on certainty 675

675. If someone believes that he has flown from America to England in the last few days, then, I believe, he cannot be making a mistake.

And just the same if someone says he is at this moment sitting at a table and writing.

you might accept someone’s statement –

but accepting someone’s statement does not make it certain

‘sitting at a table writing’ –

may well be a description used ‘at this moment’ –

but it is not the only possible description –

and if that’s the case –

where’s the certainty?

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 674

674. There are, however, certain types of cases in which I cannot be making a mistake, and Moore has given a few examples of such cases.

I can enumerate certain typical cases, but not give any common characteristic. (N.N. cannot be mistaken about having flown from America to England a few days ago.  Only if he is mad can he take anything else to be possible.)

Wittgenstein’s first statement is just unabashed rhetoric

‘certain typical cases’ – can’t give any common characteristic?

the common characteristic is pretence grounded in ignorance

the question is always – how is reality to be described?

what is clear is that there is no one description  –

the mad are those who think there is

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 673

673. It is not difficult to distinguish between the case in which I cannot and those in which I can hardly be mistaken? Is it always clear to which a case belongs? I believe not.

if I cannot be mistaken – I am certain

‘hardly mistaken? – hardly certain

hardly certain is? – uncertain

if you are certain –

you are either deluded –

or in the business of deception –

if you are uncertain –

you keep an open mind

Wittgenstein is pretending –

that its hard to draw a distinction here –

the two positions –

are as different as night and day –

and obviously so

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 672

672. ‘If I don’t trust this evidence why should I trust any evidence?’

if you trust – if you have trust –

its ground is evidence –

and so –

if the evidence is uncertain –

and all so called ‘evidence’ is –

so too – is your ‘trust’

forget ‘trust’ – and proceed with –

an open and critical mind

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 671

671. I fly from here to a part of the world where the people have only indefinite information, or none at all, about the possibility of flying. I tell them I have just flown there from …They ask me if I might be mistaken. – They have obviously a false impression of how the thing happens. (If I were packed up in a box it would be possible for me to be mistaken about the way I travelled.) If I simply tell them that I can’t be mistaken, that won’t perhaps convince them: but it will if I describe the actual procedure to them. Then they will certainly not bring the possibility of a mistake into question. But for all that – even if they trust me – they might believe I had been dreaming or that magic had made me imagine it.

if I tell them that I can’t be mistaken –

I can’t be mistaken because I am certain

if from their point of view I am mistaken –

it is because they are certain –

what you have then is a clash of certainties –

and it is not surprising in such a situation –

that one would say of the other that he is mistaken –

but what does this mean?

if I say you are mistaken it means –

I am certain and certain that you are wrong –

which just amounts to a restatement –

of the original claim of certainty

‘you’ve made a mistake’ – is what you say –

when you really have nothing to say –

except that you are certain –

and so to say someone has made a mistake –

can only really be a rhetorical move –

the point of which is –

to turn them to your way of thinking –

the mistake’s only value is rhetorical

and if the other says you’ve been dreaming –

that gives them an explanation –

for your delusion of certainty –

leaving  their’s intact

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 670

27.4.

670. We might speak of fundamental principles of human enquiry.

a principle that is fundamental –

is a principle that is certain

there is no such principle

any ‘principle of human enquiry’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

we might pretend –

fundamental principles of enquiry –

if we have been deluded by –

or wish to create the delusion –

of certainty

at best what we have is –

functioning  principles of enquiry –

principles regarded as useful

and to a large extent –

that amounts to –

what is in fashion

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 669

669. The sentence “I can’t be making a mistake” is certainly used in practice. But we may question whether it is then to be taken in a perfectly rigorous sense, or is it rather a kind of exaggeration which is used only with a view to persuasion.

yes – it’s only value is rhetorical

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 668

668. What practical consequence has it if I give a piece of information and add that I can’t be making a mistake about it?

(I might also add instead: “I can no more be wrong about this than about my name’s being L.W.”)

