on certainty 627

627. Wouldn’t one have to insert this clause into all language-games? (Which shows its senselessness)

what it shows –

is that the claim of certainty –

is an irrelevant distraction –

in any language-game

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 626

626. Nor does it mean anything to say: “The English name of this colour is certainly ‘green’, – unless, of course, I am making a slip of the tongue or am confused in some way.” 

making a pretentious claim is not meaningless – it’s just stupid

‘a slip of the tongue’ – or ‘confusion’ indicates uncertainty –

being aware of uncertainty – however that occurs – is a good thing –

this awareness keeps us honest – keeps us on our toes

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 625

625. But does that mean that it is unthinkable that the word “green” should have been produced  by a slip of the tongue or a momentary confusion? Don’t we know of such cases? – One can also say to someone “Mightn’t you have perhaps made a slip?” That amounts to “Think about it again”.

But these rules of caution only make sense if they come to an end somewhere.

A doubt without an end is not even a doubt.

‘a slip of the tongue or a momentary confusion’ –

indicates that there is no certainty as to how we will act or react –

the point of ‘these rules of caution’ – such as – ‘think about it again’ –

is that one can never be certain –

and so such ‘rules’ are really recommendations to keep an open mind –

we may stop doubting for practical reasons –

but this does not mean that doubt has come to an end

it is always possible to question

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 624

624. “Can you be mistaken about this colour’s being called ‘green’ in English?” My answer to this can only be “No”. If I were to say “Yes, for there is always the possibility of a delusion”, that would mean nothing at all.

For is that rider something unknown to the other? And how is it known to me?

yes – the colour may be called ‘green’ –

but this is just a fact of usage –

it is contingent –

it is uncertain

the point being that in different contexts –

e.g.. scientific and artistic –

different terms may well be used –

different usages may be invented

‘the possibility of a delusion’ –

when you get down to it –

is nothing more than –

the possibility of different usage

‘and is this rider unknown to the other?’

any competent user of language –

understands the uncertainty –

of language use

‘how is it known to me?’

how is uncertainty revealed?

uncertainty –

is the ground of propositional reality

language use reveals –

uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 623

623. What is odd is that in such a case I always feel like saying (although it is wrong): “I know that – so far as I can know such a thing.” That is incorrect, but something right is hidden behind it.

    

                                                                                                                                

‘I know – in so far as I can know such a thing’ –

really just points to the uncertainty in any claim to knowledge

it is the unknown – that is hidden behind it

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 622

622. But now is it also correct to use “I know” in the contexts which Moore mentioned, at least in particular circumstances. (Indeed, I do not know what “I know I am a human being” means. But even that might be given a sense.)

For each one of these sentences I can imagine circumstances that turn it into a move in one of our language-games, and by that it loses everything that is philosophically astonishing.

‘I know’ is a claim to authority in any context – in any circumstance –

the only authority is authorship and it is unnecessary and irrelevant to assert the authorship of your assertion –

as for ‘I know I am a human being’ –

‘I am a human being’ – is all that is required –

if indeed that is ever required

if you claim an authority beyond authorship –

your game is deception

‘I know’ has no philosophical significance

if it’s a move in a language game –

it’s a rhetorical move

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 621

22.4.

621. If anatomy were under discussion I should say: “I know that twelve pairs of nerves lead from the brain.” I have never seen these nerves, and even a specialist will only have observed them in a few specimens. – This is just how the word “know” is correctly used here.

I don’t know this –

but I claim to know

if this is the correct use of ‘know’

then ‘know’ correctly used –

is a deception

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 620

620. In particular circumstances one says “you can rely on this”; and this assurance may be justified or unjustified in every day language, and it may also count as justified even when what was foretold does not occur. A language-game exists in which this assurance is employed.

yes – it is the language-game of rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 619

619. Am I to say; even if an irregularity in natural events did suddenly occur, that wouldn’t have to throw me out of the saddle. I might make inferences then just as before, but whether one would call that “induction” is another question.

you’re always in the saddle –

and the ride is uncertain

any description of what you do –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 618

618. In that game it would seem as if the language-game must ‘show’ the facts that make it possible. (But that’s not how it is.)

