Hegel: consciousness
These notes were originally published in the book 'Skeptikos III' by greg t charlton.
ISBN: 9780975158371. 2007. (c) killer press.
In this blog version there have been some minor revisions and edits to the original text.
Note: the numbers in these posts (90 -165) refer to the numbered sections of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Miller. Oxford. 1977.
In what follows I will present Hegel's argument and follow it with my own commentary.
A. CONSCIOUSNESS.
I. SENSE CERTAINTY: OR THE 'THIS' AND 'MEANING' (MEINEN).
90.
ARGUMENT:
the immediate object is immediate knowledge
a knowledge of the immediate is knowledge of what is
our approach to the object must be immediate or receptive
we must alter nothing in the object as it presents
in apprehending we must refrain from comprehending
COMMENTARY:
the immediate object is only immediate knowledge on reflection
just quickly what this tells us is that there is no immediate knowledge
is there nevertheless an immediate object?
yes - but it can only be described - on reflection
outside of reflection - or prior to it - it is unknown
Hegel wants to say knowledge is the immediate object of knowledge
on the face of it this is to say knowledge is its own object
but again this can only be on reflection
and reflection is not immediate
the immediate is non-reflective
and for that reason unknown
I would be happy with the idea that knowledge is the reflective object of
knowing
we do reflect on what we know
but outside of this is what is not known
the unknown is thus the object of knowledge
the immediate object of knowledge is the unknown
it is immediate - because it is unknown
to suggest that knowledge is its immediate object
is to confuse subject and object
and further it is to fail to provide a reason for knowledge
Hegel says a knowledge of the immediate is a knowledge of what is
if so
what is - is unknown - that which is not known
you could go from here to suggesting that the point of knowledge is just to
give characterisation of the unknown
that knowledge is the mind's response to what is not known
it is to suggest that what is - is greater than what is known
on Hegel's view the two are equivalent
I argue that knowledge is human consciousness' strategy for dealing with what
is not known
it is the organism's fundamental response to its context - its environment -
the world
it is in my view a form of action
Hegel says our approach to the object must be immediate - we must alter nothing
in the object as it presents
I just say to this any response to the object (however you wish to define this)
will always be reflective - non-immediate
how can you ever establish what the 'object' is prior to this approach?
can you know if you do not alter it?
could not the act of reflection itself transform the object?
the point is we don't know
what we have is what is reflected
and our purposes determine how we describe this
the presentation is completely and utterly contingent
its definition - the presentation is a matter of reflection
outside of this - outside of reflection - the presentation is pure
it is - that is - unknown
to know just simply is to alter the object of knowledge
the immediate object of knowledge is the unknown
there is no immediate knowledge - all knowledge is reflective
what we can say from this is that reality is immediate -
but in it's immediacy - not known
I would argue too that knowledge and the unknown are categories of existence
that existence is not exhausted by either category
though you can say - what exists is what is known and what is unknown
it can be described by this conjunction
and yes - it is a matter of logic
x and -x
the point being existence is logical possibility
this is the best we can say
91.
ARGUMENT:
there appears to be no bounds to sense knowledge
sense-certainty appears to be the truest kind of knowledge for it corresponds completely with its object
this certainty the poorest of truth - in the end it amounts only to an
existential statement
consciousness' certainty here is just the 'I'
and the I in this sense certainty a pure 'This' as is the object
I this particular I is certain of this particular thing
neither I or the thing has the significance of a complex process of mediation
the 'I' does not have the significance of a manifold imagining or thinking
nor does the thing signify something that has a host of qualities
the thing is merely because it is
it is - this is the essential point of sense knowledge
pure being or simple immediacy constitutes its truth
certainty as a connection is an immediate pure connection
consciousness is a pure 'This'
the singular consciousness knows a pure 'This', or the single term
COMMENTARY:
what is given (in 'sense certainty') is prior to reflection - prior to analysis
of even the most primitive or basic kind - and is hence without description
reflection enables characterization
it is on reflection that the description of 'sense certainty' is given
you could here say, 'well what other description is possible' - this is I think
what is behind Hegel's argument
the idea being - there really is no question here at all - it is just a matter
of realisation - of seeing what is before your eyes so to speak
what I say here is that 'seeing what is before your eyes' is just what
reflection gives
the immediacy of the experience is the unknown
knowledge is not given
and not even given in the act of consciousness per se
it is an act of consciousness -
that is an act upon the unknown
and further we need to understand the 'immediacy' is a category of description
it is an account of - what is given
Hegel says of consciousness - consciousness is 'I' - nothing more
and the fact is - his 'nothing more' - just is no more than nothing
and this is the problem
the consciousness is 'I' argument is a theory of consciousness - it is a
description
now there is the fact of consciousness -
but it is strictly speaking an open fact -
which is to say we do not 'know' what consciousness is prior to reflection on
it - on it and its relations
my 'it' here or Hegel's 'I' are dummy terms whose function is to signify or
point to an as yet unknown - undescribed entity
even 'entity' here is just a functional term
what all this amounts to is that there is no certainty - far from it -
everything in an epistemological sense is in suspension
if by a pure 'This' Hegel is referring to consciousness as a pure unknown - OK
it also has the sense of just a logical sign
a sign that is that signifies but is without content
from a logical - and epistemological point of view - this is a good start
consciousness you might joke is left intact
92.
ARGUMENT:
pure being constitutes the essence of sense certainty
actual sense certainty is not merely this pure immediacy but an instance of it
in sense certainty pure being splits up into the two 'Thises' - the 'I' and the
object
when we reflect we see that neither are only immediately present in sense
certainty -
but each is mediated - I have this certainty through the thing - and the thing
is in sense certainty through the 'I'
COMMENTARY:
pure being - OK - so what would count as impure?
this is not a frivolous question -
I would suggest that anything that exists is pure being
Hegel thinks by the adjective 'pure' - he can slip in 'certainty'
(what is not certain is not pure being?)
at the very least certainty is a conception - an epistemological conception -
that is a construction of consciousness
designed to deal with the issue of the nature of knowledge
a tree in a field is neither certain or uncertain
it does not possess epistemological attributes
pure being is what in a logical sense? - that to be described
this is the best I can make of it
bearing in mind that the idea of any entity as an object of consciousness
without any description - is just a logical fantasy
the question of appropriate description is though quite real
Hegel wants also to say the sense certainty is an instance of pure being
well this I can agree with
but not for the same reasons Hegel would advance
rather because any phenomena is an instance of what Hegel calls pure being
i.e. anything that exists - exists
he goes on to argue that in sense certainty pure being splits into two -
the 'I' and the object -
consciousness and its object
or as I would put it - the world - reality - 'pure being' - given the existence
of consciousness - is best understood as two dimensional
consciousness brings internality to the world
that outside of consciousness - the 'outside world' - is externality
understood this way - the relation between the conscious and the non-conscious is dimensional
both are dimensions of the one reality
I put that we only understand reality as such in terms of these two dimensions
but enough about me
back to Hegel -
he is trying to explain or account for certainty -
and he says that the I has its certainty through the object
and further that the object is - in sense certainty because of the I
firstly - the I having certainty through the object -
awareness is a state - a relational state
it is a relation between the I and the object
'the' relation in fact -
it is no more than a simple fact - what Hegel calls pure being
are we to say this is certainty?
if so it is an empty fact
for all the questions that come with awareness - are contained in the relation
of the I and the object
and strictly speaking the relation itself can be in question - as it is in the
case of illusion - delusion or even dream states
certainty if the concept makes any sense is a reflective / epistemological
notion
it is not what is experienced
what is experienced is prior to reflection - unknown
as to the second part here - the object is in sense certainty because of the I
-
yes - but this is just to say the object becomes an object of awareness
an object of consciousness
this really is a contingency - a happening
there is no certainty in the relation
the relation of I and object is a relation of possibility
and I would say the experience of the relation is not certainty
the experience demands definition and explanation
and is thus the experience of uncertainty
93.
ARGUMENT:
in sense certainty the object is immediate being or essence
the I - a knowing - knows the object only because the object is - while the
knowing may or may not be
the object is true - or essence - it is - regardless of whether it is known or
not
whereas there is no knowledge if the object is not there
COMMENTARY:
yes the knowing may or may not be there - in particularity -
but are we to say that consciousness is not an essential dimension of reality?
really who is to know the answer here?
as Hegel would be well aware - Spinoza for one argued that consciousness is an essential attribute of reality -
we can also put the question - is the material world essential?
this too is not a matter beyond question re: George Berkeley
and in a pure Idealist reality there is no object - only subject -
just another point -
my point is - that there is an internality that consciousness is aware of -
quite independently of the external world
now granted this internality is not describable in external terminology -
nevertheless it is real and can be given characterization - in art and poetry
i.e. -
anyway his main point has to do with essence -
what is essential?
can we say existence is essential and that any thing that does exist
participates in and is an expression of that essence?
OK - if so essence is no great shakes - you can't avoid it - there is nothing
else
and on such an argument every form of existence - is essential
my point is that the essentialist argument tells us nothing
it's of no use -
granted particular consciousnesses may or may not exist
and all particular forms of non-conscious reality - may or may not exist
as to the ground of all this - existence in itself - or essence - or pure being
the fact is it is the unknown - it is 'the' unknown
94.
ARGUMENT:
the question - is the object presented in sense certainty the kind of essence
sense certainty proclaims
we are only to consider it in the way it presents
COMMENTARY:
the idea of pure presentation - basic - unanalysable facts - essence - is
understandable
the thing is we can only know what we know
the object as presented is known as presented
how this object is described - evaluated - analysed etc. - is a reflective
issue
but what of the presentation in itself?
'presentation' is may be the closest we get to a 'value free' account
the object is present to consciousness
we have here a statement of relation
and the relata - consciousness and the object are left undefined - un-described
they are as it were logical terms - just denoting that x is related to y
the relation of presentation - for it to make sense -
must have some content -
that which is presented (the object) is 'presentable' to that which can receive
a presentation (consciousness)
the point is any statement here - on the relation or on the relata - will raise
more questions than it answers
and the final truth of all of this is that there is no end to this questioning
except by fiat - convention or practice
but in a logical sense the object of knowledge (the unknown) is never exhausted
by consciousness (knowing)
the overall point is that the way it presents - what it is that presents - and
what it is presented to
the presentation in short -
is the open question
95.
ARGUMENT:
if we ask 'what is This?' - in the twofold shape of its being as 'Now' and
'Here' - the answer is 'This' itself is
to the question - 'what is now?' - if we answer e.g. 'Now is night' - write
this down and the read it when now is noon - we will say it has become stale
COMMENTARY:
to the question 'what is this?' - yes we can say - 'This' itself is -
the point is there is no real elucidation here
to answer with 'here' and 'now' - is just to expand the meaning of 'this' - to
introduce into it categories of space and time -
the real point is that the essence is unknowable
one way of putting it is to say it cannot be located in space / time
the categories of space and time - are of no use to a discussion of essence
best to drop essence and keep your bearings
96.
ARGUMENT:
a paper with 'now is night' is written on it is preserved as something that is
the now preserves itself as something that is not night or day
it is a negative in general
the now is something that night and day is not
it is not in the least affected by what it is not
it is through negation neither this nor that - the universal
and it is the universal that is the true content of sense certainty
COMMENTARY:
Hegel says the now preserves itself as something that is not day or night
that is - it is not a contingent reality or concept
that it is a negative in general
he says a simple thing of this kind - is neither this nor that - that is it has
no contingent content
it is his argument that such a thing that is neither this nor that - that is
non-contingent - is the universal
and he says that it is the universal that is the true content of
sense-certainty
what this amounts to in my view is that sense-certainty has no content
the real problem with Hegel's argument is that he thinks negation signifies
in my view when a proposition is negated it is marked as non-operational - that
is it is
marked as not useful -
the point is in general that to negate a proposition does not signify or point
to an alternative reality - a negative reality
a consequence of Hegel's confused logic is that he cannot establish the
universal - as anything other than what the 'world is not'
and the fact of it is there is no content to such a reality
97.
ARGUMENT:
we utter the universal in any sensuous content - i.e. the universal 'this'
we do not envisage the universal or being in general - but we utter the universal
we do not say in sense certainty what we mean to say - but language is more
truthful
it is not possible to say or express in words - as a sensuous being - that we
mean
COMMENTARY:
when I say 'this is red' - what 'this' is - is not defined
the statement - from a purely semantic point of view leaves 'this' as an
unknown
we have no grounds to give it the status of a universal
but the point is that the statement's meaning is not just a semantic issue
in the face of such a statement - if you see what the speaker is pointing to
you will understand the truth (or falsity) of the statement
outside of any context - just the bald statement as it were - the statement is
virtually - or practically - meaningless
while we may understand the words and their relationship in the statement -
short of being there or receiving some further explanation we cannot give or withhold
assent
what the statement refers to 'in itself' - is unknown
the problem of meaning is the problem of definition
language is a means of giving definition
and whether or not a statement actually means what you say depends on where you draw the line on definition
it could be argued that to explain any single event - you need to explain the
totality
be that as it may in a logical sense in practice no-one does this in making
statements about the world
we know that definition has its limits
these limits are set really by the circumstances in which we operate
98.
ARGUMENT:
the same is true with the other form of the 'This' - with 'Here'
'here is the tree' - if I turn around this truth has vanished and converted
into its opposite - no tree is here but a house instead
'here' itself does not vanish
therefore the 'this' shows itself as a mediated simplicity or a universality
COMMENTARY:
'here' is an indeterminate reference to space
when we are asked to find a position on a map - we might say 'here' if
simultaneously we place our finger on the map in the act of showing - however given the whole
point of maps it is more likely that we will give co-ordinates - that is 'here' will
be given a geometric characterisation - and this will be regarded as a representation of
the actual 'here'
'here' - without definition is a term that has an unknown reference - but it is
a term that we use as an unknown reference to space - so it has character
in language we have template terms - the function of which is to direct our
attention to a category of our understanding of the world
Hegel's mistake here is the idea that all terms refer to an existing state of
affairs or being
language is not just a simple matter of word and object
terms such as 'here' and 'now' are initial characterisations of the unknown -
primitive or naive characterisations
the point about meaning is that it is unknown
we structure and give form and content to this unknown
language is the principle means of this
and 'the making of meaning' is itself without foundation
it is just what self-conscious entities do
it is fair to say the making of meaning is without meaning
there is no natural or logical end to such
what we call meaning (as a finished product so to speak) is just the decision
to stop at some point in the process
the point is always perceived utility
and that point is of course always open to question
99.
ARGUMENT:
pure being is the essence of sense certainty
sense certainty has demonstrated that the truth of its object is the universal
pure being is not immediacy - it is that which mediation and negation are
essential to
it is not what we mean by being - but is rather being defined as an abstraction
- or as the pure universal
our meaning is not the universal - but is what is left over from this empty or indifferent here and now
COMMENTARY:
pure being is that which is unknown - and is thus the source of any knowledge
knowledge is our fundamental response to the unknown
the object of knowledge is the unknown - what else could it be?
Hegel's idea of pure being as an abstraction - amounts to saying that he has
adopted a definition of 'pure being' or essence
what I say is that any such approach to what is fundamental (whatever that is -
or however it is described) - is a failure
abstractions of any kind are (like anything else for that matter) aspects of
being
and aspects of being cannot be the essence of being - this is what is
essentially wrong with Hegel's argument
my point in general is that the pursuit of essence is (and partly for the
reason just given) pointless -
logically speaking all that can underlie all that is known - is the unknown
I don't call this essence - and unlike Hegel I am not going to say some
particular knowledge is essence
100.
ARGUMENT:
the relation in which knowing and the object was first presented is now
reversed
the object which was regarded as essential is now unessential
for the universal which the object has come to be is no longer what the object
was
certainty is now to be found in the opposite element - knowing
its truth is in the object as my object - and its being - mine
it is because I know it
sense certainty is in the 'I'
COMMENTARY:
the object is outside of my consciousness
and the object is inside my consciousness
the object exists as a duality -
it exists as a dimensional duality - inside and out
outside of this dimensional analysis what can we say of the object - of the
object in itself?
from such a point of view we can only say we do not know
the essence of the object if you like - as that which is beyond dimensions in
some sense - is not knowable
the thing in itself is not known
we assume a correspondence between the internal presentation and the external
reality
(the object regarded as just an external thing has no qualities - it can only
be known in formal - mathematical or logical terms
nevertheless it is the logical instance on which we hang our conscious characterisations)
so - at the heart of conscious apprehension is the unity of dimensions - we are
talking about one thing - that has two dimensions - the unity that is appearance
and its appearance is its existence - its being
what I know is what appears - there is no certainty at all in this
appearance is neither certain nor uncertain -
it simply is
certainty is a construction of thought - that serves certain purposes -
primarily organisational -
we look for a certain premise in order to base our conclusions
it is just a way of organizing thought for action
in this sense certainty is a proposed standard of construction
it has no logical basis - but nevertheless we often choose to assume it for
practical matters
the only sense of certainty is pragmatic
we have more luck in life I would suggest by operating with uncertainty
if you close off avenues of thought and action (via the stratagem of certainty)
you are more likely to get stuck
101.
ARGUMENT:
what does experience tell us about its reality in the 'I'?
the force of its truth lies in the immediacy of the experience
the I holds the single now and here fast
I, this 'I' sees the tree and asserts that 'Here' is a tree - but another 'I'
sees the house and maintains that 'Here' is not a tree but a house instead
both truths have the same authentication - immediacy of seeing - the certainty
that both have about their knowing
but the one truth vanishes in the other
COMMENTARY:
what is clear here is that immediacy is no ground for knowledge
and further that 'knowledge' is not grounded in sense certainty (for this on
Hegel's argument is an illusion) - but rather - uncertainty
firstly
what immediacy points to is the unknown - it is an epistemological portal
what is immediate vanishes - but immediacy itself is never gone
thus the contents of the immediate can never be held - and as result can never
be known
this should make it clear that if immediate knowledge is our goal - the goal
can never
be reached
if on the other hand we give up on the idea of knowledge as being immediate -
we have a show at giving the concept of knowledge some significance
at the very least we know knowledge cannot be immediate - if it is anything it
is not immediate
secondly
the 'I' is in fact never known - it is the ground of un-knowing
what I am at any point of space and time is not what or who I am
I am always more than the moment of my being - the moment of I -
so the moment is never I
the moment of I always points to the unknown
the unknown is the I
102.
ARGUMENT:
what does not disappear is the universal 'I' - whose seeing is neither the tree
nor the house
the 'I' is a universal like 'here' 'now' and 'this'
when science is faced i.e. with the task of finding the particular that the
universal refers to - it is impossible to say
COMMENTARY:
consciousness exists as the internal dimension of a two dimensional
manifestation
consciousness does not appear -
but appearance is only possible given the existence of consciousness
the external dimension - is the appearance to consciousness
it is what is outside consciousness
and is therefore what appears to consciousness - again because of the fact of consciousness
the particular consciousness - the I - exists in particular forms of existence
the persistence of consciousness through time is simply a function of the
organism (that has an internal dimension)
it is in such a case an internal function
no different in essence to the external functions of the entity - in that it is
simply function
persistence in space and time is just what existence (of anything) is
the 'I" does not exist as a mediated reality - a universal - as Hegel
would put it -
such is just a theoretical construction designed to explain phenomena
once you understand that what we are dealing with in existing phenomena - and existing conscious and self-conscious phenomena is function - the need to
create theoretical entities such as 'universals' is shown to be unnecessary and
irrelevant -and of no real value because such constructions actually lead us away from
the facts
of existing things and states - they are in a sense alienating - strange
aversions to reality
the sense of 'I' that I have as that which is more than any particular
experience of the I (what Hegel calls the universal) - is the functioning of
consciousness
in plain terms it is just the way the thing (consciousness) works - and yes as
with every other function of the entity - as conscious entities we can ask - how are
we to explain this function?
how are we - that is to explain consciousness?
well firstly what we are talking about here - and as far as I can see Hegel
hasn't recognised this - is self-consciousness
the function of consciousness that enables consciousness to hold itself as an
object -
and this is essentially what the self amounts to - the reflective capacity of consciousness
in truth we have no explanation of this - only the fact - the bald fact if you
like - of it
it is to put it crudely the way the thing works
it is how internality functions
any metaphysical theory that addresses the nature of this - attempts some
explanation is of interest
it is of interest because it is the kind of question that we ask
and Hegel's theory is no exception here
the fact of it is though - we have no way of seeing outside of the world to
have what you might call an objective view of what goes on - in consciousness and in
relation to its object
Spinoza in response to this problem proposed the sub specie aeternitatis
concept
a pretty idea - yes - but there is no such point of view -
there is no sense in speaking of a point of view - that would have to be
outside of existence - in order to see it 'objectively'
my argument would be that there are certain existing forms that are two dimensional
they have an inside and an outside - the inside is - internality is -
consciousness -
the external world is the world outside of this internality - it is the
physical / material world
the relation between the two is not a relation of substances - rather
dimensions -
the relation of inside to outside - a dimensional relation
and you can ask does it make any sense to ask the question 'how does the inside
of something 'interact' with its outside?'
the answer is no
the entity as a unity simply functions
103.
