Russell on mathematics IV

Russell: introduction to mathematical philosophy:
the definition of order


Russell begins –

the first thing to realise is that no set of terms has just one order to the exclusion of others – a set of terms has all the orders of which it is capable

the natural numbers occur to us most readily in order of magnitude – but they are capable of an infinite number of arrangements

when we say we ‘arrange’ numbers in various orders – that is an inaccurate description – what we do is turn our attention to certain relations between natural numbers – which themselves generate such and such an arrangement

we can no more arrange natural numbers than we can the starry heavens

one result of this view is that we should not look for the definition of order in the nature of the set of terms to be ordered – since one set of terms has many orders

the order lies not in the class of terms – but in a relation among the members of the class – in respect of which some appear earlier and some as latter

the fact that a class can have many orders is due to the fact that there can be many relations holding among the members of a single class

what properties must a relation have in order to give rise to order?

we must be able to say of any two terms in the class that one ‘precedes’ and the other ‘follows’

for these words to be used in this way we require that the ordering relation has three properties

(1) if x precedes y, y must not also precede x – a relation having this property is asymmetrical

(2) if x precedes y and y precedes z, x must precede z – a relation having this property is called transitive

(3) given any two terms of the class which is to be ordered – there must be one which precedes and the other which follows – a relation having this property is called connected

a relation is serial when it is asymmetrical transitive and connected

this is the definition of order or series

in response to this -

I would define order as a decision to regard individuals (of any kind) as being related

I see ordering as an essentially meta-geometrical activity – that is it is about where things are placed

the decision to place things in a common domain is the first act of ordering

the reason for this placement – for the setting up of a domain – is the reason or the purpose of the ordering

so the reason for the ordering is always outside of the ordering – outside of the domain

this is to make the point that ordering is an action –

it is a decision to relate individuals

against this you have Russell’s idea that there is something like a natural order – where e.g. the ordering of natural numbers can no more be an arrangement than the ordering of the starry heavens

this suggests that relations pertain between things quite independently of any purposes we may have for them or ‘designs’ we may have on them

my view here is that in a world without human consciousness there are no relations at all

relations – though not of blood and bone are very human constructions

constructions that are our basic method of ordering

it is true that we come into this world with a stock of categories and concepts that get us on our way –

which is to say that the making of order is a means of enabling us to function in whatever environment or domain we are engaged in – this is the idea of it

the ability to relate things is essential to our survival and happiness

my basic point here is that there are no inherent relations between things – we ‘make’ things relate

ok

Russell asks the question what properties must a relation have in order to give rise to order?

this question says it all

ordering as I have said is just the relating of things

you put any two things in relation to each other – which I argue is to make a meta-geometrical placement – then you have an ordering

ordering is not something different to relating

to relate is to order

what Russell calls the properties of a relation – are just descriptions of kinds of relations

now in this connection he mentions what he calls three ‘properties’ - these are asymmetry transitivity and connectedness

any relation that has these properties is a series or an order

an asymmetrical relation is if x precedes y – y must not precede x

what this amounts to is that from a meta-geometrical point of view x is placed before y

what is it to say x is ‘before’ y?

it is really just a decision to regard one term as having precedence spatially and / or temporarily

now if such a decision is made then clearly in terms of that decision the terms cannot be reversed

there would be no point in proposing that relation of terms in the first place if it was not to hold

so in terms of defining ‘precedes’ and ‘follows’ – all you have with this ‘property of asymmetry’ is the assertion that one will precede and the other will follow

no great step forward

the same point can be made with respect to the ‘property of transitivity’ – if x precedes y and y precedes z then x precedes z

this is just saying how things are placed – and that if they are placed in that manner then that is how they are placed – it is as simple as that

and as to the third ‘property’ – of connectedness

this is a good one

it is no more than to say that you have decided to place a number of individuals in relation to each other – that is what ‘connectedness’ comes down to – the decision ‘to connect’ things

'connectedness' seems like a rather clunky term to be used in logic – perhaps it’s a hang over from his Thomas the tank engine metaphor of the last chapter – anyway –

order presumes ontology

we order individuals or particulars be that numbers - stars - thoughts or whatever

a particular thing is what it is and not what it is not

which is to say ‘particularity’ presumes definition

what is included and what is not defines a particular

in common parlance we think of a particular thing as what it is – that is what is included

that is its positive definition

but a negative definition is just as essential

what follows from this is just that a thing cannot be ‘outside’ itself –

therefore it cannot be before itself – or after itself

‘before’ and ‘after’ – are relational terms – which means – they refer to particulars – and not a particular

and ‘relation’ here means – how things are placed in respect of each other

so ‘relation’ presumes multiplicity

there can be no relations unless there is a multiplicity

unless such an ontology is presumed

to make an order is to decide how to regard particulars – how to place them

that of course is determined by matters outside of the placement

an ordering is about how you want things to be in relation to each other

and why you want this relation depends on what you want to do with these things – and with these things in this arrangement

the series of natural numbers is really a language for progression – it is the argument that a repetitive act can be progressive - and if you go into negative numbers you have a language and a methodology of retrogression

in this way the series of natural numbers can be seen as a language of direction

the centre point of which is 0 – the place of rest relative to motion – the place you move from – or not


in conclusion – to order is to relate

to relate is to place particulars together

to place them in a context – in a domain

decisions are then made as to how the particulars are to be viewed

this is a matter of focus

i.e in xRy – we say the initial focus is x – the secondary focus y

in yRx the primary focus is y – the secondary x

where you begin is strictly speaking quite arbitrary

but in any ordering there must be a beginning - an initial focus

any relation is a series – in that any two terms related – form a series

asymmetry defines placement in a two term relation – if x precedes y – y does not precede x

transitivity is really no more than asymmetry with three terms -

order is the logic of placement


NB.


generation of series


Russell gives the example of the series of Kings of England

the series is generated by relations of each to his successor

here we pass from each term to the next – as long as there is a next – or back to the one before as long as there is one before

that is we generate a series by assuming that the term in question has an ancestry and has a posterity

my question is do we generate series?

or is it that we create a series by relating individuals – and then in terms of that series we can say the terms of the series have ancestry and posterity?

that is to say the properties of ancestry and of posterity are properties not of the terms of a series – but rather of the series

outside of the series the individual has no properties – i.e. ancestry or posterity

what I am putting here is really an argument against mathematical induction

my view is that properties such as ancestry and posterity are deductive of a series

that is they are properties we give to the terms of a series – given the series

and really what we are talking about here is description of the grounds of connection

the act of connection of the terms is just an ‘inductive' way of referring to the making of the series

in truth the terms are only connected given the series – it is the ordering that connects them – not the terms that ‘make’ the order

my sense is that mathematical induction is actually a false method if it is seen as a means of establishing order

mathematical induction only functions given that the order or series is presumed

and even so – what value does it have?

perhaps focusing on one term in a series and elucidating its properties as a member of the series might have some pedagogical value – that is it might be of use in the teaching and learning of mathematics

so it might have some value in elucidating the characteristics of a series

but the characteristics cannot be a product of mathematical induction

the characteristics of an ordering – of a series – are determined by the reason or the rationale of the series

also these characteristics are operational characteristics - they are directions for proceeding given the series - i.e with ancestry the direction is backward - with posterity forward

what I am saying basically is that a series if a series is given – it is not generated

generation given a series – is the elucidation of the principle of the series – this though is no more than to determine the series as an operation

a topical illustration of this is the ‘discovery’ of a new prime by Edson Smith of the University of California – the Guardian reports –

‘He installed software on the department’s computers from the Great Internet Prime Search (GIMPS) which uses downtime on volunteer’s PCs to hunt for ever larger numbers. Around 1000,000 computers add up to what is called a “grass roots super computer” that performs 29 trillion calculations a second.’


© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Russell on mathematics III

Russell: introduction to mathematical philosophy:
finitude and mathematical induction


Russell –

in the case of an assigned number the proof that we can reach it is we define ‘1’ as ‘the successor of 0’ – then we define ‘2’ as ‘the successor of I’ and so on

the method is not available for showing all such numbers can be reached this way

is there any way this can be proved?


we might be tempted to say ‘and so on’ means that the process leading to the successor may be repeated any finite number of times

the problem we are engaged in is defining ‘finite’ – and therefore we can’t use this notion in the definition

our definition must not assume that we know what a finite number is


the key to this problem is mathematical induction

the idea is – any property that belongs to 0 – and to the successor of any number that has the property – belongs to all natural numbers


some thoughts –


they key to all this is the idea that numbers are entities – of some kind or another

and being so – they possess as all entities do – properties

Russell wants to enshrine ‘is the successor of’ as one such property


we have with Russell some confusion at the base of all this –

mathematical induction –

is it an action – the action of making one mark the successor of another and continuing this process?

or is it the property that a number has that enables one to perform such an action?

he wants it both ways – we can perform the action because the objects (in this case numbers) allow us to do so

which of course brings us fair and square back to numbers – the question of the nature of numbers

in terms of what Russell has said so far – if you were to accept that numbers are entities – you would also have to conclude they are unknown entities

which might not be such a problem – except that Russell wants to load them up with properties

now there is a logical issue here

properties if they are to have any reality presume the reality of the entities they are attached to

that is they are characteristics of something – something that is that has a reality apart form having properties

if your entities are unknowns – then the only properties they can have are – unknown

that is to say you can’t have perfectly intelligible properties – attached to ‘something’ that has know known – properties