Then can one say that only a certain regularity in occurrences makes induction possible? The ‘possible’ would of course have to be ‘logically possible’.

the language game is the showing –

the language-game is the game of proposals –

‘facts’ are accepted  proposals –

proposals – accepted or not –

are uncertain

‘a certain regularity in occurrence’ –

is a description of how things are –

any description –is open to question –

open to doubt

if the basis of induction –

is the description –

‘a certain regularity in occurrence’

then the basis of induction –

is uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 617

617. Certain events would put me into a position in which, I could not go on with the old language-game any further. In which I was torn away from the sureness of the game.

Indeed, doesn’t it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts?

any language-game – is a response to uncertainty –

and as such is – uncertain –

sureness is pretence

a fact is an accepted interpretation of a state of affairs –

any interpretation is open to question –

open to doubt

that the possibility of a language-game –

is conditioned by facts –

is to say that –

the possibility of a language-game –

is conditioned by –

uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 616

616. Why, would it be unthinkable that I should stay in the saddle however the facts bucked?

it’s not unthinkable –

however to maintain a certainty –

in the face of an uncertain reality –

is delusional

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 615

615. Now does that mean: “I can only make judgments at all because things behave thus and thus (as it were, behave kindly)”?

that ‘things behave thus and thus’ – is a judgment –

the ‘ground’ of this judgment –

the ground of judgment –

is uncertainty

and any judgment I make –

will itself be open to question –

open to doubt

 greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 614

614. That is to say: if I were contradicted on all sides and told that this person’s name was not what I had always known it was (and here I use “know” here intentionally), then in that case the foundation of all judging would be taken away from me.

your assertion –

and the assertions that contradict your assertion –

are proposals –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

the foundation of all judging –

is uncertainty –

and all judgments made –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 613

613. If I now say “I know that the water in the kettle on the gas flame will not freeze but boil”, I seem to be as justified in this “I know” as I am in any. ‘If I know anything I know this’. – Or do I know with greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so-and-so? And how does this compare with the proposition that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass? – I don’t know confidently what I am to answer here. – But still there is a difference between the cases. If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don’t know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I have known for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos.

‘If I know anything I know this’ –

is just straight out rhetoric

the idea of ‘greater certainty’ –

puts pay to the whole notion of certainty

if certainty itself is a matter of degree –

then it is uncertain

‘I don’t know confidently what I am to answer here’ –

‘some factor I don’t know of’ –

at the heart of any so called claim to knowledge –

is what is not known –

and for this reason –

the claim to complete or certain knowledge –

is false and pretentious

‘If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be’

astonished or not –

the proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

‘But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I have known for years?’

who’s to say?

but if a doubt should arise –

the world does not fall apart –

all that has been damaged –

is your delusion of certainty –

and that’s a good thing –

it might put you back –

in the real world

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 612

612. I said I would ‘combat’ the other man – but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)

it is not that at the end of reasons –

comes persuasion –

the giving of reasons –

is persuasion –

is rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 611

611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled, then each man declares the other a fool and a heretic. 

yes – this does happen –

but if you realize that your principle –

is just as uncertain as the next man’s –

then you will have no reason –

to rubbish him

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 610

610. And are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings.

logically speaking –

there is no right or wrong  –

any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

what we are talking about here –

is rhetoric –

and the battle of rhetoric –

and if you are going to play this game –

I say –

go your hardest

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 609

609. Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? – If we call this “wrong” aren’t we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs?

any proposition –

be it a proposition of physics –

or the proposition of an oracle –

or whatever –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

and any decision you take –

as to what you’ll be guided by –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

the battle of ‘right and ‘wrong’ –

is not the logical battle –

it’s the rhetorical battle  -

the battle of delusion –

and deception

and in these rhetorical battles –

language games –

are the weapons –

of combat

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 608

608. Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of physics? Am I to say I have no good ground for doing so? Isn’t precisely this what we call a ‘good ground’?

