critical propositional activity – be it called philosophy – science – or whatever
‘(Think of such questions as ‘Are there sense data?’ and ask: what method is there of determining this? Introspection?)’
are there sense data?
there are sense data – if sense data are proposed –
what such a proposal amounts to – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘introspection’ – will be an account of the origin of the proposal –
introspection – and any other account of the origin of the proposal – is by the by –
is irrelevant – to the critical issue of evaluating the proposal
that is – putting the proposal of sense data to question – putting it to doubt – exploring its uncertainty
all to the purpose of working out whether it has a use – and in what context(s)
‘the contemptuous attitude toward the particular case’ –
really – who has this attitude?
and you would have to say – if such an attitude does exist – it is a case of emotion – mis-directed – big time
no definition – is final – a definition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –and by the way – you don’t need finality for elegance
the issue of what is common to propositions – and what distinguishes them – is a logical matter –
and these matters are genuine – whether any one is interested in them or not
‘The attitude towards the more general and the more special in logic is concerned with the usage of the word “kind” which is liable to cause confusion. We talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of propositions, kinds of proof and also, of kinds of apples, kinds of paper etc. In one sense what defines the kind are properties, like sweetness, hardness, etc. In the other the different kinds are different grammatical structure. A treatise on pomology may be called incomplete if there exist kinds of apples it doesn’t mention. Here we have a standard of completeness in nature. Supposing on the other hand there was a game resembling chess but simpler, no pawns being used in it. Should we call the game incomplete? Or should we call a game more complete than chess if it in some way contained chess but added new elements? The contempt for what seems the less general in logic springs from the idea that it is incomplete. It is in fact confusing to talk of cardinal arithmetic as something special as opposed to something more general. Cardinal arithmetic bears no mark of incompleteness; nor does an arithmetic which is cardinal and finite. (There are no subtle distinctions between logical forms as there are between the tastes of different apples.)’
the starting point in logic – is the proposal – the proposition
the word ‘kind’ – is a proposal – a propositional category – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
‘In one sense what defines the kind are properties…’
here what you have is the proposal of properties – in relation to the proposal of ‘kind’
such a proposal may well enable the ‘kind’ proposition to function – in certain contexts – to be useful in certain contexts
‘In the other the different kinds are different grammatical structure’ –
ok – what this points to is that proposal of ‘kind’ – has different propositional usages
and any proposal of usage is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and again – a ‘grammatical’ interpretation – may well suit certain propositional contexts
‘A treatise on pomology may be called incomplete if there exist kinds of apples it doesn’t mention. Here we have a standard of completeness in nature.’
any proposal – a treatise on pomology included – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
uncertainty is the logical condition of any proposal –
uncertainty – undercuts any notion of completeness
‘Supposing on the other hand there was a game resembling chess but simpler, no pawns being used in it. Should we call the game incomplete? Or should we call a game more complete than chess if it in some way contained chess but added new elements?’
should we call the game incomplete?
no – it is another game – we give it another name
the idea of ‘more complete’ – how ridiculous
‘The contempt for what seems the less general in logic springs from the idea that it is incomplete’
what we deal with in logic is uncertainty – ‘completeness’ – is not logical – its only value is rhetorical –
and it is rhetoric from which this contempt springs – if indeed it ‘springs’ at all
‘It is in fact confusing to talk of cardinal arithmetic as something special as opposed to something more general. Cardinal arithmetic bears no mark of incompleteness; nor does an arithmetic which is cardinal and finite. (There are no subtle distinctions between logical forms as there are between the tastes of different apples.)’
do we need these categories ‘special’ and ‘general’ here – do they serve any purpose?
if your focus is on cardinal arithmetic – that is where it is at –
whether you call that focus ‘general’ or ‘special’ – is irrelevant
cardinal arithmetic is what it is – and it’s not what it is not – which is just to say it is a distinctive rule governed propositional practise
(as to – ‘subtle distinctions’ between logical forms –
I say – if such a distinction proposed – for whatever reason – then it is there – and open to question
and to the taste of apples – subtle or not –
taste is in the mouth of the beholder)
‘If we study the grammar, say of the words “wishing”, “thinking”, “understanding”, “meaning’, we shall not be dissatisfied when we have described various cases of wishing, thinking, etc. If someone said, “surely this not all that one calls “wishing”, we should answer “certainly not, but you can build up more complicated cases if you like.” And after all, there is not one definite class of features which characterize all cases of wishing (at least not as the word is commonly used). If on the other hand you were able to give a definition of wishing, i.e., to draw a sharp boundary, then you are free to draw it as you like; and this boundary will never entirely coincide with actual usage, as this usage has no sharp boundary.’
‘If someone said, “surely this not all that one calls “wishing”, we should answer “certainly not, but you can build up more complicated cases if you like.”’ –
what we should answer is – what one calls ‘wishing’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any proposed class of features that characterizes all cases of wishing – is a proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Wittgenstein says – a definition of wishing in which a sharp boundary is drawn will never coincide with actual usage –
in the first instance – isn’t this an empirical matter?
i.e. – it just might be the case – that the actual usage coincides with the boundary drawn
secondly – the logical point is – any boundary proposal – is open to question – and any proposal of usage – is open to question
‘The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation: for it has not only led to no result, but also led the philosopher to dismiss as irrelevant concrete cases, which alone would have helped him understand the usage of the general term. When Socrates asks the question. “what is knowledge?” he does not even regard it as a preliminary answer to enumerate cases of knowledge.* If I wish to find out what sort of thing arithmetic is, I should be very content indeed to have investigated the case of finite cardinal arithmetic. For
(a) this would lead me on to the complicated cases,
(b) a finite arithmetic is not incomplete; it has no gaps which are then filled with the rest of arithmetic.’
*Theaetetus 146D-7C
any so-called ‘common element in all its applications’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
if this is understood – any proposal of commonality can only be seen in a pragmatic light –
which is to say it might be useful for organizational purposes – in a given propositional context – but to put it bluntly such a proposal – and its utility – is in the bigger picture – disposable
the usage of the general term – will be uncertain –
whether we are looking for a ‘common element’ – or dealing with what is proposed as a ‘concrete case’
we operate with generality – we need to operate with generality – and we make the best of it that we can – by asking questions – raising doubts – and recognizing and exploring its uncertainty
by looking at a ‘concrete case’ of what is proposed as arithmetic – i.e. – finite cardinal arithmetic – you are up and running –
what you learn there is that finite cardinal arithmetic is a rule-governed propositional sign-game
and from that – it is a small step to seeing that this definition – ‘rule governed propositional sign game’ – applies to any other propositional activity that goes by the name of ‘arithmetic’ –
but if that penny doesn’t drop – it can be easily demonstrated with further ‘concrete’ examples
no properly constructed rule-governed propositional action – is incomplete
‘What happens if from 4 till 4.30 A expects B to come to his room? In one sense in which the phrase “to expect something from 4 to 4.30” is used it certainly does not refer to one person or state of mind going on throughout the interval, but to a great many different activities and states of mind. If, for instance I expect B to come to tea, what happens maybe this: At four o’clock I look at my diary and see the name “B” against today’s date; I prepare tea for two; I think for a moment “does B smoke?” and I put out cigarettes; toward 4.30 I begin to feel impatient; I imagine B as he will look when he comes into my room. All this is called “expecting B from 4 to 4.30”. And there are endless variations to this process which are all described by the same expression. If someone asks what the different processes of expecting someone to tea have in common, the answer is that there is no single feature in common to all of them, though there are many common features overlapping. These cases of expression form a family; they have family likenesses which are not clearly defined.’
we have an expectation proposal –
and just what that proposal involves – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
in a critical assessment – you will have different proposals – different possible accounts of what the expectation involves –
you can propose a ‘family resemblance’ – between the different accounts – but any such proposal is logically uninteresting – and is superficial –
the main game here is critical – the exploration of propositional uncertainty
and in any case – a proposal of a ‘family resemblance’ – as with any other proposal –
is open to question open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘There is a totally different use of the word “expectation” if we use it to mean a particular sensation. This use of the words like “wish”, “expectation” etc., readily suggests itself. There is an obvious connection between this use and the one suggested above. There is no doubt that in many cases if we expect someone, in the first sense, some, or all, of the activities described are accompanied by a peculiar feeling, a tension; and it is natural to use the word “expectation” to mean this experience of tension.’
what we have – to begin with – is a proposal – i.e. – ‘I expect B between 4 and 4.30’
and this proposal further described as an ‘expectation’ –
putting that this expectation proposal is accompanied by a ‘sensation’ – ‘a peculiar feeling, a tension’ – is another proposal – an explanatory proposal
and one clearly open to question – as I can ‘expect’ – without ‘a peculiar feeling, a tension’ –
and if that is the case the explanatory value of the description ‘sensation’ – is at the very least open to question –
my question would be – do we need the explanatory proposal of sensation here?
I don’t see that we do –
we have a particular form of proposal – the ‘expectation proposal’ – and for all intents and purposes – that is all we need to say – by way of characterizing the initial proposal
‘sensation’ – may or may not fit the picture – and in any case – it seems like an unnecessary – and irrelevant further characterization
‘There arises now the question: is this sensation to be called ‘The sensation of expectation”, or “the sensation of expectation that B will come”? If the first case to say that you are in a state of expectation admittedly does not fully describe the situation of expecting that so-and-so will happen. The second case is often rashly suggested as an explanation of the use of the phrase “expecting that so-and-so will happen”, and you may even think that with this explanation you are on safe ground, as every further question is dealt with by saying that the sensation of expectation is indefinable.’
‘is this sensation to be called ‘The sensation of expectation”, or “the sensation of expectation that B will come”?’
I don’t think we need to really bother with this question – because ‘sensation’ – in this context is surplus baggage – best to leave it on the platform – and just catch the train
the first case – ‘the sensation of expectation’ – really just amounts to – expectation –
calling it a sensation – doesn’t add anything to it –
in fact – it is likely to lead you in the wrong direction – if you are interested in just what expectation amounts to – for your focus would be on explaining sensation –
it’s a different rabbit hole
as to the second case – this ‘sensation of expectation that B will come’ – as an explanation of ‘expecting that so-and-so will happen’ –
again – introducing ‘sensation’ there – doesn’t ‘explain’ expectation – all it does is complicate the question of expectation
‘the sensation of expectation is indefinable’ –
if so – you would have to say well – so much for the explanatory value of sensation –
and the addition of ‘sensation’ here – closes the whole issue down
but let’s be clear on this matter of definition – and the indefinable –
any proposal – is definable
any definition is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
we propose definitions – and we use them – but from a logical point of view – they are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
no proposal – is indefinable – which is to say – we can always propose in relation to a proposal –
while recognizing that any definition put – is uncertain
‘Now there is no objection to calling a particular sensation “the expectation that B will come”. There may even be good practical reasons for using such an expression. Only mark – if we have explained the meaning of the phrase “expecting that B will come” in this way no phrase which is derived from this by substituting a different name for “B” is thereby explained. One might say that the phrase “Expecting B will come” is not a value of a function “expecting that x will come”. To understand this compare our case with the function “I eat x”. We understand the proposition “I eat a chair” although we weren’t specifically taught the meaning of the expression “eating a chair”.’
what is this ‘particular sensation’ – but an attempt at an explanation of a proposal described as an ‘expectation’?
Wittgenstein has it all round the wrong way –
at the base of Wittgenstein’s argument here is the idea that ‘sensation’ – is something other than proposal –
all we have is proposal – in the absence of proposal – what we deal with – what we have – is the unknown
what we have – what we begin with (and for that matter end with) – is a proposal –
and yes – you can describe this proposal as an ‘expectation’ – and you can further describe – by introducing the description ’sensation’ – but let’s be clear – what you are describing is a proposal
‘Only mark – if we have explained the meaning of the phrase “expecting that B will come” in this way no phrase which is derived from this by substituting a different name for “B” is thereby explained.’
if you substitute a different name for ‘B’ – you have a different proposal – and with that – if there is to be further description – so called ‘explanation’ – yes you will have a different ‘explanation –
a different explanation to any proposal put – in accounting for – ‘expecting B’
different proposals – different propositional responses – different propositional elaborations
‘One might say that the phrase “Expecting B will come” is not a value of a function “expecting that x will come”.’
this functional analysis – will not ‘explain’ – any proposition
all it does is set up a logical game of substitution
you can play such a game – but it irrelevant to any critical analysis of the proposition
and here – really you have the whole sad story of Russell and Wittgenstein’s propositional failure – and indeed the huge misconception that dominated twentieth century logic and epistemology –
and that is the failure to see the difference – the different propositional modes of game playing and critical analysis –
playing logical and indeed mathematical games – playing any sort of game – does not ‘explain’ anything
an ‘explanation’ – is a critical propositional response to the subject proposal –
and that ‘explanation’ – as with the subject proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
yes – you can ‘translate’ a proposition – into the game mode – and thereby dispense with uncertainty –
and in so doing – make a game – a game to be played –
but games and game playing – have no relevance to the question of knowledge – to the critical evaluation that is essential to understanding – to understanding ourselves and the world we live in
this obsession with certainty – has just butchered philosophy –
it is a grand story of pretence – prejudice – and ignorance
‘The role which in our present case the name “B” plays in the expression “I expect B” can be compared with that which the name “Bright” plays in the expression “Bright’s disease”. Compare the grammar of this word, when it denotes a particular disease, with that of the expression “Bright’s disease”, when it means the disease which Bright has. I will characterize the difference by saying that the word “Bright” in the first case is an index in the complex name “Bright’s disease”; in the second case I shall call it an argument if the function “x’s disease”. One may say that an index alludes to something, and such an allusion may be justified in all sorts of ways. Thus calling a sensation “the expectation that B will come” is giving it a complex name and “B” possibly alludes to the man whose coming had regularly been preceded by the sensation.’
‘I expect B’ –
is a proposal – an ‘expectation proposal’ – if you want to give it description –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
every word in the proposal – is itself a proposal – open to question –
i.e. – we can ask – what is the reference of ‘I”? – ‘what is it to ‘expect’? – and – who or what is ‘B”?
on the face of it – ‘B’ is a name – but yes what does it name?
names are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and to really pin down a name-proposal – is no simple matter – that may well involve many proposals – may questions – many doubts – and in the end – logical uncertainty
in common place practice – names operate as identification tags – and we do not trouble ourselves with the full propositional uncertainty that they actually signify
as with any proposal – the proposal – ‘Bright’s disease’ – will only make sense in a propositional context –
Wittgenstein gives us two such contexts for ‘Bright’s disease’ –
and proposes a ‘grammatical’ distinction – to distinguish the two contexts
yes – we have different contexts – and yes – these contexts can be further described
an ‘index that alludes’ – to my mind is really just saying that the name – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘alludes’ – is just a bit weak for mine – and it has no real critical dimension –
still on the positive side – it does suggest – uncertainty – and that – for Wittgenstein – is a step – albeit tentative – in the right direction
Wittgenstein does recognise uncertainty – we see it with ‘allude’ – and in his ‘family resemblance’ argument –
but he doesn’t get that propositional uncertainty – is a about question – is about doubt – and is essentially – a critical logic –
as for the name as a function – again – this is to introduce a logical game – the ‘function game’ – into the issue –
doing so has no impact on any critical matter here – and as such is logically irrelevant
however – its introduction is indicative of a failure to understand the difference between the critical mode and the game mode in propositional logic –
play your logical games – yes – but don’t think that in so doing you are having any impact on any epistemological issues
as for – ‘expecting B’ – ‘possibly alludes to the man who’s coming had regularly been preceded by the sensation’ –
there really is no argument here for ‘sensation’ –
it is as if ‘sensation’ has just been tacked on at the end
I don’t see that there is any need at all to propose ‘sensation’ here –
expecting B’ – ‘possibly alludes’ to the man – one is expecting –
what ‘expecting B’ amounts to – will have to do with a particular propositional context that will involve proposals like – ‘B said he would come between 4 and 4.so’ – ‘I take B at his word’ – etc. –
to propose – ‘I have the sensation that B will come’ – strikes me as very odd –
where would you hear this statement?
I think it is a case of misplaced philosophical ideology – and badly misplaced – at that
there is a propositional context – and contexts – for the proposal of sensation – ‘expecting B will come’ – is not one of them
‘Again we may use the phrase “expecting B will come” not as a name but as a characteristic of certain sensations. We might, e.g., explain that a certain tension is said to be an expectation that B will come if it is relieved by B’s coming. If this is how we use the phrase then it is true to say we don’t know what we expect until our expectation has been fulfilled (cf. Russell). But no one can believe that this is the only way or even the most common way of using the word ‘expect’. If I ask someone “who do you expect?” and after receiving the answer ask again “Are you sure that you don’t expect someone else?” then, in most cases, this question would be regarded as absurd, and the answer will be something like “Surely, I must know whom I expect”.’
‘expecting B as a characteristic of certain sensations’?
‘expecting B’ – is a proposal – a proposal that B – the event of B – will occur –
‘certain sensations’ – could mean anything –
the fact is yes – something happens when we propose – the act of proposal – can be further described
‘sensation’ may well be a further description – but with or without that description – the expectation proposal stands
and yes of course with such a proposal – the proposal of a future state of affairs –
we don’t know what the outcome will be until it occurs
and when it does occur – it will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the satisfaction or not of the expectation is a logical matter
and whether or not there is a relief of tension – is beside the point –
at best this ‘relief of tension’ – is no more than an addendum – an additional propositional response to a logical reality –
a reality of question – of doubt – and of uncertainty
the point here is that expecting is not to be seen as characteristic of certain sensations – of certain descriptions
expecting is a propositional action – a logical action – one – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If I ask someone “who do you expect?” and after receiving the answer ask again “Are you sure that you don’t expect someone else?” then, in most cases, this question would be regarded as absurd, and the answer will be something like “Surely, I must know whom I expect”.’
yes – however the logical fact is that any proposal – an expectation proposal or not – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and you know – it doesn’t hurt to have a good look – sometimes a forensic look – at your expectations
‘One may characterize the meaning which Russell gives to the word “wishing” by saying that it means to him a kind of hunger. – It is a hypothesis that a particular feeling of hunger will be relieved by eating a particular thing. In Russell’s way of using the word “wishing” it makes no sense to say “I wished for an apple but a pear satisfied me”. But we do sometimes say this, using the word “wishing” in a different way to Russell’s. In this sense we can say that the tension of wishing was relieved without the wish being fulfilled; and also that the wish was fulfilled without the tension being relieved; That is, I may, in this sense, become satisfied without my wish being satisfied.’
‘wishing’ – in whatever form it takes – is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt uncertain
there is nothing wrong with Russell’s interpretation of ‘wishing’ – his propositional response to ‘wishing’ – but as with any propositional response – it is not the full story
in fact – there never is a ‘full story’ – the proposal ‘wishing’ – as with any proposal – is open – logically – forever open – to question – to doubt
‘wishing’ as with any proposal – is uncertain
as for the ‘tension argument’ here –
it is a propositional response – an interpretation of ‘wishing’ –
and – as with any interpretation – it is not essential to the proposal –
you can wish – you can understand ‘wishing’ – without this interpretation
you can wish – without the tension –
let us say that to wish is to propose a state of affairs to occur – perhaps – one – too that you think is unlikely – but one that you want to see come about –
there need not be a further proposal of ‘tension’ – in order to make a wish proposal understandable
and let us say that the wish is fulfilled –
if that proposal is put – it can be put without the supplementary proposal of ‘relief’
i.e. – the fulfilment can be appreciated – without a relief of tension –
and bear in mind too – that fulfilment is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
but yes – you can at least start with the fulfilment proposal – and run with it if it is useful – keeping in mind the logic of the situation
can I be satisfied without my wish being satisfied?
well – what does ‘satisfaction’ come to?
we can’t really give a final definition here –
however – is it not possible that an unfulfilled wish could result in satisfaction?
I have in mind i.e. – that one might come to see one’s wishing as a process that one had to go through in order to come to the understanding that the wish was not realistic – or perhaps that its fulfilment was not in fact desirable
the wish is not satisfied – but one is satisfied with that outcome – for the unfulfilled wish has led to knowledge – to a new understanding
‘Now one might be tempted to say that the difference which we are talking about simply comes to this, that in some cases we know what we wish and in others we don’t. There are certainly cases in which we say, “I feel a longing but I don’t know what I am longing for”, or “I feel a fear, but I don’t know what I am afraid of or again, “I feel a fear, but I am not afraid of anything in particular”.’
‘I feel a longing but I don’t know what I am longing for’
what such a proposal points to – points out – is that our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if this proposal is to come to anything substantial – it will have to be put to question
‘I feel a fear but I don’t know what I am afraid of’ – again is a proposal – a proposition that requires investigation
and ‘I feel a fear but I am not afraid of anything in particular’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and quite obviously – uncertain
‘Now we may describe these cases by saying we have certain sensations not referring to objects. The phrase “not referring to objects” introduces a grammatical distinction. If in characterizing such sensations we use the verbs like “fearing”, “longing”, etc., these verbs will be intransitive; “I fear” will be analogous to “I cry”. We may cry about something, but what we cry about is not a constituent of the process of crying; that is to say, we could describe all that happens when we cry without mentioning what we are crying about.’
intransitive or not – these verbs – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
that is the logic of the matter –
and the elephant in the room here is still ‘sensation’ –
as far as I can see – sensation for Wittgenstein – is a logical black hole –
to date he has said nothing regarding his conception of sensation – yet it is the anchor to his argument
and this absence of account is what should be concerning him
the fact is this notion of sensation – this proposal of sensation – is for Wittgenstein something of an underpinning of his argument – and the fact is that whatever account is given of sensation – it will make no difference here
no underpinning is necessary – or for that matter required –
he can have his ‘grammatical distinction’ – and prosecute it – without any reference to sensation
sensation is unnecessary – undefined – baggage – that in no way bears on the issues he is dealing with
what we cry about is not a constituent of the process of crying –
fair enough – so what?
‘Suppose now that I suggested we should use the expression “I feel fear, and similar ones, in a transitive way only. Whenever before we said “I have a sensation of fear” (intransitively) we will now say “I am afraid of something, but I don’t know of what”. Is there an objection to this terminology?’
in either case – “I have a sensation of fear’ or – ‘I am afraid of something but I don’t know what’ – we have proposals – proposals open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if the terminology functions in some context – and it is held open to question – what’s the problem?
‘We may say “There isn’t, except that we are then using the word ‘to know’ in a queer way”. Consider this case: – we have a general undirected feeling of fear. Later on, we have an experience which makes us say, “Now I know what I was afraid of. I was afraid of so-and-so happening”. Is it correct to describe my first feeling with an intransitive verb, or should I say that my fear had an object although I did not know that it had one? Both these forms of description can be used. To understand this examine the following example: – It might be practical to call a certain state of decay in a tooth, not accompanied by what we commonly call a toothache, “unconscious toothache” and to use in such a case the expression that we have a toothache but don’t know it. It is just in this sense that psychoanalysis talks of unconscious thoughts, acts of volition, etc. Now is it wrong in this sense to say I have a toothache but don’t know it? There is nothing wrong about it, as it is just new terminology and can at any time be retranslated into ordinary language. On the other hand it obviously makes use of the word “to know” in a new way. If you wish to examine how this expression is used it is helpful to ask yourself “what in this case is the process of getting to know like?” “What do we call ‘getting to know’ or, ‘finding out’?”’
‘using the word ‘to know’ in a queer way’?
not-knowing – is not ‘queer’ – not-knowing is the big picture
‘a general undirected feeling of fear’ – is a proposal – one open to question – open to doubt – and clearly – uncertain
‘now I know I was afraid of …’ – is a critical response to the subject proposal
‘Is it correct to describe my first feeling with an intransitive verb, or should I say that my fear had an object although I did not know that it had one?’
the matter is open to question
‘To understand this examine the following example: – It might be practical to call a certain state of decay in a tooth, not accompanied by what we commonly call a toothache, “unconscious toothache” and to use in such a case the expression that we have a toothache but don’t know it.’
‘unconscious toothache’ – now that is ‘queer’
and as to psychoanalysis –
in so far as psychoanalysis is based on the idea that there is a hidden reality – the ‘unconscious’ – it is logically flawed
our reality is what is proposed – it is not hidden
outside of what is proposed – you are in the unknown – you get back to not-knowing
the unconscious as a proposal?
the logical reality is that whatever is put – wherever it is put – on the couch or on the street – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
and if the idea is that we can arrive at certainty through psychoanalysis – tap into the certainty of the ‘unconscious’ –
then again – psychoanalysis – is logically – fatally flawed –
you don’t need this mumbo jumbo to get to an understanding –
and it worries me that people get led into and trapped by a promise of certain resolution of their difficulties –
when the real solution lies in understanding that our lives – our behaviours – the lives of others and their behaviours – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
uncertainty may not be what you want – but it is what is –
and it is honest
‘Now is it wrong in this sense to say I have a toothache but don’t know it? There is nothing wrong about it, as it is just new terminology and can at any time be retranslated into ordinary language. On the other hand it obviously make use of the word “to know” in a new way.’
Wittgenstein is right here – there is nothing against a new terminology – a new proposal – so long as it is held open to question
here we are not making use of the word ‘to know’ – in a new way
the words used are – ‘but I don’t know it’ –
saying ‘I don’t know’ – is not saying – ‘I know’ – but rather – quite the opposite –
a ‘grammatical distinction’ – Wittgenstein seems to have overlooked?
‘If you wish to examine how this expression is used it is helpful to ask yourself “what in this case is the process of getting to know like?” “What do we call ‘getting to know’ or, ‘finding out’?”’
to know is to propose – knowledge is proposal – knowledge is propositional
‘getting to know’ – ‘finding out’?
we get to know – we find out – by putting our proposal to question – to doubt – by exploring their uncertainty
where we don’t know – we can leave it at that –
or we can propose –
we can put a proposition to the unknown – and in so doing – make knowledge – make a start
‘It isn’t wrong according to our new convention to say “I have unconscious
toothache”. For what more can you ask of your notation than that it should distinguish between a bad tooth which doesn’t give you a toothache and one which does? But the new expression misleads us by calling up pictures and analogies which make it difficult to do through with our convention. And it is extremely difficult to discard these pictures unless we are constantly watchful; particularly difficult when, in philosophizing, we contemplate what we say about things. Thus, by the expression “unconscious toothache” you may either be misled into thinking that a stupendous discovery has been made, a discovery which altogether bewilders our understanding; or else you may be extremely puzzled by the expression (the puzzlement of philosophy) and perhaps ask such a question as “How is unconscious toothache possible?” You may be tempted to deny the possibility of the unconscious toothache; but the scientist will tell you that it is a proved fact that there is such a thing, and he will say it like a man who is destroying a common prejudice. He will say “Surely it is quite simple; there are other things that you don’t know of, and there can also be toothache which you don’t know of. It is just a new discovery.” You won’t be satisfied, but you won’t know what to answer. This situation constantly arises between the scientist and the philosopher.’
‘I have an unconscious toothache’ – is a proposal – open to question - - open to doubt – and uncertain
it is not a new convention – it is a proposal
‘Thus, by the expression “unconscious toothache” you may either be misled into thinking that a stupendous discovery has been made, a discovery which altogether bewilders our understanding; or else you may be extremely puzzled by the expression (the puzzlement of philosophy) and perhaps ask such a question as “How is unconscious toothache possible?”
you won’ t be misled – or bewildered – if you subject the proposal to a critical examination
as to the ‘puzzlement of philosophy’
proposals put by philosophers – logically speaking – are no different to proposals put by anyone else – in any other propositional context
what we deal with in ‘philosophy’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘“How is unconscious toothache possible?” You may be tempted to deny the possibility of the unconscious toothache; but the scientist will tell you that it is a proved fact that there is such a thing, and he will say it like a man who is destroying a common prejudice.’
a decayed tooth – that doesn’t cause pain – is all you need here
an ‘unconscious tooth’ – is a proposal that carries too much philosophical and metaphysical baggage for mine
as to the scientist telling you it’s a ‘proved fact’ –
you can tell the scientist that what he has is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – an uncertain
and as for ‘proved fact’ – that is just rubbish – scientific rubbish –
any so-called ‘fact’ – any so-called ‘proved fact’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘scientific propositions’ – are open to question – open to revision – are uncertain –
(just look at the history of any science) –
‘and he will say it like a man who is destroying a common prejudice.’
actually – he will say it like a man who is endorsing a common prejudice
and by the way – it is irrelevant who puts a proposition –
it is the proposition – not the proposer – that is of logical focus and interest –
it the proposition that is subject to a critical examination
the same proposal could have been put by the local butcher
furthermore – the only ‘authority’ for a proposal – for a proposition – is authorship – and authorship is logically irrelevant –
and so – any claim of authority that goes beyond authorship – is nonsense on stilts – rhetorical rubbish
‘He will say “Surely it is quite simple; there are other things that you don’t know of, and there can also be toothache which you don’t know of. It is just a new discovery.” You won’t be satisfied, but you won’t know what to answer. This situation constantly arises between the scientist and the philosopher.’
it is not that there are things we don’t know of – and we are forced to bow to a scientist’s ignorance of logic–
it is rather that any proposal – is open to question
you won’t be satisfied with this assertion – because it is pretentious –
and yes – we do see scientists and philosophers – battling out their pretensions
‘In such a case we may clear the matter up by saying: “Let’s see how the word ‘unconscious’, ‘to know’, etc. etc., is used in this case, and how it is used in others. How far does the analogy between these two cases go? We shall also try to construct new notations, in order to break the spell of those we are accustomed to.’
yes – the answer is propositional use – and understanding propositional context –
appreciating different uses – appreciating different contexts –
and putting the use of words – and the contexts of those uses – to question – and to doubt – and in so doing – exploring their uncertainty –
how far does the analogy between these two cases go?
the matter is open to question
and it is out of question – out of doubt – that in the exploration of propositional uncertainty – new constructions – new uses get proposed –
we break the spell of those we are accustomed to – through critical analysis
‘We said that it was a way of examining the grammar (the use) of the word “to know”, to ask ourselves what, in the particular case we are examining, we should call “getting to know”. There is a temptation to think that the question is only vaguely relevant, if relevant at all, to the question: what is the meaning of the word ‘to know’?” We seem to be on a side-track when we ask the question “What is it like in this case ‘to get to know’?” But the question is really a question of the grammar of the word “to know”, and this becomes clearer if we put it in the form: “What do we call ‘getting to know’?” It is part of the grammar of the word “chair” that this is what we call “to sit on a chair”, and it is part of the grammar of the “meaning” that this is what we call “explanation of meaning”; in the same way to explain my criterion for another person’s having a toothache is to give a grammatical explanation about the word “toothache” and, in this same sense, an explanation concerning the meaning of the word “toothache”.’
to know is to propose –
getting to know – is subjecting whatever is proposed to critical analysis –
the use of the word – the grammar of the word – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
yes – we begin with proposals such as ‘to sit on a chair’ – ‘the explanation of meaning’ – and recognise that these proposals – and any other proposals – are open to question
the meaning of the word – the proposal – ‘toothache’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘When we learn the use of the phrase “so-and-so has toothache” we were pointed out certain kinds of behaviour of those who were said to have toothache. As an instance of these kinds of behaviour let us take holding your cheek. Suppose that I found by observation that in certain cases whenever these first criteria told me a person had a tooth ache, a red patch appeared on the person’s cheek. Supposing I now said to someone “I see A has toothache, he’s got a red patch on his cheek”. He may ask me ‘How do you know A has toothache when you see a red patch?” I should then point out that certain phenomena had always coincided with the appearance of the red
patch.’
‘a red patch appears on A’s cheek when he has a toothache’ –
this proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and – indeed – uncertain
the proposal – ‘that the phenomena had always coincided with appearance of the red patch’ –
is again open to question –
how can you in all seriousness put the proposal that you know what always happens?
fair enough to say – ‘I’ve observed the phenomena before – and that is what makes me think he has toothache’ –
here we have a proposal – a non-grandiose proposal – which though clearly open to question – at least has a basis in experience – uncertain as that experience is
‘Now one may go on and ask: ‘How do you know he has got toothache when he holds his cheek?” The answer to this might be: “I say, “he has toothache when he holds his cheek because I hold my cheek when I have toothache.” But what if we went on asking: – “And why do you suppose that toothache corresponds to his holding his cheek just because your toothache corresponds to your holding your cheek?” You will be at a loss to answer this question, and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is where we have come down to conventions. (If you suggest as an answer to the last question that, whenever we’ve seen people holding their cheeks and asked them what’s the matter, they have answered, “I have toothache”, – remember that this experience only co-ordinates holding your cheek with saying certain words.)’
“And why do you suppose that toothache corresponds to his holding his cheek just because your toothache corresponds to your holding your cheek?” You will be at a loss to answer this question, and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is where we have come down to conventions.’
you shouldn’t be at a loss to answer this question
you can always say –
‘of course – I can’t be certain here – however in this and other matters – we assume that certain propositional behaviours of human beings have a common propositional basis – and this assumption – though open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – is useful’
as for ‘rock bottom’ – there is no rock bottom
any proposal put is open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
there is no logical rock bottom
the only rock bottom that we come across is ignorance and prejudice
conventions –
the rock bottom – you have – when you don’t have one
if a ‘convention’ is proposed as – not open to question – not open to doubt – and certain –
it is a prejudice
if a convention is a proposal – that is open to question – then ‘convention’ – is no more and no less than a useful proposal
‘(If you suggest as an answer to the last question that, whenever we’ve seen people holding their cheeks and asked them what’s the matter, they have answered, “I have toothache”, – remember that this experience only co-ordinates holding your cheek with saying certain words.)’
yes –
‘holding your cheek’ – is a proposal – interpreted – ‘explained’ – in a further proposal – a verbal proposal –
here – we have a proposal – put – to a proposal –
and that is all we ever have in any propositional activity – in any propositional context
and any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Let us introduce two antithetical terms in order to avoid certain elementary confusions: To the question “How do you know that so-and-so is the case?”, we sometimes answer by giving ‘criteria’ and sometimes by giving ‘symptoms’. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case “why do you say this man has got angina?” then answer “I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood” gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criteria of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, “His throat is inflamed”, this might give us a symptom of angina. I call “symptom” a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criteria. Then to say “A has angina if bacillus is found in him” is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition “angina”. But to say, “A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat” is to make a hypothesis.’