Russell doesn’t want to be seen as a Pythagorean – holding the view that numbers have some kind of ideal – non-material – mysterious existence

but he does want to hang on to the ‘shell’ of this idea – and somehow run his analysis on it –

and this is what has lead to the talk of properties – but it doesn’t work

you could also say he falls back on to a kind of dispositional analysis –

the idea that we can get to the underlying entity (number) by looking at its ‘propensities’

in this case the ‘propensity to be a successor’

but this approach is just the properties argument again

the only way you get out of this dilemma is to recognise that with numbers you are not dealing with entities – but rather actions

so you just drop one side of the confusion I referred to above –

mathematics is about performing actions – and it is not actions in relation to entities

the so called entities of mathematics are just the actions – and their markings

again as I mentioned at the end of the last post – this point demands a wrenching of grammar – a realization that the grammar of the key term – number - must in light of the logic of the situation be – rewritten – it is best understood as a verb – not a noun

and the strange thing here is that you would have thought – if anyone was to see this straight up and understand it would have been Bertrand Russell –

his theory of description is just this point regarding logic and grammar

anyway

on the basis of this –

we can dispense with mathematical induction – it is an inference that could only apply if what was being discussed were entities of some kind

it is a concept designed to explain something that is not there

and the idea came about as a means of getting at an understanding and definition of ‘finite number’

Russell says – ‘Mathematical induction affords, more than anything else, the essential characteristic by which the finite is distinguished from the infinite. The principle of mathematical induction might be stated popularly in some form as ‘what can be inferred from next to next can be inferred from first to last’. This is true when the number of immediate steps between first and last is finite, not otherwise.’

following this quote comes Russell’s ‘Thomas the tank engine’ metaphor

again there is this confusion between action and object – with the problem of attributes

there is no such thing as a finite number

a number is an operation in a series

what Russell means by ‘finite number’ – is a defined or definite series

so if ‘finite’ is to be applied in this context it would have to be to a series – and
understood to mean definite – as in predefined

an ‘indefinite series’ is what Russell means by ‘infinite number’ – or what I am suggesting he should mean by it

‘infinite’ is to be properly understood as ‘indefinite’

and understanding this is a key to understanding the whole matter

indefinite applies to actions – not things

definite applies to actions - not things

when we are talking about a finite number we are talking about a definite number of actions – which is to say a definite (progressive) repetition

in the case of infinite number what is being proposed is that the act of repetition is in principle repeatable – this is the best you can say

the idea of a series that is defined as indefinite seems to me to be a mismatch of notions

the point being a series by definition is definite

or to put it another way – indefinite action has no coherence

perhaps the notion of ‘infinite’ only comes about as a result of the misapplication of the negation sign to finite

that is it is a logical mistake – and the term corresponds to no actual practise



© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Russell on mathematics II

Russell: introduction to mathematical philosophy:
definition of number


Russell says – defining number should not be confused with defining plurality

number is what is characteristic of numbers – as man is what is characteristic of men

a plurality is not an instance of a number – but of some particular number

a trio of men is an instance of the number 3 – and the number 3 is an instance of number

the trio is not an instance of number


my view is that numbering is the act of marking instances of a plurality

we follow conventions in doing this – that is established practises – and that means an established terminology

the act of counting is repetition with specific identification of instances – it is a progressive act

each instant is marked as distinct i.e. by the marks ‘1’ ‘2’ ‘3’ etc.

these marks – are syntactical conventions - conventions not of the instances – but of the act

the act of counting is not particular to any circumstances – it is an act that has general application

as a matter of established practise we name these marks ‘numbers’

the term ‘number’ is thus a general term that refers to the marks made in the act of numbering


Russell goes on to say a number is something that characterizes certain collections – namely those that have that number

we can ask what is it to ‘have that number’?

how does a collection have a number?

firstly what is a collection?

clearly it is a conception

and I would say a conception is an ideal means of organizing individuals

anything can be ‘collected’ – anything came be a member of a collection

the reason for the organization – the collection - depends on other considerations

but essentially it is about what a collection is to be used for

when we speak abstractly about a collection – we refer to its members

an individual is a member of a collection – for the reason of that collection

that is the reason for the collection – what is it is designed for - is the reason for membership

on this view a number does not characterize a collection

the purpose of the collection is what characterizes it

the fact that one collection has 5 members and another has 5 actually tells us nothing of the character of the collections

that they are numerically the same is of no consequence

a numerical characterization of a collection simply gives us the number of its membership

it is really just a quantitative description of the collection

and yes trivially that does distinguish it from collections of another number

but it does not distinguish the collection in terms of its reason


Russell says a class or a collection can be defined in two ways – we may give an extensional definition – one that enumerates its members

and an intensional definition as when we mention a defining property


on the view that I have put above a class is not defined extensionally

that is to say enumerating the members of a class does not define the class

fred and jack and john – can be members of any number of collections

their membership is not what defines the class –

the class is defined by its reason for being – that is why it was constructed in the first place


now to intensional definition

can the class be defined by what the members have in common?

well they may have many things in common – but the reason for them being classified –made into a class – is not the fact they have something in common

it is the purpose that classification is to be put to

and that purpose – whatever it may be is outside of the classification – outside of the class – it is the reason for the class - and therefore is not internal to the class –


Russell goes on to say when we come to consider infinite class we find that enumeration is not even theoretically possible for beings who live for a finite time

we cannot enumerate all natural numbers

our knowledge of such collections must be derived from intensional definitions

I don’t see this last point at all

intensional definition – finding what is common to the members of a group – tells us nothing of the number of the group

so intensional definition is quite irrelevant to the question of infinite classes

the infinity of natural numbers derives not from there being an actual infinity of things called numbers

but from the fact that we can understand progressive (as in continuing in time) repetition as being in principle without end

that is the key to infinity is the concept of progression and the fact of repetition


Russell goes on to say

firstly numbers themselves form an infinite collection – and cannot therefore be defined by enumeration

secondly – collections having a given number of terms themselves – presumably form an infinite collection – e.g. there are an infinite number of trios in the world

and thirdly we wish to define ‘number’ in such a way that infinite numbers are possible

thus we must be able to speak of the number of terms in an infinite collection

and such collections must be defined by intension


it is clear here that for Russell intensional definition is the key to his idea of infinite number

but as I have pointed out intension has nothing to do with infinity or number


the notion of infinity comes down to that of repetitive action

numbering is the marking of any such action

as such the idea of infinite number – has no sense to it


the point is this – infinity is not an attribute – it is an operation

on such a view there seems to be no sense at all in speaking of infinite collections

that is to say the description ‘infinite’ is not applicable to collection

we cannot speak of infinite classes


again I say a collection – a class - is defined not by what is in it or its number but rather its reason – its purpose – its function


Russell says it is clear that number is a way of bringing together certain collections – those that have a given number of terms

we can suppose all couples in one bundle – all trios in another etc.

in this way we obtain various bundles of collections

each bundle consisting of all the collections that have a certain number of terms

each bundle is a class whose members are collections i.e. – classes

thus each is a class of classes

the bundle consisting of all couples e.g. is a class of classes –

each couple is a class with two members -

the whole bundle of couples is a class with an infinite number of members –

each of which is a class of two members


it is true that you can keep classifying – that you can classify within classification – there can be many good reasons for doing this

Russell says the whole bundle of couples is a class with an infinite number of members

‘infinite number of members’ as I have argued above makes no sense

what you can say here is that the whole bundle of couples is a class with an unknown number of members

if instead of ‘infinite’ Russell used ‘unknown’ there would be more sense to his argument


he asks how are we to decide whether two collections belong to the same bundle?


well look there is no reason why anything belongs or does not belong to anything else unless you make it so

classification – the making of classes – is a contrivance - there are no ‘natural’ classes


to his question Russell says the answer that suggests itself is – find out how many members each has – and put them in the same bundle if they have the same number of members

but this he says - presupposes that we have defined numbers - and that we know how to discover how many terms a collection has

Russell’s view is that we cannot use counting here because numbers are used in counting


his argument here sounds cogent – on the assumption that numbers are something other than the operation of counting

of course you can ask – well ok counting – but what is being counted?

my view is that the act of counting is the act of numbering

the act of counting is the act of marking in some manner or another

the resultant markings are numbers

a number is a mark in a counting

and counting is the ordering of individuals in a series


Russell says it is simpler logically to find out whether two collections have the same number of terms – than it is to find out what a number is


this seems an odd statement to me – given what has preceded

it seems Russell thinks that the defining of number is the defining of some entity

when in fact all that ‘number’ is – is the term that we use to refer to the markings we make in counting

‘number’ to be fair comes up as a noun – as the name of something – and yes you can say the marks made in counting are something – but the real point is that ‘number’ refers to an action – so it is logically better understood as a verb

in any case Russell from the above statement seems to suggest you can understand a number without first knowing what ‘number’ is

this distinction doesn’t bother me or bear on my argument – but it seems to contradict what Russell just previously said regarding counting – that you need to know number first


he goes on to distinguish kinds of relations in this connection –

a relation is said to be ‘one-one’ when if x has the relation in question to y - no other term x’ has the same relation to y – and x does not have the same relation to any term y’ other than y

when only the first of these conditions is fulfilled – the relation is called ‘one-many’

when only the second is fulfilled – it is called ‘many-one’

Russell says it should be observed that the number 1 is not used in these definitions


it is true 1 is not used in this analysis

but the point is that for a relation of any kind to exist there must be at least two terms

that is a relation – is a relation between –

so it is clear that number is here presumed in any relation and any relational analysis


two classes are said to be ‘similar’ – when there is a one-one relation

he defines this more precisely –

one class is said to be ‘similar’ to another when there is a one-one relation of which one class is the domain while the other is the converse domain

it is obvious says Russell that two finite classes have the same number of terms if they are similar – but not otherwise


in what does this similarity consist?