ARGUMENT:
sense certainty knows its essence is neither in the object or in the 'I'
and that its immediacy is neither the immediacy of one or the other
for in both what I mean is something unessential
the object and the 'I' are the universal in which 'Now' and 'Here' and 'I' - do
not have continuing being - or are not
we have to posit the whole of sense certainty as its essence and not one of its
moments
it is thus sense certainty as a whole that stands firm within itself as immediacy
- and by so doing excludes from itself all opposition hitherto obtained
COMMENTARY:
firstly -
the simple fact of it is that Hegel has given the unknown a name - the
universal
and yes it is true that the unknown has a reality deeper or more comprehensive
than the known
Hegel though really argues it is a known - not directly known - but
analytically / theoretically known
as a matter of fact he is wrong here about the unknown - it is directly
apprehended – in every human act
Hegel's universal is an attempt to give what is unknown the status of essential knowledge
when all it is - is essentially what is not known
his theory of the universal is really just a result - or a reaction to the
shock - the horror - the anguish of finding there is nothing that we can say
about reality other than what we are presented with
the need - the desire to find an underpinning - a foundation to existence - is consciousness reflecting on consciousness and finding - nothing else - beside
its awareness of its self and its object
Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to avoid the harsh reality of consciousness in
the world
it is perfectly understandable to wish to do this
the problem is that philosophically - you never do -
i.e. - the proposal of universals - just like the issue of immediacy it is
designed to solve - will be victim to the same problem
the problem of its (the universal's) foundation and basis -
the great advantage of skepticism here is its simplicity and its avoidance of
deception
this comes at a cost - at least initially - there appears to be no comfort
gained
secondly
to Hegel's - 'what I mean is something unessential' -
here lies the true 'essence' of things - of existence - that it is just what it
is and without underpinning - without explanation -
this is why we can breathe
thirdly
the unknown presents in consciousness and in consciousness' relation to its
object
what we experience in thought and action will lead us to question the nature of consciousness and the nature of its object
we are presented always with the unknown
our responses to it are our means theoretical and practical - of negotiating
this space
yes we reify our conceptions (universals gods atoms - whatever) - but all they
are in the end is stratagems for negotiating our way in what we do not know
fourthly
Hegel's argument that the whole of sense certainty stands firm within itself -
and not any of its moments - can only sensibly mean that the ground on which all our activities take place is the unknown
104.
ARGUMENT:
sense-certainty as a whole stands firm in itself as immediacy
its truth preserves itself as a relation that remains self-identical and makes
no distinction between the essential and the non-essential
I take no notice of the fact that another 'I' sees the Here as not a tree - or
that I myself at another time take the Here as not-tree, the Now as not-day
on the contrary I am a pure act of intuiting
I do not compare Here and Now themselves with one another - but stick firmly to
one immediate relation - the Now is day
COMMENTARY:
consciousness moves in relation to its object
it is no surprise therefore that the object has no permanence in consciousness
and as we cannot 'see' outside of consciousness
we cannot establish the non-conscious nature of the object of consciousness
we understand there is an external dimension - and therefore its 'inhabitants'
are not internal - they are of a different dimension
consciousness is though the means of knowing
so our understanding of the external is consciousness dependent
out of this - if we are to speculate on the nature of the object in itself - we
can only - and as a matter of logic - recognize it as that which is unknown
if an entity has an internality it is conscious - if it has an internality - it
necessarily has an external dimension
the internal exists in the external
the external and the internal are therefore two dimensions of the one thing
in a logical sense we can understand the internal as basically a reflection of
the external
we can say what we apprehend in consciousness is the truth of that which is
outside of consciousness
but if so - it is a truth we can never be certain of
it is an uncertain truth
105.
ARGUMENT:
since this certainty no longer comes to us when we direct its attention to a
Now that is night or an 'I' to whom it is night -
we will approach it - and let ourselves point to it
for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of this 'I'
were we to examine this truth afterwards - it would lose its significance
entirely
we must make ourselves into the singular 'I' - which is the one who knows with certainty
COMMENTARY:
this singular 'I' - which 'knows with certainty' is an illusion -
this particularity is immediate - but there is no certainty in this immediacy
the epistemological status of this immediacy is at the very least an open
question - hardly a matter of certainty
what I will put is that the immediate is unknown
the argument is simple really -
any 'knowledge' is reflective - and therefore by definition non-immediate
that which is immediate is therefore (by definition) - unknown
and what this amounts to is that experience - or what Hegel calls
sense-certainty - is unknown
this does not in any way take away from its reality - experience is indeed real
- but it is as immediate experience unknown
and it is for this reason that we reflect on it
'certainty' in epistemological terms is certainly (excuse the pun) not
immediate -
it is a conclusion of an epistemological argument regarding status
in so far as I operate in immediacy I operate in the unknown
philosophers might have trouble getting this - lovers never have
it is also clear from what Hegel has said above that I choose my 'I'
i.e. I can place myself in an immediacy and operate from there -
this is to operate in the pure unknown
on the other hand I may take a reflective stance - a non-immediate position and
thus operate in a theoretical or explanatory mode
what is clear is that the 'I' that makes these choices is an 'I' that is
neither of these choices
that is no choice -
this 'I' - the underlying 'I' is simply the ground of choice in a logical sense
and so I would say it is best to regard the self as a 'logical place'
its reality is logical - which is to say - functional
pure function
106.
ARGUMENT:
the Now pointed has ceased to be in the pointing
the Now that is - is another
and so Now is just this - no more than just when it is
the Now that is pointed to has been - it has not the truth of being
'has been' is not an essence that is - it is not
it is with being we are concerned
COMMENTARY
we can mark a moment with a name - i.e. - 'this is red'
but the marker - as a mark persists - beyond the moment
if its reference is just to the moment - in the next moment it will not be true
for the statement to have meaning beyond its utterance - and this you might
argue is indeed the whole point of the mark - of the marking - it must be understood in
a non-momentary sense -
my 'moment' here is Hegel's 'immediate'
language thus we can say does not refer to the moment - to the immediate
the act of language as in utterance is immediate
the point of language as a marker is just that it is not immediate
so all this raises the question of reference -
if 'this is red' - does not refer to the content of a conscious apprehension of
a moment
what does it refer to?
what does the mark refer to?
and we can ask - what does any language refer to if the moment (that is gone)
is not its reference - and here I mean by reference - meaning?
my view is that there is no reference - that language in fact does not refer -
in the sense of correspond to
- or if indeed it does refer - strictly speaking the reference is unknown -
the point of language is just that it is a means of characterizing the unknown
- and enabling language users to operate in the unknown
this is what the making of marks is about in a logical sense
language in this sense is a sophisticated tool
my argument is that language is the reference - language is the making of a
reference - the mark made is the reference
there is no reference - no known reference - outside of language
that is we have reference - because of language
outside of consciousness is the unknown - language of any form is the means of characterising the unknown
characterization - that is the positing of reference - is necessary in order
for us to operate in and negotiate the emptiness
also it needs to be pointed out that the unknown - as unknown is without
temporality - or spatiality for that matter
temporal references that is to a present a past and a future - are
characterizations of the unknown
necessary characterizations if we are to organize our experience - our world
they are as with all characterization given by consciousness to the unknown
consciousness that is provides platforms for action
some platforms are indispensable - and others simply useful
the known world is a construct of consciousness
the unknown is the object of consciousness
finally -
'now' - is 'no-time'
it is no-time because it can never be marked
temporal sequencing is a reflective act designed to create relations between
events
it is the relation of sequence
does this sequencing - making of relations - refer to anything?
that is does 'time' exist in some sense outside of the act of sequencing?
no
the act of sequencing is all time is
it is an act of order - of ordering -
the point of which is to give the unknown sequence
107.
ARGUMENT:
in this pointing-out we see a movement that takes the following course:
(1) I point out the 'Now' asserted as a truth - however it is something that
has been - I set it aside
(2) I now assert the second truth that it has been
(3) but what has been is not - I set aside the second truth - thereby negate
the negation of the 'Now' - and thus back to the first assertion - 'Now is'
the 'Now' and the pointing out the 'Now' - are neither immediate and simple -
but a movement that contains movements
the now is thus a plurality of nows
the now is a universal
COMMENTARY:
Hegel's universal is the solution to his problem of 'now'
the problem basically is that the immediate - cannot be maintained in
reflection
any reflective reference to the now - can only be a reference to what is not
now
the 'integrity of now' is lost in any description of it
Hegel does not want to say - therefore the now cannot be described - cannot be
stated
for in his view this would ultimately lead to putting it in doubt -
Hegel wishes to avoid this skepticism
his answer is to say in fact the now is every now - that it is the universal
the cost of this move is that the immediate is lost
you could say time is lost
and in its place is a conception - an idea
the argument is OK
the problem though - is just that it doesn't solve the problem - it masks it
we can ask this question -
what is the status of the universal - in terms of time - in terms of the
question of immediacy?
if any assertion of now - is an assertion of the universal -
when I assert the universal - which universal is being asserted?
when I point to the universal what have I pointed to?
is it not the case that the universal I point out 'has been'?
OK - if not -
where is the universal in time?
if not in time - where's time?
and what relevance does the universal have to it?
the issue only gets to this if it is assumed that the term 'now' actually
refers -
Hegel's analysis actually shows that it doesn't
but he doesn't want to accept this conclusion
his idea is that now is not a particular moment - but rather every moment
to go down this path renders real experience illusory and language meaningless
108.
ARGUMENT:
the Here pointed out is a this Here which in fact is not this Here etc.
what is pointed out is a negative
this which is negative only when the Heres are taken as they should be - in
being so taken they supersede themselves
what abides is a simple complex of many Heres
the Here that is meant is not a point but a movement through many Heres into
the universal Here
COMMENTARY:
the immediate cannot be described - what do we say of it - not that it does not
exist - rather that it is not known
such a view maintains the immediacy of the immediate - and the reality of its unknowing
Hegel has missed this point - or simply refuses to acknowledge it -
my bet is that he just didn't see it
the idea of the unknown as the basis of knowledge - just too radical and simple
a notion for Hegel
be that as it may
the whole point of the immediate is its stillness - and yes we do recognize it
as a point
any movement is conceptual - some way of understanding - of knowing the unknown
as I have suggested before - Hegel's ideas here are OK - in the sense that any
serious attempt to give form and content - to characterise the unknown is in itself
valid -
but as such any such theory is secondary - that is it cannot be regarded as
fundamental
and then of course there is the issue of the utility of the conception - just
where and how it functions
I guess you would have to say that Hegel has form here - the marks are on the
board
Marxism at the very least is his legacy - in an inverted way
be careful what you wish for you might get it - upside down inside out
OK
nevertheless what we have from Hegel is philosophical fantasy
(and in principle as I have just said I am not against this)
but what he is doing at heart is completely and utterly denying the unknown -
the reality of the unknown
where this gets strange is that in his case it results in the identification of
external reality with actions of consciousness - with conception and a conceptual
artifice of his making
this is the problem - if you deny the reality of the unknown - you will
invariably lose perspective
you will end up thinking what you think must be how the world is
OK - from the point of view of action in the world - that is how you operate in
the moment
but fatal as a reflective view of the nature of things
109.
ARGUMENT:
the dialectic of sense-certainty - is the history of its movement - of its
experience – and sense-certainty nothing but this history
this is why natural consciousness is always learning what is true - but equally
it is always forgetting and starting the movement all over again
it is therefore astonishing that the reality or being of external things taken
as This or sense objects has absolute truth for consciousness
to say this is to say what one does not want to say
the truth for consciousness of a This of sense is supposed to be universal
experience - but the very opposite is universal experience
every consciousness supersedes such a truth e.g. Here is a tree proclaims the
opposite - Here is not a tree
what consciousness will learn from experience in all sense certainty is only
that we have seen the This as a universal
those who assert the truth of sensuous things should go back to the drawing
board
you will come not just to doubt the being of sensuous things - but despair of
it
we bring about the nothingness of such things in our dealings with them - and
we see them reduce themselves to nothingness
i.e. an animal will not regard such things as having intrinsic being - but
assured of their nothingness will eat them
all Nature like all animals celebrates the open Mysteries - which teach the
truth about sensuous things
COMMENTARY:
what happens to us - what we call experience is just the immediate awareness of
the unknown and the reflective response to that
how we conceive what we are presented with - is how we know it
much of this conceptual response is given in the frameworks consciousness
brings to bear independently of the experience - i.e. the frameworks of space and time -
cause and effect the idea of substance
and biological historical psychological and social contexts bear on any
immediacy
our conceptual action in relation to immediacy - is our experience
how we describe this experience will have to do with the meta frameworks and
the contingent contexts we operate in - and every such event will even with these surroundings have the potential of novelty - new knowledge - new discoveries
and in reality any description of this 'experience' will be no more than a
valiant attempt to come to grips with everything
as such of course it will fail -
and the reason for this is that consciousness though it can reflect upon itself
- its 'contents' - can never grasp itself - can never contain itself -
any reflection is just a light into the darkness -
and really what this shows - illuminates is not what is in the light but rather
the extent of the darkness
we have experience and yes it is a multi-faceted affair - but it can never be
determined
experience - my experience - even that experience had - is never closed
experience is by its nature an open proposition
immediacy disappears on reflection - or should I say the force of it
as soon as you reflect on what has happened you understand it in a broader
context -
you know that to understand it cannot be left as an isolated event
you soon realize - without thinking that there is no such thing
all that really happens is that from your position in space time and given the
nature of your consciousness and body - you take one of the infinite paths
possible to consideration of the nature of reality as a whole
in practice we rarely engage - at least purposely in the grand metaphysical consideration - but that is just because our circumstances generally confine us
closer to the dirt - however the path is there and it is just a matter of how far you
go and why
I think it is true that in immediacy we do witness essence - or should I say
essence impresses itself upon us
and this is not a bad thing - for perhaps without this constant reminder of the
unknown and its power - we could easily get lost in and retreat into our
conceptions
the point of consciousness is to give character to the unknown
it is fair to say consciousness is just a function of certain organisms - and
of no significance to the unknown it is the reflection of
as I have argued before - there is no certainty in sense - there is only the
event of it -
what we make of it is a question - the proposal to regard experience as certain
- is a proposal that only is possible given the intrinsic uncertainty of the phenomena
sensuous things - the objects of sense experience - are utilized - this is what consciousness enables - the utility of the objects of sense -
how men use objects - what they use them for - what they do to them - what the results are - etc. etc. - is the history of human action
as to the end of any of this - the purpose - the goal - there are as many
answers as there are actions
in my view - events - any a kind of event - the falling of rain - the making of
a box - the act of love - the act of war etc. etc. are just happenings - acts - events
and they have no significance in themselves -
significance - meaning - is a gift - a gift of consciousness
and as to consciousness - its only meaning is in the giving -
outside of this it has no significance -
thus a consciousness that does not function - does not exist
the open mystery is a good - very good description of reality as unknown -
and yes - in a poetic sense - all nature celebrates - points to the open
mystery
110.
ARGUMENT:
this that is meant cannot be reached by language i.e. that which is inherently
universal
they would have to admit finally they are speaking about something which is not
the unutterable is the untrue - the irrational - what is meant but not
expressed
if we say of something that it is 'an actual thing' 'an external object' - its
description is the most abstract of generalities - and expresses its sameness
with everything rather than its distinctiveness
'this thing' is anything you like - if we describe it more precisely as 'this
bit of paper'
then each and every bit of paper is 'this bit of paper' - and I have only
uttered the universal
if you want to help out language you can point as in 'here' - even so a
universal - and therefore what I know is not an immediacy but a universal -
COMMENTARY:
yes - in my terms language does not refer -
language is a construction designed to mitigate against the fact of the unknown
language thus is platform for action
the unknown is never extinguished in language - it is covered
and the covering enables action -
the forms and categories imposed on the unknown - are the logic of action
in this sense what we are talking about is a metaphysical pretense - we operate
as if we know
and we must - if we are to operate at all -
there is no metaphysical dishonesty here - it a matter of simply dealing with
the fact of the unknown - and operating in relation to it -
in reality - we do what we must -
the ever presence of the reality of the unknown though - ensures that unless we
are deluded - we do not operate with certainty - we operate in uncertainty
this is to say that even in the face of our constructions on the unknown - we
are never imprisoned in by our conceptions or by our actions
the unknown is the source of freedom - whether you like that or not -
immediate experience is essentially unknown
we only know it in terms of conscious reflection
a reflection is by its nature - a move from the immediacy of the experience
any reflection will place the immediate experience in a conceptual context -
you could thus say the that the price of knowledge is the loss of the immediacy
of the
unknown
conception is a move from immediacy
it is as though nothing can be done with the immediate (of course - it is
unknown) - and therefore the only way to deal with it is to redefine it in a non-immediate
context - that is in an epistemological context
that is we make it - known - and in so doing for the purposes of action it is
no longer unknown
however the truth of its real character - as unknown - is not thereby lost -
we are left always - regardless of what we construct and what we do - with an irreducible sense of wonder
we are left always wondering and in that sense always directly in touch with
and engaged with the unknown
II. PERCEPTION: OR THE THING AND DECEPTION
111.
ARGUMENT:
immediate certainty does not take over the truth for the truth is the universal
perception takes what is present to it as a universal
the immediate self-differentiating moments within perception are universal
I is a universal and the object is a universal
there are two movements: the movement of pointing out is the act of perceiving
- the other is the same movement as a simple event - the object perceived
in essence the object is the same as the movement
the movement is the unfolding and differentiation of the two moments
and the object is the approached togetherness of the moments
the universal or principle is the essence of perception -
and in contrast to this - both the moments are distinguished - that which
perceives and that which is perceived - are the unessential
but because both are the universal - both are essential
since they are related to each other as opposites - only one can be essential
one of them - the object defined as the simple entity is the essence regardless
of whether it is perceived or not
the act of perceiving as the movement - is the unessential movement
the unstable factor that can be as well as not be
COMMENTARY:
the problem with this argument about essence is that we don't know what essence
is supposed to be -
for Hegel it is as if the term speaks for itself
he speaks of perception and the object as being moments of the same movement
one would think therefore the movement is what is essential
if i.e. essence is just that which underlies phenomena - that which is the
basis of - the foundation of appearance - appearance of anything - then in so far as this
essence does not appear - it is unknown
now we can conceptualize here - Spinoza went for substance - as that which is
the logical basis of all that exists - Plato forms etc.
what is clear is that these are conceptions - conceptions designed to give some character to the unknown - to as it were give it a voice
that is such conceptualizations are theories of the unknown
Hegel's essence is such a theory of the unknown - but not a very articulate one
- what does it tells us?
I don't really see how it adds to the discussion of perception and object
the question of perception is how to explain the object as independent of the perceiver?
clearly the appearance of the object depends on perception - i.e. from one
point view its appearance is such and such - from another angle the appearance is changed
- relative to the first moment
what is it we are perceiving?
in what sense can we say there is a unity that is the object?
what is it that makes the object what it is?
we only have perception and conception - and both these ways of knowing -
depend on the object
so there is no 'objective' view
what we get back to is appearance
the object at place 1 time 1 through the eyes of A is y -
the object at place 1 time 2 through the eyes of A is yi etc.
if we are to speak of the object itself outside of perception - we can only say
it is that which can appear -
and really this is not much help - for it is only a statement about objects per
se - not about any object in particular
it is a conceptual argument
we cannot get to the immediate object
the immediate object remains unknown
so what do we perceive?
we perceive the unknown - (x at time 1 place 1 by A) and attempt to describe it
-
any such attempt will be inconclusive - no matter how valiant
we will always be left with an incomplete picture
in Hegel's terms an unessential account
for this reason we can dispense with essence - and operate with confidence (so
to speak) with the unessential
the unessential is our best or worst response to the unknown
the point I want to make clear is that the unknown by definition is that which
is outside of consciousness -
and that whatever is outside of consciousness is unknown
it is a simple - but devastating point -
the object of knowledge is the unknown
the object of consciousness is to make the unknown - negotiable
that which is outside of consciousness is the unknown
NB.
the object is a function of consciousness
the act of perception is the establishing of a relationship between
consciousness and the object of consciousness
between consciousness and the world -
we can say the object is the point of perception
it is the focus
our relationship with the object - as phenomena - is given in the act of
perception
what is perceived is given in this act
description of this - of the object - is an epistemological act
any description will place the object - the focus of perception in space and
time - will afford it substantial characteristics and sense qualities
do we say the attributes and qualities of the object are immediately perceived
- that is are given?
yes - we say this - but this is to give the object a description
and any description is non-immediate - which is to say it is reflective
it may be an 'immediate reflection' - but it is still a reflection
that is a move from the immediate event of perception
these reflective categories are given in consciousness by consciousness and for consciousness
this is to say they are given to the object
for all intents and purposes 'object' is just that which is unknown and
undefined
it is the 'point of perception'
this 'point' exists only because of perception - the fact of it - the nature of
it
consciousness is internality
its object - is externality
its object is external to it - as a matter of logic
but its object - however that comes in perception - whatever form it takes - is
- in the first instance - unknown
description gives the appearance of transforming the unknown - to the known
we operate and negotiate our way in the world on the basis of description
the fact of the matter is that description is never determinate
it is just a false platform for action
the thing is though - without such a platform there could be no action
112.
