on certainty 245

245.  To whom does one say he knows something? To himself or someone else. If he says it to himself, how is it distinguished from the assertion that he is sure that things are like that? There is no subjective sureness that I know something. The certainty is subjective but not the knowledge. So if I say “I know that I have two hands”, and that is not supposed to express just my subjective certainty, I must be able to satisfy myself that I am right. But I can’t do that, for my having two hands is not less certain before I have looked at them than afterwards. But I could say: “That I have two hands is an irreversible belief.” That would express the fact that I am not ready to let something count as disproof of this proposition.

‘that I have two hands is an irreversible belief’ –

but how can you know that this is true – that this belief is irreversible?

surely such a statement is no more than rhetoric – pretense?

a propositions is a proposal – it is by its nature – uncertain

there is no proof or disproof

© greg t. charlton. 2010.