‘how do you know that so-and-so is the case?’ –
a proposal has been put – that so-and-so is the case – and it is put to question –
it is put to doubt – and we are invited to explore its uncertainty –
‘criteria’ are proposals – ‘symptoms’ are proposals – proposals that in any thorough logical investigation – will be put to question
and a coincidence of proposed criteria and proposed symptoms – likewise – is a proposal – to be put to question
proposing that ‘A has angina if bacillus is found in him’ – is a tautology – is to make the proposal trivial –
and the real problem here is that the tautological view renders the proposal – non-critical
if the statement is true in all circumstances – why put it to question?
this tautological argument of Wittgenstein – really demonstrates the folly – the uselessness of applying a rule-governed propositional action – a propositional game – a logical game – the tautological game – to a critical propositional issue –
it is a category mistake – that if taken seriously kills off critical evaluation –
‘a loose way of stating the definition angina’
yes – ‘loose’ is ok – loose is clearly open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat’ – is a proposal –
if it is recognised as such – and thus seen as open to question – then it is a valid proposition
if a dogmatic statement – then as with any such statement – it is logically useless
a hypothesis is a form of proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘In practice, if you were asked which phenomena is the defining criterion and which is a symptom, you would in most cases be unable to answer that question except by making an arbitrary decision ad hoc. It may be practical to define a word by taking one phenomenon as the defining criterion, but we shall easily be persuaded to define the word by means of what, according to our first use, was a symptom. Doctors will use names of diseases without ever deciding which phenomena are to be taken as criteria and which as symptoms; and this need not be a deplorable lack of clarity. For remember that in general we don’t use language in accordance with strict rules – and it hasn’t been taught us by strict rules, either. We, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding to exact rules.’
yes – an arbitrary decision ad hoc –
is really just a pragmatic response to propositional uncertainty –
a response – which nevertheless – is open to question –
logically speaking – there is no clarity –
clarity really falls in the realm of rhetoric
and we don’t use language in accordance with strict rules –
rules may be useful in terms of propositional practice – and propositional organization
however – any ‘rule’ outside of a propositional game – is finally a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘We, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding to exact rules.’ –
I am not a member of this ‘we’ – and never have been –
it is just this ‘we’ I have in my sights
‘This is a very one-sided way of looking at language. In practice we very rarely use language as such a calculus. For not only do we not think of rules of usage – of definitions, etc. – while using language, but when we are asked to give such rules, in most cases we aren’t able to do so. We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don’t know their real definition, but because there is no real ‘definition’ to them. To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules.’
any calculus is a rule-governed propositional action – a propositional game
playing propositional games is a mode of propositional activity – a mode to be distinguished from the critical mode – the mode of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
in practice – our propositional activity is by and large in the critical mode
yes – we play propositional games – but not as much as we operate in the critical mode
we don’t think of rules of usage unless we are playing rule-governed propositional games – of whatever kind – in whatever context –
and in any critical evaluation of language usage – any so-called ‘rule’ – is just another proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any concept is open to question – and any definition – is open to question –
children playing with a ball –
well – they might be playing a rule-governed game – if they are in fact following the rules –
if not – they are just playing – not playing a game
‘When we talk of language as a symbolism used in an exact calculus, that which is in our mind can be found in the sciences and in mathematics. Our ordinary use of language conforms to this standard of exactness only in rare cases. Why do we then in philosophizing constantly compare our use of words with one following exact rules? The answer is that the puzzles that we try to remove always spring from just this attitude towards language.’
mathematics is a form of the game mode of propositional activity –
when you play a game – mathematical or otherwise – you play in accordance with its rules
the rule of the game is not open to question –
if you question the rule of the game – you don’t play the game – you are not playing the game
the empirical sciences are examples of the critical propositional activity
the activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
mathematical games – can be used as models in empirical science
our ordinary use of language – is open to question
in specialized language contexts you will find rules are put – primarily for accuracy and efficiency –
this is just a pragmatic use of rules
‘Why do we then in philosophizing constantly compare our use of words with one following exact rules? The answer is that the puzzles that we try to remove always spring from just this attitude towards language.’
those who compare our use of words with one following exact rules – only do so because they don’t understand – and don’t recognize – the distinction between the critical and the game modes of propositional activity
and if ‘puzzles’ spring from ‘just this attitude to language’ – then those ‘puzzles’ – will disappear – once it is understood that ‘this attitude to language’ – springs from a logical confusion –
if you understand that the two modes of propositional activity – are different and separate uses of language – then there are no puzzles
‘Consider as an example the question, “What is time?” as Saint Augustine and others have asked it. At first sight what this question asks for is a definition, but then immediately the question arises “What should we gain by a definition, as it can only leave to other undefined terms?” And why should one be puzzled by the lack of definition of time, and not by a lack of definition of “chair”? Why shouldn’t we be puzzled in all cases where we haven’t got a definition? Now a definition often clears up the grammar of a word. And in fact it is the grammar of the word “time” that puzzles us. We are only expressing this puzzlement by asking a slightly misleading question, the question: “What is …?” This question is an utterance of unclarity, of mental discomfort, and it is comparable with the question “Why?” as children so often ask it. This too is an expression of mental discomfort, and doesn’t necessarily ask for either a cause or a reason. (Hertz, Principles of Mechanics.) Now the puzzlement about the grammar of the word “time” arises from what one might call contradictions in that grammar.’
let us be clear from the outset that ‘time’ is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
yes – the question – ‘what is time?’ – asks for a definition
a definition of any term is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any definition will be uncertain
Wittgenstein asks –
‘What should we gain by a definition, as it can only leave to other undefined terms?’
any definition will contain terms – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what do we gain by understanding this?
we gain the understanding that the nature of reality – of propositional reality – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
we gain the understanding that – logically speaking – there is no end to critical propositional investigation
it is not that there is a lack of definition(s) of time – or for that matter any term proposed
it is just that no definition – from a logical point of view – is final
so – what is the point of definition – why do we have them?
we find definitions to be useful – useful in propositional practice –
i.e. – I will use a definition of a term – of a proposal – in a particular propositional context – if that definition suits my purpose – and enables me to move forward
that same definition – in another context may be useless – and I discard it – and look for one that is fit to the purpose
definitions – are useful – and disposable
‘Why shouldn’t we be puzzled in all cases where we haven’t got a definition?’
in those cases where we can’t come up with a definition of a term – of a proposal – that term – that proposal – is of no use to us –
if we are smart about it – we drop it – and move on
and the straightforward answer to Wittgenstein’s question here is –
if a term is proposed – and we can’t define it – then we say – we recognise – that we don’t know what it means –
recognising that you don’t know – that you don’t know something – is not to be ‘puzzled’ – it is to be realistic and epistemologically honest
you would only be puzzled by such a circumstance – if you regarded yourself as omniscient
best to step down from the pedestal of pretence and vanity
ground zero is where we are
‘We are only expressing this puzzlement by asking a slightly misleading question, the question: “What is …?” This question is an utterance of unclarity, of mental discomfort, and it is comparable with the question “Why?” as children so often ask it. This too is an expression of mental discomfort, and doesn’t necessarily ask for either a cause or a reason.’
yes – the question itself – is open to question
i.e. – perhaps ‘time’ is not to be understood as a ‘what’ –
and perhaps ‘time’ – is not a simple – but a complex proposal – that needs to ‘unpacked’ – if it is to be of use
whatever the case – the term ‘time’ – the proposal of ‘time’ – as with any other proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the question – ‘what is …?’ like the question – ‘why …?’ – is not an issue of ‘mental discomfort’ – it is an expression of logical / propositional uncertainty
‘Now the puzzlement about the grammar of the word “time” arises from what one might call contradictions in that grammar.’
if by ‘grammar’ – Wittgenstein means ‘usage’ – then I would suggest ‘contradictions’ is overdoing it
I suggest that what we do have is different propositional usages – different usages – in different propositional contexts –
‘It was such a “contradiction” which puzzled Saint Augustine when he argued: How is it possible that one should measure time? For the past can’t be measured as it is gone by; and the future cannot be measured because it has not yet come. And the present can’t be measured for it has no extension.’
is there a contradiction here?
isn’t it rather that measurement – as put by Augustine – does not work with how he understands time?
if we go with his idea of measurement – where are we left with his time proposal?
it looks like time makes no sense – time gets the boot
or if we proceed with his idea of time – his proposal of time – there is no place for measurement – as he sees it –
so – no good result here
I think the way to see it like this –
measurement – is a calculation – a rule governed propositional game –
to measure time – we construct a propositional game –
the most common time game is in the form of the construction of a clock –
and the ‘clock’ here – is a rule governed propositional action
in this clock game – time is defined as a succession of instances which are represented as the marks on a clock face –
and the ‘succession of instances’ – the process or time – the arrow of time – is represented by the motion of a hand of the clock – or hands of the clock – moving through or over the marks – in a forward direction
the measurement of time is the play of the clock –
here we have a model – a game – for the measurement of time
and we can and do adapt this model – this propositional game – to the past – and to the future
and for all intents and purpose – time – just is this measurement game
we can step out of the game mode – and put the proposal ‘time’ – to question as Wittgenstein does – i.e. – ‘what is time?’ –
but if you want to ‘measure time’ – as Augustine does – you need to understand – you are no longer dealing with a critical question – rather a game question
Augustine didn’t understand the difference –
and I don’t think Wittgenstein does either
‘The contradiction which here seems to arise could be called a conflict between two different usages of a word: in this case the word “measure”. Augustine, we might say, thinks of the process of measuring length say, the distance between to marks on a travelling band that passes us, and of which we can only see a tiny bit (the present) in front of us. Solving this puzzle will consist in comparing what we mean by “measurement” (the grammar of the word “measurement”) when applied to a distance on a travelling band with the grammar of that word when applied to time. The problem may seem simple, but its extreme difficulty is due to the fascination which the analogy between two similar structures in our language can exert on us. (It is helpful here to remember that it is sometimes almost impossible for a child to believe that one word can have two meanings.)’
‘Solving this puzzle will consist in comparing what we mean by “measurement” (the grammar of the word “measurement”) when applied to a distance on a travelling band with the grammar of that word when applied to time.’
yes – maybe so – but what is Wittgenstein’s solution here – what is his solution to this ‘puzzle’?
I don’t see one
‘Now it is clear that the problem about the concept of time asks for an answer in terms of strict rules. The puzzle is about rules. – Take another example: Socrates’ question “What is knowledge?” Here the case is even clearer, as the discussion begins with the pupil giving an example of an exact definition, and then analogous to this a definition of the word “knowledge” is asked for. As the problem is put, there seems there is something wrong with the ordinary use of the word “knowledge”. It appears we don’t know what it means, and therefore, perhaps, we have no right to use it. We should reply: “There is no one exact use of the word ‘knowledge’, but we can make up several such usages, which will more or less agree with the way the word is actually used.”’
‘Now it is clear that the problem about the concept of time asks for an answer in terms of strict rules.’ –
no –
if the issue is the measurement of time – yes –
the measurement of time is a rule-governed propositional game
outside of the game context – the game mode of propositional activity – time is a critical issue –
‘time’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
the proposal ‘time’ – can be discussed in any number of ways – ways – that do not involve the use of propositional games – propositional games – such as the ‘measurement’ game
Wittgenstein does not get the difference between the critical propositional mode – and the game mode –
and his discussion of time demonstrates this
furthermore – it should be obvious that any definition – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
yes – by all means put a definition – propose a definition – and then put that definition to question – to doubt – and explore its uncertainty –
this is what Wittgenstein should have said – should have done – in relation to time
proposing a definition of ‘knowledge’ – invites a critical discussion of the proposal ‘knowledge’
and in any such discussion one would expect there to be a critical look at how the word is actually used
‘The man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used, and, and trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results. Very often the way the discussion of such a puzzle runs is this: First the question is asked “What is time?” The question makes it appear that what we want is a definition. We mistakenly think that a definition is what will remove the trouble (as in certain states of indigestion we feel a kind of hunger which cannot be removed by eating). The question is then answered by a wrong definition: say “Time is the motion of the celestial bodies”. The next step is to see that this definition is unsatisfactory. But this only means that we don’t use the word “time” synonymously with “motion of the celestial bodies”. However in saying that that first definition is wrong, we are now tempted to think that we must replace it by a different one, the correct one.’
‘The man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used, and, and trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results.’
this is not – ‘a man who is philosophically puzzled’ –
this is a man who is plain stupid –
the question – ‘what is time?’ – does make it ‘appear that what we want is a definition’ –
and the point of any such proposed definition will be that it functions as a focus for critical discussion – for question – for doubt – and for the exploration of propositional uncertainty
a wrong definition?
look – any definition put – is a proposal – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
there is no question here of right or wrong –
there is only what is proposed – and put to question
as for ‘time is the motion of the celestial bodies’ –
this proposal – as with any other proposal put – is open to question –
however – it may well be that in a certain context – for a certain purpose – it is decided that ‘time is the motion of the celestial bodies’ – fits the bill – that it works – and is therefore used
that this proposal – this definition – gets a run by someone in some context – does not mean that it will have any value for anyone else – in any other context
and the same can be said of any other proposal regarding the nature of time –
if we take the view that a definition is unsatisfactory – what we are saying is that in whatever context we are involved in – that proposal does not function – is not useful
and yes – this decision – this proposal – is open to question
‘Compare with this the case of the definition of number. Here the explanation that a number is the same thing as a numeral satisfies that first craving for a definition. And it is very difficult not to ask: “Well, if it isn’t the numeral, what is it?”’
that is a valid question – and surprise – there are – there will be different answers to this question
and those answers – like – the numeral definition answer – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us.’
this is not a bad definition – for the ‘fight’ is the critical fight – the challenge of question – of doubt – and the recognition and exploration of propositional uncertainty
‘I want you to remember that words have meanings that we give them; and we give them meanings by explanations. I may have given a definition of a word and used the word accordingly, or those who taught me the use of the word and may have given me the explanation. Or else we might, by the explanation of the word, mean the explanation which, being asked, we are ready to give. That is, if we are ready to give any explanation; in most cases we aren’t. Many words in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.’
I think this is basically right
a word is a proposal – and we propose in relation to proposals –
that is – we propose explanation –
explanation is proposal
logically speaking – there are no strict meanings –
the idea of strict meaning – can only be rhetorical –
any proposal – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any well used proposal / explanation – is open to question
so well used and conventional meanings are in the same boat as new or novel meanings
yes – meanings are given to us – proposed to us
and we will deal with proposals – words – that we do not have explanation for –
in such cases we investigate – we look for possible uses –
and in doing this – we might look at what others may have to proposed here –
and we may do a dictionary search – to get an explanation – a propositional start
there is no final definition – or understanding of a word – of a proposal –
meanings are given – and meanings open to question
different meanings – different uses – come with different propositional contexts
a propositional context is a proposal – and as such open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking – meaning is always uncertain
‘To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.’
yes – a good analogy
I would only add – that the lamp has to be turned on – for there to be any light at all
to ‘turn on’ – is to propose
NB
you might ask about the nature of proposal – i.e. – what is it to propose? – what is going on when we propose? – how and why does proposal occur? – etc. – etc –
what needs to be understood here – is that any answer to these and similar questions –
are proposals –
proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing the meaning of words. But let’s remember that a word doesn’t have a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given it.’
yes –
a word is a proposal –
and meaning is a proposal put to a word – in explanation of it –
and any such explanation / proposal – is open to question
in the absence of meaning – a word is a mark –
we call such a mark/word – (in the absence of a meaning proposal) – syntax
in the absence of meaning – a word is an unknown
and as for meaning –
we can ask – what is proposed – in a meaning proposal?
any answer to this question – I think – will be very complex –
however – whatever answer is given – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
so – the idea that we can determine what a word really means – falls away – once it is understood that that any meaning-proposal is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
and let’s be clear about scientific investigation
science does not deal with proposals given ‘as it were by a power independent of us’
any scientific investigation is an investigation into proposals given meaning by us –
by human beings – by scientists
and any investigation – properly conducted – is logical –
a scientific investigation is a critical investigation –
scientists – question – doubt –and explore the propositional uncertainty of the proposals – that is the – statements – the theories – the predictions – that are put to them for consideration
‘There are words with several clearly defined meanings. It is easy to tabulate these meanings. And there are words of which one might say: They are used in a thousand different ways which gradually merge into one another. No wonder that we can’t tabulate strict rules for their use.’
words with clearly defined meanings – yes –
but any word is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – whether or not it is regarded as having a ‘clearly defined’ meaning –
and really what we are talking about with ‘clearly defined meaning’ – is characteristic or common usage –
and any usage – commonplace or not – is open to question
look we can always construct rules – but if we construct rules – we are constructing a game – a game to be played
you can play games with words – but it is quite another matter to critically evaluate words
as to ‘gradually merge into one’ – isn’t it rather that we begin with the one – the one word – and give it – or find that it has – different meanings – different usages – in different propositional contexts?
and there is no logical end to the possibilities of usage –
and what is possible – is what occurs – what happens
‘It is wrong to say that in philosophy we consider ideal language as opposed to our ordinary one. For this makes it appear as if we thought we could improve on ordinary language. But ordinary language is alright. Whenever we make up ‘ideal languages’ it is not in order to replace our ordinary language by them; but just to remove some trouble caused in someone’s mind by thinking he has got hold of the exact use of a common word. That is also why our method is not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but deliberately to invent new ones, some of them because of their absurd appearance.’
any language – is proposal – proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the term ‘ideal language’ – should be dropped – for what it suggests is a language that is beyond question – beyond doubt – and certain
and if that is what is suggested – you are not dealing with a language – at best you could say you have created a game – a rule governed propositional exercise – the point of which is that there is no question – no doubt – and no uncertainty –
but it is a game – not a language
the motive for the so called ‘ideal language’ – is certainty
so called certain statements or languages – are the repository of ignorance – pretension – and prejudice
‘Whenever we make up ‘ideal languages’ it is not in order to replace our ordinary language by them; but just to remove some trouble caused in someone’s mind by thinking he has got hold of the exact use of a common word’
there is no ‘exact’ use of a common word – any common word is open to question – is logically uncertain
we don’t need an ‘ideal language’ to put common words to question
a so-called ‘ideal language’ – is an alternative language – a specialized language –
any specialized language is designed to do a specialized job – to enable specialized tasks to proceed – and to proceed efficiently
nevertheless – any specialized language – as with ordinary language – or any other propositional form – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and you will find that ‘trouble can be caused in someone’s mind’ – by a specialized language
‘That is also why our method is not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but deliberately to invent new ones, some of them because of their absurd appearance.’
if we question – if we doubt – if we explore propositional uncertainty – we will be involved in a critical and creative endeavour –
and it is out of such an endeavour – that new proposals are put – new languages ‘invented’
‘some of them because of their absurd appearance’ –
to be honest I don’t quite get what Wittgenstein is saying here –
is he saying we invent specialized languages – in order to create something that looks absurd?
it would seem so – and if so – that makes no sense to me –
and what does ‘looking absurd’ mean?
I can’t imagine why anyone would do this – and if there is an example of where someone has – let’s have it –
unless I have completely missed the point here – this statement strikes as absurd
‘When we say that by our method we try to counteract the misleading effect of certain analogies, it is important that you should understand that the idea of an analogy being misleading is nothing sharply defined. No sharp boundary can be drawn round the cases that we should say that a man was misled by an analogy. The use of expressions constructed on analogical patterns stresses analogies between cases often far apart. And by doing this these expressions may be extremely useful. It is, in most cases, impossible to show an exact point where an analogy begins to mislead us. Every particular notation stresses some particular point of view. If, e.g., we call our investigations “philosophy”, this title, on the one hand, seems appropriate, on the other hand it certainly has misled people. (One might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called “philosophy”.) The cases in which particularly we wish to say that someone was misled by a form of expression are those in which we would say “he wouldn’t talk as he does if he was aware of this difference in grammar of such-and-such words, or if he were aware of this other possibility of expression.” and so on. Thus we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are absolutely not aware of the differences between the many uses of the word “proof”; and that they are not clear about the difference of the use of the word “kind”, when we talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proofs, as though the word “kind” here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of apples. Or, we may say, they are not aware of the different meanings of the word “discovery”, when in one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the other case the discovery of the South Pole.”
An ‘analogy is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
no proposal – no analogy per se is misleading – an analogy / proposal – logically speaking – is open to question
an analogy / proposal – may fit a context – be fit for use – or out of context – and of no use –
a critical examination of the proposal / analogy – and the context under discussion – should reveal if it is well placed
and any decision made here – is – open to question
what you call your investigation – is irrelevant – and if you have sharp investigators – they will not be put off by a name tag
‘The cases in which particularly we wish to say that someone was misled by a form of expression are those in which we would say “he wouldn’t talk as he does if he was aware of this difference in grammar of such-and-such words, or if he were aware of this other possibility of expression.” and so on.’
maybe so – but equally he may be coming from a different propositional place – and thus have – a different propositional agenda –
and if his position is serious – then it is worthy of consideration –
and let’s be clear ‘the difference in grammar of such and such words’ – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we should not be afraid of different points of view – and of iconoclastic thinking –
it’s all up for question
‘Thus we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are absolutely not aware of the differences between the many uses of the word “proof”; and that they are not clear about the difference of the use of the word “kind”, when we talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proofs, as though the word “kind” here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of apples.’
again – really – who sets the agenda here
‘the differences between many uses of ‘proof’’ –
one can imagine a propositional system in which it is indeed useful to make distinctions between different uses of ‘proof’ –
and one can equally imagine a propositional situation where those proposed differences – are not relevant
mathematics is a rule-governed propositional activity – mathematics is a game –
mathematics – as played out – is not a critical activity –
if you want to get into the critical side of mathematics – into the philosophy of mathematics – meta- mathematics – that is different matter
mathematicians play games – explore games – create games
they should be left to get on with it – and not be bothered by philosophers
‘Or, we may say, they are not aware of the different meanings of the word “discovery”, when in one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the other case the discovery of the South Pole.’
‘discovery’ – whether in mathematics or in geography – is a critical issue
‘Now when we distinguish a transitive and intransitive use of such words as “longing”, “fearing”, “expecting”, etc. we said that someone might try to smooth over our difficulties by say: “The difference between the two cases is simply that in one case we know what we are longing for and in the other we don’t”. Now who says this, I think obviously doesn’t see that the difference which he tried to explain away reappears when we carefully consider the use of the word “to know” in the two cases. The expression “the difference is simply …” makes it appear as though we had analysed the case and found a simple analysis; as when we point out that two substances with very different names differ in composition.’
where we know what we are longing for we have a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt
where we are longing for something – but don’t know what that is – we have a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the transitive / intransitive distinction here – is philosophically irrelevant
when we put that we know what is the case – we put a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
when we don’t what is the case – and so put a proposal – as it were against the unknown –
we are putting a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘We said in this case that we might use both expressions “we feel a longing” (where longing is used intransitively) and “we feel a longing and don’t know what we are longing for”. It may seem queer to say that we may use either of the two forms of expression which seem to contradict each other; but such cases are very frequent.’
the logical fact of the matter is that ‘we feel a longing’ and ‘we feel a longing and don’t know what we are longing for’ – are different proposals
they don’t contradict each other – they are just different proposals
where it is decided that one will be used in place of another – it is not because the two proposals are equivalent
where one is used ‘in place of’ another – there is a difference
the use of one proposal – is different from the use of the other –
to suggest that there is an equivalence – is sloppy thinking
‘Let us use the following example to clear this up. We say that the equation x2 = -1
has the solution + Ö-1. There was a time when one said this equation had no solution.
Now this statement, whether agreeing or disagreeing with the one which told us the
solutions, certainly hasn’t its multiplicity. But we can easily give it that multiplicity
by saying that an equation x2+ax + b = 0 hasn’t got a solution that comes a
near to the nearest solution which is b. Analogously we can say either “A straight line always intersects a circle; sometimes in real, sometimes in complex points”, or, “A straight line either intersects a circle, or it doesn’t and is a far from doing so”. These two statements mean exactly the same. They will be more or less satisfactory according to the way a man wishes to look at it. He may wish to make the difference between the intersecting and the non-intersecting as inconspicuous as possible. Or on the other hand he may wish to stress it; and either tendency may be justified, say, by his particular practical purposes. But this may not be the reason at all why he prefers one form of expression to the other. Which form he prefers, and whether he has a
preference at all, often depends on general, deeply rooted tendencies in his thinking.’
an equation is a rule governed propositional game
if an ‘equation’ has no solution – it is not an equation – it is not rule governed – it is not a game that can be played
the idea of a solution that ‘comes near to the nearest solution’ is not a solution –
it is an accommodation
and yes – the ‘accommodation’ may cover over the fact of no solution – but here we are playing with mathematics – not playing the game of mathematics
I want a red coloured car – but I settle for a maroon-coloured car –
maroon is not red – no matter how I look at
in fact – logically speaking – I could have chosen any other colour as a substitute – the result would be the same – not red
‘A straight line always intersects a circle; sometimes in real, sometimes in complex points’ and ‘A straight line either intersects a circle, or it doesn’t and is a far from doing so’
these are not equivalent propositions – they are different propositions
they do not mean the same thing
if you use one – you play a particular rule governed propositional game –
if you use the other – you play a different game
‘more or less satisfactory’ – is not mathematics – it is a use of mathematics that is not mathematical – i.e. is not rule-governed
making the difference between the intersecting and non-intersecting as inconspicuous as possible – or to stress it – is not mathematical – is not rule-governed –
it is – at best – artistic – and at worst cavalier
‘general deeply rooted tendencies in his thinking’ – has nothing whatsoever to do with understanding rule governed propositional practise –
has nothing to do with playing the mathematical game
when it comes to mathematics – you can leave your deep-rooted tendencies at the door
(‘Should we say there are cases when a man despises another man and doesn’t know it; or should we describe such cases by saying he doesn’t despise him but unintentionally behaves towards him in a way – speaks to him in a tone of voice, etc., which in general would go together with despising him? Either form of expression is correct; but they may betray different tendencies of the mind.)’
we can imagine a man critically evaluating his own behaviour towards another – and asking the question – do I despise him?
i.e. – do I ‘despise’ him – or is that just that he just ‘rubs me the wrong way’?
so here the person is looking for a the most appropriate description of his behaviour
he has engaged in a critical process –
it is not a question of knowing or not knowing – is rather a question of finding a satisfactory description
and any ‘satisfactory’ description adopted – will be open to question
and what any observer makes of his behaviour – how it is described – i.e. – as despising – as unintentional etc – likewise – will be from a logical point of view –
open to question-
you work with what you land on – and keep an open mind
with ‘either form of expression’ – what we have is different proposals
‘tendencies of mind’ – is a way of describing these different proposals
s description – open to question
‘Let us revert to examining the logic of the expression “to wish”, “to long for”, etc., and consider the most important case in which the expression “I wish so and so to happen” is the direct expression of a conscious process.’ That is to say, the case in which we should be inclined to answer the question “Are you sure that it is this you wish?” by saying: “Surely I must know what I wish”. Now compare this answer to the one which most of us would give to the question: “Do you know the ABC?” Has the emphatic assertion that you know it a sense analogous to that of the former assertion? Both assertions in a sense brush away the question. But the former doesn’t wish to say “Surely I know such a simple thing as this” but rather: the question which you asked makes no sense”. We might say: We adopt in this case a wrong method of brushing aside the question. “Of course I know” could be replaced by “Of course there is no doubt” and this interpreted to mean “It makes, in this case, no sense to talk of doubt”. In this way the answer “Of course I know what I wish” can be interpreted to be a grammatical statement.’
‘Let us revert to examining the logic of the expression “to wish”, “to long for”, etc., and consider the most important case in which the expression “I wish so and so to happen” is the direct expression of a conscious process.’
I wish so and so to happen is a proposal – a proposal – first and foremost –
‘the direct expression of a conscious process’ – in this case –– is a propositional response – to ‘I wish so and so to happen’ – and yes – you can further describe this propositional response as an ‘explanation’
the proposal – a response to it – and any further description of the response – are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘Surely I must know what I wish’ –
this is a rhetorical statement – it is one designed to persuade –
the person making this statement may be trying to persuade him or herself – as well as someone else
stripped of its rhetoric – (‘surely’) – the proposal is – ‘I know what I wish’
as with any proposal ‘I know what I wish’ – is open to question – i.e. – what is it ‘to know?’ – ‘what is it to wish?’
one can of course – avoid the logic of the proposition – of the propositional situation – and pretend certainty – however any such pretence – renders the statement – the proposal – logically worthless
‘Now compare this answer to the one which most of us would give to the question: “Do you know the ABC?”’
‘knowing the ABC’ – is a word game – a rule governed propositional game
you know the sequence of the alphabet because you have learned the rule of the succession of letters –
and this rule is a rule of practice
games – propositional games – are rule governed –
if you play the game – you play in accordance with the rule – in this case the rule of accepted practice
the game – the rule – are not open to question –
if you question the game – if you question the rule – and of course you can – you are not playing the game –
you are not engaged in a rule-governed propositional exercise – you are engaged in a critical evaluation
the two are quite different modes of propositional activity –
we play propositional games and we critically evaluate propositions –
we do both – they are not to be confused
‘Has the emphatic assertion that you know it a sense analogous to that of the former assertion?’
no – a different sense altogether – one – ‘Surely I must know what I wish’ – is a rhetorical statement and ‘I know the ABC’ – is a rule-governed game proposition
‘Both assertions in a sense brush away the question. But the former doesn’t wish to say “Surely I know such a simple thing as this” but rather: the question which you asked makes no sense”.’
yes – of course – it makes no sense – if you deny the ‘the question’ – the question – the doubt – the uncertainty of the proposal –
questioning does not make sense to someone who has closed themselves off to questioning –
often you find that – in response to any scepticism about their statement – they double down on the rhetoric
you can put the logical / rational approach to people – and on any matter –
if they reject it – there is really nothing you can do –
you can’t do anything with ignorant people – you just have to close them down –
leave them to their pretence and their prejudice
‘We might say: We adopt in this case a wrong method of brushing aside the question. “Of course I know” could be replaced by “Of course there is no doubt” and this interpreted to mean “It makes, in this case, no sense to talk of talk of doubt”. In this way the answer “Of course I know what I wish” can be interpreted to be a grammatical statement.’
there is a sense in which this right – grammar is a rule governed – propositional exercise – grammar is a language game –
and if you play this game – it is not open to question – not open to doubt –
where this is wrong – where it is all screwed up – is that ‘of course there is no doubt’
and – ‘of course I know what I wish’ – are not game propositions –
they are rhetorical statements – and as such – best left to the wind
‘It is similar when we ask, “has this room a length?”, and someone answers: “of course it has”. He might have answered, “Don’t ask nonsense”. On the other hand, “The room has length can be used as a grammatical statement. It then says that a sentence of the form “The room is ________feet long” makes sense.’
‘has this room length?’ –
‘the room’ – is a proposal – and to this proposal – we make proposals –
if we say the ‘room has length’ – we are proposing a description of the room
the description ‘length’ – is a measurement proposal
it is to propose that we can attribute – that we are attributing – the measurement game to the ‘room’ proposal –
‘the room is _________feet long’ – is to apply – is to propose – a rule-governed propositional action – a game – to the ‘room’ proposal
‘the room is _________feet long’ – is a propositional game statement
we see the room proposal through the lens – as it were – of the measurement game
grammar is – a theory – a construction – a standard – of acceptable usage –
any proposal can be placed against – assessed in relation to – a theory of acceptable usage
to say that the statement is grammatical – only tells us that it conforms to someone’s idea of how it should be presented –
it tells us nothing of its logic – of its logical status – it doesn’t address the question
‘A great many philosophical difficulties are connected with the sense of the expressions “to wish”, “to think”, etc., which we are now considering. These can all be summed up in the question: “How can one think what is not the case?”’
what we do is propose
we can describe the action of proposing – as ‘thinking’
any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what is the case – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
what is not the case – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
there is no logical difference between a proposal of what is the case – and a proposal of what is not the case
in either case – we are dealing with propositional uncertainty
‘This is a beautiful example of a philosophical question. It asks “How can one …?” and while this puzzles us we must admit that nothing is easier than to think what is not the case. I mean this shows us again that the difficulty which we are in we does not arise from our inability to imagine how thinking something is done; just as the philosophical difficulty about the measurement of time did not arise through our inability to imagine how time is actually measured. I say this because sometimes it almost seems as though our difficulty were one of remembering exactly what happened when we thought something, a difficulty of introspection, or something of the sort; whereas in fact it arises when we look at the facts through the medium of a misleading form of expression.’
‘how can one …?’ –
what we are saying here – is – yes – we do – but how do we do it?
this is a good question
answers to this question will be proffered –
and any answer here – any proposal here – will be open to question – open to doubt – will be uncertain
we make proposals – and we can ask how this is done –
logically – ‘how this is done’ – whatever proposal is put here – is a backstory to the fact of proposal –
interesting – but a secondary issue –
the main game in propositional life – is dealing with any proposal put – and subjecting it to critical examination – putting it to question – putting it to doubt – and exploring its uncertainty –
that is where the action is
and yes – we measure time – this is what we do
logically speaking measuring time – is applying a rule-governed propositional game – the game of measurement to time
now a we may not be confident in explaining just what time is – what the proposal of time amounts to – but we have no difficult measuring it –
and this is just because – the measuring of time – is the playing of a game – a rule-governed propositional game
‘I say this because sometimes it almost seems as though our difficulty were one of remembering exactly what happened when we thought something, a difficulty of introspection, or something of the sort; whereas in fact it arises when we look at the facts through the medium of a misleading form of expression.’
the issue is not one of remembering or introspection – it is simply a matter of playing a game – a propositional game –
and playing propositional games – is something that we do
furthermore – there are no ‘misleading expressions’ –
what we deal with – logically speaking – is propositional uncertainty
any expression – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘“How can one think what is not the case? If I think that King’s College is on fire when it is not on fire, the fact of its being on fire does not exist. Then how can I think it? How can we hang a thief who does not exist?” Our answer could be put in this form: “I can’t hang him when he doesn’t exist: but I can look for him when he doesn’t exist”.’
‘how can one think what is not the case?’ – is to ask – ‘how can one propose what is not the case?’
I can propose – ‘that King’s College is burning’ – whether this proposal is true or not – whether the proposal is affirmed or denied – is another matter –
but the fact is I can put this proposal
whether the proposal is true or not – will depend entirely on whether it is affirmed or denied by those who have access to the proposal
in the case where it is not affirmed – by anyone – we would say the proposal is false –
however – any proposal of truth (affirmation) – or falsehood (denial) – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
also – we would want to know the propositional context of the proposal –
i.e. – was the proposal put as a ‘matter of fact’?
was the proposer putting that right now the college is physically burning?
and could it be that there was a fire – albeit a small one – that no one investigating the matter discovered?
if so – we would still question how the proposer knew this
or was he being – as it were ‘poetic’ – and – i.e. – in some way referring to the intellectual life of the college?
and just what could that mean?
that the intellectuals in the college are ‘hot’ – and are at the cutting edge of intellectual life?
or perhaps that the college is in some way is destroying itself intellectually – whatever that might mean?
could the proposer be mentally ill – and suffering an hallucination?
in the context of hallucinatory experience – what do we say – the proposal is true – the proposal is false?
these are just a few examples of different propositional contexts – which would bear on the question of whether the proposal is to be regarded as true or false
whatever the case in relation to propositional context – the proposal can be put –
and the proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘How can we hang a thief who does not exist?” Our answer could be put in this form: “I can’t hang him when he doesn’t exist: but I can look for him when he doesn’t exist”.’
whether anything exists or not – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if I am looking for someone – what counts as their ‘existing’ – direct experience – reports of them – traces of them – i.e. – DNA?
again – it is a question of context – propositional context
I could be looking for Frieda Kahlo – and come upon her painting ‘Self portrait Dedicated to Dr Eloesser 1940.’
‘We are here misled by the substantives “objects of thought” and “fact”, and by the different meanings of the word “exist”.’
any so called ‘substantive’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we only get ‘misled’ – if we don’t recognise that our proposals – are open to question
‘Talking of the fact as a “complex of objects” springs from this confusion (cf. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus). Supposing we asked: “How can one imagine what does not exist?”’
one proposes existence –
and any proposal of existence – of something existing – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘The answer seems to be: “If we do, we, we imagine non-existent combinations of existing elements”.’
what we do is – we propose –
in science – a new effect can be proposed – predicted – an effect – that only latter is observed
in such a case – a non-existent entity is proposed
what exists – is open to question – open to doubt –
what exists is uncertain
when a new entity – object – state of affairs is proposed –
yes – existing descriptions – will be brought into play – and likely modified –
perhaps too – new terms will be invented in the attempt to accommodate novelty
any such descriptive process – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘But what do you mean by “redness exists”? My watch exists, if it hasn’t been pulled to pieces, if it hasn’t been destroyed. What would we call “destroying redness”? We might of course mean destroying all red objects: but would this make it impossible to imagine a red object? Supposing to this one answered: “But surely, red objects must have existed and you must have seen them if you were able to imagine them”? – But how do you know if this is so? Suppose I said “Exerting a pressure on your eyeball produces a red image”. Couldn’t the way in which you first become acquainted with red have been this? And why shouldn’t I have been just imagining a red patch? (The difficulty which you may feel here will have to be discussed at a later occasion.’
(* He does not do this – Edd.)
‘But what do you mean by “redness exists”?
if this proposal – ‘redness exists’ – is put – it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
and what you mean here – will be whatever account you propose –
i.e. – you might take a platonic line and argue that redness is an ideal form outside of experience – a form that is manifested in the experience of red objects –
or perhaps you say ‘redness’ is a quality in certain objects – and that we experience it visually when we see these objects
‘What would we call ‘destroying redness’?
‘redness’ – is a proposal –
so – the question is – can a proposal be destroyed?
a proposal be of ‘redness’ – or anything else – is put – or it is not put
if it is not put – it doesn’t exist
if the proposal of ‘redness’ – ceased to be put – it would no longer exist
but destroyed?
there is a sense in which Wittgenstein’s watch – pulled to pieces – can be said to exist – i.e. – exists in pieces
and would we not say – if his watch was crushed to pieces – just that – that ‘the watch is crushed to pieces’ – or – ‘the watch is destroyed’?
point being – we still refer to the watch –
what I am saying here is that the proposal – be it ‘redness’ – or ‘the watch’ – or whatever – exists – if it is proposed
if it is not proposed – it doesn’t exist –
‘destroying’ – doesn’t come into it
‘We may now be inclined to say: As the fact which would make our thought true if it existed does not always exist, it is not the fact which we think”. But this just depends on how I wish to use the word “fact”. Why shouldn’t I say: “I believe the fact that the college is on fire”? It is just a clumsy expression for saying “I believe that the college is on fire”. To say “It is not the fact which we believe”, is itself the result of the confusion. We think we are saying something like: “It isn’t the sugar cane which we eat but the sugar”, “It isn’t Mr. Smith who hangs in the gallery, but his picture”.’
what we think – is what we propose
if we use the term ‘fact’ – ‘fact’ – is proposed –
and as with any other proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘facts’ – are uncertain
we can say that what we say we believe – is what we propose – except in the case of deception
if we propose a ‘fact’ – it is a ‘fact’ – that we believe – whatever that amounts to
and whatever it amounts to – is open to question
‘The next step that we are inclined to take is to think that as the object of thought isn’t the fact it is a shadow of the fact. There are different names for this shadow, e.g., “proposition”, “sense of the sentence”.
But this doesn’t remove our difficulty. For the question now is: “How can something be the shadow of a fact which doesn’t exist.”’
a thought is a proposal –
the ‘object’ of a proposal – is a proposal – is another proposal –
we propose in relation to proposals –
in the absence of proposal – what we face – is the unknown
there are no ‘shadows’ in propositional reality – there are only – only – proposals –
proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
as for calling propositions – ‘shadows’ –
this is a perfect example of just how dysfunctional modern philosophy is –
a proposition is a proposal –
our reality is propositional – and our reality is open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘I can express our trouble in a different form by saying “How can we know what the shadow is a shadow of?” – The shadow would be some sort of portrait; and therefore I can restate the problem by asking “What makes a portrait a portrait of Mr. N?” the answer which might suggest itself is: “The similarity between the portrait and Mr. N”. The answer in fact shows what we had in mind when we talked of the shadow of a fact. It is quite clear, however, that similarity does not constitute our idea of a portrait; for it is in the essence of this idea that it should make sense to talk of a good portrait or a bad portrait. In other words, it is essential that the shadow should be capable of representing things as they are not.’
“What makes a portrait a portrait of Mr. N?”the answer is simple and straightforward – and does not involve chasing shadows –
a portrait of N – is a portrait of N – if it is proposed as a portrait of N
‘“What makes a portrait a portrait of Mr. N?” the answer which might suggest itself is: “The similarity between the portrait and Mr. N”.’
a criterion of ‘similarity’ – might be put forward as a means of identification –
but if it works – it will only work with straightforward or standard portraits –
and even in those cases – questions can be asked – doubts raised – uncertainties explored –
if you were considering the ‘Weeping Woman’ by Picasso – the issue of similarity with his model Dora Marr – is more than problematic –
yet it is prime facie – a portrait –
just who or what – it is a portrait of – is really a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and we can say the ‘Weeping Woman’ is presented – as an uncertainty – which is I think the key to its greatness
‘It is quite clear, however, that similarity does not constitute our idea of a portrait; for it is in the essence of this idea that it should make sense to talk of a good portrait or a bad portrait. In other words, it is essential that the shadow should be capable of representing things as in fact they are not.’
no –
what we have here is the proposal – ‘Mr. N’ – and – the proposal – ‘the portrait of Mr. N’ – and the question of the relation between these two proposals
any answer to the question of the relation between the two proposals – is a proposal – a relational proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we are not dealing with a shadow – ‘representing things as in fact they are not’
what we have is a relational proposal – that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘An obvious and correct answer to the question “What makes a portrait the portrait of so-and-so?” is that it is the intention. But if we wish to know what it means “intending this to be a portrait of so-and-so” let’s see what actually happens when we intend this. Remember the occasion when we talked of what happened when we expect someone from four to four-thirty. To intend a picture to be a portrait of so-and so (on the part of the painter, e.g.) is neither a particular state of mind nor a particular mental process. But there are a great many combinations of actions and states of mind which we should call “intending …”. It might have been that he was told to paint a portrait of N, and sat down before N, going through certain actions which we call “copying N’s face”. One might object to this by saying that the essence of copying is the intention to copy. I should answer that there are a great many different processes which we call “copying something”. Take an instance. I draw an ellipse on a sheet of paper and ask you to copy it. What characterizes the process of copying? For it is clear that it isn’t the fact that you draw a similar ellipse. You might have tried to copy it but not succeeded: or you might have drawn an ellipse with a totally different intention, and it happened to be like the one you should have copied. So what do you do when you try to copy the ellipse? Well, you look at it, draw something on a piece of paper, perhaps measure what you have drawn, perhaps you curse if find that it doesn’t agree with the model: or perhaps you say “I am going to copy this ellipse” and just draw an ellipse like it. There are endless variations of actions and words, having a family likeness to each other which we call “trying to copy”.