ARGUMENT:
since the principle of the object is in its simplicity a mediated universal -
the object must express this nature in its own self
this it does by showing itself to be the thing with many properties
the wealth of sense knowledge belongs to perception - not to immediate
certainty - for which it was only the source of instances -
for only perception contains negation - that is difference or manifoldness
within its own essence
COMMENTARY:
in truth can we speak of the object itself - outside of its perception?
outside of perception what you have is that which does not appear - that which
is not known
that which does not appear - that which is not known is the point of perception
that is the point outside of perception - that perception is directed to
it is this point that is the object independently of its characteristics
the characteristics of the object come into being through the relationship of
perception
that is as a result of the act of perception on its point of focus
the fact of this event is the revelation of perception
as a result of this event we refer to the object as object -
that is a point of focus that has primary and secondary properties
the object is not manufactured by consciousness
it exists independently of consciousness (as an unknown) but the event of
perception reveals a definite relationship between consciousness and its point of focus
which is the object characterised - the object as a known
I say consciousness characterizes its point of focus - this is just what it
does
we never perceive the object as just a point of focus - always as a revelation
to
consciousness
nevertheless we can say that in the moment of perception - we only know what is before us in terms of how it is described - though we describe as a matter of
reflex - logically speaking the description is still a reflective act - after immediacy
so perhaps you could say we perceive the object initially as unknown and known
and if this is so it suggests we perceive the object as it is and as its is
perceived -
as it appears and as it does not appear -
if this is so - you have always a logically complete picture of the object
also I wish to say perception is specific
description may not be - but perception is
perception is focus
so - the object is that which is focused on -
perception defines the object - as focus
the characteristics of this focus as revealed in perception are the common
reality of the perception and the object - the common reality - the object
perceived -
that is the event - the singular event - of the object perceived
NB.
what perception reveals is the known and the unknown dimensions of the object
of perception
that is as well as what is given in the act of perception - we are as conscious
entities aware of what is not given - what is not known
the known always comes to us in the greater context of the unknown - what is
not revealed -
the awareness of what is not known is the intrigue of the object
it as an awareness that has two aspects -
firstly what is not revealed
and secondly - the origin - the basis - the foundation of what is revealed
what the reality of the unknown introduces into the world is possibility
113.
ARGUMENT:
the This therefore is established as not This or as something superseded - and
hence not as Nothing - but as a determinate nothing - the Nothing of content viz. of
the This
thus the sense element is present - not as what is immediate certainty - rather
as a universal - as that which will be defined as property
the immediacy is a universal immediacy
being is a universal by virtue of it having mediation or the negative in it
when it expresses this in its immediacy it is a differentiated determinate
property
many such properties are established simultaneously - one being the negative of another
these determinacies are related only to themselves - they are indifferent to
one another - each is on its own and free from the others
the simple self-identical universality is itself distinct from these
determinate properties it has
it is pure relating of self to self
the abstract universal medium which we call 'thinghood' or 'pure essence' is a
simple togetherness of a plurality - but the many are in their determinateness simple universals themselves
this salt is a simple here and at the same time a manifold - it is white and it
is tart - cubical and of specific gravity
all these properties are in the simple Here in which they therefore
interpenetrate – none has a different Here from the others - but each is
everywhere in the same Here as the others
and without being separated by different Heres they do not affect each other in
this interpenetration
the whiteness does not affect the cubical shape etc.
since each is a simple relating of self to self - it leaves the others alone -
and is connected by the indifferent Also - this Also is thus the pure universal
itself - the medium - the 'thinghood' - which holds them together in this way
COMMENTARY:
the relation of consciousness to its point of focus (the object) - results in
the revelation that is the 'object in consciousness' and 'consciousness in the
object' -
the relation is appearance
consciousness and the object are outside of this relationship - this happening
this event of relation - unknowns
it is the relation that reveals consciousness and the object - as phenomena
the primary act of consciousness is description
the sensual properties of a thing are its natural affects on the body
in describing these natural affects we begin with the differing ways they
affect the body - we describe them in terms of sense experience
these are 'affective descriptions'
the thing itself is nothing more than its affects on the body
affects possible because of the way the body is -
that an object might affect different bodies in different ways - or the same
body in different ways at different times - just points to the fact that its
descriptive possibilities are not limited
the thing itself - if you want to go there - is just 'that which affects'
what distinguishes one thing from another is really just a question of
description – how it is described
the fact there can be no final - essential description is just testament to the
fact that consciousness and its objects are never fixed in time and place
any here and now is just an occasion for description
all that we have of the here and now is the history of its marks - that is the
history of descriptions
a thing's properties are its descriptions
outside of its descriptions the thing is an unknown
the thing itself remains the focus - the point of all descriptions -
Hegel's 'indifferent Also' is a conjunction
we can create complex descriptions of the object of focus by conjoining
descriptions
the object itself is not in any way altered by this action
its revelation though is expanded
the point of any description is just that it is a platform from which we can
act in relation to the object of consciousness
it is a platform that suggests the possibility of action - of utility
what this in fact amounts to is in the end a matter of practice - what happens
in order to act - we must always defy essence
which is to say we must always pretend knowledge
114.
ARGUMENT:
if the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent to one another -
if they were simply and solely related - they would not be determinate
for they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from
one another - and relate themselves to others as their opposites
yet thus opposed to one another they cannot be together in the simple unity of
their medium - which is just as essential to them as negation
the differentiation of the properties in so far as it is not an indifferent
differentiation but is exclusive - each property negating the others - falls outside the simple
medium
therefore it is not merely an also - an indifferent unity - but a one as well -
a unity which excludes another
the one is the moment of negation - it is a relation of self to self - and it
excludes another - and it is that by which thinghood is determined as a thing
negation is inherent in a property as a determinateness - which is immediately
one with the immediacy of being - which is universality
as one however this determinateness is set free from this unity with its
opposite - and exists in and for itself
COMMENTARY:
how is that the one contains or is a plurality?
if so - what sense of referring to it as 'one'?
and yet - is not a plurality - many of the one?
if so what sense of referring to the 'plurality'?
we can of course take Hegel's road here - and say there is a contradiction at
the heart of being
this is an option - and it makes sense on the face of it
the other option I see is that we say the fact of the contradiction shows us
that we cannot go there
and where is there?
if we assert being is one - or if we assert being is many - or indeed that
being is one and many - we are making the claim that we can know the nature of being - the
nature of existence
that we can give it a formal characterization - and that we can assert this
claim as a true claim
in my view the fact that we can put forward contradictory metaphysical
arguments that ultimately end in contradiction - shows us that we cannot know
the essence of things - the nature of reality
a way of putting it is to say reality - itself - resists such a claim - and
furthermore denies it - throws it back at us as nonsense -
the trick I think is to see that concepts such as the one - or the many e.g. -
are strategies for dealing with the unknown
and by dealing with the unknown I mean in practice - we need certain ideas and categories for organization and operation
understanding a contingency in terms of the idea of unity can in certain
circumstances be useful and productive
perhaps given different circumstances - different players different goals - the
idea of plurality may prove to be more useful - more productive
there is no guide to what tools to use - what tools to make - or what results
can be expected -
ultimately the solution to any problem of action is a shot in the dark
how we conceive the problem - how we conceive the solution - when and how we decide to stop or to go on - is finally a matter without knowledge
Hegel's analysis goes awry in my view just because of his use of logic
the concepts of negation and contradiction are properly used in the assessment
of propositions - that is descriptions of reality
my point being - reality does not negate - the world does not contradict itself
-
negation is an operation on a proposition - it is an operation of denial - 'it
is not the case that......'
the negation of a proposition is the assertion that the proposition does not
apply to the circumstances under consideration -
it is the assertion that given the way the world is the proposition has no
function
a contradiction likewise is a propositional operation or outcome that shows the proposition that contains a contradiction has no function
negation is an operation on propositions - it is not an assertion that reality
contains negativity - or in the case of contradiction that the world asserts and denies
itself -
all our propositions are attempts to provide some basis for action - logic is a
means of determining the functionality of such propositions
reality as such - is not affected one way or another by our propositions
our propositions nevertheless can have function
115.
ARGUMENT:
the Thing as the truth of perception is:
(a) a indifferent passive universality - the also of many properties
(b) negation or the ONE which exclude opposite properties
(c) the many properties themselves - the relation of the first two moments or
negation as it relates to the indifferent element and expands into a host of differences
- the point of singular individuality in the medium of subsistence radiating forth
into
plurality
in so far as these differences belong to the indifferent medium they are
universal
they are related to themselves and do not affect one another
but in so far as they belong to the negative unity they are exclusive of other
properties
they necessarily have this relationship of opposition to properties remote from
their Also
the sensuous universality - or the immediate unity of being and the negative is
a property only when the One and pure universality are developed from it - and differentiated from each other - and when the sensuous universality unites them
it is this relation of the universality to the pure essential moments which at
last completes the thing
so in summary:
the thing is a passive universality of many properties - it is also the one
which excludes opposite properties and the point of singular universality that
expresses plurality
we can distinguish pure universality and the one - sensuous universality
(sensuality)unites them
the relation of universality to the essential moments (universalities)
completes the thing
COMMENTARY:
yes - 'the thing' presents as a singularity that expresses many properties -
the 'properties' are descriptions given of the thing
'the thing' is a description that functions as the reference for the
descriptions (of the properties)
that is it becomes the reference - the term itself I am saying is the reference
for the descriptions given to it -
the terms 'the thing' or 'the entity' - 'the object' etc. are base descriptions
of the unknown that is the subject of focus
they are good descriptions in that they are clearly content free
they are simple recognitions that the unknown is in play -
they announce the unknown and are true to it
description here is the defining of a domain - or should I say the assertion
that a domain is established - for the purpose of description
secondary descriptions - what Hegel would call properties - give the base
description character - give the domain content
at this point for all practical purposes the thing is known -
what acts are performed in relation to it are dependent on the secondary
descriptions put forward
that is its capacity is directly related to its description -
there is no necessity in relation to description
entities are transformed by being variously described
the thing in itself - what Hegel would refer to as a universal - is the unknown
- in focus - an unknown
when Hegel says the thing is a negation of the one that excludes opposite
properties - he is suggesting that the thing is fixed -
which in my terms would be to say there is one set of descriptions that apply
to the entity - and that is that -
rather I would suggest that the point about the thing as unknown is just that
it is not bound by any description
true we will define a thing which means we will go with or run with a set of descriptions - this is just a decision to utilize
what descriptions are used will depend on what purposes are in play - and how
the thing is to be utilized -
again there is no necessity in this
under different circumstance - inevitably different descriptions will be
operative -
we can say it is the same thing because - whatever description - at heart the
thing – the object etc. - is unknown
description does not alter this fact - and this fact - the fact of the unknown
- allows for various descriptions - and is indeed the source of the possibility of
description
the thing is never fixed - it is though a focus of possible description
one's circumstances - and I mean this in the broadest possible terms - will
suggest appropriate description of that which is the subject of conscious focus
116.
ARGUMENT:
consciousness is determined as percipient in so far as the Thing is its object
it has only to take it - to confine itself to a pure apprehension of it - and
what is thus yielded is the True
if consciousness did anything in taking what is given - it would by such adding
or subtracting alter the truth
since the object is the True and universal - the self-identical - while
consciousness is alterable and unessential - it can happen that consciousness apprehends the
object incorrectly and deceives itself
the percipient is aware of the possibility of deception - for in the
universality which is the principle - otherness itself is immediately present
for him - though present as what is null and superseded
his criterion for truth is self-identity - and his behaviour consists in
apprehending the object as self-identical
since diversity is explicitly there - it is a conception of the diverse moments
of his apprehension to one another
if a dissimilarity is felt in the course of this comparison - then this is not
an untruth - but an untruth in perceiving it
COMMENTARY:
consciousness is never determined - the essence of consciousness is
indeterminacy
the object apprehended in the apprehension is made indeterminate
truth is a reflective argument of consciousness - in regard to its descriptions
of that apprehended
the 'object' apprehended is in itself neither true nor false
truth is a decision regarding propositions - their utility or not -
propositions are descriptions of what is presented to consciousness
to say a thing is self-identical - is simply to say it is a thing
identity per se is an illusion in this world - it is a mistaken concept -
every 'thing' that exists - exists as non-identical to any other thing
the object outside of consciousness is unknown - the object in consciousness is
known - as knowledge it exists as an indeterminate - this is the essence of its
utility – its indeterminateness -
the point is that our knowledge of the object is always an open question - that
is it is never finally resolved-
in practice we always run with some conception of the object of consciousness -
but no conception is fixed - the conception of the object - which is the object -
holds only in terms of its utility - conceptions change radically or ever so slightly
depending on
how the knowledge functions
and the question of function is never determined - it simply just how we act -
and there are no absolutes in human action
there can be no incorrect apprehension - consciousness simply internalizes the
outside world -
what it does with this internalisation - how the internalisation is utilised -
depends entirely on the circumstance of the percipient - and here we include the state
of the body - the state of the immediate external -
all we can offer here is the possibility of different perspectives - different
perspectives determined by differing circumstances
what Hegel calls the awareness of the possibility of deception - is really only
the awareness of the indeterminacy of consciousness
there is no deception as there is no determinateness -
there is only indeterminacy and thus the possibility of differing perspectives
you never deceive yourself -
therefore the question of the truth of the apprehension is a meaningless
question
NB.
consciousness and self-consciousness
just a note here -
I want to argue here and put that all consciousness - is self-consciousness
that any distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be maintained
my point is that all consciousness is aware of itself -
that is consciousness is aware of consciousness -
that it makes no sense to speak of consciousness as just aware of that which is
outside itself
for the awareness of the outside is just internalization
the object becomes consciousness
as such it is still the object of consciousness
but at the same time it is consciousness
it is subject and object
all consciousness is self-consciousness
consciousness by its nature is aware of itself
'itself' here is awareness
'awareness' thus by its nature is self-referring
this characteristic - self-reference - is what makes it awareness
it is what distinguishes consciousness from the non-consciousness
the non-conscious is not self-referring
it is simply what is - it is one dimensional
in relation to consciousness - it becomes the object of consciousness
further -
what are we to make of self-reference?
how can a subject refer to a subject?
we know this happens but how does it happen?
what is the logic of it?
the point is reference is based on the distinction of referee and referent
clearly if consciousness refers to itself - what you have is the identity of
referee and referent
on the face of it - this is not possible - if what we understand as reference
is to occur
so sticking with this idea of reference - what is possible here?
that consciousness reflects itself
and that the reflection becomes the referent -
still the question - how does this happen?
perhaps we have no way of saying how this happens
but is it fair to say it must if self-reference is to occur?
p.s.
consciousness is internality
if it reflects - it reflects out
its reflection that is - is its relation with the world outside itself
its reflection is this relation - inter-internal /external
the 'self' that consciousness knows is this relation
117.
ARGUMENT:
the object which I apprehend presents itself purely as One - but I also
perceive it as a property that is universal - which thereby transcends the singularity of the
object
the being of the objective essence of the one was therefore not its true being
but since the object is what is true - the untruth falls in me - my
apprehension was not correct
on account of the universality of the property - I must take the objective
essence to be on the whole a community
I now see the property to be determinate and opposed to another and excluding
it
therefore the objective essence is not a community with others - on account of
the determinateness of the property I must break up the community - and posit the objective essence as one that excludes
in the broken up One I find many properties that are mutually indifferent
therefore I do not apprehend the object correctly when I apprehend it as an
exclusive
it is now a universal common medium in which many properties are present as sensuous universalities
what I perceive as the simple and the true is not a universal medium - but the
single property by itself - which is neither a property or a determinate being - for
now it is neither in a One nor connected with others
only when it belongs to a One is it a property - and only in relation to others
is it determinate
as this relating of itself to itself - it remains merely sensuous being in
general - since it no longer possesses the character of negativity
and the consciousness that takes its object - as my object - has ceased to
perceive and has withdrawn into itself
sensuous being and my meaning pass over into perception -
I am thrown back to the beginning and drawn into the cycle which supersedes
itself each moment and as a whole
COMMENTARY:
the object I perceive is a possibility of description
it is in this state an unknown that is open to consciousness - open to
interpretation
any conception of it - as e.g. - 'one' - is revisable - but nevertheless any
such description is true - as true as any other -
the truth of descriptions is determined by their use
the concepts that Hegel refers to here - the one - property - universal -
common medium etc. - are all in themselves valid -
that is the unknown can be defined and described in such terms
for them to make sense we need to know their point or their use
what is clear from Hegel's analysis is the interconnectedness of such concepts
and the importance of argument -
argument is what relates one conception to another
on the conceptual level - the focus of consciousness - the unknown - becomes an argument
here really is the beginning of objective status -
what was unknown is now argued - and as an 'argued' is at least a public entity
- and open to the possibility of description
118.
ARGUMENT:
thus it becomes quite definite for consciousness how its perceiving is
essentially constituted - that it is not a simple pure apprehension - but in its apprehension
is at the same time reflected out of the True and into itself
this return of consciousness into itself which is directly mingled with the
pure apprehension of the object -
this return into itself alters the truth
consciousness at once recognizes this aspect as its own and takes
responsibility for it
by doing so it will obtain the pure object in its purity
we have in perception the same as happened in sense certainty - the aspect of consciousness being driven back into itself - but not as this happened in sense certainty - not as if the truth of perception fell in consciousness
on the contrary consciousness recognizes that it is the untruth occurring in
perception that falls within it
but by this recognition it is able to supersede this untruth
it distinguishes its apprehension of the truth from the untruth - and since it
undertakes to make this correction itself - the truth qua truth of perception falls within consciousness
consciousness no longer merely perceives - but is conscious of its reflection
into itself - and separates this from simple apprehension
COMMENTARY:
consciousness' perceiving is a simple apprehension -
the object of this apprehension is given form and content in the act of
conscious attention
the object of consciousness - is embraced by consciousness
prior to conscious apprehension - the object is unknown
the essence of the object of apprehension - the fact that it is unknown will be
at the heart of any conscious apprehension and characterisation
and in so far as this is the case - the truth is never altered - it is rather
given new clothes
the object as unknown is the pure object -
this reality is the pre-conscious reality -
consciousness imposes its categories on its object of focus - and these
categories function as the phenomenal dimensions of the object -
reflection on any of the attributes of the object apprehended - is to raise
questions -
it is here that the uncertainty of the apprehension emerges
this uncertainty is a reflective uncertainty
yes the object in consciousness - as now an object of consciousness - is
subject to the nature of consciousness - and that is the essential uncertainty of
consciousness
in reflection the object is uncertain
so it is in reflection that the true nature of the object of consciousness is
revealed -
it is revealed as uncertain - and thus in any final sense - unknown
so we can say consciousness does not just perceive - but it reflects on its
perception
however it is not the object that reflects to consciousness
the object is made by consciousness and reflected on by consciousness
before its making the object is unknown - after its making the object is
unknown -
however in the making - the uncertain making - the object is given the
possibility of utility and function
119.
ARGUMENT:
I become aware of the thing as a One - and have to hold fast to it in this its
true character
if in the course of perceiving it something turns up which contradicts it -
this is to be recognised as a reflection of mine
there also occur in the perception various properties which seem to be
properties of the thing - but the thing is a one - and we are conscious that its diversity -
by which it would cease to be a one falls in us
so in point of fact the thing is one only to our eyes - tart to our tongue -
cubical to our touch
we get the entire diversity of these aspects - not from the thing - but from
ourselves
and they fall asunder for us because the eye is distinct from the tongue etc.
we are thus the universal medium in which such moments are kept apart and exist each on its own
through the fact then that we regard the characteristic of being a universal
medium as our reflection - we preserve the self-identity and truth of the thing - its
being One
COMMENTARY:
the thing as one is no more than the focus of consciousness - consciousness
defines and determines its object
conscious definition is never fixed - so there is always the possibility of
revision - such revision though is always a result of a reflection on the initial
perception
the fact that the object defined as one has properties does not take away from
its unity
the properties are signs of the unity - they point to the unity -
the properties of a thing are our descriptions of it - they are our attempt to
determine the thing - to give it some utility - some possibility of function
no description is final - all descriptions are revisable - the thing in itself
is unknown
it is true to say that the entire diversity of these aspects come from
ourselves - and not from the thing
and further that the very focus of consciousness - which is the thing - which
makes an unknown a thing of focus - which makes it 'one' - likewise comes from ourselves
the focus of consciousness however it is defined is never the truth of the
thing – except in the sense that we decide that it is - and we do this for our
purposes
'the thing' outside of consciousness is the unknown - consciousness describes -
the unknown though is not made by consciousness - it is the object of
consciousness
120.
