HEGEL ON CONSCIOUSNESS

Hegel: consciousness

These notes were originally published in the book 'Skeptikos III' by greg t charlton. 

ISBN: 9780975158371. 2007. (c) killer press. 

In this blog version there have been some minor revisions and edits to the original text.

Note: the numbers in these posts (90 -165) refer to the numbered sections of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Miller. Oxford. 1977.

In what follows I will present Hegel's argument and follow it with my own commentary.


A. CONSCIOUSNESS.

I. SENSE CERTAINTY: OR THE 'THIS' AND 'MEANING' (MEINEN).


90.


ARGUMENT:


the immediate object is immediate knowledge

a knowledge of the immediate is knowledge of what is

our approach to the object must be immediate or receptive

we must alter nothing in the object as it presents

in apprehending we must refrain from comprehending


COMMENTARY:


the immediate object is only immediate knowledge on reflection

just quickly what this tells us is that there is no immediate knowledge

is there nevertheless an immediate object?

yes - but it can only be described - on reflection

outside of reflection - or prior to it - it is unknown

Hegel wants to say knowledge is the immediate object of knowledge

on the face of it this is to say knowledge is its own object

but again this can only be on reflection

and reflection is not immediate

the immediate is non-reflective

and for that reason unknown

I would be happy with the idea that knowledge is the reflective object of knowing

we do reflect on what we know

but outside of this is what is not known

the unknown is thus the object of knowledge

the immediate object of knowledge is the unknown

it is immediate - because it is unknown

to suggest that knowledge is its immediate object

is to confuse subject and object

and further it is to fail to provide a reason for knowledge

Hegel says a knowledge of the immediate is a knowledge of what is

if so

what is - is unknown - that which is not known

you could go from here to suggesting that the point of knowledge is just to give characterisation of the unknown

that knowledge is the mind's response to what is not known

it is to suggest that what is - is greater than what is known

on Hegel's view the two are equivalent

I argue that knowledge is human consciousness' strategy for dealing with what is not known

it is the organism's fundamental response to its context - its environment - the world

it is in my view a form of action

Hegel says our approach to the object must be immediate - we must alter nothing in the object as it presents

I just say to this any response to the object (however you wish to define this) will always be reflective - non-immediate

how can you ever establish what the 'object' is prior to this approach?

can you know if you do not alter it?

could not the act of reflection itself transform the object?

the point is we don't know

what we have is what is reflected

and our purposes determine how we describe this

the presentation is completely and utterly contingent

its definition - the presentation is a matter of reflection

outside of this - outside of reflection - the presentation is pure

it is - that is - unknown

to know just simply is to alter the object of knowledge

the immediate object of knowledge is the unknown

there is no immediate knowledge - all knowledge is reflective

what we can say from this is that reality is immediate -

but in it's immediacy - not known

I would argue too that knowledge and the unknown are categories of existence

that existence is not exhausted by either category

though you can say - what exists is what is known and what is unknown

it can be described by this conjunction

and yes - it is a matter of logic

x and -x

the point being existence is logical possibility

this is the best we can say


91.


ARGUMENT:


there appears to be no bounds to sense knowledge

sense-certainty appears to be the truest kind of knowledge for it corresponds completely with its object

this certainty the poorest of truth - in the end it amounts only to an existential statement

consciousness' certainty here is just the 'I'

and the I in this sense certainty a pure 'This' as is the object

I this particular I is certain of this particular thing

neither I or the thing has the significance of a complex process of mediation

the 'I' does not have the significance of a manifold imagining or thinking

nor does the thing signify something that has a host of qualities

the thing is merely because it is

it is - this is the essential point of sense knowledge

pure being or simple immediacy constitutes its truth

certainty as a connection is an immediate pure connection

consciousness is a pure 'This'

the singular consciousness knows a pure 'This', or the single term


COMMENTARY:


what is given (in 'sense certainty') is prior to reflection - prior to analysis of even the most primitive or basic kind - and is hence without description

reflection enables characterization

it is on reflection that the description of 'sense certainty' is given

you could here say, 'well what other description is possible' - this is I think what is behind Hegel's argument

the idea being - there really is no question here at all - it is just a matter of realisation - of seeing what is before your eyes so to speak

what I say here is that 'seeing what is before your eyes' is just what reflection gives

the immediacy of the experience is the unknown

knowledge is not given

and not even given in the act of consciousness per se

it is an act of consciousness -

that is an act upon the unknown

and further we need to understand the 'immediacy' is a category of description

it is an account of - what is given

Hegel says of consciousness - consciousness is 'I' - nothing more

and the fact is - his 'nothing more' - just is no more than nothing 

and this is the problem

the consciousness is 'I' argument is a theory of consciousness - it is a description

now there is the fact of consciousness -

but it is strictly speaking an open fact -

which is to say we do not 'know' what consciousness is prior to reflection on it - on it and its relations

my 'it' here or Hegel's 'I' are dummy terms whose function is to signify or point to an as yet unknown - undescribed entity

even 'entity' here is just a functional term

what all this amounts to is that there is no certainty - far from it - everything in an epistemological sense is in suspension

if by a pure 'This' Hegel is referring to consciousness as a pure unknown - OK

it also has the sense of just a logical sign

a sign that is that signifies but is without content

from a logical - and epistemological point of view - this is a good start

consciousness you might joke is left intact


92.


ARGUMENT:


pure being constitutes the essence of sense certainty

actual sense certainty is not merely this pure immediacy but an instance of it

in sense certainty pure being splits up into the two 'Thises' - the 'I' and the object

when we reflect we see that neither are only immediately present in sense certainty -

but each is mediated - I have this certainty through the thing - and the thing is in sense certainty through the 'I'


COMMENTARY:


pure being - OK - so what would count as impure?

this is not a frivolous question -

I would suggest that anything that exists is pure being

Hegel thinks by the adjective 'pure' - he can slip in 'certainty'

(what is not certain is not pure being?)

at the very least certainty is a conception - an epistemological conception - that is a construction of consciousness

designed to deal with the issue of the nature of knowledge

a tree in a field is neither certain or uncertain

it does not possess epistemological attributes

pure being is what in a logical sense? - that to be described

this is the best I can make of it

bearing in mind that the idea of any entity as an object of consciousness without any description - is just a logical fantasy

the question of appropriate description is though quite real

Hegel wants also to say the sense certainty is an instance of pure being

well this I can agree with

but not for the same reasons Hegel would advance

rather because any phenomena is an instance of what Hegel calls pure being

i.e. anything that exists - exists

he goes on to argue that in sense certainty pure being splits into two -

the 'I' and the object -

consciousness and its object

or as I would put it - the world - reality - 'pure being' - given the existence of consciousness - is best understood as two dimensional

consciousness brings internality to the world

that outside of consciousness - the 'outside world' - is externality

understood this way - the relation between the conscious and the non-conscious is dimensional

both are dimensions of the one reality

I put that we only understand reality as such in terms of these two dimensions

but enough about me

back to Hegel -

he is trying to explain or account for certainty -

and he says that the I has its certainty through the object

and further that the object is - in sense certainty because of the I

firstly - the I having certainty through the object -

awareness is a state - a relational state

it is a relation between the I and the object

'the' relation in fact -

it is no more than a simple fact - what Hegel calls pure being

are we to say this is certainty?

if so it is an empty fact

for all the questions that come with awareness - are contained in the relation of the I and the object

and strictly speaking the relation itself can be in question - as it is in the case of illusion - delusion or even dream states

certainty if the concept makes any sense is a reflective / epistemological notion

it is not what is experienced

what is experienced is prior to reflection - unknown

as to the second part here - the object is in sense certainty because of the I -

yes - but this is just to say the object becomes an object of awareness

an object of consciousness

this really is a contingency - a happening

there is no certainty in the relation

the relation of I and object is a relation of possibility

and I would say the experience of the relation is not certainty

the experience demands definition and explanation

and is thus the experience of uncertainty


93.


ARGUMENT:


in sense certainty the object is immediate being or essence

the I - a knowing - knows the object only because the object is - while the knowing may or may not be

the object is true - or essence - it is - regardless of whether it is known or not

whereas there is no knowledge if the object is not there


COMMENTARY:


yes the knowing may or may not be there - in particularity -

but are we to say that consciousness is not an essential dimension of reality?

really who is to know the answer here?

as Hegel would be well aware - Spinoza for one argued that consciousness is an essential attribute of reality -

we can also put the question - is the material world essential?

this too is not a matter beyond question re: George Berkeley

and in a pure Idealist reality there is no object - only subject -

just another point -

my point is - that there is an internality that consciousness is aware of - quite independently of the external world

now granted this internality is not describable in external terminology - nevertheless it is real and can be given characterization - in art and poetry i.e. -

anyway his main point has to do with essence -

what is essential?

can we say existence is essential and that any thing that does exist participates in and is an expression of that essence?

OK - if so essence is no great shakes - you can't avoid it - there is nothing else

and on such an argument every form of existence - is essential

my point is that the essentialist argument tells us nothing

it's of no use -

granted particular consciousnesses may or may not exist

and all particular forms of non-conscious reality - may or may not exist

as to the ground of all this - existence in itself - or essence - or pure being

the fact is it is the unknown - it is 'the' unknown


94.


ARGUMENT:


the question - is the object presented in sense certainty the kind of essence sense certainty proclaims

we are only to consider it in the way it presents


COMMENTARY:


the idea of pure presentation - basic - unanalysable facts - essence - is understandable

the thing is we can only know what we know

the object as presented is known as presented

how this object is described - evaluated - analysed etc. - is a reflective issue

but what of the presentation in itself?

'presentation' is may be the closest we get to a 'value free' account

the object is present to consciousness

we have here a statement of relation

and the relata - consciousness and the object are left undefined - un-described

they are as it were logical terms - just denoting that x is related to y

the relation of presentation - for it to make sense -

must have some content -

that which is presented (the object) is 'presentable' to that which can receive a presentation (consciousness)

the point is any statement here - on the relation or on the relata - will raise more questions than it answers

and the final truth of all of this is that there is no end to this questioning

except by fiat - convention or practice

but in a logical sense the object of knowledge (the unknown) is never exhausted by consciousness (knowing)

the overall point is that the way it presents - what it is that presents - and what it is presented to

the presentation in short -

is the open question


95.


ARGUMENT:


if we ask 'what is This?' - in the twofold shape of its being as 'Now' and 'Here' - the answer is 'This' itself is

to the question - 'what is now?' - if we answer e.g. 'Now is night' - write this down and the read it when now is noon - we will say it has become stale


COMMENTARY:


to the question 'what is this?' - yes we can say - 'This' itself is -

the point is there is no real elucidation here

to answer with 'here' and 'now' - is just to expand the meaning of 'this' - to introduce into it categories of space and time -

the real point is that the essence is unknowable

one way of putting it is to say it cannot be located in space / time

the categories of space and time - are of no use to a discussion of essence

best to drop essence and keep your bearings


96.


ARGUMENT:


a paper with 'now is night' is written on it is preserved as something that is

the now preserves itself as something that is not night or day

it is a negative in general

the now is something that night and day is not

it is not in the least affected by what it is not

it is through negation neither this nor that - the universal

and it is the universal that is the true content of sense certainty


COMMENTARY:


Hegel says the now preserves itself as something that is not day or night

that is - it is not a contingent reality or concept

that it is a negative in general

he says a simple thing of this kind - is neither this nor that - that is it has no contingent content

it is his argument that such a thing that is neither this nor that - that is non-contingent - is the universal

and he says that it is the universal that is the true content of sense-certainty

what this amounts to in my view is that sense-certainty has no content

the real problem with Hegel's argument is that he thinks negation signifies

in my view when a proposition is negated it is marked as non-operational - that is it is

marked as not useful -

the point is in general that to negate a proposition does not signify or point to an alternative reality - a negative reality

a consequence of Hegel's confused logic is that he cannot establish the universal - as anything other than what the 'world is not'

and the fact of it is there is no content to such a reality


97.


ARGUMENT:


we utter the universal in any sensuous content - i.e. the universal 'this'

we do not envisage the universal or being in general - but we utter the universal

we do not say in sense certainty what we mean to say - but language is more truthful

it is not possible to say or express in words - as a sensuous being - that we mean


COMMENTARY:


when I say 'this is red' - what 'this' is - is not defined

the statement - from a purely semantic point of view leaves 'this' as an unknown

we have no grounds to give it the status of a universal

but the point is that the statement's meaning is not just a semantic issue

in the face of such a statement - if you see what the speaker is pointing to you will understand the truth (or falsity) of the statement

outside of any context - just the bald statement as it were - the statement is virtually - or practically - meaningless

while we may understand the words and their relationship in the statement - short of being there or receiving some further explanation we cannot give or withhold assent

what the statement refers to 'in itself' - is unknown

the problem of meaning is the problem of definition

language is a means of giving definition

and whether or not a statement actually means what you say depends on where you draw the line on definition

it could be argued that to explain any single event - you need to explain the totality

be that as it may in a logical sense in practice no-one does this in making statements about the world

we know that definition has its limits

these limits are set really by the circumstances in which we operate


98.


ARGUMENT:


the same is true with the other form of the 'This' - with 'Here'

'here is the tree' - if I turn around this truth has vanished and converted into its opposite - no tree is here but a house instead

'here' itself does not vanish

therefore the 'this' shows itself as a mediated simplicity or a universality


COMMENTARY:


'here' is an indeterminate reference to space

when we are asked to find a position on a map - we might say 'here' if simultaneously we place our finger on the map in the act of showing - however given the whole point of maps it is more likely that we will give co-ordinates - that is 'here' will be given a geometric characterisation - and this will be regarded as a representation of the actual 'here'

'here' - without definition is a term that has an unknown reference - but it is a term that we use as an unknown reference to space - so it has character

in language we have template terms - the function of which is to direct our attention to a category of our understanding of the world

Hegel's mistake here is the idea that all terms refer to an existing state of affairs or being

language is not just a simple matter of word and object

terms such as 'here' and 'now' are initial characterisations of the unknown - primitive or naive characterisations

the point about meaning is that it is unknown

we structure and give form and content to this unknown

language is the principle means of this

and 'the making of meaning' is itself without foundation

it is just what self-conscious entities do

it is fair to say the making of meaning is without meaning

there is no natural or logical end to such

what we call meaning (as a finished product so to speak) is just the decision to stop at some point in the process

the point is always perceived utility

and that point is of course always open to question


99.