granted you can have a one-one relation – why introduce similarity?

it seems like a weak word for what is very precise logical relation

and what is added by this notion of similarity?

the notion seems to me to be superfluous


Russell continues - the act of counting consists in establishing a one to one correlation between the sets of objects counted and the natural numbers (excluding 0) that are used in the process

the notion of similarity is logically presupposed in the operation of counting


the idea seems to be that you have a set of objects and a set of numbers – and then the act of co-relating the two

this presentation I think shows just how vacuous this idea of similarity really is

is Russell trying to suggest that the reason a number co-relates with an object is because of similarity?

he say the act of counting presupposes similarity

this is to suggest counting is like placing dominos on the ‘correct’ squares of a domino board

this seems incredibly naïve

numbers do not exist as objects – to be co-related or ‘imposed’ on other objects

numbering is simply the act itself of marking in a progressive manner the objects in a series

the numbers just are the marks of the numbering

no similarity exists or is required


he says we may thus use the notion of ‘similarity’ to decide when two collections belong to the same bundle

we want to make one bundle containing the class that has no members – one bundle of all classes that have one member – this will be for the number 1 etc.

given any collection we can define the bundle it is to belong to as being the class of all those collections that are similar to it

if a class has three members – the class of all those collections that are similar to it – will be the class of trios

whatever number of terms a collection may have – those collections that are ‘similar’
to it will have the same number of terms

and the number of a class is the class of those classes that are similar to it

and so to number – a number is anything that is the number of some class

Russell says at the end of this – such a definition has the verbal appearance of being circular – we define ‘the number of a given class’ – without using the notion of number
in general

therefore we define number in general in terms of ‘the number of a given class’ – without logical error


it is in this section that Russell reveals the point of ‘similarity’

it is a concept designed to establish the notion of number

the number of a class is the class of those classes that are similar to it

which is a very weak way of getting around saying that ‘the number of a class is the class of those classes which have the same number’

and Russell wants to avoid this statement for not only is it a circular definition -

and it brings down the whole edifice of classes –

for if a number is just a number (whatever that might mean) there really is no need to introduce classes at all

you also have the problem of classes that have the same number not being distinguishable

and there goes the neighbourhood

the idea of similarity is supposed to hold off these results

as I have said above – it just comes across as a very weak criterion in this context

but more than this it is at the very least – in this context an empty concept

we are it seems supposed to assume a similarity between classes with the same number – while not mentioning that they have the same number – which is of course the basis of their similarity

and if it doesn’t mean this it means nothing


the final point is that a number in general is any collection which is the number of one of its members

all its members are of course similar in that they have the same number

so the number of one of its members will be the number of the class

what else could it be?


the thing is Russell’s use of class here has not I think added to the issue

simply because in the end in order to identify class you need number

class does not elucidate number

now simply bundling things together that have the same number – and calling the greater bundle – the number –just doesn’t cut it for me

the greater bundle is just a greater bundle


Russell seems to think that we can in some way discover numbers in reality – and at this he has failed


reality as in the non-human reality has no numbers

numbering is an operation that human beings bring to reality – for their purposes

the human reality is one that demands at times an overlay of order

numbering is a basic operation to this end


Russell’s argument is like this – you use number to define class (even though you try to appear to not be doing this by using the phantom concept ‘similarity’) and then you use class to define number

it’s hard to credit really


and the result is that number is left undefined


as Russell says at the beginning of his discussion of the definition of number –

‘In seeking a definition of number, the first thing to be clear about is what we may call the grammar of our inquiry.’

number is not a noun – it is a verb



© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Russell on mathematics I

Russell: introduction to mathematical philosophy:
the series of natural numbers

Peano’ argument


Peano showed that the entire theory of natural numbers could be derived from three primitive ideas and five primitive propositions in addition to those of pure logic

the three primitive ideas in Peano’s arithmetic are:

0, number, successor

the five primitive propositions are:

(1) 0 is a number
(2) the successor of any number is a number
(3) no two numbers have the same successor
(4) 0 is not the successor of any number
(5) any property which belongs to 0, and also to the successor of every number which has the property, belongs to all numbers


some preliminary thoughts -

by ‘number’ I mean ‘an operation or action in a series of actions’

the mark ‘1’ is the first in the series

‘the first in the series’ is defined by ‘series’ itself

the actual mark ‘1’ is a convention –

0 on this view is not a number – 0 is non-action – it the position prior to a series

it defines the series by marking the position of no series

the point being that a series ‘comes into being’ – there are thus no natural series

a series is a construction on action

succession is - relative to the series – a repetition of action

a mathematical series is thus a repetitive series

repetition is succession in time

in a repetitive series the successor of an action is an action

no two actions have the same successor because each action is unique in time

0 is not the successor of any number

any property of 0 is not shared by any number


on this view a number is just the mark of an action in a series of actions

not all actions are numbers of course –

but all numbers are actions in a series – in a conception

‘series’ thus is an ideal construction placed on action to create order

and order here is defined as repetition

repetition is the mast basic ordering – and it is on this basis that the series of natural numbers emerges

there are no numbers in the Pythagorean sense of ideal entities

the term ‘1’ or the mark ‘1’ has universality because any repetitive series has a first action

0 if you were to be metaphysical or poetical it is the ‘place’ of no action relative to any series

mathematics as a theory - or the mathematics of the series of natural numbers - is the formalization of the notion of a repetitive series

this is the point of Peano’s axiom 5

it is really a pragmatic theory in the sense that it provides us with terms that enable us to operate without actually performing every action that the terms name

numbers as marks refer to places in a series

so that whatever the series – we know that 501 – refers to a particular place in that series

we can therefore say numbers are ‘places in a series’ – relative of course to other places

and that these places are finally no more than actions performed in the series


Russell says of Peano’s three primitive ideas -

that they are capable of an infinite number of interpretations

he gives this example – let ‘0’ be taken to mean 100 – and let ‘number’ be taken to mean the numbers from 100 on in the series of natural numbers – then all our primitive propositions are satisfied – even the fourth – for though 100 is the successor of 99 – 99 is not a ‘number’ – in the sense we are now giving to number

he gives other examples – the point is that in Peano’s system there is nothing to enable us to distinguish between different interpretations of his primitive ideas –

that is it is assumed that we know what is meant by '0' – and we shall not suppose this symbol means 100 or Cleopatra’s needle


on the face of it - this seems like an ok argument –

however Peano’s clear intent is to distinguish ‘0’ – 0 is a number and it is not the successor of any number – unlike 100 – which like all numbers except 0 is a successor

so for Peano anyway there is no question that 100 can be 0

that possibility is excluded by definition –

0 is 0 – 100 is another number

so Russell’s argument is clever but it is not true to Peano’s definitions


the real problem I think – and one which Russell at least to this point does not address is the relation between axiom 2 and 4

the successor of any number is a number - 0 is not the successor of any number

this to me goes to the problem of defining 0 as a number

at the very least you end up with 0 as some special case number

and as a result your definition of number – whatever that might be – is problematic

for it is a definition that is not all inclusive – but one that has an exception

and so really – it fails


Russell goes on to say –

‘0’ ‘number’ and ‘successor’ cannot be defined by Peano’s definitions – and that they must be independently understood

he says it might be suggested that instead of setting up ‘0’ and ‘number’ and ‘successor’ as terms we know the meaning of although we cannot define them –

we might let them stand for any three terms that verify Peano’s axioms –

they will no longer have a meaning that is definite though undefined –

they will be variables – terms concerning which we make certain hypotheses – namely those stated in the five axioms – but which are otherwise undetermined

Russell says of this view – it does not enable us to know if there are any sets of terms verifying Peano’s axioms

and we want our numbers to be such as can be used for counting among common objects

and this requires that our numbers have a definite meaning


this is just to say if the three primitive ideas are regarded as variables then they will not have definite meanings

and of course you could then wonder what the actual value of any such terminology would be

his second point here that it does not enable us to know if there are any sets of terms verifying Peano’s axioms – is a strange argument

couldn’t you say just this of Peano’s argument as it stands?

it depends how you come at it – if you begin with the axioms – your question might be well – ok – we have these principles – but how are we to know what they refer to ?

what I am getting at is that you could be quite sceptical and ask – how are we to know that the terms ‘0’ ‘number’ and ‘successor’ verify the axioms

just because they are used is not verification

anyway


the basic problem with Peano’s approach as I see it is firstly that he wishes to define 0 and number – and he defines 0 as a number

the result of this is that elucidation of 0 is now dependent on the definition of number

that is a number – 0 – has already been singled out - without the ‘over riding’ definition of number being in place

so you could take the view that nothing has been accomplished by introducing 0 – it needs to wait until number is defined

you might then argue that Peano has failed to define 0

and another thing – 0 is not on the same level as number and successor

it is not primitive in this scheme – it is if anything derivative –

derivative that is from number

now I don’t know – but I suspect Peano did not envisage this implication

I think it probably undercuts his theory


‘successor’ is defined as ‘the next number in the natural order’

clearly then for the definition of ‘successor’ to proceed we need the definition of ‘number’

that is the integrity of the notion of ‘successor’ is dependent on that of number

so is ‘successor’ like 0 dependent on number?

and if so like 0 it is a derivative notion?


