on certainty 12

12. – For “I know” seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”.

there are no guarantees –

and any ‘fact’ – is open to question –

open to doubt

if ‘I know’ is used to guarantee – what is ‘known’ – as a fact –

then in a logical sense –

‘I know’ is misused –

for ‘I know ‘ – so used is false and misleading

still the fact remains ‘I know’ is used in such a manner-

and what this shows is that the real function of ‘I know’ –

is rhetorical –

that is to say –

the point of it is persuasion –

a persuasion based on –

deception

‘I thought I knew’ –

is the realization that –

that if to know – is to be certain –

then –

‘I don’t know’

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 11

11. We just do not know how specialized the use of “I know” is.

if we don’t know the specialized use of ‘I know’-

then there is no specialized use

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 10

10. I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face. – So I don’t know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense. Any more than the assertion “I am here”, which I might yet use at any moment, if the suitable occasion presented itself. – Then is “2 x 2 + 4” nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? “2 x 2 = 4” is a true proposition of arithmetic – not “on particular occasions” nor “always” – but the spoken or written sentence “2 x 2 = 4” in Chinese might have a different meaning or be out and out nonsense, and from this is seen that it is only in use that a proposition has sense. And “I know that there’s a sick man lying here”, used in an unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense but rather seems matter-of-course, only because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it, and one thinks that the words “I know that…..” are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would be unintelligible.

we do imagine situations for use

and it is only in use – that a proposition has sense –

which is to say – function

but just what that sense is –

what it amounts to –

is an uncertain matter –

Wittgenstein says 2 x 2 = 4 – is a true proposition of arithmetic

yes – it’s a proposition of arithmetic –

and it is true – if it is assented to

‘I know that …’ – is a claim to an authority –

the only authority – is authorship

it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

to state that you are the author – of your assertion

if ‘I know’ is meant as an expression of certainty –

it is always out of place

a proposition is a proposal –

and the ground of any proposal –

is uncertainty

doubt is only unintelligible –

to those who do not think

NB

2 x 2 = 4 –

is a proposal for a sign game –

a game of sign substitution

the game is defined by the ‘=’ sign –

the operation to the left of the ‘=’ sign –

can be substituted for the sign to the right –

that’s the game –

if you play the game –

as it is designed to be played

you play it without question –

there are no questions in the game –

the equal sign is not a question mark

however this is not to say –

the game itself – is without question –

its terms – its operations – its concepts –

are all – uncertain

the propositions of mathematics  –

are like any other proposition –

open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 9

9. Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand – my own hand, that is?                                                                                                                                     

how do I make sure?

do I know how ‘to make sure’?

am I certain about how to make sure?

do I make sure?

no

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 8

8. The difference between the concept of ‘knowing’ and the concept of ‘being certain’ isn’t of any great importance at all, except where “I know” is meant to mean I can’t be wrong. In a law court, for example, “I am certain” could replace “I know” in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine its being forbidden to say “I know” there. [A passage in Wilhem Meister, where “you know” or “You knew” is used in the sense “You were certain”, the facts being different from what he knew.]

the facts being different from what he knew –

nevertheless he was certain

if so

certainty is either an irrelevancy –

a delusion –

or both

and once certainty has been dropped –

if we are to use the term ‘knowing’ –

it needs to understood as meaning –

being uncertain

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 7

7. My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on – I tell a friend e.g. “Take that chair over there”, “Shut the door’, etc. etc.

if I claim knowledge and certainty –

my life shows that I make these claims

it does not show that there is a basis to these claims

in fact the making of these claims –

invites – doubt

my life is an invitation –

to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 6

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. – For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed.

with ‘I know ..’ ‘I know …’  ‘I know …’

etc . etc. –

it is not that ‘I know’ gets misused –

it gets revealed –

for what it is –

unnecessary and irrelevant

and the mental state –

revealed –

‘queer’ – ‘extremely important’ –

or otherwise

is pretentiousness –

and the basis of pretension –

is either deception –

or delusion

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 5

5. Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition.

a proposition is false – if I dissent from it

what  I make count as determinants –

is the argument for my dissent

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 4

4. “I know that I am a human being.” In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean “I know I have the organs of a human.” (E.g. a brain which, after all no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as “I know I have a brain”? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it is operated on.

doubt does not require grounds –

doubt is the questioning of grounds

 

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 3

3. If e.g. someone says “I don’t know if there is a hand here’ he might be told “Look closer”. – This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. It is one of its essential features.

when does he stop looking closer?

when he’s  found what?

knowledge?

any ‘satisfaction’ here –

is pretence

and yes – perhaps pretence –

just is one of the essential features –

of the language-game

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 2

2. From it seeming to me – or to everyone – to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.

What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it.

saying something seems to be the case –

is to regard it as uncertain

any proposal as to what is the case –

is open to question –

open to doubt

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

on certainty 1

1. If you do know that here is one hand, we will grant you all the rest.

When one says that such and such a proposition can’t be proved, of course that does not mean that it can’t be derived from other propositions; any propositions can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself. (On this a curious remark by H. Newman.)

‘If you do know that here is one hand, we will grant you all the rest.’

if you are certain of one proposition  -

any derived from it – will be certain?

the question is can you be certain of any proposition?

certainty is what?

a claim to an authority that is beyond question –

first up the only authority you have is authorship –

secondly any proposition – any proposal – you put forward –

is open to question – open to doubt

the claim of certainty is at best no more than a rhetorical claim –

the point of which is to persuade – yourself – or others –

of an authority (beyond authorship) – that you don’t have –

it ‘s a false claim – based the in deception or ignorance

and yes – derivation – is really just a language game –

it guarantees nothing

© greg t. charlton. 2009.