ARGUMENT:


pure being is the essence of sense certainty

sense certainty has demonstrated that the truth of its object is the universal

pure being is not immediacy - it is that which mediation and negation are essential to

it is not what we mean by being - but is rather being defined as an abstraction - or as the pure universal

our meaning is not the universal - but is what is left over from this empty or indifferent here and now


COMMENTARY:


pure being is that which is unknown - and is thus the source of any knowledge

knowledge is our fundamental response to the unknown

the object of knowledge is the unknown - what else could it be?

Hegel's idea of pure being as an abstraction - amounts to saying that he has adopted a definition of 'pure being' or essence

what I say is that any such approach to what is fundamental (whatever that is - or however it is described) - is a failure

abstractions of any kind are (like anything else for that matter) aspects of being

and aspects of being cannot be the essence of being - this is what is essentially wrong with Hegel's argument

my point in general is that the pursuit of essence is (and partly for the reason just given) pointless -

logically speaking all that can underlie all that is known - is the unknown

I don't call this essence - and unlike Hegel I am not going to say some particular knowledge is essence


100.


ARGUMENT:


the relation in which knowing and the object was first presented is now reversed

the object which was regarded as essential is now unessential

for the universal which the object has come to be is no longer what the object was

certainty is now to be found in the opposite element - knowing

its truth is in the object as my object - and its being - mine

it is because I know it

sense certainty is in the 'I'


COMMENTARY:


the object is outside of my consciousness

and the object is inside my consciousness

the object exists as a duality -

it exists as a dimensional duality - inside and out

outside of this dimensional analysis what can we say of the object - of the object in itself?

from such a point of view we can only say we do not know

the essence of the object if you like - as that which is beyond dimensions in some sense - is not knowable

the thing in itself is not known

we assume a correspondence between the internal presentation and the external reality

(the object regarded as just an external thing has no qualities - it can only be known in formal - mathematical or logical terms

nevertheless it is the logical instance on which we hang our conscious characterisations)

so - at the heart of conscious apprehension is the unity of dimensions - we are talking about one thing - that has two dimensions - the unity that is appearance

and its appearance is its existence - its being

what I know is what appears - there is no certainty at all in this

appearance is neither certain nor uncertain -

it simply is

certainty is a construction of thought - that serves certain purposes - primarily organisational -

we look for a certain premise in order to base our conclusions

it is just a way of organizing thought for action

in this sense certainty is a proposed standard of construction

it has no logical basis - but nevertheless we often choose to assume it for practical matters

the only sense of certainty is pragmatic

we have more luck in life I would suggest by operating with uncertainty

if you close off avenues of thought and action (via the stratagem of certainty) you are more likely to get stuck


101.


ARGUMENT:


what does experience tell us about its reality in the 'I'?

the force of its truth lies in the immediacy of the experience

the I holds the single now and here fast

I, this 'I' sees the tree and asserts that 'Here' is a tree - but another 'I' sees the house and maintains that 'Here' is not a tree but a house instead

both truths have the same authentication - immediacy of seeing - the certainty that both have about their knowing

but the one truth vanishes in the other


COMMENTARY:


what is clear here is that immediacy is no ground for knowledge

and further that 'knowledge' is not grounded in sense certainty (for this on Hegel's argument is an illusion) - but rather - uncertainty

firstly

what immediacy points to is the unknown - it is an epistemological portal

what is immediate vanishes - but immediacy itself is never gone

thus the contents of the immediate can never be held - and as result can never be known

this should make it clear that if immediate knowledge is our goal - the goal can never
be reached

if on the other hand we give up on the idea of knowledge as being immediate -

we have a show at giving the concept of knowledge some significance

at the very least we know knowledge cannot be immediate - if it is anything it is not immediate

secondly

the 'I' is in fact never known - it is the ground of un-knowing

what I am at any point of space and time is not what or who I am

I am always more than the moment of my being - the moment of I -

so the moment is never I

the moment of I always points to the unknown

the unknown is the I


102.


ARGUMENT:


what does not disappear is the universal 'I' - whose seeing is neither the tree nor the house

the 'I' is a universal like 'here' 'now' and 'this'

when science is faced i.e. with the task of finding the particular that the universal refers to - it is impossible to say


COMMENTARY:


consciousness exists as the internal dimension of a two dimensional manifestation

consciousness does not appear -

but appearance is only possible given the existence of consciousness

the external dimension - is the appearance to consciousness

it is what is outside consciousness

and is therefore what appears to consciousness - again because of the fact of consciousness

the particular consciousness - the I - exists in particular forms of existence

the persistence of consciousness through time is simply a function of the organism (that has an internal dimension)

it is in such a case an internal function

no different in essence to the external functions of the entity - in that it is simply function

persistence in space and time is just what existence (of anything) is

the 'I" does not exist as a mediated reality - a universal - as Hegel would put it -

such is just a theoretical construction designed to explain phenomena

once you understand that what we are dealing with in existing phenomena - and existing conscious and self-conscious phenomena is function - the need to create theoretical entities such as 'universals' is shown to be unnecessary and irrelevant -and of no real value because such constructions actually lead us away from the facts

of existing things and states - they are in a sense alienating - strange aversions to reality

the sense of 'I' that I have as that which is more than any particular experience of the I (what Hegel calls the universal) - is the functioning of consciousness

in plain terms it is just the way the thing (consciousness) works - and yes as with every other function of the entity - as conscious entities we can ask - how are we to explain this function?

how are we - that is to explain consciousness?

well firstly what we are talking about here - and as far as I can see Hegel hasn't recognised this - is self-consciousness

the function of consciousness that enables consciousness to hold itself as an object -

and this is essentially what the self amounts to - the reflective capacity of consciousness

in truth we have no explanation of this - only the fact - the bald fact if you like - of it

it is to put it crudely the way the thing works

it is how internality functions

any metaphysical theory that addresses the nature of this - attempts some explanation is of interest

it is of interest because it is the kind of question that we ask

and Hegel's theory is no exception here

the fact of it is though - we have no way of seeing outside of the world to have what you might call an objective view of what goes on - in consciousness and in relation to its object

Spinoza in response to this problem proposed the sub specie aeternitatis concept

a pretty idea - yes - but there is no such point of view -

there is no sense in speaking of a point of view - that would have to be outside of existence - in order to see it 'objectively'

my argument would be that there are certain existing forms that are two dimensional

they have an inside and an outside - the inside is - internality is - consciousness -

the external world is the world outside of this internality - it is the physical / material world

the relation between the two is not a relation of substances - rather dimensions -

the relation of inside to outside - a dimensional relation

and you can ask does it make any sense to ask the question 'how does the inside of something 'interact' with its outside?'

the answer is no

the entity as a unity simply functions


103.


ARGUMENT:


sense certainty knows its essence is neither in the object or in the 'I'

and that its immediacy is neither the immediacy of one or the other

for in both what I mean is something unessential

the object and the 'I' are the universal in which 'Now' and 'Here' and 'I' - do not have continuing being - or are not

we have to posit the whole of sense certainty as its essence and not one of its moments

it is thus sense certainty as a whole that stands firm within itself as immediacy - and by so doing excludes from itself all opposition hitherto obtained


COMMENTARY:


firstly -

the simple fact of it is that Hegel has given the unknown a name - the universal

and yes it is true that the unknown has a reality deeper or more comprehensive than the known

Hegel though really argues it is a known - not directly known - but analytically / theoretically known

as a matter of fact he is wrong here about the unknown - it is directly apprehended – in every human act

Hegel's universal is an attempt to give what is unknown the status of essential knowledge

when all it is - is essentially what is not known

his theory of the universal is really just a result - or a reaction to the shock - the horror - the anguish of finding there is nothing that we can say about reality other than what we are presented with

the need - the desire to find an underpinning - a foundation to existence - is consciousness reflecting on consciousness and finding - nothing else - beside its awareness of its self and its object

Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to avoid the harsh reality of consciousness in the world

it is perfectly understandable to wish to do this

the problem is that philosophically - you never do -

i.e. - the proposal of universals - just like the issue of immediacy it is designed to solve - will be victim to the same problem

the problem of its (the universal's) foundation and basis -

the great advantage of skepticism here is its simplicity and its avoidance of deception

this comes at a cost - at least initially - there appears to be no comfort gained

secondly

to Hegel's - 'what I mean is something unessential' -

here lies the true 'essence' of things - of existence - that it is just what it is and without underpinning - without explanation -

this is why we can breathe

thirdly

the unknown presents in consciousness and in consciousness' relation to its object

what we experience in thought and action will lead us to question the nature of consciousness and the nature of its object

we are presented always with the unknown

our responses to it are our means theoretical and practical - of negotiating this space

yes we reify our conceptions (universals gods atoms - whatever) - but all they are in the end is stratagems for negotiating our way in what we do not know

fourthly

Hegel's argument that the whole of sense certainty stands firm within itself - and not any of its moments - can only sensibly mean that the ground on which all our activities take place is the unknown


104.


ARGUMENT:


sense-certainty as a whole stands firm in itself as immediacy

its truth preserves itself as a relation that remains self-identical and makes no distinction between the essential and the non-essential

I take no notice of the fact that another 'I' sees the Here as not a tree - or that I myself at another time take the Here as not-tree, the Now as not-day

on the contrary I am a pure act of intuiting

I do not compare Here and Now themselves with one another - but stick firmly to one immediate relation - the Now is day


COMMENTARY:


consciousness moves in relation to its object

it is no surprise therefore that the object has no permanence in consciousness

and as we cannot 'see' outside of consciousness

we cannot establish the non-conscious nature of the object of consciousness

we understand there is an external dimension - and therefore its 'inhabitants' are not internal - they are of a different dimension

consciousness is though the means of knowing

so our understanding of the external is consciousness dependent

out of this - if we are to speculate on the nature of the object in itself - we can only - and as a matter of logic - recognize it as that which is unknown

if an entity has an internality it is conscious - if it has an internality - it necessarily has an external dimension

the internal exists in the external

the external and the internal are therefore two dimensions of the one thing

in a logical sense we can understand the internal as basically a reflection of the external

we can say what we apprehend in consciousness is the truth of that which is outside of consciousness

but if so - it is a truth we can never be certain of

it is an uncertain truth


105.


ARGUMENT:


since this certainty no longer comes to us when we direct its attention to a Now that is night or an 'I' to whom it is night -

we will approach it - and let ourselves point to it

for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of this 'I'

were we to examine this truth afterwards - it would lose its significance entirely

we must make ourselves into the singular 'I' - which is the one who knows with certainty


COMMENTARY:


this singular 'I' - which 'knows with certainty' is an illusion -

this particularity is immediate - but there is no certainty in this immediacy

the epistemological status of this immediacy is at the very least an open question - hardly a matter of certainty

what I will put is that the immediate is unknown

the argument is simple really -

any 'knowledge' is reflective - and therefore by definition non-immediate

that which is immediate is therefore (by definition) - unknown

and what this amounts to is that experience - or what Hegel calls sense-certainty - is unknown

this does not in any way take away from its reality - experience is indeed real - but it is as immediate experience unknown

and it is for this reason that we reflect on it

'certainty' in epistemological terms is certainly (excuse the pun) not immediate -

it is a conclusion of an epistemological argument regarding status

in so far as I operate in immediacy I operate in the unknown

philosophers might have trouble getting this - lovers never have

it is also clear from what Hegel has said above that I choose my 'I'

i.e. I can place myself in an immediacy and operate from there -

this is to operate in the pure unknown

on the other hand I may take a reflective stance - a non-immediate position and thus operate in a theoretical or explanatory mode

what is clear is that the 'I' that makes these choices is an 'I' that is neither of these choices

that is no choice -

this 'I' - the underlying 'I' is simply the ground of choice in a logical sense

and so I would say it is best to regard the self as a 'logical place'

its reality is logical - which is to say - functional

pure function


106.


ARGUMENT:


the Now pointed has ceased to be in the pointing

the Now that is - is another

and so Now is just this - no more than just when it is

the Now that is pointed to has been - it has not the truth of being

'has been' is not an essence that is - it is not

it is with being we are concerned


COMMENTARY


we can mark a moment with a name - i.e. - 'this is red'

but the marker - as a mark persists - beyond the moment

if its reference is just to the moment - in the next moment it will not be true

for the statement to have meaning beyond its utterance - and this you might argue is indeed the whole point of the mark - of the marking - it must be understood in a non-momentary sense -

my 'moment' here is Hegel's 'immediate'

language thus we can say does not refer to the moment - to the immediate

the act of language as in utterance is immediate

the point of language as a marker is just that it is not immediate

so all this raises the question of reference -

if 'this is red' - does not refer to the content of a conscious apprehension of a moment

what does it refer to?

what does the mark refer to?

and we can ask - what does any language refer to if the moment (that is gone) is not its reference - and here I mean by reference - meaning?

my view is that there is no reference - that language in fact does not refer - in the sense of correspond to

- or if indeed it does refer - strictly speaking the reference is unknown -

the point of language is just that it is a means of characterizing the unknown - and enabling language users to operate in the unknown

this is what the making of marks is about in a logical sense

language in this sense is a sophisticated tool

my argument is that language is the reference - language is the making of a reference - the mark made is the reference

there is no reference - no known reference - outside of language

that is we have reference - because of language

outside of consciousness is the unknown - language of any form is the means of characterising the unknown

characterization - that is the positing of reference - is necessary in order for us to operate in and negotiate the emptiness

also it needs to be pointed out that the unknown - as unknown is without temporality - or spatiality for that matter

temporal references that is to a present a past and a future - are characterizations of the unknown

necessary characterizations if we are to organize our experience - our world

they are as with all characterization given by consciousness to the unknown

consciousness that is provides platforms for action

some platforms are indispensable - and others simply useful

the known world is a construct of consciousness

the unknown is the object of consciousness

finally -

'now' - is 'no-time'

it is no-time because it can never be marked

temporal sequencing is a reflective act designed to create relations between events

it is the relation of sequence

does this sequencing - making of relations - refer to anything?

that is does 'time' exist in some sense outside of the act of sequencing?

no

the act of sequencing is all time is

it is an act of order - of ordering -

the point of which is to give the unknown sequence


107.


