'For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage player, or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves than they can combine existence with non-existence'.

- Benedict de Spinoza. Political Treatise. 1677.




Saturday, August 30, 2008

Sartre 1d - the being of the percipi

Sartre 1d.

Being and nothingness: the pursuit of being.

IV. The being of the percipi.


the argument:


we have reduced things to the united totality of their appearances – and established that these appearances are a being that is no longer appearance

the percipi referred us to the percipiens – the being that is consciousness

consciousness is the absolute to which every phenomenon is relative

there is only known being

consciousness is not a phenomenon of knowledge – but is the structure of being

we are on the ground of phenomenology here

the question is – is consciousness sufficient to provide the foundation for the appearance qua appearance?

we have extracted its being from the phenomenon in order to give it consciousness – will consciousness subsequently restore it to the phenomenon?

the answer is in examination of the percipi

there is a being of the thing perceived – as perceived

if I reduce this table to its impressions – it nevertheless reveals itself qua table through this synthesis

that is it is the transcendent limit of the synthesis – the reason for it and its end

the table is before knowledge – and cannot be identified with it – otherwise it would be consciousness – pure immanence – and it would disappear as a table

in so far as the known cannot be reabsorbed into knowledge – we must discover for it a being

this being we are told is the percipi

let us recognize that the being of the percipi cannot be reduced to the percipiens – to consciousness

at most we can say it is relative to this being

still to the being of the percipi –


the mode of the percipi – to be perceived - is passive

if the being of the phenomenon is in the percipi – then this being is passivity

what is passivity?

I am passive when I undergo a modification of which I am not the origin – neither the source or the creator

so my being supports a mode of being of which I am not the source

but in order to support it – I must exist

and therefore my being is always situated on the other side of passivity

either I am not passive in my being – and am therefore the foundation of my being

or I am affected with passivity in my very existence – my being is received being – and hence falls into nothingness

passivity must be a relation of one being to another – and not of one being to nothingness

one can conceive of a creation on the condition that the created being recover itself – tear itself away from the creator – in order to close in on itself immediately – and assume its being

it is in this sense that a book exists as distinct from the author

but if the act of creation is to be continued indefinitely – if the created thing does not have its independence – then the creature is in no way distinguished from the creator – it is absorbed in him – we are dealing with a false transcendence

the creator cannot have even the illusion of getting out of his subjectivity

what element of passivity can we assign to perception – to knowledge?

we cannot assign passivity here - it is all activity - all spontaneity

it is precisely because it is pure spontaneity – because nothing can get a grip on it – that consciousness cannot act upon anything

thus esse est percipi would require that consciousness – pure spontaneity which cannot act upon anything – give being to a transcendent nothingness – at the same time keeping it in its state of nothingness

the percipi implies that the law of being of the perceptum is relativity

can we conceive that the being of the thing known is relative to the knowledge?

what can the relativity of being mean for an existent – if not that the existent has its being in something other than itself – an existent which it is not

certainly it would not be inconceivable that a being should be external to itself – if one means that this being is its own externality

but such is not the case here

the perceived being is before consciousness

consciousness cannot reach it

and it cannot enter into consciousness

and as the perceived being is cut off from consciousness

it exists cut off from its own existence

it would be no use to make of it an unreal – in the manner of Hursserl

even as unreal it must exist

the two determinations of relativity and passivity – which can concern modes of being – can on no account apply to being

the esse of the phenomenon cannot be its percipi

the transphenomenal being of consciousness cannot provide a basis for the transphenomenal being of the the phenomenon

here we see the error of the phenomenalists


commentary:


the act of perception reveals

it is an act however that is dependent on an underlying relation

that relation is the relation of consciousness to the non-conscious

unless this relation obtains there is no result

that is there is no appearance

appearance in itself – is unknown

as known – it can be accounted for either subjectively or objectively

it is not an either / or proposition

the subjective account (of this unknown) serves certain purposes

as indeed does the objective account

so – we can speak of appearance in terms of subjective impressions – or as that which is outside of the subjective impression – as the thing in itself –

i.e. the table in the sunlit room – or the table in terms of its dimensions and quantities