also defining ‘successor’ as ‘the next….’ is really not to give us anything at all –

it amounts to saying ‘a successor is a successor’

perhaps the point is that we should just focus on this notion as a key notion in the philosophy of mathematics


one thing we can say is that ‘successor’ is a relational term –

and this seems to me to be how Peano goes about defining number -

a number is that which is the successor to a number

is this to say – numbers are ‘points’ in a succession?


it is pretty clear that Peano’s three primitive ideas – 0 – number – successor

are not given clean - ‘stand alone’ – definitions

and I can’t see how you could say on the basis of Peano’s definitions that any of these notions are ‘primitive’

0 depends on number – number depends on successor - successor is a relation between numbers


what this is suggestive of – is that the idea that there are primitive notions in mathematics – that do no not depend on the meaning of the notions that derive from them – is not on

which is to say the quest for the foundations of mathematics is wrongheaded

that there are no foundations

what you have is an activity – perhaps a primitive human activity - and the description of that activity – the language of that activity – has given us working concepts – the meaning of which is not validated by analysis – but by the activity itself

this might suggest that the ‘foundations of mathematics’ – are not stable – that the activity of mathematics itself – whereever that is it goes will have repercussions on the concepts that are regarded as central or ‘foundational’

to be blunt – if you want to know what a ‘number’ is - look at what people do when they operate with numbers


you would have to say Peano leaves ‘number’ undefined – perhaps that is his sense of primitive

but really this is just a touch of the old Pythagoreans – what you might call a persistent mathematical malady



© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Rorty's solidarity or objectivity V

Rorty is right about objectivism

his response is to fill the hole left by objectivism with solidarity

Rorty says if you reject the objectivist program of trying to get in touch with mind-independent and language independent reality – you can ask questions like – what are the limits of our community ?– are our encounters sufficiently free and open ?– has what has recently been gained in solidarity cost us our ability to listen to outsiders who are suffering? – do outsiders have new ideas?

Rorty I think as failed to see that any objectivist view of a mind independent and language independent reality – comes as an answer to objective questions

yes you can drop the transcendental objectivist answers – but this does not mean that the objectivist question – what is the nature of this or that? – is thereby rendered meaningless or useless

the above so called solidarity questions of Rorty are quite simply objective questions

you cannot decide the limits of a community without an objective understanding of what a community is

you will not determine if your encounters are sufficiently free and open unless you deal objectively with the question of the nature of freedom and openness

and now to the elephant in the room in Rorty’s article ‘solidarity or objectivity?’ –

to adopt this conception of solidarity in place of objectivity you must at some point ask the question – what is ‘solidarity’ in this context? – what does it mean?

this unfortunately for Rorty is an objective question

perhaps that’s why he doesn’t address or answer this question in his article

perhaps you just have to be ‘in the know’ – one of the gang – in the group – an insider – solid with Richard Rorty’?

who’s to say? – I am a sceptic that is true – but I would like to know something at this point – like what his key concept amounts to

the problem is you are left suspecting that Rorty has just done the big metaphysical world tour to simply come home to his prejudice –

with the idea that if he mounts an argument against ‘objectivism’ and refers to all the usual suspects we’ll all just automatically see the wisdom of his prejudice

it looks like a bit of a con job

in logical terms his premises do not support his conclusion

if we have anything here - it is an epistemology of prejudice

also he portrays his ‘argument’ as being a contribution to the theory of pragmatism

yes you could say – the objective reality isn’t there so I’ll just stay inside and celebrate myself with those who agree with me – we’ll have a lovely time

there’s pragmatists and there’s pragmatists

pragmatism as a philosophical theory was not designed to cater for insularity and self-indulgence

you can take lipstick off a pig - but that doesn’t make it a pragmatist



© greg. t. charlton. 2008

Rorty's solidarity or objectivity IV

there are rationalities (plural)

when I come to participate in a social practise – an activity with others – I will in short accept the rules and norms of that practise

for the duration of that practise the norms of that practise are my rationality

in different places and different times we operate with different rationalities

this multiplicity of rationalities points to the fact that there is no single universal account of rationality

which is to say there is no one theory of how to proceed

so yes there are cultural rationalities – agreed social practises and all they entail

it is not they are incommensurable with other rationalities

it is rather that there is no question of commensurability

different rationalities underlie different practises

the common ground of all practises is the unknown

the common ground of all rationalities is the unknown

the Tasmanian aborigines and the British colonist had trouble communicating – this is true

what they were facing in each other’s eyes was the unknown

and the question in any such situation is confrontation or embrace

confrontation is based on fear of the unknown

embrace is based on the recognition that the unknown is what underlies all difference – that it is the common ground – and therefore that from which one can move forward with another towards a new understanding



© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Rorty's solidarity or objectivity III

there can be no universal definition of ‘true’ – for the reason that no-one is in the position to see how the term is used in all circumstance – by all users – in space / time regions

that is there is no sub specie aeternitatis – or any one to have such a point of view

there is no god’s eye view as Putman calls it

very well –

what then of truth?

well from the ‘objectivist’ point of view if that is the term – we don’t know

now Rorty does not realise I think that – while we can see that the objectivist program of epistemology and ontology as dead in the water – the objectivist question has enormous heuristic and epistemological value

what it leads us to in a positive sense is the realization that we don’t know – that is it leads to scepticism – what I call positive scepticism

so if we don’t know in an objectivist sense –

how is it that we do know?

what meaning can we give to epistemological claims?

well the only meaning that we can give is the meaning that we do give

the term ‘true’ does not change its syntax when used by me or you – and used to mean different things

objectivity I will say is an illusion of syntax

and I would suspect - a necessary illusion –

necessary in what you might call an evolutionary sense

so what 'x' means when he uses the term ‘true’ – is a study all in itself

if we are to be intellectually thorough and honest – there is no quick answer

and there may be no determinate answer –

we may never know

and if for some reason we have to come up with an answer –

well we take our best shot

now because I think the ‘base’ is scepticism – I can entertain that the use of the term ‘true’ – can be genuinely analysed in different ways – i.e. a representationalist analysis – a realist analysis – a relativist analysis – a pragmatist analysis or whatever

that is people can use the term in these ways

and of course I can do as a philosopher does argue one against the other

and if I am good at what I do – and caring – the result may be that the person I am ‘arguing’ with will be educated in the theories of truth and their use

and in a genuine discussion and exchange of ideas I should be educated too

and who is to say what the results of this will be?

I am suggesting a philosophical usage and method even – that is primarily embracing

as distinct from one that is confrontationalist

this is not to be seen as just a pedagogical method

my point is that it is possible given the epistemological base of positive scepticism

Rorty’s idea that pragmatism operates without epistemology –

is I think in its full implications – a dangerous thing

it suggests that there is point of view – that by its nature is not open to criticism or evaluation

such a view is hard core objectivistism

pragmatism is an operating theory

it’s what I call a second order philosophical theory

by first order I mean one’s response to the objectivist question

my view is that the value of the objectivist question is that it leads us to scepticism – to the realization that every second order theory is an attempt – a genuine attempt to make sense of the unknown

I describe my self as a pragmatist

I think ‘true’ is a mark for ‘what enables’ – and ‘false’ for ‘what does not enable’

more on that later –

however I would like to think – just because finally I don’t know

that while I operate in a pragmatic manner – or with pragmatic theory

I don’t hold to this with any sense of certainty –

that it is possible that I would modify or change my view – or even overthrow it

I don’t know what would lead to the latter possibility – but then that is just the point

the value of the objectivist framework or perspective is that it leaves the question open

another way of putting it is to say - it is a given of the animal – of the human being - to reflect –

and this is perhaps all that objectivism finally amount to – reflection

and as to this ‘capacity’ to reflect -

I don’t have any particular characterization of it

there are various theories that come at it in different ways

I don’t know what it is to reflect – I just do it


© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Rorty's solidarity or objectivity II

the pragmatist’s argument regarding truth – as that which is ‘good for us to believe’

is not an argument against objectivism as such – for the question ‘what is good for us to believe?’ is an objective question

Rorty’s argument of solidarity is just the objectivist argument restated in a particular form

it is to say that one’s community – whatever this amounts to – is the objective category

the idea of being ‘solid’ with a community strikes me as being fanciful and a little strange

one has membership of a community in so far as one participates in its practises

communities are fluid things – and this is the basis of their true value

you can’t be solid with a community - the community is not solid and for the matter of that – neither are you – sorry

the real question is not objectivity or solidity – but solidity or fluidity?

the best communities are characterized by their lack of pretence – and their lack of ‘solidarity’ –

they are communities in which ideas and their bearers – flow

solidity is the end of it – it is when things get stuck – when they stop

that is when the freedom that is essential to good community gets halted by the ‘solidity’ of its denial -

and this happens in those communities where power takes over from freedom

a power base is what is solid or ties to be – it is also the end of genuine community

solidity is more a desire than a reality – a desire for the conscious world – the social world to be what it is not

solidity is just an illusion based on denial

anyway even if you accept Rorty’s overall idea you still have to define community – that is there is still an objective question

now in practise of course we simply make a decision – and say yes – this is how I will define my community – this is community for me –

after which if you are lucky you can forget the whole notion – and get about your business

however it seems to me that if you are genuinely interested in this objective question – you would fairly soon come to the realization that the idea of community is not solid – it is amorphous

it is a concept that in experience is never fixed and never stable – so ‘solid’ is hardly the description –

and my general point is this – there is always an objective question –

which is the question – what is the nature of this or that?