ARGUMENT:


in this pointing-out we see a movement that takes the following course:

(1) I point out the 'Now' asserted as a truth - however it is something that has been - I set it aside

(2) I now assert the second truth that it has been

(3) but what has been is not - I set aside the second truth - thereby negate the negation of the 'Now' - and thus back to the first assertion - 'Now is'

the 'Now' and the pointing out the 'Now' - are neither immediate and simple - but a movement that contains movements

the now is thus a plurality of nows

the now is a universal


COMMENTARY:


Hegel's universal is the solution to his problem of 'now'

the problem basically is that the immediate - cannot be maintained in reflection

any reflective reference to the now - can only be a reference to what is not now

the 'integrity of now' is lost in any description of it

Hegel does not want to say - therefore the now cannot be described - cannot be stated

for in his view this would ultimately lead to putting it in doubt -

Hegel wishes to avoid this skepticism

his answer is to say in fact the now is every now - that it is the universal

the cost of this move is that the immediate is lost

you could say time is lost

and in its place is a conception - an idea

the argument is OK

the problem though - is just that it doesn't solve the problem - it masks it

we can ask this question -

what is the status of the universal - in terms of time - in terms of the question of immediacy?

if any assertion of now - is an assertion of the universal -

when I assert the universal - which universal is being asserted?

when I point to the universal what have I pointed to?

is it not the case that the universal I point out 'has been'?

OK - if not -

where is the universal in time?

if not in time - where's time?

and what relevance does the universal have to it?

the issue only gets to this if it is assumed that the term 'now' actually refers -

Hegel's analysis actually shows that it doesn't

but he doesn't want to accept this conclusion

his idea is that now is not a particular moment - but rather every moment

to go down this path renders real experience illusory and language meaningless


108.


ARGUMENT:


the Here pointed out is a this Here which in fact is not this Here etc.

what is pointed out is a negative

this which is negative only when the Heres are taken as they should be - in being so taken they supersede themselves

what abides is a simple complex of many Heres

the Here that is meant is not a point but a movement through many Heres into the universal Here


COMMENTARY:


the immediate cannot be described - what do we say of it - not that it does not exist - rather that it is not known

such a view maintains the immediacy of the immediate - and the reality of its unknowing

Hegel has missed this point - or simply refuses to acknowledge it -

my bet is that he just didn't see it

the idea of the unknown as the basis of knowledge - just too radical and simple a notion for Hegel

be that as it may

the whole point of the immediate is its stillness - and yes we do recognize it as a point

any movement is conceptual - some way of understanding - of knowing the unknown

as I have suggested before - Hegel's ideas here are OK - in the sense that any serious attempt to give form and content - to characterise the unknown is in itself valid -

but as such any such theory is secondary - that is it cannot be regarded as fundamental

and then of course there is the issue of the utility of the conception - just where and how it functions

I guess you would have to say that Hegel has form here - the marks are on the board

Marxism at the very least is his legacy - in an inverted way

be careful what you wish for you might get it - upside down inside out

OK

nevertheless what we have from Hegel is philosophical fantasy

(and in principle as I have just said I am not against this)

but what he is doing at heart is completely and utterly denying the unknown - the reality of the unknown

where this gets strange is that in his case it results in the identification of external reality with actions of consciousness - with conception and a conceptual artifice of his making

this is the problem - if you deny the reality of the unknown - you will invariably lose perspective

you will end up thinking what you think must be how the world is

OK - from the point of view of action in the world - that is how you operate in the moment

but fatal as a reflective view of the nature of things


109.


ARGUMENT:


the dialectic of sense-certainty - is the history of its movement - of its experience – and sense-certainty nothing but this history

this is why natural consciousness is always learning what is true - but equally it is always forgetting and starting the movement all over again

it is therefore astonishing that the reality or being of external things taken as This or sense objects has absolute truth for consciousness

to say this is to say what one does not want to say

the truth for consciousness of a This of sense is supposed to be universal experience - but the very opposite is universal experience

every consciousness supersedes such a truth e.g. Here is a tree proclaims the opposite - Here is not a tree

what consciousness will learn from experience in all sense certainty is only that we have seen the This as a universal

those who assert the truth of sensuous things should go back to the drawing board

you will come not just to doubt the being of sensuous things - but despair of it

we bring about the nothingness of such things in our dealings with them - and we see them reduce themselves to nothingness

i.e. an animal will not regard such things as having intrinsic being - but assured of their nothingness will eat them

all Nature like all animals celebrates the open Mysteries - which teach the truth about sensuous things


COMMENTARY:


what happens to us - what we call experience is just the immediate awareness of the unknown and the reflective response to that

how we conceive what we are presented with - is how we know it

much of this conceptual response is given in the frameworks consciousness brings to bear independently of the experience - i.e. the frameworks of space and time - cause and effect the idea of substance

and biological historical psychological and social contexts bear on any immediacy

our conceptual action in relation to immediacy - is our experience

how we describe this experience will have to do with the meta frameworks and the contingent contexts we operate in - and every such event will even with these surroundings have the potential of novelty - new knowledge - new discoveries

and in reality any description of this 'experience' will be no more than a valiant attempt to come to grips with everything

as such of course it will fail -

and the reason for this is that consciousness though it can reflect upon itself - its 'contents' - can never grasp itself - can never contain itself -

any reflection is just a light into the darkness -

and really what this shows - illuminates is not what is in the light but rather the extent of the darkness

we have experience and yes it is a multi-faceted affair - but it can never be determined

experience - my experience - even that experience had - is never closed

experience is by its nature an open proposition

immediacy disappears on reflection - or should I say the force of it

as soon as you reflect on what has happened you understand it in a broader context -

you know that to understand it cannot be left as an isolated event

you soon realize - without thinking that there is no such thing

all that really happens is that from your position in space time and given the nature of your consciousness and body - you take one of the infinite paths possible to consideration of the nature of reality as a whole

in practice we rarely engage - at least purposely in the grand metaphysical consideration - but that is just because our circumstances generally confine us closer to the dirt - however the path is there and it is just a matter of how far you go and why

I think it is true that in immediacy we do witness essence - or should I say essence impresses itself upon us

and this is not a bad thing - for perhaps without this constant reminder of the unknown and its power - we could easily get lost in and retreat into our conceptions

the point of consciousness is to give character to the unknown

it is fair to say consciousness is just a function of certain organisms - and of no significance to the unknown it is the reflection of

as I have argued before - there is no certainty in sense - there is only the event of it -

what we make of it is a question - the proposal to regard experience as certain - is a proposal that only is possible given the intrinsic uncertainty of the phenomena

sensuous things - the objects of sense experience - are utilized - this is what consciousness enables - the utility of the objects of sense -

how men use objects - what they use them for - what they do to them - what the results are - etc. etc. - is the history of human action

as to the end of any of this - the purpose - the goal - there are as many answers as there are actions

in my view - events - any a kind of event - the falling of rain - the making of a box - the act of love - the act of war etc. etc. are just happenings - acts - events

and they have no significance in themselves -

significance - meaning - is a gift - a gift of consciousness

and as to consciousness - its only meaning is in the giving -

outside of this it has no significance -

thus a consciousness that does not function - does not exist

the open mystery is a good - very good description of reality as unknown -

and yes - in a poetic sense - all nature celebrates - points to the open mystery


110.


ARGUMENT:


this that is meant cannot be reached by language i.e. that which is inherently universal

they would have to admit finally they are speaking about something which is not

the unutterable is the untrue - the irrational - what is meant but not expressed

if we say of something that it is 'an actual thing' 'an external object' - its description is the most abstract of generalities - and expresses its sameness with everything rather than its distinctiveness

'this thing' is anything you like - if we describe it more precisely as 'this bit of paper'

then each and every bit of paper is 'this bit of paper' - and I have only uttered the universal

if you want to help out language you can point as in 'here' - even so a universal - and therefore what I know is not an immediacy but a universal -


COMMENTARY:


yes - in my terms language does not refer -

language is a construction designed to mitigate against the fact of the unknown

language thus is platform for action

the unknown is never extinguished in language - it is covered

and the covering enables action -

the forms and categories imposed on the unknown - are the logic of action

in this sense what we are talking about is a metaphysical pretense - we operate as if we know

and we must - if we are to operate at all -

there is no metaphysical dishonesty here - it a matter of simply dealing with the fact of the unknown - and operating in relation to it -

in reality - we do what we must -

the ever presence of the reality of the unknown though - ensures that unless we are deluded - we do not operate with certainty - we operate in uncertainty

this is to say that even in the face of our constructions on the unknown - we are never imprisoned in by our conceptions or by our actions

the unknown is the source of freedom - whether you like that or not -

immediate experience is essentially unknown

we only know it in terms of conscious reflection

a reflection is by its nature - a move from the immediacy of the experience

any reflection will place the immediate experience in a conceptual context -

you could thus say the that the price of knowledge is the loss of the immediacy of the
unknown

conception is a move from immediacy

it is as though nothing can be done with the immediate (of course - it is unknown) - and therefore the only way to deal with it is to redefine it in a non-immediate context - that is in an epistemological context

that is we make it - known - and in so doing for the purposes of action it is no longer unknown

however the truth of its real character - as unknown - is not thereby lost -

we are left always - regardless of what we construct and what we do - with an irreducible sense of wonder

we are left always wondering and in that sense always directly in touch with and engaged with the unknown


II. PERCEPTION: OR THE THING AND DECEPTION


111.


ARGUMENT:


immediate certainty does not take over the truth for the truth is the universal

perception takes what is present to it as a universal

the immediate self-differentiating moments within perception are universal

I is a universal and the object is a universal

there are two movements: the movement of pointing out is the act of perceiving - the other is the same movement as a simple event - the object perceived

in essence the object is the same as the movement

the movement is the unfolding and differentiation of the two moments

and the object is the approached togetherness of the moments

the universal or principle is the essence of perception -

and in contrast to this - both the moments are distinguished - that which perceives and that which is perceived - are the unessential

but because both are the universal - both are essential

since they are related to each other as opposites - only one can be essential

one of them - the object defined as the simple entity is the essence regardless of whether it is perceived or not

the act of perceiving as the movement - is the unessential movement

the unstable factor that can be as well as not be


COMMENTARY:


the problem with this argument about essence is that we don't know what essence is supposed to be -

for Hegel it is as if the term speaks for itself

he speaks of perception and the object as being moments of the same movement

one would think therefore the movement is what is essential

if i.e. essence is just that which underlies phenomena - that which is the basis of - the foundation of appearance - appearance of anything - then in so far as this essence does not appear - it is unknown

now we can conceptualize here - Spinoza went for substance - as that which is the logical basis of all that exists - Plato forms etc.

what is clear is that these are conceptions - conceptions designed to give some character to the unknown - to as it were give it a voice

that is such conceptualizations are theories of the unknown

Hegel's essence is such a theory of the unknown - but not a very articulate one - what does it tells us?

I don't really see how it adds to the discussion of perception and object

the question of perception is how to explain the object as independent of the perceiver?

clearly the appearance of the object depends on perception - i.e. from one point view its appearance is such and such - from another angle the appearance is changed - relative to the first moment

what is it we are perceiving?

in what sense can we say there is a unity that is the object?

what is it that makes the object what it is?

we only have perception and conception - and both these ways of knowing - depend on the object

so there is no 'objective' view

what we get back to is appearance

the object at place 1 time 1 through the eyes of A is y -

the object at place 1 time 2 through the eyes of A is yi etc.

if we are to speak of the object itself outside of perception - we can only say it is that which can appear -

and really this is not much help - for it is only a statement about objects per se - not about any object in particular

it is a conceptual argument

we cannot get to the immediate object

the immediate object remains unknown

so what do we perceive?

we perceive the unknown - (x at time 1 place 1 by A) and attempt to describe it -

any such attempt will be inconclusive - no matter how valiant

we will always be left with an incomplete picture

in Hegel's terms an unessential account

for this reason we can dispense with essence - and operate with confidence (so to speak) with the unessential

the unessential is our best or worst response to the unknown

the point I want to make clear is that the unknown by definition is that which is outside of consciousness -

and that whatever is outside of consciousness is unknown

it is a simple - but devastating point -

the object of knowledge is the unknown

the object of consciousness is to make the unknown - negotiable

that which is outside of consciousness is the unknown


NB.


the object is a function of consciousness

the act of perception is the establishing of a relationship between consciousness and the object of consciousness

between consciousness and the world -

we can say the object is the point of perception

it is the focus

our relationship with the object - as phenomena - is given in the act of perception

what is perceived is given in this act

description of this - of the object - is an epistemological act

any description will place the object - the focus of perception in space and time - will afford it substantial characteristics and sense qualities

do we say the attributes and qualities of the object are immediately perceived - that is are given?

yes - we say this - but this is to give the object a description

and any description is non-immediate - which is to say it is reflective

it may be an 'immediate reflection' - but it is still a reflection

that is a move from the immediate event of perception

these reflective categories are given in consciousness by consciousness and for consciousness

this is to say they are given to the object

for all intents and purposes 'object' is just that which is unknown and undefined

it is the 'point of perception'

this 'point' exists only because of perception - the fact of it - the nature of it

consciousness is internality

its object - is externality

its object is external to it - as a matter of logic

but its object - however that comes in perception - whatever form it takes - is - in the first instance - unknown

description gives the appearance of transforming the unknown - to the known

we operate and negotiate our way in the world on the basis of description

the fact of the matter is that description is never determinate

it is just a false platform for action

the thing is though - without such a platform there could be no action


112.


ARGUMENT:


since the principle of the object is in its simplicity a mediated universal - the object must express this nature in its own self

this it does by showing itself to be the thing with many properties

the wealth of sense knowledge belongs to perception - not to immediate certainty - for which it was only the source of instances -

for only perception contains negation - that is difference or manifoldness within its own essence


COMMENTARY:


in truth can we speak of the object itself - outside of its perception?

outside of perception what you have is that which does not appear - that which is not known

that which does not appear - that which is not known is the point of perception

that is the point outside of perception - that perception is directed to

it is this point that is the object independently of its characteristics

the characteristics of the object come into being through the relationship of perception

that is as a result of the act of perception on its point of focus

the fact of this event is the revelation of perception

as a result of this event we refer to the object as object -

that is a point of focus that has primary and secondary properties

the object is not manufactured by consciousness

it exists independently of consciousness (as an unknown) but the event of perception reveals a definite relationship between consciousness and its point of focus which is the object characterised - the object as a known

I say consciousness characterizes its point of focus - this is just what it does

we never perceive the object as just a point of focus - always as a revelation to
consciousness

nevertheless we can say that in the moment of perception - we only know what is before us in terms of how it is described - though we describe as a matter of reflex - logically speaking the description is still a reflective act - after immediacy

so perhaps you could say we perceive the object initially as unknown and known

and if this is so it suggests we perceive the object as it is and as its is perceived -

as it appears and as it does not appear -

if this is so - you have always a logically complete picture of the object

also I wish to say perception is specific

description may not be - but perception is

perception is focus

so - the object is that which is focused on -

perception defines the object - as focus

the characteristics of this focus as revealed in perception are the common reality of the perception and the object - the common reality - the object perceived -

that is the event - the singular event - of the object perceived


NB.


what perception reveals is the known and the unknown dimensions of the object of perception

that is as well as what is given in the act of perception - we are as conscious entities aware of what is not given - what is not known

the known always comes to us in the greater context of the unknown - what is not revealed -

the awareness of what is not known is the intrigue of the object 

it as an awareness that has two aspects -

firstly what is not revealed

and secondly - the origin - the basis - the foundation of what is revealed

what the reality of the unknown introduces into the world is possibility


113.