‘An obvious and correct answer to the question “What makes a portrait the portrait of so-and-so?” is that it is the intention.
what makes a portrait the portrait of so-and-so – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
I might intend my painting to be a portrait – which is to say – I might propose my painting as a portrait –
but find that no-one who sees it – regards it as a portrait –
is my painting a portrait?
as I propose it – yes – as others propose it – no
‘But there are a great many combinations of actions and states of mind which we should call “intending …”.’
that I explain my proposal – in terms of intention – is likewise – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and in any case ‘intention’ – is propositional backstory –
its function is to provide – suggest – authority for the proposal –
you might call it a ‘propositional buffer’ –
a buffer against uncertainty – and as such it essentially a rhetorical device
‘Take an instance. I draw an ellipse on a sheet of paper and ask you to copy it. What characterizes the process of copying?’
what counts as ‘copying’?
‘copying’ is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
i.e. – we can ask – is a copy a duplication? – or do we allow interpretation in any copy?
in geometry – it is most likely we would go with duplication – in a creative artistic endeavour – we would regard interpretation as valid –
so – it does depend on propositional context –
and even within any context – there will be questions – doubts – uncertainties
in practise – what will happen is a definition of ‘copying’ will be proposed – will be ‘settled’ on –
and any ‘copy’ proposed – will be assessed against that definition – that standard
and here again – there will still be questions – doubts – and uncertainties –
but decisions get made – actions are taken – and things get done
‘There are endless variations of actions and words, having a family likeness to each other which we call “trying to copy”.’
and we will see this through question – though doubt – and through the exploration of propositional uncertainty
and once this logical uncertainty is understood – this notion of ‘family resemblance’ – comes off as logically superficial
for – ‘family resemblance’ – is itself – a proposal –
a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘Suppose we said “that a picture is a portrait of a particular object consists in its being derived from that object in a particular way” Now it is easy to describe what we should call processes of deriving a picture from an object (roughly speaking processes of projection). But there is a peculiar difficulty about admitting that any such process is what we call “intentional representation”. For describe whatever process (activity) that we may, there is a way of reinterpreting this projection. Therefore – one is tempted to say – such a process can never be intention itself. For we could always have intended the opposite by reinterpreting the process of projection. Imagine this case: We give someone an order to walk in a certain direction by pointing or by drawing an arrow which points in the direction. Suppose drawing arrows is the language in which we generally we give such an order. Couldn’t such an order be interpreted to mean that the man who gets it is to walk in the direction opposite to that of the arrow? This could obviously be done by adding to our arrow some symbols which we might call “an interpretation”. It is easy to imagine a case in which, say to deceive someone, we might make an arrangement that an order should be carried out opposite to its normal one. The symbol which adds the interpretation to our original arrow could, for instance, be another arrow. Whenever we interpret a symbol in one way or another, the interpretation is a new symbol added to the old one.’
‘Suppose we said “that a picture is a portrait of a particular object consists in its being derived from that object in a particular way” Now it is easy to describe what we should call processes of deriving a picture from an object (roughly speaking processes of projection).’
a ‘picture’ is a proposal – an ‘object’ is a proposal
how does a picture come about?
it is a picture / proposal put in relation to an object /proposal –
the object/proposal does not generate – or project – a picture / proposal –
and it is not as if the object / proposal contains – is ‘brimming with’ others proposals – just waiting to be ‘derived’ – to be ‘brought forth’ –
the object/proposal – is just a proposal – a proposal – open to question
the object exists as a proposal – and the picture/proposal is put in relation to it
the ‘portrait’ – is the proposed relation
and this relational proposal (the portrait) – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
i.e. – we can ask is it a ‘portrait? – and / or – what is to count as a portrait? –
‘But there is a peculiar difficulty about admitting that any such process is what we call “intentional representation”. For describe whatever process (activity) that we may, there is a way of reinterpreting this projection. Therefore – one is tempted to say – such a process can never be intention itself. For we could always have intended the opposite by reinterpreting the process of projection.’
intention – here is a back story – whether the picture / proposal is intended or not – is logically irrelevant
it is not a matter of ‘reinterpreting this projection’ –
it is rather a matter of critically evaluating this proposal
what we have is a proposal – a relational proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Suppose drawing arrows is the language in which we generally we give such an order. Couldn’t such an order be interpreted to mean that the man who gets it is to walk in the direction opposite to that of the arrow?’
an order is a proposal – and yes – the proposal – is open to question – open to interpretation
‘The symbol which adds the interpretation to our original arrow could, for instance, be another arrow. Whenever we interpret a symbol in one way or another, the interpretation is a new symbol added to the old one.’
a symbol – is a proposal – and whether or not another arrow is added to the original arrow – the symbol / proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
the symbol / proposal is open to interpretation
if a new symbol is ‘added to the old one’ – we have a new proposal – a separate proposal to the old one –
but as with the old one – the new proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
the real point here is that if you understand propositional logic – there is no need for a symbol to indicate the possibility of ‘interpretation’ –
any proposal is open to interpretation
to give someone an order by showing them an arrow – is to put a proposal
what we mean by this proposal – is open to question
if we then state our meaning – we put another proposal –
meaning is a proposal
if we want to then go on and say meaning is a ‘process’ of some kind – we are then giving an account of our meaning – an explanation of our meaning
any explanation – is a proposal
this explanation represented as another arrow?
really – does an arrow explain the process of meaning?
I can’t see it –
saying and meaning – taking place in two different spheres?
there is only one sphere – the propositional sphere
if you explain what you say – what you mean – you put a proposal –
a proposal put in relation to what you have said (proposed)
and this proposal – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we operate in propositional complexes –
we operate in complex uncertainty
‘Is it then correct to say that no arrow could be the meaning, as every arrow could be meant the opposite way? Suppose we write down the scheme of saying and meaning by a column of arrows one below the other.
Then if this scheme is to serve our purpose at all, it must show us which of the three levels is the level of meaning. I can e.g., make a scheme with three levels, the bottom level always being the level of meaning. But adopt whatever model or scheme you may, it will have a bottom level, and there will be no such thing as an interpretation of that. To say in this case that every arrow can still be interpreted would only mean that I could always make a different model of saying and meaning which had one more level than the one I am using.’
there is only one ‘level’ – the propositional level –
and we can drop ‘level’ here – for what we are dealing with is the proposal – is the proposition
and the proposal – the proposition – is open to question –
a proposal is put – and the question is put – what is its meaning?
any response to this question – will be a proposal – a proposal – open to question –
any proposal – put to question – put to doubt – is uncertain – is open to interpretation
be it the original proposal under consideration – or any propositional response to the original proposal
there are no ‘levels’ here – there is just basic propositional activity
meaning is not some rock bottom to the proposition – meaning is a critical investigation
which is to say – any proposal put regarding meaning – as a matter of logic – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
is open to interpretation
‘Let us put it in this way: – What one wishes to say is: “Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.” Now I assume that you take that the meaning to be a process accompanying the saying, and that it is translatable into, and so far equivalent to, a further sign. You have therefore further to tell me what you take to be the distinguishing mark between a sign and the meaning. If you do so, e.g., by saying that the meaning is the arrow which you imagine as opposed to any which you may draw or produce in any other way, you thereby say that you will call no further arrow an interpretation of the one which you have imagined.’
there is no last interpretation –
any proposed interpretation – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
yes – we may settle on an interpretation – on a meaning – and run with it – work with it –
this is common practise – it is what we do
nevertheless – the logical situation is not changed by a decision to proceed – to use an interpretation
an interpretation – used or not – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
meaning as a process accompanying the saying?
the meaning of a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if I put the proposal – it will have meaning – meaning for me –
just what that is – what it amounts to – will be – for me – open to question
and most likely my proposal will have a meaning – for anyone else witnessing it –
but just what that meaning is – for the other – will be open to question –
a process? – this may well be proposed – but as with any proposal – it will be open to question
a process – equivalent to a further sign?
that may well be the proposal – but just where the further sign represents the meaning – will be open to question
‘You have therefore further to tell me what you take to be the distinguishing mark between a sign and the meaning’
the sign is a proposal – open to question –
meaning – is a matter open to question
logically speaking there is no distinguishing mark
the question of meaning arises because the sign is open to question –
any proposed meaning – as with the sign in question – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If you do so, e.g., by saying that the meaning is the arrow which you imagine as opposed to any which you may draw or produce in any other way, you thereby say that you will call no further arrow an interpretation of the one which you have imagined.’
this ‘arrow’ business is just a ploy – against the nature of the proposition –
any interpretation – is a proposal – is a proposition – a proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
this ‘you thereby say that you will call no further arrow an interpretation of the one which you have imagined’ –
is no more than an advocacy for authoritarian – dead-head ‘epistemology –
its basis is ignorance and pretence
‘All this will be become clearer if we consider what it is that really happens when we say a thing and mean what we say. – Let us ask ourselves: If we say to someone “I should be delighted to see you” and mean it, does a conscious process run alongside these words, a process which could itself be translated into spoken words? This will hardly ever be the case.
But let us imagine an instance which it does happen. Suppose I had a habit of accompanying every English sentence which I said aloud with a German sentence spoken to myself inwardly. If then, for some reason or other, you call the silent sentence the meaning of the one spoken aloud, the process of meaning accompanying the process of saying would be one which could itself be turned into outward signs. Or, before any sentence which we say aloud we say its meaning (whatever it may be) to ourselves in a kind of aside. An example similar to the case we would want would be saying one thing and at the same time seeing a picture before our mind’s eye which is the meaning and agrees or disagrees with what we say. Such cases and similar one exist, but they are not at all what happens as a rule when we say something and mean it, or mean something else. There are, of course real cases in which what we call meaning is a definite conscious process accompanying, preceding, or following the verbal expression and itself a verbal expression of some sort or translatable into one. A typical example of this is the ‘aside’ on the stage.
But what tempts us to think of the meaning of what we say as a process essentially of the kind which we have described is the analogy between forms of expression:
“to say something”
“to mean something”.
which seems to refer to two parallel processes.’
to say something – is to propose something
to mean something – is to propose something
‘saying something’ – and ‘meaning something’ – are just two descriptions of the propositional act – the act of proposing
for all intents and purposes – they are equivalent
when I put a proposal – i.e. – when I say something – what it means – what it amounts to – how it can be used etc. – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
any so called ‘aside’ – is either a propositional explanation of what is proposed – or an alternative way of putting what is proposed
we don’t need the notion of ‘process’ – to understand ‘proposal’
‘process’ – in this context – is irrelevant –
it’s like carrying a bag that has nothing in it
‘A process accompanying our words which one might call the “process of meaning them” is the modulation of the voice in which we speak the words or one of the processes similar to this, like the play of facial expression. These accompany the spoken words not in the way a German sentence might accompany an English sentence, or writing a sentence to accompany speaking a sentence; but the sense in which the tune of a song accompanies its words. This tune corresponds to the ‘feeling’
with which we say the sentence. And I wish to point out that this feeling is the expression with which the sentence is said, or something similar to this expression.’
Wittgenstein commits a basic logical error in his account of meaning –
he confuses and conflates the logical issue of meaning with the rhetorical issue of meaning
the meaning of word is a critical issue –
the word is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
it is a critical investigation that considers the possible meanings of a word
meaning a word – is a rhetorical issue –
if I behave in a way that suggests I mean a word – what I am doing is persuading – either myself and / or others of its significance
this is rhetoric – not logic
Wittgenstein doesn’t identify such as rhetoric per se – but that it what it is
and yes – a rhetorical use of a word – of a proposal – may well involve the modulation of voice – may involve facial expression – in fact – any behaviour which is calculated to persuade
meaning a word – is not the meaning of a word
‘These accompany the spoken words not in the way a German sentence might accompany an English sentence, or writing a sentence to accompany speaking a sentence; but the sense in which the tune of a song accompanies its words. This tune corresponds to the ‘feeling’ with which we say the sentence. And I wish to point out that this feeling is the expression with which the sentence is said, or something similar to this expression.’
‘the feeling with which we say a sentence’?
look – how I feel about what I am saying – may or may not correspond to how I say it – how I present it
ask any politician – any advertising agent – any con artist – or really – just anybody –
we all play the game
‘And I wish to point out that this feeling is the expression with which the sentence is said …’
the expression with which a sentence is said?
best here to drop ‘feeling’ from the analysis –
and simply focus on the rhetorical behaviour that is exhibited
bringing feeling into it is a back step – and one that muddies the waters – and adds nothing to issue – except perhaps unnecessary confusion
how one feels – and what that involves – is best given separate consideration –
and that there might be a tie up with how one feels and how one says – makes no difference to the question of the effect of one’s rhetoric – the effect of one’s rhetorical behaviour
to bring ‘feeling’ into this issue – is really philosophically weak
‘Let us revert to our question “What is the object of a thought?” (e.g. when I say: “I think that King’s college is on fire”)
The question as we put it is already the expression of several confusions. This shows by the mere fact that it almost sounds like a question of physics: like asking: “What are the ultimate constituents of matter?” (It is typically a metaphysical question; the characteristic of a metaphysical question being that we express an unclarity about the grammar of words in the form of a scientific question).
One of the origins of our question is the two-fold use of the propositional function “I think x”. We say, “I think that so-and-so is the case”, or “that so-and-so is the case” and also “I think just the same thing as he”; and we say “I expect him”, and also “I expect that he will come”. Compare “I expect him” and “I shoot him”. We can’t shoot him if he isn’t there. This is how the question arises: “How can we expect something that is not the case?”, “How can we expect a fact which does not exist?”
The way out of this difficulty seems to be: what we expect is not the fact, but a shadow of the fact; as it were, the next thing to the fact. We have said that this only pushing the question one step back. There are several origins to this idea of a shadow. One of them is this: we say “Surely two sentences of different languages can have the same sense”; and we argue, “therefore the sense is not the same as the sentence”, and ask the question “What is the sense?’ And we make of ‘it’ a shadowy being, one of the many which we create when we wish to give meaning to substantives to which no material objects correspond.’
the question – ‘what is the object of a thought?’ – as an expression of several confusions?
any question is legitimate – and yes – any question is open to question – be it classified or described as a ‘question of physics’ – ‘a metaphysical question’ – or indeed – if it is given some other description
the question – is not confused – it is a proposal – and open – open to question – open to interpretation
‘(It is typically a metaphysical question; the characteristic of a metaphysical question being that we express an unclarity about the grammar of words in the form of a scientific question).’
‘clarity’ is a philosophical myth – strictly speaking there is no logical clarity – there is only logical uncertainty
logically speaking – any claim of clarity is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
clarity – when properly understood – is a rhetorical notion
and ‘grammar’ – no more than a theory of usage – and again – open to question
Wittgenstein’s definition of a metaphysical question here – is that it is a pseudo- scientific question –
once you understand that any question – is open – open to question – open to interpretation –
then these classifications of ‘scientific’ and ‘metaphysical’ – will be seen to be superficial labels – descriptive tags – with no logical basis –
perhaps they are useful in the division of intellectual labour – but they should not be seen as signifying types of knowledge
as to the question – ‘what is the object of a thought?’
firstly – a thought is a proposal – a proposal given the description – ‘a thought’
as to ‘object’ – if we go with the proposal that a thought has an object – the object of a thought – will be what it is proposed to be
so – whatever is proposed as the ‘object’ of a thought – will be a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Compare “I expect him” and “I shoot him”. We can’t shoot him if he isn’t there. This is how the question arises: “How can we expect something that is not the case?”, “How can we expect a fact which does not exist?”’
whether a so called ‘fact’ – any fact – exists or not – is open to question –
existence – is uncertain
and what we expect – whatever we expect – is of course – an uncertain prospect – an uncertain state of affairs
“Surely two sentences of different languages can have the same sense”; and we argue, “therefore the sense is not the same as the sentence”, and ask the question “What is the sense?’ And we make of ‘it’ a shadowy being, one of the many which we create when we wish to give meaning to substantives to which no material objects correspond.’
‘sense’ is an explanation of what is proposed – in whatever language – in whatever propositional structure –
and as with any explanatory proposal – open to question –
sense is uncertain
if you believe in philosophical shadows – you may as well give up the ghost
there are no ‘shadows’ in propositional reality –
beyond propositional reality – is the unknown
all there is – all we have – all we deal with – is the proposal –
and any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Another source of the idea of a shadow being the object of thought is this: we imagine the shadow to be the picture the intention of which cannot be questioned, that is, a picture which we don’t interpret in order to understand it. Now there are pictures of which we should say that we interpret them, that is translate them into a different kind of picture, in order to understand them; and pictures of which we should say that we understand them immediately, without any further interpretation. If you see a telegram written in cypher, and you know the key to this cypher, you will, in general, not say that you understand the telegram before you have translated into ordinary language. Of course you have only replaced one kind of symbols by another; and yet now if you read the telegram in your language no further process of interpretation will take place. – Or rather, you may now, in certain cases, again translate this telegram, say into a picture; but then too you have only replaced one set of symbols by another.’
‘Another source of the idea of a shadow being the object of thought is this: we imagine the shadow to be the picture the intention of which cannot be questioned, that is, a picture which we don’t interpret in order to understand it.’
still chasing shadows –
here is the point – logically speaking – the intention is irrelevant
the question is – what is proposed here?
if the proposal takes the form of a ‘picture’ – it is the proposal / picture that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
it is the proposal / picture that is open to interpretation
open to interpretation – regardless of any intention
intention – is a back story
what is up front – what is front and centre for consideration – is the proposal – what is proposed
any proposal can be questioned – and it is this questioning – this critical evaluation that is understanding
simply accepting what is put to you – is not understanding – it is ignorance
‘Now there are pictures of which we should say that we interpret them, that is translate them into a different kind of picture, in order to understand them; and pictures of which we should say that we understand them immediately, without any further interpretation.’
translating – is a result of a critical examination
any translated picture / proposal – as with the original proposal – is open to question
understanding is not getting a picture
this picture view of the proposition – is naïve – simplistic
it is where you start in philosophy – it is what you start with – in any critical understanding
yes – you can put an end to interpretation – quite simply
all you have to do is stop questioning – stop the logical process – stop critical evaluation
and you may do this – in fact we all do this – for practical – pragmatic reasons
we do this – to get on with it
however – the brute logical reality is – the interpretation you stop at – is still a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If you see a telegram written in cypher, and you know the key to this cypher, you will, in general, not say that you understand the telegram before you have translated into ordinary language. Of course you have only replaced one kind of symbols by another; and yet now if you read the telegram in your language no further process of interpretation will take place. – Or rather, you may now, in certain cases, again translate this telegram, say into a picture; but then too you have only replaced one set of symbols by another.’
yes – you have replaced one kind of symbol with another – whether you are dealing with a cypher or not
‘no further process of interpretation will take place’ – if the interpretation is not put to question
nevertheless – logically speaking – it is open to interpretation
and any decision to stop the process of interpretation – will be a decision – a proposal – open to question – open to interpretation
the point is that in putting a proposal to question – you explore its uncertainty
and it is this exploring of propositional uncertainty – that opens up possibilities of understanding – possibilities of use – new directions for action
you can stay dumb – if you want to – but don’t pretend that ignorance is a philosophical solution
‘The shadow, as we think of it, is some sort of picture: in fact, something very much like an image which comes before our mind’s eye; and this again is something not unlike a painted representation in the ordinary sense. A source of the idea of the shadow certainly is the fact that in some cases saying, hearing or reading a sentence brings before our mind’s eye, images which more or less strictly correspond to the sentence, and which are therefore, in a sense, translations of the sentence into a pictorial language. – But it is absolutely essential for the picture which we imagine the shadow to be that it is what I call a “picture of similarity”. I don’t mean by this that it is a picture similar to what it is intended to represent, but that it is a picture that is correct only when it is similar to what it represents. One might use for this kind of picture the word “copy”. Roughly speaking, copies are good pictures when they can easily be mistaken for what they represent.’
‘The shadow, as we think of it, is some sort of picture: in fact, something very much like an image which comes before our mind’s eye; and this again is something not unlike a painted representation in the ordinary sense.’
this ‘shadow’ is coming off as all things to all men – a picture – an image – a painted representation
you would have to say that it is a dummy concept –
this shadow is no different to the traditional ‘image’ – to a ‘representation’ –
except perhaps that it is possibly – more vague
we can ask – why not just go with ‘image’ or ‘representation”?
the ‘shadow’ – is no advance on these concepts –
and in so far as it seems to have no content – no distinctive feature – it is effectively meaningless – and useless
‘A source of the idea of the shadow certainly is the fact that in some cases saying, hearing or reading a sentence brings before our mind’s eye, images which more or less strictly correspond to the sentence, and which are therefore, in a sense, translations of the sentence into a pictorial language.’
a translation of a sentence into pictorial language – is a translation of a proposal – into another proposal – a proposal that has a different form
any such translation – will be a result of a critical investigation of the original proposal
there are no shadows here – there are only proposals – proposals in a critical relation to each other
‘But it is absolutely essential for the picture which we imagine the shadow to be that it is what I call a “picture of similarity”. I don’t mean by this that it is a picture similar to what it is intended to represent, but that it is a picture that is correct only when it is similar to what it represents.’
seriously?
a picture of similarity – that is not a picture similar to what it represents – but is correct when it is similar
this is just confused –
the fact is – it’s either similar or it’s not –
and in any case – we can ask Wittgenstein – just what does ‘similarity’ amount to?
I don’t think he has an answer –
and if he does – his ‘similarity’ – is in the same boat as ‘shadow’ – a vague concept of no consequence
‘One might use for this kind of picture the word “copy”. Roughly speaking, copies are good pictures when they can easily be mistaken for what they represent.’
you have a proposal – a proposition
and the question is asked – what is the object of this proposition?
any answer to this question – will be a proposal –
you have two proposals – if you say one is a copy of the other – then what you have is a duplication –
and if you have a duplication – you effectively have just one proposal – and you are back at square one
so – this ‘copy’ notion – gets us nowhere
a sentence translated into ‘pictorial language’ – is a different and separate proposal – to the sentence –
both proposals – the sentence – and the translation – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and furthermore –
their relation – likewise – is open to question – to doubt – and is uncertain
‘A plane projection of one hemisphere of our terrestrial globe is not a picture by similarity or a copy in this sense. It would be conceivable that I portrayed someone’s face by projecting it in some queer way, though correctly according to the adopted rule of projection, on a piece of paper, in such a way that no one would normally call a projection “a good portrait of so-and-so” because it would not look a bit like him’
a ‘picture’ – of whatever kind – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents. If we were doubtful about how the sentence “King’s college is on fire” can be a picture of King’s college on fire, we need only ask ourselves: “How should we explain what the sentence means?” Such an explanation might consist of ostensive definitions. We should say, e.g., “this is King’s College” (pointing to the building), “this is a fire” (pointing to the fire). This shows you the way in which words and things are connected.’
‘If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point.’
first off – there is no ‘correct’ picture –
any ‘picture’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
whether the picture is similar to the object or not – this shadow of Wittgenstein’s imagination – has no point
there are no shadows in propositional reality
a proposal is put –
what it amounts to – how it is to be explained – how it is to be used – are matters open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and out of such questioning will emerge further proposals – proposals – not shadows
‘If we were doubtful about how the sentence “King’s college is on fire” can be a picture of King’s college on fire, we need only ask ourselves: “How should we explain what the sentence means?”
here’s the point – whether we are doubtful or not – the proposition is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and whether we are doubtful or not – there is always the question – of how should we explain what the sentence means?
the question is always there
‘Such an explanation might consist of ostensive definitions. We should say, e.g., “this is King’s College” (pointing to the building), “this is a fire” (pointing to the fire). This shows you the way in which words and things are connected.’
yes – such an explanation – such an account might be in the form of an ostensive definition
let’s be clear here – an ostensive definition – is a proposal –
and as such – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
i.e. - ‘this is King’s college’ – what if it isn’t King’s college that he is pointing at? – that he has mistaken King’s College – for another building?
‘this is the fire’ – and what if what he is pointing at isn’t a fire? – perhaps what he points to here is actually some kind of optical illusion caused by reflection and light at a certain time of day?
the point I am making here is that the proposal ‘this is the fire’ – as with any proposal – is open to question
‘This shows you the way in which words and things are connected.’
‘words’ are proposals – ‘things’ are proposals –
the way in which words and things are connected – is the way in which proposals are related to each other
and the relationship between proposals – is a critical relationship
‘The idea that that which we wish to happen must be present as a shadow in our wish is deeply rooted in our forms of expression. But, in fact, we might say that it is only the next best absurdity to the one which we should really like to say. For how can we wish just this to happen if just this isn’t present in our wish. If we weren’t too absurd we should say that the fact which we wish for must be present in our wish? It is quite true to say: The mere shadow won’t do: for it stops short before the object; and we want the wish to contain the object itself – We want that the wish that Mr. Smith should come into this room should wish that just Mr Smith, and no substitute, should be coming, and no substitute for that, into my room and no substitute for that. But this is exactly what we said.’
‘The idea that that which we wish to happen must be present as a shadow in our wish is deeply rooted in our forms of expression.’
‘deeply rooted’ in our forms of expression’?
nothing is ‘deeply rooted’ – logically speaking
all that might be ‘deeply rooted’ is prejudice – philosophical prejudice –
any ‘form of expression’ is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If we weren’t too absurd we should say that the fact which we wish for must be present in our wish?’
‘I wish for x” – is a proposal – a wish – is a proposal – a proposal for a desirable future state of affairs
the ‘fact’ that we wish for – is proposed –
it is not an existing fact – rather a proposed possible state of affairs
‘It is quite true to say: The mere shadow won’t do: for it stops short before the object; and we want the wish to contain the object itself.’
yes – the shadow won’t do – it’s a stupid idea
the wish / proposal – is that we want a state of affairs to eventuate
or you could say the wish – is the proposed object
‘But this is exactly what we said.’
yes – you can drill down on the wish for Mr. Smith – but all you are doing there is – unnecessarily – elaborating on just what you proposed
‘Our confusion could be described in this way. Quite in accordance with our usual form of expression we think of the fact which we wish for as a thing which is not yet here, and too which therefore we cannot point. Now in order to understand this grammar of our expression “object of our wish” let’s just consider the answer which we gave to the question: “What is the object of your wish?” The answer to this question of course is: “I wish that so-and-so should happen”. Now what would the answer be if we went on asking: “And what is the object of this wish?” It could only consist in a repetition of our previous expression of the wish, or else in the form of a translation into some other form of expression. We might, e.g., state what we wished in other words or illustrate it by a picture. etc., etc. Now when we are under the impression that what we call the object of our wish is, as it were, a man who has not yet entered our room, and therefore can’t yet be seen, we imagine that any explanation of what it is we wish is only the next best thing to the explanation which would show the actual fact – which, we are afraid, can’t yet be shown as it has not entered. – It is as though I said to someone “I am expecting Mr. Smith”, and he asked me “Who is Mr. Smith?”, and I answered. “I can’t show him to you now, as he isn’t there. All I can show you is a picture of him”. It seems as though I could never entirely explain what I wished until it had actually happened. But of course this is a delusion. The truth is that I needn’t be able to give a better explanation of what I wished after the wish was fulfilled than before: for I might perfectly well have shown Mr. Smith to my friend, and have shown him what “coming in” means, and have shown him what my room is, before Mr. Smith came into my room.’
is the answer to the question – ‘what is the object of this wish?’ – a repetition of the answer to the question – ‘what is the object of your wish?’?
well – it might be – but it may not be
how one responds to any question – is open to question
you see it all depends where someone is coming from –
a philosopher – might answer to the second question – ‘a sense datum’
‘It seems as though I could never entirely explain what I wished until it had actually happened. But of course this is a delusion. The truth is that I needn’t be able to give a better explanation of what I wished after the wish was fulfilled than before: for I might perfectly well have shown Mr. Smith to my friend, and have shown him what “coming in” means, and have shown him what my room is, before Mr. Smith came into my room.’
any explanation of a proposal – in this case a wish-proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
so – the idea of ‘entirely explain’ – is misguided – if not straight out pretentious
if you understand that any explanation – is open to question – then all explanations have the same logical status
‘Our difficulty could be put this way: We think about things, – but how do these things enter into our thoughts? We think about Mr. Smith; but Mr. Smith need not be present. A picture of him won’t do: for how are we to know whom it represents? In fact no substitute for him will do. Then how can he himself be an object of our thoughts? (I am here using the expression “object our thought” in a different way from that in which I used it before. I mean now a thing I am thinking about, not ‘that which I am thinking’.)’
‘Our difficulty could be put this way: We think about things, – but how do these things enter into our thoughts?’
to think is to propose
our thoughts are proposals
‘We think about Mr. Smith; but Mr. Smith need not be present. A picture of him won’t do: for how are we to know whom it represents? In fact no substitute for him will do. Then how can he himself be an object of our thoughts?’
‘Mr. Smith’ is a proposal –
‘thinking about Mr. Smith’ – is proposing Mr. Smith –
and if ‘thinking about’ – has some teeth – it is putting the proposal – the proposal of Mr Smith – to question – to doubt –
it is exploring the uncertainty of the proposal that is ‘Mr. Smith’
‘(I am here using the expression “object our thought” in a different way from that in which I used it before. I mean now a thing I am thinking about, not ‘that which I am thinking’.)’
‘a thing that I am thinking about’ – is a proposal
‘that which I am thinking’ – is that which I am proposing
‘We said the connection between our thinking, or speaking, about a man and the man himself was made when, in order to explain the meaning of the word “Mr. Smith” we pointed to him, saying “this is Mr. Smith”. And there is nothing mysterious about this connection. I mean, there is np queer mental act which somehow conjures up Mr. Smith in our minds when he really isn’t there. What makes it difficult to see that this is the connection is a peculiar form of expression of ordinary language, which makes it appear that the connection between our thought (or the expression of our thought) and the thing we think about must have subsisted during the act of thinking.’
to point is to propose –
‘Mr Smith’ is a proposal – ‘the man himself’ – is a proposal
when we point to him – we are – through the propositional action of pointing – proposing him – proposing Mr. Smith
there is nothing mysterious about the ‘connection’ – so long as you recognise that the action of pointing – proposes
the connection between our thought – and the thing we think about – is propositional
our thought is proposal – and what we think about is what we propose
there is no ‘subsistence’ in propositional reality
what we have – what we deal with – in propositional reality – is the proposal – plain and simple –
a proposal does not carry any ‘subsisting’ or hidden baggage
what you see is what you get
and there is nothing else to see –
nothing else to see – unless of course – it is proposed
and anything that is proposed – any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
“Isn’t it queer that in Europe we should be able to mean someone who is in America?” – If someone had said “Napoleon was crowned in 1804”, and we asked him “Did you mean the man who won the battle of Austerlitz?” he might say “Yes, I meant him”. And the use of the past tense “meant” might make it appear as though the idea of Napoleon having won the battle of Austerlitz must have been present in the man’s mind when he said that Napoleon was crowned in 1804.’
the brute fact here is that what was ‘present in the man’s mind when he said’ – when he proposed – ‘Napoleon was crowned in 1804’ – is logically irrelevant to the proposal put
the proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
it is open to critical investigation
the question in response to this proposal – ‘Did you mean the man who won the battle of Austerlitz?’ – is fair enough
and his response too – is fair enough
what we have here is proposal put – and put to question
and a response – open to question
what did or did not go on in his mind when he put the initial proposal – has no logical bearing on the proposal – or any propositional response to it
perhaps – at the time of putting the proposal – he was thinking of what he would have for dinner –
it makes no difference what he was thinking about –
the proposal was put – it stands – and is open to question – regardless of what he was thinking
what is relevant from a logical point of view is that we have critical evaluation of any proposal put
and critical evaluation is the logical actions of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
‘Someone says, “Mr. N will come to see me this afternoon”; I ask “Do you mean him?” pointing to someone present, and he answers “Yes”. In this conversation a connection has was established between the word “Mr. N” and Mr. N. But we are tempted to think that while my friend said, “Mr. N will come to see me”, and meant what he said, his mind must have made the connection.
This is partly what makes us think of meaning or thinking as a peculiar mental activity, the word “mental” indicating that we mustn’t be expected to understand how these things work.’
the word ‘Mr. N’ – is a proposal –
Mr. N is a proposal – Mr N is proposed
logically speaking – whether or not his mind made the connection – is neither here nor there
what we have is a relation between proposals
‘meaning or thinking as a peculiar mental activity’?
meaning and thinking – are propositional activities
as to the word ‘mental’ –
I think that ‘mental’ – if it makes any sense at all – refers to private propositional activity –
propositional activity that is not public
private or public – any propositional activity is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘What we said of thinking can also be applied to imagining. Someone says, he imagines King’s college on fire. We can ask him: “How do you know it’s Kings College you imagine on fire? Couldn’t it be a different building, very much like it? In fact, is your imagination so absolutely exact that there might not be a dozen buildings whose representation your image could be?” – And still you say: “There is no doubt I imagine King’s College and no other building”. But can’t saying this be making, the very connection we want? For saying it is like writing the words “Portrait of so-and- so” under a picture. It might have been that while you imagined King’s College on fire you said the words “King’s College is on fire”. But in very many cases you certainly don’t speak explanatory words in your mind while you have the image. And consider even if you do, you are not going the whole way from your image of King’s College, but only to the words “King’s College”. The connection between these words and King’s College was, perhaps, made at another time.’
the proposal is put that – ‘King’s College is on fire’
any proposal – any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Wittgenstein raises doubts regarding this proposal
and we have from Wittgenstein a series of questions in relation to this proposal –
and from a logical point of view – that is how it should be
‘King’s College is on fire – as with any proposition – is uncertain
‘The fault in all our reasoning about these matters we are inclined to make is to think that images and experiences of all sorts, which are in some sense closely connected with each other, must be present in our minds at the same time. If we sing a tune which we know by heart, or say the alphabet, the notes or letters seem to hang together, and each seems to draw the next after it, as though they were a string of pearls in a box, and by pulling out one pearl I pulled out the one following it.’
as to propositional action – what is – or is not present in our minds – is irrelevant
what is relevant is what is proposed
images – experiences – minds – are propositional explanations –
explanations of the act of proposing – explanations of proposals
these explanations – are embedded in our propositional frameworks – because they have proved to be useful
and as with any propositional explanation – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the big mistake – from a logical point of view is to see these explanations – images – experiences – minds – as the primary focus of our critical activity
in truth – as with any explanation – they are back stories –
interesting and useful – but back stories nevertheless
we can get on with critical propositional activity – without them
these back stories – if given the primary focus – will lead you astray and you run the risk of falling into a miasma of irrelevance
singing a tune – or saying the alphabet – is quite simply following a rule –
in logical terms – it is playing a game
there are two modes of propositional activity and behaviour – the critical mode – and the game mode
Wittgenstein confuses the two
‘Now there is no doubt that, having the visual image of a string of beads being pulled out of a box through a hole in the lid, we should be inclined to say: “Those beads must have all been together in the box before.” But it is easy to see that this is making a hypothesis. I should have had the same image if the beads if the beads had gradually come into existence in the hole of the lid. We casually overlook the distinction between stating a conscious mental event, and making a hypothesis about what one might call the mechanism of mind. All the more as such hypotheses or pictures of the working of our mind are embodied in many of the forms of expression of our everyday language. The past tense ‘meant’ in the sentence “I meant the man who won the battle of Austerlitz” is part of such a picture, the mind being considered as a place in which what we remember is kept, stored, before we express it. If I whistle a tune I know well and am interrupted in the middle, if then someone asks me “did you know how to go on?” I should answer “yes, I did”. What sort of process is this knowing how to go on? It might appear as though the whole continuation of the tune had to be present while I knew how to go on.’
‘We casually overlook the distinction between stating a conscious mental event, and making a hypothesis about what one might call the mechanism of mind. All the more as such hypotheses or pictures of the working of our mind are embodied in many of the forms of expression of our everyday language.’
in putting this distinction between ‘a conscious mental event’ and a hypothesis about ‘the mechanism of mind’ – I see what Wittgenstein is getting at – but he hasn’t got it right
this ‘conscious mental’ event – is actually in the same boat as the ‘mechanism of mind’ hypothesis
they are both – propositional explanations
explanations of a proposal put
we have the proposal – whatever that might be – and it is described as a ‘conscious mental event’
‘conscious mental event’ – is a propositional description / explanation – of the proposal put
and then with ‘mechanism of mind’ – we have a proposed explanation of the ‘conscious mental event’
these explanations are not set in stone –
as with the subject proposal – they are indeed – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
so – we are dealing with proposals – and their relation to each other
the point to understand here is that the subject proposal put – as put – from a logical point of view – is without explanation
we can – and do propose explanation – and indeed explanation of the explanation
yes – these explanations – if they are functional – if they are useful – will be – and are incorporated into our language – ‘embodied in many of the forms of expression of our everyday language.’
and yes – it is only through question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty – that is – through critical analysis – that we can with such ‘embodied expressions’ – untangle the original proposal from its descriptions and explanations
‘conscious mental event’ – may well be a useful account of the proposal put – is some propositional contexts
and ‘mind’ – or ‘the mechanism of mind’ – may well suit to explain – ‘conscious mental event’
what is difficult for most to understand here – is that the ‘embodied expressions’ – are just that – expressions – proposals
‘conscious mental event’ – is just a proposal – a propositional explanation –
‘mind’ – is just a proposal – a propositional explanation –
put it this way – the ‘conscious mental event’ – is not a ‘thing’
‘mind’ – ‘the mechanism of mind’ – is not a ‘thing’ –
all we have here is proposals
our reality is what we propose – our reality is propositional –
and our reality – whatever we propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
beyond our proposal – beyond propositional reality – there is only the unknown –
and the unknown is silent
‘If I whistle a tune I know well and am interrupted in the middle, if then someone asks me “did you know how to go on?” I should answer “yes, I did”. What sort of process is this knowing how to go on? I t might appear as though the whole continuation of the tune had to be present while I knew how to go on.’