ARGUMENT:
the diverse aspects for which consciousness accepts responsibility are
specifically determined - white is white only in opposition to black etc.
and the Thing is one precisely by being opposed to others
it is not by being a One that a thing excludes others from itself - for to be a
One is the universal relating of self to self - it is through its determinateness that it
excludes others
things are therefore in and for themselves determinate - they have properties
by which they distinguish themselves
the Thing has a number of properties
in the first place the thing is what is true - it possesses intrinsic being -
and what is in it is the thing's essence
secondly - the determinate properties do not exist on account of other things -
and for other things - but in the Thing itself - they are determinate properties in it
because they are a plurality of reciprocally self-differentiating elements
they exist in and for themselves
the Thing is the Also - or the universal medium in which many properties
subsist apart from one another
COMMENTARY:
my argument is that pre-consciousness - what exists is unknown - and that
therefore the object of knowledge - is the unknown
consciousness reveals the world - as the revelation of consciousness
so yes the sky is blue the grass is green and the farmer and his tractor are
coming up the road
what we perceive is the revelation of consciousness
now the question - can we say that the world of veridical perception is a true
account of the nature of the world?
can we start at least with this assertion?
my answer is that we don't know -
what we do know is that such a world is revealed in consciousness - it is what
we know - because of consciousness -
outside of consciousness - or let us say in terms of some other form of
consciousness
some other revelation - the world may
look entirely different to how we see it
or indeed it could be that how we see it just is the way it is -
the point is we can't know the answer here -
so we are wise to regard the deliverances of consciousness for just what they
are - deliverances of consciousness
why a thing is white and has certain shape or taste - why that focus of
consciousness yields those descriptions is not a question we can finally answer - we only
have these
deliverances - and the explanation that they are not properties of the thing -
but rather descriptions of it given in consciousness
now we may wish to explain this and account for it - and to this end sciences
have been developed
clearly our perception of the world is determined by our physicality - that is
the forms of that perception are determined by the body
consciousness as the internal dimension of a two-dimensional being operates
through the agency of the body
this though is not to argue consciousness is of the external dimension - that
it is physical -
awareness is not an external property - it is therefore not a physical
manifestation
even so we can understand something of the way consciousness receives the
external world through an understanding of its immediate external - the body
the limit though that science has to recognize here is that it is only ever a
reflective argument - that is an argument after awareness -
understanding the surface world (the body and beyond) is not to explain the
internal dimension
the internal dimension is the seeing - it is the seeing that is never seen
we do of course reflect on the nature of consciousness - but again this is
awareness holding itself as object -
the subject truly cannot be the object - so any internal focus of consciousness
will only reveal consciousness
the point being that consciousness though it reveals - is never revealed
121.
ARGUMENT:
now in perceiving in this way consciousness is also reflected into itself
in perceiving the opposite moment to the Also turns up
this moment is the unity of thing with itself
this unity consciousness takes upon itself
for the thing itself is the subsistence of the many diverse and independent
properties
positing a thing's properties as a oneness is the work of consciousness - and
therefore consciousness has to prevent them from collapsing into oneness in the Thing
it introduces the 'in so far' - preserving the properties as mutually external
- and the thing as the Also
the oneness here which was called a property is represented as 'free matter'
the Thing is raised to the level of a genuine Also - since it becomes a
collection of matters - and instead of being One becomes the enclosing surface
COMMENTARY:
firstly -
consciousness reflecting into itself - just is the issue of consciousness -
the fact of it is really not at issue - the question is - what does this mean -
what sort of 'thing' reflects into itself -
the reflectivity of consciousness does distinguish it from the non-conscious -
but can we explain it?
can we explain its logic?
in the case of a physical reflection - i.e. - a mirror reflection - the
reflection is external to the thing reflected
what does it mean to reflect into the thing
what is reflected in?
is it consciousness -
or is it an awareness of consciousness?
and how does consciousness 'hold itself'?
and if it does not hold itself in reflection -
can it be said to reflect into itself?
I am hoping Hegel will throw some light on all of this -
just to say consciousness reflects into itself is really where the issue of
consciousness begins -
secondly -
it's clear isn't it that all conscious perception is the perception of a
diversity in one - and indeed a diversity of 'ones'?
this is just what happens in conscious apprehension
and what this diversity in unity leaves us with is uncertainty
and that I would say just is the revelation of consciousness - uncertainty
Hegel's 'free matter' here is simply a tag for the unknown -
and yes the thing is of the surface of the world - it is of the external
dimension
consciousness is the inside of the world -
it is internality -
and indeed the external world encloses the internal
122.
ARGUMENT:
we see consciousness alternately makes itself - as well as the thing - into
both a pure many-less One - and into an Also that resolves itself into independent matters
consciousness finds - that not only its truth perceiving contains the distinct
moments of apprehension - and withdrawal into itself - but rather that the truth itself
- the Thing - reveals itself in this twofold way
our experience then is this that the Thing exhibits itself 'for the
consciousness apprehending it' in a specific manner - but is at the same time reflected out
of the way in which it presents itself to consciousness and back into itself
in other words - it contains in itself an opposite truth to that which it has
for the apprehending consciousness
COMMENTARY:
the relation between consciousness and its object - or consciousness and the
Thing is that of revelation
consciousness reveals - the object of consciousness is revealed
the revelation then is a revelation in consciousness
that which is revealed has the characteristics that are revealed
strictly speaking we cannot say whether these characteristics come from consciousness to the object - or from the object to consciousness
there just is no way to decide this issue
all you can logically say is that what is revealed is revealed
so what we are talking about here is not consciousness 'and' the object or visa
versa
what the revelation reveals is a relation
it is the relation that is revealed -
and it is because it is the relation that is revealed we can say - that what is
revealed in consciousness is just what consciousness reveals
that is that there is a complete correspondence
this is the first moment of consciousness - and it is what appears to be sure
the second moment of consciousness is reflection -
it is here that it becomes known that this initial correspondence - is without
any foundation - and even more devastatingly that we cannot characterise
consciousness or its object in any sustainable way -
that is to say consciousness and its object are 'doubtfuls' (to use a kind of
Hegelian term)
my point is you have the initial revelation - but a revelation is all that it
is -
on reflection it is seen to be without a basis -
this does not take away from its reality -
what it does is show us that its reality is purely phenomenal
that there is nothing we can point to with any certainty - behind this
appearance - this revelation -
in fact all that is revealed there is uncertainty
we are left simply with what occurs -
we may wonder at this - and yes we do - and in response to this wonder we
attempt to give the phenomenal some underpinning
this epistemological endeavour though is not really to do with the phenomena at
all -
granted this is the almost universal assumption - that we are in theorising
foundations - giving phenomena an epistemological basis and content -
in fact as I have pointed out - this can't be done
and if so the epistemological enterprise needs to be re-evaluated
what I suggest is that the whole business of epistemological is to do with
utility -
that is how to operate with - to utilize - to work with the given phenomena
in practical terms i.e. it is often seen to be necessary to give our
perceptions a basis that is not perceived - in order to make the perception operable
so epistemology and indeed metaphysics are sciences of operation - sciences of
action
the whole point of speculation is to find the best way forward -
I don't think that speculation ever actually delivers here - but it does give
that appearance
the final point is that we ultimately do not know - how to proceed - and this
is of crucial importance -
but nevertheless we must - and so we do - and speculation gives us options
options that is for dealing with the unknown
123.
ARGUMENT:
the object is now for consciousness the whole movement previously shared
between object and consciousness
the Thing is a One reflected into itself - it is for itself but also for
another - a being that is doubly differentiated but also a One - but the Oneness contradicts this
diversity
hence consciousness would have to assume responsibility for placing the
diversity into the one - and for keeping it away from the Thing
it would have to say that in so far as it is for itself - the thing is not for
an other
but the Oneness also belongs to the Thing itself as consciousness has found by experience - the thing is essentially reflected into itself
the Also - or the indifferent difference falls as much within the Thing as it
does the Oneness - but since the two are different they do not fall within the same
Thing - but different things
the contradiction that is present in the objective essence as a whole is
distributed between two objects
in and for itself the Thing is self-identical - but this unity of the Thing is
disturbed by other Things
the unity is preserved - and at the same time the otherness is preserved
outside of the Thing and outside of consciousness
COMMENTARY:
consciousness recognizes what it is not -
it is not that which is outside of itself - it is not that is - its object
this is a base fact essential to the logic of consciousness
it is this fact which is the source of consciousness' identity -
its identity is essentially - what it is not -
consciousness can reflect on consciousness - and this is self-consciousness
the reflection of consciousness on itself reveals that it is - what it is not
and for all intents and purposes this is as good as it gets
that consciousness knows itself as what it is not
as to positive definition of consciousness by consciousness -
this does not occur -
the drama of this fact has led though to positive definitions -
and these are really definitions in panic
we hear it said that consciousness is spirit - is soul is mind etc.
but really consciousness is what its object is not -
there is a beauty in this definition - it is non-substantial - it is purely
logical -
my specific point here is that the object is never compromised by consciousness
the object outside of consciousness is unknown
consciousness gives it knowledge - that is description -
the object is not a movement - it is a point of focus -
the thing is an unknown - it is given description in the action of
consciousness
the giving of description - does not in any way alter the object - rather
description gives the object possibilities of use and function
different descriptions will give the object different possibilities - different
utilities
the thing itself does not reflect - this if nothing else defines the thing - as
what it is - and what it is not
it is not consciousness
the relation of consciousness to its object - which is the phenomenal world - is
a relation of clarity and uncertainty -
this just is the relationship - it can be no otherwise -
we perceive the world clearly - the world is clear -
nevertheless on reflection - in reflection - it is uncertain
my view is that uncertainty is the gift of consciousness
that in a world without consciousness - no categories of thought would apply
we would simply have what is unknown
124.
ARGUMENT:
the contradiction present in the objective essence - is that the thing is
self-identical and its otherness is preserved - this contradiction is distributed among
different things
different things exist on their own account - and the conflict is that each is
different from the other
each is determined as being a different thing - and its essential difference is
its own self
its self is a simple determinateness
it is an actual difference manifoldly constituted
but this manifold - in that it distinguishes a thing from others is unessential
thus the thing does have the twofold 'in so far as' within its unity - but the
aspects are unequal in value
this opposition does not develop into an actual opposition in the thing itself
- but is an opposition of the thing to that outside itself
COMMENTARY:
Hegel is here saying what distinguishes things is not essential to the
individual things - rather that it is unessential
and he says what determines the identity of anything - is essential
any account of the nature of a thing - of the logic of a thing will if it is
successful distinguish that thing from all other things
so I am saying that there is an argument that the essence of a thing is what it
is not - that is what is excluded from its definition
on such a view a thing is that which is not-known -
and it is to say we define entities negatively
that definition is a negative description
it is to put - is it not that 'x' is -x?
where 'x' here is a focus of consciousness - an entity to be described
and '-x' - the account of what x excludes?
my general point is that to define an entity with any precision will always
entail a characterisation of what it is not -
for it is only in terms of what it is not - that we are able to differentiate
it from everything else
a corollary of this is that we cannot define everything - or the totality - or
'the' one' - just because there is nothing to distinguish it from
the way consciousness determines its focus is by determining what it is not
the focal point is therefore never grasped positively - only negatively
what is clear here I think is that the essence of consciousness is negation
consciousness brings negation into play in the world
and it is through negation that it determines and distinguishes
negation is the essential operating category of consciousness
can we say that negation is consciousness?
that into a 'world of assertion' consciousness brings negation?
and the game is on
125.
ARGUMENT:
the determinateness that defines a thing and distinguishes it from all others -
puts it in opposition to other things - also preserves its independence
its relationship with others establishes rather its continuity with others -
and for it to be connected with others is to cease to exist on its own account
it is the absolute character of the Thing and its opposition that it relates
itself to others
and is essentially only this relating
the relation is the negation of its self-subsistence - and it is really the
essential property of the thing that is its undoing
COMMENTARY:
they key concept here is uncertainty
the thing or entity in consciousness exists - even in phenomenal perception -
as an uncertain
its identity is unknown
how we describe it - what characteristics we operate with in relation to it -
is dependent on what we want to do with it - what function it is to have
and of course a thing can have many functions and many descriptions - all of
which are useful and true
i.e. - from the point of view of atomic science we do not regard the thing as
'a table' - rather as an atomic structure or state
the reality outside of any description - is unknown
the object of consciousness - the focus of consciousness does not have any
absolute description or function
knowledge is an attempt to deal with the world outside of consciousness
consciousness presents an alternative to the unknown
how that alternative - in whatever form it takes - functions - is not a matter
that is decided in any independent sense -
we simply make our decisions and run with them - and in the course of this
running make assessments (finally based on nothing) as to whether these decisions have
or have not borne fruit - whatever we decide that is to be - or is to mean
126.
ARGUMENT:
the Thing is posited as being for itself - or as the absolute negation of all
otherness - this is self-related negation
but the negation that is self-related is the suspension of itself - and so the
thing has its essential being in another Thing
COMMENTARY:
the thing as being for itself - what can we make of this?
'being for itself' must be being outside of consciousness -
of course we have no knowledge of this -
such being - for consciousness - is no more than a logical possibility
it is to say yes the world could be without consciousness -
and that such a world would exist not for consciousness - rather for itself
for 'being in consciousness' it is fair to say is being for consciousness
that is from consciousness' point of view
bearing in mind there is no other 'point of view'
in the sense that consciousness is the focus - brings a focus to being - that
which is the object of the focus - from the point of view of that focus -
exists for that focus
OK - this though is what you have to call a consciousness-centric view
and yes - this is not a criticism per se - for indeed the practical reality of
consciousness in the world is that consciousness is metaphysically central
however we can think beyond such - or outside of such a conception
we can imagine a world without consciousness
and if we do this we are imagining a world without self
and in such a world the categories of being for itself and being for another -
do not
apply
all you have is being -
now you can call this pure being if you like - or give it some other poetic characterisation
the fact is that we are only speaking - and quite precisely - of what we cannot
know
this is the result when consciousness imagines its non-existence you come
squarely to the unknown
127.
ARGUMENT:
the object is defined as having within it an essential property which
constitutes its simple being for itself -
but along with this it contains a diversity which though necessary is not
essential determinateness
this distinction is nominal
the unessential which is none the less supposed to be necessary - cancels
itself out
it is what has been called the negation of itself
COMMENTARY:
look the fact of it is that this 'essential property' that is 'simple being for
itself' is unknown
we can decorate the fact with such phrases - but in the end that is what it
comes to - decoration
we may wish to think of things as having simple base properties or essences and
also on top of this a collection of non-essential properties - and this way of
thinking may well be very natural - ingrained - and as it were necessary if we are to do
anything
with an object or objects of our focus
but really all this amounts to is that consciousness characterizes the unknown
- gives it some structure and utility
my own view is that strictly speaking we can't say for sure what the origin of
this characterisation is - on the face of it there are two options - consciousness
or the non-conscious -
origin is not really the issue - and it can't be decided
we have what we have and we work with it
my immediate response to this issue would be to say consciousness imposes its characterisation on the unknown - and I think there is value in looking at it
this way -
it does set up the issue quite sharply -
however my considered view is as I just mentioned that strictly speaking once
this perspective is understood - it too must be held in doubt
129.
ARGUMENT:
thus the object in pure determinateness (essential being) is overcome just as
surely as it was in its sensuous being -
from sensuous being it turned into a universal - but this universal originated
in the sensuous and is conditioned by it - and thus not a truly self-identical
universality at all - but one affiliated with opposition
for this reason the universality splits into two extremes of singular
individuality and universality - into the One of the properties and the Also of 'free matters'
these pure determinatenesses seem to express essential nature itself - but they
are onlya 'being-for-self' that is burdened with 'being-for-another'
as both are essentially in a single unity - what we have now is an
unconditioned absolute universality - and consciousness for the first time enters into
Understanding
COMMENTARY:
what we have from Hegel is a series of descriptions of the object - and he
believes that the incompatibility of these descriptions - the fact that they
'contradict' each other – is really because the object itself is contradictory
-
first as I pointed put earlier contradiction is a relation between propositions
- that is descriptions of the world - it is not a fact of the object of these
descriptions -
it is just that the object is described variously
now there are a number of ways of accounting for this
my view is that the object itself is unknown - and that consciousness gives it characterisation in the form of description
now consciousness itself is essentially uncertain - hence possibility -
possibility of description - and the fact of various descriptions
you might say that the object of consciousness is still (perhaps eternally so)
- but consciousness is not - it is not stillness -
granted it reaches for definition - definitiveness - absoluteness - stillness
this you might say is the desire of consciousness
but it is a desire that is never satisfied just because consciousness itself is
without definition - indefinite - unessential and contingent
perhaps it is desire that is definitive - not that desired
we might say the object - the objective world - a world of things - suggests a
stillness
and consciousness follows that suggestion - but in terms of that suggestion the
result is always futile
I've got a little away from myself here -
my point is that really Hegel is not in his metaphysics of the object
addressing the object at all - rather what he is doing is characterising the movement of
consciousness
Hegel confuses the object of consciousness with consciousness
also he assumes that consciousness knows what is the case
the truth is rather that consciousness never knows what is the case - hence metaphysics
130.
ARGUMENT:
the singular being of sense vanishes in the dialectical movement of immediate certainty and becomes universality
my meaning vanishes and perception and perception takes the object as it is in
itself or as a universal
singular being emerges in the object as true singleness - as the in-itself of
the One – or as a reflectedness-into-self
this is still a conditioned being-for-self - along which appears another
being-for-self - the universality that is opposed to and conditioned by singular being
these two contradictory extremes are in a single unity
being-for-self is burdened with opposition i.e. is at the same time not a
being-for-self
the sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments by distinguishing
between the aspects - by sticking to the 'Also' and 'in so far as' - and finally
distinguishing the
unessential from an essence
these expedients instead of warding off deception in the process of
apprehension - prove to be empty
the truth of this logic of perceptual process - proves to be in one and the
same respect the opposite of itself - and to have an essence of universality devoid of
distinctions
and determinations
COMMENTARY:
sense experience as the immediate connection of consciousness to the world
outside itself - is strictly speaking without content
consciousness reflects on this immediacy and gives it form and content
the singular being of sense does not vanishes - it was only ever there as the
contact of consciousness with the unknown
my meaning is never definitive - perception regards the object as a
sophisticated unknown - that can be characterized and thus can be grasped for use
the 'single unity' does not burden us with contradictory extremes - the object
is simply essentially and unessentially - unknown
how consciousness regards the 'single unity' - depends on whether or not there
is a clear conception of use
it is not a matter of 'also' and 'in so far as' - consciousness deals with
possibilities of definition - possibilities of use - and the object does not have these
possibilities - outside of consciousness - the object as a question of use becomes a range of possibilities
conception which is really only the operation of consciousness on perception -
is never without distinctions and determinations
that is so long as human beings have to act
131.
ARGUMENT:
empty abstractions of 'singleness' 'universality' 'essence' 'non-essential' -
whose interplay is conceptual understanding - are often called 'sound common sense'
philosophy recognises them in their perceptual determinateness - whereas common sense takes them for the truth - as substantial material content - in fact they
hold sway over it
the essentialities in fact run to and fro through all material and content
they are what the sensuous is as essence for consciousness - and it is through
them that the process of perception and its truth runs its course
this course of perceptual alteration constitutes everyday life and activity of consciousness
in each single moment it is conscious only of this one determinateness - and
then in turn the opposite one
it does suspect their unessentiality - and resorts to the sophistry of asserting
to be true what is declared untrue
the nature of these untrue essences tries to bring together and thereby
supersede the thoughts of these non-entities
the understanding makes itself responsible for one thought in order to keep the
other one isolated - but the nature of the abstractions brings them together
it is sound common sense that is prey to these abstractions
it calls their deceptiveness a semblance of the unreliability of Things
when the understanding separates what is essential from what is unessential -
it does not secure their truth but convicts itself of untruth
COMMENTARY:
these abstractions are based on nothing - that is there is no knowledge behind
them -
they exist - Hegel's abstractions and anyone else's - as explanations of the
relation of consciousness to its object -
they are that is tools for organization - for procedure and ultimately for
action
consciousness which has no basis in itself manufactures categories to function
as basis - as foundation -
the object as unknown is not diminished by these efforts - it remains unknown
and for this reason the categories hoisted onto it never sit with any authority
-
they are infected by the nature of the thing - that is consciousness is aware
even as it uses such concepts - that they have no foundation - that they are just
responses to the
unknown - and thus finally without basis
it is not that consciousness is involved in a conflict of truth over its
abstractions - one minute true - the next false -
the truth is just that consciousness knows it does not know - there is no
conflict here
and truth is what functions - is what enables - clearly there will not be no
end to such an endeavour - and whatever is useful to this enterprise will find its place
its dangerous to speculate about the nature of common sense - but in my view
what common sense points to is conceptual openness
absolutes tend to be the refuge of insecurity - the trick is to understand that
insecurity is the grain of being - that it is the essential intrigue of conscious being
III. FORCE AND THE UNDERSTANDING: APPEARANCE AND THE SUPERSENSIBLE WORLD
132.