Feyerabend: against method 18

‘Thus science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared to admit. It is one of the many forms of thought that have been developed by man, and not necessarily the best. It is conspicuous, noisy, impudent, but it is inherently superior only for those who have already decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who have accepted without ever having examined its advantages and its limits. And as the accepting and rejecting of ideologies should be left to the individual it follows that the separation of state and church must be complemented by the separation of state and science, that most recent, most aggressive, and most dogmatic religious institution. Such a separation may be our only chance to achieve a humanity we are capable of, but have never fully realised’

I will consider each of the propositions advanced in the above

firstly -

it is not that science is closer to myth than scientific philosophy is prepared to admit

science is myth – and here I am defining myth as any story about how the world functions

any such story is an attempt at knowledge

the unknown reality that we face is open to all comers – and it does not discriminate for or against

those who hold to the scientific philosophy do not believe that science is myth or close to it

in fact they regard science as a form of objective knowledge – that tests theories against a known reality that has characteristics and features – quite independent of any theoretical characterization

in this account is the assumption that reality has features which are objective and which are known

this assumption – cannot be tested in any objective manner

but it is the assumption on which – empirical testing is based

this assumption of an objective reality – in my view is no more than a pragmatic action

and an action that establishes a platform for activity and behaviour

and as such it is in essence no different to the kind of non-empirical platforms that have been advanced by religious thinkers

that is to say it is just a way of seeing – defining the world – in order for us to get on with the business of acting and operating in it – with some semblance of order and purpose

as to empirical testing –

now indeed you can set up a situation – create a state of affairs – and see what happens

all action is objective – but independent of perspective and interpretation – it is unknown

we interpret what happens in terms of our perspectives and theories –

if something occurs that was not expected –

then we do indeed face objective reality – the unknown

in practise we can either accept this reality – or go on to develop a point of view which covers it

that is develop a theory in which the unknown event is given a character and function

I am not at all convinced that covering the world with myth – hunting done every unknown is the way to go

it is not something that from a logical point of view can be achieved – there is no complete knowledge

therefore I think such is an undesirable and unrealistic endeavour

the unknown is what grounds us – it is our connection with the real world

best I think to stay connected

secondly –

it is the case that science is one of many forms of thought and it is not necessarily the best

the reason that ‘it is not necessarily the best’ is because there is no ‘best’ for it to 'not necessarily' be

for there to be a ‘best’ form of thought – there would have to be an objective standard – against which all forms could be judged

Plato was all for this idea –

and objectivists and authoritarians ever since – right down to Feyerabend – have argued for it –

some more openly than others

Plato might have been a prick – but he didn’t pretend otherwise

the logical point here is that forms of thought exist and have currency and position within cultures when they are regarded as useful

Feyerabend should know this now that he is a born again anthropologist

and as to how important and significant science is regarded in any society or culture – that is an empirical question

thirdly –

science as conspicuous noisy and impudent – and superior only to those who have accepted it without examination?

you can of course interpret any action in terms of science – or in terms of any of the sciences

but this is just to say conspicuousness is in the eye of the be holder

there are religious people who see God everywhere – and there are schizophrenics who report the same

as for noisy – well all I can say is move to the country

as for impudent – if by this Feyerabend means shameless and insolent – I think he has a point

this objective rubbish about the pursuit of knowledge – has lead some to think that whatever they do – whatever their research – it’s all good – regardless of the consequences

such thinking and such practise – such science - is sociopathetic

as for those who have decided in favour of the scientific outlook – they have every right to do so

choices must be made – and the idea of a world view – faulty as it is – holds an attraction

science can be this or less than this –

it is not for Feyerabend or anyone else to legislate how anyone should think

you can say of course the scientific outlook is a blinkered view of reality – I would say there is no other kind

we all operate with blinkers –

and most with different sets of blinkers

anyone who uses just one set of blinkers – well that’s their business

I recommend a draw full – trunk even

to say that some adopt science without understanding its advantages and limits –

this might be true – but it can also be true of anyone in any practise

no-one I would suggest is fully aware of all the advantages and limits of anything that they do

fourthly –

the separation of science and state – catchy phrase – rings a bell

as far as I know there are no scientific institutes operating as political governments

whereas the same is not true in relation to religious institutions –

i.e. in Iran the government is run by Ayatollas – there is no comparable situation with respect to science nor has there ever been

I do indeed favour the separation of church and state –

however I can understand those like the Tibetan Buddhists who do not regard this as desirable – and would prefer to live under a theocracy

I think people should be able to live how they want to

in Western society there is a relation between governments and science

governments use science - science uses governments

who would have thought?

working up this argument about a non-existent identity – the identity of the state with science – is just the creation of an illusion –

there are illusions and there are illusions - this one is of the latter kind

finally –

what is humanity capable of that it has not fully realized?

Feyerabend’s argument here is very spurious

for one the science-state argument – is a straw man

secondly the idea that humanity is striving toward fulfillment is bullshit

what humanity is capable of – is what human beings do


© greg t. charlton. 2009.



To the memory of Prof. Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994)
A great philosopher a great spirit