my argument is that appearance – independently of its subjective and objective arguments (internal and external dimensions) – is unknown

underlying this operational dualism is uncertainty

this uncertainty is the way of being for conscious entities aware of their existence in a non-conscious world – because appearance is – outside of our dealings with it – unknown

there is no touch stone –

back to Sartre –

substance theories – of Descartes – of Spinoza – of Sartre –

the argument of being as far as I can see must be a substance theory

clearly – Sartre does not want to accept – the fact of scepticism –

that his being – Descartes’ mind – and Spinoza’s God - are just synonyms for – or characterizations of – the unknown

but you could ask –

where do you go from here – if you are not to explain being in terms of substance –

what’s the alternative?

my argument is that we can deal with these issues in terms of dimensions

that is recognize that consciousness is the internal dimension – that the non-conscious – the external dimension

dimensions of a unity – that is as a unity – unknown

my argument is that we operate in terms of these categories

that they are essential to our understanding of the world

that they are essential to our being as human beings – as human animals

as to whether the world ‘in itself’ – is like this or not

I say we don’t know

what we can do ‘know’ is how we operate in it –

the point is – that which exists outside of consciousness – is the external dimensions of our reality –

our internality is consciousness is ‘the knowing’ – and that which is outside of this – that which is known

so there is on this view no question of either one being the other

the perceiver and the perceived are two dimensions of the one reality

my point in general is that the basis on which we operate is uncertainty

there is no ‘being’ – or ‘knowledge’ – that can be the basis of our reality

we operate with those notions that best enable us to function –

so even my dimensional analysis – this theory of an internal and external dimensions – as the operational categories of an unknown unity - is like any other account of the nature of reality – a functional stratagem

I argue that such an analysis makes more sense than the substantial theories offered by idealists and materialists and the phenomenalists and the absolutists

it’s all up for grabs

the point in an existential sense is to embrace uncertainty and deal with it – not run from it or deny it

ok – like I said – back to Sartre

Sartre asks – what is passivity?

and his answer is pretty much pure Spinoza – I am passive when I undergo a modification of which I am not the source or creator

Sartre notes that to support such a passivity – I must exist

and thus that my being is always situated on the other side of passivity

being here is some kind of back stop

for without it one’s identity would simply be passivity – what is received

and what then of identity?

space time co-ordinates for a ‘passivity cluster’?

any deterministic view is subject to this kind of argument

being – for Sartre is the metaphysical levee

without it the sea of passivity would just keep flowing

the problem really for Sartre is that being here functions as a kind of first cause

‘being’ has the ring of something

just as ‘God’ did for Thomas Aquinas

but the point really is that this something – if it is anything - is unknown

this is the truth of Sartre’s ‘being’

the essence that is being is unknown

he goes on to claim that consciousness is activity – is spontaneous –

and this the basis of his argument against esse est percipi – the idea that the percipi is
of an essentially different nature to the percipere –

so the argument hinges on the active / passive distinction

all human reality is open to explanation

that is – really – to description - to account

it is just here that the categories of consciousness and its object – of the internal and the external come into focus

it is clear we can explain conscious action in terms of its effect in the external world –

that is action in or from the internal dimension

and likewise – the external impacts on the internal

in such analyses 'active' and 'passive' are notions that play a role

clearly we can describe an action in terms of the action of consciousness on – the non-conscious

in which case – for the sake of the explanation – for the sake of the argument - the external world is regarded as passive

alternatively we can explain a conscious event in terms of an external action

here – consciousness is passive – the world is active

this conceptual flexibility is not possible if you think passive and active – are absolutes that only have one designation

they are concepts the value of which is to be found in their utility - that is their descriptive function

the subject which is to be described – some instance of the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious – is essentially unfixed

we fix it with our descriptions

so my point here is that I think it foolish to brand the object of perception – just as it is foolish to brand perception – with any mark – any name

how we describe consciousness – how we describe the world – is not set in some kind of metaphysical stone – that it is the job of philosophers to uncover

we make our characterizations – in the knowledge that there is no template to use – no prototype to appeal to