ARGUMENT:


the This therefore is established as not This or as something superseded - and hence not as Nothing - but as a determinate nothing - the Nothing of content viz. of the This

thus the sense element is present - not as what is immediate certainty - rather as a universal - as that which will be defined as property

the immediacy is a universal immediacy

being is a universal by virtue of it having mediation or the negative in it

when it expresses this in its immediacy it is a differentiated determinate property

many such properties are established simultaneously - one being the negative of another

these determinacies are related only to themselves - they are indifferent to one another - each is on its own and free from the others

the simple self-identical universality is itself distinct from these determinate properties it has

it is pure relating of self to self

the abstract universal medium which we call 'thinghood' or 'pure essence' is a simple togetherness of a plurality - but the many are in their determinateness simple universals themselves

this salt is a simple here and at the same time a manifold - it is white and it is tart - cubical and of specific gravity

all these properties are in the simple Here in which they therefore interpenetrate – none has a different Here from the others - but each is everywhere in the same Here as the others

and without being separated by different Heres they do not affect each other in this interpenetration

the whiteness does not affect the cubical shape etc.

since each is a simple relating of self to self - it leaves the others alone -

and is connected by the indifferent Also - this Also is thus the pure universal itself - the medium - the 'thinghood' - which holds them together in this way


COMMENTARY:


the relation of consciousness to its point of focus (the object) - results in the revelation that is the 'object in consciousness' and 'consciousness in the object' -

the relation is appearance

consciousness and the object are outside of this relationship - this happening this event of relation - unknowns

it is the relation that reveals consciousness and the object - as phenomena

the primary act of consciousness is description

the sensual properties of a thing are its natural affects on the body

in describing these natural affects we begin with the differing ways they affect the body - we describe them in terms of sense experience

these are 'affective descriptions'

the thing itself is nothing more than its affects on the body

affects possible because of the way the body is -

that an object might affect different bodies in different ways - or the same body in different ways at different times - just points to the fact that its descriptive possibilities are not limited

the thing itself - if you want to go there - is just 'that which affects'

what distinguishes one thing from another is really just a question of description – how it is described

the fact there can be no final - essential description is just testament to the fact that consciousness and its objects are never fixed in time and place

any here and now is just an occasion for description

all that we have of the here and now is the history of its marks - that is the history of descriptions

a thing's properties are its descriptions

outside of its descriptions the thing is an unknown

the thing itself remains the focus - the point of all descriptions -

Hegel's 'indifferent Also' is a conjunction

we can create complex descriptions of the object of focus by conjoining descriptions

the object itself is not in any way altered by this action

its revelation though is expanded

the point of any description is just that it is a platform from which we can act in relation to the object of consciousness

it is a platform that suggests the possibility of action - of utility

what this in fact amounts to is in the end a matter of practice - what happens

in order to act - we must always defy essence

which is to say we must always pretend knowledge


114.


ARGUMENT:


if the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent to one another - if they were simply and solely related - they would not be determinate

for they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another - and relate themselves to others as their opposites

yet thus opposed to one another they cannot be together in the simple unity of their medium - which is just as essential to them as negation

the differentiation of the properties in so far as it is not an indifferent differentiation but is exclusive - each property negating the others - falls outside the simple medium

therefore it is not merely an also - an indifferent unity - but a one as well - a unity which excludes another

the one is the moment of negation - it is a relation of self to self - and it excludes another - and it is that by which thinghood is determined as a thing

negation is inherent in a property as a determinateness - which is immediately one with the immediacy of being - which is universality

as one however this determinateness is set free from this unity with its opposite - and exists in and for itself


COMMENTARY:


how is that the one contains or is a plurality?

if so - what sense of referring to it as 'one'?

and yet - is not a plurality - many of the one?

if so what sense of referring to the 'plurality'?

we can of course take Hegel's road here - and say there is a contradiction at the heart of being

this is an option - and it makes sense on the face of it

the other option I see is that we say the fact of the contradiction shows us that we cannot go there

and where is there?

if we assert being is one - or if we assert being is many - or indeed that being is one and many - we are making the claim that we can know the nature of being - the nature of existence

that we can give it a formal characterization - and that we can assert this claim as a true claim

in my view the fact that we can put forward contradictory metaphysical arguments that ultimately end in contradiction - shows us that we cannot know the essence of things - the nature of reality

a way of putting it is to say reality - itself - resists such a claim - and furthermore denies it - throws it back at us as nonsense -

the trick I think is to see that concepts such as the one - or the many e.g. - are strategies for dealing with the unknown

and by dealing with the unknown I mean in practice - we need certain ideas and categories for organization and operation

understanding a contingency in terms of the idea of unity can in certain circumstances be useful and productive

perhaps given different circumstances - different players different goals - the idea of plurality may prove to be more useful - more productive

there is no guide to what tools to use - what tools to make - or what results can be expected -

ultimately the solution to any problem of action is a shot in the dark

how we conceive the problem - how we conceive the solution - when and how we decide to stop or to go on - is finally a matter without knowledge

Hegel's analysis goes awry in my view just because of his use of logic

the concepts of negation and contradiction are properly used in the assessment of propositions - that is descriptions of reality

my point being - reality does not negate - the world does not contradict itself -

negation is an operation on a proposition - it is an operation of denial - 'it is not the case that......'

the negation of a proposition is the assertion that the proposition does not apply to the circumstances under consideration -

it is the assertion that given the way the world is the proposition has no function

a contradiction likewise is a propositional operation or outcome that shows the proposition that contains a contradiction has no function

negation is an operation on propositions - it is not an assertion that reality contains negativity - or in the case of contradiction that the world asserts and denies itself -

all our propositions are attempts to provide some basis for action - logic is a means of determining the functionality of such propositions

reality as such - is not affected one way or another by our propositions

our propositions nevertheless can have function


115.


ARGUMENT:


the Thing as the truth of perception is:

(a) a indifferent passive universality - the also of many properties

(b) negation or the ONE which exclude opposite properties

(c) the many properties themselves - the relation of the first two moments or negation as it relates to the indifferent element and expands into a host of differences - the point of singular individuality in the medium of subsistence radiating forth into
plurality

in so far as these differences belong to the indifferent medium they are universal

they are related to themselves and do not affect one another

but in so far as they belong to the negative unity they are exclusive of other properties

they necessarily have this relationship of opposition to properties remote from their Also

the sensuous universality - or the immediate unity of being and the negative is a property only when the One and pure universality are developed from it - and differentiated from each other - and when the sensuous universality unites them

it is this relation of the universality to the pure essential moments which at last completes the thing

so in summary:

the thing is a passive universality of many properties - it is also the one which excludes opposite properties and the point of singular universality that expresses plurality

we can distinguish pure universality and the one - sensuous universality (sensuality)unites them

the relation of universality to the essential moments (universalities) completes the thing


COMMENTARY:


yes - 'the thing' presents as a singularity that expresses many properties -

the 'properties' are descriptions given of the thing

'the thing' is a description that functions as the reference for the descriptions (of the properties)

that is it becomes the reference - the term itself I am saying is the reference for the descriptions given to it -

the terms 'the thing' or 'the entity' - 'the object' etc. are base descriptions of the unknown that is the subject of focus

they are good descriptions in that they are clearly content free

they are simple recognitions that the unknown is in play -

they announce the unknown and are true to it

description here is the defining of a domain - or should I say the assertion that a domain is established - for the purpose of description

secondary descriptions - what Hegel would call properties - give the base description character - give the domain content

at this point for all practical purposes the thing is known -

what acts are performed in relation to it are dependent on the secondary descriptions put forward

that is its capacity is directly related to its description -

there is no necessity in relation to description

entities are transformed by being variously described

the thing in itself - what Hegel would refer to as a universal - is the unknown - in focus - an unknown

when Hegel says the thing is a negation of the one that excludes opposite properties - he is suggesting that the thing is fixed -

which in my terms would be to say there is one set of descriptions that apply to the entity - and that is that -

rather I would suggest that the point about the thing as unknown is just that it is not bound by any description

true we will define a thing which means we will go with or run with a set of descriptions - this is just a decision to utilize

what descriptions are used will depend on what purposes are in play - and how the thing is to be utilized -

again there is no necessity in this

under different circumstance - inevitably different descriptions will be operative -

we can say it is the same thing because - whatever description - at heart the thing – the object etc. - is unknown

description does not alter this fact - and this fact - the fact of the unknown - allows for various descriptions - and is indeed the source of the possibility of description

the thing is never fixed - it is though a focus of possible description

one's circumstances - and I mean this in the broadest possible terms - will suggest appropriate description of that which is the subject of conscious focus


116.


ARGUMENT:


consciousness is determined as percipient in so far as the Thing is its object

it has only to take it - to confine itself to a pure apprehension of it - and what is thus yielded is the True

if consciousness did anything in taking what is given - it would by such adding or subtracting alter the truth

since the object is the True and universal - the self-identical - while consciousness is alterable and unessential - it can happen that consciousness apprehends the object incorrectly and deceives itself

the percipient is aware of the possibility of deception - for in the universality which is the principle - otherness itself is immediately present for him - though present as what is null and superseded

his criterion for truth is self-identity - and his behaviour consists in apprehending the object as self-identical

since diversity is explicitly there - it is a conception of the diverse moments of his apprehension to one another

if a dissimilarity is felt in the course of this comparison - then this is not an untruth - but an untruth in perceiving it


COMMENTARY:


consciousness is never determined - the essence of consciousness is indeterminacy

the object apprehended in the apprehension is made indeterminate

truth is a reflective argument of consciousness - in regard to its descriptions of that apprehended

the 'object' apprehended is in itself neither true nor false

truth is a decision regarding propositions - their utility or not -

propositions are descriptions of what is presented to consciousness

to say a thing is self-identical - is simply to say it is a thing

identity per se is an illusion in this world - it is a mistaken concept -

every 'thing' that exists - exists as non-identical to any other thing

the object outside of consciousness is unknown - the object in consciousness is known - as knowledge it exists as an indeterminate - this is the essence of its utility – its indeterminateness -

the point is that our knowledge of the object is always an open question - that is it is never finally resolved-

in practice we always run with some conception of the object of consciousness - but no conception is fixed - the conception of the object - which is the object - holds only in terms of its utility - conceptions change radically or ever so slightly depending on
how the knowledge functions

and the question of function is never determined - it simply just how we act - and there are no absolutes in human action

there can be no incorrect apprehension - consciousness simply internalizes the outside world -

what it does with this internalisation - how the internalisation is utilised - depends entirely on the circumstance of the percipient - and here we include the state of the body - the state of the immediate external -

all we can offer here is the possibility of different perspectives - different perspectives determined by differing circumstances

what Hegel calls the awareness of the possibility of deception - is really only the awareness of the indeterminacy of consciousness

there is no deception as there is no determinateness -

there is only indeterminacy and thus the possibility of differing perspectives

you never deceive yourself -

therefore the question of the truth of the apprehension is a meaningless question


NB.


consciousness and self-consciousness

just a note here -

I want to argue here and put that all consciousness - is self-consciousness

that any distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be maintained

my point is that all consciousness is aware of itself -

that is consciousness is aware of consciousness -

that it makes no sense to speak of consciousness as just aware of that which is outside itself

for the awareness of the outside is just internalization

the object becomes consciousness

as such it is still the object of consciousness

but at the same time it is consciousness

it is subject and object

all consciousness is self-consciousness

consciousness by its nature is aware of itself

'itself' here is awareness

'awareness' thus by its nature is self-referring

this characteristic - self-reference - is what makes it awareness

it is what distinguishes consciousness from the non-consciousness

the non-conscious is not self-referring

it is simply what is - it is one dimensional

in relation to consciousness - it becomes the object of consciousness

further -

what are we to make of self-reference?

how can a subject refer to a subject?

we know this happens but how does it happen?

what is the logic of it?

the point is reference is based on the distinction of referee and referent

clearly if consciousness refers to itself - what you have is the identity of referee and referent

on the face of it - this is not possible - if what we understand as reference is to occur

so sticking with this idea of reference - what is possible here?

that consciousness reflects itself

and that the reflection becomes the referent -

still the question - how does this happen?

perhaps we have no way of saying how this happens

but is it fair to say it must if self-reference is to occur?


p.s.


consciousness is internality

if it reflects - it reflects out

its reflection that is - is its relation with the world outside itself

its reflection is this relation - inter-internal /external

the 'self' that consciousness knows is this relation


117.


ARGUMENT:


the object which I apprehend presents itself purely as One - but I also perceive it as a property that is universal - which thereby transcends the singularity of the object

the being of the objective essence of the one was therefore not its true being

but since the object is what is true - the untruth falls in me - my apprehension was not correct

on account of the universality of the property - I must take the objective essence to be on the whole a community

I now see the property to be determinate and opposed to another and excluding it

therefore the objective essence is not a community with others - on account of the determinateness of the property I must break up the community - and posit the objective essence as one that excludes

in the broken up One I find many properties that are mutually indifferent

therefore I do not apprehend the object correctly when I apprehend it as an exclusive

it is now a universal common medium in which many properties are present as sensuous universalities

what I perceive as the simple and the true is not a universal medium - but the single property by itself - which is neither a property or a determinate being - for now it is neither in a One nor connected with others

only when it belongs to a One is it a property - and only in relation to others is it determinate

as this relating of itself to itself - it remains merely sensuous being in general - since it no longer possesses the character of negativity

and the consciousness that takes its object - as my object - has ceased to perceive and has withdrawn into itself

sensuous being and my meaning pass over into perception -

I am thrown back to the beginning and drawn into the cycle which supersedes itself each moment and as a whole


COMMENTARY:


the object I perceive is a possibility of description

it is in this state an unknown that is open to consciousness - open to interpretation

any conception of it - as e.g. - 'one' - is revisable - but nevertheless any such description is true - as true as any other -

the truth of descriptions is determined by their use

the concepts that Hegel refers to here - the one - property - universal - common medium etc. - are all in themselves valid -

that is the unknown can be defined and described in such terms 

for them to make sense we need to know their point or their use

what is clear from Hegel's analysis is the interconnectedness of such concepts and the importance of argument -

argument is what relates one conception to another

on the conceptual level - the focus of consciousness - the unknown - becomes an argument

here really is the beginning of objective status -

what was unknown is now argued - and as an 'argued' is at least a public entity - and open to the possibility of description


118.