we ask such a question in the hope of establishing a base for action –

a base to operate from

what I think is true is that we never strike pay dirt

we never get the definitive answer to such a question

however in the process we get ‘operative’ answers –

answers we can run with – answers we can work with

my point is the objective question is genuine and necessary – even though there is no objective answer

the question is asked not for the answer looked for – but for the answers found

what this points to is that our reality is not fixed – never essentially stable – and fundamentally unknown

the objective question keeps us in the game and enables us to proceed

and the ‘knowledge’ you operate with is based on decision –

the decision to stop the analytical or questioning process - and just to work with what you have – so long as you can – so long as it yields the results that you want

one’s objectives are never ‘objective’ – in the sense of clear and uncontroversial

true it often helps to decide to see them in such a way

but in the actual living of a life – one’s view of the world – one’s view of one’s goals and objectives - is never fixed – never solid

we have no final knowledge of reality – and therefore no guarantees along the way

but it is just this uncertainty that enables us to proceed – to get on with it – to make our way


© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Rorty's solidarity or objectivity I

granted we try to make sense of relations -

of our relation to others -

and our relation to the non-human reality

the idea of relations presupposes a plurality

that is for a relation to exist there must be more than one thing

so the relata must have an independent existence

if there is to be a genuine relation

what the relation tells us is something other than the nature of relata

it tells us of the reality that comes into being when the individuals are placed in relation to each other

my relationship with my friend – is nether an account of myself or of my friend

it is the account of what exists between us

the point being –

identity presupposes relation

this is not just a logical point

people as a matter of fact or practise seek to understand the nature of individual things – ‘in their own right’

now such an understanding is never entirely independent of the question of relations

there is a difference though and it is one of emphasis and focus

so the first point is that Rorty has put the cart before the horse here

or at least he has not understood that we at least ask the question – what is x in itself?

true we also ask what is x in relation to y? –

but for this second question to proceed – the first needs some answer at least

a world with just relations is a world with no centre

people who only understand themselves in terms of their relations with others have no centre – and no integrity

so this issue does have some moral implications –

Rorty begins his first sentence with the phrase ‘reflective human beings’

one reflects on one’s self – and what is external to one’s self – be that other conscious entities or non-conscious entities

so a reflective human being is inwardly reflective and outwardly reflective

we have a sense of what is internal and what is external

internality and externality are the dimensions of our awareness – the dimensions of our existence

Rorty it seems wants to argue there is really only outward reflection

and yet for such to be some internality must be presumed

now I am not saying at this point that we can make definite sense of internality

and at the same time I am not suggesting we have clear and distinct ideas of externality

the point is here – that as self-conscious entities we have an inner sense – and we try to make sense of this

we ask such questions as – who am I? – what is my essence?

to fail to understand that human beings are interested in things as they are in themselves – is very strange

community -

I want to suggest that the notion of community is a defensive notion – and is a fantasy based on fear

this is not to say it has no value – or that it should not be adopted or embraced –

just that it should be seen for what it is

it is essentially an argument against the Hobbesian view of all against all – where life – like some of its bearers is nasty brutish and short

how do we decide this issue?

I’ll jump to the end of the rope here – and say – as to the true nature of man in relation to man - well the issue is always open

neither the Rorty view of togetherness or the Hobbesian view of all against all – or for that matter any combination or variation – can claim to be the final word –

there is no final word

the true nature of human beings – if there is such a thing is something we just don’t know

we operate with different views on the matter at different times

the question is always open –

and this if anything is the true nature of things

Rorty’s argument for solidarity here is very simplistic

it is suggestive of the decision to be or the desire to be as non-conscious objects appear to be –

solid –

at the very least you can say such a view stems from the desire to negate consciousness

to negate its indeterminacy and its freedom from – solidarity

I may be jumping ahead of things here – but such a notion is concerning

it is the kind of concept that if used in an extreme way could well lead to totalitarian thought and action

anyway we shall see

the initial point here is that the matter is not so simple

the practise of things as I see it is that – yes you can say at times people desire something like solidarity with their fellows

but equally at times human beings like their own company – and like to be separate and apart

yes the particle may seek mass – but it is its own light too

Rorty’s view here strikes me as being just too one sided

and when you see that – you have to wonder why?

objectivity

as to objectivity – it is best to drop the notion and the term altogether – it’s a broken record

we appreciate that there is a world outside ourselves

and that it is on the face of it – different

it is external to consciousness

it is not conscious –

now I don’t want to get into the issue of the nature of consciousness here

just to make the point that the non-conscious is not conscious

and that we understand this distinction – whatever it amounts to

my relation to the external world is no great mystery

consciousness is an internality that I am aware of – and identify with

my body is the primary external I am aware of and identify with

in terms of identification and recognition they are one in the same -

different dimensions of a single unity –

if you wish to speak of the unity – as something over and above its dimensions – as a thing in itself – so to speak – you have to recognize it as an unknown

it is ‘known’ only in terms of its dimensions

these dimensions are expressions of a singularity

the singularity that is qua singularity – an unknown


© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Richard Rorty - intro. 3.

Richard Rorty’s philosophical papers vol.1 - the introduction


our experience of reality is unified

our analysis of reality is divided

this can be seen as being of the nature of analysis

without divisions separations differentiations there is no breaking down of the unity

it is clear that it is of the nature of the human being to break down the unified reality

and we can say that this breaking down of the unity to its parts or to its dimensions - provides the dynamic basis on which the human beings operate

I would suggest the most fundamental of these divisions is that between the internal and external dimensions of reality

internality is consciousness - the external dimension is the surface world

these are the two metaphysical dimensions of a single unity

and they are the natural given operational dimensions of the human being

nevertheless any action of this unity – the human being - is a unified action

in analysis it can be broken down

we can speak of the internal dimension of an act – that is the consciousness of it

and we can speak of an act as a purely external observable event

‘an event’s belief’- if I can put it that way – is its thought content - is its internal dimension –

there is no question of representation here

the belief does not represent the act – the belief is the internal dimension of the act

what though is this thought content?

in an immediate sense it is simply the awareness of what is happening

in a reflective sense it characteristically means to give reasons for

and this is to place an event in an ideal context or setting

to speak of it in terms such as i.e. as ‘cause’ and ‘end’

such ideal categories refer to - if you like – the subjective dimension of an act - the unobservable dimension of an act

one’s belief e.g. about the cause and end of one’s act – is from the external observer’s point of view – the unknown dimension of the act

and even from the actor’s point of view any such description is really indeterminate

the act as a purely external event is unknown –

as a conscious event there is the pretence of knowledge –

that is the event has ‘belief characterization’

this is not some decision - it is a given dimension of any conscious act

reflection shows us clearly that the epistemology of action is indeterminate

that is to say there are any number of ways the event can be characterized internally

an internal characterization – nevertheless – there will be

it is often put that analysis has the goal of explanation

as if the fact of analysis somehow leads to a deeper truth – deeper than the truth of reality – as given

this thinking really comes from a denial of the unknown and a fear of it – and the belief that it can be challenged and overcome with ‘knowledge’

that knowledge – therefore is something deeper than what is given

as I see it analysis simply enables us to move – to act

it provides the space - the dynamic setting for action –

that is to say that with the awareness of division - comes the awareness of the possibility of its resolution - that is of unity

but a unity which is not like the initial unity – unknown

the unity that is sought after the division – as a result of the analysis – is the known unity – the explained unity

this is a common view of the function and end of analysis

it is a view which I believe is like the idea of sub specie aeternitatis – an imaginative leap - wishful thinking

however without such beliefs much of human action would be without motive or end

my view is that such ‘false’ conceptions – actually have function

and therefore as second order belief systems they are valid

that is to say they enable conscious action – they provide operative frameworks

the ‘truth’ of these frameworks is to be decided in the field of action

what enables one to move has truth value – what brings you to a stop does not

reality demands decision – and there are no objective grounds to appeal to

one simply does what one does – because one has to - and the reasons for or against the decision are justifications – before or after the fact

justifications here function as support for the unsupported – this is their value – their use

short lived – but emotionally and strategically necessary



(c) greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Richard Rorty - intro. 2.

Richard Rorty’s philosophical papers vol.1 - the introduction


my view is that the object of knowledge is the unknown

that ‘objective’ reality is the unknown

given this – strictly speaking any characterization of the unknown – any description is valid

any such description is what I call second order

the first order account is the objective account

second order accounts are not true or false because they correspond or do not to the objective reality

the unknown – is just that

it is the ‘space’ for human conception and speculation

it does not adjudicate – it does not determine – it is silent

any decision about any conception – is a decision of the knower

and the ‘knower’ is the actor

put simply – one’s view of the world – if there is anything quite as defined and singular – is what enables or not – one to function

we have diverse views because the objective reality – is empty

our acts – and the conceptions that drive them are just our attempts to define – to determine

the act of determination here is to give character to the unknown

a conception that is true is one that enables us to proceed –

a false idea or view – is one that pulls us up

as to the final reason the final cause as to why anyone proceeds or halts – there is no ‘objective’ answer – there is only higher order descriptions

the point of these is to give action reason – and doing this is just providing a covering note

at any point in this process we are uncertain

this uncertainty is the reason to go on –

it is the source of all heuristics – all creativity

it is strictly speaking never diminished

we all get moments of relief – the illusion of knowledge – even sometimes certainty

‘certainty’ as a genuine notion is a second order stratagem

there are many human activities that proceed well with this strategy of certainty – mathematics as calculation is one such activity

the need for certainty is an emotional need

it is a response to the essential insecurity human beings experience

it is a strategy to deal with the unknown

reflection shows us that it is not first order based

this does not change the fact of need

we exist – we operate between first and second order ‘realities’ -

between the stark objective reality – that we don’t know – and the existential reality that we must know - in order to proceed

this contradiction is what it is to be human

if you are looking for the soul – it is between true and false


© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Richard Rorty - intro. 1.