‘knowing how to go on’ – is following a rule
in this case it is knowing the rule of the tune
and the rule of the tune – can be understood and explained in a number of ways
for someone who can read music – the notation – may serve as the rule –
i.e. – if you want to whistle the tune – you follow the rule of the musical notation
for others it may just be learning the melody – the rule of the melody –
and that just may be listening – and practising
‘Ask yourself such a question as: “How long does it take to know how to go on?” Or is it an instantaneous process? Aren’t we making a mistake like mixing up the existence of a gramophone record of a tune with the existence of a tune? Aren’t we assuming that whenever a tune passes through existence there must be some sort of gramophone record of it from which it is played?’
how long does it take to know how to go on?
as long as it takes to learn the rule of the action
an instantaneous process?
nothing happens outside of time – so the so-called instantaneous process – still begs the question – how long?
here the gramophone record of a tune – is a form of the rule – that is the tune –
the tune is both a propositional action and a propositional rule –
i.e. – there is no action – no tune – without the rule
‘Consider the following example: a gun is fired in my presence and I say: “This crash wasn’t as loud as I expected.” Someone asks me: “How is this possible? Was there a crash, louder than that of a gun, in your imagination” I must confess that there was nothing of the sort. Now he says: “Then you didn’t really expect a louder crash – but perhaps the shadow of one. – And how did you know it was the shadow of a louder crash?” – Let’s see in such a case, might really have happened. Perhaps in waiting for the report I opened my mouth, held onto something to steady myself, and perhaps I said: “This is going to be terrible”. Then when the explosion was over: “It wasn’t so bad after all.” Certain tensions in my body relax. But what is the connection between these tensions, opening my mouth, etc., and a real louder crash? Perhaps this connection was made by having heard such a crash and having had the experiences mentioned.’
“Then you didn’t really expect a louder crash – but perhaps the shadow of one …?’
you did expect a louder crash – and to suggest that you in fact didn’t – is philosophical mischief making – which should be disregarded off-hand –
(bear in mind here that an expectation is a proposal – a proposal regarding what might happen –
and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain)
so – the shadow?
once again – nowhere to be seen –
this shadow argument annoys me –
it has no logical bearing on the matter at hand – and is nothing more than an unnecessary and irrelevant philosophical imposter
it’s the guest who was not invited to the party – but turns up anyway – and makes a nuisance of himself – by just hanging around
‘But what is the connection between these tensions, opening my mouth, etc., and a real louder crash? Perhaps this connection was made by having heard such a crash and having had the experiences mentioned.’
this question – is to ask – what is the ground of the expectation?
any proposal put here – including the one Wittgenstein suggests – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the ground of expectation is open to question – and open to doubt –
the ground of expectation is uncertain
‘Examine expressions like “having an idea in one’s mind”, “analysing the idea before one’s mind”. In order not to be misled by them see what really happens when, say, in writing a letter you are looking for the words which correctly express the idea which is ‘before your mind’. To say that we are trying to express the idea which is before our mind is to use a metaphor, one which very naturally suggests itself, and which is alright so long as it doesn’t mislead us when philosophizing. For when we recall what really happens in such cases we find a great variety of processes more or less akin to each other. – We might be inclined to say that in all such cases, at any rate, we are guided by something before our mind. But then the words “guided” and “thing before our mind” are used in as many senses as the words “idea” and ‘expression of an idea”.’
‘having an idea in one’s mind’ – is putting a proposal
‘analysing the idea before one’s mind’ – is putting the proposal to question – to doubt – and exploring its uncertainty
‘one’s mind’ – amounts to a propositional explanation of the proposal – and the proposal put
logically speaking such an explanation is really of no consequence
what is pertinent – is the proposal put
‘one’s mind’ – is a background story – a form of propositional packaging
the point of the idea of mind is to give some sense of a basis – a ground to propositional action
however – the only ground to propositional action – is uncertainty
‘mind’ as a proposal – is – as with any other proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘In order not to be misled by them see what really happens when, say, in writing a letter you are looking for the words which correctly express the idea which is ‘before you’re your mind’
you have a proposal – and in looking for the words to correctly express that proposal
you are involved in a critical activity – of question – of doubt – and of uncertainty
‘For when we recall what really happens in such cases we find a great variety of processes more or less akin to each other. – We might be inclined to say that in all such cases, at any rate, we are guided by something before our mind. But then the words “guided” and “thing before our mind” are used in as many senses as the words “idea” and “expression of an idea”.’
recalling what really happens – is about putting forward propositional explanations
‘guided by something before our mind’ –
what is ‘before our mind’ – whether it is described as an ‘idea’ – or the ‘expression of an idea’ – or however else it is described – is a proposal
it is the proposal that guides
and it is the proposal that is then given explanation – through the logical actions of question and doubt –
and it through these logical actions that propositional uncertainty is explored
the phrase ‘to express an idea which is already before our mind’ –
is an expression that foreshadows a proposal – a proposition –
the idea being that the proposition has not been put – but it will be put
‘before our mind’ – is an attempt to explain the foreshadowing – to give it some significance
it is not that the proposition is there – and expressed in a different language –
the proposition has not been put –
and not – as yet been put – in any language
and this idea of translating from a mental image to a verbal image – is again – no more than to give some account of this foreshadowing
really this phrase ‘to express an idea which is before our mind’ – is a piece of rhetoric
the foreshadowing – is rhetoric –
the point is to put the proposition – and get on with it – not arse about with unnecessary backgrounding
in the case where I am ‘groping for a word’ – I am trying to form a proposal – to make a proposal –
and when I have found the word that will do the job – I put the proposal
‘that is what I meant’ – you might say if you want to give the impression that you knew something – before you knew it –
a good example of pretention
‘(We should be inclined to say that the proof of the impossibility of trisecting the angle with a ruler and compasses analyses our idea of the trisection of an angle. But the proof gives us a new idea of trisection, one which we didn’t have before the proof constructed it. The proof led us [on] a road which we were never inclined to go; but it led away from where we were, and didn’t just show us clearly where we had been all the time)’
‘We should be inclined to say that the proof of the impossibility of trisecting the angle with a ruler and compasses analyses our idea of the trisection of an angle.’
the proof is an analysis of the idea of the trisection of an angle –
and as with any analysis – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘But the proof gives us a new idea of trisection, one which we didn’t have before the proof constructed it.’
yes – any critical evaluation – any process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty – should open up any proposal to further investigation – which may result in a new idea
‘The proof led us [on] a road which we were never inclined to go; but it led away from where we were, and didn’t just show us clearly where we had been all the time)’
strictly speaking – logically speaking – this so called ‘proof’ – is a rule governed propositional game
you play the game – according to its rules – you get the result – according to its rules
still – we can ask – is the trisection of an angle possible?
on this issue of the trisection of an angle – in my book Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations pages 312-313 – I wrote the following:
‘it is possible to trisect an arbitrary angle using tools other than straightedge and compass – i.e. neusis construction which involves the simultaneous sliding and rotation of a straightedge’
this was a method used by ancient Greeks
other methods have been developed over time by mathematicians
the ‘proof of impossibility’ comes down to an algebraic argument –
if you accept the premises – the mathematics of this argument – then the conclusion follows –
i.e. – it can be shown that a 60° cannot be trisected
the question this raises is just whether the mathematics employed here fits the task –
and indeed – whether there is a ‘real’ problem here at all –
or is it just that we have a language-game – a clever algebraic game – played in the wrong context?’
‘Let us now revert to the point where we said that we gained nothing by assuming that a shadow must intervene between the expression of our thought and the reality with which our thought is concerned. We said that if we wanted a picture of reality the sentence itself is such a picture (though not a picture by similarity)’
yes –
the sentence – is the proposed reality –
and this proposed reality – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there ‘must be’ what is called a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc. And I want to give you the following rule of thumb: If you are puzzled about the nature of thought, belief, knowledge, and the like, substitute for the thought the expression of the thought, etc. The difficulty which lies in this substitution, and at the same time the whole point of it, is this: the expression of a belief, thought etc., is just a sentence; –
and the sentence has sense only as a member of a system of language; as one expression within a calculus. Now we are tempted to imagine that this calculus, as it were, as a permanent background to every sentence which we say, and to think that, although the sentence as written on a piece of paper or spoken stands isolated, in the mental act of thinking the calculus is there – all in a lump. The mental act seems to perform in a miraculous way what could not be performed by any act of manipulating symbols. Now when the temptation to think that in some sense the whole calculus must be present at the same time vanishes, there is no more point in postulating the existence of a peculiar kind of mental act alongside of our expression. This, of course, doesn’t mean that we have shown that peculiar acts of consciousness do not accompany the expression of our thought! Only we no longer say that they must accompany them.’
‘And I want to give you the following rule of thumb: If you are puzzled about the nature of thought, belief, knowledge, and the like, substitute for the thought the expression of the thought, etc. The difficulty which lies in this substitution, and at the same time the whole point of it, is this: the expression of a belief, thought etc., is just a sentence; – and the sentence has sense only as a member of a system of language; as one expression within a calculus.’
a thought – is a proposal
a belief – is a proposal
a sentence – is a proposal –
the sense of a sentence – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a calculus is a rule governed propositional game
the sense of s sentence – of a system of language – is not rule-governed –
it is a critical issue
‘Now we are tempted to imagine that this calculus, as it were, as a permanent background to every sentence which we say, and to think that, although the sentence as written on a piece of paper or spoken stands isolated, in the mental act of thinking the calculus is there – all in a lump. The mental act seems to perform in a miraculous way what could not be performed by any act of manipulating symbols. Now when the temptation to think that in some sense the whole calculus must be present at the same time vanishes, there is no more point in postulating the existence of a peculiar kind of mental act alongside of our expression.’
propositional possibilities – in one sense are a permanent background – a permanent possibility
possibility doesn’t vanish – and possibility is not a ‘lump’
there never was a point in postulating the existence of a peculiar kind of mental act alongside our expression
all we in fact have is a proposal – that when put to question – can be elaborated on
and any elaboration is a propositional response to the subject proposal –
and any proposed elaboration – as with the subject proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘This, of course, doesn’t mean that we have shown that peculiar acts of consciousness do not accompany the expression of our thought! Only we no longer say that they must accompany them.’
there are no ‘peculiar acts of act of consciousness’ –
there are only propositional constructions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘‘But the expression of our thought can always lie, for we may say one thing and mean another”. Imagine the many different things which happen when we say one thing and mean another! – Make the following experiment: say the sentence “It is hot in this room”, and mean: “it is cold”. Observe closely what you are doing.’
yes – the expression of our thought can lie –
but even where it is claimed it doesn’t lie – the relation between the two proposals – the thought / proposal – and the expression proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and – any so called ‘lie’ – is open to question
“it’s hot in this room” – and mean ‘it is cold’? –
what are we doing here?
well – it depends on propositional context
in the example Wittgenstein gives – it is an ‘exercise’ –
but it could be described in any number of ways
perhaps one has a dry sense of humour
the logical point is that the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘We could easily imagine beings who do their private thinking by means of ‘asides’ and who manage their lies by saying one thing aloud, following it by an aside which says the opposite.’
one gets the impression here that Wittgenstein doesn’t understand private thinking
if their ‘lies’ expressed aloud – are followed by asides –
what we have here is two public proposals – the expressed ‘lie’ – and – the aside –
for the ‘aside’ – is a public proposal
‘“But meaning, thinking. etc. are private experiences. They are not activities like writing or speaking, etc.” – But why shouldn’t they be the specific private experiences of writing – the muscular, visual, tactile sensations of writing or speaking?’
here it looks like Wittgenstein doesn’t understand public actions – and the difference between private and public propositional acts
what are dealing with is proposals – private or public –
proposals – that is – what is put
you can analyse – a private action in terms of sensations – shall we say felt sensations
you can analyse a public action or experience in terms of sensations – observable – measurable effects
the point here is that the sensation argument – is irrelevant to the issue of the difference between private and public proposals – private and public propositional actions
and really – the difference is no great mystery – private proposals – are one’s that are not given public expression – proposals that others do not have access to –
public proposals – are those proposals that when put – others do have access to
here – again it might be argued that in so far another may interpret muscular visual and tactile sensations – the private proposals – are therefore not private – but public
the key point is that regardless of any interpretation – if the proposal is not put in a public arena – it is private
private and public – are categories of propositional space
private or public is a question of propositional space
and remember – for a proposition to be – in any space – it must be put
if not put it – it’s not in the space – it’s not there
‘Make the following experiment: say and mean a sentence, e.g.: “It will probably rain tomorrow”. Now think the same thought again, mean what you just meant, but without saying anything (either aloud or to yourself). If thinking that it will rain tomorrow accompanied saying that it will rain tomorrow, then just do the first activity and leave out the second. – If thinking and speaking stood in the relation of words and the melody of a song, we could leave out the speaking and do the thinking just as we can sing the tune without words.’
‘Now think the same thought again, mean what you just meant, but without saying anything (either aloud or to yourself).’
thinking the same thought – is putting the same proposal
‘mean without saying anything (either aloud or to yourself).’ –
to mean something without verbalizing it – either privately or publicly? –
is this to suggest that you can mean something – without language of any kind or form – effectively – without the faculty of language?
that is to say – you can mean something without proposing it?
this makes no sense
also – we must distinguish here ‘meaning’ – i.e. – the meaning of a sentence – how it is interpreted – and – the act of meaning what you say –
in the first case – we are talking about a critical process of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
in the second case we are dealing with a rhetorical use of language –
you ‘mean what you say’ – to persuade – to convince – yourself or others of the significance of what you propose
the point here is that whether you are investigating the meaning of a proposal – or persuading yourself or others of the significance of a proposal – neither can happen – without proposal – proposal of one kind or another
‘If thinking and speaking stood in the relation of words and the melody of a song, we could leave out the speaking and do the thinking just as we can sing the tune without words.’
yes – you could leave out the speaking and do the thinking –
in that case your proposals would be entirely private –
but how realistic is this?
even people who cannot speak – due to some disability or illness – manage to communicate publicly through various means – i.e. – gestures – motor and sound – and sign languages
‘But can’t one at any rate speak and leave out the thinking? Certainly – but observe what sort of thing you are doing if you speak without thinking. Observe first of all that the process which we might call “speaking and meaning what you speak” is not necessarily distinguished from speaking thoughtlessly by what happens at the time when you speak. What distinguishes the two might very well be what happens before or after you speak.’
yes – we can and do speak without thinking –
that is without critically investigating the proposal privately – before making it public
‘speaking thoughtlessly’ – most likely means saying something that doesn’t fit the propositional context of the moment –
you may recognise this at the time – or after the event
‘speaking and meaning what you say’ – is a rhetorical propositional use –
we can and do speak thoughtlessly and rhetorically
‘Suppose I tried, deliberately to speak without thinking – what in fact would I do? I might read out a sentence from a book, trying to read it automatically, that is, trying to prevent myself from following the sentence with images and sensations which otherwise it would produce, A way of doing this would be to concentrate my attention on something else while I was speaking the sentence, e.g. by pinching my skin hard while I was speaking – Put it this way: Speaking a sentence without thinking consists in switching on speech and switching off certain accompaniments of speech. Now ask yourself: Does thinking the sentence without speaking it consist in turning over the switch (switching on what we previously switched off and vice versa): that is; does thinking the sentence without speaking it now simply consist in keeping on what accompanied the words but leaving out the words? Try to think the thoughts of a sentence without the sentence and see whether this is what happens.’
‘Suppose I tried, deliberately to speak without thinking – what in fact would I do?
any deliberate propositional action – will involve the critical faculty – i.e. – what am I going to say? – how will I say it? –
‘Put it this way: Speaking a sentence without thinking consists in switching on speech and switching off certain accompaniments of speech.’
one can speak sentence – put a proposal – without any prior critical action with regard to the sentence / proposal –
the accompaniments of speech – i.e. – images – sensations –
and such accompaniments can be subject to critical evaluation – can be the subject of thinking – or not
if not – they are merely effects of the sentence – the proposal –
they are not the sentence – they are not the proposal
‘Now ask yourself: Does thinking the sentence without speaking it consist in turning over the switch (switching on what we previously switched off and vice versa): that is; does thinking the sentence without speaking it now simply consist in keeping on what accompanied the words but leaving out the words?’
thinking is the critical activity of question – of doubt – and the exploration of logical uncertainty
‘thinking the sentence without speaking it’ – is critically evaluating a proposal without making the proposal public
‘what accompanied the words but leaving out the words’ – i.e. – an image
in so far as any such ‘accompaniment’ is noncritical – it is logically irrelevant
‘Let us sum up: If we scrutinize the usages which we make of such words as “thinking”, “meaning”, “wishing”, etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some peculiar medium. We are no longer prevented by the established forms of expression from recognizing that the experience of thinking may be just the experience of saying, or may consist of this experience plus others which accompany it. (It is also useful to examine the following case. Suppose a multiplication is part of a sentence; ask yourself what is it like to say the multiplication 7 x 5 = 35, thinking it, and, on the other hand, saying it without thinking,) The scrutiny of the grammar of a word weakens the position of certain fixed standards of expression which had prevented us from seeing facts with unbiased eyes. Our investigation tried to remove this bias, which forces us to think that the facts must conform to certain pictures embedded in our language.’
‘Let us sum up: If we scrutinize the usages which we make of such words as “thinking”, “meaning”, “wishing”, etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some peculiar medium.’
in philosophy we should never be rid of temptation – it is the door to possibility
I see no problem in looking for ‘a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some peculiar medium’
any scrutiny of usages – that is – any critical examination of the proposals that we operate with – is good logical practise
and it is fair enough to ask the question – what is behind our acts of expressing – what is their ground and basis?
without such questions there would be no western philosophy
have no fear – any answer here is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
nevertheless – answers to this question may prove useful in certain propositional contexts
‘We are no longer prevented by the established forms of expression from recognizing that the experience of thinking may be just the experience of saying, or may consist of this experience plus others which accompany it.’
the ‘experience of thinking’ – is the experience of questioning – of doubt – and of exploring propositional uncertainty
you can ‘experience saying’ – without thinking – without any critical evaluation of what you are saying
‘(It is also useful to examine the following case. Suppose a multiplication is part of a sentence; ask yourself what is it like to say the multiplication 7 x 5 = 35, thinking it, and, on the other hand, saying it without thinking.)’
mathematics is a rule governed propositional game
to say the multiplication 7 x 5 = 35 – while thinking it – is to say the rule of this mathematical game – while thinking it –
saying it without thinking – is to say the rule of the game – without thinking it
in either case – it is simply a matter of recognizing and following the rule
‘The scrutiny of the grammar of a word weakens the position of certain fixed standards of expression which had prevented us from seeing facts with unbiased eyes. Our investigation tried to remove this bias, which forces us to think that the facts must conform to certain pictures embedded in our language.’
‘the scrutiny of grammar’ – the critical evaluation of proposals
‘fixed standards of expression’ – are only ‘fixed’ – if not put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored –
isn’t it the ‘fact’ that putting proposals to question – whether they are ‘fixed’ or not – is just what philosophers do – and have always done?
doing this – critically examining proposals put – is just where philosophy – and for that matter – any rational activity – begins – and where it ends
‘“Meaning” is one of the words of which one may say that they have odd jobs in our language. It is these words which cause most philosophical troubles. Imagine some institution: most of the members have certain regular functions, functions which can easily be described, say, in the statutes of the institution. There are on the other hand, some members who are employed for odd jobs, which nevertheless may be extremely important. – What causes most trouble in philosophy is that we are tempted to describe the use of important ‘odd-job’ words as though they were words with regular functions.’
language is not an institution
propositional activity – of any kind – is not determined by statutes –
philosophy – is not guided or determined by statutes –
a word is a proposal –
a word may have a regular use – and it may have an unusual use –
this will be a question of propositional context
whether regular or irregular – and regardless of any propositional context –
any word is open to question
a word – any word – will only give you trouble – if you are unable to see that it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘The reason I postponed talking about personal experience was that thinking about this topic raises a hot of philosophical difficulties which threaten to break up all our commonsense notions about what we should commonly call the objects of our experience. And if we were struck by these problems it might seem to us that all we have said about signs and the various objects we mentioned in our examples may have to go into the melting pot.’
here is the point – any proposal is valid – and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
this goes for our common-sense notions – and any alternatives views that might be put forward –
our propositional reality – is anything but one dimensional –
on any matter there are as may different notions and views – as are proposed
we live and operate in a world of possible views – possible interpretations –
that is our propositional reality
so called ‘common sense notions’ – tend to be very useful in day to day living
where we are dealing with specialized issues – and problems – we need to bring to bear different proposals – different propositional structures
it is all a question of context – and use
there is no contradiction in holding a common-sense view of the world – and at the same time a specialized view – i.e. – a philosophical view – a scientific view
we can and do operate with different propositional structures – effectively – at the same time
the melting pot?
I don’t think there is any ‘melting’ going on – there is no need for it
what we have is a range of different propositional perspectives – that can be held together –
that are – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
as is any choice we make as to what will be most useful to us at any point in time
‘The situation in a way is typical in the study of philosophy; and one sometimes has described it by saying that no philosophical problem can be solved until all philosophical problems are solved; which means as long as they aren’t all solved every new difficulty renders all our previous results questionable. To this statement we can only give a rough answer if we are to speak about philosophy in such general terms. It is, that every new problem that arises may put in question the position which our previous partial results are to occupy in the final picture. One then speaks of having to reinterpret these previous results; and we should say: they have to be placed in a different surrounding.’
‘all philosophical problems?’
what does this mean? – problems philosophers have dealt with – and will deal with?
seriously – no-one can know – all the problems formulated and addressed by all philosophers of the past – and is anyone really suggesting you can say what the future holds with respect to philosophical problems?
and as to solutions to philosophical problems –
this is very naïve
firstly – so called ‘philosophical problems’ are in fact no different to any other problem –
conflicting – or different propositions are put – and are critically examined – put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainty explored –
and as a result of such a critical investigation – new proposals are put –
new proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the point being here – that from a logical point of view – whatever the ‘problem’ – and however it is described – there is no final solution –
any so called ‘solution’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
in practise – we make decisions about what works and what doesn’t – and proceed on that basis –
but again – any such decision – is open to question –
we operate in uncertainty – and we deal with uncertainty
and what this means is that any issue – and any formulation of any issue – in whatever propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – its status – uncertain
logically speaking we are always ‘reinterpreting’ any ‘results’ – and proposing different ‘surroundings’ – different – and new propositional contexts
propositional contexts – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Imagine we had to arrange the books of a library. When we begin the books lie higgledy-piggledy on the floor. Now there would be many ways of sorting them and putting them in their places. One would be to take the books one by one and, put each on the shelf in its right place. On the other hand we might take up several books from the floor and put them in a row on a shelf merely in order to indicate that these books ought to go together in this order. In the course of arranging the library this whole row of books will have to change its place. But it would be wrong to say that therefore putting them together on a shelf was no step towards the final result. In this case, in fact, it is pretty obvious that having put together books which belong together was a definite achievement, even though the whole row of them had to be shifted. But some of the greatest achievements in philosophy could only be compared with taking up some books which seemed to belong together, and putting them on different shelves; nothing more being final about their position than that they no longer lie side by side. The onlooker who doesn’t know the difficulty of the task might well think in such a case that nothing at all had been achieved. – The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than we know. E.g., to see that when we have put two books together in their right order we have not thereby put them in their final places.’
philosophical work is not arranging pieces in a jig-saw puzzle
philosophical work is a critical investigation – a critical investigation of proposals / propositions put
so called ‘philosophical propositions’ – from a logical point of view – are no different to any other proposal – any other proposition
any proposition – in any context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘achievements in philosophy’?
any proposed ‘achievement’ in philosophy – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
philosophers – like anybody else – will talk up their work – or the work of those they agree with –
and here – what we have is rhetoric – persuasion – advertising
and as for ‘right order’ –
there is no propositional ‘right order’ –
yes – you can get propositional ‘systems’ – that are a result of a cobbling together of proposals from different ‘philosophical’ quarters –
nothing wrong with this – if such a mishmash serves some purpose – and is seen to be useful
regardless of what is put together with what – any proposal – any propositional system – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking – there is no ‘final place’ – for any proposition – ‘philosophical’ – or otherwise
any proposal – any proposition – is open – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘When we think about the relation of the objects surrounding us to our personal experiences of them, we are sometimes tempted to think that these personal experiences are the material of which reality consists. How this temptation arises will become clearer later on.’
the objects surrounding us are proposals – proposals we put – proposals put to us
our personal experiences of the objects surrounding us – are proposals put in relation to proposals
reality is what is proposed –
reality is propositional –
our proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
propositional reality is uncertain
reality is uncertain
‘When we think in this way we seem to lose our firm hold on the objects surrounding us. And instead we are left with a lot of separate personal experiences of different individuals. These personal experiences again seem vague and seem to be in constant flux. Our language seems not to be made to describe them. We are tempted to think that in order to clear up such matters philosophically our ordinary language is too coarse, that we need a more subtle one.’
‘When we think in this way we seem to lose our firm hold on the objects surrounding us.’
I don’t think so –
our ‘personal experiences’ – are proposals put to the object /proposal –
if anything – by proposing in relation to the object / proposal – we establish a connection with the object / proposal
‘And instead we are left with a lot of separate personal experiences of different individuals’
what we have – is different proposals – put to different individuals
‘These personal experiences again seem vague and seem to be in constant flux.’
our propositional reality is dynamic
‘Our language seems not to be made to describe them’
well – it does describe them – otherwise we wouldn’t be having this conversation
but the logical reality is that any description – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘We are tempted to think that in order to clear up such matters philosophically our ordinary language is too coarse, that we need a more subtle one.’
there are no ‘matters’ to clear up here –
what you have – what you always have – is propositional uncertainty
and it is this propositional uncertainty – that gives you the option of further critical investigation – and analysis
‘We seem to have made a discovery – which I could describe by saying that the ground on which appeared to be firm and reliable was found to be boggy and unsafe. – That is, this happens when we philosophize; for as soon as we revert to the standpoint of common sense this general uncertainty disappears.’
this – so called – ‘standpoint of common sense’ – is what? – decided by who?
look – the reality is that this claim of ‘common sense’ – is really just a rhetorical ploy designed to silence alternative views
it’s a last resort for the ignorant and pretentious
if you resort to this ‘standpoint’ – yes – general uncertainty – ‘disappears’ –
it disappears because questions are not asked – doubts are not raised – uncertainties are not explored –
there is no ‘discovery’ made here –
our propositions are open to questions – open to doubt – and uncertain
our propositional life is uncertain –
this is our everyday reality – different proposals – alternative proposals – put to question – put to doubt –
our world is a world of propositional uncertainties
and in our lives – we explore this world
‘This queer situation can be cleared up somewhat by looking at an example in fact a kind of parable illustrating the difficulty we are in, and also showing the way out of this sort of difficult: We have been told by popular scientists that the floor on which we stand is not solid, as it appears to common sense, as it has been discovered that the wood consists of particles filling space so thinly that it can almost be called empty. This is liable to perplex us, for in a way we know that the floor is solid, or that, if it isn’t solid, this may be due to the wood being rotten but not to its being composed of electrons. To say, on this latter ground, that the floor is not solid is to misuse language. For even if the particles were as big as grains of sand, and as close together as these are in a sand-heap, the floor would not be solid, if it were composed of them in the sense is in which the sand-heap is composed of grains. Our perplexity was based on a misunderstanding: the picture of the thinly filled space had been wrongly applied. For this picture of the structure of matter was meant to explain the very phenomenon of solidity.’
‘To say, on this latter ground, that the floor is not solid is to misuse language.’
for our everyday purposes it suits us to say that the floor is solid
however – the world of subatomic particles – is not a world of every day purposes
the propositions of sub-atomic physics call in question – our understanding of matter
the propositions / theories of sub-atomic physics present a different view of the nature of matter – to that of common experience
and the opposite is also true – our common experience gives us a different propositional reading to that offered by physics
these are not the only possible different views of the nature of matter
i.e. – idealists will argue that ‘matter’ is a misnomer – that in fact what we deal with is mind or spirit
and Spinoza argued that matter and mind are really two aspects of the one substance – which he understood to be God – or nature
different proposals – different propositional perspectives – on any matter – are not a misuse of language – they are different uses of language
where we have different propositional perspectives – we should expect different understandings – different definitions of the terms used
in the case of ‘solidity’ – it is clear that from the point of view of the sub-atomic perspective – the commonplace notion of solidity – does not figure – it’s not there –
and the point to be taken here – is not that we are dealing with a contradiction or a paradox – but rather that what we have is just an alternative propositional perspective – a different view
and the same is true the other way around –
‘particles filling space so thinly that it can almost be called empty’ – have no purchase in our commonplace experience of dealing with material things
‘empty space particles’ – is a propositional concept from an alternative perspective to what we would call our ordinary experience of the material world
our propositional world is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and it is out of this uncertainty that different propositional perspectives can and do emerge
we are all enriched by these different views –
uncertainty is the ground of human creativity
and it is obvious – and yet important to realise – that no one perspective suits all human purposes – all human needs –
i.e. – we can’t do physics with a common-sense view of the world – and we could not deal with our day-to-day reality – with a purely sub-atomic view of matter –
nevertheless – the fact remains – we are quite adept at entertaining these different views – and others – at the same time –
and I think that is because – deep down we understand – the uncertainty of our propositional existence
‘As in this example the word “solidity” was used wrongly and it seemed that we had shown that nothing really was solid, just in this way, in stating our puzzles about the general vagueness of sense experience, and about the flux of all phenomena, we are using the words “flux” and “vagueness” wrongly, in a typically metaphysical way, namely without an antithesis; whereas in their correct everyday use vagueness is opposed to clearness, flux to stability, inaccuracy to accuracy, and problem to solution. The very word “problem” one might say, is misapplied when used for our philosophical troubles. These difficulties, as long as they are seen as problems, are tantalizing, and appear insoluble.’
sense experience – is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
phenomena – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any term – any word – used in any propositional context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
our ‘philosophical troubles’ – are no different to any other trouble we might face –
whether in the ‘trouble’ phase – the ‘problem’ faze – the ‘puzzle’ faze – what we face is propositional uncertainty
and any ‘resolution’ to our troubles – our problems – our puzzles – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘There is a temptation for me to say that only my own experience is real: “I know that I see, hear, feel pains, etc., but not that anyone else does: I can’t know this, because I am I and they are they.”’
perhaps this ‘temptation’ exists in the absence of any critical examination of what it means to know
what I know – is what I propose
knowledge is what is proposed – knowledge is propositional
what I see – is what I propose – what I hear – is what I propose –
what I feel – is what I propose – if I feel a pain – I propose a pain –
now these proposals can all be put to question –
can all be subjected to critical examination
we can always question – what it is we see – what it is we hear – and what we feel –
and i.e. – a physician – may well give us reason to question our pain – i.e. – its location – its origin
our proposals – our propositions – are all – open to question – open to doubt – and as such – uncertain
our ‘knowledge’ – what we ‘know’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a proposal – a proposition – that is not open to question – not open to doubt – and regarded as certain – is a dead proposal – it is a prejudice
any claim to knowledge – that is not open to question – is false – and is pretentious
such a claim is rightly seen to be grounded in ignorance
‘I know that I see, hear, feel pains, etc., but not that anyone else does: I can’t know this, because I am I and they are they.’
‘I am I and they are they’ – is of no relevance to the question of knowledge
any proposal put – any proposition put – by anyone – in any context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
where it comes from – who it comes from – is logically irrelevant –
propositional back stories – are irrelevant – and if given any importance – will lead us astray
I can know what another sees – hears – feels – if what they see – hear – feel –
is proposed –
and any such proposals – are open to critical examination – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘On the other hand I feel ashamed to say so to anyone that my experience is the real one; and I know that he could reply that he could say exactly the same thing about his experience. This seems to lead us to a silly quibble. Also I am told: “If you pity someone for having pains, surely you must at least believe that he has pains.” But how can I even believe this? How can these words make sense to me? How could I even come by the idea of another’s experience if there is no possibility of evidence for it?’
‘On the other hand I feel ashamed to say so to anyone that my experience is the real one; and I know that he could reply that he could say exactly the same thing about his experience’
what is real is what is proposed –
and what is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
“If you pity someone for having pains, surely you must at least believe that he has pains.” But how can I even believe this?
you entertain the proposal put – and critically examine it
‘How could I even come by the idea of another’s experience if there is no possibility of evidence for it?’
the evidence – is the proposal – and the evidence is open to question
‘But wasn’t this a queer question to ask? Can’t I believe that someone else has pains? Is it not quite easy to believe this? – Is it an answer to say that things are as they appear to common sense? – Again, needless to say, we don’t feel these difficulties in ordinary life. Nor is it true to say that we feel them when we scrutinize our experiences by introspection, or make scientific investigations about them. But somehow, when we look at them in a certain way, our expression is likely to get into a tangle. It seems to us as though we had either the wrong pieces, or not enough of them, to put together our jig-saw puzzle. But they are all there, only all mixed up: and there is a further analogy between the jig-saw puzzle and our case: It’s no use trying to apply force in fitting pieces together. All we should do is to look at them carefully and arrange them.’
‘Can’t I believe that someone else has pains?’
yes – you can – just because others propose that they have pain –
however – any such proposal – is open to question – your belief – is open to question
and there are all kinds of questions that can be asked – as any practicing physician will attest
our propositional lives – our knowledge of the world – is not a matter of playing with a jig-saw puzzle –
our propositional lives – our knowledge of the world – is a critical issue
and once again Wittgenstein misapplies the propositional game model into the critical setting
game-playing is rule governed – critical analysis and investigation – is not –
and as a result his whole notion of epistemology – is wrong
problems or issues of knowledge are critical issues – issues open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
game-playing has no place in genuine epistemological investigation – it’s not in the picture –
and to suggest that it is – is to make a mockery of the problem of knowledge
Wittgenstein says the pieces ‘are all there’ – how does he know this?
in any critical evaluation of a proposition – what is relevant to that consideration – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
to suggest that we have all the pieces – is pretentious
‘All we should do is to look at them carefully and arrange them.’
any ‘arrangement’ – however carefully made – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
arranging – rearranging – doesn’t have any value at all – unless what is proposed – is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty – explored
‘There are propositions of which we may say that they describe facts in the material world (external world). Roughly speaking, they treat of physical objects: bodies, fluids. I am not thinking in particular of the laws of natural science, but of any such proposition as ’the tulips in our garden are in full bloom”, or “Smith will come in any moment”. There are on the other hand propositions describing personal experiences, as when the subject in a psychological experiment describes his sense-experiences: say his visual experience, independent of what bodies are before his eyes, and n.b., independent also of any processes which might be observed to take place in his retina, his nerves, his brain, or other parts of his body. (That is, independent of both physical and psychological facts.)’
from a logical point of view – all we have – is proposal – proposition –
and any proposition put is – is uncertain – is open to question – open to doubt – and open to exploration
what this means is that propositions can be and are given further description –
that – propositions – are open to interpretation
we can ask – questions like – how do we account for this proposition? – what is its basis – its origin?
and in response to such questions – we get different analyses of the proposition put
any analysis will be propositional
so – where you have a proposition – further described as having a ‘material’ description
it will be placed within a propositional perspective described as ‘material’ – of the ‘external world’
and where a proposition is described as an account of a ‘personal experience’ – it may well be placed within what is described as a ‘psychological perspective’ – a subjective perspective
these and other propositional perspectives – are possible propositional back stories – for the proposition in question
we have these back stories – just because we have found them to be useful –
we find them useful for understanding – and describing – and navigating the propositional landscape – the world we live in
but really all we are dealing with here is – description of the proposition –
description that emerges as a result of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
these descriptions – the propositional perspectives – these propositional back stories – logically speaking – are no different to the proposition that that they describe
they are – as with the subject proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘There are on the other hand propositions describing personal experiences, as when the subject in a psychological experiment describes his sense-experiences: say his visual experience, independent of what bodies are before his eyes, and n.b., independent also of any processes which might be observed to take place in his retina, his nerves, his brain, or other parts of his body. (That is, independent of both physical and psychological facts.)’
yes – of course –
the point really is that any proposal put – any proposition put – stands on its own two feet
its legitimacy – its validity – does not depend on it being incorporated into any propositional perspective
a proposition can indeed stand without a back story
‘At first sight it may appear (but why it should can only become clear later) that here we have two kinds of worlds, world built of different materials; a mental world and a physical world. The mental world in fact is liable to be imagined as gaseous, or rather, aethereal. But let us remind you here of the queer role which the gaseous and aethereal play in philosophy, – when we perceive that a substantive is not used as what in general we should call the name of an object, and when therefore we can’t help saying to ourselves that it is the name of an aethereal object. I mean, we already know the idea of ‘aethereal objects’ as a subterfuge, when we are embarrassed about the grammar of certain words, and when all we know is that they are not used as names for material objects. This is a hint as to how the problem of the two materials, mind and matter, is going to dissolve.’