The other person might doubt my statement nonetheless. But if he trusts me he will not only accept my information, he will also draw definite conclusions from my conviction, as to how I shall behave.

we can’t say what the practical consequences of any assertion will be –

we can have our hunches –

but whatever happens is open to interpretation –

and therefore – uncertain

saying that you can’t be making a mistake – that you can’t be wrong –

is just claiming an authority – you don’t have –

you might be able to fool yourself – or someone else –

but all that amounts to is – deception

if the other person trusts you – then he is a fool –

perhaps well meaning – and kind –

but nevertheless – not on the ball

there are no definite conclusions to draw –

from anything – or anyone –

any conclusion drawn –

will be indefinite –

uncertain –

open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 667

667. Even if I came to country where they believed that people were taken to the moon in their dreams, I couldn’t say to them: “I have never been on the moon. – Of course I may be mistaken”. And to their question “Mayn’t you be mistaken?” I should have to answer: No.”

to ask ‘mayn’t you be mistaken?’ –

is to ask – are you certain?

if you answer – yes –

what is the point of saying –

‘I may be mistaken’?

to say this is really no more than to pretend –

that there is some doubt

if you are certain –

there is no doubt

but then it might be useful –

from a rhetorical point of view –

to pretend doubt

to give the impression –

of having an open mind

you can either be certain or uncertain here –

if you are certain – the mistake is a pretense –

a bogus concept – of use to the fraud

if you are uncertain –

it doesn’t come up at all

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 666

666. But how is it for example with anatomy (or a large part of it)? Isn’t what it describes, too, exempt from doubt?

anatomy – is the description –

what it describes – is – without description – unknown –

the description that is anatomy is a response to the unknown –

a response that is grounded in doubt –

grounded in uncertainty –

in the question –

how are we to describe this feature of reality?

anatomical description – as with any description –

is a product of this underlying uncertainty –

and as such it is not exempt from doubt –

the history of the description – the history of anatomy –

shows quite clearly that there is no certainty here –

if you wish to adopt as gospel –

a particular theory – a particular description

at a particular place and time  –

and hold to it –

that is not science –

that is stupidity

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 665

665. In the latter case I am adding something special to what is generally laid down.

the latter case is where in mathematics –

‘I myself say that I cannot be making a mistake’

what is ‘generally laid down’ –

                                                                                                                                    

is no more than what is practiced –

and we add something ‘special’ to this?

what is added here is the claim to certainty

Wittgenstein’s ‘something special’ –

is ignorance

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 664

664. It makes a difference: whether one is learning in school what is right and wrong in mathematics, or whether I myself say that I cannot be making a mistake.

what you learn in school –

is not what is right and wrong in mathematics –

though it may be presented to you that way –

what you actually learn is –

the rules of the game –

the game of mathematics

at school it is unlikely –

that you will be made aware –

that the rules of the game –

are uncertain –

and that they have emerged –

from question and doubt

you will simply be shown –

how to play the game

if you are certain –

there are no mistakes

and if you are uncertain –

what you face –

is uncertainties –

not mistakes

the ‘mistake’ is not in the picture

however if you say to yourself –

‘I cannot be making a mistake’ –

which is to say –

‘I am certain’ –

all you do is make a stand for –

ignorance

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 663

663. I have a right to say “I can’t be making a mistake about this” even if I am in error

I am certain about this even if I am in error –

so the claim of certainty –

has nothing to do with truth –

or with how the world is

and if so –

it has no logical value –

it has no content –

it is nothing more than –

it is empty rhetoric

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 662

662. If I were to say “I have never been on the moon – but I may be mistaken”, that would be idiotic.

For even the thought that I might have been transported there, by unknown means, in my sleep, would not give me any right to speak of a possible mistake here. I play the game wrong if I do.

if you think that asserting you cannot be mistaken – regardless of what proposal is put

then yes – you play the game wrong

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 661

661. How might I be mistaken in my assumption that I was never on the moon?

if you are certain – you can’t be mistaken

and if you are uncertain –

what you face is not the mistake –

but rather – possibility

the possibility of –

different perspectives –

different  descriptions –

different assessments

so certain or uncertain –

logically speaking –

the notion of the mistake –

makes no sense

being mistaken or not –

is all about claiming an authority –

you don’t have –

for the purpose of persuasion

‘the mistake’ –

is an exercise in rhetoric

as to the assumption –

that I was never on the moon?

any assumption –

 is open to question –

open to doubt –

and therefore uncertain

but there is the question –

what’s the point of entertaining –

useless propositions?