Richard Rorty’s philosophical papers vol.1 - the introduction - an opening foray


the idea of a god’s eye view is an argument for transcendence

the idea that there is a position outside of reality – outside of the unity – that is reality – from which we can assess the goings on inside –

so it’s not just that we might be able to step outside of the mind – but go further as it were – and step out of reality

so such a view is not just an argument against idealism – it’s an argument against realism (whatever that might be) and it’s an argument against reality –

it posits and presumes a higher reality

to my mind a particularly absurd notion

the only thing you can say for it is that it is a posit of the imagination

the idea of a ‘possible standpoint’ – which held as a product of the imagination – is no more than a fantasy

much of life is fantasy

what is front and centre is that we don’t know

we function and we operate – and we reflect on this

all our reflections are stratagems for dealing with the unknown

realism is strictly speaking a non-reflective position

representationalism is an attempt to explain the relation of subject and object – or more precisely the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious

this unity I suggest is properly regarded as unknown

and ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ – to be regarded as operational dimensions of this unity

this unity is where we begin – it is the unknown

what I am putting here is that the notion of the unity of dimensions – of the internal and the external – is the best we can achieve with regard to objectivity

so ‘objectivity’ is the essential unity – and this is unknown

there is no position beyond this – no god’s eye view

or to continue the metaphor – the ‘god’s eye view’ that we have – the unity of dimensions – of the conscious and the non-conscious – is blind

representationalism:

representationalism requires a point of view outside that of the supposed relation of representation

there is no such point of view

therefore language does not represent reality –

language just is the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious – expressed

thus language is a mode of action

we have the relation between consciousness and the non-conscious - its expression is language

language is neither consciousness per se or non-consciousness per se

it is the relation expressed

so on this view the distinction between word and object –

is a pre-language distinction

it could only make sense before you have language

the reality of language in action – you might say –

is that there is no word and object

there is the action of language

the fact of it – heaven forbid I use this expression

and the fact of it is that it functions

its logic is the logic of function

now to meaning –

this is the post-language parlour game

so language is the action of the unity that is consciousness in a non-conscious context

it is the expression of this unity

and expression is just the basic function of this unity – of the human being

language expresses the unity and is the platform of its function and operation

given this – or once it is seen in this light – any of the distinctions we have used to get to this point – i.e. – conscious / non-conscious – internal / external – word / object etc.

are operating distinctions that come from the fact of language

and yes some of these distinctions are turned back on language – with the idea of explaining it

these distinctions come from language – they cannot be used to explain it – they are an outcome of it

they are internal to it –

there is no outside of language

that is to say subjectivity and objectivity are operating categories of the unity expressed

and clearly they are natural and have great utility in dealing with the unknown

reality is what we don’t know – realism is dealing with this fact


© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Sartre 1f - being-in-itself

Sartre 1f

Being and nothingness: the pursuit of being

V. Being-in-itself.


the argument:


we can form some conclusions regarding the phenomenon of being

consciousness is the revealed revelation of existents –

and existents appear before consciousness on the foundation of their being

the primary characteristic of the being of an existent is never to reveal completely

an existent can never be stripped of its being – its being is the ever present foundation of the existent

consciousness can always pass beyond the existent – not towards its being – but to the meaning of its being

the meaning of the being of the existent in so far as it reveals itself is the phenomenon of being

this meaning has itself a being – based on which it manifests itself.

the meaning of being is valid for every phenomenon

the phenomenon of being is not being – but it indicates being and requires it

the phenomenon of being like ever primary phenomenon – is immediately disclosed to consciousness

we have what Heideggar calls a pre-ontological apprehension of it – that is one which is not accompanied by a fixing in concepts an elucidation


the elucidation of the meaning is valid only for the being of the phenomenon –

since the being of consciousness is radically different – it will necessitate a particular elucidation in terms of the revealed-revelation of another type of being – being for itself

and being for itself is opposed to the being of the phenomenon – the being in itself


the elucidation of the meaning of being-in-itself can only be provisional

previous work enables us to distinguish two separate regions of being – the being of the pre-reflexive cogito – and the being of the phenomenon

we have established by examination of non-positional self-consciousness that the being of the phenomenon can on no account act upon consciousness

in this way we have ruled out the realistic conception of the relations of the phenomenon with consciousness


the spontaneity of the non-reflexive consciousness shows us that conscious cannot get out of its subjectivity – therefore it cannot act on transcendent being – nor admit the passive elements necessary to constitute the transcendent being

this rules out the idealist solution

it seems transcendent being and consciousness are two closed totalities without possible means of communication

there is a solution other than idealism or realism


in short even if it had been created – being in itself would be inexplicable in terms of creation – for it assumes its being beyond the creation


this is equivalent to saying that being is uncreated

but we do not need to conclude that being creates itself – which would suppose it is prior to itself

being cannot be causa sui in the manner of consciousness

being is itself

this means that it is neither passivity or activity

both these notions are human and designate human conduct or the instruments of human conduct


being is equally beyond negation as beyond affirmation

being is not a connection with itself

it is itself

it is an immanence which cannot realize itself

an affirmation which cannot affirm itself

an activity which cannot act – because it is glued to itself

every thing happens as if - in order to free the affirmation of self from the heart of being – there is necessary decompression of being

the un-differentiation of the in-itself is beyond an infinity of self-affirmations – in as much as there is an infinity of modes of self-affirming

being is in itself


if it is in itself – this means that being does not refer to itself as consciousness does

it is this self

it is itself so completely that the perpetual reflection which constitutes the self is dissolved in an identity

that is why being is at bottom beyond the self

being is opaque to itself because it is filled with itself

this is to say – being is what it is

being-for-itself will be defined - as being what it is not – and not being what it is


being in itself has no consciousness of itself

the in-itself has nothing secret – it is solid – in a sense we can designate it as a synthesis – but it is the most indissoluble of all – the synthesis of itself with itself


the result is evidently that being is isolated in its being

it does not enter into any connection with what is not itself

it cannot encompass no negation – it is full positivity – it knows no otherness

it is not subject to temporality

consciousness can be conscious of it as no longer being – because consciousness is temporal

the full positivity of being is re-formed on its giving way

it was and at present other beings are – that is all


being in itself is –

being can neither be derived from the possible – or reduced to the necessary

necessity concerns the connection between ideal propositions – but not that of existents

an existing being can never be derived from another existent qua existent – this is the contingency of being in itself

being-in-itself cannot be derived from possibility

the possible is a structure of the for itself – that is it belongs to the other region of being

being in itself is never possible or impossible – it is

uncreated – without reason for being – without any connection with another – being in itself is de trop for eternity

being is – being is in itself – being is what it is –


commentary:


(1) being-for-itself and being-in-itself


the distinction of being-for-itself – and being-in-itself -

reality is not divided

it is a unity – a singularity

the unity qua unity – the singularity – is the unknown

by viewing the conscious (being-for-itself) and the non-conscious (being-in- itself) as opposing modes of being –

Sartre loses the unity and singularity that is reality

the point is this idea of the opposition of being-for-itself and being-in-itself – leaves us without any unifying account of being

Sartre confuses being with dimension

he confuses the whole (of being) with its parts (the dimensions of internality and externality)

being-for-itself and being-in-itself are dimensions of a greater unity

and this greater unity – is unknown

apart from this the distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself is not genuine

it is if anything - poetic

the conscious and the non-conscious are dimensions of a unity

the internal and external dimensions

these dimensions do not exist for any reason

they simply exist as the relation that is human reality

internality does not exist for the outside world

the outside world does not exist independently of the internal


(2) the realistic conception


two regions of being – pre-reflexive cogito and the being of the phenomenon –

any action – any human action is like reality itself – a singularity

the fact that it has a dual aspect – an internal and external expression – does not entail separate and distinct regions of being –

it makes no sense to say the internal and the external dimension of anything – interact

to say that suggests a division or a separation

which denies the essential unity

and this undercuts the whole enterprise

leaves you with nothing

the idea that conscious acts on the non-conscious – or visa versa – is actually an illusion

Sartre calls it the realistic conception – and he is right here – it is realistic

it is characteristically what people think happens – it is their praxis

and it is not to be dismissed

it is an operational illusion


(3) being is the unknown


when Sartre says being-in-itself is neither passivity or activity – he is just saying being is unknown

but this of course is my view of the matter

Sartre wants to begin with something other than the unknown – something that has ‘something’ to it –

but it is an unnecessary complication –

to just say – the unknown - leaves the question completely open

to introduce being – compromises this purity – by saying – something is there

and when of course we ask – what is it? – we get back to where we began – the unknown

we do not need this merry-go-round of being


(4) consciousness and being-in-itself


affirmation and negation are actions of consciousness

consciousness – exists

it does not – it is true - exist out there in the external world –

the external dimension

consciousness exists as a dimension of reality – or being if you like

it is the internal dimension

it is distinguished in the first place by the fact that it is not observable

only the external is observable

consciousness – is the observing –

the observing that is unobserved

what Sartre call ‘being-in-itself’ is the external world – the world of matter

this being-in-itself does not include consciousness on his view

consciousness for Sartre is nothingness

now Sartre has got into this predicament because he has confused one dimension of reality with reality as a whole

this is exactly the same mistake the idealist and the materialist make

they confuse a dimension with the totality

consciousness is a reality - and on any reasonable understanding of the concept of being-in-itself – consciousness – like anything else that exists – would be included

in so far as being-in-itself is to be the totality – then it is the unknown


(5) self-reference and internality


that consciousness refers to itself – distinguishes it as - internal

self reference is the distinguishing characteristic of the internal dimension

the external dimension – is not – self-referential

that is it is not internal

- it is not conscious

being-in-itself is neither the internal or the external dimension

it is that which is the unity of the internal and the external

it is the unknown

the fact of self-reference is the fact of internality

that an entity – an existent – can refer to itself – signifies internality

the external is without the capacity for reference – and for self-reference

and it is this fact which characterizes the surface of things

as to the origin of this attribute of self-reference –

we have only consciousness (self-reference) as an analytical tool

consciousness can only assert its awareness of self-reference

and this is self reference – asserting self-reference

that is all we can have from consciousness is the expression of self-reference

there is nothing outside of consciousness that can function as a higher order consciousness – that could take human consciousness as its object – and give it an explanation