ARGUMENT:
seeing and hearing have been lost to consciousness - and as perception
consciousness has arrived at thoughts - which it brings together in the unconditioned
universal
if this was an inert simple substance - it would be one extreme of
being-for-self - for it would be confronted with non-essence - but if so it would be unessential -
and consciousness would not have escaped the deceptions of the perceptual process
however this universal has returned into itself out of conditioned
being-for-self
this unconditional universal which is the true object of consciousness - is
still just an object for it
consciousness has not yet grasped the notion of the unconditioned as Notion
it is essential to distinguish the two -
for consciousness the object has returned into itself from its relation to
another and has become Notion in principle - but consciousness is not yet for itself the
Notion - and consequently does not recognise itself in that reflected object
for us this object has developed through the movement of consciousness and consciousness is involved in that development - and the reflection is the same
both
sides - there is only one reflection
but since this is movement consciousness has for its content objective essence
and not consciousness as such
consciousness shrinks away from what has emerged and takes its essence in the objective sense
COMMENTARY:
clearly Hegel wants to argue that self-consciousness or consciousness of consciousness - consciousness holding itself as object - is an outcome a
development of consciousness' movement
in general on this issue I wish to say consciousness is self-consciousness
that it makes no sense at all to speak of awareness that is not in some sense
aware of itself
all awareness is self-aware
and I argue this is just what distinguishes consciousness from its primary
object - the non-conscious
the conscious dimension of an entity is the internality of that entity - the
non-conscious - the externality - is in the first place the body and then the
external world the body exists in
also it is clear that this primary distinction of consciousness and
non-consciousness - of internality and externality - mind and body - is only possible because
consciousness is aware of itself
it is this awareness (of self) that is at the basis of notion - of distinction
consciousness just does distinguish itself and it can only do this if it is
aware of itself
and here too is the foundation of logic - for it is in consciousness' awareness
of itself that negation is introduced -
because of its awareness and the distinction this implies - consciousness is
thus aware of what it is not
and this 'what it is not' - is the basis on which - the 'other' is recognized
and defined
just a note - it is important to see that consciousness does not as many
philosophers - principally Descartes - have thought - see the body primarily as its negation
consciousness recognizes itself as internality - consciousness sees itself as
the internal dimension of an operating unity - the non-conscious dimension of
which is the body
so in this sense consciousness sees the body as itself revealed
and itself as the body hidden
the unity which is consciousness and non-consciousness - that is in a
non-dimensional sense - is unknown
133.
ARGUMENT:
with this Understanding consciousness has superseded its own untruth and the
untruth of its object
what has emerged is the Notion of True - but this is not yet a Notion - it
lacks the being-for-self of consciousness
the Understanding without knowing itself - lets go its own way
this truth follows out of its own essence - consciousness plays no part in its
realisation - it simply apprehends it
we must step into its place and be the Notion which develops and fills out
it is through awareness of this fully developed object that consciousness first
becomes a consciousness that comprehends its object
COMMENTARY:
consciousness superseding its own truth and its object's - is to point out that consciousness posits or holds the object in awareness - and so too
consciousness posits or holds itself in awareness -
and the reason for this is the first realization of consciousness - that its
object is unknown - and the second realisation (consciousness) is that it is unknown
whatever thus comes to be the object and the awareness of the object is never
held with certainty - consciousness deals with the world and with itself as
uncertain posits
and this fact is the origin of consciousness' creativity - what I guess Hegel
would call its movement
the movement of consciousness is no more than its uncertainty in action
truth in fact is just a marker for consciousness - if a state of consciousness
is marked as true it is viewed as having function - if false - the mark is ‘do not
proceed’ - go directly to jail
this fully developed object is just the unknown with layers of clothes - and
the truth of this adornment is only to do with whether these accessories enable
the object to have the function consciousness intends
134.
ARGUMENT:
consciousness negated its one-sided notions and abstracted them - it gave them
up - but the result is the unity of 'being-for-self' and 'being-for-another'
the absolute antithesis is posited as a self-identical essence
being-for-self and being-for-another are the content as well as the form of the moments in reciprocal relation
but being-for-self and being-for-another are the content itself since the
antithesis in its truth can have no other nature than the one yielded in the result - that the
content taken
in perception is true - belongs in fact only to form - in the unity which is
dissolved
the content is likewise universal
no particular content could fail to fall within this unconditioned universality
in general to be for itself and to be in relation to an other constitutes the
nature and essence of the content - whose truth consists in it being unconditionally
universal
COMMENTARY:
I would put that Hegel's unconditioned universal which he argues constitutes
the nature and essence of content - is effectively an abstraction that is empty of
content -
and is a theoretical devise designed to empty content from perception -
for it is true that in the unconditioned universal there is no negation -
the reason for this - is I suggest - there is nothing to negate
the unconditioned universal is being put up as a category of knowledge that has
no content - it comes at the end of a rather tortuous logical route
what it amounts to is this - that reflective consciousness reveals perceptual / conceptual posits as ultimately without epistemological content - that is as
unknowns
what I have put is that the object of consciousness is unknown - reflection on
this I say - simply - finally reflects this reality -
this is the reality of the 'unconditioned universal'
in the meantime - between immediate perception - the perceptual unknown - and
the reflective unknown - is the operating reality of consciousness in the world
it is between the unknowns of perception and reflection that the world we deal
with - with all its features intact - is to be found
veridical reality and its interpretations - is the world we operate in
the illusion of knowledge is the operating basis of consciousness in the world
consciousness is aware of the uncertainty of its posits - and finally of the
relation that creates them - and yet at the same time recognises the absolute necessity of
these posits
these posits - which finally comes down to consciousness and its object - are
real - though uncertain - they are the 'foundations' of the world we operate in
they are nothing more or nothing less than operational posits
consciousness can never escape consciousness - to have any sense of itself - it
must hold itself as object -
this holding of the self as object - this subject positing itself as object -
reveals a complete absence of self-knowledge
self-knowledge I would suggest is an operating illusion of consciousness
135.
ARGUMENT:
the unconditioned universal is an object for consciousness - there emerges in
it the distinction of form and content - and in the shape of content the moments look
like they did in the first presentation - on one side - a universal medium of many
subsistent 'matters' - on the other a One reflected into itself - in which
their independence is extinguished
these moments exist only in this universality - they are no longer separated
from one another - they are essentially self-superseding aspects - and what is posited
is only their transition into one another
COMMENTARY:
I have an argument with Hegel regarding his unconditioned universal - either it
is unconditioned or it is not -
if it is unconditioned it is without form and content - it is pre these
conditions
and as such it is correctly understood as the unknown -
and in my terms the description 'unconditioned universal' can be dropped
altogether
on the other hand if Hegel is offering a theory of the object - his
unconditioned universal as stated above - all very well - this is a reflective argument
concerning the unknown -
as I have said before as a theory of the unknown such a creation is in
principle as good as any other
but let's be absolutely clear here - what we are talking about is a theory of
the object of consciousness -
a theory of - the object is not this theory - the theory is a response to the
object - and here I mean the object is pre any such theory - the object 'in itself' is
unknown - and
remains so regardless of one's ingenuity and imagination
136.
ARGUMENT:
the unconditioned universal is simply and solely the plurality of the diverse
universals
the universal an undivided unity with this plurality
these 'matters' mutually interpenetrate but are independent
their unity directly unfolds its diversity and once again reduces itself to
unity
this movement is what is called Force
one of its movements - the dispersal of the independent matters in their
immediate being is the expression of Force
but force taken as that in which they have disappeared is Force proper - Force
that has been driven back into itself from its expression
Force exists only in thought
what has been posited is the Notion of force - not its reality
in fact Force is the unconditioned universal - which is equally in its own self
what it is for another - or which contains the difference in its own self
in order then that Force may in truth be - it must be set free from thought -
it must be posited as the substance of these differences
Force exists as an exclusive One - for which the unfolding of the different
matters is another subsisting essence - and thus two distinct independent aspects are set
up
these differences are superficial vanishing moments
there would be no Force if it did not exist in these opposite ways
these two moments exist independently and supersede themselves
in general it is clear that the movement is nothing else than the movement of perceiving
thus the movement which was the destruction of contradictory notions - has
objective form and is the movement of Force
the outcome of which is the unconditioned universal as something not objective
but rather the inner being of things
COMMENTARY:
the inner being of things - if indeed things have an inner being - is
consciousness
the nature of consciousness is that it is inner - that it is internality
this is the essence of consciousness and effectively nothing more can be said
of it
there are no substantial issues to the question of consciousness -
consciousness is not a substance - it is a dimension - the internal dimension
that is awareness
consciousness recognizes consciousness directly - which is to say internality recognises internality
or dimensional entities recognize dimensional entities - perhaps it is a
recognition of type
the point is not all entities have an internal dimension -
I would put it to you that from what we can see most of reality is
one-dimensional
consciousness is thus exceptional
and what this amounts to is to say much of reality is one-dimensional - simply externality
some of reality has an internal dimension
not very neat logically - somewhat skew-whiff - nevertheless - from what we can
see that's how it is -
such an argument would not sit well with Hegel - it is clear he does not want exceptions in his universe
he has represented the object as an argument from consciousness - and extended
this description - as a matter of logic to everything
so the world of the universal and the universals within the universal - and the movements of these universals - the movements of difference and unity - is for
Hegel
not just a construction an invention an imagination of consciousness - but
rather the objective reality of the world outside of consciousness -
the hard and pure reality is that the world outside of consciousness is unknown
Hegel has indeed resisted this conclusion with every trick of the trade - and
yes his resistance has resulted in a rather magnificent work of art - one is often
reminded of a painter of grand scale and style when reading Hegel -
nevertheless the truth is any work that begins - only begins on a blank canvas
Hegel knows his grand picture is only a picture - and he has it mind for it to
be the reality - that is pictured - and for this picture and its reality to in some
sense be one
for that to happen we need something to kick start it off the page - or out of
the mind
enter force -
now the universal is force - and force of course will get everything moving
this jump from concept to reality here is reminiscent of the ontological
argument of Anselm
137.
ARGUMENT:
Force is itself this universal medium in which the moments subsist as 'matters'
- or in other words - Force has expressed itself - and what was supposed to be
something else soliciting it is really force itself
it exists as the medium of the unfolded matters
but equally essentially it has the form of the supercession of the subsisting
matters – or is essentially a One
COMMENTARY:
it is clear that 'Force' becomes a characterization of the unconditioned
universal - of a One
and what this tells us is that the unconditioned universal - is undefined - it
can function as a ground for definition
in this case the idea that is being running through the universal is force
one gets the impression that any notion could have its place here -
that Hegel's universal does not discriminate regarding its use
this is OK - but what it really points to is that this universal is an unknown
that becomes the ground for description - in this case 'force' - but anything is
possible
we can also see from this that language has meaning given particular use -
given a particular slant -
the term 'force' is a term that is designed to function in e.g. a dynamic
context - in a context that is in which we wish to explain movement -
how far you want to go with this depends on how far you think the concept
extends
if you end up thinking of it in a holistic way - the particularity of the
concept is by definition lost - you move into the realm of such indefinite terms as 'one',
'universal'
etc.
and its really at this point that function is lost
and this is why in my view such terms as 'universal' 'one' 'totality' are of no
use
they are actually not positive concepts though they are often presented as such
- they are in fact non-functional concepts - that have been mistakenly accorded
significance
perhaps this is overstating the case a little
clearly such concepts have function - but only in a formal sense
whereas when it comes to force e.g. we are dealing with a concept that defines
action
we can I think also say of these formal concepts that in a metaphysical sense -
they function as signs of the unknown
they function as markers of the foundationless ground of consciousness and the
world
138.
ARGUMENT:
what appears as an 'other' and solicits Force - proves itself to be Force - for
the 'other' is as much a universal medium as the One - and each of these forms appears as a vanishing moment
the notion of Force - in that it has an 'other' has gone from a unity to
duality -
instead of the antithesis we have two independent forces
the second force solicits the retraction of Force into itself - through its
being solicited to do so
this distinction between solicited Force and soliciting Force is transformed
into the same reciprocal interchange of determinateness
COMMENTARY:
Hegel's argument is that underlying the relation of the conditioned universals
(in the unconditioned universal) is Force
and here he argues that to understand the action of Force we must posit two
forces - or two moments of Force
and Force proper is essentially the alteration of these two moments - i.e. the
second force solicits the retraction of Force into itself
so we have a dynamic in Force - that is the action of Force
the question is I think - do we need to posit force as the explanation of - as
the action behind the movement of consciousness?
is not 'force' here just an attempt at explanation of 'movement' - a definition
if you like
a way of characterizing the 'action' of consciousness?
I think the answer is yes -
any explanation of consciousness will simply be consciousness reflecting on its
own action
which in effect is no more than just the very conscious event that is being
explained - for in the end consciousness is reflection
the real question is - how do we explain reflection?
characterising consciousness as a relation of moments - or as the action of
forces underlying these moments - might prove useful in the sense that it does seem to
give us some kind of handle on consciousness
all very well
however any such characterization is just - in the end a reflection - on what?
on reflection
and this you could say is just what self-consciousness is -
we perhaps might like to think that each reflection on reflection - in some way
reveals more - goes deeper into the nature of consciousness
but in the end I am afraid a reflection is just a reflection
and we can only ever account for reflection via reflection
what does this tells us?
it tells us consciousness is an action (reflection) - and that is as far as we
can go with
any analysis
does reflection on reflection - reveal 'self-consciousness'?
I use to think so - these days as I just said I think of consciousness as a
kind of action
as an internal action
if self makes any sense - in my view it is just internality
and thus consciousness' awareness of itself as inside
that is it is awareness of dimension
and the inside is just the inside
your inside and my inside - no difference per se
139.
ARGUMENT:
the interplay of the two Forces thus consists in their being determined as
mutually opposed
the soliciting Force e.g. is posited as a universal medium and the one
solicited on the other hand - as Force driven back into itself
the first Force has its determinateness only through the other and solicits
only in so far as the other solicits it to be a soliciting force - and its determinateness
passes over to the other
the solicited Force gives the other its character as a universal medium - it
gives the soliciting Force this character because this determination is essential to it -
because this is its own self
COMMENTARY:
first up we have no explanation of force here -
what we have at best is simply an account of its 'logic' - its soliciting and
its being driven back into itself - there is an attempt to present a description of force
as a dynamic
this is all verbalism
in the first place Hegel just simply introduced force as a category and then
did his thing on it
his argument equally applies to 'x' - or any number of similar terms - i.e.
'essence'
OK - let's say Hegel just does want to introduce force - and say something
about it - because it is an important concept for him -
that is he is setting up his view - and force is in there
nothing wrong with this as such
the point is though we can read these paragraphs on force and really be none
the wiser
yes we have various metaphors for its nature and action - but still it has no
content
Hegel's description of force is a possible description of reality
that is a particular focus or slant on the workings of consciousness and the
world
the term force has for us to begin with wide enough applicability -
from the seventeenth century at least the idea of force as a universal has been
part of the common understanding -
OK - what we need from Hegel is more than just the use of this concept - for it
to have (excuse the pun) 'force' - we need a compelling reason as to why such a
notion is to have a central importance - and a compelling reason is not just
common parlance
as it stand all Hegel has done here is give the unknown - a name and some characterisation
there is nothing wrong with this - it is just what we do - but for the
characterisation to be of value it needs to be operable - that is it needs to do work - to issue
results
as it is with Hegel all we have at this stage is an empty name
this is not to say it might not amount to something - but at the present all we
are getting from Hegel is hot air - without force
140.
ARGUMENT:
the Notion of this movement exhibits a two fold difference - one a difference
of content - one extreme - the force reflected into itself - the other the medium
of the - 'matters'
and as a difference of form - since one solicits and the other is solicited -
the former active the other passive
according to the difference of content they are distinguished for us -
but according to the difference of form they are independent - and in their
relation keep themselves separate and opposed to one another
these extremes are vanishing moments - the immediate transition of each into
its opposite
this truth becomes apparent to consciousness in its perception of the movement
of Force
but for us the differences are differences of form and content - vanished in
themselves
on the side of form the essence of the active - soliciting was the same as that
on the side of content - Force driven back into itself
COMMENTARY:
consciousness in relation to its object - which we now understand as force -
we can only theoretically separate consciousness and its object
consciousness in itself is without object makes no sense - what is reflected in
such consciousness?
the object without consciousness is simply unknown - nothing can be said of it
-
so we come to consciousness in the world - and consciousness in relation to it
object
the key notion here is relation
consciousness and the object are the two terms of the relation
the relation is the unity of the object and consciousness
and the unity is what the object (the world outside of consciousness) is to consciousness
and what the object becomes in its relation with consciousness
we can call the immediate relation experience
this experience is the connection between consciousness and its object
it is the unity
experience (the relation) is the ground on which consciousness operates
its operation is reflection
consciousness' reflection on this relation - on experience - is its 'knowledge'
the point is reflection is a reflection of the relation
not the object per se
not consciousness per se
consciousness and the object really are abstractions out of the relation
the relation is in itself - an unknown - even though it comes into being as consciousness in the world -
that is the world as we know it - the world we operate in
we abstract from this to consciousness and its object
we abstract that is the internal dimension and the external dimension
but the real game is what is dead centre - the relation
that is the ground of being
now I think we can only approach this ground of being in terms of its
dimensions – the internal and the external
I don't think logically we can speak directly about the relation that is the
unity
we can only speak logically in terms of its dimensions - with the understanding
that the real focus is what we don't know - the relation
nevertheless in fact in practice we do regard the object in terms of
consciousness – and we speak of consciousness as an object
what I think this shows is that we use the categories that we make as best we
can to cover the ground as best we can
reflection on this - which is what philosophy is - shows us very quickly that
such interchanging of subjective / internal categories and objective / external
categories - brakes down
and we are in analysis left point blank with what we do not know
this can lead to despair or creativity - the usual response though is to
proceed as if everything is in order - and to try and make something of it that satisfies our
needs
most I think would admit that on reflection this approach is an illusion but a
necessary one
141.
ARGUMENT:
the notion of Force becomes an actual through its duplication into two Forces
these two Forces exist as independent essences - but their movement is each
towards the other - such that their being is a being posited by the other - their being
has the significance of a pure vanishing
they do not exist as extremes that are fixed and substantial - transmitting to
each other in the middle term of their contact a merely external property - on
the contrary they are only in this middle term and in this contact
in this there is immediately present both the repression within itself of Force
or its being-for-self - as well as its expression - Force that solicits and Force that
is solicited
their essence is solely through the other
thus they have no substances of their own that support and sustain them
the Notion of Force preserves itself as the essence in its very actuality
Force as actual exists in its expression
the truth of it remains only the thought of it -
the movements of its actuality - their substances and movements - collapse into
an undifferentiated unity
thus the realization of Force is at the same time the loss of reality - in that
realization it has become something quite different - viz. - this universality - which the understanding knows at the outset to be its essence and which proves itself to
be such in the reality of Force - in the actual substances
COMMENTARY:
here consciousness and its object are instances of the one universality
the understanding consciousness has of the object - is the reality of the
object
consciousness understands itself in terms of force and understands its object
as force
this is if you like an account of the middle term - of the relation of
consciousness and
its object
the relation is force expressed in consciousness - expressed in its object
'force' is the name of the universal
even so this force argument is post immediacy - post that is raw experience -
it is a reflective and indeed metaphysical account of the relation - of the experience
and yes it is true to say the relation is a relation of unity
the relation is the unity of consciousness and its object
we experience the unity
but the unity as experienced is unknown
consciousness reflects on this - on its unity with object and characterizes it
- gives it 'substance' - or at least expression
Hegel's argument that the understanding knows immediately its essence and that
this essence is the actuality of the substances - is not correct
this 'knowledge' is not immediate at all -
it is a reflective argument - an explanation of the unity that presents -
immediately - without knowledge -
it is the ground of knowledge - it is what 'knowledge' rests on
in truth there is no explanation in the sense of a final account - just
transitory hypotheses - that function as explanation
Hegel's notion of force really just gives the unity - the unknown - a name
142.