Sartre says the perceived being is before consciousness – consciousness cannot reach it – it cannot enter into consciousness

I realise Sartre wants to avoid the Cartesian problem of interaction

and it seems here that he might have done so

pretty radical solution – no interaction

at best all that seems to be left is a very cold parallelism

being might be in the centre here – but it would be a lonely and strange place to be –

like being between two rooms and listening to the conversations in both

also – the passive active distinction - to cut to the chase is a relational distinction

that is x is related to y – in that i.e. - x is passive relative to y – or x is active relative to y

what I am saying here is that passive and active describe a relation between –

they are not ‘essential attributes’ of the relata

so for all intents and purposes x and y could be anything at all –

Sartre here has used a relational argument to try and settle an essential dispute – he has thus missed the point and misapplied this argument

Sartre is clearly struggling to characterize the relata – consciousness and its object –

I think he is desperately trying to avoid the obvious – that in essential terms they can only be characterized as unknowns –

hence he has gone down the relational route

as I said earlier this is essentially a Spinozistic argument –

but in Sartre’s hands it is a crude instrument

Spinoza’s passive / active distinction hinges on his theory of knowledge

on Spinoza’s view we must distinguish between adequate and inadequate knowledge

inadequate knowledge is if you like partial or incomplete - and typically that which is given to mind by the world –

the mind as the receiver of this ‘knowledge’ is passive – passive in that it is the receiver

when the mind acts and acts on the basis of rational or complete ideas then its basis is adequate knowledge and its mode is active

from this we can argue that for Spinoza – consciousness is in itself or in essence neither passive or active –

it can be either – and that depends on its basis

Sartre desperately wants knowledge out of the picture as fundamental – and to rest on the laurels of being

but Spinoza’s argument regarding passive and active – shows us at least that if you have an epistemological underpinning the concepts can make sense – in a way that just appealing to being – like to the elephant in the room – does not

just by the by my own view on ‘adequate knowledge’ is that there is no such thing –

except – if you like the adequate knowledge that precedes effective action

in short all ‘knowledge’ – is essentially inadequate –

and this fact is why there continues to be knowledge and its growth

real adequate knowledge would be the end of the penny section

and as to Spinoza’s account –

on his view – the only adequate knowledge is the knowledge of God – or substance as a knowing thing

it is true that as modes of this substance we participate in the eternal truths

but it is also true that as modes we are only parts of whole – and thus essentially limited entities

any action - in the sense of self-caused action – is only ‘adequate’ in the sense that I believe I determine the action

this may be a necessary mode of thinking for self-determined action to occur – but it is only so because it is determined as such

any analysis – that is any explanation – will blow apart the apparent necessity of the determination

Spinoza himself as Sartre has already noted is a determinist – so in Spinoza’s world the totality determines the modes

as conscious entities we may think we determine – at least some of our actions – but in Spinoza’s metaphysics – this has to be an illusion

really with Spinoza freedom is a matter of ‘getting with the program’ – that is living – thinking and acting in terms of his metaphysics

ok – you might say – except that in fact it doesn’t work

Spinoza’s God – is really the unknown

and the unknown is silent

our thought and actions are not based on any foundation of knowledge or being

if there is a basis to our thought and action it is whatever basis we give to our thought and action –

there is a necessity to act – this I grant

but is – in itself – an undefined necessity –

in characterizing our actions – and the world of our actions - we create the illusion of knowledge

and this illusion – is the ground on which we operate – it is the real world

a note on Berkeley’s esse est percipi -

the idea here is that to be – is to be the object of perception

so clearly perception or consciousness is what is essential and central

whatever is within consciousness or perception - in so far as it is in consciousness – has being

on such a view consciousness exists outside of being

and therefore cannot be said to exist

and in that case – being then has no content

if it hadn’t been so influential you would have to say this is just a drunken Irishman with his cassock inside out

in the cold morning light – the reality we actually live in is two dimensional

we have an internal sense of the external world

the external world is external relative to our internal reality

the unity of these dimensions is the world – is just that which is to be known

the unity of these dimensions – is the world unknown

being is this unity – being is this unknown


(c) greg. t. charlton. 2008.