God – has been argued in this connection – or if he hasn’t he should have been –
just for the sake of the argument

but if there was such a God the explanation would only be good for him – of no value to us

so it still comes down to consciousness simply recognizing itself

that is the end of the penny section

beyond this – if you wish to go there – is the greater unknown


(6) being-for-itself


being-for-itself as being what it is not and not being what it is –

so we have a double contradiction – and the idea that we end up with nothingness –

this is a horrible misuse of logic

even on what I would call a conservative or standard view of contradiction – we have a logically false proposition – a proposition that is that is so constructed that it cannot be true –

my own view – as I argued in my work on Wittgenstein in the Skeptikos blog is that the contradiction as with the tautology is a useless propositional string that masquerades as a proposition

so however you regard the contradiction it is clear it does not signify

it is not that it signifies nothing

it simply does not signify –

consciousness is essentially different to non-consciousness

consciousness is internality

the non-conscious – externality

internality – consciousness is – if you like – the realm of self-reference

the external is the realm of non-reference

however you bag it up – consciousness is a reality – consciousness is in the world – consciousness is not some perverted logical contortion

again Sartre’s above characterization is more suggestive of poetry than logic

poetry runs in defiance of logic – that is its basis and its charm

and I think poetry is the language of the internal – in whatever artistic form you choose

however for Sartre – there is no internal

consciousness for Sartre exists – if you can say it exists – outside of being

this to my mind is taking poetry just a verse too far


(7) no such point of view


Sartre speaks of regions of being – the in-itself – the for-itself – as if he has an objectivity

an objectivity of the order of sub specie aeternitatis –

the point of view of eternity

there is no such point of view

the only point of view is that of consciousness

consciousness is aware of the fact that it is in the world –

it is not outside of the world – outside of being-in-itself

the outside of consciousness is the surface of things – the material world

it is rather simple

straightforward

the world as a unity – as it were before the division of dimensions – is unknown

it is the singularity we face front up and have to interpret and deal with

the deconstruction of the unity into dimensions enables us to do this

it gives us an operational dynamic

this deconstruction is necessary – it is essential as an operating basis for the human animal


(8) in conclusion - Spinoza


Sartre says being-in-itself is isolated – has no connection with itself – does not encompass negation – is full positivity – and is not temporal

for this re: Spinoza’s substance

Spinoza though not only had space for mind in his substance – he also had the manners to include it – or at least invite it to the party

for Sartre there is no mind – there is no consciousness – there is just the big nothing of being – which he calls being-in-itself – which includes everything that is not conscious

there is no place for mind in Sartre’s reality

and to relegate it to nothingness is the solution you have when you have no solution

he says the three characteristics of being-in-itself are – being is – being is in itself – being is what it is -

this is just an identity statement – x = x

what x is – if x is anything – is unknown


(9) postscript


what we face initially is the singularity - the essential unknown

this is the true pre-reflexive reality – it is pre cogito and pre-object

the first reflection which is a necessary primary functioning of the human animal – is the revelation of the internal and external domains of the totality

that is the awareness of awareness and the awareness of the object of awareness

the recognition of an internal and external dimension

this dimensional awareness is the operating domain of the human being

reflection on reflection reveals the internal unknown

reflection on the world outside reveals the external unknown

the unknowns of internality and externality are dimensional unknowns

action is a singularity

it is reaction to the unknown – the essential unknown and the dimensional unknowns

we act to defy this reality

our actions initiate internal categories and external practises

these primary functional bases are given in the organism

that is the need to act initiates the ‘knowledge’ of evolution

this always occurs in the context of the given reality of the entity – in the case of human beings ideational and physical contexts

that is we have thought patterns and physical capabilities to enable us to operate in the unknown as physically aware unities

these thought patterns and physical capabilities are functional stratagems

their only significance is their utility

what we make of the inside (mind) and the outside (matter) is the history of our action

the history of action is the history of illusion

our reactions are always at base reactions to the ever present unknown

it is at the heart of every human being –

it is the essence of human reality


TO BE CONTINUED


© greg. t. charlton. 2008.

Sartre 1e - the ontological proof

Sartre 1e

Being and nothingness: the pursuit of being.

V. The ontological proof.


the argument:


being has not been given its due – we thought we’d dispensed with granting the transphenomenality to the being of the phenomenon – by discovering the transphenomenality of consciousness

we see on the contrary that the transphenomenality of consciousness – requires thr transphenomenality of the being of the phenomenon

there is an ontological proof to be derived not from the reflective cogito but from the pre-reflective being of the percipiens


all consciousness is consciousness of something

we can take this two ways

either we understand that consciousness is constitutive of the being of its object

or consciousness is a relation to a transcendent being

the first view destroys itself – to be conscious of – is to be confronted with a concrete presence that is not consciousness

one can be conscious of an absence – but this appears as a pre-condition of presence

the subjectivity that is consciousness cannot go out of itself – to posit a transcendent object – such that it has a plenitude of impressions

if we wish to make the being of the phenomenon depend on consciousness – the object must be distinguished from consciousness – not by its presence – but by its absence – not by its plenitude – but by its nothingness

if being belongs to consciousness – the object is not conscious

not to the extent that it is another being – but that it is non-being


intentions aim at appearances which are never to be given at one time

it is an impossibility on principle for the terms of an infinite series to exist all at the same time before consciousness – along with the real absence of all these terms except for the one which is the foundation of objectivity

if present these impressions – even in an infinite number – would dissolve in the subjective

it is their absence which gives them objective being

thus the being of the object is pure non-being

it is defined as a lack

it is that which escapes – that which by definition will never be given – and that which offers itself only in fleeting and successive profiles


but how can non-being be the foundation of being?

how can the absent expected subjective become thereby the objective?

I may hope for a joy – I may dread a grief – that transcendence in immanence – does not bring us out of subjectivity

things give themselves in profile – that is simply by appearances

but each of them is a transcendent being – not a subjective material of impressions – a plenitude of being – not a lack – a presence not an absence

the objective will never come out of the subjective - nor the transcendent from immanence – nor being from non-being


consciousness is consciousness of something

this means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness

that consciousness is born supported by a being that is not itself

this is what we call the ontological proof

to say consciousness is consciousness of something – means that for consciousness there is no being outside of that precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of something – i.e. of a transcendent being

not only does pure subjectivity – fail to transcend itself to posit the objective – a ‘pure’ subjectivity – disappears

what can properly be called subjectivity is – consciousness of consciousness

but this consciousness of being conscious – must be qualified – and it can be qualified as a revealing intuition – or it is nothing

a revealing intuition implies something revealed

absolute subjectivity can be established only in the face of something revealed

immanence can be defined only within the apprehension of a transcendent

the point is that consciousness implies in its being a non-conscious and transphenomenal being

there is no point in replying that subjectivity implies objectivity

we have seen that the subjective is powerless to constitute the objective

to say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself as a revealed revelation – of a being which is not it – and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it


thus we have left pure appearance and arrived at pure being

consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence

and inversely it is consciousness of a being – whose essence implies its existence – that is in which appearance lays claim to being

being is everywhere

we do not apply to consciousness the definition Heidegger reserves for Dasein – and say that it is a being – such that in its being – its being is in question

it is necessary to complete the definition and formulate it like this –

consciousness is a being such that in its being – its being is in question – in so far as this being implies a being other than itself


this being is no other than the transphenomenal being of phenomena – and not a noumenal being which is hidden behind them

it is the being of this table - more generally the being of the world which is implied
by consciousness

it requires simply that the being of that which appears does not exist only in so far as it appears

the transphenomenal being of what exists for consciousness is itself in itself


Commentary:


(1) being


the point about being is that it is the essence of everything that exists – this is the idea

that is – it is the function of the concept – to be the essence of what exists

the issue of being only emerges – if we are looking for an essence –

i.e. that is a way of describing apparently irreconcilable categories of existence – in a way that unites them

‘being’ is a way of describing what is given in a non-differential manner

and – this – ‘what is given’?

what is this – if not that which has being?

what is given here is – the unknown – if you want to strip it all down

by unknown – I mean unknown in the purest of senses –

it is not to be confused with non-being

a way of saying it is this -

the unknown is the object of description –

it is that to which description applies – can apply

what I am saying here is that what is before us is just the world we live in –

but that this presentation is unknown until it is described

but more than this – any description of reality – be that of the man in the street or that of a metaphysician – is no more than a platform for action

it is a platform that has no foundation but the necessity to act

which itself can be described variously

I suppose I could be cheeky and say here – to be is to be described

the point being that the world in the absence of consciousness is unknownable

and if it was not for the fact of consciousness – it would be so eternally –

on my view this means it would not appear


(2) where we begin


always it is a question of where to begin – for the beginning of thought can determine its end

