on certainty 419

419. If I say “I have never been in Asia Minor”, where do I get this knowledge from? I have not worked it out, no one told me; my memory tells me. – So I can’t be wrong about it? Is there a truth here that I know? – I cannot depart from this judgment without toppling all other judgments with it.

‘I have never been in Asia Minor’

what you have here is an assertion –

not knowledge –

and the further assertion –

that ‘my memory tells me’

Wittgenstein goes from this to saying –

‘so I can’t be wrong’ –

to say this – is to say – ‘I am certain’

memory is not certain –

his statement is neither –

right or wrong –

it is uncertain –

it is open to question –

open to doubt

he then says –

‘I cannot depart from this judgment without toppling all other judgments with it’

yes – if he regards the ground of judgment to be – certain

the reason for judgment is uncertainty –

it is decision in the face of uncertainty

and any judgment made – will be uncertain –

hopefully useful –

but nevertheless uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.