ARGUMENT:
the first universal is the Understanding's Notion in which force is not yet for
itself
the second is now Force's essence as it exhibits itself for and in itself
the first universal would be Force driven back into itself or Force as
Substance
the second is the inner being of things qua inner - which is the same as the
Notion of Force qua Notion
COMMENTARY:
Hegel's method is to propose a general term i.e. 'force' - and to then argue
that this name applies to reality
granted we seek and need description of reality - without description we are
simply faced with the unknown - and while this may be a philosophically pure position
- in practice it is of no use -
language focuses and defines -
language is essentially a decision to act -
and for this to be the unknown is effectively disregarded
and to it - or onto it consciousness brings its frameworks
there is no one set of structures that can be applied here
the making of the known is a creative and ultimately baseless exercise
language is the assertion of coverage
so
indeed Hegel's method is essentially what does happen
where it falls down is that Hegel has not understood that the object of
consciousness is the unknown
and that whatever is proposed as its operational alternative - the unknown
remains untouched -
it is not transformed it is simply covered for practical purposes
therefore he is committed to holding that his argument is the truth
in philosophy this charge generally applies across the board
the best any of us can do is present a comprehensive and interesting
perspective on how the world is
what is in fact of most interest in a philosophical theory is ingenuity
what I say of my own view of things is that it's the best I have been able to
come up with so far - that it requires a lot more work - and as to its value in a
public sense - well that is finally a matter of sophistry and chicanery i.e. persuasion
but back to Hegel -
one other thing I would say here is that the idea of taking a term - and then
showing or arguing that it applies in all circumstances - that is the
metaphysical argument - is
nothing from nothing
Hegel may well have used any term to have the function that 'force' has in his argument
in the end he has simply resolved all description into one term
the result paradoxically is that the term has no content
the reason for this is that for a term to have content it must exclude
for this is what definition amounts to
you could ask well what meaning does language as whole have?
it has none
a statement has meaning relative to other statements
there is nothing that language as a whole is relative to
all the relations of language are internal
another thing to consider is the status of universals
here Hegel is speaking of the first and second universals
we must remember his universal argument was his solution to the problem of the fleeting nature of experience - the problem of here and now
it strikes me that his multiplicity of universals simply is the same problem in
different terms - without his recognition of the problem -
what was the problem for him - now is the solution
it seems metaphysics is often just a matter of packaging
finally I want to say here that Hegel is quite confused about what is in and
what is out
the 'inner being' of things is not the 'notion' of things
a notion is an idea had by a conscious human entity
if a thing has inner being it is a conscious thing
consciousness is internality
and the uncomfortable fact for metaphysicians is that not everything has an
inner being
non-conscious entities have only (relative to conscious entities) a surface
dimension
that is they are pure externality
one's notions about things is consciousness' reflection
we make notions in order to effect action
our idea of a thing is simply a theoretical construction designed to facilitate
action
the thing itself is mercifully free of our vanities
143.
ARGUMENT:
the true essence of things has the character of not being immediately for consciousness
consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner being
consciousness looks through this mediating play of forces into the true
background of things
the middle term which unites the two extremes - the understanding and the inner world - is appearance
for we call being that is directly and in its own self a surface show
the totality as totality or as the universal - is what constitutes the inner -
the play of forces as a reflection of the inner into itself
in the universal - the totality - things of perception are expressly present
for consciousness as they are in themselves - as moments that turn into their
opposite
the universal is the object that in itself possesses being
the being of this object for consciousness is mediated by the movement of
appearance - in which the being of perception has a merely negative significance
consciousness reflects itself out of this movement back into itself as the true
consciousness converts this truth again into an objective inner - and
distinguishes this reflection of Things from its own reflection into itself - just as the movement
of mediation is likewise objective for it
this inner for consciousness is an extreme over and against it - but it is for consciousness the true - since in the inner as with the in-itself -
consciousness possesses the certainty of itself - or the moment of its being for self
but it's not yet conscious of this ground as the being-for-self is a negative
movement
this for consciousness is still the objective vanishing appearance
the inner for Consciousness is certainly Notion - but it does not yet know the
nature of the Notion
COMMENTARY:
the true essence of things for consciousness is uncertainty
the world of appearance as a mediated world is this uncertainty
when consciousness looks through this play of mediating forces what it sees is
the unknown
and the unknown is the explanation for - the reason for - uncertainty
consciousness in relation to that which external to it - this relation is
experience - is appearance
this is the middle term
the understanding just is a function of the inner world - and here I mean not
the inner nature of things - but internality - that is consciousness
consciousness is the inner world
and I too would say that being that is directly and in its own self is a
surface show
the surface as in the external world
the totality -
the 'totality' - as I understand it is that which is undefined - so any word
denoting it is dummy word - a marker or a placement that signifies the absence of definition
the universal is on the other hand a definition of type - the universal is that
which has members - it signifies membership - so it is just a general classification
its nature has to do really with how we describe - that is how language is
structured to operate in the world
in a way the universal is best seen as an approximation of particularity - a
pointing to it -
we never of course get to it - for it is the unknown
consciousness operates with universals - the universal is its stock and trade -
the universal is form
universals are essentially without content - they are merely proposals of
category or organisation
we use them to gather particulars - to make particulars in effect - but the
particulars are just decided contents for a specific purpose
reality is never at issue - everything is real
the question is definition is description - it is here that uncertainty reveals
itself as the essence of consciousness
so the universal is not the object that possess being
the universal is an operation of consciousness - the universal is an action
appearance is just appearance - there is really nothing else to say of it
and what I mean here is that whenever we reflect on it - we come a cropper
a good deal of Hegel's thinking is about how to make appearance not what it is
- to give it a basis that has no movement - or perhaps he would say - higher
movement
appearance is just appearance - and what this amounts to is that appearance -
as with any purity - is unknown
that is essence or essences are unknown
reflection is the dissolution of essence -
reflection makes the essence into object
the object thereafter is unstable
yes consciousness does distinguish its reflection of things from its own
reflection into itself
consciousness distinguishes itself from what it is not
that is consciousness - in reflection - distinguishes internality (itself) from
externality
(what it is not)
it couldn't be further from the truth to say that consciousness possesses
certainty
the essence of consciousness is uncertainty
the self is a reflective construct of consciousness - we are best to understand
in terms of its function - what such a construct enables
consciousness is the inner - and consciousness reflects - its reflection of
itself - the construct of consciousness for consciousness - is indeed unknown -
144.
ARGUMENT:
the inner truth as the absolute universal - purged of the antithesis between the universal and the individual is the object of understanding
there now opens up above the sensuous world the world of appearance - a supersensible world which hence forth is the true world
above the vanishing present world there opens up a permanent beyond - an itself which is the imperfect appearance of Reason - or the only pure element in which
the truth has essence
COMMENTARY:
for Hegel the inner truth is his conception - the universal - and it is clear
that this absolute universal - is just another reflective step back - or conceptual step
back from reality as given - from the unknown
it seems he wants to say this conceptual argument of the absolute universal is
an accurate description of how the world is - a true account - that the world is
not only understood as this - but is in fact - this
as a pragmatic argument about how to understand the world in order to operate
in it - in principle I have no objection - if it works it works
but clearly for Hegel it is meant to be more than this
the 'sensuous world' is a description of 'immediate experience' - is a
description of ...... etc.
my point is that we never get to gold
every description is an attempt to grasp - and an attempt that in fact finally
fails
for what it is that we are trying to grasp is the unknown
we are left to fall back on some syntax - on the structure of language
this becomes our foundation - even though we realize its inadequacy - it is all
we have
so whatever the reality is that we immediately (whatever this means) come to -
its understanding or its knowledge - will of necessity be a step back
we don't need to posit a supersensible world
we just need to be realistic about the tools we have at our disposal
and we need to accept the uncertainty of our situation
positing alternative realities might be practically useful in specific contexts
however the ground is the ground - dirt is dirt
and all that is done by proposing super realities - is to move the issue of
uncertainty into another context
now you might be able to con someone that in so doing you have solved a problem
- give the impression that there is now an end to it
but in fact all such a move does is restate it
now I am not against doing this - and I think as matter of course this is just
what we do in life -
but let's do it in a clear headed fashion
understanding that what you are doing is re-conceptualizing a state of affairs
that is unknown
we have to deal with the unknown - such is the purpose and function of
epistemology
145.
ARGUMENT:
the object now has the extremes of the inner being of Things and the
Understanding and appearance as the middle term
the Understanding sees the inner world through the middle term and it learns
about the close linked unity of these terms
COMMENTARY:
the object has no inner being or understanding
inner being is consciousness
understanding is consciousness operating with and on the object which in itself
is unknown
yes appearance is the middle term - it is the basic relation of consciousness
to its object
the understanding is reflection on this - on this relation
consciousness - the understanding recognises itself as internality and it
recognises what it is not - that which is external to it
it operates reflectively with the relation given between itself and the
external world
appearance is this relation
'knowledge' is reflection on this relation
NB:
consciousness expresses itself
the non-conscious does not express - there is no self to express
the expression is a function of consciousness' searching for foundation
the foundation does not exist - this fact does not alter the rationale of
consciousness
the outside world is the means of consciousness' expression
the immediate outside - the body - is consciousness means of expression
the body enables consciousness to function
the body is consciousness' mechanism
consciousness is the internal dimension of a two dimensional entity
the two dimensional function
the body - the external dimension
the unity that is the action - can only be comprehended in terms of its
expression
the unity - in itself - the person - is unknown
146.
ARGUMENT:
the inner world for consciousness is still - a pure beyond - because
consciousness does not yet find itself in it - it is empty - for it is merely
the nothingness of appearance - and the simple or unitary universal
this mode of inner being of things finds acceptance by those who say the inner
being of things is unknowable
we have no knowledge of this inner world as it is here in its immediacy -
because in the void nothing is known - or expressed from the other side
this inner world is the beyond of consciousness
if no further significance is attached to the inner world - there would be
nothing to stop us perceiving something as true that is not true
the void - the holy of holies - we must fill up with reveries appearances
produced by consciousness itself
COMMENTARY:
the inner world for consciousness just is consciousness - consciousness is
internality - and this is all consciousness is -
now what this is - this internality is not known - it is an unknown -
nevertheless it is recognized as a dimension - the internal dimension
consciousness may attempt - in fact does attempt at every move to define itself
- to 'find itself' - but the reflective realization of consciousness is that the
lack of definition is the definition of consciousness
the external world is surface - it does not have the depth of consciousness -
that is it does not have the dimension of consciousness
the surface is just that - the surface
appearance is strictly speaking a relation -
it is the relation that is the world experienced - that is the relation of the
internal and the external - it is the unity - given
Hegel has got it all wrong in my opinion
and his fundamental mistake is with the nature of consciousness
consciousness is internality
that which does not have consciousness has no internality
the external world - the outside of consciousness - the material world - is
purely one dimensional
so there is no question of the inner being of external things
they do not have an inner being
unless that is they possess consciousness
and from what we can see such is an exception and not the rule
so the inner world is not beyond consciousness - the inner world just is
consciousness
Hegel's imaginary inner world of things has nothing to do with the issue of
truth
what appears (the external world) is what is true - and what does not appear (consciousness) is what is true
and as to the void - there is no void -
147.
ARGUMENT:
the inner world or supersensible beyond has come into being - it comes from the world of appearance which has mediated it - appearance is its essence and its
filling
the supersensible is the sensuous and the perceived posited as it is in truth
the supersensible is appearance qua appearance
the supersensible is not immediate sense certainty and perception
the world of appearance - is not the world of sense-knowledge and perception -
but the world as posited as superseded - as the inner world
it is often said the supersensible is not appearance - what is here understood
as appearance is not appearance - but the sensuous world as itself - the actual
COMMENTARY:
appearance is the relation of consciousness and its object - consciousness and
non-consciousness -
the middle term is appearance
appearance that is - is the unity of the internal and the external
and this unity becomes - is - the actual ground of consciousness and the
external world
it is where we begin - though in truth it is not the beginning
Hegel's view here is very strange - appearance as the supersensible - as the
inner world
it is not the inner world
and it is not supersensible
the inner world is consciousness -
appearance is a relation between consciousness and the non-conscious
there is no supersensibility involved here
sensibility is the relation between
the sensible world is a relation
what is given in this relation is in the first instance unknown
the relation itself though is necessary
reflection - the operation of consciousness is the creation of characterization
it is in reflection that we have 'knowledge of'
or to be precise the positing of knowledge
knowledge as that which gives us something to go on with
in itself it is nothing but a reflex -
a reflex of consciousness -
in principle no different to a reflex of the body
just the essential - natural - primitive action of the unity in action
148.
ARGUMENT:
the inner world has come into being for the understanding only as the universal
- still unfilled in itself
the play of Forces has the negative significance of being in itself nothing -
its positive significance is as a mediating agency - but this is outside of the
understanding
the inner world through the mediation fills itself out for the understanding
what is immediate for the understanding is the play of Forces - but what is
True for it is the simple inner world
the movement of Force is therefore the True
what is present in the interplay of Forces - the soliciting and the solicited
is the immediate alternation of the determinateness that constitutes the sole content
of what appears - either a universal medium or a negative unity
it ceases immediately on its appearance in determinate form to be what it was
on appearing -
by appearing in a determinate form it solicits the other side to express itself
- the latter now what the first was supposed to be
but these two relations are again one in the same - and the difference of form
is the same as the difference of content
in this way there vanishes all distinction of mutually contrasted Forces - the distinction between these Forces - soliciting and solicited - passive and
negative - collapses into one
there are no Forces - nor a determinateness of being - nor a stable medium and
unity nor diverse antitheses
what there is in this absolute flux is only difference as a universal
difference - or the difference into which the many antitheses have been resolved
this difference as a universal difference - is the simple element in the play
of Force itself and what is true in it - it is the law of Force
COMMENTARY:
the inner world - is consciousness' reflection on its object -
its object is that which is to consciousness immediately unknown
the inner world - is just the characterizations given to the object by
consciousness
and these characterizations or descriptions are decisions regarding how to
operate with the object
such operational decisions will always involve provisional definitions and
strategies for action
what is immediate for the understanding is the unknown -
which is to say consciousness' awareness that it cannot fix its object in a
determinate manner
and indeed the realisation that it has no theory of what such a fix - such determinateness amounts to
and further that any theory of determinateness even if provisional - is without foundation or basis
this is to say the object despite its appearances is unknown
and further that the appearances themselves have no basis in knowledge
what Hegel calls the state of flux is just the fact of the unknown as a
relation between consciousness and the world
the relation is uncertain - appearance is uncertain
149.
ARGUMENT:
the absolute flux of appearance becomes a simple difference through its
relation with the simplicity of the inner world - or the understanding
the inner being is an outcome of the flux or the flux is its essence
but it is a flux that is posited in the inner world as its truth
in other words negation is an essential moment of the universal - and negation
is a universal difference
this difference is expressed in the law - which is the stable image of unstable appearance
consequently the supersensible world is an inert realm of ideas which though
beyond the perceived world - for this exhibits law only through incessant change - is
equally present in it and is its direct tranquil image
COMMENTARY:
consciousness is the inner world - the inner world is the internal dimension -
its characteristic is awareness
the relation between consciousness and the non-conscious - between the internal
and the external - is the unity of these two dimensions - this unity is appearance
the characteristic of appearance is uncertainty
this uncertainty is reflected in consciousness and in the external world
uncertainty is the essence of awareness
the inner dimension therefore is not an outcome of appearance - of the
uncertainty
in a metaphysical sense it exists prior to appearance -
appearance though is what consciousness deals with
the uncertainty of appearance becomes the ground of consciousness - it becomes
the basis of consciousness
the positing of this uncertainty is consciousness' reflection on appearance
assertion and negation are the operational actions of uncertainty
law is the denial of uncertainty
law is not first and foremost a stable image - it is rather the expression of
the decision to act in the face of uncertainty
action is the denial of uncertainty
law is a reflective description of the ground for such action
any such ground is to be true - groundless - however we propose it as if it has foundation
the assertion of law is purely pragmatic -
it is finally based only on the need to act and to act in a 'rational' fashion
- which is to say an ordered fashion
the tranquil image of law is a ruse
150.
ARGUMENT:
this realm of laws is the truth for the Understanding - and the content of the
truth is in the law
this truth is only an initial truth and does not fill out the world of
appearance
the law is present in appearance - but it is not the entire appearance
with every change of circumstance the law has a different actuality
thus appearance retains for itself an aspect that is not the inner world
there are indefinitely many laws
but this plurality contradicts the principle of the Understanding for which the
True is the implicitly universal unity
the many laws must collapse into one law
but when laws coincide they lose their specific character -
i.e. the unification of all laws in universal attraction expresses no other
content than just the mere Notion of Law itself - universal attraction merely asserts that
everything has a constant difference in relation to other things
the expression universal attraction is important in so far as it is directed
against the view that everything is contingent
COMMENTARY:
for the understanding truth is always an open question - we decide out of
necessity - but recognise that such a determination of truth is pragmatic
laws are descriptions of proposed regularities - they are formulations of
reflective analysis
the term 'law' has more to do with epistemological naiveté and vanity than
anything else
we understand a so called law holds if it holds at all only within the set of circumstances it embraces or describes
any decision to use a law will involve the assumption that its content is true
a proposition is held to be true if we decide to proceed with it - that is -
utilize it
a false proposition is a useless proposition
clearly a proposition regarded as true in one set of circumstances could be
regarded as false in another
it is true that our descriptions of the world - our proposals for order and
regularity cannot embrace the whole of appearance
however the 'whole of appearance' is nothing more than the unknown that has not been characterised by consciousness
a law can be seen as the setting up of a domain of knowledge - in the totality
of the unknown
these domains - have currency so long as they effect action
we need to understand that at any time the great body of knowledge of the world
is essentially a proposal - or really a multitude of proposals for dealing with
the unknown
we can say that what is useful is good -
and this turns the light on utility - what is really useful to human beings?
it is clear that there is no universal answer to this question
my own view is that what is useful is what enables us to proceed
and that finally we all proceed or not in the unknown
Hegel thinks the true is the implicitly universal unity
this is rubbish
the true is what is useful
it is clear that this concept of utility implies multiplicity and flexibility
utility is the pure action of consciousness
'true' is the decision to proceed -
the basis of any such decision is another question -
it may be good or not
the decision is made -
the result will determine the wisdom of the action - or at least will be seen
to - or held to - so determine
yes the idea of a universal law - its value - collapses as soon as you come up
with a law of that kind -
any such law is without content
and it is so because by definition it excludes nothing
therefore there cannot be any particular content to it
nevertheless such 'laws' have value as myths - and out of myths come good
stories - and who's not up for a good story?
151.
ARGUMENT:
in contrast to specific law we have universal attraction - or the pure notion
of law
this notion is seen as the essence - but the true inner being - the
determinateness of the specific law belongs to appearance
but the pure notion of law transcends not just specific law - but law itself
the determinateness is a vanishing moment - it is only the law that is true -
not the moment
the Notion of law as universal attraction must to get its true meaning - be
grasped in such a way - as what is absolutely simple and unitary
the differences in the law return to the inner world as a simple unity
this unity is the inner necessity of law
COMMENTARY:
the idea of the notion of law - of universal law is fair enough - it is just
that - a notion
to define it so specifically as 'universal attraction' - is to give this notion
- this universal notion a particular characterisation - and in so doing take away from
the universality of the notion
a universal notion - the idea of a universal law - may have some heuristic
value - it may - it may have some emotional value - but essentially the idea is the idea
of what we do not know
to say it is 'universal attraction' destroys the notion - and its value
it's really a case of trying to have it both ways - universality - and specific characterisation -
the idea of essence again may be a useful stratagem - but essence in the sense
that Hegel is putting - is - if it is anything - just what we don't know
I wouldn't say the essence is the unknown
but I would say essence is unknown
determinateness is strictly speaking an illusion and Hegel knows this - it's
where he began
what do we say of determinateness?
the best we can say is that it is the decision to act -
to say the notion of law transcends law as such - is just to do the Hegel thing
- but actually it is also to recognise that laws are made - and made for particular
purposes - and so there cannot be any universality - that is in our
descriptions of reality
the notion of law is for Hegel - a necessary posit - it is almost for him that it
has to be - even though we have no experience of it
he wants it to be the simple that underlies the complex of experience - the
unity that underlies the diversity
from a practical point of view I can see the utility of such
in practice we do use such a notion
however I would say the purest characterization of experience is to say it is
unknown
for any other characterization i.e. as 'diversity' or 'unity' - is really an
attempt to establish a basis for use -
and it is here that contingency and necessity resolve into action
NB:
how are we to determine utility?
what is useful?
my view is that the issue is open
that in truth we don't know in any absolute sense what is useful
we face problems and we face the unknown
I think that which is useful is that which enables us to proceed in the face of
the unknown
now it could be said - well everyone proceeds anyway - no-one stops still -
there is always some action
but this is just to say from a logical point of view -
we have options and we will choose
yes
the question is what to choose?
and once the question is asked -
the state of skepticism is put on notice
so - the considered - the determined action - the chosen action - will be the
act that takes us out of a position of uncertainty
why choose one course of action and not another?
again there are no a priori answers here
we decide for our reasons
and we may find these reasons have no basis when reflected upon
but nevertheless they are the reasons for the moment
they are the reasons that enable - enable action -
they are the 'appearance' of reason
and this is what I mean by utility
- not just any action -
but a considered action
now why should this be a definition of utility - and not just a description of
a certain kind of action - i.e. - 'considered action'?
why that is - is 'considered action' - 'useful action'?
indeed - 'utility' is a philosophical classification
- no action is or is not useful in itself
to describe in this way is to place a framework on action
philosophically speaking there are any number of frameworks
action itself is - in itself - unknown
we give it characterization by framing it
there is no way of 'testing' philosophical frameworks - to decide - which is
true
one's perspective here is an outcome of one's philosophical exploration
the argument is always - open
152.