there is no right or wrong here –

if you find the propositions of physics useful –

you will be guided by them –

if you don’t find them useful

you won’t be guided by them

and whatever proposition you use –

or are guided by –

that proposition – that proposal –

is open to question –

is open to doubt –

is uncertain

as for ‘ground’ –

the ground of any proposition –

any propositional action –

is uncertainty

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 607

607. A judge might even say “That’s the truth – so far as a human being can know it”. But what would this rider achieve? (“beyond all reasonable doubt”).

our knowledge –

is uncertain

a proposition is true –

if assented to

assent – as with dissent –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

the notion of ‘reasonable doubt’ –

is really just the attempt –

to put the kibosh –

on doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 606

606. That to my mind someone else has been wrong is no ground for assuming that I am wrong now. – But isn’t it a ground for assuming that I might be wrong? It is no ground for any unsureness in my judgment, or my actions.

right and wrong are not in the picture –

our propositions are uncertain

our decisions regarding propositions –

are uncertain –

you can assent to a proposition –

or you can dissent from it

your judgments –

and your actions –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

are uncertain

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 605

605. But what if a physicist’s statement were superstition and it were just as absurd to go by it in receiving a verdict as to rely on an ordeal of fire?

whether the physicist’s statement –

is regarded as superstition – or science –

relying on it –

in the sense of regarding it as certain –

is what is absurd

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 604

604. In a court of law the statement of a physicist that water boils at about 100 degrees C. would be accepted unconditionally as truth.

If I mistrusted this statement what could I do to undermine it? Set up experiments myself? What would they prove?

whether or not the statement is accepted as unconditionally true in a court of law –

is not relevant here –

any proposition – regardless of whether it has the backing of so called ‘authorities’ –

is a proposal –

that is to say – open to question – open to doubt –

to ‘mistrust’ it – is to question the proposition –

to doubt it –

that is to say – to understand it

any experiment you perform –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

if by ‘proof’ you mean –

reaching a conclusion that is certain –

there is no proof

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 603

603. I am taught that under such circumstances this happens. It has been discovered by making the experiment a few times. Not that that would prove anything to us, if it weren’t that this experience was surrounded by others which combine with it to form a system. Thus, people did not make experiments just about falling bodies but also about air resistance and all sorts of other things.

But in the end I rely on these experiences, or on the reports of them, I feel no scruples about ordering my own activities in accordance with them. – But hasn’t this trust also proved itself? So far as I can judge – yes.

a system of propositions – of proposals –

is no more certain – than a single proposition –

a single proposal

regarding a proposition as part of a system –

may give you a sense of security  –

but in the end –

the system – is just packaging

the reality here is –

if you want to see where a proposition goes – what it offers –

you play along –

if playing this language-game suits your purpose –

you’ll continue to play it –

if it is the only option available to you –

you’ll make the best of it

‘so far as I can judge’ –

is a good way of putting it -

for it makes clear –

that any judgment you make –

will be incomplete –

will be uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 602

23.4.

602. Should I say “I believe in physics”, or “I know that physics is true”?

what you say is – ‘I do physics’ –

or – ‘I use the propositions of physics’

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 601

22.4.

601. There is always the danger of wanting to find an expression’s meaning by contemplating the expression itself, and the frame of mind in which one uses it, instead of always thinking of the practice. This is why one repeats the expression to oneself so often, because it is as if one must see what one is looking for in the expression and in the feeling it gives one.

if you are contemplating an expression –

you are considering its use –

the possibilities of its use

the meaning of an expression –

is the possibilities of its use

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 600

600. What kind of grounds do I have for trusting text-books of experimental physics?

I have no grounds for not trusting them. And I trust them. I know how such books are produced – or rather I believe I know. I have some evidence, but it does not go very far and is of a scattered kind. I have heard, seen and read various things.  