‘At first sight it may appear (but why it should can only become clear later) that here we have two kinds of worlds, world built of different materials; a mental world and a physical world.’
we don’t have two kinds of worlds –
to be precise – what we have here is two different propositional descriptions – two different propositional perspectives – two of a potentially infinite number
and these perspectives are effectively just proposals – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘The mental world in fact is liable to be imagined as gaseous, or rather, aethereal. But let us remind you here of the queer role which the gaseous and aethereal play in philosophy, – when we perceive that a substantive is not used as what in general we should call the name of an object, and when therefore we can’t help saying to ourselves that it is the name of an aethereal object.’
nice try –
Wittgenstein is here suggesting that the mental perspective – is really – no more than a mistake – that occurs because we have not used a substantive as the name of an object
the reality is that the ‘mental perspective’ – is no less a valid propositional description – and perspective – than the material description and perspective
a proposal – a proposition – is open – open to question – open to doubt – open to propositional exploration –
and as such – any description is valid
‘aethereal object’ – is nothing more than a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and – as with any other object / proposal – uncertain
‘I mean, we already know the idea of ‘aethereal objects’ as a subterfuge, when we are embarrassed about the grammar of certain words, and when all we know is that they are not used as names for material objects. This is a hint as to how the problem of the two materials, mind and matter, is going to dissolve.’
from a logical point of view – there are no ‘propositional subterfuges’ –
there is only propositions put – and put to question
and as for ‘grammar’ – grammar is what we make it –
it is to my mind a real subterfuge – to pretend that any genuine critical issue – any genuine philosophical issue – is rendered impotent by grammar
all Wittgenstein does with his ‘grammar’ – is find a new term for his deep-seated prejudices
‘This is a hint as to how the problem of the two materials, mind and matter, is going to dissolve.’
as to the problem of the two materials – mind and matter – ‘dissolving’ in grammar –
such a suggestion – is quite ridiculous
what we have here with ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ – is two proposals – two propositional perspectives – two propositional constructions – that on the face of it are not compatible –
now this prime facie incompatibility – raises questions – raises doubt – leaves us uncertain
and this is just how it should be
to write off the critical issues involved in dealing with these two proposals as a matter of grammar – of ‘getting the words right’ – will fool no one –
and the real issue behind this grammar idea – is the attempt to shut down any critical activity –
you shut down critical activity – and there is just epistemological darkness
‘It seems to us sometimes as though the phenomena of personal experience were in a way phenomena in the upper strata of the atmosphere as opposed to the material phenomena which happen on the ground. There are views according to which these phenomena reach a certain degree of complexity. E.g., that the mental phenomena, sense experience, volition, etc., merge when a type of animal body of a certain complexity has been evolved. There seems to be some obvious truth in this, for the amoeba certainly doesn’t speak or write or discuss, whereas we do. On the other hand the problem here arises which could be expressed by the question: “Is it possible for a machine to think?” (whether the action of this machine can be described and predicted by the laws of physics, or, possibly, only by laws of a different kind applying to the behaviour of organisms). And the trouble that is expressed in this question is not really that we don’t yet know a machine that could do the job. The question is not analogous to that which someone might have asked a hundred years ago: “Can a machine liquefy gas?” The trouble is rather that the sentence, “A machine thinks (perceives, wishes)”: seems somehow nonsensical. It is as though we had asked “Has the number 3 a colour?” (What colour would it be, as it obviously has none of the colours known to us?”) For in one respect of the matter, personal experience, far from being the product of physical, chemical, physiological processes, seem to be the very basis of all that we say with any sense about such processes. Looking at it in this way we are inclined to use our idea of a building material in yet another misleading way, and to say that the whole world, mental and physical, is made of one material only.’
any proposal put – be it described as of ‘personal experience’ – or of material phenomena – and hence ‘objective’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and should we wish to put the proposal that ‘the whole world, mental and physical, [is] made of one material only’ – as Spinoza has done – we are logically in the same position –
such a proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
with the physical and mental propositional perspectives – there have been – are – and I think will continue to be – valiant attempts at reduction of one perspective – to another
I think this is all to the good from a logical point of view – for it involves rigorous critical assessments – and generates new ideas and approaches to the issues involves
the question – ‘do machines think?’ – is a good example – it has led to the development of the science of artificial intelligence – which in many ways we have all benefited from
the propositional reality is that proposals / propositional perspectives – are put – and developed logically – with question – with doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
this is just what happens
those proposals and propositional perspectives that prove to be useful and productive last the distance
they hold up – not because they provide – a definitive solution to the issues that they are a response to –
but rather just because they don’t –
really productive propositional perspectives – leave more questions than answers –
but with this comes – the making of propositional ground –
more propositional ground to be explored –
and the most productive / critical analyses – render any notion of certainty – epistemologically obsolete and barren –
always a good lesson to learn
‘When we look at everything that we know and can say about the world as resting upon personal experience, then what we know seems to lose a good deal of value, reliability, and solidity. We are inclined to say that it is all “subjective”; and subjective is used derogatorily, as when we say that an opinion is merely subjective, a matter of taste. Now, that this aspect should seem to shake the authority of experience and knowledge points to the fact that here our language is tempting us to draw some misleading analogy. This should remind us of the case when the popular scientist appeared to have shown us that the floor which we stand on is not really solid because it is made up of electrons.’
what this shows – is just what everyone actually knows – and that is that no one philosophical perspective – tells the whole story
and as for the whole story – it is clear that what makes up the whole story – is different stories – different propositional perspectives –
that I think is the epistemological reality – whether we like it or not
there is nothing against the attempt to push one perspective against others – in a critical manner
any critical analysis will lead to a growth of knowledge
but let’s be clear – what this state of affairs shows us – is that what we are facing – what we are dealing with – at every turn – is propositional uncertainty
now you can bemoan this fact – or embrace it –
face reality – or try and defy it
I suspect that the tension between these two approaches to life defines human beings
it is the tension between logic and rhetoric – a daily battle
‘We are up against trouble caused by our way of expression.’
no – not if you have a critical bone in your body
there is no one way of expression
yes – there are commonplace practises – but when we come up against ‘trouble’ – we adapt – and look for different ways of expression
and where we can’t find a complementarity – a resolution to our ‘troubles’ – we learn to operate with apparently conflicting propositional models
and here lies the source of our freedom – for logically speaking – we are never trapped by any one proposition – or propositional perspective –
and it is this logical freedom that is the source of real joy –
the joy that is found in everyday life
‘We are up against trouble caused by our way of expression.’
our way of expression does not cause trouble
what we have with any expression is critical opportunity –
the opportunity to question – to doubt – and to explore propositional uncertainty
‘Another such trouble, closely akin, is expressed in the sentence: “I can only know that I have personal experiences, not that anyone else has”. Shall we call it an unnecessary hypothesis that anyone else has personal experiences? But is it an hypothesis at all? For how can I even make the hypothesis if it transcends all possible experience? How could such a hypothesis be backed by meaning? (Is it not like paper money, not backed by gold?). It doesn’t help if anyone tells us that, though we don’t know whether the other person has pains, we certainly believe it when, for instance, we pity him. Certainly we shouldn’t pity him if we didn’t believe he had pains: but is this a philosophical metaphysical belief? Does a realist pity me more than an idealist or a solipsist? – In fact the solipsist asks: “How can we believe that the other has pain; what does it mean to believe this? How can the expression of such a supposition make sense?’
‘Another such trouble, closely akin, is expressed in the sentence: “I can only know that I have personal experiences, not that anyone else has”.’
what I know is propositional – knowledge is propositional –
if there were no proposals – no propositions – there would be no knowledge
propositions are put – and that is what we know – that is our knowledge
our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
our knowledge is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
so –
I can only know that I have personal – because I propose them – if only to myself
I know that others have personal experience – for exactly the same reason – because they propose them
any personal experience – I propose – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any proposed personal experience – made by another – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Shall we call it an unnecessary hypothesis that anyone else has personal experiences?’
we would only do so – if no one else put propositions proposing ‘personal experience’
‘For how can I even make the hypothesis if it transcends all possible experience?’
our experience is propositional – there is no transcendence
there is no reality that ‘transcends’ propositional reality –
our reality is propositional –
what we propose – what others propose to us – is what there is
we recognise the other’s personal experience – because it is proposed –
and as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘How could such a hypothesis be backed by meaning? (Is it not like paper money, not backed by gold?)’
a proposal doesn’t need any backing to be valid – to have function
a proposal put – a hypothesis put – has meaning – but the meaning of any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
proposals are uncertain – hypotheses are uncertain – ‘meaning’ – is uncertain
‘It doesn’t help if anyone tells us that, though we don’t know whether the other person has pains, we certainly believe it when, for instance, we pity him.’
if the other person puts the proposition that he or she is in pain –
that proposition is taken on face value
and that proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
as is any propositional response to it – i.e. – pity
if I was a physician – and a patient comes complaining of pain – perhaps my response is not pity at all – but rather professional curiosity as to what is causing the pain
in general – when someone claims to be in pain – we ordinarily accept the claim –
but this is not to say the claim is not open to question – open to doubt – and logically speaking – uncertain –
i.e. – perhaps we decide he is feigning pain
as to the solipsist –
he has to understand – like everybody else – (if I can be so bold as to say ‘everybody else’ in his presence) – that his proposals – his propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
point being – his solipsism – is uncertain –
and it should be – uncertain – to him
and that my friend – spells the end of solipsism – as it is it is usually understood
‘Now the answer of the common-sense philosopher – and that, n.b., is not the common-sense man, who is as far from realism as from idealism – the answer of the common-sense philosopher is that surely there is no difficulty in the idea of supposing, thinking, imagining that someone else has what I have. But the trouble with the realist is that he does not solve but skip the difficulties which his adversaries see, though they too don’t succeed in solving them. The realist answer, for us, just brings out the difficulty: for who argues like this overlooks the difference between different usages of the words “to have”, “to imagine”. “A has a gold tooth” means that the tooth is in A’s mouth. This may account for the fact I am unable to see it. Now the case of the toothache, of which I say I am not able to feel it because it is in his mouth, is not analogous to the case of the gold tooth. It is the apparent analogy, between these cases which causes the trouble. And it is this troublesome feature in our grammar which the realist does not notice. It is conceivable that I feel the pain in another’s man’s mouth; and the man who says he can’t feel the other’s toothache is not denying this. The grammatical difficulty which we are in we shall only see clearly if we get familiar with the idea of feeling pain in another’s body. For otherwise, in puzzling about this problem, we shall be liable to confuse our metaphysical proposition, “We can’t have (haven’t as a rule) pains in another’s tooth”. In this proposition the word “can’t” is used in the same way as in the proposition “An iron nail can’t scratch glass”. (We could write this in the form “experience teaches us that an iron nail doesn’t scratch glass”, thus doing away with the “can’t”.) In order to see that it is conceivable that one person should have pain in another person’s body, one must examine what sort of facts we call criteria for a pain being in a certain place. It is easy to imagine the following case: When I see my hands I am not always aware of their connection with my body. That is to say, I often see my hand moving but don’t see the arm which connects it to my torso. Nor do I necessarily, at the time, check up on the arms existence in any other way. Therefore the hand may, for all I know, be connected to the body of a man standing beside me (or, of course, not to a human body at all). Suppose I feel a pain which on the evidence of the pain alone, e.g., with closed eyes, I should call a pain in my left hand. Someone asks me to touch the painful spot with my right hand. I do so and looking round perceive that I am touching my neighbour’s hand (meaning the hand connected to my neighbour’s torso).’
‘For otherwise, in puzzling about this problem, we shall be liable to confuse our metaphysical proposition, “We can’t have (haven’t as a rule) pains in another’s tooth”. In this proposition the word “can’t” is used in the same way as in the proposition “An iron nail can’t scratch glass”. (We could write this in the form “experience teaches us that an iron nail doesn’t scratch glass”, thus doing away with the “can’t”.)’
the point here – is that the proposals – the propositions – ‘we can’t have (haven’t as a rule) pains in another’s tooth’ and ‘an iron nail can’t scratch glass’ – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and yes – we could write the latter proposition in the form – ‘experience teaches us that an iron nail doesn’t scratch glass’ –
however – if we keep an open mind on the matter – we are open to the possibility of experiencing a nail scratching glass
but is this not also the case – with so-called ‘metaphysical’ proposition – ‘we can’t have (haven’t as a rule) pains in another’s tooth’?
doesn’t experience teach us this – in so far as we don’t have this experience?
but again – if we keep an open mind on the matter – we keep open the possibility of experiencing pain in another’s tooth
so – we’ve done away with the ‘can’t’ – big deal
logically speaking – with this rewriting – we still have two propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
perhaps the rewrites have uses that the originals – do not?
that much you can say
‘In order to see that it is conceivable that one person should have pain in another person’s body, one must examine what sort of facts we call criteria for a pain being in a certain place. It is easy to imagine the following case: When I see my hands I am not always aware of their connection with my body. That is to say, I often see my hand moving but don’t see the arm which connects it to my torso. Nor do I necessarily, at the time, check up on the arms existence in any other way. Therefore the hand may, for all I know, be connected to the body of a man standing beside me (or, of course, not to a human body at all).’
the argument made here – is one that emerges – when the original proposition – is put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored –
and yes – it is a most interesting critical examination of the issue
‘Suppose I feel a pain which on the evidence of the pain alone, e.g., with closed eyes, I should call a pain in my left hand. Someone asks me to touch the painful spot with my right hand. I do so and looking round perceive that I am touching my neighbour’s hand (meaning the hand connected to my neighbour’s torso).’
in this case – ‘my hand’ – is not my hand – but my neighbour’s hand
so – when I touch the painful spot – I am not touching my hand – but another’s hand
if the painful spot is in another’s hand – would you call it a pain in my hand?
there is a pain yes – but can we definitively say where the pain is?
can we definitively say who’s pain it is?
the same pain – in different locations? –
this is worth considering – and there are e.g. – stories of twins experiencing the same pain in the same place in their bodies at the same time
but any such consideration involves complex philosophical issues
Wittgenstein’s counter example to realism here – is a direct result of question – of doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty –
and indeed – it raises most interesting and intriguing questions
as for realism –
naïve realism – has its uses in non-reflective – non-critical propositional contexts – but as Wittgenstein points out – it lacks any real philosophical potential
in fact – we would be wise to drop the notion of realism altogether – and instead just talk of critical propositionalism –
critical propositionalism – leaves the door open to all and any views of the nature of reality –
and puts any such view to question
the curious thing is – this is just what philosophers do
however – most regard the critical method as a means to an end – the end of solution – of resolution
when in fact the method – just is the end –
and this idea of solution – of resolution – once and for all – is just a naïve myth –
and one that every philosopher worth his or her salt – sees through – immediately
it starts to look like a silly game – that everyone recognises as a silly game
the hard – and I should say – obvious – truth –is that there is no distinction between method and goal –
the method is the goal – the goal is the method
and the critical approach – has no logical end point
‘Ask yourself: how do we know where to point to when we are asked to point to the painful spot? Can this sort of pointing be compared to a black spot on a sheet of paper when someone says: “Point to the black spot on this sheet”? Suppose someone said “You point to this spot because you know before you point that the pains are there”; ask yourself “What does it mean to know that the pains are there?” The word “there” refers to a locality: but in what space, i.e. ‘locality’ in what sense? Do we know the place of pain in Euclidean space, so that when we know where we have pains we know how far away from two of walls of this room, and from the floor? When I have pain in the tip of my finger and touch my tooth with it, is my pain both a toothache and a pain in my finger? Certainly, in one sense the pain can be said to be located on the tooth. Is the reason why in this case it is wrong to say I have a toothache, that in order to be in the tooth the pain should be one sixteenth an inch away from the tip of my finger? Remember that the word “where” can refer to localities in many different senses. (Many different grammatical games, resembling each other more or less, are played with this word. Think of the different uses of the numeral “1”.) I may know where a thing is and then point to it by virtue of that knowledge. The knowledge tells me where to point to. We have conceived this knowledge as the condition for deliberately pointing to the object. Thus one can say: “I can point to the spot you mean because I see it”, “I can direct you to the place because I know where it is; first turning to the right, etc.” Now one is inclined to say “I must know where a thing is before I can point to it”. Perhaps you will feel less happy about saying: “I must know where the thing is before I can look at it”. Sometimes of course of is correct to say this. But we are tempted to think there is one particular psychical state or event, the knowledge of the place, which must succeed every deliberate act of pointing, moving towards, etc. Think of the analogous case: “One can only obey an order after having understood it.”’
‘Ask yourself: how do we know where to point to when we are asked to point to the painful spot?’
in a final – definitive sense – we don’t know
what we do is – we propose – and that proposal – is our knowledge – is what we know
as to how we come to such a proposal –
we come to this proposal – in terms of what we experience
I experience pain my finger – my finger is what I point to
however – experience – in any context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
perhaps I am hallucinating – and if so – it can reasonably be asked – is there any pain – at all – no matter the supposed location?
or a neurologist may put to me that the pain is not in my finger – as my experience suggests – but in a certain region of the brain
the point is – the matter – the location of pain – is open to question
our experience is open to question
our knowledge is just what we propose –
and our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Can this sort of pointing be compared to a black spot on a sheet of paper when someone says: “Point to the black spot on this sheet”?’
the difference is that the location of pain – is primarily a private experience
the black spot is public
however – it is conceivable i.e. – that the black spot is a reflection –
and therefore – that it is ‘on a sheet of paper’ – is open to question
‘Suppose someone said “You point to this spot because you know before you point that the pains are there”; ask yourself “What does it mean to know that the pains are there?”’
what it means is – to propose that that the pains are there
‘The word “there” refers to a locality: but in what space, i.e. ‘locality’ in what sense?’
the word ‘there’ – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘I may know where a thing is and then point to it by virtue of that knowledge. The knowledge tells me where to point to. We have conceived this knowledge as the condition for deliberately pointing to the object.’
my knowing where a thing is – is a proposal –
I propose where it is
this knowledge – is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Now one is inclined to say “I must know where a thing is before I can point to it”. Perhaps you will feel less happy about saying: “I must know where the thing is before I can look at it”.’
what you know – is what you propose – and what you propose – is open to question
so yes – you know – but this knowledge – is uncertain
‘Sometimes of course of is correct to say this. But we are tempted to think there is one particular psychical state or event, the knowledge of the place, which must succeed every deliberate act of pointing, moving towards, etc. Think of the analogous case: “One can only obey an order after having understood it.”’
what counts as understanding it?
and it is quite obvious that you don’t have to understand an order before obeying it –
i.e. – people obey orders without understanding them
Wittgenstein would know this – he did military service in the first world war –
what you learn in the military – and indeed any other authoritarian structure – is to obey orders – whether you understand them or not
and furthermore – an order can be given – without understanding – from the giver
I am thinking here of computer-generated voice directions – from a navigation system – that might be given when you are driving a car
if by ‘understanding’ – you mean some kind of conscious state or event – such a navigation system has no understanding per se –
it might well be argued that there is understanding – a consciousness – somewhere behind such a propositional dynamic – i.e. – whoever created it had an understanding
firstly – if such is the case – we can ask – where does understanding end and automation begin?
could we end up with generated propositional systems that have not been consciously envisioned?
not consciously envisioned – until they are active?
secondly – with complex propositional generation – you can ask – well – in the end – just how relevant is any initial conscious ‘understanding’?
and from this – how significant is understanding – to any propositional action?
in any case – the example of computer-generated voice directions – makes clear – that in a direct and immediate sense – such an order – does not involve or require consciousness
it is an automation
in logical terms what we are talking about here – is a rule-governed propositional game – a game that generates proposals / ‘orders’
what this means – is that an understanding – may or may not accompany the putting of proposals – or the receiving of proposals –
that understanding – that is to say – a conscious state or event – is not essential to propositional action – and propositional response –
that we can and do operate with proposals – without an understanding
and that we can and do – operate with proposals – quite successfully – while ‘looking for’ – or ‘chasing down’ – an understanding –
it seems – we adopt or look for an understanding – to put a floor to our propositional behaviour –
to provide ourselves with confidence in our propositional actions
and as such – understanding can be viewed as a rhetorical action
and if so – from a logical point of view – understanding comes off as a propositional accessory
‘If I point to the painful spot on my arm, in what sense can I be said to have known where the pain was before I pointed to the place? Before I pointed I could have said “The pain is in my left arm”. Supposing my arm had been covered with a meshwork of lines numbered in such a way that I could refer to any place on its surface. Was it necessary that I should have been able to describe the painful spot by means of these co-ordinates before I could point to it? What I wish to say is that the act of pointing, determines a place of pain. The act of pointing, by the way, is not to be confused with that of finding the painful spot by probing. In fact the two may lead to different results.’
‘If I point to the painful spot on my arm, in what sense can I be said to have known where the pain was before I pointed to the place?’
I propose where the pain is – make the proposal – either to myself or others –
and when I point – my pointing is another proposal – a propositional action
‘Supposing my arm had been covered with a meshwork of lines numbered in such a way that I could refer to any place on its surface. Was it necessary that I should have been able to describe the painful spot by means of these co-ordinates before I could point to it?’
pointing is imprecise
describing the painful spot in terms of co-ordinates – is to supplement the propositional action of pointing – with a further proposal – a game proposal
‘What I wish to say is that the act of pointing, determines a place of pain’
what I wish to say is the act of pointing proposes a place of pain –
and further that any such proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain
any so-called determination – is uncertain
‘The act of pointing, by the way, is not to be confused with that of finding the painful spot by probing. In fact the two may lead to different results.’
pointing and probing – two different propositional actions –
however – logically – of a piece –
they are propositional actions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and by the way – any ‘result’ – whether different or not – is open to question
‘An innumerable variety of cases can be thought of in which we should say that someone has pains in another person’s body; or, say, in a piece of furniture, or in an empty spot. Of course we mustn’t forget that a pain in a particular part of our body, e.g., in a upper tooth, has a particular tactile and kinaesthetic neighbourhood. Moving our hand upward a little distance we touch our eye; and the word “little distance” here refers to a tactile distance or kinaesthetic distance, or both. (It is easy to imagine tactile or kinaesthetic distances correlated in ways different from the usual. The distance from our mouth to our eye might seem very great ‘to the muscles of our arm’ when we move our finger from the mouth to the eye. Think how large you imagine the cavity in your tooth when the dentist is drilling or probing it.)’
I take it from this – that Wittgenstein is saying that any proposal of the location of pain – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and also – that any proposal of measurement of distance – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to –
‘An innumerable variety of cases can be thought of in which we should say that someone has pains in another person’s body; or, say, in a piece of furniture, or in an empty spot.’
not good enough really –
unless we are in the realm of pure fantasy – I would have appreciated from Wittgenstein – just one example – one from the ‘innumerable cases’ – where someone’s pain is in a piece of furniture – or an empty spot –
such proposals can be made –
but they need to be more than just alluded to – they need to have something to them –
if they are to be relevant to the matter at hand –
and all we get from Wittgenstein – is effectively – a throw-away line
‘When I said that if we moved our hand upward a little, we touch our eyes, I was referring to tactile evidence only. That is, the criterion for my finger touching my eye was to be only that I had the particular feeling which would have made me say that I was touching my eye, even if I had no visual evidence for it, and even if, on looking into a mirror, I saw my finger not touching my eye, but, say my forehead. Just as the ‘little distance’ I referred to was a tactile or kinaesthetic one, so also the places of which I said, “they lie a little distance apart” were tactile places. To say that my finger in tactile or kinaesthetic space moves from my tooth to my eye then means that I have those tactile and kinaesthetic experiences which we normally have when we say “my finger moves from my tooth to my eye”. But what we regard as evidence for this latter proposition is, as we all know, by no means only tactile and kinaesthetic. In fact if I had the tactile and kinaesthetic sensations referred to, I might still deny the proposition “my finger moves etc …” because of what I saw. That proposition is a proposition about physical objects. (And now don’t think that the expression “physical objects” is meant to distinguish one kind of object from another.) The grammar of propositions which we call propositions about physical objects admits of a variety of evidence for every such proposition. It characterizes the grammar of the proposition “my finger moves, etc.” that I regard the propositions “I see it move”, “I feel it move”, “He sees it move”, “He tells me that it moves”, as evidence for it. Now if I say “I see my hand move” this at first sight seems to presuppose that I agree with the proposition “my hand moves”. But if I regard the proposition “I see my hand move” as one of the evidences for the proposition “my hand moves”, the truth of the latter is, of course, not presupposed in the truth of the former. One might therefore suggest the expression “It looks as though my hand were moving” instead of “I see my hand moving. But this expression, although it indicates that my hand may appear to be moving without really moving, might still suggest that after all there must be a hand in order that it should appear to be moving; whereas we should easily imagine cases in which the proposition describing the visual evidence is true and at the same time other evidence make us say that I have no hand. Our ordinary way of expression obscures this. We are handicapped in ordinary language by having to describe, say, a tactile sensation by means of terms for physical objects such as the word “eye”, “finger”, etc., when what we want to say does not entail the existence of an eye or finger, etc. We have to use a roundabout description of our sensations. This of course does not mean that ordinary language is insufficient for our special purposes, but that it is slightly cumbrous and sometimes misleading. The reason for this peculiarity of our language is of course the regular coincidence of certain sense experiences. Thus when I feel my arm moving I mostly also can see it moving. And if I touch it with my hand, also that hand feels the motion, etc. (The man whose foot has been amputated will describe a particular pain as pain in his foot.) We feel in such cases a strong need for such an expression as: “a sensation travels from my tactual cheek to my tactual eye”. I said all this because, if you are aware of the tactual and kinaesthetic environment of a pain, you may find difficulty in imagining that one could have a toothache anywhere else than in one’s own teeth. But if we imagine such a case, this simply means that we imagine a correlation between visual, tactual, kinaesthetic, etc., experiences different from the ordinary correlation. Thus we can imagine a person having a sensation of a toothache plus those tactual and kinaesthetic experiences which are normally bound up with seeing his hand travelling from his tooth to his nose, to his eyes, etc., but correlated to the visual experience of his hand moving to those places on another person’s face. Or again, we can imagine a person having the kinaesthetic sensation of moving his hand, and the tactual sensation, in his fingers and face, of his fingers moving over his face, whereas his kinaesthetic and visual sensations should have to be described as those of his fingers moving over his knee. If he had a sensation of a toothache plus certain tactual and kinaesthetic sensations usually characteristic of touching the painful tooth and neighbouring parts of our face, and if these sensations were accompanied by seeing my hand touch, and move about on, on the edge of my table, we should feel doubtful whether to call this experience an experience of toothache in the table or not. If, on the other hand, the tactual and kinaesthetic sensations described were correlated to the visual experience of seeing my hand touch a tooth and other parts of the face of another person, there is no doubt that I would call this experience “toothache in another person’s tooth”.’
‘When I said that if we moved our hand upward a little, we touch our eyes, I was referring to tactile evidence only. That is, the criterion for my finger touching my eye was to be only that I had the particular feeling which would have made me say that I was touching my eye, even if I had no visual evidence for it, and even if, on looking into a mirror, I saw my finger not touching my eye, but, say my forehead. Just as the ‘little distance’ I referred to was a tactile or kinaesthetic one, so also the places of which I said, “they lie a little distance apart” were tactile places. To say that my finger in tactile or kinaesthetic space moves form my tooth to my eye then means that I have those tactile and kinaesthetic experiences which we normally have when we say “my finger moves from my tooth to my eye”.
we have a propositional action – ‘moving the hand upward a little to touch the eye’
‘evidence’ here – as elsewhere – is a backstory – where a justification is required
‘But what we regard as evidence for this latter proposition is, as we all know, by no means only tactile and kinaesthetic. In fact if I had the tactile and kinaesthetic sensations referred to, I might still deny the proposition “my finger moves etc …” because of what I saw.’
the point here is that propositional act – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and – logically speaking – uncertain
so – it is not a matter in a final sense of affirmation or denial – rather it is a matter of propositional uncertainty
yes – you can affirm – you can deny – put these propositional actions of affirmation and denial – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘That proposition is a proposition about physical objects. (And now don’t think that the expression “physical objects” is meant to distinguish one kind of object from another.) The grammar of propositions which we call propositions about physical objects admits of a variety of evidence for every such proposition. It characterizes the grammar of the proposition “my finger moves, etc.” that I regard the propositions “I see it move”, “I feel it move”, “He sees it move”, “He tells me that it moves”, as evidence for it.’
‘That proposition is a proposition about physical objects.’
how you describe that proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘about physical objects’ – is ok – and a commonplace – and generally speaking useful proposition
‘The grammar of propositions which we call propositions about physical objects admits of a variety of evidence for every such proposition. It characterizes the grammar of the proposition “my finger moves, etc.” that I regard the propositions “I see it move”, “I feel it move”, “He sees it move”, “He tells me that it moves”, as evidence for it.’
‘the grammar of the propositions …’ – is nothing more than the claim that the propositions ‘my finger moves’ etc. – can be described as ‘about physical objects’
well – if that suits your purposes – fair enough – but there is no necessity in this –
it really just comes down to use – customary use – and context –
the propositions – the proposals – are valid – have function – with or without ‘evidence’
evidence is a propositional prop – and for certain users – in certain contexts – it gives them confidence in their propositional use
‘evidence’ – when all is said and done is a rhetorical ploy
‘Now if I say “I see my hand move” this at first sight seems to presuppose that I agree with the proposition “my hand moves”. But if I regard the proposition “I see my hand move” as one of the evidences for the proposition “my hand moves”, the truth of the latter is, of course, not presupposed in the truth of the former. One might therefore suggest the expression “It looks as though my hand were moving” instead of “I see my hand moving. But this expression, although it indicates that my hand may appear to be moving without really moving, might still suggest that after all there must be a hand in order that it should appear to be moving; whereas we should easily imagine cases in which the proposition describing the visual evidence is true and at the same time other evidence make us say that I have no hand.’
‘it looks as if my hand moves’ – ‘I see my hand move’ – ‘my hand moves’ – ‘I have no hand’ –
different propositions –
and all – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and how they are related – i.e. – one as evidence for another – will be a matter of context – and use
again – ‘evidence’ – is really just a rhetorical issue –
a matter of persuasion
‘Our ordinary way of expression obscures this. We are handicapped in ordinary language by having to describe, say, a tactile sensation by means of terms for physical objects such as the word “eye”, “finger”, etc., when what we want to say does not entail the existence of an eye or finger, etc. We have to use a roundabout description of our sensations. This of course does not mean that ordinary language is insufficient for our special purposes, but that it is slightly cumbrous and sometimes misleading.’
there is no logical difference between ‘our ordinary way of expression’ – and any refinement or specialization of expression –
any proposal – any proposition – however described – is open to question – open to doubt – and just is – uncertain
the attempt to find certainty – to nail precision – once and for all – is illogical – and indeed counter-productive
you can miss so much – so many possible ways of seeing – by any one singular focus
in the end – of course – it doesn’t work – for wherever you arrive at in a quest for certainty – that propositional place – is open to question
‘The reason for this peculiarity of our language is of course the regular coincidence of certain sense experiences. Thus when I feel my arm moving I mostly also can see it moving. And if I touch it with my hand, also that hand feels the motion, etc. (The man whose foot has been amputated will describe a particular pain as pain in his foot.) We feel in such cases a strong need for such an expression as: “a sensation travels from my tactual cheek to my tactual eye”.’
sense experiences – regular or not – are open to question – are uncertain
you may well feel a strong need for an expression –
nothing wrong with that –
but it doesn’t change the logic of the situation –
your expression – is open to question
‘I said all this because, if you are aware of the tactual and kinaesthetic environment of a pain, you may find difficulty in imagining that one could have a toothache anywhere else than in one’s own teeth. But if we imagine such a case, this simply means that we imagine a correlation between visual, tactual, kinaesthetic, etc., experiences different from the ordinary correlation. Thus we can imagine a person having a sensation of a toothache plus those tactual and kinaesthetic experiences which are normally bound up with seeing his hand travelling from his tooth to his nose, to his eyes, etc., but correlated to the visual experience of his hand moving to those places on another person’s face.’
yes – you can imagine – what you like –
any experience – tactual – kinaesthetic – visual etc. – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and in a case where tactual and kinaesthetic experiences do not align with the visual –
how confident would you be – should you be – of describing the whole experience – as anything but – doubtful?
‘Or again, we can imagine a person having the kinaesthetic sensation of moving his hand, and the tactual sensation, in his fingers and face, of his fingers moving over his face, whereas his kinaesthetic and visual sensations should have to be described as those of his fingers moving over his knee. If he had a sensation of a toothache plus certain tactual and kinaesthetic sensations usually characteristic of touching the painful tooth and neighbouring parts of our face, and if these sensations were accompanied by seeing my hand touch, and move about on, on the edge of my table, we should feel doubtful whether to call this experience an experience of toothache in the table or not. If, on the other hand, the tactual and kinaesthetic sensations described were correlated to the visual experience of seeing my hand touch a tooth and other parts of the face of another person, there is no doubt that I would call this experience “toothache in another person’s tooth”.’
these examples – bring into sharp relief – the propositional uncertainty of sense experience – and the propositional uncertainty in any explanation of sense experience
we may not have immediate cause to question sense experience that conforms with our history and expectations –
nevertheless – from a logical point of view – any sense experience – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘I said that the man who contended that it was impossible to feel the other person’s pain did not thereby wish to deny that one person could feel pain in another’s body. In fact he would have said: “I may have toothache in another man’s body, but not his toothache.”’
so – what determines his toothache?
presumably a tooth ache – a pain – is possessed – happens in a place of consciousness
(can we make any sense of a pain – without location?)
so – what distinguishes my place of consciousness – from his place of consciousness?
presumably – location
I would say – my consciousness occurs in my body – and not in his – that the conscious states of his body – are his – not mine
however – such a proposal – such a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
at first sight – they are quite obviously different proposals –
if they are not used analogously – it is because they are given different propositional analyses – different propositional explanations
this occurs primarily because they are put to question – put to doubt – their uncertainties explored
what is obvious – at first sight – and which leads to the different propositional analyses – and explanations – is that prime facie – they have different uses
‘As to the use of the word “imagine” – one might say: “Surely there is quite a definite act of imagining the other person to have pain”. Of course we don’t deny this, or any other statement about facts. But let us see: If we make an image of another person’s pain, do we apply it in the same way in which we apply the image, say, of a black eye, when we imagine the other person having one? Let us again replace imagining, in the ordinary sense, by making a painted image. (this could quite well be the way certain beings did their imagining). Then let a man imagine in this way that A has a black eye. A very important application of this picture will be comparing it with the real eye to see if the picture is correct. When we vividly imagine that someone suffers pain, there often enters in our image what one might call a shadow of a pain felt in the locality corresponding to that which we say his pain is felt. But the sense in which an image is an image is determined by the way in which it is compared with reality. This we might call the method of projection. Now think of comparing an image of A’s toothache with his toothache. How would you compare them? If you say, you compare them ‘indirectly’ by his body behaviour, I answer that this means you don’t compare them as you compare the picture of his behaviour with his behaviour.’
‘As to the use of the word “imagine” – one might say: “Surely there is quite a definite act of imagining the other person to have pain”.’
as to the use of the word ‘imagine’ – what we have with any such use – is a proposal
a proposal – then described as – ‘imaginative’ –
and just what ‘imagine’ – and ‘imaginative’ – amounts to – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘But let us see: If we make an image of another person’s pain, do we apply it in the same way in which we apply the image, say, of a black eye, when we imagine the other person having one?’
‘another person’s pain’ – and – ‘another person’s black eyes’ – are different proposals
‘difference’ – will be displayed in propositional analyses
‘another person’s pain’ – will be given a different propositional analysis – to ‘another person’s black eye’
different proposals – may well have – different applications –
‘Let us again replace imagining, in the ordinary sense, by making a painted image. (this could quite well be the way certain beings did their imagining). Then let a man imagine in this way that A has a black eye. A very important application of this picture will be comparing it with the real eye to see if the picture is correct.’
a painted image – is a proposal – a proposal different from the verbal proposal – ‘he has a black eye’
this ‘real eye’ – ‘what is seen’ – is likewise a proposal – a different proposal
any comparison between proposals – between propositions – will be open to question
as to ‘correctness’ – again – a matter open to question –
‘When we vividly imagine that someone suffers pain, there often enters in our image what one might call a shadow of a pain felt in the locality corresponding to that which we say his pain is felt.’
when we propose that someone suffers pain – we may well also propose an image –
that is put an image proposal
as to the ‘shadow’ – this is baloney –
what we deal with is proposals – not shadows
‘But the sense in which an image is an image is determined by the way in which it is compared with reality. This we might call the method of projection. Now think of comparing an image of A’s toothache with his toothache. How would you compare them? If you say, you compare them ‘indirectly’ by his body behaviour, I answer that this means you don’t compare them as you compare the picture of his behaviour with his behaviour.’
an image is a proposal – ‘reality’ – here – is a proposal
comparing an ‘image’ to ‘reality’ – is only and just – comparing two different proposals –
and that is so – in the case of an image and a toothache
yes – different proposals – different applications – different ways of comparing –
if you stick to one method of comparison of propositions – in the case where it doesn’t apply – where it doesn’t ‘fit’ – there will be no comparison
so – just how you compare – different propositions – is a matter – open to question
the propositional fact is that comparisons do get made – and proceeded with –
that they might be regarded as unsatisfactory – simply points – in the end – to the reality of propositional uncertainty –
these – proposals – applications – comparisons – are from a logical point of view –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Again, when you say. “I grant you that you don’t know when A has pain, you can only conjecture it”, you don’t see the difficulty which lies in the different uses of the words “conjecturing” and “knowing”. What sort of possibility were you referring to when you said you couldn’t know? Were you thinking of a case analogous to that when one couldn’t know whether the other man had a gold tooth in his mouth because he had his mouth shut? Here what you couldn’t know you could nevertheless imagine knowing; it makes sense to say that you saw that tooth although you didn’t see it: or rather, it makes sense to say that you don’t see his tooth and therefore it also makes sense to say you do. When on the other hand, you granted me that a man can.t know whether the person has pain, you do not wish to say that as a matter of fact people didn’t know, but that it made no sense to say they knew (and therefore no sense to say they don’t know). If therefore in this case you use the term “conjecture” or “believe”, you don’t use it as opposed to “know”. That is, you did not state that knowing was a goal you could not reach. and that you have to be contented with conjecturing; rather there is no goal in this game. Just as when one says “You can’t count through the whole series of cardinal numbers” one doesn’t state a fact about human frailty but rather a convention which we have made. Our statement is not comparable, though always falsely compared, with such a one as “it is impossible for a human being to swim across the Atlantic”. but it is analogous to a statement like “there is no goal in an endurance race”. And this is one of the things which the person feels dimly who is not satisfied with the explanation that though you can’t know … you can conjecture …’
‘Again, when you say. “I grant you that you don’t know when A has pain, you can only conjecture it”, you don’t see the difficulty which lies in the different uses of the words “conjecturing” and “knowing”.’
what I know – is what is proposed – and what is proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
a conjecture is a proposal – a conjecture – is knowledge
Wittgenstein’s distinction here between ‘conjecturing’ and ‘knowing’ – is a superficial distinction
we can describe proposals – in any number of ways – i.e. – conjectures – beliefs – ideas – images – forms – actions –
there are – that is to say – different kinds of proposals – proposals that have different uses – different functions
nevertheless – whatever their description – proposals are from a logical point of view – open – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘What sort of possibility were you referring to when you said you couldn’t know? Were you thinking of a case analogous to that when one couldn’t know whether the other man had a gold tooth in his mouth because he had his mouth shut?’
you can know – what is put – what is put to you – or what you put – what you propose
you can’t know – what is not put – what is not proposed
to not know – is to not propose
in the case of the gold tooth – if you have no evidence for it – why would you propose it –
if you have no reason to propose it – why would you?
it is not that you can’t know –
on the face of it – there is nothing here to know –
there is nothing proposed
‘Here what you couldn’t know you could nevertheless imagine knowing; it makes sense to say that you saw that tooth although you didn’t see it: or rather, it makes sense to say that you don’t see his tooth and therefore it also makes sense to say you do’
in reality – why would you – out of the blue – imagine – someone has a gold tooth?
yes – you could imagine it – you could propose it – but would you – what reason would you have to propose it?
look – you either see it or you don’t
or – you have reason to propose a gold tooth – i.e. – you have heard from another that he has a gold tooth
‘When on the other hand, you granted me that a man can.t know whether the person has pain, you do not wish to say that as a matter of fact people didn’t know, but that it made no sense to say they knew (and therefore no sense to say they don’t know).’
you can propose that another is in pain –
and this will happen if you have reason to believe they are in pain – i.e. – they say so – you identify their behaviour as pain behaviour –
and your proposal – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If therefore in this case you use the term “conjecture” or “believe”, you don’t use it as opposed to “know”.’
not if you realise that what you propose – is what you know – and that beliefs and conjectures – are proposals’
‘That is, you did not state that knowing was a goal you could not reach. and that you have to be contented with conjecturing; rather there is no goal in this.’
firstly – knowing is not a ‘goal’ – knowing is quite simply – proposing –
secondly – knowing – proposing – is not a game
a ‘game’– is a rule governed propositional exercise –
proposing – knowing – is not a rule-governed propositional exercise – it is a critical activity –
there are two modes to propositional life – the critical mode and the game mode –
human beings propose – and critically evaluate they propose – and what is proposed to them –
and human beings play games – i.e. – mathematics – formal logic – football – two-up – etc. etc.
the two modes should not be confused – they are logically distinct propositional forms
‘Just as when one says “You can’t count through the whole series of cardinal numbers” one doesn’t state a fact about human frailty but rather a convention which we have made.’
the ‘convention’ here is a rule – a rule to a game
‘Our statement is not comparable, though always falsely compared, with such a one as “it is impossible for a human being to swim across the Atlantic”. but it is analogous to a statement like “there is no goal in an endurance race”.
whether there is a goal in an endurance race – or not – is of no relevance here –
the sky is blue – the grass is green – proposals are put
putting proposal – is not striving for a goal – it is the natural activity of living – functioning human beings
‘And this is one of the things which the person feels dimly who is not satisfied with the explanation that though you can’t know … you can conjecture …’
you won’t be satisfied – if you dimly feel that knowledge is anything other than proposal –
proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If we’re angry with someone for going out on a cold day with a cold in his head, we sometimes say: “I won’t feel; your cold”. And this can mean: “I don’t suffer when you catch a cold”. This is a proposition taught by experience. For we could imagine a, so to speak, a wireless connection between the two bodies which made one person feel pain in his head when the other had experienced his to the cold air. One might in this case argue that the pains are mine because they are felt in my head; but suppose that I and someone else had a part of our bodies in common, say a hand. Imagine the nerves and tendons of my arm and A’s connected to this hand by an operation. Now imagine the hand stung by a wasp. Both of us cry, contort our faces, give the same description of the pain, etc. Now are we to say we have the same pain or different ones? If in such a case you say: “We feel pain in the same place, in the same body, our descriptions tally, but still my pain can’t be his”, I suppose as a reason you will be inclined to say: “because my pain is my pain and his pain is his pain”. And here you are making a grammatical statement about the use of such a phase as “his pain is exactly like mine”. (It would be no argument to say the two couldn’t have the same pain because one might anaesthetize or kill one of them while the other still felt pain.)