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 660

660. I might ask: “How could I be making a mistake about my name being L.W?” And I can say: I can’t see how it would be possible.

the real issue here is – what is certainty?

it is just the refusal to consider possibility –

different understandings –

different ways of considering the world –

and all its details

yes – you can be certain –

but what this amounts to is –

stupidity

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 659

659. “I cannot be making a mistake about the fact that I have just had lunch.,”

For if I say to someone “I have just eaten” he may believe that I am lying or have momentarily lost my wits but he won’t believe that I am making a mistake. Indeed, the assumption that I might be making a mistake has no meaning here.

But that isn’t true. I might for example, have dropped off immediately after the meal without knowing it and have slept for an hour, and now I believe I had just eaten.

But still, I distinguish here between different kinds of mistake.

‘the mistake’ –

has no role to play here –

if you are certain – there is no mistake –

and if you are uncertain –

what you are dealing with –

is uncertainties –

not mistakes –

this ‘concept’ – if you can call it that –

of the ‘mistake’ –

just simply – does not work –

in either epistemological setting –

it’s a dud

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 658

658. The question “But mightn’t you be in the grip of a delusion now and perhaps later find this out?” – might also be raised as an objection to any proposition of the multiplication tables.

your proposition –

is uncertain –

whether you are delusional or not –

‘delusional’ –

is a description –

you have applied to yourself –

that description –

like any description –

is open to question –

open to doubt

a proposition of the mathematical tables –

is a game of sign substitution –

yes – you may well play the game without question –

however – every aspect of the game –

every term of the proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

as the history of arithmetic –

the history of the development of its concepts –

clearly shows

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 657

657. The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized. – The proposition “I am called …” is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming evidence for it. And this is not out of thoughtlessness. For, the evidence’s being overwhelming consists precisely in the fact that we do not need to give way before any contrary evidence. And so we have a buttress similar to the one that makes the propositions incontrovertible.

   

the propositions of mathematics –

are really just syntactical games –

and yes – as it stands at this point time –

these games have a stable form –

a stable use

short of the development of a new mathematics –

we can expect that stability to maintain –

however there is no necessity here –

the matter is contingent –

a question of circumstance –

effectively intellectual circumstance –

and that can change

you may not need –

to give way before contrary evidence –

or consider a different theory –

or different account –

but the fact remains –

different views are possible –

and for that reason no proposition –

is incontrovertible

and in any case what you need –

can and does change –

it’s hardly a certainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 656

656. And one can not say that of the proposition that I am called L.W. Nor of the proposition that such-and-such people have calculated such-and-such a problem correctly.

nor in fact of any mathematical proposition

Wittgenstein confuses ‘incontestability’ –

with how a proposition may be used

a proposition may well be used uncritically –

but this is not to say that it is beyond doubt

that it is beyond question

© greg t.charlton. 2010.

on certainty 655

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e. : “Dispute about other things; this is immovable – it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn.”

any proposition is contestable –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

the history of mathematics –

is a history of dispute

the point is – you won’t contest any proposition –

if you don’t think about it –

if you don’t examine the assumptions –

on which it is based

if you think that substituting one sign or set of signs for another –

is certainty –

well so be it –

but your certainty amounts to –

nothing more than –

playing a game –

which if not for it’s utility –

its applications –

would be virtually mindless

this ‘official stamp of incontestability’ –

is nothing more than rhetoric –

a rhetoric that only reinforces

entrenched ignorance

and stupidity

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 654

26.4.51

654. But against this there are plenty of objections. – In the first place there is the fact that “12 x 12 etc.” is a mathematical proposition, and from this one may infer that only mathematical propositions are in this situation. And if this inference is not justified, then there ought to be a proposition that is just as certain, and deals with the process of this calculation, but isn’t itself mathematical. I am thinking of such a proposition as: “The multiplication ‘12 x 12’, when carried out by people who know how to calculate, will in the great majority of cases give the result ‘144’ ”. Nobody will contest this proposition, and naturally it is not a mathematical one. But has it got the certainty of the mathematical one?