ARGUMENT:


thus it becomes quite definite for consciousness how its perceiving is essentially constituted - that it is not a simple pure apprehension - but in its apprehension is at the same time reflected out of the True and into itself

this return of consciousness into itself which is directly mingled with the pure apprehension of the object -

this return into itself alters the truth

consciousness at once recognizes this aspect as its own and takes responsibility for it

by doing so it will obtain the pure object in its purity

we have in perception the same as happened in sense certainty - the aspect of consciousness being driven back into itself - but not as this happened in sense certainty - not as if the truth of perception fell in consciousness

on the contrary consciousness recognizes that it is the untruth occurring in perception that falls within it

but by this recognition it is able to supersede this untruth

it distinguishes its apprehension of the truth from the untruth - and since it undertakes to make this correction itself - the truth qua truth of perception falls within consciousness

consciousness no longer merely perceives - but is conscious of its reflection into itself - and separates this from simple apprehension


COMMENTARY:


consciousness' perceiving is a simple apprehension -

the object of this apprehension is given form and content in the act of conscious attention

the object of consciousness - is embraced by consciousness

prior to conscious apprehension - the object is unknown

the essence of the object of apprehension - the fact that it is unknown will be at the heart of any conscious apprehension and characterisation

and in so far as this is the case - the truth is never altered - it is rather given new clothes

the object as unknown is the pure object -

this reality is the pre-conscious reality -

consciousness imposes its categories on its object of focus - and these categories function as the phenomenal dimensions of the object -

reflection on any of the attributes of the object apprehended - is to raise questions -

it is here that the uncertainty of the apprehension emerges

this uncertainty is a reflective uncertainty

yes the object in consciousness - as now an object of consciousness - is subject to the nature of consciousness - and that is the essential uncertainty of consciousness

in reflection the object is uncertain

so it is in reflection that the true nature of the object of consciousness is revealed -

it is revealed as uncertain - and thus in any final sense - unknown

so we can say consciousness does not just perceive - but it reflects on its perception

however it is not the object that reflects to consciousness

the object is made by consciousness and reflected on by consciousness

before its making the object is unknown - after its making the object is unknown -

however in the making - the uncertain making - the object is given the possibility of utility and function


119.


ARGUMENT:


I become aware of the thing as a One - and have to hold fast to it in this its true character

if in the course of perceiving it something turns up which contradicts it - this is to be recognised as a reflection of mine

there also occur in the perception various properties which seem to be properties of the thing - but the thing is a one - and we are conscious that its diversity - by which it would cease to be a one falls in us

so in point of fact the thing is one only to our eyes - tart to our tongue - cubical to our touch

we get the entire diversity of these aspects - not from the thing - but from ourselves

and they fall asunder for us because the eye is distinct from the tongue etc.

we are thus the universal medium in which such moments are kept apart and exist each on its own

through the fact then that we regard the characteristic of being a universal medium as our reflection - we preserve the self-identity and truth of the thing - its being One


COMMENTARY:


the thing as one is no more than the focus of consciousness - consciousness defines and determines its object

conscious definition is never fixed - so there is always the possibility of revision - such revision though is always a result of a reflection on the initial perception

the fact that the object defined as one has properties does not take away from its unity

the properties are signs of the unity - they point to the unity -

the properties of a thing are our descriptions of it - they are our attempt to determine the thing - to give it some utility - some possibility of function

no description is final - all descriptions are revisable - the thing in itself is unknown

it is true to say that the entire diversity of these aspects come from ourselves - and not from the thing

and further that the very focus of consciousness - which is the thing - which makes an unknown a thing of focus - which makes it 'one' - likewise comes from ourselves

the focus of consciousness however it is defined is never the truth of the thing – except in the sense that we decide that it is - and we do this for our purposes

'the thing' outside of consciousness is the unknown - consciousness describes -

the unknown though is not made by consciousness - it is the object of consciousness


120.


ARGUMENT:


the diverse aspects for which consciousness accepts responsibility are specifically determined - white is white only in opposition to black etc.

and the Thing is one precisely by being opposed to others

it is not by being a One that a thing excludes others from itself - for to be a One is the universal relating of self to self - it is through its determinateness that it excludes others

things are therefore in and for themselves determinate - they have properties by which they distinguish themselves

the Thing has a number of properties

in the first place the thing is what is true - it possesses intrinsic being - and what is in it is the thing's essence

secondly - the determinate properties do not exist on account of other things - and for other things - but in the Thing itself - they are determinate properties in it because they are a plurality of reciprocally self-differentiating elements

they exist in and for themselves

the Thing is the Also - or the universal medium in which many properties subsist apart from one another


COMMENTARY:


my argument is that pre-consciousness - what exists is unknown - and that therefore the object of knowledge - is the unknown

consciousness reveals the world - as the revelation of consciousness

so yes the sky is blue the grass is green and the farmer and his tractor are coming up the road

what we perceive is the revelation of consciousness

now the question - can we say that the world of veridical perception is a true account of the nature of the world?

can we start at least with this assertion?

my answer is that we don't know -

what we do know is that such a world is revealed in consciousness - it is what we know - because of consciousness -

outside of consciousness - or let us say in terms of some other form of consciousness

some other revelation - the world may look entirely different to how we see it

or indeed it could be that how we see it just is the way it is -

the point is we can't know the answer here -

so we are wise to regard the deliverances of consciousness for just what they are - deliverances of consciousness

why a thing is white and has certain shape or taste - why that focus of consciousness yields those descriptions is not a question we can finally answer - we only have these
deliverances - and the explanation that they are not properties of the thing - but rather descriptions of it given in consciousness

now we may wish to explain this and account for it - and to this end sciences have been developed

clearly our perception of the world is determined by our physicality - that is the forms of that perception are determined by the body

consciousness as the internal dimension of a two-dimensional being operates through the agency of the body

this though is not to argue consciousness is of the external dimension - that it is physical -

awareness is not an external property - it is therefore not a physical manifestation

even so we can understand something of the way consciousness receives the external world through an understanding of its immediate external - the body

the limit though that science has to recognize here is that it is only ever a reflective argument - that is an argument after awareness -

understanding the surface world (the body and beyond) is not to explain the internal dimension

the internal dimension is the seeing - it is the seeing that is never seen

we do of course reflect on the nature of consciousness - but again this is awareness holding itself as object -

the subject truly cannot be the object - so any internal focus of consciousness will only reveal consciousness

the point being that consciousness though it reveals - is never revealed


121.


ARGUMENT:


now in perceiving in this way consciousness is also reflected into itself

in perceiving the opposite moment to the Also turns up

this moment is the unity of thing with itself

this unity consciousness takes upon itself

for the thing itself is the subsistence of the many diverse and independent properties

positing a thing's properties as a oneness is the work of consciousness - and therefore consciousness has to prevent them from collapsing into oneness in the Thing

it introduces the 'in so far' - preserving the properties as mutually external - and the thing as the Also

the oneness here which was called a property is represented as 'free matter'

the Thing is raised to the level of a genuine Also - since it becomes a collection of matters - and instead of being One becomes the enclosing surface


COMMENTARY:


firstly -

consciousness reflecting into itself - just is the issue of consciousness -

the fact of it is really not at issue - the question is - what does this mean - what sort of 'thing' reflects into itself -

the reflectivity of consciousness does distinguish it from the non-conscious -

but can we explain it?

can we explain its logic?

in the case of a physical reflection - i.e. - a mirror reflection - the reflection is external to the thing reflected

what does it mean to reflect into the thing

what is reflected in?

is it consciousness -

or is it an awareness of consciousness?

and how does consciousness 'hold itself'?

and if it does not hold itself in reflection -

can it be said to reflect into itself?

I am hoping Hegel will throw some light on all of this -

just to say consciousness reflects into itself is really where the issue of consciousness begins -

secondly -

it's clear isn't it that all conscious perception is the perception of a diversity in one - and indeed a diversity of 'ones'?

this is just what happens in conscious apprehension

and what this diversity in unity leaves us with is uncertainty

and that I would say just is the revelation of consciousness - uncertainty

Hegel's 'free matter' here is simply a tag for the unknown -

and yes the thing is of the surface of the world - it is of the external dimension

consciousness is the inside of the world -

it is internality -

and indeed the external world encloses the internal


122.


ARGUMENT:


we see consciousness alternately makes itself - as well as the thing - into both a pure many-less One - and into an Also that resolves itself into independent matters

consciousness finds - that not only its truth perceiving contains the distinct moments of apprehension - and withdrawal into itself - but rather that the truth itself - the Thing - reveals itself in this twofold way

our experience then is this that the Thing exhibits itself 'for the consciousness apprehending it' in a specific manner - but is at the same time reflected out of the way in which it presents itself to consciousness and back into itself

in other words - it contains in itself an opposite truth to that which it has for the apprehending consciousness


COMMENTARY:


the relation between consciousness and its object - or consciousness and the Thing is that of revelation

consciousness reveals - the object of consciousness is revealed

the revelation then is a revelation in consciousness

that which is revealed has the characteristics that are revealed

strictly speaking we cannot say whether these characteristics come from consciousness to the object - or from the object to consciousness

there just is no way to decide this issue

all you can logically say is that what is revealed is revealed

so what we are talking about here is not consciousness 'and' the object or visa versa

what the revelation reveals is a relation

it is the relation that is revealed -

and it is because it is the relation that is revealed we can say - that what is revealed in consciousness is just what consciousness reveals

that is that there is a complete correspondence

this is the first moment of consciousness - and it is what appears to be sure

the second moment of consciousness is reflection -

it is here that it becomes known that this initial correspondence - is without any foundation - and even more devastatingly that we cannot characterise consciousness or its object in any sustainable way -

that is to say consciousness and its object are 'doubtfuls' (to use a kind of Hegelian term)

my point is you have the initial revelation - but a revelation is all that it is -

on reflection it is seen to be without a basis -

this does not take away from its reality -

what it does is show us that its reality is purely phenomenal

that there is nothing we can point to with any certainty - behind this appearance - this revelation -

in fact all that is revealed there is uncertainty

we are left simply with what occurs -

we may wonder at this - and yes we do - and in response to this wonder we attempt to give the phenomenal some underpinning 

this epistemological endeavour though is not really to do with the phenomena at all -

granted this is the almost universal assumption - that we are in theorising foundations - giving phenomena an epistemological basis and content -

in fact as I have pointed out - this can't be done

and if so the epistemological enterprise needs to be re-evaluated

what I suggest is that the whole business of epistemological is to do with utility -

that is how to operate with - to utilize - to work with the given phenomena

in practical terms i.e. it is often seen to be necessary to give our perceptions a basis that is not perceived - in order to make the perception operable

so epistemology and indeed metaphysics are sciences of operation - sciences of action

the whole point of speculation is to find the best way forward -

I don't think that speculation ever actually delivers here - but it does give that appearance

the final point is that we ultimately do not know - how to proceed - and this is of crucial importance -

but nevertheless we must - and so we do - and speculation gives us options

options that is for dealing with the unknown


123.


ARGUMENT:


the object is now for consciousness the whole movement previously shared between object and consciousness

the Thing is a One reflected into itself - it is for itself but also for another - a being that is doubly differentiated but also a One - but the Oneness contradicts this diversity

hence consciousness would have to assume responsibility for placing the diversity into the one - and for keeping it away from the Thing

it would have to say that in so far as it is for itself - the thing is not for an other

but the Oneness also belongs to the Thing itself as consciousness has found by experience - the thing is essentially reflected into itself

the Also - or the indifferent difference falls as much within the Thing as it does the Oneness - but since the two are different they do not fall within the same Thing - but different things

the contradiction that is present in the objective essence as a whole is distributed between two objects

in and for itself the Thing is self-identical - but this unity of the Thing is disturbed by other Things

the unity is preserved - and at the same time the otherness is preserved outside of the Thing and outside of consciousness


COMMENTARY:


consciousness recognizes what it is not -

it is not that which is outside of itself - it is not that is - its object

this is a base fact essential to the logic of consciousness

it is this fact which is the source of consciousness' identity -

its identity is essentially - what it is not -

consciousness can reflect on consciousness - and this is self-consciousness

the reflection of consciousness on itself reveals that it is - what it is not

and for all intents and purposes this is as good as it gets

that consciousness knows itself as what it is not

as to positive definition of consciousness by consciousness -

this does not occur -

the drama of this fact has led though to positive definitions -

and these are really definitions in panic

we hear it said that consciousness is spirit - is soul is mind etc.

but really consciousness is what its object is not -

there is a beauty in this definition - it is non-substantial - it is purely logical -

my specific point here is that the object is never compromised by consciousness

the object outside of consciousness is unknown

consciousness gives it knowledge - that is description -

the object is not a movement - it is a point of focus -

the thing is an unknown - it is given description in the action of consciousness

the giving of description - does not in any way alter the object - rather description gives the object possibilities of use and function

different descriptions will give the object different possibilities - different utilities

the thing itself does not reflect - this if nothing else defines the thing - as what it is - and what it is not

it is not consciousness

the relation of consciousness to its object - which is the phenomenal world - is a relation of clarity and uncertainty -

this just is the relationship - it can be no otherwise -

we perceive the world clearly - the world is clear -

nevertheless on reflection - in reflection - it is uncertain

my view is that uncertainty is the gift of consciousness

that in a world without consciousness - no categories of thought would apply

we would simply have what is unknown


124.