Of course, if we exclude the phrase “I have his toothache” from our language, we thereby also exclude “I have (or feel) my toothache”. Another form of our metaphysical statement is this: “A man’s sense data are private to himself”. And this way of expressing it is even more misleading because it looks still more like an experiential proposition: the philosopher who says this may well think that he is expressing a kind of scientific truth.’
‘Now are we to say we have the same pain or different ones?’
two people have a hand in common –
whether it is the same pain or a different one – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘If in such a case you say: “We feel pain in the same place, in the same body, our descriptions tally, but still my pain can’t be his”, I suppose as a reason you will be inclined to say: “because my pain is my pain and his pain is his pain”. And here you are making a grammatical statement about the use of such a phase as “his pain is exactly like mine”.’
‘my pain can’t be his pain’ –
this proposal – is open to question – is open to doubt and is uncertain –
and the context – in which Wittgenstein puts it – makes this patently obvious
‘his pain is exactly like mine’ – really – only raises further questions –
i.e. – how would you know that it is exactly the same – and what does ‘exactly the same’ amount to?
also – we can ask – if it is exactly the same – is the location of the pain – a relevant matter?
and still – don’t we want to say – there is a reasonable question as to who’s pain it is?
as to ‘his pain is exactly like mine’ – being a ‘grammatical statement’ –
‘his pain is exactly like mine’ – is simply a propositional response to the issue of how to describe the ‘identity’ of the pain –
and a response – open to question
‘(It would be no argument to say the two couldn’t have the same pain because one might anaesthetize or kill one of them while the other still felt pain.)’
this won’t clear up the issue –
again – questions –
i.e. – is the pain the pain felt by the survivor – the same pain – as the dead guy felt – before being put out of his misery – for a philosophical experiment no less?
how would you know?
‘Of course, if we exclude the phrase “I have his toothache” from our language, we thereby also exclude “I have (or feel my toothache”.’
yes – you can ‘exclude’ these statements – but it is likely that the question of who’s pain it is – will nevertheless quite naturally arise –
and as soon as the question is asked – there it is
and really – the business of philosophy is not exclusion – it is inclusion – logical and epistemological inclusion –
we deal with what there is – and explore the possible and different understandings – of what there is
you can cut a branch off a tree – or indeed – all the branches –
and the result is – your tree is diminished – if not ruined –
‘Another form of our metaphysical statement is this: “A man’s sense data are private to himself”. And this way of expressing it is even more misleading because it looks still more like an experiential proposition: the philosopher who says this may well think that he is expressing a kind of scientific truth.’
the point is that – ‘A man’s sense data are private to himself’ – is – as with any proposition – simply – open to question
and describe it further as you will – metaphysical – scientific – however –
any descriptions and any attendant arguments – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘We use the phrase “two books have the same colour”, but we could perfectly well say: “They can’t have the same colour, after all, this book has its own colour and the other book has its own colour too”. This also would be a stating grammatical rule – a rule incidentally, not in accordance with our ordinary usage. The reason why one should think of these two different usages at all is this: We compare the case of sense data with physical bodies, in which case we make a distinction between: “this is the same chair I saw an hour ago” and “this is not the same chair but one exactly like the other”. Here it makes sense to say, and it is an experiential proposition: “A and B couldn’t have seen the same chair, for A was in London and B was in Cambridge, they saw two chairs exactly alike”. (Here it will be useful if you consider the different criteria for what we call the “the identity of these objects”. How do we apply the statements: “This is the same day …”, “This is the same word …”, “This is the same occasion …”, etc?’
clearly – statements of the form – ‘This is the same …’ – have function – have use –
in our language – our ordinary – non-specialized language –
but – as illustrated by Wittgenstein in his example of the books with the same colour –
the issue of identity – is a matter open to question
and yes – in certain propositional contexts – most likely non-ordinary language contexts – it may be useful to drill down on the question of sameness – and make certain distinctions
as to ‘exactly like’ – yes – it is proposal – that on first sight – avoids the claim of sameness – but for how long?
questioning of – ‘exactly alike’ – will likely make the point that in fact – ‘exactly alike’ – is actually no more than a synonym for ‘sameness’
that is one possibility
another is – that ‘exactly alike’ – may lead to the proposal that things have common properties or qualities – while being distinct in space and time?
‘sameness’ – really comes across as being a case of philosophical laziness –
but still the fact is the notion is commonly used –
and what this points to – is that our language use – in many contexts – is not – and need not be – precise –
that it is – logically speaking – imprecise – and therefore – uncertain –
nevertheless – the fact remains that such language use – a good deal of the time – is useful and effective
‘What we did in these discussions was what we always do when we meet the word “can” in a metaphysical proposition. We show that this proposition hides a grammatical rule. That is to say, we destroy the outward similarity between a metaphysical proposition and an experiential one, and we try to form the expression which fulfils a certain craving of the metaphysician which our ordinary language does not fulfil and which, as long as it isn’t fulfilled, produces a metaphysical puzzlement. Again, when in a metaphysical sense I say “I must always know when I have pain”, this simply makes the word “know” redundant; and instead of “I know that I have pain”, I can simply say “I have pain”. The matter is different, of course, if we give the phrase “unconscious pain” sense by fixing experiential criteria for the case in which a man has pain and doesn’t know it, and if then we say (rightly or wrongly) that as a matter of fact nobody has ever had pain pains which he didn’t know of.’
‘Again, when in a metaphysical sense I say “I must always know when I have pain”, this simply makes the word “know” redundant; and instead of “I know that I have pain”, I can simply say “I have pain”.’
any proposal is a claim to knowledge
and therefore – to say ‘I know ..’ – to preface any proposition with ‘I know’ –is redundant –
in practise you can see it in one of two ways –
firstly – as being unnecessary – inconsequential – but harmless
secondly – ‘I know’ – often functions as a rhetorical devise –
as a means of persuasion
the idea being that – ‘I know’ – gives a proposal – authority
and that that authority – is persuasive
logically speaking – the only authority – is authorship –
and further – the authorship of a proposition – is logically irrelevant
that is to say – who says what – has no bearing on the logical status of what is said
and what is said – what is proposed – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – and is – uncertain
‘The matter is different, of course, if we give the phrase “unconscious pain” sense by fixing experiential criteria for the case in which a man has pain and doesn’t know it, and if then we say (rightly or wrongly) that as a matter of fact nobody has ever had pain pains which he didn’t know of.’ –
this is to misunderstand the issue – the philosophical issue – the logical issue –
it is to get it wrong
any proposal put – that is any proposition put – whether a claim about pain – or anything else – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘When we say “I can’t feel his pain”, the idea of an insurmountable barrier suggests itself to us. Let us think straight away of a similar case: “The colours green and blue can’t be in the same place simultaneously”. Here the picture of physical impossibility which suggests itself is, perhaps, not of the barrier: rather we feel that the two colours are in each other’s way. What is the origin of this idea? – We Say three people can’t sit side by side on this bench; they have no room. Now the case of the colours is not analogous to this; but it is somewhat analogous to saying: “3 x 18 inches won’t go into 3 feet”. This is a grammatical rule and states a logical impossibility. The proposition “three men can’t sit side by side on a bench a yard long” states a physical impossibility; and this example shows clearly why the two impossibilities are confused. (Compare the proposition “He is six feet taller than I” with “6 foot is six inches longer than 5 foot 6”. These propositions are of an utterly different kinds, but look exactly alike.) The reason why in these cases the idea of physical impossibility suggests itself to us is that on the one hand we decide against using a particular form of expression, on the other hand we are strongly tempted to use it, since (a) it sounds English or German, etc., all right, and (b) there are closely similar form of expression used in other departments of our language. We have decided against using the phrase “They are in the same place”; on the other hand this phrase strongly recommends itself to us through the analogy with other phrases, so that, in a sense, we have to turn this form of expression out by force. And this is why we seem to ourselves to be rejecting a universally false proposition. We make a picture like that of the two colours being in each other’s way, or that of a barrier which doesn’t allow one person to come closer to another’s experience than to the point of observing his behaviour; but on looking closer we find that we can’t apply the picture which we have made.’
‘The colours green and blue can’t be in the same place simultaneously’
the cover of my diary is a green – and yet in a different light I say it is a blue –
is it the colour green – or is it blue?
or perhaps a colour that is green-blue?
and if green-blue – what happens to the question of green or blue?
are we to say green-blue – is a different colour to green or blue – and therefore the question of whether green and blue can be in the same place simultaneously – doesn’t arise?
or – is green-blue a case where green and blue are in the same place simultaneously?
what is clear here is that the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the proposal that green and blue can’t be in the same place simultaneously – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
it is an uncertain proposition
Wittgenstein goes on to ask – ‘what is the origin of this idea?’
well – what is the idea?
it is this idea of impossibility – be it described as ‘physical’ – or ‘logical’ – or however
this notion of ‘impossibility’ – is a variety of the claim of certainty
any proposal – any proposition – is open to question – and is therefore in a logical sense – uncertain
the idea of certainty – rests on an appeal to authority – some kind of authority
to say a proposition is logically impossible – is to claim the authority of logic
to say a proposition is physically impossible – is to claim the authority of physics
but just what does this authority amount to – where does it come from – what is it?
the only authority – is authorship
you are the author of your propositions – they have your authorship – your authority
once this is seen – it becomes clear that the idea of authority – as in some way above and beyond any proposition – guaranteeing propositions – is without basis
and that it is no more than a rhetorical ploy to subvert logic – the logic of the proposition
the traditional idea of authority – is pervasive – we find it in every context
and really it is a testament to human irrationality –
for it is the failure to understand propositional uncertainty – to defy propositional uncertainty – to fear propositional uncertainty
however – let’s be clear –
in this world of the human being – this propositional world – irrationality flourishes –
and it would be a mistake to think that it has no value – function – or use
‘Now the case of the colours is not analogous to this; but it is somewhat analogous to saying: “3 x 18 inches won’t go into 3 feet”. This is a grammatical rule and states a logical impossibility. The proposition “three men can’t sit side by side on a bench a yard long” states a physical impossibility; and this example shows clearly why the two impossibilities are confused’
there are two modes to propositional action – the critical mode – and the game mode
in the critical mode – proposals / propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
in the game mode – propositional action is rule-governed
if you play the game – you play in accordance to the rules –the point of the propositional game – is not to critically evaluate the rules – it is to follow them
mathematics – is a propositional game – arithmetic is a propositional game –
if you play the arithmetic game – you play in accordance with its rules
if you don’t follow the rules – you don’t play the game – there is no game
‘3 x 18 inches into 3 feet’ – is a game proposition
‘that 3 x 18 inches won’t go into 3 feet’ – is a rule of the division game –
a rule that states – what you can’t do in the division game
‘a grammatical rule that states a logical impossibility’?
yes – I suppose you could call it a grammatical rule – but it is better understood as a sign-game rule
we are not dealing here with ‘logical impossibility’ –
all we are dealing with is propositional games – and propositional rules
it is not logically impossible to break a rule of chess –
it is just that if you do – you put yourself out of the game
the same is true with arithmetic – and more generally mathematics
‘“three men can’t sit side by side on a bench a yard long” states a physical impossibility’ –
here is a non-game proposition – a proposition that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
again – we are not dealing with ‘impossibility’ here –
if it is the case that three men can’t sit on a bench a yard long – then we come to this conclusion – not as a result not of a rule in in game – but rather as a result of observation –
observation is a critical activity
and the point is that the proposition – ‘three men can’t sit on a bench a yard long’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and as such – uncertain
perhaps the proposition ‘three men on a bench a yard long’ – is given a photographic / digital interpretation –
and a photo-shopped image is developed where three men – reduced in size – are sitting on a bench a yard long?
such would be an interpretation of the proposition – and a particular use of it
and an interpretation and use – that is a result of question – of doubt – and of seeing and understanding the proposition – as logically uncertain
what Wittgenstein confuses is the difference between the critical mode of propositional action – and the game mode
human beings critically evaluate propositions – and – they play propositional games
the two are quite logically different modes of activity
‘We have decided against using the phrase “They are in the same place”; on the other hand this phrase strongly recommends itself to us through the analogy with other phrases, so that, in a sense, we have to turn this form of expression out by force. And this is why we seem to ourselves to be rejecting a universally false proposition. We make a picture like that of the two colours being in each other’s way, or that of a barrier which doesn’t allow one person to come closer to another’s experience than to the point of observing his behaviour; but on looking closer we find that we can’t apply the picture which we have made.’
‘We have decided against using the phrase “They are in the same place”’–
yes – well – who has decided against using the phrase?
and is Wittgenstein talking about a blanket ban – without any consideration of context?
“we have to turn it out by force’?
so – we give up on logic here – and go straight for rhetoric?
that seems to be Wittgenstein’s form
‘but on looking closer we find that we can’t apply the picture which we have made.’
the point is not that we can’t apply the picture we have made
the picture we have made – is a proposal –
a proposition – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and therefore – where it does or doesn’t work – is open to question
‘Our wavering between logical and physical impossibility makes us make such statements as this: “If what I feel is my pain only, what can the supposition mean that someone else has pain?” The thing to do in such cases is always to look how the words in question are actually used in our language. We are in all such cases thinking of a use different from that which our ordinary language makes of the words. Or a use, on the other hand, which then for some reason strongly recommends itself to us. When something seems queer about the grammar of our words it is because we are alternately tempted to use a word in several different ways. And it is particularly difficult to discover that an assertion that the metaphysician makes expresses discontentment with our grammar when the words of this assertion can also be used to state a fact of experience. Thus when he says “only my pain is real’, this sentence might mean that the other people are only pretending. And when he says “this tree doesn’t exist when nobody sees it”, this sentence might mean “this tree vanishes when we turn our backs to it”. The man says “only my pain is real”, doesn’t mean to say that he has only found out by the common criteria, i.e., which give our words their common meanings – that the others who said they had pains were cheating. But what he rebels against is the use of this expression in connection with their criteria, That is he objects to using this word in the particular way it is commonly used. On the other hand he is not aware that he is objecting to a convention. He sees a way of dividing the country different from the one he sees on the map. He feels tempted, say, to use the name “Devonshire” not for the country with its conventional boundary, but for a region differently bounded. He could express this by saying: “Isn’t it absurd to make this a country, to draw the boundaries here?” But what he says is: “the real Devonshire is this”. We could answer: “What you want is only a new notation, and by a new notation no facts of geography are changed”. It is true, however that we may be irresistibly attracted or repelled by a notation. (We easily forget how much a notation, a form of expression, may mean to us, and that changing it isn’t always as easy it often is in mathematics or in the sciences. A change of clothes or names may mean very little and it may mean a great deal.)’
‘We are in all such cases thinking of a use different from that which our ordinary language makes of the words. Or a use, on the other hand, which then for some reason strongly recommends itself to us. When something seems queer about the grammar of our words it is because we are alternately tempted to use a word in several different ways.’
this is quite right
and the reason is that a word is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Thus when he says “only my pain is real’, this sentence might mean that the other people are only pretending. And when he says “this tree doesn’t exist when nobody sees it”, this sentence might mean “this tree vanishes when we turn our backs to it”.’
‘only my pain is real’
yes – he might be saying – that other people are only pretending – or he might be saying something else –
when put to question – he might say – ‘what I mean by ‘real’ here – is probably better expressed in term of ‘direct experience’ – i.e. – my pain is what I directly experience.’
and he might be meaning something else entirely –
his proposition is open to question – open to question
“this tree doesn’t exist when nobody sees it”
yes – might mean – the tree vanishes when we turn our backs to it’
but he might just be being cheeky – and really only saying – ‘if you are not looking at it – you can’t see it’
and again – he may mean something else altogether
really – you can’t just pluck statements out of any context – and think you are dealing with meaningful propositions
you need to investigate propositional context –
and if you do this properly – you will discover further questions – and further doubts
what we do is explore propositional uncertainty
‘But what he says is: “the real Devonshire is this”. We could answer: “What you want is only a new notation, and by a new notation no facts of geography are changed”. It is true, however that we may be irresistibly attracted or repelled by a notation. (We easily forget how much a notation, a form of expression, may mean to us, and that changing it isn’t always as easy it often is in mathematics or in the sciences. A change of clothes or names may mean very little and it may mean a great deal.)’
this answer is wrong
he doesn’t ‘want’ anything – he doesn’t need a ‘new notation’
what he says – is no different to what anyone else says – under any circumstance –
what is said – is what is proposed – and what is proposed is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
that is all there is to it
and look – when any proposal is put to question – the so called ‘facts’ proposed – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
so – yes – facts may well change – in what is being proposed
‘how much a notation may mean to us’
I don’t know about this –
I suspect that for most – notation – is nothing more than a mean to an end –
it’s a vehicle – not the destination –
an instrument –
and when one instrument or tool doesn’t do the job – you try another
and yes – ‘a change of clothes or names may mean very little and it may mean a great deal’
what any change ‘means’ – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘I shall try to elucidate the problem discussed by realists, idealists, and solipsists by showing you a problem closely related to it. It is this: “Can we have unconscious thoughts, unconscious feelings, etc.?” The idea of there being unconscious thoughts has revolted many people. Others again have said that these were wrong in supposing that there could only be conscious thoughts, and that psychoanalysis has discovered unconscious ones. The objectors to unconscious thoughts did not see that they were not objecting to the newly discovered psychological reactions, but to the way in which they were described. The psychoanalysts on the other hand were misled by their own way of expression into thinking they had done more than discover new psychological reactions: that they had in a sense discovered conscious thoughts which were unconscious. The first could have stated their objection by saying: “We don’t wish to use the phrase ‘unconscious thoughts’; we wish to reserve the word ‘thought’ for what you call ‘conscious thoughts’”. They state their case wrongly when they say: “There can only be conscious thoughts and no unconscious ones”. For if they don’t wish to talk of “unconscious thought” they should not use the phrase “conscious thought”, either.’
‘The objectors to unconscious thoughts did not see that they were not objecting to the newly discovered psychological reactions, but to the way in which they were described. The psychoanalysts on the other hand were misled by their own way of expression into thinking they had done more than discover new psychological reactions: that they had in a sense discovered conscious thoughts which were unconscious.’
yes – any proposed phenomena – can be variously described –
and there is no rule about how anything can be described
our descriptions will be understood within propositional frameworks –
and descriptions will have function – if they are deemed to serve our purposes
and frameworks will rise and fall – on the basis of their utility
from a logical point of view – any proposed description – any propositional framework or network – and any proposed use – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘conscious thoughts which were unconscious’
if – that is what psychoanalysts thought they had discovered – then all they were proposing was a propositional / descriptive contradiction or confusion –
and you would say – they needed to find new descriptions – a new propositional model – a new propositional framework – if they were to elucidate their proposed discovery –
‘conscious thoughts that are unconscious’ – suggests they don’t know what they are talking about – consciously – or unconsciously
‘The first could have stated their objection by saying: “We don’t wish to use the phrase ‘unconscious thoughts’; we wish to reserve the word ‘thought’ for what you call ‘conscious thoughts’”. They state their case wrongly when they say: “There can only be conscious thoughts and no unconscious ones”. For if they don’t wish to talk of “unconscious thought” they should not use the phrase “conscious thought”, either.’
I really don’t see any problem with saying – ‘there can only be conscious thoughts and no unconscious ones’ –
if it is understood that the word ‘thought’ – is to be reserved for ‘conscious thought’ –
what exists is what you propose – and if you reject an existential proposal – then what it proposes – from your point of view – doesn’t exist –
you should of course keep an open mind on any such matters – and be prepared to evaluate your propositional decisions –
and this will be about being critically aware that while what you reject – doesn’t fit the propositional context you are working in – in other propositional contexts – in other circumstances – it may have to be brought back to life
‘For if they don’t wish to talk of “unconscious thought” they should not use the phrase “conscious thought”, either.’
yes – there is a point here – but it is somewhat puristic
and you can ask – given the way this issue has developed – its history – in any serious discussion of these matters – is it likely that these terms won’t be used – won’t be central?
and if you want to drop them altogether – what alternative have you got that can be brought into play right away – and be just as useful?
such matters are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and that is as it should be
we are always involved in propositional struggle
Do we use a hammer in two different ways when we hit a nail with it and, on the other hand, drive a peg into a hole? And do we use it in two different ways or in the same way when we drive this peg into this hole and, on the other hand, another peg into another hole? Or should we only call it different uses when in one case we drive something into something and in the other, say, we smash something? Or is this all using the hammer in one way and is it to be called a different way only when we use the hammer as a paper weight? – in which cases are we to say that a word is used in two different ways? To say that a word is used in two (or more) different ways does in itself not yet give us any idea of its use. It only specifies a way of looking at this usage by providing a schema for its description with two or more subdivisions. It is alright to say: “I do two things with this hammer: I drive a nail into this board and one into that board”. There can be two kinds of discussions as to whether a word is used in one way or in two ways: (a) Two people may discuss whether the English word “cleave” is only used for chopping up something or also for joining things together. This is a discussion about the facts of a certain usage. (b) They may discuss whether the word “altus”, standing for both “deep” and “high” is thereby used in two different ways. This question is analogous to the question whether the word “thought” is used in two ways or in one when we talk of conscious and unconscious thought. The man who says “surely these are two different usages” has already decided to use a two-way schema, and what he said expressed this decision.’
‘Do we use a hammer in two different ways when we hit a nail with it and, on the other hand, drive a peg into a hole? And do we use it in two different ways or in the same way when we drive this peg into this hole and, on the other hand, another peg into another hole? Or should we only call it different uses when in one case we drive something into something and in the other, say, we smash something? Or is this all using the hammer in one way and is it to be called a different way only when we use the hammer as a paper weight? – in which cases are we to say that a word is used in two different ways?’
we can’t determine use a priori –
we will have common practises – and with that – common descriptions of use –
but these can always be put to question
we might say – a hammer is a tool – and any tool can have any number of uses
so – just how a use is described – will be dependent on the context of the use –
and even then – questions can be raised
and the same with words –
a word can have any number of uses – and any number of descriptions of use –
and these descriptions will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
Wittgenstein says –
‘To say that a word is used in two (or more) different ways does in itself not yet give us any idea of its use. It only specifies a way of looking at this usage by providing a schema for its description with two or more subdivisions.’
it is not a matter of predetermining use – or legislating use –
we can only really describe use – as and when it happens –
or if we are dealing with use – second hand – do our level best to understand the propositional context of the use
a ‘schema for description’ – might be useful is a particular propositional context –
but as with any proposal – it will be open to question
and yes – there may be what goes for ‘accepted’ usage –
but this changes nothing from a logical point of view –
any usage – and description of usage – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘I do two things with this hammer: I drive a nail into this board and one into that board”. There can be two kinds of discussions as to whether a word is used in one way or in two ways: (a) Two people may discuss whether the English word “cleave” is only used for chopping up something or also for joining things together. This is a discussion about the facts of a certain usage. (b) They may discuss whether the word “altus”, standing for both “deep” and “high” is thereby used in two different ways. This question is analogous to the question whether the word “thought” is used in two ways or in one when we talk of conscious and unconscious thought. The man who says “surely these are two different usages” has already decided to use a two-way schema, and what he said expressed this decision.’
any discussion of the ‘facts’ of a certain usage – is an empirical question – and any proposal as to what the facts are – will be open to question – as is –any empirical proposal
it may be that ‘altus’ stands for ‘deep’ and ‘high’ – and is thereby characteristically used in two different ways – just as ‘thought’ characteristically is used in two different ways in ‘conscious though’ and ‘unconscious thought’ – but this only speaks to common usage – it does not bear on a logical / critical examination of the usage
from this – you could be forgiven for thinking – that Wittgenstein thinks – that in the end – all you need do to solve philosophical problems – is go to a dictionary
consider this –
imagine a discussion of the issue of the use of ‘thought’ – which begins with the view that the word ‘thought’ has the same meaning in ‘conscious thought’ as in ‘unconscious thought’
perhaps the idea is that we are not talking about two different kinds of thought – but rather the same idea of thought in different contexts – different settings
ok – let’s say that this is put to question – and doubt arises as to whether in fact the one sense of ‘thought’ can survive a context change –
this may lead to the view that ‘thought’ in ‘conscious thought’ – is not the same ‘thought’ in ‘unconscious thought’ –
such a proposal will raise questions – like – if there is this difference – what is it –
how is it to be described?
and if there is a difference then the generic term ‘thought’ – is no longer satisfactory – and new terms are needed – so – what do we say here?
I can imagine this discussion – going to-and-fro – without any real satisfaction for those involved
and perhaps it comes to a point – where it is decided that what is needed is a fresh look at the matter – a back to basics look at the very nature of thought –
to start again – as it were
issues such as this – if one is being philosophically brutally honest – never get finally settled –
does anyone think psychoanalysis – sorted out this matter?
the absence of a final resolution here – hasn’t stopped psychoanalysts getting on with it –
and it hasn’t stopped anyone else using the terms ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ – in many and varied ways
yes – we make pragmatic decisions – and get on with it –
however – the logical issue of propositional uncertainty – is always there
and it is this propositional uncertainty that leads to new and interesting propositional discoveries
whenever we are uncertain – we are in the discovery mode
‘Now when the solipsist says that only his experiences are real, it is no use answering him: “Why do you tell us this if you don’t believe we really hear it?” Or anyhow, if we give him this answer, we mustn’t believe we have answered his difficulty. There is no common sense answer to a philosophical problem. One can defend common sense against the attacks of philosophers only by solving their puzzles, i.e., by cuing them of the temptation to attack common sense; not by restating the views of common sense. A philosopher is not a man out of his senses, a man who doesn’t see what everybody else sees; not on the other hand is his disagreement with common sense that of the scientist disagreeing with the coarse views of the man in the street. That is, his disagreement is founded on a more subtle knowledge of fact. We therefore have to look round for the source of his puzzlement. And we find that there is puzzlement and mental discomfort, not only when our curiosity about certain facts is not satisfied, or we can’t find a law of nature fitting in with all our experience, but also when a notation dissatisfies us – perhaps because of various associations it calls up. Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation that stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does, or one which is a particular case, uses more closely similar forms of expression than ordinary language. Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the notions fulfils these needs. These needs can be of the greatest variety.’
‘Now when the solipsist says that only his experiences are real, it is no use answering him: “Why do you tell us this if you don’t believe we really hear it?” Or anyhow, if we give him this answer, we mustn’t believe we have answered his difficulty. There is no common sense answer to a philosophical problem. One can defend common sense against the attacks of philosophers only by solving their puzzles, i.e., by cuing them of the temptation to attack common sense; not by restating the views of common sense.’
what the solipsist puts forward is a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the common sense answer to the solipsist – is a genuine answer – a genuine response
as it challenges the solipsist’s proposal –
it puts it to question – and to doubt – it challenges its certainty
we are not dealing with ‘puzzles’ here –
what we have is different views – different world views if you like – different proposals
the ‘common sense’ view – is just another proposal – open to question – open doubt – and uncertain
the solipsists can be said to put this proposal of common sense – to question – to doubt – to challenge its certainty
what this amounts to – is that the issue is not puzzlement – rather propositional uncertainty
different proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and logically speaking – any response to any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘A philosopher is not a man out of his senses, a man who doesn’t see what everybody else sees; not on the other hand is his disagreement with common sense that of the scientist disagreeing with the coarse views of the man in the street. That is, his disagreement is founded on a more subtle knowledge of fact. We therefore have to look round for the source of his puzzlement. And we find that there is puzzlement and mental discomfort, not only when our curiosity about certain facts is not satisfied, or we can’t find a law of nature fitting in with all our experience, but also when a notation dissatisfies us – perhaps because of various associations it calls up.’
a ‘philosopher’ – puts a different proposal – that is all –
the philosopher’s proposal – as with the so called ‘common sense’ proposal – and the scientist’s – and for that matter – anyone else’s proposal – is a response to propositional uncertainty
‘mental discomfort’ – is the wrong term – the issue is logical uncertainty –
and yes – logical uncertainty gives rise to curiosity – to question – to doubt
our experience – is open to question – is uncertain –
and experience teaches us that no one view – holds the answers to our questions
as for notation – all we are talking about here is proposal – and the forms of proposal
any dissatisfaction with notation – with the form of a proposal – has its root in propositional uncertainty
‘Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation that stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does, or one which is a particular case, uses more closely similar forms of expression than ordinary language. Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the notions fulfils these needs. These needs can be of the greatest variety.’
our ordinary language perhaps best captures propositional uncertainty – in that – you might say – it is so full of holes
this makes it overall – most useful to us – for it is so flexible – and furthermore – it provides us with an ever-present springboard for propositional discovery
we don’t have this ‘mental cramp’ – what we have is different ways of seeing the world
you only ‘cramp-up’ if you can’t see outside your box –
if you are unable to explore different propositional responses
our needs are of the greatest variety – and in addressing these needs – we need – to question – to doubt – to explore propositional uncertainty –
we need to keep an open mind on an open world
‘Now the man whom we call a solipsist and who says that only his own experiences are real, does not thereby disagree with us about any practical question of fact, he does not say that we are simulating when we complain of pains, he pities us as much as anyone else, and at the same time he wishes to restrict the use of the epithet “real” to what we should call his experiences; and perhaps he doesn’t want to call our experiences “experiences” at all (again without disagreeing with us about any question of fact). For he would say that it is inconceivable that experiences other than his own are real. He ought therefore to use a notation in which such a phrase as ‘A has a real headache’ (where A is not he) is meaningless, a notation whose rules exclude this phrase as the rules of chess exclude a pawn’s making a knight’s move. The solipsists suggestion comes to using such a phrase as ‘there is a real toothache” instead of “Smith (the solipsist) has toothache”. And why should we grant him this notation? I needn’t say that in order to avoid confusion he had in this case better not use the word “real” as opposed to “simulated” at all; which just means that we shall have to provide for the distinction “real / simulated” in some other way. The solipsist who says “only I feel real pain”, “only I really see (or hear)” is not stating an opinion; and that’s why he is so sure of what he says. He is irresistibly tempted to use a certain expression but we must find why he is.’
it could be said that in so far as he uses the phrase ‘only I feel real pain’ – that his statement is meaningless – as the word ‘I’ only makes sense as a contrast to ‘you’ –‘he’ – ‘she’ – ‘we’ – ‘they’ –
that is to say – the very point of ‘I’ – is that it is a distinction between oneself and others
so – if you do not believe that there are others – ‘I’ has no meaning –
the up-shot of this is that solipsist has nothing to say – he must be silent
‘there is a real toothache’ – doesn’t help much either – for where is ‘there’?
if there is no other – and ‘I’ makes no sense – ‘there’ comes off as having no reference – it too falls into emptiness
‘The solipsist who says “only I feel real pain”, “only I really see (or hear)” is not stating an opinion; and that’s why he is so sure of what he says.’
why is he so sure of what he says?
my answer is that he does not understand the logic of the proposition
he is so sure because he doesn’t see that any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
uncertain
at the very least it is propositional uncertainty that should make him question and doubt his own view
if he is to be logical and rational – he must entertain the possibility that he is wrong
just as those who argue against him – or against some version of his proposal – must recognise that their view of the matter – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
the problem here is not solipsism – it is certainty – the illogical claim of certainty
the logical and rational approach to life is the critical approach
and the critical approach demands the exploration of alternative points of view –
if the only point of view is your own point of view – if that is the only point of view you recognise –
then all you achieve is ignorance and prejudice
the solipsist has a closed mind –
he revels in his ‘certainty’ – and celebrates it with a smugness
you can’t do anything with stupid people –
you just have to quarantine them – and work around them –
even if they pretend – you are not there
‘The phrase “only I see” is closely connected with the idea expressed in the assertion “we never know what the other man really sees when he looks at a thing” or this, “we can never know whether he calls the same thing “blue” which we call “blue”. In fact we might argue: “I can never know what he sees or that he sees at all, for all I have is signs of various sorts which he gives me: therefore it is an unnecessary hypothesis altogether to say that he sees; what seeing is only I know from seeing myself; I have only learnt the word ‘seeing’ to mean what I do”. Of course this is just not true, for I have definitely learned a different and more complicated use of the word “to see” than I here profess. Let us make clear the tendency that guided me when I did so, by an example from a slightly different sphere: Consider this argument: “How can we wish that this paper were red if it isn’t red? Doesn’t this mean I wish that which doesn’t exist at all? Therefore my wish can only contain something similar to the paper’s being red. Oughtn’t we therefore use a different word instead of ‘red’ when we talk of wishing that something were red? The imagery of the wish surely shows us something less definite, something hazier, than the reality of the paper being red. I should therefore say, instead of “I wish this paper red”, something like “I wish a pale red for this paper”. But if in the usual way of speaking he had said, “I wish a pale red for this paper”, we should in order to fulfil his wish, have painted it a pale red – and this wasn’t what he wished. On the other hand there is no objection to adopting the form of expression which he suggests as long as we know he uses the phrase “I wish a pale x for this paper” always to mean what ordinarily we express by “I wish this paper had the colour x”. What he said really recommended this notation, in the sense in which a notation can be recommended. But he did not tell us a new truth and did not show us that what we said was false. (All this connects our present problem with the problem of negation. I will only give you a hint, by saying that a notation should be possible in which, to put it roughly, a quality always had two names, one for the case when something is said to have it, the other for the case when something is said not to have it. The negation of “This paper is red” could then be say, “The paper is not rode”. Such a notation would actually fulfil some of the wishes that are denied us by our ordinary language and which sometimes produce a cramp of philosophical puzzlement about the idea of negation.)’
‘The phrase “only I see” is closely connected with the idea expressed in the assertion “we never know what the other man really sees when he looks at a thing” or this, “we can never know whether he calls the same thing “blue” which we call “blue”.
‘only I see’ – as a statement of solipsism – fails
for the ‘I’ in the proposal implies ‘other’ –
point being – the solipsist position cannot be stated –
it is internally incoherent
as to ‘we can never know what the other man really sees when he looks at a thing’ –
there is epistemological confusion here too
there is no ‘certain knowledge’ – ‘certainty’ – is an illogical pretence
our ‘knowledge’ is proposal –
what we know – is what we propose – and what we propose is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
I propose – what I see – and I propose what the other sees –
what I propose – is what I know
and what I propose is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘I know from seeing myself; I have only learnt the word ‘seeing’ to mean what I do.’
again – the same problem – the very use of the term ‘I’ – renders the solipsist argument – incoherent
and as to learning the word ‘seeing’ – to mean what I do
how does that happen?
what? – language – a complete language just comes into being for me (the solipsist) – from nowhere – and from no-one?
here we are in the realm of imaginative fiction
‘Consider this argument: “How can we wish that this paper were red if it isn’t red? Doesn’t this mean I wish that which doesn’t exist at all?
the point of wishing is that we recognise that what we wish for is something that is not there – not in existence
and in wishing – what we do is we propose a different state of affairs – to be – to exist
‘Therefore my wish can only contain something similar to the paper’s being red. Oughtn’t we therefore use a different word instead of ‘red’ when we talk of wishing that something were red? The imagery of the wish surely shows us something less definite, something hazier, than the reality of the paper being red. I should therefore say, instead of “I wish this paper red”, something like “I wish a pale red for this paper”.’
the word ‘red’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
its logical status – does not change – whether we are talking about an existing red thing – or a wished-for red thing –
just what ‘red’ amounts to in either logical context – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and – ‘pale red’ – is a different proposal to ‘red’
‘On the other hand there is no objection to adopting the form of expression which he suggests as long as we know he uses the phrase “I wish a pale x for this paper” always to mean what ordinarily we express by “I wish this paper had the colour x”. What he said really recommended this notation, in the sense in which a notation can be recommended. But he did not tell us a new truth and did not show us that what we said was false.’
you do not need an alternative notation –
‘red’ is a different proposal to ‘pale red’ – and ‘pale red’ misses the mark entirely – if what is being proposed is ‘red’
‘(All this connects our present problem with the problem of negation. I will only give you a hint, by saying that a notation should be possible in which, to put it roughly, a quality always had two names, one for the case when something is said to have it, the other for the case when something is said not to have it. The negation of “This paper is red” could then be say, “The paper is not rode”. Such a notation would actually fulfil some of the wishes that are denied us by our ordinary language and which sometimes produce a cramp of philosophical puzzlement about the idea of negation.)’
the negation of ‘this paper is red’ – is – ‘this paper is not red –
‘rode’ or ‘not rode’ – is not in this picture
in putting ‘this paper is not red’ – what I am doing is dissenting from the proposal – ‘this paper is red’ –
it is as simple as that –
a proposal is put – be it verbally or not –
and it is either affirmed or denied
and any proposal of affirmation – or denial – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
negation – in short – is a statement of denial –
no cramp required
‘The difficulty we express by saying “I can’t know what he sees when he (truthfully) says he sees a blue patch” arise from the idea that “knowing what he sees” means: “seeing that which he also sees”; not, however in the sense in which we do so when we both have the same object before our eyes; but in the sense in which the object seen would be an object, say, in his head, or in him. The idea is that the same object may be before his eyes and mine, but that I can’t stick my head into his (or my mind into his, which comes to the same) so that the real and immediate object of his vision becomes the real and immediate object of my vision too. By “I don’t know what he sees” we really mean “I don’t know what he looks at”, where ‘what he looks at’ is hidden and he can’t show it to me; it is before his mind’s eye. Therefore, in order to get rid of this puzzle, examine the grammatical difference between the statements “I don’t know what he sees” and “I don’t know what he looks at”, as they are actually used in our language.’
whatever – is proposed here – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain
‘knowing what he sees’ – means proposing what he sees –
and any such proposal – is open to question
‘seeing what he also sees’ – again – is a proposal – open to question
even when we both have the same object before or eyes – what is seen – by either – is open to question
what is in his head – is a proposal – that for him is open to question –
and any speculation – from another as to what is in his head – is a proposal – open to question
the real and immediate object of his vision – is open to question – open to doubt – and logically speaking – uncertain
whether or not the real and immediate object of his vision – is the real and immediate object of my vision – is a matter – again – open to question – a matter that is – uncertain –
and just what is ‘the real and immediate object’ – of anyone’s vision?