Descartes begins with consciousness – Hobbes and the Materialists begin with the non-conscious

so history of the subject has largely been determined by where one starts

Sartre begins with consciousness – and immediately states a problem -

is consciousness thus constitutive of the being of its object – or is it that consciousness is a relation to a transcendent being?

the notion of being I would argue is misused by Sartre in this argument

consciousness and its object exist – or to put it another way - we cannot begin to speak of either or both – unless this is assumed

unless that is the ground of discussion is already established

and this just is the function of the idea of being – to enable the issue of the relation of the categories of being to proceed

being is this ground - is this commonality that enables the matter to be addressed

that is to say – being is never in issue – or as Sartre says –‘being is everywhere’

ok

Sartre’s own arguments here point in this direction

he says – ‘to be conscious of is to be confronted with a concrete presence that is not conscious’ – ‘the subjectivity that is consciousness cannot go out of itself’

so – if you place the cart before the horse – try that is to bring being about by one of its categories – you will not succeed

you will not be able to show how matter comes from mind or mind from matter – if your idea is that mind and matter are essentially different

to assume that they are essentially different – or even that they are the same - you must already have assumed their being

being cannot be the result of any question of their relation

you can also say that the notion of being – which is essential to the issue even proceeding – must establish an essential unity

and if so – what then is the question?

that is if there is a metaphysical homogeneity – in being – what then is the question?

the question clearly is to account for the apparent difference of the categories of being

and here it is crucial to get the next question right

are we in addressing the issue of difference asking about substance?

this has been the standard view of the argument for both Idealists and Materialists

the idea being we have two fundamentally different substances – mind and matter – how do they relate?

well the question is in fact answered in its formulation –

fundamentally different things only relate as fundamentally different – as separate and apart

end of story – the credits are rolling

Spinoza was the smartest of the lot in relation to this question –

he saw where the answer lay – or the kind of answer that is possible

mind and matter can only relate in a positive sense – if they are expressions of a more fundamental reality

this reality for Spinoza was – substance

this substance was for Spinoza – that which is self-caused – eternal and infinite

ok

brilliant move on an intractable issue

unfortunately – it doesn’t work

for even if we hold to an underlying unity – that of substance – still the question of how different things relate – is still live – is still to be addressed

and the problem is not in the question in itself – but in the terms in which it is couched

different substances will remain different and apart

so – my argument is forget about substance

that is to say substance is not going to be the ground on which this matter can be addressed – let alone resolved

that is the issue is not substance

we need to look at it differently and look at it again –

it’s a question always of definition

what is it that we are trying to explain?

how are we to best describe the issue?

substance doesn’t work – what are the options?

there is as I can see only one –

we need to think in terms of dimensions - not of substances

things fall into place here

clearly consciousness is internal

internal that is to that which is outside of it

the material world as the external world – is outside of consciousness

my view is that that the unity that is reality is as unity - unknown

the distinction between internal external dimensions – really is just a means of enabling us to ‘know’ this unity

that is given this distinction we have a means of dealing with the unknown – we have that is categories that enable us to act in the manner necessary to our nature

so I get back to the question of where you begin

if you begin in terms of the categories of reality – how do you ever get to the underlying unity?

on the other hand to start with reality as a whole – as a unity – as a totality – as the unknown

may seem to be to begin with nothing – but it is really to begin at the begine

the key is reflection

in the moment of reflection we recognize – the fact of reflection – which is consciousness – and by implication the object of consciousness – which Sartre correctly notes – is not conscious

these are the natural existential categories of our nature

they enable us to distinguish what is internal and what is external

the common reality that is expressed in these dimensions is only expressed in these dimensions

in itself it is unknown

real – very real – but unknown

when we face reality first up head on – we face the unknown

our natural and necessary reaction or – if you like metaphysical reflex – is to recognize that we experience this reality in terms of its dimensions

consciousness and non-consciousness are thus – from this point of view - derivations of and from the unknown

they are natural derivations

what happens in the world happens on the level of unity

we break it down – we deal with the events of the world – in terms of their internal and external manifestations

there is no question here of interaction

the internal does not interact with the external or visa versa

internality and externality are the dimensions of metaphysical space for human beings

whatever occurs – that is the unknown event – is ‘known’ in terms of its internal and external manifestations

this is how we operate

this is our reality


(3) intention


any internal act of consciousness will have an external expression

as consciousness being in the world is forever affected by the world

so any event will – for the conscious human being – have an external and internal expression

this is not say though that all events on the surface will immediately register internally

that all knowledge is immediate or direct

i.e what we learn about the body from the physician – is not direct

on the other hand the reason for his knowledge for his explanation – i.e. a physical pain – is direct

in that way – in terms of science – the external world becomes known – is internalized

consciousness as internality ‘looks out’

that is it relates directly to externality

this is really what intention comes to

the relation of the internal to the external

that is – as it were from the point of view of the internal

the action of the internal is outward –

and that is just because it is inside

there is nothing else for the internal to relate to

this is really a logical relation

the relation of dimensions

to call it intentional

is to ‘take the point of view of the internal’

and to see the external as its object

the opposite in a way is also true

from ‘the point of the external world’

given the fact of consciousness

the object of the external is the internal

thus – you could just as easily say

the non-conscious is intentional

that is in relation to consciousness

again it’s a question of where you begin your analysis

from the point of view of the event in itself – there is just expression – in dimensions - and no intention

(there is no actual non-conscious ‘point of view’)

from the point of view of consciousness

and this is the natural point of view in an operational sense

the point of consciousness is outside itself

so

intention is really just an internal – an ‘in-house’ description of conscious action

it is strictly speaking an operational view of consciousness

consciousness in itself as it were – or in a non-operational sense is not intentional

it is simply the internal space of a two dimensional reality


(4) non-being


just as consciousness does not create non-consciousness – and non-consciousness does not bring into being consciousness –

the application of the negation sign ‘~’ does not create non-being

if as I have put it being is the ground of discourse – then any action to negate being can only mean the decision to end discourse

shut down the shop

this is the only sense you can make of it

while we can here make intelligible the application of the negation sign to being

it is clear that it is an application that is of no use at all

therefore of no value

unless of course your idea is logical suicide

perhaps there have been philosophers who have toyed with this

it may have crossed Wittgenstein’s mind

and it's not inconsistent with some mystical thinking

anyway

the point is in logical terms that the negation sign only validly functions given a platform of discourse

to apply it in such a way that it denies its own platform of discourse is clearly an illogical use

Sartre recognizes at least that non-being does not come from being

my point is more comprehensive

the idea of non-being is a contradiction – a logical absurdity

what it amounts to is saying there is a discourse (non-being) – that has no basis in discourse

if you define being in terms of its categories or one of its categories - and not the other way around - you have to account for a dichotomy – in this case consciousness and non-consciousness

on such an analysis – something has being and something doesn’t

this is Sartre’s big mistake – consciousness and non-consciousness are dimensions of being

there is no question that one has being and the other doesn’t

to explain the dichotomy you can only really state the obvious

one dimension is conscious the other not

I go further and characterize this in ontological terms – as the relation between the internal and the external

my argument is that these are operational categories – whose function is dealing with the unknown

the unknown makes sense – non-being does not


(5) the ontological argument


Sartre says – that consciousness is supported by a being that is not itself – is the ontological argument

on the contrary I say

the ontological argument is that consciousness and non-consciousness are ontological dimensions of a single unknown reality

this is the ontology of consciousness

Sartre mistakes being – for dimensions of being

being if you like is the whole – dimensions are its parts

to identify one dimension as being – is to confuse the part with the whole

this leads to the postulation of the absurd notion of non-being

for how else on this analysis are you to account for the other term in the relation?

he thinks we are talking about different beings – or being and non-being - when in fact it is different dimensions of being

even different aspects if you like

furthermore consciousness is not ‘supported’

consciousness is inside the externality that is the world (outside of consciousness)

there really is no question of support

Sartre says what can properly be called subjectivity is consciousness of consciousness and he describes this as a revealing intuition – and that consciousness implies in its being a non-conscious transphenomenal being

yes this is true if you understand by being here – dimensions of being

the external world is reflected in consciousness

and consciousness reflects on to the external world

it is not consciousness producing in itself a being it is not

this is just garbage

the internal is essentially a different dimension to the external

reality in this sense has two expressions - two modes

two ways of being

two ways of being - that is given the reality of consciousness in the world

as to this – as I have said consciousness is not aware of its origin – or the origin of external world

origin (as with end) is a matter that is properly understood as in the realm of the unknown

Sartre says –

the being of the world is implied by consciousness – and it requires that the being of that which appears does not exist only in so far as it appears

the being of the world is not implied by consciousness

the being of the world – if understood by this - the unity that is reality - is not implied by anything

there is nothing else for it to be an implication of

to use Spinoza's argument regarding the nature of substance -

the world only implies everything – and in that of course the implication is lost

consciousness is aware of itself as internality

it follows as a matter of logic that the internal is internal to the external

therefore the object of consciousness

and therefore the object of consciousness as a dimension

in itself – unknown

unknown that is until the relation consciousness and non-consciousness is operative

it is the operation of the relation that creates the illusion of knowledge – and therefore the means of action

the internal dimension exists for no reason

its existence is not for – the external world

just as the external world does not exist for the internal

the is no end (in view) for existence

what we have with conscious beings is their operation in the world

the action

there is a logic to this action

it is the relation of the internal to the external – or the external to the internal

it is the playing out of this

the playing out of this is human reality

action in itself is unknown

we interpret it in terms of its internal and external expressions

this is the energy of being


(c) greg. t. charlton 2008.