on certainty 613

613. If I now say “I know that the water in the kettle on the gas flame will not freeze but boil”, I seem to be as justified in this “I know” as I am in any. ‘If I know anything I know this’. – Or do I know with greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so-and-so? And how does this compare with the proposition that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass? – I don’t know confidently what I am to answer here. – But still there is a difference between the cases. If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don’t know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I have known for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos.

‘If I know anything I know this’ –

is just straight out rhetoric

the idea of ‘greater certainty’ –

puts pay to the whole notion of certainty

if certainty itself is a matter of degree –

then it is uncertain

‘I don’t know confidently what I am to answer here’ –

‘some factor I don’t know of’ –

at the heart of any so called claim to knowledge –

is what is not known –

and for this reason –

the claim to complete or certain knowledge –

is false and pretentious

‘If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be’

astonished or not –

the proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

‘But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I have known for years?’

who’s to say?

but if a doubt should arise –

the world does not fall apart –

all that has been damaged –

is your delusion of certainty –

and that’s a good thing –

it might put you back –

in the real world

© greg t. charlton. 2010.