Friday, August 20, 2010

on certainty 597


597. The reply to the question “Can you be mistaken?” gives the argument a definite weight. The answer may also be “I don’t think so.”



the answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’ –

or ‘I don’t think so’ –

will only give the argument ‘weight’ –

definite or not 

if the question –

‘can you be mistaken?” –

makes sense in the first place

now the fact is –

if you claim certainty –

there is no place for the mistake –

your world is certain –

if on the other hand –

you see propositional reality as uncertain –

then there will be no mistakes –

rather different conceptions –

different proposals–

different assessments –

uncertainties

mistakes – don’t enter into this matter –

the ‘mistake’-

is not in the picture


NB


Wittgenstein trades on the fact –

that ‘mistake’ – is a common notion –

interesting – that at no point –

does he even attempt

an analysis of ‘mistake’

the reason is –

it doesn’t stand up –

to philosophical analysis –

it is not a notion –

with a any philosophical significance

I find it hard to believe –

that Wittgenstein didn’t see this –

and so I can’t but conclude –

that his argument in On Certainty

is a fraud


© greg t. charlton. 2010.