Saturday, February 27, 2010

on certainty 308


308. ‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ belong to different categories. They are not two ‘mental states’ like, say ‘surmising’ and ‘being sure’. (Here I assume it is meaningful for me to say “ I know what (e.g.) the word ‘doubt’ means” and that this sentence indicates that the word “doubt” has a logical role.) What interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one.



knowledge – is not a mental state –

knowledge is a proposal – a proposition –

open to question – open to doubt –

to claim certainty is to make a stand for ignorance

if when you say –

‘I know what the word ‘doubt ‘ means’ –

and you are claiming certainty –

then you misuse the word ’know’

to know is to recognize uncertainty –

and to deal in uncertainty

and so the meaning of ‘doubt’ –

as with meaning of any word –

is open to question –

is open to doubt

the logic of language –

is the logic of uncertainty

‘about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is possible at all’ –

judgment is only a possibility – given uncertainty –

if there is no doubt – there will be no judgment

a proposition – empirical or otherwise –is a proposal

and as such – uncertain

how we characterize a proposition –

i.e. – as ‘empirical’ – as ‘non- empirical’ – or whatever –

is a question of usage –

a matter of circumstance

and any characterization itself –

will be open to question –

open to doubt


© greg t. charlton. 2010.