510. If I say “Of course I know that that’s
a towel” I am making an utterance. I
have no thought of verification. For me it is an immediate utterance.
I don’t think of past or future. (And of
course it is the same for Moore, too)
It is just like directly taking hold of
something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts.
if by ‘utterance’ Wittgenstein means – a use of language
without any claim to knowledge –
then ‘Of course I know that that’s a towel’
– is not an utterance –
either that or ‘Of course I know’ – the
claim of knowledge – is irrelevant to the utterance
if your ‘utterance’ is made – without a
claim to knowledge –
it is nevertheless open to question – open to
doubt –
even if you’re not
© greg t. charlton. 2010.