ARGUMENT:
the law is present in a twofold manner - once as a law where the differences
are expressed as independent moments - and in a simple withdrawal into itself which
can be called Force in the sense of the Notion of Force - an abstraction which
absorbs the
differences of what attracts and is attracted
simple electricity e.g. is Force - but the expression of difference falls
within law – this difference is positive and negative electricity
in the case of the motion of falling - Force is the simple factor of gravity -
whose law is that the magnitudes of the different moments of motion are related to one
another as root to square
electricity itself is not difference per se - not essentially the dual essence
of positive and negative electricity
it has the law of the mode of this being and it has the property of expressing
itself this way
the property is the essential property of this Force - it belongs to it
necessarily
necessity is an empty word
Force must - just because it must duplicate this way
of course given positive electricity negative too is given in principle
but that electricity should divide itself in this way is not a necessity
electricity as a simple force is indifferent to its law
it's Notion is indifferent to its being
it merely has this property - which means the property is not necessary
definition does not contain the necessity of its essence - it either exists
because we find it or it exists by means of other Forces
that is its necessity is an external necessity
being through another is to relapse into a plurality of specific laws - which
we left behind in order to consider law as law
it is only with law as law that we are to compare its Notion as Notion - or its
necessity
but in all these forms necessity has shown itself to be an empty word
COMMENTARY:
this law of attraction - that which attracts and that which is attracted - is a
law that cannot be put to the test - how could we devise a test to determine if the law
does not apply - in terms of this law - any state of affairs is either that which
attracts or that
which is attracted?
it is simply a case of a universal statement - and as such - as it does not
exclude anything - it has no testable content - that is to say in principle it cannot
be falsified
according to this law there cannot be anything that does not attract or is
attracted
the only thing you can say for it is that it shapes focus - it directs our
attention to the subject of force -
in speaking of electricity as a force Hegel says it is not essentially positive
and negative - and it is not necessary that electricity should divide itself this
way - that electricity is a simple force indifferent to its law of positive and negative
attributes
we can say here that any phenomena can be categorised and then described - and
that in essence this is the endeavour of science - levels of description
always we can say that the phenomenon in itself 'is indifferent to' its
description
in describing consciousness places phenomena within more and more general descriptive frameworks
this is the business of dealing with phenomena
outside of this dealing the phenomena is unknown
it is only 'known' in terms of the descriptive attributes given to it
I should point out - we never begin - in this descriptive process with a
pristine state -
always we come to description - in the midst of a given description - it is in
response to this given description that we develop our theories - our stratagems for
action
however at the same time we see that outside of description primary or
secondary - what is given is unknown
so yes 'definition does not contain the necessity of its essence' -
by the same token there is not I think any non-pragmatic value in retaining the
notions of essence and necessity
on necessity - to get right to it - we cannot know whether the world is
necessary or contingent - the world as it is - if such a concept makes any sense - is simply
the world undefined - which is to say unknown
contingency and necessity are best understood as tools - for dealing with what
we face
they are concepts that have a role in certain activities and certain
understandings
mathematics has used the notion of necessity as a concept fundamental to its operations
and empirical science has done the same with contingency
153.
ARGUMENT:
in the law of motion it is necessary that motion be split up into time and
space or again into distance and velocity
thus motion is only the relation of these factors - the universal - is
certainly divided in its own self
but these parts do not express themselves in a One
they are indifferent to one another - space is thought to be able to do without
time - time without space - distance without velocity - just as their magnitudes are indifferent to one another - since they are not related to one another as
positive to
negative - and are thus not related to one another in their essential nature
the necessity of the division is thus certainly here - but not the necessity of
the parts for one another
but its just for this reason that the first necessity is a sham - a false
necessity
for motion itself is not thought of as something simple as a pure essence - but
as already divided - time and space are in themselves independent parts or
essences - distance and velocity - modes of being - ways of thinking
if it is thought of as simple essence motion is no doubt gravity - but this
does not contain these differences at all
COMMENTARY:
what you have with Hegel here is the placing of common sense and the science of
the day in a philosophical arrangement
his philosophy is designed to show that the conceptions of space and time
distance and velocity - can be further resolved into the broader categories of his
metaphysics
in this way his philosophy is descriptive
he is proposing a description of the world
now I say this world is the relation between consciousness and the
non-conscious - between the internal and the external
the world is this relation
science is a form of description - an account of this relation
what is clear is that there is no one account of the world - of the relation
human belief systems are testament to this fact of consciousness
how are we to judge one system against another?
what is preferable?
there is no standard that is not a player in the game -
descriptive systems are non-commensurable
what Hegel does is create categories which resolve apparent non-commensurable theories
but this in effect is just to further fill out his own vision - to show that it
has 'universal applicability' - it is really just what any theorist will
attempt to do
even so his description as a complete picture is just one of a number of
possible complete pictures
and as there is no true objectivity in any of this - there is no objective
standard to appeal to
you can only work within your descriptive framework - or change it - or take up
with another
this is the artistry of living - of acting - it is what we do
possibility - this possibility of different views of the world - exists because 'knowledge' - in whatever form it is expressed - is finally only a stratagem
for dealing with the unknown
the unknown gives us the reality of possibility - the indeterminateness of
description
consciousness is the awareness of indeterminacy -
consciousness creates possible descriptions
these possible descriptions become real through our actions in the face of the unknown
154.
ARGUMENT:
either the universal - Force - is indifferent to the division that is the law -
or the differences - the parts are indifferent to one another
the Understanding however has the Notion of this implicit difference just
because the law is on the one hand the implicit being - but is at the same time inwardly differentiated
that this difference is an inner difference follows from the fact that the law
is a simple force - or is the Notion of the difference - and is therefore a
difference belonging to the Notion
but this inner difference still falls to begin with only within the
Understanding - and is not yet posited in the thing itself
it is therefore only its own necessity that is asserted by the Understanding -
the difference here is not a difference of the thing itself
this necessity which is merely verbal is thus a recital of the moments
constituting the cycle of the necessity
the moments are indeed distinguished but their difference is expressly said to
be not a difference of the thing itself - and consequently it is immediately cancelled
again – this process is called explanation
a law is enunciated - from this its universal element or ground is
distinguished as Force - but this difference is no difference - the ground is constituted
exactly the same as the law
the single occurrence of lightning is apprehended as a universal - and this law
is enunciated as the law of electricity - the explanation then condenses the law
in Force as the essence of the law
this Force then is so constituted that when it is expressed - opposite
electricities appear - which disappear again into one another - that is Force is constituted
exactly the same as the law - there is no difference between them
Force and law have the same content
COMMENTARY:
a statement or law i.e. 'all a's are b's' - strictly speaking can never be
asserted in the first place - we have no grounds for such a proposal
so we ask what is going on in the proposal of law?
it is simply this - universal statements give the appearance of certainty
they are in effect a simple denial of uncertainty
and I would put that they therefore function as platforms on which and from
which we deal with - the true reality of uncertainty
for purposes of action we need such illusions -
they are false platforms - created for the purpose of looking forward and
proceeding
in such proposals as 'all a's are b's' - what we have is an argument of unity -
the differences are there 'a' is 'a' - 'b' is 'b' - the argument is that all
a's are b's - which is to dissolve the differences - the particularities - into what -?
clearly just the notion of singularity
and this is really the logic of the idea of singularity -
the argument that particularity dissolves -
dissolves into what?
well here the answer is Hegelian in a sense -
into the opposite of particularity
now it's not hard to see that this conclusion - has no content -
multiplicity is given - unity is posited as its opposite
but here the argument as much of Hegel's argument does - assumes there is
always an opposite - and that the opposite has reality
it is true we can always construct an opposite simply by applying the negation
sign
the fact that we can perform this operation - may well be very useful at times
however it doesn't follow that in performing that operation we are pointing to
an actual state of affairs
Buddhism and other mystical traditions are based on the fallacy of negative
content
the notion of singularity I am suggesting is without content -
clearly though - even as such it has function in our thinking
perhaps it gives us the idea of space
and in order to organize our actions such an idea is necessary
it is clear that when Hegel speaks of force and law as having the same content
what we are getting from him is alternative descriptions of the unknown
these descriptions are - in terms of the unknown - equivalent
their difference is a matter of function
155.
ARGUMENT:
in this tautological movement the Understanding sticks to the inert unity of
its object
and the movement falls only within the understanding
it’s an explanation that explains nothing - only repeats the same thing
in the Thing itself this movement gives rise to nothing new - it comes into consideration as a movement of the understanding
in it we detect what is missing in the law - the absolute flux - for this
movement is directly opposite of itself - it posits a difference which is not only a
difference for us
but one which the movement cancels as a difference
this is the same flux as presented itself as the play of forces - soliciting
and solicited forces - but these distinctions were no distinctions - and immediately cancelled
out
what is present here is not merely a bare unity in which no difference would be posited - but a movement in which the distinction is made - but cancelled
this process of explaining the to and fro of change - which before was outside
of the inner world and present only in appearance - has now penetrated the
supersensible
world itself
consciousness has passed over from the inner being as object - to the other
side - into the Understanding - and it experiences a change there
COMMENTARY
yes - the cancelling out of the movement - if this is what happens it is a cancelling
out to what?
if the movement is cancelled - what do we say of it?
that it is an illusion -
for either it is a real movement - which presumes movement is possible -
actually occurs - or it is not -
and as to the status of such - if it is an illusion - what is this to mean?
if it is a comprehended movement - it has some reality
if you want to then say - well reality just doesn't support such a movement -
then it's pretty clear your theory of reality is what is out of whack
the focus of consciousness is like a template that is placed on all conscious
experience
if you want to say time moves on - then this template moves with it
the focus of consciousness - of a consciousness - is the action of a
particularity within a non-particular context
consciousness moves with the movement and therefore its focus - while a focus -
is never still
the object in this movement is rendered unknown by the movement
reflective consciousness fixes the object as an argument
this is how the object is held in consciousness
reflective consciousness theorizes and describes the object
this action moves it from the phenomenal realm into the theoretical
this theoretical realm is no timeless form -
the act of description and particularly its expression in language - as it were
holds the moment - this is the idea of it anyway
for operational purposes we assume we are then dealing with a fixed form - and
one therefore we have some hope of dealing with and of manipulating
but really all we have done is create a descriptive event - which in its
complexity is an argument
also it is worth noting we only operate on this level - in these terms given
the very real fact of memory
and memory here I will put is clearly a necessary function for and of
consciousness
and it is clear consciousness can only function in memory given a certain
physical state of it functional external - the body
so I am saying the fact of focus - focus in time is no metaphysical conundrum -
it is just the fact of it
reflectively we can say this is what happens
and yes we can try and explain it - and for a lot of reasons - this can be an
important thing to do - it can help us function better in the world
but this is all it is - explanation is simply a ground for function
156.
ARGUMENT:
thus this change is not yet a change of the thing itself - but presents as pure
change because the contents of the moments remain the same
this change becomes for the Understanding the law of the inner world
the understanding thus learns it is a law of appearance itself - that
differences arise that are no differences and the self same repels itself
and differences cancel themselves - thus what is not self same is self
attractive
thus a second law - difference which remains self same - this expresses that
like becomes unlike and vice versa
the second law posits the permanence of impermanence
consequently the difference exhibits itself as a difference in the thing in
itself or as an absolute difference
and this difference of the thing is thus the self same that has repelled itself
from itself and posits an antithesis that is none
COMMENTARY:
the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious is the reality we face
thus for consciousness the object of consciousness does not appear as the thing
itself
the thing itself is for all intents and purposes an abstraction - if anything -
an abstraction from the appearance
so any change in the object is a change only in the appearance - the object as appearance
the thing in itself - on a phenomenal level is irrelevant
as a reflective argument it has a function in consciousness - but this is a
theoretical function
the thing in itself cannot be known - so the issue of change does not arise
the object as an appearance is what?
well strictly we don't know
however the function of consciousness is to describe
so the object is consciousness' description
we know consciousness does not remain still
so descriptions change
in a logical sense the object of consciousness as an objective reality is the
sum of possible descriptions
and this does not presume some fixed point that all possible descriptions refer
to
the point of descriptions is itself up for argument
these epistemological issues are never resolved qua epistemology
'resolution' is only a decision to move or proceed in relation to a conception
that provisionally stabilises the object of consciousness
here it must be understood that issues of 'change' and 'sameness' are arguments
that are never settled qua argument
rather they are acted upon and the action is as close to resolution as is
required
finally any action is - despite its apparent determinateness - an argument that
can be opened up
157.
ARGUMENT:
through this principle the first supersensible world of laws - the immediate
copy of the
perceived world is changed into its opposite
the law was like its differences - that which remains selfsame - now it is
posited that each of the two worlds is really opposite itself
the selfsame really repels itself from itself - and what is not the selfsame
posits itself as selfsame
here the like is unlike itself and the unlike like itself
the second supersensible world is in this way the inverted world - the
inversion of the first
for the supersensible world was only the immediate raising of the perceived
into the universal element
it had its necessary counterpart in this perceived world which still retained
for itself the principle of change and alteration
the first realm of laws lacked that principle but obtains it in the inverted
world
COMMENTARY
to account for the relation that is consciousness in relation with the
non-conscious -
to account that is for the world that appears - a world that presents but is
unknown -
it is necessary to abstract from the phenomenal - the world of appearance - to
its relata -
consciousness - and its object
this is done quite instinctively - in fact it generally takes argument for us
to see that what we have -
what we are presented with is the unity -
that is to say appearance here is the unity of the conscious and non-conscious
and therefore these categories - conscious and non-conscious - are steps back
from the unity
the fact is though - and this is reality - we have no way of comprehending or
dealing with the unity - unless these steps are taken
so in practice - the analytical position is the working position - what we call
the real position -
and this is the division of the unity - into consciousness and
non-consciousness -
this is the working posit - or the position of human beings
what I am arguing here is that we do not begin with consciousness as Descartes argued
but rather that we begin with the unknown as the given reality that is
appearance -
and that this appearance can only be analyzed if we see it in terms of the
conscious and non-conscious
it is in so doing that we apprehend the reality of a dimensional existence -
we see - we recognise consciousness as the internal dimension and - the non-conscious as that which is external
so the reality of consciousness in the world - I'm suggesting is the actual
state of affairs - but it is also an analytical response to the unknown unity
consciousness recognizes itself - and its object - in response to the unknown
the unknown is where we begin
I hasten to add - the unknown is also where we end - but in the process we make
a world - which is to say we give the unknown a working character - many
characters
the greatness of Hegel's work is in the fact that he doesn't flinch on the
attempt to give
a comprehensive account of reality - he takes it on
and at the basis of this quite heroic endeavour is the assumption that we can
know
I don't think he ever seriously questions this assumption
it strikes me that he attempts to begin in the midst of it all - that he has in
mind the relation of consciousness and the non-conscious as his central focus
for Hegel you might say it is then something of a juggling act - he has the two
balls in his hands
and what he argues for - what his juggling results in is the universal
the way I see it we begin with the unity and separate out to the categories of
conscious and non-conscious
my unity though it is 'appearance' - is in an epistemological sense - the
unknown
Hegel's unity - the universal - is he thinks the unity of all opposites - the
unity that is knowledge and substance
my argument here is just that his universal is really no more than the unknown
-
I am quite happy to accept that beyond appearance - and I mean this in the
broadest sense - is not what does not appear - but what is unknown
Hegel in my terms wants to make the unknown - substantial - a substance - the universal substance
even if we were to begin with such a view - as Spinoza does - still the
question - can we even say of this (universal) that it is a substance?
to my mind - the granting of substance - though it may seem rather harmless is nevertheless - without rational basis
by all means let the imagination run wild
Hegel's theory of inversion here - that what is perceived becomes its opposite
in conception is really his attempt to give some logical justification for his
metaphysics as a solution to his account of immediate perception
he can say here the world of conception is the real world - just inverted
if this is so - it is more than just a way of seeing things - Hegel wants to
say it is in fact a truer reality -
OK - but you can always ask - why?
if one is the inversion of the other - what is the essential difference -
surely just a matter of how it is seen?
and if indeed you can see the world in one of two ways - why go with the second
- or why the first?
also you can ask what grounds do we have for this inversion?
that is why ditch the standard view that consciousness is not an inversion of
the non-conscious world - or vice versa
on what do we base this idea of the reversal of position of the internal and
external dimensions?
in is in - out is out - the relationship is essentially logical -
you could say here - Hegel has solved nothing - that he has tried to create the
opposite to his theory of perception - by just inverting it - and is then
presenting this as the solution
logically neat - but where is the world in all this?
I have deeper concerns with his account here
as I see it the world of change and alteration is a conceptual world
what we perceive immediately is the unknown - the undefined - the undescribed
reflective consciousness gives this world character - and yes you can define it
in terms of selfsameness and its opposite -
and you can theorize further and argue to something like the opposite of this -
Hegel's universal
all this is well and good - but be clear what you are doing at every stage is
theorizing the unknown
158.
ARGUMENT:
according then to the law of this inverted world what is like in the first
world is unlike to itself and what is unlike in the first world is equally
unlike to itself - or it becomes like itself
expressed in determinate moments - this means that what is the law of the first
world is sweet - in this inverted is sour - what in the former is black in the other
is white
what is the law of the first is the north pole of the magnet - in its other
supersensible in itself - in the earth - is the south pole
in another sphere revenge on an enemy is according to the immediate law to the satisfaction of the injured party - this law forces me to confront him as a
person who does not treat me as such - and in fact bids me to destroy him as an
individuality – this law is turned around by the principle of the other world
into its opposite - the reinstatement of myself as a person through the destruction of the alien
personality is
turned into self-destruction
if this inversion finds expression in the punishment of crime and made into a
law - it's only a law of one world - which is confronted by the inverted
supersensible world where what is despised in the former is honoured - and what in the former is
honoured meets with contempt
the punishment which in the first world disgraces and destroys a man is
inverted into the pardon which preserves his essential being and brings him to honour
COMMENTARY:
it is clear that the world of the unity of consciousness and non-consciousness
- that which appears -
presents our perception and that perceived - as a unity
so that we can quite naturally say - what is - is what is seen
this is the first moment of awareness
consciousness does not appear in this unity
the object 'in itself' does not appear in this unity
what appears is the unity of consciousness and non-consciousness
so appearance is a singular experience
however the singular experience as a singularity is without differentiation
consciousness divides
it separates itself out and its object is that which it is not
the separation is based on awareness - awareness of consciousness - as internal
- and thus its object as external
it is clear that the essential logical category of consciousness is negation
the operation of negation - is the operation that defines and differentiates consciousness from its object
opposition is one form of characterization of this act of differentiation (the
logic of negation)
and inversion - one kind of opposition
anyway the point is consciousness acts in this way -
and it transfers this action to the unity - to the world of appearance -
consciousness acting on and in this unity differentiates
this fundamental action forms the logical or metaphysical basis for subsequent
action
action in the world of appearance - the appearance that is unknown
independently of this action
what thus really appears is the appearance of knowledge
NB.
the action of consciousness that reveals consciousness - that results in self-consciousness is reflection
in the initial state the appearance is unified -
consciousness reflects and thus reveals itself
and in this action distinguishes itself and posits its object
the point here is that consciousness is - in the initial state unknown
unknown to itself
its action - reflection reveals
there is nothing deeper to this
reflection is just what happens - what occurs
it is the revelation of internality
and consequently of externality
this is the first reflection
reflection on this initial reflection is not revelatory in a phenomenal sense
it is interpretive and thus theoretical
159.
ARGUMENT:
superficially this inverted world is the opposite of the first in the sense
that it has the latter outside of it and repels that world from itself as an inverted actual
world - that the one is appearance and the other the in-itself - that the one is the world
for another whereas the other is the world as it is - what tastes sweet is really or
inwardly sour
but such antitheses as inner and outer - of appearance and supersensible - as
of two different kinds of actuality - we no longer find here
the repelled differences are not shared between two substances - this would
result in the Understanding withdrawing from the inner world
the one side or substance would be the world of perception again in which one
of the two laws would be operative - and confronting it would be an inner world - just
such
a sense world as the first - but in the imagination - it would be
exhibited as a sense world without its characteristics
but in fact if the one posited world is a perceived world - and its in-itself -
as its inversion is equally thought of as sensuous - the sourness would be the in
itself of the sweet thing - and it would thus be a sour thing
COMMENTARY:
Hegel introduces the idea of inversion
in the context of the consciousness and the non-conscious - it is an
interesting idea
there is a neat logic to the idea that consciousness is the inversion of the
non-conscious - that what we 'see' is the inversion of what is -
while logically neat the idea has no content - what is inverted - is just what
is (notinverted) - in a different position - a different way of seeing - the same
thing
the metaphor is geometrical
the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness can be seen as an issue of position - but not in such a simplistic way - that is it is not just a matter
of reversal
I have argued that consciousness is internality - the internal dimension of an
entity (that has an internal dimension) - and that this is a fundamentally different philosophical position to the substance arguments of the Cartesians and the materialists (brain-identity theorists)
I argue we understand a thing fundamentally in terms of its dimensions - that
the substance approach ought to be abandoned
- that is we can know a thing - whatever it is - dimensionally -
that consciousness recognizes itself as internal - and sees its body as
external
and that the notion of the unity - as unity - is unknown
so yes my own argument about mind and body is meta-geometrical -
the issue is dimension not substance
dimensions do not interact - they are the formal characteristics of a thing -
and that which has two dimensions is a different kind of thing to that which
does not
or that which is one-dimensional is effectively non-dimensional
thus metaphysically speaking there are two dimensions - the entities that are
so constructed are those entities that have an inside and an outside
internality - the second dimension
we variously describe this internal dimension as 'mind' 'consciousness'
'spirit' - even 'soul'
the essential nature of such an entity as a unity of dimensions - is unknown
we describe the unity in either internal and external terms
there is no non-dimensional language - no way to approach the unity as unity
what we have here is the unknown manifested two dimensionally
this is where we begin
160.