‘I don’t know what he sees’ – really means – knowledge – knowing – is finally about being certain –
a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any claim of certainty is not logical – in fact any such claim undermines logic – undermines rationality
a claim of certainty – is a claim of prejudice and pretension
looking for certainty – from a logical point of view – is looking for nothing – is looking at nothing
what is before his ‘mind’s eye’ – is for him – and anyone else – a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
there is no ‘puzzle’ here – it is just a matter of understanding propositional logic
the puzzle comes if you are trying to defy – or undercut – logic
grammatical differences between statements – don’t figure in logical analysis –
for any proposal – whatever its ‘grammar’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and as to the matter of how statements are actually used in our language – that of course – is open to question – as anyone who studies language use – will tell you
‘Sometimes the most satisfying expression of our solipsism seems to be this: “When anything is seen (really seen), it is always I who see it”.’
the use of ‘satisfying’ here – is an attempt to present solipsism as a given – as established
and the ‘our’ in ‘our solipsism’ – is more of the same
and here – the ‘really’ – in – ‘really seen’ – is no more than persuasion
‘satisfying’ – ‘really’ and ‘our’ – are – in this proposal – plain and simple rhetorical devises
what we have here from Wittgenstein – is a piece of rhetoric
and there is good reason for this
solipsism cannot withstand logical analysis
where there is an ‘I’ – there is an ‘other’ –
if no ‘other’ – ‘I’ – makes no sense –
and the opposite holds
the solipsist’s position cannot be stated –
and if proposed – it is a self-defeating argument –
yes – self-defeating! – how ironic
the more general point is this –
when put to question – put to doubt – when uncertainty is introduced – solipsism falls apart – and is seen for what it is – irrational and illogical
‘What should strike us about this expression is the phrase “always!”. Always who? – For queer enough. I don’t mean: “always L.W”. This leads us to considering the criteria for the identity of a person. Under what circumstances do we say: “This is the same person I saw an hour ago”? Our actual use of the phrase “the same person” and of the name of a person is based on the fact that the many characteristics that we use as the criteria for identity coincide in the vast majority of cases. I am as a rule recognized by the appearance of my body. My body changes in appearance only gradually and comparatively little, and likewise my voice, characteristic habits, etc. only change slowly and within a narrow range. We are inclined to use personal names in the way we do, only as a consequence of these facts. This can best be seen by imagining unreal cases which show us what different ‘geometries’ we would be inclined to use if facts were different. Imagine e.g., that all human bodies that exist look alike, that on the other hand, different sets of characteristics seemed, as it were, to change their habitation among these bodies. Such a set of characteristics might be say, mildness, together with a high pitched voice, and slow movements, or a choleric temperature, a deep voice and jerky movements, and such like. Under such circumstances, although it would be possible to give the bodies names, we should be as little inclined to do so as we are to give names to the chairs of our dining-room set, On the other hand, it might be useful to give names to the set of characteristics, and the use of these names would now roughly correspond to the personal names in our present language.’
any proposal / proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
any proposal of identity – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking – identity is uncertain –
yes – we operate with criteria for identity – and for all intents and purposes these criteria work well – but of course – if put to question – we face doubt – we face uncertainty
any ‘criterion’ – is open to question
in the case where all bodies looked the same – i.e. – there were no distinguishing marks –
you might think you could differentiate in terms of spatial location
but for this to work – you would still have to be able ascertain which body was in that spatial position
and you might think you could identify the bodies mathematically – i.e. – by numbering them
but to do this you would need to mark them with a number – and then they would not all look the same –
in the case where all bodies looked the same – but there were characteristics which changed habitation among bodies –
we could only distinguish bodies logically and in a transient sense
i.e. – characteristic a is associated with body x for a period of time – t1 – and for t1 we could say all other bodies are not x –
but even as we say this – we recognize that this identity of body x – is not stable – and is thus logically speaking an identity in a field of uncertainty
such a state of affairs would shake the common sense understanding of identity –
and we would see that if we are still to use the term ‘identity’ at all – it is not what we thought it was
i.e. – ‘identity’ – has another identity
in a world where everybody looked the same – there would be no identity –
and it seems that in such a world – the very question of identity would not arise
however – this is not the world we live in –
the question of identity does arise because of difference –
it is only in a world of difference – that identification is possible –
and any proposal of identity – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Or imagine it were usual for human beings to have two characters, in this way: People’s shape size and characteristics of behaviour characteristically undergo a complete change. It is a usual thing for a man to have two such states, and he lapses suddenly from one into another. It is very likely that in such a society we should be inclined to christen every man with two names, and perhaps talk of the pair of persons in his body. Now were Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde two persons or were they the same person who changed? We can say whichever we like, we are not forced to talk of a double personality.’
you could say a person has multiple identities – over a life time –
i.e. – Wittgenstein the boy – and Wittgenstein the Cambridge philosopher
and it seems that we carry multiple identities – at any one time –
i.e. – Wittgenstein the lecturer and Wittgenstein the brother of Greta etc – etc –
identity – comes down to description – description adopted – description given –
and what is clear is that we operate with many and varied descriptions –
many and varied identities
and it is through these descriptions that we know ourselves – that we know others –
that we identify ourselves – that we identify others
and any description – any identity – is logically speaking – transient –
with a change in circumstance – a change in identities
in the absence of any of the descriptions / identities constructed by him or herself – and in the absence of any descriptions / identities given by others – the person is an unknown – is without identity
identity – unknown
or another way of putting it – is to say that logically speaking – the person is a field of possible identities –
a field of possible descriptions –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘There are many uses of the word ‘personality’ which we may feel inclined to adopt, all more or less akin. The same applies when we define the identity of a person by means of his memories. Imagine a man whose memories on the even days of his life comprise the events of all those days, skipping entirely what happened on the odd days. On the other hand, he remembers on an odd day what happened on previous odd days, but his memory then skips the even days without a feeling of discontinuity. If we like we can also assume that he has alternating appearances and characteristics on odd and even days. Are we bound to say that here two persons are inhabiting the same body? That is, is it right to say that there are, and wrong to say that there aren’t? Neither. For the ordinary use of the word “person” is what one might call a composite use suitable under ordinary circumstances. If I assume, as I do, that these circumstances are changed, the application of the term “person” or “personality” has already changed: and if I wish to preserve this term and give it a use analogous to its former use, I am at liberty to choose between many uses, that is, between may different kinds of analogy. One might say in such a case that the term “personality” hasn’t got one legitimate heir only. (This kind of consideration is important in the philosophy of mathematics. Consider the use of the words “proof”, “formula” and others. Consider the question: “Why should what we do here be called “philosophy”? Why should it be regarded as the only legitimate heir of the different activities which had this name in former time?”)’
‘Are we bound to say that here two persons are inhabiting the same body? That is, is it right to say that there are, and wrong to say that there aren’t?’
what is going on here is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
logically speaking – there is nothing special about this matter – for whatever circumstance we face – we face with question – with doubt – and uncertainty –
and as for ‘personality – as with any term – any word – ‘personality’ is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
yes – and of course exactly the same logical considerations apply in the philosophy of mathematics –
and indeed – to the term ‘philosophy’-
what counts as philosophy – is a matter open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
with such terms as ‘personality’ – ‘proof’ – ‘philosophy’ – we get introduced – by way of explanation to a perspective on their use – and this may involve a perspective on their history –
and really – we take it from there – and make of these perspectives what we will –
the trap – is to think – that at any point in the use of any term – you have hit a logical end – that you have hit pay dirt
that is just pretence
and what it leads to is closed-mindedness – and philosophical prejudice
work with what you have at hand – but keep an open mind on just how your tools work – and whether they are doing the job you want
sometimes a change or modification of terms – can be productive – and this goes on all the time – in every field of endeavour
‘Now let us ask ourselves what sort of identity of personality it is we are referring to when we say “when anything is seen, it is always I who see”. What is it I want all these cases of seeing to have in common? As an answer I have to confess to myself that it is not my bodily appearance. I don’t always see part of my body when I see. And it isn’t essential that my body, if seen amongst the things I see, should always look the same. In fact I don’t mind how much it changes. And I feel the same way about all the properties of my body, the characteristics of my behaviour, and even about my memories. – When I think about it a little longer I see what I wished to say was: “Always when anything is seen, something is seen”. I.e., that of which I said it continued during all the experiences of seeing was not any particular entity “I”. but the experience of seeing itself. This may become clearer if we imagine the man who makes our solipsistic statement to point to his eyes while he says “I”. (Perhaps because he wishes to be exact and wants to say expressly which eyes belong to the mouth which says “I” and to the hands pointing to his own body. But what is he pointing to? These particular eyes with the identity of physical objects? (To understand this sentence, you must remember that the grammar of the words of which we say that they stand for physical objects is characterized by the way in which we use the phrase “the same so- and-so”, or “the identical so-and-so”, where “so-and-so designates the physical object.) We said before that he did not wish to point to a particular physical object at all. The idea that he had made a significant statement arose from the confusion between what we call “the geometrical eye” and the “physical eye”. I will indicate the use of these terms: If a man tries to obey the order “Point to your eye”, he may do many different things, and there are many different criteria he will accept for having pointed to his eye. If these criteria, as they usually do, coincide, I may use them alternatively and in different combinations to show me that I have touched my eye. If they don’t coincide, I shall have to distinguish between different senses of the phrase “I touch my eye” or “I move my finger towards my eye”. If, e.g., my eyes are shut, I can still have the characteristic kinaesthetic experience in my arm which I should call the kinaesthetic experience of raising my hand to my eye. That I had succeeded in doing so, I shall recognize by the peculiar tactile sensation of touching my eye. But if my eye were behind a glass plate fastened in such a way that it prevented me from exerting a pressure on my eye with my finger, there would still be a criterion of muscular sensation which would make me say that now my finger was in front of my eye. As to visual criteria there are two I can adopt. There is the ordinary experience of seeing my hand rise and come towards my eye, and this experience, of course, is different from seeing two things meet, say, two finger tips. On the other hand, I can use as criterion for my finger moving towards my eye, what I see when I look into a mirror and see my finger nearing my eye. If that place on my body which, we say “sees” is to be determined by moving my finger towards my eye, according to the second criterion, then it is conceivable that I may see with what according to other criteria is the tip of my nose, or places on my forehead; or I might in this way point to a place lying outside my body. If I wish a person to point to his eye (or his eyes) according to the second criterion alone, I shall express my wish by saying: “Point to your geometrical eye (or eyes)”. The grammar of the word “geometrical eye” stands in the same relation to the grammar of the word “physical eye” as the grammar of the expression “the visual sense datum of a tree” to the grammar of the expression “the physical tree”. In either case it confuses everything to say “the one is a different kind of object to the other”; for those who say that a sense datum is a different kind of object from a physical object misunderstand the grammar of the word “kind”, just as those who say that a number is a different kind of object from a numeral. They think they are making such a statement as “A railway train, a railway station and a railway car are different kinds of objects”, whereas their statement is analogous to “A railway train, a railway accident, and a railway law are different kinds of objects”.’
‘Now let us ask ourselves what sort of identity of personality it is we are referring to when we say “when anything is seen, it is always I who see”. What is it I want all these cases of seeing to have in common?’
‘always I who see it’?
yes – there is always a problem with ‘always’ –
how can we speak of what ‘always’ happens?
and you might want a commonality to what is ‘always seen’ – assume it –
but how could you ever say what it is?
and does it make any sense to speak of it at all?
‘When I think about it a little longer I see what I wished to say was: “Always when anything is seen, something is seen” I.e., that of which I said it continued during all the experiences of seeing was not any particular entity “I”. but the experience of seeing itself.’
‘Always when anything is seen, something is seen’
if the issue is ‘identity of personality’ – as Wittgenstein has proposed above – then ‘Always when anything is seen, something is seen’ – kills off the issue
there is no ‘personality’ in this statement – and therefore no question of identity
further the statement is – for all intents and purpose – analytic –
it is uninformative – and as such no more than a play with words –
so – you could argue that in strictly logical terms – no one is saying anything – and nothing is said
‘This may become clearer if we imagine the man who makes our solipsistic statement to point to his eyes while he says “I”. (Perhaps because he wishes to be exact and wants to say expressly which eyes belong to the mouth which says “I” and to the hands pointing to his own body. But what is he pointing to?’
that is the question
and any answer hear – is open to question
‘These particular eyes with the identity of physical objects?”
perhaps that is the idea – but equally – perhaps not
could he not in so pointing – be proposing – by way of mime – his notion of self?
and if he imagines himself a genuine solipsist – in so doing – is he not – pointing at the world?
this pantomime of pointing really does not take us anywhere –
it does not – as such – elucidate the proposal – ‘Always when anything is seen, something is seen’ –
or in any way advance the solipsist cause –
if anything – it turns it into a comedy act
‘The idea that he had made a significant statement arose from the confusion between what we call “the geometrical eye” and the “physical eye”.
pointing to your physical eye – is ‘is the ordinary experience of seeing my hand rise and come towards my eye’
pointing to the geometrical eye is – ‘what I see when I look into a mirror and see my finger nearing my eye’
I really don’t see how – pointing – to either this – ‘physical eye’ or the ‘geometrical eye’ – or elucidating any difference between the two – in anyway bears on the significance of the statement – ‘Always when anything is seen, something is seen’
the pointing – is as insignificant – as the statement
Wittgenstein goes on to say –
‘The grammar of the word “geometrical eye” stands in the same relation to the grammar of the word “physical eye” as the grammar of the expression “the visual sense datum of a tree” to the grammar of the expression “the physical tree”.’
this ‘geometrical eye’ is a propositional explanation of what the eye is doing (i.e. – seeing)
the ‘sense datum’ – is a proposed explanation of what we see – in this case – the tree
yes – there is a relation between the notion of the geometrical eye – and the physical eye –
and there is a relation between the sense datum explanation and the physical tree –
is it the same relation?
what x is doing – and how we know x – the same relation?
well – there is a connection – but I think you would say – ‘what is going on’ – and ‘how one knows’ – are two different matters
‘In either case it confuses everything to say “the one is a different kind of object to the other”; for those who say the sense datum is a different kind of object from a physical object misunderstand the grammar of the word “kind”, just as those who say that a number is a different kind of object from a numeral.’
‘different kind of object’ – amounts to what?
different proposals – and prime facie – different proposals they are
now there are epistemologists who argue that the physical object – is a sense datum – and so for them – the term ‘physical object’ becomes – ‘sense datum’ –
this argument might seem to help the solipsist – i.e. – there is only his experience – and nothing external to his sense datum – no physical objects – no trees
but against this can be put that the ‘sense datum’ – is a propositional explanation – an explanation of – of something else –
and what is that?
the key point here is that the explanation – is not – what is to be explained
and there are philosophers of mathematics who would argue that a ‘number’ – amounts to – is – in fact nothing more than – a numeral –
here again – it can be put that the ‘numeral’ is an explanatory proposal – and therefore to be distinguished from that to be explained –
if the solipsist’s world is just explanation – we can always ask – what is it that is explained – what does the explanation – explain?
the solipsist has no answer
whatever one’s view on such questions –
these matters of epistemology and the philosophy of mathematics – are logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and the logical reality is that uncertainty is not anything the solipsist can entertain
Wittgenstein’s argument of the ‘grammar of kind’ – is weak
‘grammar of kind’ – what is that supposed to mean?
our grammar – is just how we use words – and any use of words – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
there is no set grammar – no set use of any word – of any term
‘They think they are making such a statement as “A railway train, a railway station and a railway car are different kinds of objects”, whereas their statement is analogous to “A railway train, a railway accident, and a railway law are different kinds of objects”.’
an ‘object’ – however further described – is logically speaking – a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and it can be argued that ‘a railway train’ – ‘a railways station’ – ‘a railway car’ – are different proposals – different kinds of proposals
and of course – this can be argued against –
and it can also be argued – that ‘a railway train’ – ‘a railway accident’ and a ‘railway law’ – are proposals of the same the same kind –
and this too can be put to question
let’s be clear – ‘kind’ is a propositional classification – an explanatory proposal – and its definition – its use – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
finally – I fail to see how this discussion of – pointing – of geometrical / physical eyes – and sense datum / physical object distinction – and the grammar of kind argument –
assist the solipsist argument in any way
and as for the matter of ‘identity of personality’ –
what counts as ‘personality’ – is a matter – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the identity of my personality – is for me – and for others – an uncertain matter
pointing – only raises the question
as do sense data and physical object proposals
grammar – our use of words – is nothing less than the play of uncertainty
‘What tempted me to say “it is always I who see when anything is seen”, I could also have yielded to by saying: “whenever something is seen, it is this which is seen”. accompanying the word “this” by a gesture embracing my visual field (but not meaning by “this” the particular objects which I happen to see at the moment). One might say, “I am pointing to the visual field as such, not at anything in it”. And this only serves to bring out the senselessness of the former expression.’
‘this’ – you would say – references a particular – an undefined particular
and a ‘visual field’ – in common usage – would not be regarded as a particular – rather the place of particulars
can you gesture to – a visual field?
well in a specialized propositional discussion – i.e. – this philosophical discussion – I think that can happen –
also – it might occur in a discussion with your optometrist
but you would need the supplementary verbal proposal of a visual field – in the discussion – to give significance to the gesture
pointing – I don’t think so –
as when you point – you point at something – ‘something’ in a visual field
although in the context of an eye examination – an image of one’s visual field – on a computer screen – could be presented – and pointed to
but again – the image would have to identified as a picture of one’s visual field
the former expression – ‘it is always I who see when anything is seen’ – is not senseless
it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and the supplementary proposal – ‘whenever something is seen, it is this which is seen’ – with a gesture to a visual field –
is not itself senseless – nor – as an explanation of the first proposal – does it render the first proposal senseless –
it is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘Let us then discard the “always” in our expression. Then I can still express my solipsism by saying, “Only what I see (or: see now) is really seen”. And here I am tempted to say: “Although by the word “I” I don’t mean L.W., it will do if others understand “I” to mean L.W., if just now I am in fact L.W.” I could also express my claim by saying: “I am the vessel of life”; but mark, it is essential that everyone to whom I say this should be unable to understand me. It is essential that the other should not be able to understand “what I really mean”, though in practice he might do what I wish by conceding to me an exceptional position in his notation. But I wish it to be logically impossible that he should understand me. Thus my expression is one of the many which is used on various occasions by philosophers and supposed to convey something to the person who says it, though essentially incapable of conveying anything to anyone else. Now if for an expression to convey a meaning means to be accompanied by or produce certain experiences, our expression may have all sorts of meanings, and I don’t wish to say anything about them. But we are, as a matter of fact, misled into thinking that our expression has a meaning in the sense in which a non-metaphysical expression has; for we wrongly compare our case with one in which the other person can't understand what we say because he lacks certain information. (This remark can only become clear if we understand the connection between grammar and sense and nonsense.)’
‘Let us then discard the “always” in our expression. Then I can still express my solipsism by saying, “Only what I see (or: see now) is really seen”.
substituting ‘always’ with ‘only’ – is no step forward
yes – the proposal ‘Only what I see (or: see now) is really seen’ – can be put –
but as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and for this proposal to have substance – we need to see it in a propositional context – where it is used –
the present – philosophical context – would be a start –
but in this context – it is a proposal that is interesting – only if put to question – put to doubt – and its uncertainty explored
‘And here I am tempted to say: “Although by the word “I” I don’t mean L.W., it will do if others understand “I” to mean L.W., if just now I am in fact L.W.”.’
yes – ‘I’ – as a proposal – is open to question –
and if L.W. – doesn’t mean L.W – by ‘I’ when he says ‘I’ – what does he mean?
does he know?
we don’t get an answer here
Wittgenstein goes on to say –
‘I could also express my claim by saying: “I am the vessel of life”; but mark, it is essential that everyone to whom I say this should be unable to understand me. It is essential that the other should not be able to understand “what I really mean”, though in practice he might do what I wish by conceding to me an exceptional position in his notation. But I wish it to be logically impossible that he should understand me.’
‘I am the vessel of life’
well – he might sensibly say – ‘I am a vessel of life’
‘the vessel of life’ – and you have moved into the realm of delusion – delusions of grandeur –
‘but mark, it is essential that everyone to whom I say this should be unable to understand me.’ –
and this statement fits perfectly with an argument for philosophical delusion
anyway – from a logical point of view – Wittgenstein is in no man’s land
any proposal put – in so far as it is – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
is understandable –
if it is not understandable – form a logical point of view – it is not a proposal – it is not a proposition –
it is a prejudice – masking as a proposition –
what you are then dealing with – is logical fraud – or at least the attempt at logical fraud
and this is what we do get from L.W.
‘But I wish it to be logically impossible that he should understand me. This my expression is one of the many which is used on various occasions by philosophers and supposed to convey something to the person who says it, though essentially incapable of conveying anything to anyone else.’
‘logically impossible that he should understand me’ –
if what is said – is ‘logically impossible’ – then what is said – will not make any sense at all – either to the person who makes the statement – or to whoever witnesses it
‘Now if for an expression to convey a meaning means to be accompanied by or produce certain experiences, our expression may have all sorts of means, and I don’t wish to say anything about them.’
here Wittgenstein seems to realise that a proposal put – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
(what alcoholics call ‘a moment of clarity’) –
but he doesn’t wish to say anything about possible interpretations of the proposal –
that is – he doesn’t wish to acknowledge the logic of the proposition –
he is arguing for – denial
‘But we are, as a matter of fact, misled into thinking that our expression has a meaning in the sense in which a non-metaphysical expression has; for we wrongly compare our case with one in which the other person can't understand what we say because he lacks certain information. (This remark can only become clear if we understand the connection between grammar and sense and nonsense.)’
any proposal – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
and this is the case – however you further describe the proposal – e.g. – as ‘metaphysical’
‘grammar’ – if it is to mean anything – is an account – some account – of usage –
and the matter of sense and nonsense – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘The meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it. The meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the expression. Therefore the phrase “I think I mean something by it”, or “I’m sure I mean something by it”, which we often hear in philosophical discussions to justify the use of an expression is for us no justification at all. We ask: “What do you mean?”, i.e., “How do you use this expression?” If someone taught me the word “bench” and said that he sometimes or always put a stroke over it
_____
thus: “bench”. and that this meant something to him, I should say: “I don’t know what sort of an idea you associate with this stroke, but it doesn’t interest me unless you show me that there is a use for the stroke in the kind of calculus in which you wish to use the word ‘bench’”. – I want to play chess, and a man gives the white king a paper crown, using the use of the piece unaltered, but telling me that the crown has a meaning to him in the game, which he can’t express by rules, I say “as long as it doesn’t alter the use of the piece, it hasn’t what I call a meaning.’
‘The meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it.’ –
yes – however – the use we make of it – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘use’ – is uncertain
it is telling that Wittgenstein provides no analysis of ‘use’ –
and what that points to is that he hasn’t really thought about it – strange as that might sound
clearly for him – it is not open to question – open to doubt – and he doesn’t appear to regard it as uncertain
in such a formula – ‘meaning = use’ – we really have no explanation – no account of meaning
‘use’ – is just a tag – a label – Wittgenstein has stuck on ‘meaning’
‘The meaning is not a mental accompaniment to the expression’
what if the use is explained – is elaborated in terms of a mental accompaniment?
for clearly – use – if it is to be understood – will most likely be elaborated on –
will have to be explained –
and when it comes to an elaboration – and explanation – we deal with whatever is put – however it is put
‘Therefore the phrase “I think I mean something by it”, or “I’m sure I mean something by it, which we often hear in philosophical discussions to justify the use of an expression is for us no justification at all.’
‘I think I mean something by it’ – is no justification of an expression – of a proposal – in fact – it is not even meant to be
‘I think I mean something by it’ – expresses uncertainty – uncertainty regarding whether the proposal put has meaning
uncertainty – is logical – is healthy – is good
on the other hand –
“I’m sure I mean something by it” – is quite the opposite
there is no propositional certainty –
any claim of certainty is illogical – and generally speaking – only has a rhetorical function
any claim of propositional certainty – misses the boat completely
‘We ask: “What do you mean?”, i.e., “How do you use this expression?”’
any proposal put – has a use – is used –
you can point to its use – and still the question can be asked – ‘what do you mean?’
any answer to the questions – ‘what do you mean?’ – ‘how do you use this expression?” – will be a proposal – a proposal that will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
point being ‘meaning’ – whatever account you give of it – is uncertain
and the ‘use’ of a proposal – likewise – will be open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘If someone taught me the word “bench” and said that he sometimes or always put a stroke over it
_____
thus: “bench”. and that this meant something to him, I should say: “I don’t know what sort of an idea you associate with this stroke, but it doesn’t interest me unless you show me that there is a use for the stroke in the kind of calculus in which you wish to use the word ‘bench’”.’
_____
even if shown a use for ‘bench” – the question of its meaning – is not – in any logical sense settled – it is open to question
all very well for someone to say ‘this is what I mean by it’ – if we were satisfied by this kind of statement – there would be no question of meaning –
and this is what I think is really behind Wittgenstein’s thinking here – the absence of doubt – or at least the attempt to put that the absence of doubt – as valid and sensible
and to my mind – such is – at the very least – naïve – and if not naïve – pretentious
‘I want to play chess, and a man gives the white king a pauper crown, using the use of the piece unaltered, but telling me that the crown has a meaning to him in the game, which he can’t express by rules, I say “as long as it doesn’t alter the use of the piece, it hasn’t what I call a meaning.’
chess is a game –
a game is a rule-governed propositional exercise
the pieces in chess – are rule governed tokens
is there any question – in a game – in the rules of a game – as to how the tokens – can be used?
no –
if you follow the rules – if you play the game –
if you don’t follow the rules – there is no game
is there any question of meaning in a game?
no –
you don’t mean the game – you play the game –
the game is not ‘meaningful’ or ‘meaningless’ –
it is a rule-governed play
‘One sometimes hears that such a phrase as “This is here”. when while I say it I point to a part of my visual field, has a kind of primitive meaning to me, although it can’t impart information to anyone else.’
such a phrase as ‘this is here’ – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
when put to question – such a proposal will be open to elaboration – and open to interpretation
and so – this primitive meaning – to me can be explored – and might quite possibly end up being quite complex – if I explore it
and if others are invited to do so – the world may open up
that we put proposals to ourselves – and to others – and put them to question – is the start of the critical process
‘When I say “Only this is seen”, I forget that a sentence may come ever so naturally to us without having any use in our calculus of language. Think of the law of identity,
a = a, and how we sometimes try hard to get a hold of its sense, to visualise it, by looking at an object and repeating to ourselves such a sentence as “This tree is the same thing as this tree”. The gestures and images by which I apparently give this sentence sense are very familiar to those I use in the case of “Only this is really seen”. (To get clear about philosophical problems, it is useful to become conscious of the apparently unimportant details of the particular situation in which we are inclined to make a certain metaphysical assertion. Thus we may be tempted to say “Only this is really seen” when we stare at unchanging surroundings, whereas we are not at all tempted to say this when we look about us while walking.)’
‘When I say “Only this is seen”, I forget that a sentence may come ever so naturally to us without having any use in our calculus of language.’
the fact is – this could be said of any sentence – any proposal – that is not put in a propositional context – or not understood to be in a propositional context
that is the first point
secondly –
‘only this is seen’ – is quite clearly a propositional invitation to question – to doubt – an invitation to explore propositional uncertainty – i.e. – ‘what is this that is only seen?’
thirdly –
as it stands – ‘only this is seen’ – is like the presentation of a form – a form – without substance
look we make such statements from time to time – but again – they function as a starting point for further proposal – for propositional investigation
as for this so call ‘law of identity’ –
this is a different kettle of fish
‘a = a’ – is a proposal – that leaves you stumped –
it is not like ‘only this is seen’ – an invitation to proceed
so – the analogy Wittgenstein is trying to set up here – is wrongheaded –
a = a – is really a misuse of the ‘=’ signs
in mathematics the ‘=’ sign indicates that one term can be substituted for another – as in ‘x = y’ –
in ‘x = y’ – where y occurs x can be substituted – and vice versa
the ‘=’ sign is the substitution sign
unless the terms are different on either side of the ‘=’ sign – there can be no substitution
in ‘a = a’ – there is no substitution –
there is only the appearance of substitution – though the use – the misuse of the ‘=’ sign
‘=’ is not an identity sign – it is a substitution sign
if we are to go with the ‘a = a’ proposal – then identity is repetition – is duplication
and yes – you can duplicate ‘a’ – but in what sense does duplication give us identify?
and if your argument is that identity is duplication – if that’s all it amounts to – then
identity is without identity
and it is this realization – that is behind why ‘a = a’ – strikes one as dumb and useless
this so called ‘law of identity’ – ‘a = a’ – is presented here in a mathematical form –
the form of a propositional game – a rule-governed propositional exercise –
‘a = a’ – has the form of a propositional game – but here lies the deception
a game is to played – there is no play in ‘a = a’ –
‘a = a’ – as a game – is a dud –
the philosophical issue of identity – is not a game problem – not a problem to be resolved by rules – it is a critical problem –
a critical issue – to be addressed with question – with doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty
‘The gestures and images by which I apparently give this sentence sense are very familiar to those I use in the case of “Only this is really seen”.’
you can gesture all you like with ‘a = a’ – it remains a propositional corruption – a propositional dead end
on the other hand – gesturing with ‘Only this is really seen’ – is just rhetorical –
as far as analysis goes – rhetoric – gets you nowhere
‘(To get clear about philosophical problems, it is useful to become conscious of the apparently unimportant details of the particular situation in which we are inclined to make a certain metaphysical assertion. Thus we may be tempted to say “Only this is really seen” when we stare at unchanging surroundings, whereas we are not at all tempted to say this when we look about us while walking.)’
it will always be the case that we can say that different circumstances will prompt different proposals –
if this is all that it is thought that philosophical problems come down to – where’s the problem?
the issue is not about coming up with a circumstantial account of propositional action – interesting and useful as that might be
a philosophical problem is the result of a critical analysis of any proposition
a philosophical problem just is the propositional action of question – of doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty
‘There is, as we have said, no objection to adopting a symbolism in which a certain person always or temporarily holds an exceptional place. And therefore, if I utter the sentence “Only I really see”, it is conceivable that my fellow creatures thereupon will arrange their notation so as to fall in with me by saying “so-and- so is really seen” instead of L.W sees so-and so”, etc. etc. What, however, is wrong, is to think that I can justify this choice of notation. When I said, from my heart, that only I see, I was also inclined to say that by “I” I didn’t really mean L.W., although for the benefit of my fellow men I might say “It is now L.W. who really sees” though this is not what I really mean. I could almost say that by “I” I meant something which just now inhabits L.W., something which the others can’t see. (I meant my mind, but could only point to it via my body.) There is nothing wrong in suggesting that the others should give me an exceptional place in their notation; but the justification which I wish to give for it: that this body is now the seat of that which really lives – is senseless. For admittedly this is not to state anything which in the ordinary sense is a matter of experience. (And don’t think that it is an experiential proposition which only I can know because only I am in the position to have the particular experience.) Now the idea that the real I lives in my body is connected with the peculiar grammar of the word “I”, and to misunderstandings this grammar is liable to give rise to. There are two different cases in which the word “I” (or “my”) which I might call “the use as object” and “the use as subject”. Examples of the first kind of use are these: “My arm is broken”, “I have grown six inches”, “I have a bump on my forehead”, “The wind blows my head about”. Examples of the second kind are: “I see so-and-so”, “I hear so-and-so”, “I try to lift my arm”, “I think it will rain”, “I have a toothache”. One can point to the difference between these two categories by saying: The cases of the first category involve the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error, or I should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been provided for. The possibility of failing to score has been provided for in a pin game, On the other hand it is not one of the hazards of the game that the balls should fail to come up if I put a penny in the slot. It is possible that, say in an accident I should feel a pain in my arm at my side, and think it is mine, when really it is my neighbour’s. And I could, looking into the mirror, mistake a bump on his forehead for one in mine. On the other hand, there is no question of recognising a person when I say I have a toothache. To ask “are you sure that it is you who have pains?” would be nonsensical. Now when in this case no error is possible, it is because the move which we might be inclined to think of as an error, a ‘bad move’ is no move of the game at all. We distinguish in chess between good and bad moves, and we call it a mistake if we expose the queen to a bishop. But it is no mistake to promote a pawn to a king). And now this way of stating our idea suggests itself: that it is impossible that in making the statement “I have a toothache” I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me. To say “I have pain” is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning it. “But surely the word “I” in the mouth of a man refers to the man who says it: it points to himself; and very often the man who says it points to himself with his finger”. But it is quite superfluous to point to himself. He might just as well only have raised his hand. It would be wrong to say that when somebody points to the sun with his hand, he is pointing both to the sun and to himself because it is he who points; on the other hand, he may by pointing attract attention both to the sun and to himself.’
‘There is nothing wrong in suggesting that the others should give me an exceptional place in their notation; but the justification which I wish to give for it: that this body is now the seat of that which really lives – is senseless. For admittedly this is not to state anything which in the ordinary sense is a matter of experience. (And don’t think that it is an experiential proposition which only I can know because only I am in the position to have the particular experience.)’
the proposal – ‘only I really see’ – does not require an ‘exceptional place’ in others notation –
logically speaking there is no exceptional place – in any notation – in any propositional construct
any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
and the proposal – ‘this body is the now the seat of that which really lives’ – is not senseless –
it is just another proposal – open to question
the idea that ‘only I can know’ – is a gross claim of propositional denial –
what we know – what is known – is whatever is proposed – and whatever is proposed – by whoever – is open to question
knowledge just simply is proposal
I am in a position to have particular experience – and any proposal I put in this connection - is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
^
‘We distinguish in chess between good and bad moves, and we call it a mistake if we expose the queen to a bishop. But it is no mistake to promote a pawn to a king). And now this way of stating our idea suggests itself: that it is impossible that in making the statement “I have a toothache” I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me. To say “I have pain” is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning it. “But surely the word “I” in the mouth of a man refers to the man who says it: it points to himself; and very often the man who says it points to himself with his finger”. But it is quite superfluous to point to himself. He might just as well only have raised his hand. It would be wrong to say that when somebody points to the sun with his hand, he is pointing both to the sun and to himself because it is he who points; on the other hand, he may by pointing attract attention both to the sun and to himself.’
we operate with two propositional modes – the critical mode – of question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty – and the game mode – of rule-governed propositional action
chess is a game – in logical terms – a rule governed propositional action
‘mistakes’ in chess – are rule-governed –
‘I have a toothache’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
there are no mistakes in non-game propositional activity –
what we deal with in the critical mode – is uncertainty – not mistakes
in the critical mode – any so called ‘mistake’ – as with any other proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
i.e. – the pain in my tooth – may actually be a referred pain – and it could well be argued that it is not in my tooth
‘that it is impossible that in making the statement “I have a toothache” I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me.’
so – there is no issue of mistake here – ‘I have a toothache’– is not a game proposition
with respect to ‘I’ – as Wittgenstein argues – and acknowledges – ‘I’ is logically irrelevant (or – as he goes on to say – ‘superfluous’) – in the sense that a proposal’s logical value has nothing to do with its origin – or how that origin is described – i.e. – ‘I’ – ‘you’ – ‘he’ – ‘we’ – ‘they’ –
the logical value of a proposal – lies in its critical possibilities
so – if you preface your proposal with ‘I’ – the best that can be said of the ‘I’ – is that is rhetorical
‘The word “I” does not mean the same as “L.W.” even if I am L.W., nor does it mean the same as the expression “the person who is now speaking”. But that doesn’t mean that L.W. and “I” mean different things. All it means is that these words are different instruments of our language.’
meaning is a question of use and context –
if I am L.W and I am speaking –
then – ‘I’ and ‘L.W’ – can mean the same – to me –
that is to say – in the context of me speaking – I could use ‘I’ and ‘L.W.’ – to refer to myself –
in that context – ‘I’ and ‘L.W’ could be used interchangeably – one could be substituted for the other
in other contexts – ‘I’ and ‘L.W’ – will have different uses – different meanings
whatever the case – use and context – are open to question – open to doubt – and are
uncertain
‘Think of words as instruments characterized by their use, and then think of the use of a hammer, the use of a chisel, the use of a square, of a glue pot, of the glue. (Also, all that we say here can be understood only if we understand that a great variety of games is played with the sentences of our language: Giving and obeying orders; asking questions and answering them; describing an event; telling a fictitious story; telling a joke; describing an immediate experience; making conjectures about events in the physical world; making scientific hypotheses and theories; greeting someone etc., etc.) The mouth which says ‘I’ or the hand that is raised to indicate that it is I who wish to speak, or I who have a toothache, does not thereby point to anything. If on the other hand, I wish to indicate the place of my pain, I point. And here again remember the difference between pointing to the painful spot without being led by the eye and on the other hand pointing to a scar on my body after looking for it. (“That’s where I was vaccinated”.) – The main who cries out with pain, or says he has pain, doesn’t choose the mouth which says it.’