ARGUMENT:


the contradiction present in the objective essence - is that the thing is self-identical and its otherness is preserved - this contradiction is distributed among different things

different things exist on their own account - and the conflict is that each is different from the other

each is determined as being a different thing - and its essential difference is its own self

its self is a simple determinateness

it is an actual difference manifoldly constituted

but this manifold - in that it distinguishes a thing from others is unessential

thus the thing does have the twofold 'in so far as' within its unity - but the aspects are unequal in value

this opposition does not develop into an actual opposition in the thing itself - but is an opposition of the thing to that outside itself


COMMENTARY:


Hegel is here saying what distinguishes things is not essential to the individual things - rather that it is unessential

and he says what determines the identity of anything - is essential

any account of the nature of a thing - of the logic of a thing will if it is successful distinguish that thing from all other things

so I am saying that there is an argument that the essence of a thing is what it is not - that is what is excluded from its definition

on such a view a thing is that which is not-known -

and it is to say we define entities negatively

that definition is a negative description

it is to put - is it not that 'x' is -x?

where 'x' here is a focus of consciousness - an entity to be described

and '-x' - the account of what x excludes?

my general point is that to define an entity with any precision will always entail a characterisation of what it is not -

for it is only in terms of what it is not - that we are able to differentiate it from everything else

a corollary of this is that we cannot define everything - or the totality - or 'the' one' - just because there is nothing to distinguish it from

the way consciousness determines its focus is by determining what it is not

the focal point is therefore never grasped positively - only negatively

what is clear here I think is that the essence of consciousness is negation

consciousness brings negation into play in the world

and it is through negation that it determines and distinguishes

negation is the essential operating category of consciousness

can we say that negation is consciousness?

that into a 'world of assertion' consciousness brings negation?

and the game is on


125.


ARGUMENT:


the determinateness that defines a thing and distinguishes it from all others - puts it in opposition to other things - also preserves its independence

its relationship with others establishes rather its continuity with others - and for it to be connected with others is to cease to exist on its own account

it is the absolute character of the Thing and its opposition that it relates itself to others

and is essentially only this relating

the relation is the negation of its self-subsistence - and it is really the essential property of the thing that is its undoing


COMMENTARY:


they key concept here is uncertainty

the thing or entity in consciousness exists - even in phenomenal perception - as an uncertain

its identity is unknown

how we describe it - what characteristics we operate with in relation to it - is dependent on what we want to do with it - what function it is to have

and of course a thing can have many functions and many descriptions - all of which are useful and true

i.e. - from the point of view of atomic science we do not regard the thing as 'a table' - rather as an atomic structure or state

the reality outside of any description - is unknown

the object of consciousness - the focus of consciousness does not have any absolute description or function

knowledge is an attempt to deal with the world outside of consciousness

consciousness presents an alternative to the unknown

how that alternative - in whatever form it takes - functions - is not a matter that is decided in any independent sense -

we simply make our decisions and run with them - and in the course of this running make assessments (finally based on nothing) as to whether these decisions have or have not borne fruit - whatever we decide that is to be - or is to mean


126.


ARGUMENT:


the Thing is posited as being for itself - or as the absolute negation of all otherness - this is self-related negation

but the negation that is self-related is the suspension of itself - and so the thing has its essential being in another Thing


COMMENTARY:


the thing as being for itself - what can we make of this?

'being for itself' must be being outside of consciousness -

of course we have no knowledge of this -

such being - for consciousness - is no more than a logical possibility

it is to say yes the world could be without consciousness -

and that such a world would exist not for consciousness - rather for itself

for 'being in consciousness' it is fair to say is being for consciousness

that is from consciousness' point of view

bearing in mind there is no other 'point of view'

in the sense that consciousness is the focus - brings a focus to being - that which is the object of the focus - from the point of view of that focus - exists for that focus

OK - this though is what you have to call a consciousness-centric view

and yes - this is not a criticism per se - for indeed the practical reality of consciousness in the world is that consciousness is metaphysically central

however we can think beyond such - or outside of such a conception

we can imagine a world without consciousness

and if we do this we are imagining a world without self

and in such a world the categories of being for itself and being for another - do not
apply

all you have is being -

now you can call this pure being if you like - or give it some other poetic characterisation

the fact is that we are only speaking - and quite precisely - of what we cannot know

this is the result when consciousness imagines its non-existence you come squarely to the unknown


127.


ARGUMENT:


the object is defined as having within it an essential property which constitutes its simple being for itself -

but along with this it contains a diversity which though necessary is not essential determinateness

this distinction is nominal

the unessential which is none the less supposed to be necessary - cancels itself out

it is what has been called the negation of itself


COMMENTARY:


look the fact of it is that this 'essential property' that is 'simple being for itself' is unknown

we can decorate the fact with such phrases - but in the end that is what it comes to - decoration

we may wish to think of things as having simple base properties or essences and also on top of this a collection of non-essential properties - and this way of thinking may well be very natural - ingrained - and as it were necessary if we are to do anything
with an object or objects of our focus

but really all this amounts to is that consciousness characterizes the unknown - gives it some structure and utility

my own view is that strictly speaking we can't say for sure what the origin of this characterisation is - on the face of it there are two options - consciousness or the non-conscious -

origin is not really the issue - and it can't be decided

we have what we have and we work with it

my immediate response to this issue would be to say consciousness imposes its characterisation on the unknown - and I think there is value in looking at it this way -
it does set up the issue quite sharply -

however my considered view is as I just mentioned that strictly speaking once this perspective is understood - it too must be held in doubt


129.


ARGUMENT:


thus the object in pure determinateness (essential being) is overcome just as surely as it was in its sensuous being -

from sensuous being it turned into a universal - but this universal originated in the sensuous and is conditioned by it - and thus not a truly self-identical universality at all - but one affiliated with opposition

for this reason the universality splits into two extremes of singular individuality and universality - into the One of the properties and the Also of 'free matters'

these pure determinatenesses seem to express essential nature itself - but they are onlya 'being-for-self' that is burdened with 'being-for-another'

as both are essentially in a single unity - what we have now is an unconditioned absolute universality - and consciousness for the first time enters into Understanding


COMMENTARY:


what we have from Hegel is a series of descriptions of the object - and he believes that the incompatibility of these descriptions - the fact that they 'contradict' each other – is really because the object itself is contradictory -

first as I pointed put earlier contradiction is a relation between propositions - that is descriptions of the world - it is not a fact of the object of these descriptions -

it is just that the object is described variously

now there are a number of ways of accounting for this

my view is that the object itself is unknown - and that consciousness gives it characterisation in the form of description

now consciousness itself is essentially uncertain - hence possibility - possibility of description - and the fact of various descriptions

you might say that the object of consciousness is still (perhaps eternally so) - but consciousness is not - it is not stillness -

granted it reaches for definition - definitiveness - absoluteness - stillness

this you might say is the desire of consciousness

but it is a desire that is never satisfied just because consciousness itself is without definition - indefinite - unessential and contingent

perhaps it is desire that is definitive - not that desired

we might say the object - the objective world - a world of things - suggests a stillness

and consciousness follows that suggestion - but in terms of that suggestion the result is always futile

I've got a little away from myself here -

my point is that really Hegel is not in his metaphysics of the object addressing the object at all - rather what he is doing is characterising the movement of consciousness

Hegel confuses the object of consciousness with consciousness

also he assumes that consciousness knows what is the case

the truth is rather that consciousness never knows what is the case - hence metaphysics


130.


ARGUMENT:


the singular being of sense vanishes in the dialectical movement of immediate certainty and becomes universality

my meaning vanishes and perception and perception takes the object as it is in itself or as a universal

singular being emerges in the object as true singleness - as the in-itself of the One – or as a reflectedness-into-self

this is still a conditioned being-for-self - along which appears another being-for-self - the universality that is opposed to and conditioned by singular being

these two contradictory extremes are in a single unity

being-for-self is burdened with opposition i.e. is at the same time not a being-for-self

the sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments by distinguishing between the aspects - by sticking to the 'Also' and 'in so far as' - and finally distinguishing the
unessential from an essence

these expedients instead of warding off deception in the process of apprehension - prove to be empty

the truth of this logic of perceptual process - proves to be in one and the same respect the opposite of itself - and to have an essence of universality devoid of distinctions
and determinations


COMMENTARY:


sense experience as the immediate connection of consciousness to the world outside itself - is strictly speaking without content

consciousness reflects on this immediacy and gives it form and content

the singular being of sense does not vanishes - it was only ever there as the contact of consciousness with the unknown

my meaning is never definitive - perception regards the object as a sophisticated unknown - that can be characterized and thus can be grasped for use

the 'single unity' does not burden us with contradictory extremes - the object is simply essentially and unessentially - unknown

how consciousness regards the 'single unity' - depends on whether or not there is a clear conception of use

it is not a matter of 'also' and 'in so far as' - consciousness deals with possibilities of definition - possibilities of use - and the object does not have these possibilities - outside of consciousness - the object as a question of use becomes a range of possibilities

conception which is really only the operation of consciousness on perception - is never without distinctions and determinations

that is so long as human beings have to act


131.


ARGUMENT:


empty abstractions of 'singleness' 'universality' 'essence' 'non-essential' - whose interplay is conceptual understanding - are often called 'sound common sense'

philosophy recognises them in their perceptual determinateness - whereas common sense takes them for the truth - as substantial material content - in fact they hold sway over it

the essentialities in fact run to and fro through all material and content

they are what the sensuous is as essence for consciousness - and it is through them that the process of perception and its truth runs its course

this course of perceptual alteration constitutes everyday life and activity of consciousness

in each single moment it is conscious only of this one determinateness - and then in turn the opposite one

it does suspect their unessentiality - and resorts to the sophistry of asserting to be true what is declared untrue

the nature of these untrue essences tries to bring together and thereby supersede the thoughts of these non-entities

the understanding makes itself responsible for one thought in order to keep the other one isolated - but the nature of the abstractions brings them together

it is sound common sense that is prey to these abstractions

it calls their deceptiveness a semblance of the unreliability of Things

when the understanding separates what is essential from what is unessential - it does not secure their truth but convicts itself of untruth


COMMENTARY:


these abstractions are based on nothing - that is there is no knowledge behind them -

they exist - Hegel's abstractions and anyone else's - as explanations of the relation of consciousness to its object -

they are that is tools for organization - for procedure and ultimately for action

consciousness which has no basis in itself manufactures categories to function as basis - as foundation -

the object as unknown is not diminished by these efforts - it remains unknown and for this reason the categories hoisted onto it never sit with any authority -

they are infected by the nature of the thing - that is consciousness is aware even as it uses such concepts - that they have no foundation - that they are just responses to the
unknown - and thus finally without basis

it is not that consciousness is involved in a conflict of truth over its abstractions - one minute true - the next false -

the truth is just that consciousness knows it does not know - there is no conflict here

and truth is what functions - is what enables - clearly there will not be no end to such an endeavour - and whatever is useful to this enterprise will find its place

its dangerous to speculate about the nature of common sense - but in my view what common sense points to is conceptual openness

absolutes tend to be the refuge of insecurity - the trick is to understand that insecurity is the grain of being - that it is the essential intrigue of conscious being


III. FORCE AND THE UNDERSTANDING: APPEARANCE AND THE SUPERSENSIBLE WORLD


132.


ARGUMENT:


seeing and hearing have been lost to consciousness - and as perception consciousness has arrived at thoughts - which it brings together in the unconditioned universal

if this was an inert simple substance - it would be one extreme of being-for-self - for it would be confronted with non-essence - but if so it would be unessential - and consciousness would not have escaped the deceptions of the perceptual process

however this universal has returned into itself out of conditioned being-for-self

this unconditional universal which is the true object of consciousness - is still just an object for it

consciousness has not yet grasped the notion of the unconditioned as Notion

it is essential to distinguish the two -

for consciousness the object has returned into itself from its relation to another and has become Notion in principle - but consciousness is not yet for itself the Notion - and consequently does not recognise itself in that reflected object

for us this object has developed through the movement of consciousness and consciousness is involved in that development - and the reflection is the same both
sides - there is only one reflection

but since this is movement consciousness has for its content objective essence and not consciousness as such

consciousness shrinks away from what has emerged and takes its essence in the objective sense


COMMENTARY:


clearly Hegel wants to argue that self-consciousness or consciousness of consciousness - consciousness holding itself as object - is an outcome a development of consciousness' movement

in general on this issue I wish to say consciousness is self-consciousness

that it makes no sense at all to speak of awareness that is not in some sense aware of itself

all awareness is self-aware

and I argue this is just what distinguishes consciousness from its primary object - the non-conscious

the conscious dimension of an entity is the internality of that entity - the non-conscious - the externality - is in the first place the body and then the external world the body exists in

also it is clear that this primary distinction of consciousness and non-consciousness - of internality and externality - mind and body - is only possible because consciousness is aware of itself

it is this awareness (of self) that is at the basis of notion - of distinction

consciousness just does distinguish itself and it can only do this if it is aware of itself

and here too is the foundation of logic - for it is in consciousness' awareness of itself that negation is introduced -

because of its awareness and the distinction this implies - consciousness is thus aware of what it is not

and this 'what it is not' - is the basis on which - the 'other' is recognized and defined

just a note - it is important to see that consciousness does not as many philosophers - principally Descartes - have thought - see the body primarily as its negation

consciousness recognizes itself as internality - consciousness sees itself as the internal dimension of an operating unity - the non-conscious dimension of which is the body

so in this sense consciousness sees the body as itself revealed

and itself as the body hidden

the unity which is consciousness and non-consciousness - that is in a non-dimensional sense - is unknown


133.


ARGUMENT:


with this Understanding consciousness has superseded its own untruth and the untruth of its object

what has emerged is the Notion of True - but this is not yet a Notion - it lacks the being-for-self of consciousness

the Understanding without knowing itself - lets go its own way 

this truth follows out of its own essence - consciousness plays no part in its realisation - it simply apprehends it

we must step into its place and be the Notion which develops and fills out

it is through awareness of this fully developed object that consciousness first becomes a consciousness that comprehends its object


COMMENTARY:


consciousness superseding its own truth and its object's - is to point out that consciousness posits or holds the object in awareness - and so too consciousness posits or holds itself in awareness -

and the reason for this is the first realization of consciousness - that its object is unknown - and the second realisation (consciousness) is that it is unknown

whatever thus comes to be the object and the awareness of the object is never held with certainty - consciousness deals with the world and with itself as uncertain posits

and this fact is the origin of consciousness' creativity - what I guess Hegel would call its movement

the movement of consciousness is no more than its uncertainty in action

truth in fact is just a marker for consciousness - if a state of consciousness is marked as true it is viewed as having function - if false - the mark is ‘do not proceed’ - go directly to jail

this fully developed object is just the unknown with layers of clothes - and the truth of this adornment is only to do with whether these accessories enable the object to have the function consciousness intends


134.


