Philosophical Grammar 113

IX

113. Is the pictorial character of thought an agreement with reality? In what sense can I say that a proposition is a picture?

‘the pictorial character of thought’?

we can use the description ‘thought’ – and all that goes with it to characterize what we propose – to characterize a proposition –

and you can then go on and further describe your characterization ‘thought’ – as a ‘picture’

does the proposal agree with reality?

if we are talking about an un-described reality – what we are talking about is the unknown

does the proposal agree with the unknown?

the unknown is silent

if the question is – does the proposal agree with an already described reality?

yea or nay – the matter is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

that is the logical and practical reality –

we may assume agreement or disagreement – simply to get on with it –

but here we are talking pragmatism – not logic

‘In what sense can I say that a proposition is a picture’?

a proposition can be described in any number of ways – ‘picture’ – is one –

there is no necessity here – it depends on what your doing and why –

it’s a question of circumstance – of propositional context – propositional practice –

even propositional histories

presumably in some circumstance – in some context – the description ‘picture’ works

and if so – the description has utility –

however utility or not – there is always a question

© greg t. charlton. 2015.