‘Think of words as instruments characterized by their use, and then think of the use of a hammer, the use of a chisel, the use of a square, and of the glue.’
yes – words can well be characterized as ‘instruments of use’ –
and we have standard uses for words – just as we have defined uses for hammers – chisels – squares – and glue –
this is not to say anything remarkable –
however – to suggest that this matter – ends with standard uses – is naïve at best – and ignorant at worst
any instrument is open to question – any use is open to question
I may not use a chisel in the standard way –
and I have seen avant-garde art works where clue is not used to glue anything – but rather as a layer on an artifact that contrasts with the paint –
the point is that use is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
and if you don’t see this – you see nothing
‘(Also, all that we say here can be understood only if one understands that a great variety of games is played with sentences of our language: giving and obeying orders; asking questions and answering them; describing an event; telling a fictitious story; telling a joke; describing an immediate experience; making conjectures about events in the physical world; making scientific hypotheses and theories; greeting someone, et., etc.)’
first up – let’s get one thing straight –
there are two modes of propositional activity – the critical mode – and the game mode
if we are to operate logically – any proposal put – in any context – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
this is logical reality – this is everyday reality –
we put our propositions to question – and any use that we put them to – is open to question
also – we play propositional games
when we play propositional games – we are not in the critical mode – we are in a rule-governed mode
to play the game – you follow the rules –
putting the rules to question is not playing the game
of course – you can put the rules to question – but in doing this you move into the critical mode
it is essential to understand the difference between the two modes of logical activity –
if you don’t – you end up with the confusion that permeates all of Wittgenstein’s work in the philosophy of language
the question to ask here in relation to the great variety of propositional activity that Wittgenstein points to – is – are we dealing with language in a game mode – or are we dealing with language use – in the critical mode?
i.e. – is ‘giving and obeying orders’ – a game?
is it rule-governed – and without question? – obviously not
and what of ‘describing an event’ – clearly a matter – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
and ‘greeting someone’? – there can always be a question of what the appropriate way to greet someone is in a particular circumstance
all of the propositional activities – mentioned above are activities – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
they are not propositional games –
if you want games – rule-governed propositional activities - look to mathematics –
computer science – chess – kids at play
‘The mouth which says “I” or the hand that is raised to indicate that it is I who wish to speak, or I who have a toothache, does not thereby point to anything.’
do the mouth or the hand point to the ‘I’?
what is it to point?
it is a way of directing one’s attention to something
now in my view ‘I’ – is a rhetorical devise – that has no actual reference –
Wittgenstein – takes a similar view
however – I can see that a common understanding is that the ‘I’ represents the person speaking –
and if you think this – you may regard the action of the mouth – or the action of the hand – as directing one’s attention to the person speaking –
I am here just pointing out that there are different ways of understanding ‘I’ –
that the matter is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘If, on the other hand, I wish to indicate the place of my pain, I point. And here again remember the difference between pointing to the painful spot without being led by the eye and on the other hand pointing to a scar on my body after looking for it. (“That’s where I was vaccinated”.)
regardless of how one is led to it or how one goes about finding it – any proposal – regarding the place of my pain – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘The man who cries out with pain, doesn’t choose the mouth that says it.’
what of the case of Stephen Hawking – and the machine he used to speak – wasn’t that a choice?
‘All this comes to saying that the person of whom we say “he has pain” is, by the rules of the game, the person who cries, contorts his face, etc. The place of this pain – as we have said – may be in another person’s body. If, in saying “I”, I point to my own body, I model the use of the word “I” on that of the demonstrative “this person: or “he”. (This way of making the two expressions similar is somewhat analogous to that which one sometimes adopts in mathematics, say in the proof that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is 180°.
We say “a= a¢, b = b¢¢ and y = y”. The first two equalities are of an entirely different kind from the third.) In “I have a pain”, “I” is not a demonstrative pronoun.’
‘All this comes to saying that the person of whom we say “he has pain” is, by the rules of the game, the person who cries, contorts his face, etc.’
there is no ‘game’ here –
a game is a rule-governed propositional action
‘he has pain’ – is not a game – is not rule-governed
‘he has pain’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
a person’s action of crying – of contorting his face etc – may well be interpreted as ‘he has pain’
however – it is open to other interpretations
i.e. – perhaps he is feigning pain – perhaps he has some neurological disorder – perhaps he is an actor rehearsing a part – etc. etc.
‘The place of this pain – as we have said – may be in another person’s body’
any proposal regarding the place of this pain – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if the experience of pain is transferred from another person’s body – still the place of the pain is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain –
i.e. – where now is the place of pain?
does the pain now have two places – and if so – what are we to make of that?
questions – doubts – uncertainties
‘If, in saying “I”, I point to my own body, I model the use of the word “I” on that of the demonstrative “this person: or “he” … In “I have a pain”, “I” is not a demonstrative pronoun.’
the logic of ‘I’ is no different to the logic of any proposal –
it is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
if you take the view that ‘I’ is not a demonstrative pronoun – (and that is open to question) – what account do you give of ‘I’?
there is a point to Wittgenstein’s analogy of the analysis of ‘I have pain’ and mathematical proof –
the ‘=’ sign – is a substitution sign –
in ‘y = y’ – there is no substitution – there is no equality
‘y = y’ – is – ‘y’ – restated
the proof-game is a game of restatement
restatement is rhetorical
the ‘I’ in ‘I have pain’ – is a statement of authorship – authorship of the proposal ‘there is pain’ –
from a logical point of view – authorship – is logically irrelevant
what is logically relevant – is what is being proposed – not who is proposing it
how then do we account for the ‘I’ – how do we explain its use? – why is it there? – what is its propositional function?
the ‘I’ in ‘I have a pain’ – is rhetorical –
it draws attention to – the proposal – the proposal of pain – it gives it a focus and emphasis
‘Compare the two cases: 1. “How do you know that he has pains?’ – “Because I hear him moan”. 2. “How do you know that you have pains?” – “Because I feel them”. But “I feel them” means the same as “I have them”. Therefore this was no explanation at all. That, however, in my answer I am inclined to stress the word “feel” and not the word “I” indicates that by “I” I don’t wish to pick out one person (from amongst different persons).’
‘because I hear him moan’ – is an answer to the question – how do you know he has pains?’ – but an answer obviously open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
i.e. – he may not be in pain at all – just pretending
‘because I feel them’ – is an answer to the question – ‘how do you know that you have pains?’ – an answer that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
we can ask is ‘feeling pains’ – the same as ‘having pains’ – as
Wittgenstein here asks?
if – as Wittgenstein has put above – that the place of the pain may be in another person’s body
then there is a question as to whether feeling pains – is having pains –
perhaps you feel pains – but you don’t have them?
‘That, however, in my answer I am inclined to stress the word “feel” and not the word “I” indicates that by “I” I don’t wish to pick out one person (from amongst different persons).’
that may be so – but it is no more than rhetoric
look – you can try to banish ‘I’ – with rhetorical tricks – but like the elephant in the room – it’s always there –
it will continue to be used by everyone – and everywhere
and in any serious philosophical consideration – it will be front and centre –
and it will be put to question
interesting too – that earlier on Wittgenstein seemed to be suggesting that ‘I’ is to be seen as a rhetorical device re:
‘It would be wrong to say that when someone points to the sun with his hand, he is pointing both to the sun and to himself because it is he who points; on the other hand he may by pointing attract attention to the sun and to himself’
attracting attention
now he seems to be arguing that we can get rid of the ‘I’ with a rhetorical flourish –
so – it all just becomes a question of rhetorical moves – a jump to the left – a jump to the right?
is that where he has landed?
‘The difference between the propositions “I have pain” and “he has pain” is not that of “L.W. has pain” and “Smith has pain”. Rather, it corresponds to the difference between moaning and saying that someone moans. – “But surely the word “I” in “I have pain” serves to distinguish me from other people, because it is by the sign “I” that I distinguish saying that I have pain from saying that one of the others has”. Imagine the philosophical problems which would arise out of such a convention. Some philosophers brought up in this language would probably feel that they didn’t like the similarity of the expression “Mr. Nobody” and “Mr, Smith”. When we feel that we wish to abolish the ‘I” in “I have pain”, one may say that we tend to make the verbal expression of pain similar to the expression by moaning. – We are inclined to forget that it is the particular use of the word only which gives the word its meaning. Let us think of our old example of the use of words: Someone is sent to the grocer with a slip of paper with the words “five apples” written on it. The use of the term “in practice” is its meaning. Imagine that it were the usual thing that the objects around us carried labels with words on them by means of which our speech referred to the objects. Some of these words would be proper names of the objects, others generic names (like tables, chairs etc.) others again, names of colours, names of shapes, etc. That is to say, a label would only have meaning to us in so far as we make a particular use of it. Now we could easily imagine ourselves being impressed by merely seeing a label on a thing, and so what makes these labels important is their use. In this way we sometimes believe that we have named something when we make the gesture of pointing and utter words like “This is …” (the formula of the ostensive definition). We may call something “toothache”, and think that the word has received a definite function in the dealings that we carry out with language when, under certain circumstances, we have pointed to our cheek and said: “This is a toothache”. (Our idea is that we point and the other “only knows what we are pointing to” he knows the use of the word. And here we have in mind the special case when ‘what we point to’ is, say, a person and “to know that I point to” means to see which persons present I point to.)’
‘The difference between the propositions “I have pain” and “he has pain” is not that of “L.W. has pain” and “Smith has pain”. Rather, it corresponds to the difference between moaning and saying that someone moans.’
ok – but it will be said that behind this moan is – an ‘I’ –and furthermore – not every ‘I’ statement can be – or is – represented by an moan‘
“But surely the word “I” in “I have pain” serves to distinguish me from other people, because it is by the sign “I” that I distinguish saying that I have pain from saying that one of the others has”.’
what the ‘I’ in ‘I have pain’ does is draw attention to – give focus to – the proposal – of pain – the “I’ in ‘I have pain’ is rhetorical
‘Imagine the philosophical problems which would arise out of such a convention. Some philosophers brought up in this language would probably feel that they didn’t like the similarity of the expression “Mr. Nobody” and “Mr, Smith”.’
the ‘similarity’ of the expressions ‘Mr. Nobody’ and Mr. Smith – is logically neither here nor there the issue here is the relevance of propositional authorship the authorship of a proposition – be it represented by ‘I’ – ‘he’ – ‘she’ – ‘he’ – ‘we’ – ‘they’ – or names – i.e. – ‘Mr. Nobody’ – ‘Mr. Smith’ – etc. – is logically irrelevant who puts the proposal – is not logically significant the proposal itself – is what is logically significant – and any proposal put is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘When we feel that we wish to abolish the ‘I” in “I have pain”, one may say that we tend to make the verbal expression of pain similar to the expression by moaning.’
it is similar – in that it is verbal and yes – you would say that moaning is rhetorical it is a case of pure rhetoric really – for there is no proposal that comes with it the moan raises the question – what – if anything – is being proposed? again – who moans – is not in the logical picture and in any case – it seems to me that substituting a moan for a genuine proposal – regardless of whether there is an ‘I’ involved or not – is scrapping the bottom of the philosophical barrel –
‘We are inclined to forget that it is the particular use of the word only which gives the word its meaning.’
yes – but any use of word is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain use is logically uncertain
‘Let us think of our old example of the use of words: Someone is sent to the grocer with a slip of paper with the words “five apples” written on it. The use of the term “in practice” is in its meaning. Imagine that it were the usual thing that the objects around us carried labels with words on them by means of which our speech referred to the objects. Some of these words would be proper names of the objects, others generic names (like tables, chairs etc.) others again, names of colours, names of shapes, etc. That is to say, a label would only have meaning to us in so far as we make a particular use of it.’
labelling – and – naming – are propositional actions – and as with any propositional act – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain – i.e. – ‘what does this label / name mean?” – ‘is this the correct label /name?’ –labelling and naming are identifying actions – any identity proposal is open to question – identity is open to question – identity is uncertain and as for use – any propositional use – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
‘Now we could easily imagine ourselves being impressed by merely seeing a label on a thing, and so what makes these labels important is their use. In this way we sometimes believe that we have named something when we make the gesture of pointing and utter words like “This is …” (the formula of the ostensive definition). We may call something “toothache”, and think that the word has received a definite function in the dealings that we carry out with language when, under certain circumstances, we have pointed tour cheek and said: “This is a toothache”.’
there is no definite propositional use – if by ‘definite’ is meant a use that defies interpretation – that is not open to question – that is beyond doubt – that is certain and as with labelling and naming – ostensive definition – is a propositional action – pointing is a propositional action – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘(Our idea is that we point and the other “only knows what we are pointing to” he knows the use of the word. And here we have in mind the special case when ‘what we point to’ is, say, a person and “to know that I point to” means to see which persons present I point to.)’
that may be the idea – ‘in practice’ – but logically speaking there is always the question – ‘does he know what we are pointing to – does he see which persons present I am pointing to?’ from a logical point of view – the matter is uncertain practice is uncertain
‘We feel that in the cases in which “I” is used as subject, we don’t use it because we recognise a particular person by his bodily characteristics; and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body. In fact this seems to be the real ego, the one of which it was said, “Cogito ergo sum”. – “Is there then no mind, but only a body? Answer: the word “mind” has meaning, i.e., it has a use in our language; but saying this doesn’t yet say what kind of use we make of it.’
I just make the point that ‘something bodiless’ – cannot be in a body –
and if it is in a body – it is characteristic of that body –
and if ‘I’ does not refer to bodily characteristics – it has no reference
and if so – we must ask – what then is its propositional function?
in my view – ‘I’ – draws attention to whatever proposal is put –
it gives that proposal – that proposition – a propositional focus – a propositional emphasis
therefore – ‘I’ – is a rhetorical device
yes – the word ‘mind’ – the proposal of ‘mind’ – has meaning –
and its meaning – as with any other word – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
that is the bottom line
the proposal of ‘mind’ – in my view – is an explanatory proposal –
and as I see it – it functions to account for propositional action that in the first place – is private
that is propositional action that is not made public –
we can of course question – doubt – and explore the uncertainty of our proposals – without making them public – without making them accessible to others
and of course – such propositional action can be made public – can be made accessible to others –
and placing our proposals in the public domain – invites further critical analysis
a proposal – not made public – and a proposal made public – is the same proposal –
open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
to use an analogy –
there are two different theatres in which the propositional performance can take place – the private and the public –
and we can easily – and readily – go from one to the other –
and the critical issue is the same wherever the performance takes place
‘In fact one might say that what in these investigations we were concerned with was the grammar of those words which describe what are called “mental activities”: seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. And this comes to the same as saying that we are concerned with the grammar of ‘phrases describing sense data’.’
by ‘the grammar of those words which describe what are called ‘mental activities’’ – I take to mean just how those words are used – and the philosophical arguments for their use
‘And this comes to the same as saying that we are concerned with the grammar of ‘phrases describing sense data’.’
here it is put that mental activities – are sense data –
and that therefore what we are concerned with is the phrases describing sense data
philosophers have taken this view of mental activities – that they can be reduced to sense data
as I see it – how we understand mental activities – as with non-mental activities – or any activities – however described – is a matter always open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
which is to say there is no one way of describing mental activities – that there are different ways of describing mental activities – and that these different ways – different proposals – have their uses
that in our propositional lives we will – if we are rational – be open to the different propositional descriptions of mental activities – the different accounts of mental activities
‘Philosophers say it is a philosophical opinion or conviction that there are sense data. But to say that I believe that there are sense data comes to saying that I believe that an object may appear before my eyes even when it isn’t.’
what ‘comes before my eyes’ – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain which is to say that logically speaking we cannot say with certainty – what it is we see
what we see is open to various and different descriptions
the sense data proposal is one such descriptive possibility – is one such explanation
an explanation is not an object
and object – if that is the term you want to use – is what is explained
but we are better to drop ‘object’ here – and just stick with ‘unknown’
what we experience – in the absence of any proposal – is unknown
we propose to make known –
and any proposal we put is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
the unknown is silent
‘Now when one uses the term “sense datum”, one should be clear about the peculiarity of its grammar. For the idea in introducing this expression was to model expressions referring to ‘appearance’ after expressions referring to ‘reality’. It was said, e.g., that if two things seem to be equal, there must be two somethings which are equal. Which of course means nothing else but that we have decided to use such an expression as “the appearance of these two things are equal”.’
and if we use this expression – ‘the appearance of these two things are equal’ –
what this proposal amounts to is ‘these two things are equal’ –
point being – the term ‘appearance’ – is redundant – and irrelevant
and if ‘appearance’ comes down to ‘sense data’ – the sense data proposal is irrelevant – has no logical function
‘Queerly enough, the introduction of this new phraseology has deluded people into thinking they have discovered new entities, new elements of the structure of the world, as though to say “I believe that there are sense data” were similar to saying “I believe that matter consists of electrons”.’
well – the proposal that ‘matter is consists of electrons’ – is an explanatory proposal –
just as the sense data proposal is an explanatory proposal
I see no logical problem with proposing new entities –
any such proposal is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘When we talk of equality of appearance or sense data, we introduce a new usage of the word “equal”. It is possible that the lengths A and B should appear to us to be equal, that B and C should appear to be equal, but that A and C do not appear to be equal. And in the new notation we shall have to say that though the appearance (sense datum) of A is equal to that of B and the appearance of B equal to that of C, the appearance of A is not equal to C; which is all right if you don’t mind using “equal” intransitively.’
again – it just seems that ‘appears’ has no real significance or roll here – and so ‘sense data’ – has no roll here
the proposal ‘A and B are equal’ – does not need to supplemented with ’appears’
and the proposition ‘A and B are equal’ – as with any proposal – is open to question
as to the intransitive use of ‘equal’ – it doesn’t sit well with me
‘Now the danger we are in when we adopt the sense datum notation is to forget the difference between the grammar of a statement about sense datum and the grammar of an outwardly similar statement about physical objects. (From this point one might go on to talking about the misunderstandings which find their expression in such sentences as: “we can never see an accurate circle”, “All our sense data are vague”. Also, this leads to the comparison of the grammar of “position”, “motion”, and “size” in Euclidean and in visual space. There is, e.g., absolute position, absolute motion and size, in visual space.)’
‘Now the danger we are in when we adopt the sense datum notation is to forget the difference between the grammar of a statement about sense datum and the grammar of an outwardly similar statement about physical objects.’
any proposal is different to another
a statement about sense data – is a different proposal to a statement about a physical object –
propositions – whether outwardly similar or not – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
and where a proposition functions – is a question of context
so – no surprise that a sense datum explanatory proposal – may not be of any use in a physical object context
‘(From this point one might go on to talking about the misunderstandings which find their expression in such sentences as: “we can never see an accurate circle”, “All our sense data are vague”. Also, this leads to the comparison of the grammar of “position”, “motion”, and “size” in Euclidean and in visual space. There is, e.g., absolute position, absolute motion and size, in visual space.)’
proposals – such as ‘position’ – ‘motion’ – and ‘size’ – have no propositional value –
until they are placed in wider – deeper – propositional contexts
and different contexts for these proposals – will result in different values –
and – of course – as with propositions – propositional contexts are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
it is always a question – of what fits where – and what is useful in terms of proposed outcomes –
and from a logical point of view – this question – is never finally resolved –
we work with what we’ve got – we make the best of it – and keep an open mind
‘Now we can make use of such an expression as “pointing to the appearance of a body” or “pointing to a visual sense datum”. Roughly speaking, this sort of pointing comes to the same as sighting, say, along the barrel of a gun. Thus we may point and say: “This is the direction in which I may see my image in the mirror”. One can also use such an expression as “the appearance, or sense datum, of my finger points to the sense datum of the tree” and similar ones. From these cases of pointing, however, we must distinguish those of pointing in the direction a sound sees to come from, or of pointing to my forehead with closed eyes, etc.’
we only come to the notion – the proposal of ‘appearance’ – as a result of putting a proposition to question – to doubt and exploring its uncertainty –
appearance is a critical notion – and a notion that has wide critical function and use
‘sense data’ – is a particular ‘drilling down’ on ‘appearance’ –
its place in this critical schema is primarily epistemological – and in this context – it has generated much critical debate
my question at present regarding ‘sense data’ – is just whether outside of a technical epistemological focus – it is any useful advance on ‘appearance’ –
and even in that context I have my doubts as to whether anything is achieved with ‘sense data’ – as against a straight-out critical approach
the matter is open to question
‘One can also use such an expression as “the appearance, or sense datum, of my finger points to the sense datum of the tree” and similar ones.’
yes – you can use such an expression – but really why would you – what is the point?
‘my finger points to the tree’ – is clear and to the point –
you don’t need to load up a perfectly straightforward proposal – with unnecessary philosophical baggage
‘From these cases of pointing, however, we must distinguish those of pointing in the direction a sound sees to come from, or of pointing to my forehead with closed eyes, etc.’
‘pointing in the direction a sound seems to come from’ and ‘pointing to my forehead with closed eyes’ are different proposals – are different propositions
nevertheless – both proposals are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘Now when in the solipsistic way I say ‘This is what’s really seen’, I point before me and it is essential that I point visually. If I pointed sideways or behind me – as it were, to things which I don’t see – the pointing in this case would be meaningless to me: it would not be pointing in the sense in which I wish to point, but this means that when I point before me saying “this is what’s really seen”, although I make the gesture of pointing, I don’t point to one thing as opposed to another. This is as when travelling in a car and feeling in a hurry, I instinctively press against something in front of me as though I could push the car from the inside.’
‘this is what is really seen’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
pointing is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
‘pushing against something in front of me’ – while in a car – is likewise a proposal –
admittedly – inarticulate – but a proposal – a propositional action – nevertheless – and one clearly – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘When it makes sense to say “I see this”, or “this is seen, pointing to what I see, it also makes sense to say “I see this” or “this is seen”, pointing to something I don’t see. When I made my solipsistic statement, I pointed, but I robbed the pointing of its sense by inseparably connecting that which points and that to which it points. I constructed a clock with all its wheels, etc., and in the end fastened the dial to the pointer and made it go round with it. And in this way the solipsist’s “Only this is seen” reminds us of a tautology.’
a tautology?
a tautology – i.e. – ‘it is raining or it is not raining’ – proposes propositional possibility
we can see the tautology as a meta proposal –
it does not propose what is the case – rather what can be the case
it is on a different logical level to ordinary or normative proposals
normative proposals specify a state of affairs –
and such proposals can be affirmed or denied
it makes no sense to affirm or deny a tautology – as no state of affairs is specified
‘When I made my solipsistic statement, I pointed, but I robbed the pointing of its sense by inseparably connecting that which points and that to which it points.’
yes – in the solipsistic statement the pointing is robbed of its sense –
nothing is pointed at
however – the solipsistic statement unlike the analytic statement – does not lay out – does not propose – possibility
what the solipsistic statement does is deny possibility
the solipsistic statement is not a meta proposal like the tautology – and it is not a normative proposal – it points to nothing
all we can say here is that the solipsistic proposal – is logical corruption
it strikes me that the solipsistic statement is best understood as a mood proposal –
i.e. – you find yourself thinking for a moment – that nothing else exists – nothing but what you experience
and perhaps such is and equal an opposite reaction to feeling overwhelmed by the world –
with a little thought you leave both extremes – and come back to a sensible centre –
so – a passing mood?
‘Of course one of the reasons why we are tempted to make our pseudo-statement is its similarity with the statement “I only see this”, or “this is the region in which I see”, where I point to certain objects around me, as opposed to others, or in a certain direction in physical space (not in visual space), as opposed to other directions in physical space. And if, pointing in this sense, I say “this is what is really seen, one may answer me: “This is what you, L.W., see”; but there is no objection to adopting a notation in which what we used to call ‘things which L.W. sees’ is called ‘things really seen’”. If, however, I believe that by pointing to that which in my argument has no neighbour I can convey something to myself (if not to others), I make a mistake similar to that of thinking that the sentence “I am here” makes sense to me (and, by the way, it is always true) under conditions different form the very special conditions under which it makes sense. E.g., when my voice and direction from which I speak is recognised by another person. Again an important case where you can learn that a word has meaning by the particular use we make of it. – We are like people who think that pieces of wood shaped more or less like chess or draughts pieces and standing on a chess board make a game, even if nothing has been said as to how they are to be used.’
And if, pointing in this sense, I say “this is what is really seen, one may answer me: “This is what you, L.W., see”; but there is no objection to adopting a notation in which what we used to call ‘things which L.W. sees’ is called ‘things really seen’”.
one might object –
‘things really seen’ – is a proposal – where there is no-one who does the seeing –
and in so far as no-one does the seeing – there is no seeing
and further –
‘things which L.W sees’ – is a perfectly reasonable proposal –
why substitute it with ‘things really seen’?
and if the understanding is – that ‘things really seen’ – is a substitute for ‘things L.W. sees’ –
then ‘things really seen’ – disappears – in a puff of irrelevancy
‘If, however, I believe that by pointing to that which in my grammar has no neighbour I can convey something to myself (if not to others), I make a mistake similar to that of thinking that the sentence “I am here” makes sense to me (and, by the way, it is always true) under conditions different form the very special conditions under which it makes sense. E.g., when my voice and direction from which I speak is recognised by another person.’
‘I am here’ – could be an exclamation – made when one arrives –
if the other is not already aware that you have arrived – ‘I am here’ – tells the other – you have arrived – and is thus informative –
if the other does know you have arrived – ‘I am here’ – is rhetorical – not informative
so here – the logical status of the proposal – is dependent on the circumstance – or the propositional context of its use
‘We are like people who think that pieces of wood shaped more or less like chess or draughts pieces and standing on a chess board make a game, even if nothing has been said as to how they are to be used.’
if you have played board games or seen board games played – but not yet come across chess or draughts – you might speculate that the pieces and the chess board – represent the form of a game
however – whether it is a ‘game’ – and if a game – how the game is played – when nothing is said of its rules of play –
will be matters – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
‘To say “it approaches me” has sense, even when, physically speaking, nothing approaches my body; and in the same way it makes sense to say “it is here” or “it has reached me” when nothing has reached my body. And, on the other hand, “I am here” if my voice is recognized and heard to come from a particular place of common space. In the sentence “it is here” the ‘here’ was a here in visual space. Roughly speaking it is the geometrical eye. The sentence “I am here”, to make sense, must attract attention to a place in common space. (And there are several ways in which this sentence might be used.) The philosopher who thinks it makes sense to say to himself “I am here” takes the verbal expression from the sentence in which “here” is a place in common space and thinks of “here” as the here in visual space. He therefore really says something like “Here is here”.’
‘To say “it approaches me” has sense, even when, physically speaking, nothing approaches my body; and in the same way it makes sense to say “it is here” or “it has reached me” when nothing has reached my body.’
‘it approaches me’ – ‘it is here’ – ‘it has reached me’ – are proposals – open to question –
whether they make sense or not – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
sense is uncertain –
what makes no sense – is thinking that you can makes sense of a proposal – that has no propositional context –
this seems to be what Wittgenstein has in mind
and the fact is that different contexts will give different answers to the question of sense
you could well have contexts where the above proposals do not make sense – and many and varied contexts where – yes – there is sense – but the sense is different from context to context
and whatever the case here – the question of ‘sense’ – is always live –
which is to say – always open to question
‘And, on the other hand, “I am here” if my voice is recognized and heard to come from a particular place of common space. In the sentence “it is here” the ‘here’ was a here in visual space. Roughly speaking it is the geometrical eye. The sentence “I am here”, to make sense, must attract attention to a place in common space. (And there are several ways in which this sentence might be used.)’
again – the logical reality is that ‘I am here’ – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
that is the starting position – with any proposal – with any proposition
Wittgenstein’s analysis here – is fair enough –
however – it is just one proposal among any number of possible proposals that might be put – to give propositional context to ‘I am here’
and yes – the very point is – ‘there are several ways in which this sentence might be used’
‘The philosopher who thinks it makes sense to say to himself “I am here” takes the verbal expression from the sentence in which “here” is a place in common space and thinks of “here” as the here in visual space. He therefore really says something like “Here is here”.’
i.e. – ‘here’ – might be – for this philosopher – ‘existence itself’
and in proposing ‘I am here’ – he might be asserting his existence –
in much the same way as did Descartes with his – ‘I think therefore I am’
that is – his ‘I am here’ – is to be understood as a particular kind of philosophical proposal –
you cannot make any sense of any statement – unless you place it in a propositional context –
and a proposal put – as it were – without context – invites context
and any context proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain
as to – ‘here is here’ –
‘here is here’ – is a rhetorical statement –
i.e. – it draws attention to ‘here’ –
which only of course raises questions
‘I could, however, try to express my solipsism in a different way: I imagine that I and others draw pictures or write descriptions of what each of us sees. These descriptions are put before me. I point to the one which I have made and say: “Only this is (or was) really seen”. That is I am tempted to say: “Only this description has reality (visual reality) behind it”. The others I might call – “blank descriptions”. I could also express myself by saying: “This description only has derived from reality; only this was compared with reality.” Now it has a clear meaning when we say that this picture or description is a projection, say, of this group of objects – the trees I look at – or what has been derived from those objects. But we must look into the grammar of such a phrase as “this description is derived from my sense datum”. What we are talking about is connected with that peculiar temptation to say: “I never know what the other really means by “brown”, or what he really sees when he (truthfully) says that he sees a brown object”. – We could propose to one who says this to use two different words instead of the one word ‘brown’; one word for his particular impression, the other word with that meaning which other people beside himself can understand as well. If he thinks about this proposal he will see that there is something wrong in his conception of the meaning, function, of the word “brown” and others. He looks for justification of his description where there is none. (Just as in the case when a man believes that the chain of reasons must be endless. Think of the justification by a general formula for performing mathematical operations; and the question: Does this formula compel us to make use of it in this particular case as we do?). To say “I derive a description from visual reality” can’t mean anything analogous to: “I derive a description from what I see here”. I may say: “This chart shows me that I must use the word ‘brown’ for the description of this patch”. This is how I may derive the word which his needed in my description. But it would be meaningless to say I derive the word “brown” from the particular colour-impression which I receive.’
‘I could, however, try to express my solipsism in a different way: I imagine that I and others draw pictures or write descriptions of what each of us sees. These descriptions are put before me. I point to the one which I have made and say: “Only this is (or was) really seen” That is I am tempted to say: “Only this description has reality (visual reality) behind it”. The others I might call – “blank descriptions”. I could also express myself by saying: “This description only has derived from reality; only this was compared with reality.”’
yes – you could make these statements – and what they would indicate is stupidity –grounded in logical ignorance
for what is being put – is that the descriptions proposed by the others – are not in fact descriptions – are not propositions at all – but that they are ‘blanks’ – empty shells –
when of course they are not
they are valid propositions – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – in just the same way as the proposals – ‘only this is (or was) really seen’ – and – ‘only this description has reality (visual reality) behind it’ – are – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
if they are not held open to question – then for their authors – they are prejudices
‘Now it has a clear meaning when we say that this picture or description is a projection, say, of this group of objects – the trees I look at – or what has been derived from those objects. But we must look into the grammar of such a phrase as “this description is derived from my sense datum”.
‘But we must look into the grammar of such a phrase as “this description is derived from my sense datum”’
to say that this description is derived from my sense datum – is on the face of it – just to say – this description involves the senses
‘sense datum’ – here is unnecessary cumbersome and irrelevant
as for ‘derive from’ – how a proposition comes about is open to question
do we in fact derive propositions?
or is it rather that we propose propositions – and after the fact of proposing – look for an analysis of the proposition?
when I propose the ‘grass is green’ – I don’t actually do any deriving – I just put the proposal
‘What we are talking about is connected with that peculiar temptation to say: “I never know what the other really means by “brown”, or what he really sees when he (truthfully) says that he sees a brown object”.’
what Wittgenstein regards as ‘peculiar’ – is in fact rational and logical –
our knowledge is proposal –
what we ‘know’ – is what we propose – and what we propose – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain – at any stage of any analysis
while you can’t be certain what ‘brown’ means to the other – you make the assumption that in normal circumstances – the other’s use of ‘brown’ will be what is regarded as a standard usage –
and if any doubt is raised as to whether the other does operate with a standard usage
that matter can be addressed – critically
this assumption is essentially pragmatic – it is about getting on with the business of propositional action
uncertain as the assumption is – it is still functional and useful
we operate with and in uncertainty – that is the logical reality
‘We could propose to one who says this to use two different words instead of the one word ‘brown’; one word for his particular impression, the other word with that meaning which other people beside himself can understand as well. If he thinks about this proposal he will see that there is something wrong in his conception of the meaning, function, of the word “brown” and others.’
two different words instead of one?
such a suggestion would come as a result of question – of doubt – and the exploration of the uncertainty of the word –
this is perfectly rational
‘If he thinks about this proposal he will see that there is something wrong in his conception of the meaning, function, of the word “brown” and others.’
is Wittgenstein suggesting here that ‘the word ‘brown’ and others’ – only has one meaning – one function – one use?
‘He looks for justification of his description where there is none. (Just as in the case when a man believes that the chain of reasons must be endless. Think of the justification by a general formula for performing mathematical operations; and the question: Does this formula compel us to make use of it in this particular case as we do?).
it is not a question of ‘justification’ – ‘justification’ is rhetoric – not logic –
as to the chain of reasons being endless –
any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain – at any stage of its elaboration or explanation
we will stop the activity of question of doubt and the exploration of uncertainty – for practical – pragmatic reasons –
however – whatever proposition we stop at – the logical reality is that that proposition – is open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
mathematics is a rule governed propositional game
the ‘justification’ of mathematical formula – just is the rule(s) that govern its use
‘Does this formula compel us to make use of it in this particular case as we do?’
the rules(s) governing the use of the formula – are its only use –
if you want to play a propositional game – you play in accordance with its rules
if you don’t play in accordance with its rules – there is no game
‘To say “I derive a description from visual reality” can’t mean anything analogous to: “I derive a description from what I see here”. I may say: “This chart shows me that I must use the word ‘brown’ for the description of this patch”. This is how I may derive the word which his need in my description. But it would be meaningless to say I derive the word “brown” from the particular colour-impression which I receive.’
as to deriving –
we propose – and any derivation – be it a colour impression – something you have seen on a chart – or whatever – can be put as a proposed explanation of the proposal in question –
and any such derivation / explanation – like the proposal in question – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –
and let us be clear – an explanation – any explanation – is a back story – a back story to what is proposed – to what is put
there are two modes of propositional action – the critical mode – and the game mode
how we use a word – is a critical matter –
a word – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and its use – uncertain
‘This chart shows me that I must use the word ‘brown’ for the description of this patch’ –
the chart here – is a rule-governed propositional game –
we play games – we don’t mean games – there is no meaning in a game
meaning is a critical matter – it is not rule-governed
Wittgenstein confuses the two propositional modes
I think Wittgenstein would like to see propositional life – as a rule-governed – as a rule-governed game –
it would dispel his fear of uncertainty
we play games in many and varied contexts – but playing games is not an answer to questions of meaning – of sense – and of use
playing games does not address the problem of knowledge
these are critical matters – uncertain matters –
and it is this uncertainty that must be faced – fair and square – if we are to live authentic lives –
if we are to live rational lives
‘Let us now ask: “Can a human body have pain?” One is inclined to say: “How can the body have pain? The body itself is something dead; a body isn’t conscious!” And here again it is as though we looked in to the nature of pain and saw that it lies in its nature that a material object can’t have it. And it is as though we saw that what has pain must be an entity of different nature from that of a material object; that, in fact, it must be of a mental nature. But to say that the ego is mental is like saying that the number 3 is of a mental or an immaterial nature, when we recognize the numeral “3” isn’t used as a sign for a physical object.’
is the body dead? – not unless it is dead
and to say the body isn’t conscious – is to only to adopt a dualist view of the mind- body problem
and that is not the only way to understand the matter
Spinoza argued that that there is one substance with infinite attributes – of which we know two – thought and extension – and that a mode of thought and a mode of extension are the same thing expressed in different ways
and as the human mind and the human body are modes of thought and extension – they are the same thing – considered now under the attribute of thought – now under the attribute of extension
my point in mentioning this view – is simply to make clear that how we describe the ‘body’ – and how we describe ‘pain’ – are matters – open to question
and the corollary of this is that different descriptions will suit different circumstances
different descriptions will have different uses
it is clear you can have a physical / material focus on pain –
physicians do this as a matter of course –
and yes – the focus might be ‘mental’ – and psychologists have this focus
how we understand the relation of mind and body – and how we deal with the different descriptions proposed – are matters that are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain – and they stay open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
however – the upshot of this logical uncertainty is that we have propositional options
and it is out of the mix of these propositional options that we move forward
‘But to say that the ego is mental is like saying that the number 3 is of a mental or an immaterial nature, when we recognize the numeral “3” isn’t used as a sign for a physical object.’
there are two propositional modes – the critical mode and the game mode
in the critical mode we put our propositions to question
in the game mode – we play in accordance with the rules of the game
human beings – question and play – and it is important to see the difference between these different modes of propositional action
‘3’ – is a token in a mathematical / arithmetical game –
to introduce the question – ‘is ‘3’ of a mental or an immaterial nature?’ – is to confuse the game mode with the critical mode
this confusion is at the heart of Wittgenstein’s philosophy –
and it has a long and illustrious history – it goes back to Pythagoras
‘On the other hand we can perfectly well adopt the expression “this body feels pain”, and we shall then, just as usual, tell it to go to the doctor, to lie down, and even to remember that when the last time it had pains they were over in a day. But wouldn’t this form of expression at least be an indirect one?” – Is it using an indirect expression when we say “Write ‘3’ for ‘x’ in this formula” instead of “Substitute 3 for x”? (on the other hand, is the first of these two expressions the only direct one, as some philosophers think? One expression is no more direct than the other. The meaning of the expression depends entirely on how we go on using it. Let’s not imagine the meaning as an occult connection the mind makes between a word and a thing, and that this connection contains the whole usage of the word as the seed might be said to contain the tree.’
any ‘expression’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
having said that – yes – ‘one expression is no more direct than another’
as to meaning as a matter of use –
in a sense this is to say nothing – for all language has meaning – in some context – and yes – we use language – that is what we do with language
any meaning – any use – is from a logical point of view – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain
as to the proposal of – ‘an occult connection the mind makes between a word and a thing’
as with any proposal – this proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –
i.e. – we can ask –
does this proposal have a use? –
in what propositional contexts – does it have meaning? –
in what contexts does it not function?
we cannot say what the ‘whole’ use of a word is – or will be –
we can only critically examine the uses – that are in use – that are proposed
‘The kernel of our proposition that that which has pains or sees or thinks is of a mental nature is only, that the word “I” in “I have pains” does not denote a particular body, for we can’t substitute for “I” a description of a body.’
that which has pains – or sees – or thinks – is a matter open to question – open to doubt and uncertain
yes – you can propose a ‘mental’ description here – but that description – as with any description – as with any proposal – is open to question
the proposal that ‘‘I have pains’ does not denote a particular body’ – is fair enough –
in any context and propositional elaboration – almost a statement of the obvious
however – you have to see that on the same argument – the ‘I’ does not denote a particular ‘soul’ either – if you were thinking of going down that path
the logical reality is that – ‘I’ does not denote –
“I’ is a rhetorical device –
the point of which is to draw attention to whatever proposal – follows it
© greg t. charlton. 2021.