ARGUMENT:
from the idea of inversion - which constitutes the essential nature of one
aspect of the supersensible world - we must eliminate the idea of fixing the differences in a different sustaining element
and this absolute Notion of the difference must be represented and understood
purely as inner difference - a repulsion of the selfsame from itself and likeness of
the unlike as an unlike
we have to think contradiction
for in the difference which is an inner difference the opposite is not merely
one of two - if it were it would simply be without being an opposite - but it
is the opposite of an opposite - or the other is immediately present in it
certainly I put the 'opposite' here - and the other of which it is the opposite
there
thus the supersensible world which is the inverted world has at the same time over-arched the other world and has it within it
it is for itself the inverted world - i.e. - the inversion of itself - it is
itself and its opposite in one unity
only thus is it difference as an inner difference - or difference in its own
self - or difference as an infinity
COMMENTARY:
the internality and externality of thing are its dimensions -
which is to say the formal characteristics of its structure
now Hegel describes the relation of the sensible to the supersensible as
inversion
do we say the inside of an entity is the inversion of the outside?
this is to give the relation a definite characterization
the idea is neat in a logical sense - i.e. it does preserve the unity of the
entity and yet defines the difference in terms of perspective
and it seems to acknowledge the inside-ness of consciousness
and yes we could just say the inside of a thing is the outside - inverted
why I resist this characterisation is that it seems to carry with it much
metaphysical baggage - i.e. the sensible world is in a state of flux - the supersensible the
home of the universal -
this preserves the inversion but it is clear that the idea of inversion is not
the simple geometrical one - it is metaphysically loaded
I think this is a mistake
I think we can give a simple and elegant characterization of mind and body that
can be stated in terms that shows we do not need to fill it up with extraneous
metaphysical issues and properties
that is we can say an entity has an inside and an outside - and we understand
this just as stated - the notion of inversion is not necessary to the idea of inside - to
the idea of the relation of inside to outside
what do we say of this relation?
that one is the opposite of the other?
'opposite' is easy - but like 'inversion' it seems to imply more than just an
essential relation
internality and externality are essential qualities of a thing
these qualities are distinct - internality cannot be changed into externality
or vice versa
the space of these qualities is distinct - they exist in different spaces
so I would argue it is not just a matter of a different perspective in the same
space - which is the inversion argument
mind and matter are different dimensions regardless of perspective
furthermore perspective is a function of internality - internality is not a
function of perspective
the internality of a thing is awareness
awareness is not the inversion of its absence
the absence of awareness is its non-existence
the non-existence of a thing cannot be inverted
there is nothing to invert
161.
ARGUMENT:
we see that through infinity law completes itself into an immanent necessity -
and all the moments of the world of appearance are taken up into the inner world that the simple character of law is infinity means - (a) that it is
self-identical but is also in itself different - (b) what is thus dirempted - which constitutes the
parts thought of as in law - exhibits itself in a stable existence - and if the parts
are considered without the Notion of the inner difference - then space and time -
or distance and velocity - which appear as moments of gravity are just as
indifferent and without a necessary relation to one another as to gravity itself - (c) through
the notion of inner difference - these unlike and indifferent moments or space and time
are a difference which is no difference - or only a difference of what is self same
and its essence is unity - as a positive and negative they stimulate each other into
activity and their being is rather to posit themselves as not being and to
suspend themselves in the unity - the two distinguished moments both subsist -
they are implicit and opposites in themselves
COMMENTARY:
the way I see it is like this -
the world we experience - the world of appearance is the first moment of
awareness
reflection - which is an act or operation of consciousness divides the unity of appearance into consciousness and non-consciousness
and so we understand appearance as the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness -
the world as given - the world of appearance is initially unknown
the division of consciousness and non-consciousness - becomes for us the existential reality and the analytical reality -
this is the second moment of awareness
and so we can say that the operational reality is a divided reality - in the
sense that we recognize that the unity has for us a conscious and non-conscious
aspect
the understanding is that we can deal with the unity in terms of the relation
of its aspects
the world in the first moment prior to the reflection that gives us the
awareness of the conscious and non-conscious aspects is not a blank - but it is unknown
what is given in this first moment is analysed in the second - so that what
appears is given characterization in consciousness
this is the beginning of the reflective process that gives us operational power
this power is the power of knowledge
this knowledge though is based on the unknown - it is consciousness' reflective response to the unknown - and therefore it has no foundation other than
operation
and the truth is we operate in mystery - in the sense that why the world just
is the way it is for us is never a matter we have - 'knowledge' of - but this
understanding actually makes no difference to how we deal with what we have to
deal with
so for operational purposes the world of appearance - becomes that which is
external to consciousness
the inner world the world of thought is the resource we have to determine how
to proceed outside of thought
Hegel has it that all the moments of appearance are taken up into the inner
world -
that which is outside of consciousness and is placed in the focus of a
consciousness is the world of appearance for that consciousness -
what this is for that consciousness is in the first place given in the very
relation of consciousness and the non-conscious - but what this means is always a
reflective possibility of the individual consciousness - and what it in fact means is
shown in how the person operates - which is just thought translated into action
it is not possible to ascertain the full meaning of any action - it is here
that we are faced with infinity - what in fact happens is we decide - that is cut-off the
process and determine - and in so doing we posit the finite - we make our
actions and the world of our action finite
infinity is the reality of the absence of knowledge
decision is the world made finite
162.
ARGUMENT:
this simple infinity or the absolute Notion may be called the simple essence of
life
this self-identical essence is related only to itself
each sundered moment is a pure opposite and therefore each the opposite of
itself - therefore not an opposite at all - but rather a pure self-identical essence
philosophy cannot answer the question 'how from this pure essence does
difference or otherness issue forth?' - for the division into two moments has
already taken place
difference is excluded from the
self-identical and set apart from it
what was supposed to be self-identical is already one of these two moments
instead of being the absolute essence
that the self-identical divides into two means that it supersedes itself as an
otherness
the unity of which it is usual to say that difference cannot issue from it - is
in fact one of the two moments - it is the abstraction of the simplicity or unitary nature
over and against the difference
but in saying the unity is an abstraction - it is only one of the opposed
moments - it is already implied that it is the dividing of itself - for if the unity is a
negative it is opposed to something - then it is eo ipso posited as that which has an
antithesis within it
the different moments of self-sundering and of becoming self-identical are
therefore only this movement of self-suppression
for since the self-identical moment which becomes its opposite is an
abstraction or is already a self-sundering - its self-sundering is therefore a suppression of
what it is and therefore a suppression of its dividedness
its becoming self-identical is equally a self-sundering - what becomes
identical with itself thereby opposes itself to self-sundering - it puts itself on one side -
it becomes the sundered moment
COMMENTARY:
first up the term 'self-identical' is meaningless - the phrase suggests a
relation where none holds - a relation exists between different things - therefore a thing is
not related to itself - if it is related to anything - it is related to what is
not itself
likewise 'self-sundering' makes no sense - if a thing is sundered - it is
sundered by another thing
if 'self-identical' is the definition of essence - we can forget essence
alternatively we can simply recognize that the final nature of things is
unknown
in saying that philosophy cannot answer the question 'how from pure essence
does difference issue forth? - Hegel is for a moment recognising the truth of
skepticism
that is he is acknowledging that we do not and cannot know the origin and
nature of reality
but this acknowledgment is short lived - it is in his terms 'sundered' and I
think never to be 'un-sundered'
really where Hegel shines is in his introduction of movement into the
metaphysical realm
and it is a useful concept in relation to the problem of unity and diversity
his idea in short is that the unity diversifies and that the diversification
unifies and that this movement is ongoing - that is it is of the nature of reality -
reality is this movement
his logic of opposites is the conceptual underpinning or description for this
reality
and he can say that his logic expresses the movement of reality and that the
movement of reality is described or expressed in his logic
one cannot help but think that whatever else you might say against Hegel's
argument
there is no doubt his identification of reality as a movement is of lasting
significance
and value
for Hegel - it is the movement - the fact of change that is unchanging -
and this for him is the essence of life
as to this movement - it is quite simply unknown -
Hegel devotes all his power to describing it - 'explaining' it - but really all
his efforts finally point to the fact that the 'movement' is no more than a name for the
unknown
to my mind his dialectical argument amounts to saying that the idea of stable knowledge is an illusion
and I would go the one step further and say that therefore this account of
knowledge and reality - cannot itself be held outside of it own logic
that is to say that such a metaphysics - like what it describes is only a
moment in an ever changing reality
language fixes it to a page - therefore it has the appearance of being what it
is not - unchanging
in fact like everything else it is ephemeral
from an artistic perspective it is a moment of revelation - even a moment of
delight
163.
ARGUMENT:
infinity or this absolute unrest of pure movement - is being - is the soul of
all that has gone before -
it is in the inner world that it has freely and clearly shown itself
appearance or the play of forces displays it - but it is as explanation that it
first freely stands forth
and in being finally an object of consciousness - as that which it is -
consciousness is thus self-consciousness
the Understanding's 'explanation' is primarily the only description of what self-consciousness is
the reason why 'explaining' affords so much satisfaction is just because in it consciousness is so to speak communing directly with itself - enjoying only
itself - although it seems to be busy with something else - it is in fact occupied only
with itself
COMMENTARY:
it is very disappointing to finally get to self-consciousness in Hegel's
argument - and to get nothing from him
it appears that he does not see that the question of how the inner world of consciousness becomes an object of consciousness - is the question that must be answered in any theory of consciousness
it is not even on his radar - as if there is no question here
and this is the central issue of consciousness - the nature of
self-consciousness -
how does the subject hold itself as object - how can the subject be object?
what kind of thing can be subject and object - how can we explain or comprehend
this?
to simply say - consciousness exists as 'object consciousness' - and thus
consciousness is self-consciousness - is at the best breathtakingly naive
in what sense - how - does consciousness exist as an object?
we have no account form Hegel on this issue
his next point is that the understanding's explanation of consciousness is the
only description of what self-consciousness is -
so on this view - the understanding is something other than consciousness
to be cruel here you could say therefore the understanding is by definition -
non-conscious - and this of course is ridiculous
or the alternative is - that the understanding is consciousness - and therefore consciousness' explanation of itself is the only description of self-consciousness
OK - so how does consciousness 'describe itself" - what is being
described?
and again - how is that consciousness can regard itself as the object of
consciousness?
these are all questions Hegel's seems not to have recognized - or if recognized
decided not to address
and everything depends on the answers here
finally it's clear that he has put all this in the too hard basket - and just
taken the apparently easy way out - an unexplained solipsism -
'it is in fact only occupied with itself'
as I said this is a sad chapter in Hegel's discussion
I was really hoping he would take this issue on - instead he has just
sidestepped it
I am going to jump in here and put some conclusions -
consciousness is self-consciousness -
to be aware one must be aware that one is aware
so this is just the nature of consciousness - of awareness
by its nature consciousness is 'self-illuminating' - and this is where we begin
if so consciousness - does not become self-conscious
the categories of subject and object - of knower and known are constructs of consciousness deigned to give some logical foundation to our dealings with the unknown that is appearance
consciousness recognizes itself as internality - it is thus aware of its meta
place
the world outside of consciousness is the external world
the external world is the object of consciousness
consciousness recognizes itself as knower -
the idea that consciousness is known - that you can know yourself - is to
confuse subject and object
consciousness does not - cannot know itself
'itself' is internal - the known is external -
consciousness is not external to itself
consciousness is aware of itself - aware of itself as unknown
this is the essential nature of consciousness - that it recognizes itself as
unknown
in fact it sees itself as unknowable
the category of knowability does not apply to consciousness - only to that
which is outside of consciousness
awareness of self is simply and only the awareness of internality
and this awareness is not an awareness of something - of substance - it is an
awareness of dimension -
which is simply to say it is an awareness of logic - of logical form
that is consciousness' awareness of 'itself'
my view is that the world of appearance is the relation of consciousness and
its object
that this relation is the common ground of conscious and non-conscious being -
it is the working reality
and so it is the case that consciousness reflects on what is given in this
working reality
and what is it that is given?
I am going to put something quite radical in answer to this -
my view is that the relation of consciousness and the non-conscious is the
common reality that is image -
the relation of mind to its object results in image
the ground that consciousness comes to in the second moment is the world of
image
I say this here to get to the fact that image is not a characteristic of the
internal - and it is not a characteristic of the external - not that such a
view would generally need to be argued
image is the relation
image is the reality of the relation of the conscious and non-conscious
therefore as object the image is reflected on by consciousness
it is this reflective action that transfers the image as reflection to
consciousness
so it will be asked - if so what is the internality of consciousness?
most would say it is the world of image - at the very least
the internality of consciousness is thought
and thought is without image
imagination is the action of thought in the world of image
it is consciousness' dealing with the world of image
and what can we say of the nature of the this relational world - this unity of
the conscious and non-conscious?
it is not to be confused with the internal or with the external -
so how is it to be characterized?
my answer is both ways -
it's really the Blues Brother's joke - "what kind of music have you got
here?" "we got both kinds - country and western"
the point is - we can only explain the unity in terms of thought or non-thought
in terms of mind or matter
the unity that is the unity of mind and matter is not definable - it is unknown
164.
ARGUMENT:
infinity becomes the object of the Understanding - but the Understanding falls
short of infinity as such - since it apportions to two worlds - that which is a
difference in itself - the self-repulsion of the self same and the
self-attraction of the unlike
to the Understanding the movement as it is found in experience is a mere
happening - and the self same and the unlike are predicates whose essence is an inert
substrate
what is for the Understanding an object in a sensuous covering - is for us a
pure Notion
the exposition of its Notion belongs to science - consciousness immediately has
this Notion - and the notion comes onto the scene as a form belonging to
consciousness itself - or as a new shape of consciousness
since this object of infinity is an object for consciousness - the latter is
consciousness of a difference that is no less immediately cancelled
consciousness is for its own self - it is a distinguishing of that which
contains no difference - or self-consciousness
I distinguish myself from myself - and in doing so I am directly aware that
what is distinguished from myself is not different from me
I - the self-same being repel myself from myself - but what is posited as
distinct from me or as unlike me - is immediately in being so distinguished - not a
distinction for me
it is true that consciousness of an 'other' - of an object in general - is itself
necessarily self-consciousness - a reflectedness-into-self - consciousness of itself - in
its otherness
the necessary advance from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their
truth
was a Thing - an 'other' than themselves - expresses just this - that not
only is consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness - but that
self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes
but it is only for us that this truth exists - not yet for consciousness
but self-consciousness has become simply for itself - not yet as a unity with consciousness in general
COMMENTARY:
infinity in the sense of a conception of the endless or the boundless is a
pseudo conception in that a concept is a concept because it is bound or defined - that
is if this infinity makes some kind of existential sense - it cannot be
conceived - what you have here is the mistake that the non-concept refers or
signifies - an example of the general logical error that the negative refers -
or is a sign of a kind of reality - when in fact all the negative is - is a
sign of decision - the decision not to proceed -
beyond what is conceived - is relative to the conception - that which is not
known - this is the best that can be made of this 'infinity theory'
the 'mere happening' Hegel refers to is just a description of the fact of
consciousness facing the unknown - this unknown or 'mere happening' is the object of
consciousness - it is just what consciousness must and does make something of
the 'object in a sensuous covering' is the world of appearance - that is the
relation of consciousness and the non-conscious - the ground which consciousness
reflectively interprets - for us it is a pure notion in the sense that it is the unknown -
this is its
'purity' - if you want to go down the poetic track
science is indeed a tool for the exposition of the world of appearance as it is
given as an unknown - and yes consciousness immediately has this notion - it is what is
given
to consciousness - just in the act of consciousness' relation to the
non-conscious - and yes the notion as any notion does belong to consciousness - the notion is a
creation of
consciousness - and notions do give consciousness a characterization - but in
so far as consciousness is a dimension - the internal dimension - what you will have is
the play
of shapes within this space
Hegel defines self-consciousness as that which contains no difference - all
this amounts to is the idea that self-consciousness is a unity - which in my terms
is to say
it is the internal dimension of a thing -
now I happen to think that all consciousness is self-consciousness - and that
therefore any distinction between consciousness and non-consciousness is a false
distinction -
but for Hegel consciousness is not self-consciousness - self-consciousness is
some kind of development of consciousness
therefore to say that self-consciousness is that with no difference - is really
to say nothing -
we have no theory of self-consciousness from Hegel
he says I distinguish myself from myself - this makes no sense - there is no
proper use of logic here - that which is - may be distinguished from that which
is not - that which is therefore outside of itself - consciousness may
distinguish that which it is not i.e. - the external world - but 'itself' - is
not - external to consciousness
his idea that I repel myself from myself suggests the beginning of some kind of
theory of how consciousness can create 'itself' - strange as this idea might be
- but this line of inquiry ends quickly with the realization that any such
distinction is 'not a distinction for me'
but the real kicker comes next - the argument that the 'other' is itself
necessarily self-consciousness
as they say you can run but you can't hide - and this is the position Hegel is
in - he has nowhere to go -
his failure to understand that consciousness / self-consciousness is
internality - and that its object is externality - his failure that is to recognise and or
establish the external world - as external - has left him only with consciousness - we cannot
even say - 'the internal' - for Hegel does not understand that the essence of
consciousness
is internality - therefore his 'consciousness' - is nothing -
literally nothing - the term has no meaning as a result of his deliberations -
he can't even retreat into solipsism - there is literally nowhere to go - for
to this point he hasn't managed to establish the self - let alone the self as everything
what you have from Hegel is like an archaeological expedition that covers all
the ground and uses every tool available - and even makes a number of new tools -
but in the end after all the blood and sweat - all the high hopes and grand endeavours
- finds nothing - and leaves nothing but a hole where once there was a serene landscape
165.
ARGUMENT:
we see that in the inner world of appearance the Understanding comes to know nothing else but appearance - not in the shape of a play of forces - rather it
is the play of forces in its absolutely universal moments - in fact the Understanding
experiences
only itself
raised above perception consciousness exhibits itself closed in a unity with
the supersensible world through the mediating term of appearance - through which it gazes into this background lying behind appearance
the two extremes - the one of the pure inner world - the other that of the
inner being gazing into this pure world - have now coincided - and have vanished - so too
the middle term as something other than these two extremes
this curtain of appearance hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn
away - and we have the inner being gazing into the inner world - self-consciousness
it is manifest that behind the so called curtain which is supposed to conceal
the inner world - there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves - as much
in order to see - as that there may be something that can be seen
it is nevertheless evident that we cannot go behind appearance
for this knowledge of appearance and of its inner being - is a result of a
complex movement whereby the modes of consciousness 'meaning' perceiving and Understanding vanish
and it will be equally evident that the cognition of what consciousness knows
in knowing itself - requires a still more complex movement
COMMENTARY:
appearance as I have argued is the relation between the inner and outer worlds
- between consciousness and non-consciousness
so appearance as such is neither of the inner or outer worlds - and for this
reason I say it is clearly unknown - if not inner or outer - what is it - the answer quite
clearly is that which is not known
the relation nevertheless exists and the object in the sense of the goal of
consciousness is to make it 'known' - it becomes clear that this goal is not
reached - but the endeavour results in the capacity to deal with what is
presented and what is unknown
so yes I would agree the understanding comes to know nothing but appearance -
and that this knowledge qua knowledge is an illusion - a ruse - a con
Hegel has no account of the external world - as external - and so for him - the 'knowledge' that results is a knowledge that has no basis outside of
consciousness
he does speak a lot of the inner world - but strictly speaking he has no inner
world to refer to - for an inner reality only has any sense and definition if it is the
inner of an outer - and so for Hegel it is true the Understanding only experiences itself -
but here's the twist - there is no self in Hegel that can do the experiencing -
consciousness is not raised above perception - perception is a function of consciousness -
and yes consciousness is a closed unity - the inside dimension is defined - and determined by the unity it is the inside of -
however there is no background to consciousness - there is no background to the inside - there is relative to the inside - only the outside - and the outside
is just the external dimension of the unity
appearance is a 'mediating term' in the sense that appearance is that which
results
from the relation of consciousness and its object -
this relation is given - it is natural - there are no holes in it - it is
simply the world we inhabit - in all its fullness
the inner world is pure - but the inner world just is the inner being - there
is no differentiation between inner world and inner being -
and from the inside there is no 'gazing in' - there is no inside - in the
inside -
the gazing is gazing out - and what is reflected into consciousness is the
world conceived
there is no curtain of appearance -
appearance covers nothing - there is nothing to cover
the relation of the inside and the outside is the creation that is appearance –
appearance is an effect
the relation that is consciousness and the non-conscious does not vanish - but
equally it is not seen - the unity that is the human being in the world can only be
approached in terms of consciousness and what is outside of consciousness - the unity per
se is ever present - but unknown
(c) greg t. charlton. 2025.