if by ‘grounds’ – you mean – certainties –

there are no grounds –

if on the other hand – if you mean – ‘accepted practices’ –

then that’s it –

yes – you will have supposed authorities thrown at you –

but all that amounts to is persuasion –

rhetoric

and any so called ‘evidence’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt

the real value of evidence –

is that it points us to uncertainty –

and in so doing –

destroys illusion

and pretension

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 599

599. For example one could describe the certainty of the proposition that water boils at circa 100 degrees C. That isn’t e.g. a proposition I have once heard (like this or that, which I could mention). I made the experiment myself at school. The proposition is a very elementary one in our texts-books, which are to be trusted in matters like this because … – Now one can offer counter-examples to all this, which show that human beings have held this and that to be certain which later, according to our opinion, proved false. But the argument is worthless* To say: in the end we can only adduce such grounds as we hold to be grounds, is to say nothing at all.

I believe at the bottom of this is a misunderstanding of the nature of our language-games.

*Marginal Note. May it not also happen that we believe we recognize a mistake of earlier times and latter come to the conclusion that the first opinion was the right one?

etc.

the argument for grounds – is an argument for justification –

for an authority – beyond that of authorship –

there is no such authority

from a logical point of view any such claim –

is false

the only value in any such statement –

is rhetorical –

that is to say  the point of such statements is persuasion –

not truth

‘To say: in the end we can only adduce such grounds as we hold to be grounds, is to say nothing at all.’

yes – any statement of grounds is really just a rhetorical underpinning of the proposition

and logically speaking –

rhetoric – amounts to –

‘nothing at all’ –

and yes – if you don’t understand this – you will not understand the nature of our language games

‘May it not also happen that we believe we recognize a mistake of earlier times and latter come to the conclusion that the first opinion was the right one? etc.’

there are no mistakes in an uncertain reality –

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

© greg t. charlton.2010.

on certainty 598

598. But couldn’t one reply to the question “Can you …” by saying: “I will describe the case to you and then you can judge for yourself whether I am mistaken”?

For example, if it were a question of someone’s own name, the fact might be that he had never used this name, but remembered he had read it on some document, – but on the other hand the answer might be: “I’ve had this name my whole life long, I’ve been called it by everyone.” If that is not equivalent to the answer “I can’t be mistaken” then the latter has no meaning whatever. And yet obviously it points to a very important distinction.

‘judge for yourself’ –

the basis – the reason for – judgment –

is uncertainty

and in an uncertain reality –

there are no mistakes –

what we have is – uncertainties

so – any judgment –

will be a response to –

uncertainty –

and any judgment will be –

uncertain

repetitive use – does not entail –

certainty

a use of language – is uncertain –

open to question –

open to doubt –

the first time it is used –

or the five hundredth time

and it is irrelevant –

who the user is

‘I can’t be mistaken’ –

has no logical meaning –

it’s only value –

is rhetorical

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 597

597. The reply to the question “Can you be mistaken?” gives the argument a definite weight. The answer may also be “I don’t think so.”

the answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’ –

or ‘I don’t think so’ –

will only give the argument ‘weight’ –

definite or not  –

if the question –

‘can you be mistaken?” –

makes sense in the first place

now the fact is –

if you claim certainty –

there is no place for the mistake –

your world is certain –

if on the other hand –

you see propositional reality as uncertain –

then there will be no mistakes –

rather different conceptions –

different proposals–

different assessments –

uncertainties

mistakes – don’t enter into this matter –

the ‘mistake’-

is not in the picture

NB

Wittgenstein trades on the fact –

that ‘mistake’ – is a common notion –

interesting – that at no point –

does he even attempt –

an analysis of ‘mistake’

the reason is –

it doesn’t stand up –

to philosophical analysis –

it is not a notion –

with a any philosophical significance

I find it hard to believe –

that Wittgenstein didn’t see this –

and so I can’t but conclude –

that his argument in On Certainty –

is a fraud

© greg t. charlton. 2010.