ARGUMENT:


consciousness negated its one-sided notions and abstracted them - it gave them up - but the result is the unity of 'being-for-self' and 'being-for-another'

the absolute antithesis is posited as a self-identical essence

being-for-self and being-for-another are the content as well as the form of the moments in reciprocal relation

but being-for-self and being-for-another are the content itself since the antithesis in its truth can have no other nature than the one yielded in the result - that the content taken
in perception is true - belongs in fact only to form - in the unity which is dissolved

the content is likewise universal

no particular content could fail to fall within this unconditioned universality

in general to be for itself and to be in relation to an other constitutes the nature and essence of the content - whose truth consists in it being unconditionally universal


COMMENTARY:


I would put that Hegel's unconditioned universal which he argues constitutes the nature and essence of content - is effectively an abstraction that is empty of content -
and is a theoretical devise designed to empty content from perception -

for it is true that in the unconditioned universal there is no negation -

the reason for this - is I suggest - there is nothing to negate

the unconditioned universal is being put up as a category of knowledge that has no content - it comes at the end of a rather tortuous logical route

what it amounts to is this - that reflective consciousness reveals perceptual / conceptual posits as ultimately without epistemological content - that is as unknowns

what I have put is that the object of consciousness is unknown - reflection on this I say - simply - finally reflects this reality -

this is the reality of the 'unconditioned universal'

in the meantime - between immediate perception - the perceptual unknown - and the reflective unknown - is the operating reality of consciousness in the world

it is between the unknowns of perception and reflection that the world we deal with - with all its features intact - is to be found

veridical reality and its interpretations - is the world we operate in

the illusion of knowledge is the operating basis of consciousness in the world

consciousness is aware of the uncertainty of its posits - and finally of the relation that creates them - and yet at the same time recognises the absolute necessity of these posits

these posits - which finally comes down to consciousness and its object - are real - though uncertain - they are the 'foundations' of the world we operate in

they are nothing more or nothing less than operational posits

consciousness can never escape consciousness - to have any sense of itself - it must hold itself as object -

this holding of the self as object - this subject positing itself as object - reveals a complete absence of self-knowledge

self-knowledge I would suggest is an operating illusion of consciousness


135.


ARGUMENT:


the unconditioned universal is an object for consciousness - there emerges in it the distinction of form and content - and in the shape of content the moments look like they did in the first presentation - on one side - a universal medium of many subsistent 'matters' - on the other a One reflected into itself - in which their independence is extinguished

these moments exist only in this universality - they are no longer separated from one another - they are essentially self-superseding aspects - and what is posited is only their transition into one another


COMMENTARY:


I have an argument with Hegel regarding his unconditioned universal - either it is unconditioned or it is not -

if it is unconditioned it is without form and content - it is pre these conditions

and as such it is correctly understood as the unknown -

and in my terms the description 'unconditioned universal' can be dropped altogether

on the other hand if Hegel is offering a theory of the object - his unconditioned universal as stated above - all very well - this is a reflective argument concerning the unknown -

as I have said before as a theory of the unknown such a creation is in principle as good as any other

but let's be absolutely clear here - what we are talking about is a theory of the object of consciousness -

a theory of - the object is not this theory - the theory is a response to the object - and here I mean the object is pre any such theory - the object 'in itself' is unknown - and
remains so regardless of one's ingenuity and imagination


136.


ARGUMENT:


the unconditioned universal is simply and solely the plurality of the diverse universals

the universal an undivided unity with this plurality

these 'matters' mutually interpenetrate but are independent

their unity directly unfolds its diversity and once again reduces itself to unity

this movement is what is called Force

one of its movements - the dispersal of the independent matters in their immediate being is the expression of Force

but force taken as that in which they have disappeared is Force proper - Force that has been driven back into itself from its expression

Force exists only in thought

what has been posited is the Notion of force - not its reality

in fact Force is the unconditioned universal - which is equally in its own self what it is for another - or which contains the difference in its own self

in order then that Force may in truth be - it must be set free from thought - it must be posited as the substance of these differences

Force exists as an exclusive One - for which the unfolding of the different matters is another subsisting essence - and thus two distinct independent aspects are set up

these differences are superficial vanishing moments

there would be no Force if it did not exist in these opposite ways

these two moments exist independently and supersede themselves

in general it is clear that the movement is nothing else than the movement of perceiving

thus the movement which was the destruction of contradictory notions - has objective form and is the movement of Force

the outcome of which is the unconditioned universal as something not objective but rather the inner being of things


COMMENTARY:


the inner being of things - if indeed things have an inner being - is consciousness

the nature of consciousness is that it is inner - that it is internality

this is the essence of consciousness and effectively nothing more can be said of it

there are no substantial issues to the question of consciousness -

consciousness is not a substance - it is a dimension - the internal dimension that is awareness

consciousness recognizes consciousness directly - which is to say internality recognises internality

or dimensional entities recognize dimensional entities - perhaps it is a recognition of type

the point is not all entities have an internal dimension -

I would put it to you that from what we can see most of reality is one-dimensional

consciousness is thus exceptional

and what this amounts to is to say much of reality is one-dimensional - simply externality

some of reality has an internal dimension

not very neat logically - somewhat skew-whiff - nevertheless - from what we can see that's how it is -

such an argument would not sit well with Hegel - it is clear he does not want exceptions in his universe

he has represented the object as an argument from consciousness - and extended this description - as a matter of logic to everything

so the world of the universal and the universals within the universal - and the movements of these universals - the movements of difference and unity - is for Hegel
not just a construction an invention an imagination of consciousness - but rather the objective reality of the world outside of consciousness -

the hard and pure reality is that the world outside of consciousness is unknown

Hegel has indeed resisted this conclusion with every trick of the trade - and yes his resistance has resulted in a rather magnificent work of art - one is often reminded of a painter of grand scale and style when reading Hegel -

nevertheless the truth is any work that begins - only begins on a blank canvas

Hegel knows his grand picture is only a picture - and he has it mind for it to be the reality - that is pictured - and for this picture and its reality to in some sense be one

for that to happen we need something to kick start it off the page - or out of the mind

enter force -

now the universal is force - and force of course will get everything moving

this jump from concept to reality here is reminiscent of the ontological argument of Anselm


137.


ARGUMENT:


Force is itself this universal medium in which the moments subsist as 'matters' - or in other words - Force has expressed itself - and what was supposed to be something else soliciting it is really force itself

it exists as the medium of the unfolded matters

but equally essentially it has the form of the supercession of the subsisting matters – or is essentially a One


COMMENTARY:


it is clear that 'Force' becomes a characterization of the unconditioned universal - of a One

and what this tells us is that the unconditioned universal - is undefined - it can function as a ground for definition

in this case the idea that is being running through the universal is force

one gets the impression that any notion could have its place here -

that Hegel's universal does not discriminate regarding its use

this is OK - but what it really points to is that this universal is an unknown that becomes the ground for description - in this case 'force' - but anything is possible

we can also see from this that language has meaning given particular use - given a particular slant -

the term 'force' is a term that is designed to function in e.g. a dynamic context - in a context that is in which we wish to explain movement -

how far you want to go with this depends on how far you think the concept extends

if you end up thinking of it in a holistic way - the particularity of the concept is by definition lost - you move into the realm of such indefinite terms as 'one', 'universal'
etc.

and its really at this point that function is lost

and this is why in my view such terms as 'universal' 'one' 'totality' are of no use

they are actually not positive concepts though they are often presented as such - they are in fact non-functional concepts - that have been mistakenly accorded significance

perhaps this is overstating the case a little

clearly such concepts have function - but only in a formal sense

whereas when it comes to force e.g. we are dealing with a concept that defines action

we can I think also say of these formal concepts that in a metaphysical sense - they function as signs of the unknown

they function as markers of the foundationless ground of consciousness and the world


138.


ARGUMENT:


what appears as an 'other' and solicits Force - proves itself to be Force - for the 'other' is as much a universal medium as the One - and each of these forms appears as a vanishing moment

the notion of Force - in that it has an 'other' has gone from a unity to duality -

instead of the antithesis we have two independent forces

the second force solicits the retraction of Force into itself - through its being solicited to do so

this distinction between solicited Force and soliciting Force is transformed into the same reciprocal interchange of determinateness


COMMENTARY:


Hegel's argument is that underlying the relation of the conditioned universals (in the unconditioned universal) is Force

and here he argues that to understand the action of Force we must posit two forces - or two moments of Force

and Force proper is essentially the alteration of these two moments - i.e. the second force solicits the retraction of Force into itself

so we have a dynamic in Force - that is the action of Force

the question is I think - do we need to posit force as the explanation of - as the action behind the movement of consciousness?

is not 'force' here just an attempt at explanation of 'movement' - a definition if you like

a way of characterizing the 'action' of consciousness?

I think the answer is yes -

any explanation of consciousness will simply be consciousness reflecting on its own action

which in effect is no more than just the very conscious event that is being explained - for in the end consciousness is reflection

the real question is - how do we explain reflection?

characterising consciousness as a relation of moments - or as the action of forces underlying these moments - might prove useful in the sense that it does seem to give us some kind of handle on consciousness

all very well

however any such characterization is just - in the end a reflection - on what?

on reflection

and this you could say is just what self-consciousness is -

we perhaps might like to think that each reflection on reflection - in some way reveals more - goes deeper into the nature of consciousness

but in the end I am afraid a reflection is just a reflection

and we can only ever account for reflection via reflection

what does this tells us?

it tells us consciousness is an action (reflection) - and that is as far as we can go with
any analysis

does reflection on reflection - reveal 'self-consciousness'?

I use to think so - these days as I just said I think of consciousness as a kind of action

as an internal action

if self makes any sense - in my view it is just internality

and thus consciousness' awareness of itself as inside

that is it is awareness of dimension

and the inside is just the inside

your inside and my inside - no difference per se


139.


ARGUMENT:


the interplay of the two Forces thus consists in their being determined as mutually opposed

the soliciting Force e.g. is posited as a universal medium and the one solicited on the other hand - as Force driven back into itself

the first Force has its determinateness only through the other and solicits only in so far as the other solicits it to be a soliciting force - and its determinateness passes over to the other

the solicited Force gives the other its character as a universal medium - it gives the soliciting Force this character because this determination is essential to it - because this is its own self


COMMENTARY:


first up we have no explanation of force here -

what we have at best is simply an account of its 'logic' - its soliciting and its being driven back into itself - there is an attempt to present a description of force as a dynamic

this is all verbalism

in the first place Hegel just simply introduced force as a category and then did his thing on it

his argument equally applies to 'x' - or any number of similar terms - i.e. 'essence'

OK - let's say Hegel just does want to introduce force - and say something about it - because it is an important concept for him -

that is he is setting up his view - and force is in there

nothing wrong with this as such

the point is though we can read these paragraphs on force and really be none the wiser

yes we have various metaphors for its nature and action - but still it has no content

Hegel's description of force is a possible description of reality

that is a particular focus or slant on the workings of consciousness and the world

the term force has for us to begin with wide enough applicability -

from the seventeenth century at least the idea of force as a universal has been part of the common understanding -

OK - what we need from Hegel is more than just the use of this concept - for it to have (excuse the pun) 'force' - we need a compelling reason as to why such a notion is to have a central importance - and a compelling reason is not just common parlance

as it stand all Hegel has done here is give the unknown - a name and some characterisation

there is nothing wrong with this - it is just what we do - but for the characterisation to be of value it needs to be operable - that is it needs to do work - to issue results

as it is with Hegel all we have at this stage is an empty name

this is not to say it might not amount to something - but at the present all we are getting from Hegel is hot air - without force


140.


ARGUMENT:


the Notion of this movement exhibits a two fold difference - one a difference of content - one extreme - the force reflected into itself - the other the medium of the - 'matters'

and as a difference of form - since one solicits and the other is solicited - the former active the other passive

according to the difference of content they are distinguished for us -

but according to the difference of form they are independent - and in their relation keep themselves separate and opposed to one another

these extremes are vanishing moments - the immediate transition of each into its opposite

this truth becomes apparent to consciousness in its perception of the movement of Force

but for us the differences are differences of form and content - vanished in themselves

on the side of form the essence of the active - soliciting was the same as that on the side of content - Force driven back into itself


COMMENTARY:


consciousness in relation to its object - which we now understand as force -

we can only theoretically separate consciousness and its object

consciousness in itself is without object makes no sense - what is reflected in such consciousness?

the object without consciousness is simply unknown - nothing can be said of it -

so we come to consciousness in the world - and consciousness in relation to it object

the key notion here is relation

consciousness and the object are the two terms of the relation

the relation is the unity of the object and consciousness

and the unity is what the object (the world outside of consciousness) is to consciousness

and what the object becomes in its relation with consciousness

we can call the immediate relation experience

this experience is the connection between consciousness and its object

it is the unity

experience (the relation) is the ground on which consciousness operates

its operation is reflection

consciousness' reflection on this relation - on experience - is its 'knowledge'

the point is reflection is a reflection of the relation

not the object per se

not consciousness per se

consciousness and the object really are abstractions out of the relation

the relation is in itself - an unknown - even though it comes into being as consciousness in the world -

that is the world as we know it - the world we operate in

we abstract from this to consciousness and its object

we abstract that is the internal dimension and the external dimension

but the real game is what is dead centre - the relation

that is the ground of being

now I think we can only approach this ground of being in terms of its dimensions – the internal and the external

I don't think logically we can speak directly about the relation that is the unity

we can only speak logically in terms of its dimensions - with the understanding that the real focus is what we don't know - the relation

nevertheless in fact in practice we do regard the object in terms of consciousness – and we speak of consciousness as an object

what I think this shows is that we use the categories that we make as best we can to cover the ground as best we can

reflection on this - which is what philosophy is - shows us very quickly that such interchanging of subjective / internal categories and objective / external categories - brakes down

and we are in analysis left point blank with what we do not know

this can lead to despair or creativity - the usual response though is to proceed as if everything is in order - and to try and make something of it that satisfies our needs

most I think would admit that on reflection this approach is an illusion but a necessary one


141.