a mathematical proposition –

Wittgenstein suggest ‘is in this situation’ –

that is to say – is certain –

this is just rhetoric –

he then goes on to say –

if this ‘inference’ is not justified –

there ought to be a proposition – ‘just as certain’

again – another piece of rhetoric –

and this time of the pleading kind

he says there ‘ought’ to be such a proposition –

presumably because – it suits his purposes –

his view of the world

hardly a basis for what he would call –

‘objective truth’

the proposition he puts forward – as ‘just as certain’ –

because it ought to be there –

“The multiplication ‘12 x 12’, when carried out by people who know how to calculate, will in the great majority of cases give the result ‘144’

is speculation – plain and simple –

and he asks –

but has it got the certainty of the mathematical one?

it has no certainty –

and like ‘the mathematical one’ –

is a proposal – open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 653

653. If the proposition 12 x 12 = 144 is exempt from doubt, then so too must non-mathematical propositions be.

12 x 12 = 144 –

is not exempt from doubt –

every feature of the proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt

the history of the proposition –

of the mathematics behind it –

is a history of doubt

12 x 12 = 144 –

is a  sign game –

a game of substitution –

yes – you can play the game –

without questioning it –

however that does not mean –

the game is without question –

without doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 652

652. Now I can prophesy that men will never throw over the present arithmetical propositions, never say at last they know how the matter stands? Yet would that justify a doubt on our part?

you don’t know –

what propositions men will use in the future –

and you don’t know –

what they will say about how the matter stands

and because you don’t know –

there is doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 651

651. I cannot be making a mistake about 12 x 12 = 144. And now one cannot contrast mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions. For the mathematical proposition has been obtained by a series of actions that are in no way different from the actions of the rest of our lives, and are in the same degree liable to forgetfulness, oversight and illusion.

12 x 12 = 144 –

substituting one set of terms for another – does not amount to certainty

what we have here is a practise – a convention – a game –

not a certainty

and yes –

‘the mathematical proposition has been obtained by a series of actions that are in no way different from the actions of the rest of our lives, and are in the same degree liable to forgetfulness, oversight and illusion.’ –

and this is to say –

the ground of any proposal – of any proposition –

is uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 650

650. This surely means: the possibility of a mistake can be eliminated in certain (numerous) cases. – And one does eliminate mistakes in calculation in this way. For when a calculation has been checked over and over again one cannot say “Its rightness is still only very probable – for an error may always still have slipped in”. For suppose it did seem for once as if an error had been discovered – why shouldn’t we suspect an error here?

the mistake doesn’t exist –

what you deal with in any calculation – is uncertainty

when you check a calculation –

you are recognising uncertainty

the rightness of the calculation –

is an assumption –

effectively a pragmatic assumption –

you assume the rightness –

to go forward –

this assumption – like any assumption –

is open to question –

open to doubt

this does not stop us operating –

uncertainty –

it is the ground of action

‘for an error may always have slipped in’ –

is only to say –

you can never be sure

you follow practises –

you make assessments –

you make decisions –

you go forward –

in uncertainty

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 649

649. (I once said to someone – in English – that the shape of a certain branch was typical of an elm, which my companion denied. Then we came past some ashes, and I said “There, you see, here are the branches I was speaking about”. To which he replied “But that’s an ash” – and I said “I always meant ash when I said elm”)

‘I always meant ash when I said elm’

here there is a claim of certainty –

despite the fact –

the apparent fact of – uncertainty

and what justifies this claim?

nothing at all in fact –

it is just self-serving rhetoric 

© greg t. charlton. 2010.

on certainty 648

648. I may convince someone else that I ‘can’t be making a mistake’.

I say to someone “So-and-so was with me this morning and told me such-and-such”. If this is astonishing he may ask me: “You can’t be mistaken about it?” That may mean: “Did that really happen this morning?” or, on the other hand: “Are you sure you understood him properly?” It’s easy to see what details I should add to show that I was not wrong about the time, and similarly to show that I hadn’t misunderstood the story. But all that cannot show that I haven’t dreamed the whole thing, or imagined it to myself in a dreamy way. Nor can it show that I haven’t perhaps made some slip of the tongue throughout. (That sort of thing does happen.)

perhaps you can convince others of your statements –

but can you ever really know that?

and can you be sure – if you have convinced them –

just what it is you have convinced them of?

convincing is a matter of persuasion – of rhetoric –

I think better to forget about it altogether –

say what you have to say – and leave it at that –

there will always be doubt –

even with the so called ‘slip of the tongue’ –

doubt is a sign of philosophic health –

your proposition has a 50/50 chance –

run with it

© greg t. charlton. 2010.