ARGUMENT:


the notion of Force becomes an actual through its duplication into two Forces

these two Forces exist as independent essences - but their movement is each towards the other - such that their being is a being posited by the other - their being has the significance of a pure vanishing

they do not exist as extremes that are fixed and substantial - transmitting to each other in the middle term of their contact a merely external property - on the contrary they are only in this middle term and in this contact

in this there is immediately present both the repression within itself of Force or its being-for-self - as well as its expression - Force that solicits and Force that is solicited

their essence is solely through the other

thus they have no substances of their own that support and sustain them

the Notion of Force preserves itself as the essence in its very actuality

Force as actual exists in its expression

the truth of it remains only the thought of it -

the movements of its actuality - their substances and movements - collapse into an undifferentiated unity

thus the realization of Force is at the same time the loss of reality - in that realization it has become something quite different - viz. - this universality - which the understanding knows at the outset to be its essence and which proves itself to be such in the reality of Force - in the actual substances


COMMENTARY:


here consciousness and its object are instances of the one universality

the understanding consciousness has of the object - is the reality of the object

consciousness understands itself in terms of force and understands its object as force

this is if you like an account of the middle term - of the relation of consciousness and
its object

the relation is force expressed in consciousness - expressed in its object

'force' is the name of the universal

even so this force argument is post immediacy - post that is raw experience - it is a reflective and indeed metaphysical account of the relation - of the experience

and yes it is true to say the relation is a relation of unity

the relation is the unity of consciousness and its object

we experience the unity

but the unity as experienced is unknown

consciousness reflects on this - on its unity with object and characterizes it - gives it 'substance' - or at least expression

Hegel's argument that the understanding knows immediately its essence and that this essence is the actuality of the substances - is not correct

this 'knowledge' is not immediate at all -

it is a reflective argument - an explanation of the unity that presents - immediately - without knowledge -

it is the ground of knowledge - it is what 'knowledge' rests on

in truth there is no explanation in the sense of a final account - just transitory hypotheses - that function as explanation

Hegel's notion of force really just gives the unity - the unknown - a name


142.


ARGUMENT:


the first universal is the Understanding's Notion in which force is not yet for itself

the second is now Force's essence as it exhibits itself for and in itself

the first universal would be Force driven back into itself or Force as Substance

the second is the inner being of things qua inner - which is the same as the Notion of Force qua Notion


COMMENTARY:


Hegel's method is to propose a general term i.e. 'force' - and to then argue that this name applies to reality

granted we seek and need description of reality - without description we are simply faced with the unknown - and while this may be a philosophically pure position - in practice it is of no use -

language focuses and defines -

language is essentially a decision to act -

and for this to be the unknown is effectively disregarded

and to it - or onto it consciousness brings its frameworks

there is no one set of structures that can be applied here

the making of the known is a creative and ultimately baseless exercise

language is the assertion of coverage

so

indeed Hegel's method is essentially what does happen

where it falls down is that Hegel has not understood that the object of consciousness is the unknown

and that whatever is proposed as its operational alternative - the unknown remains untouched -

it is not transformed it is simply covered for practical purposes

therefore he is committed to holding that his argument is the truth

in philosophy this charge generally applies across the board

the best any of us can do is present a comprehensive and interesting perspective on how the world is

what is in fact of most interest in a philosophical theory is ingenuity

what I say of my own view of things is that it's the best I have been able to come up with so far - that it requires a lot more work - and as to its value in a public sense - well that is finally a matter of sophistry and chicanery i.e. persuasion

but back to Hegel -

one other thing I would say here is that the idea of taking a term - and then showing or arguing that it applies in all circumstances - that is the metaphysical argument - is
nothing from nothing

Hegel may well have used any term to have the function that 'force' has in his argument

in the end he has simply resolved all description into one term

the result paradoxically is that the term has no content

the reason for this is that for a term to have content it must exclude

for this is what definition amounts to

you could ask well what meaning does language as whole have?

it has none

a statement has meaning relative to other statements

there is nothing that language as a whole is relative to

all the relations of language are internal

another thing to consider is the status of universals

here Hegel is speaking of the first and second universals

we must remember his universal argument was his solution to the problem of the fleeting nature of experience - the problem of here and now

it strikes me that his multiplicity of universals simply is the same problem in different terms - without his recognition of the problem -

what was the problem for him - now is the solution

it seems metaphysics is often just a matter of packaging

finally I want to say here that Hegel is quite confused about what is in and what is out

the 'inner being' of things is not the 'notion' of things

a notion is an idea had by a conscious human entity

if a thing has inner being it is a conscious thing

consciousness is internality

and the uncomfortable fact for metaphysicians is that not everything has an inner being

non-conscious entities have only (relative to conscious entities) a surface dimension

that is they are pure externality

one's notions about things is consciousness' reflection

we make notions in order to effect action

our idea of a thing is simply a theoretical construction designed to facilitate action

the thing itself is mercifully free of our vanities


143.


ARGUMENT:


the true essence of things has the character of not being immediately for consciousness

consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner being

consciousness looks through this mediating play of forces into the true background of things

the middle term which unites the two extremes - the understanding and the inner world - is appearance

for we call being that is directly and in its own self a surface show

the totality as totality or as the universal - is what constitutes the inner - the play of forces as a reflection of the inner into itself

in the universal - the totality - things of perception are expressly present for consciousness as they are in themselves - as moments that turn into their opposite

the universal is the object that in itself possesses being

the being of this object for consciousness is mediated by the movement of appearance - in which the being of perception has a merely negative significance

consciousness reflects itself out of this movement back into itself as the true

consciousness converts this truth again into an objective inner - and distinguishes this reflection of Things from its own reflection into itself - just as the movement of mediation is likewise objective for it

this inner for consciousness is an extreme over and against it - but it is for consciousness the true - since in the inner as with the in-itself - consciousness possesses the certainty of itself - or the moment of its being for self

but it's not yet conscious of this ground as the being-for-self is a negative movement

this for consciousness is still the objective vanishing appearance

the inner for Consciousness is certainly Notion - but it does not yet know the nature of the Notion


COMMENTARY:


the true essence of things for consciousness is uncertainty

the world of appearance as a mediated world is this uncertainty

when consciousness looks through this play of mediating forces what it sees is the unknown

and the unknown is the explanation for - the reason for - uncertainty

consciousness in relation to that which external to it - this relation is experience - is appearance

this is the middle term

the understanding just is a function of the inner world - and here I mean not the inner nature of things - but internality - that is consciousness

consciousness is the inner world

and I too would say that being that is directly and in its own self is a surface show

the surface as in the external world

the totality -

the 'totality' - as I understand it is that which is undefined - so any word denoting it is dummy word - a marker or a placement that signifies the absence of definition

the universal is on the other hand a definition of type - the universal is that which has members - it signifies membership - so it is just a general classification

its nature has to do really with how we describe - that is how language is structured to operate in the world

in a way the universal is best seen as an approximation of particularity - a pointing to it -

we never of course get to it - for it is the unknown

consciousness operates with universals - the universal is its stock and trade - the universal is form

universals are essentially without content - they are merely proposals of category or organisation

we use them to gather particulars - to make particulars in effect - but the particulars are just decided contents for a specific purpose

reality is never at issue - everything is real

the question is definition is description - it is here that uncertainty reveals itself as the essence of consciousness

so the universal is not the object that possess being

the universal is an operation of consciousness - the universal is an action

appearance is just appearance - there is really nothing else to say of it

and what I mean here is that whenever we reflect on it - we come a cropper

a good deal of Hegel's thinking is about how to make appearance not what it is - to give it a basis that has no movement - or perhaps he would say - higher movement

appearance is just appearance - and what this amounts to is that appearance - as with any purity - is unknown

that is essence or essences are unknown

reflection is the dissolution of essence -

reflection makes the essence into object

the object thereafter is unstable

yes consciousness does distinguish its reflection of things from its own reflection into itself

consciousness distinguishes itself from what it is not

that is consciousness - in reflection - distinguishes internality (itself) from externality
(what it is not)

it couldn't be further from the truth to say that consciousness possesses certainty

the essence of consciousness is uncertainty

the self is a reflective construct of consciousness - we are best to understand in terms of its function - what such a construct enables

consciousness is the inner - and consciousness reflects - its reflection of itself - the construct of consciousness for consciousness - is indeed unknown -


144.


ARGUMENT:


the inner truth as the absolute universal - purged of the antithesis between the universal and the individual is the object of understanding

there now opens up above the sensuous world the world of appearance - a supersensible world which hence forth is the true world

above the vanishing present world there opens up a permanent beyond - an itself which is the imperfect appearance of Reason - or the only pure element in which the truth has essence


COMMENTARY:


for Hegel the inner truth is his conception - the universal - and it is clear that this absolute universal - is just another reflective step back - or conceptual step back from reality as given - from the unknown

it seems he wants to say this conceptual argument of the absolute universal is an accurate description of how the world is - a true account - that the world is not only understood as this - but is in fact - this

as a pragmatic argument about how to understand the world in order to operate in it - in principle I have no objection - if it works it works

but clearly for Hegel it is meant to be more than this

the 'sensuous world' is a description of 'immediate experience' - is a description of ...... etc.

my point is that we never get to gold

every description is an attempt to grasp - and an attempt that in fact finally fails

for what it is that we are trying to grasp is the unknown

we are left to fall back on some syntax - on the structure of language

this becomes our foundation - even though we realize its inadequacy - it is all we have

so whatever the reality is that we immediately (whatever this means) come to - its understanding or its knowledge - will of necessity be a step back

we don't need to posit a supersensible world

we just need to be realistic about the tools we have at our disposal

and we need to accept the uncertainty of our situation

positing alternative realities might be practically useful in specific contexts

however the ground is the ground - dirt is dirt

and all that is done by proposing super realities - is to move the issue of uncertainty into another context

now you might be able to con someone that in so doing you have solved a problem - give the impression that there is now an end to it

but in fact all such a move does is restate it

now I am not against doing this - and I think as matter of course this is just what we do in life -

but let's do it in a clear headed fashion

understanding that what you are doing is re-conceptualizing a state of affairs that is unknown

we have to deal with the unknown - such is the purpose and function of epistemology


145.


ARGUMENT:


the object now has the extremes of the inner being of Things and the Understanding and appearance as the middle term

the Understanding sees the inner world through the middle term and it learns about the close linked unity of these terms


COMMENTARY:


the object has no inner being or understanding

inner being is consciousness

understanding is consciousness operating with and on the object which in itself is unknown

yes appearance is the middle term - it is the basic relation of consciousness to its object

the understanding is reflection on this - on this relation

consciousness - the understanding recognises itself as internality and it recognises what it is not - that which is external to it

it operates reflectively with the relation given between itself and the external world

appearance is this relation

'knowledge' is reflection on this relation


NB:


consciousness expresses itself

the non-conscious does not express - there is no self to express

the expression is a function of consciousness' searching for foundation

the foundation does not exist - this fact does not alter the rationale of consciousness

the outside world is the means of consciousness' expression

the immediate outside - the body - is consciousness means of expression

the body enables consciousness to function

the body is consciousness' mechanism

consciousness is the internal dimension of a two dimensional entity

the two dimensional function

the body - the external dimension

the unity that is the action - can only be comprehended in terms of its expression

the unity - in itself - the person - is unknown


146.


ARGUMENT:


the inner world for consciousness is still - a pure beyond - because consciousness does not yet find itself in it - it is empty - for it is merely the nothingness of appearance - and the simple or unitary universal

this mode of inner being of things finds acceptance by those who say the inner being of things is unknowable

we have no knowledge of this inner world as it is here in its immediacy - because in the void nothing is known - or expressed from the other side

this inner world is the beyond of consciousness

if no further significance is attached to the inner world - there would be nothing to stop us perceiving something as true that is not true

the void - the holy of holies - we must fill up with reveries appearances produced by consciousness itself


COMMENTARY:


the inner world for consciousness just is consciousness - consciousness is internality - and this is all consciousness is -

now what this is - this internality is not known - it is an unknown -

nevertheless it is recognized as a dimension - the internal dimension

consciousness may attempt - in fact does attempt at every move to define itself - to 'find itself' - but the reflective realization of consciousness is that the lack of definition is the definition of consciousness

the external world is surface - it does not have the depth of consciousness - that is it does not have the dimension of consciousness

the surface is just that - the surface

appearance is strictly speaking a relation -

it is the relation that is the world experienced - that is the relation of the internal and the external - it is the unity - given

Hegel has got it all wrong in my opinion

and his fundamental mistake is with the nature of consciousness

consciousness is internality

that which does not have consciousness has no internality

the external world - the outside of consciousness - the material world - is purely one dimensional

so there is no question of the inner being of external things

they do not have an inner being

unless that is they possess consciousness

and from what we can see such is an exception and not the rule

so the inner world is not beyond consciousness - the inner world just is consciousness

Hegel's imaginary inner world of things has nothing to do with the issue of truth

what appears (the external world) is what is true - and what does not appear (consciousness) is what is true

and as to the void - there is no void -


147.


ARGUMENT:


the inner world or supersensible beyond has come into being - it comes from the world of appearance which has mediated it - appearance is its essence and its filling

the supersensible is the sensuous and the perceived posited as it is in truth

the supersensible is appearance qua appearance

the supersensible is not immediate sense certainty and perception

the world of appearance - is not the world of sense-knowledge and perception - but the world as posited as superseded - as the inner world

it is often said the supersensible is not appearance - what is here understood as appearance is not appearance - but the sensuous world as itself - the actual



COMMENTARY:


appearance is the relation of consciousness and its object - consciousness and non-consciousness -

the middle term is appearance

appearance that is - is the unity of the internal and the external

and this unity becomes - is - the actual ground of consciousness and the external world

it is where we begin - though in truth it is not the beginning

Hegel's view here is very strange - appearance as the supersensible - as the inner world

it is not the inner world

and it is not supersensible

the inner world is consciousness -

appearance is a relation between consciousness and the non-conscious

there is no supersensibility involved here

sensibility is the relation between

the sensible world is a relation

what is given in this relation is in the first instance unknown

the relation itself though is necessary

reflection - the operation of consciousness is the creation of characterization

it is in reflection that we have 'knowledge of'

or to be precise the positing of knowledge

knowledge as that which gives us something to go on with

in itself it is nothing but a reflex -

a reflex of consciousness -

in principle no different to a reflex of the body

just the essential - natural - primitive action of the unity in action


148.


ARGUMENT:


the inner world has come into being for the understanding only as the universal - still unfilled in itself

the play of Forces has the negative significance of being in itself nothing - its positive significance is as a mediating agency - but this is outside of the understanding

the inner world through the mediation fills itself out for the understanding

what is immediate for the understanding is the play of Forces - but what is True for it is the simple inner world

the movement of Force is therefore the True

what is present in the interplay of Forces - the soliciting and the solicited is the immediate alternation of the determinateness that constitutes the sole content of what appears - either a universal medium or a negative unity

it ceases immediately on its appearance in determinate form to be what it was on appearing -

by appearing in a determinate form it solicits the other side to express itself - the latter now what the first was supposed to be

but these two relations are again one in the same - and the difference of form is the same as the difference of content

in this way there vanishes all distinction of mutually contrasted Forces - the distinction between these Forces - soliciting and solicited - passive and negative - collapses into one

there are no Forces - nor a determinateness of being - nor a stable medium and unity nor diverse antitheses

what there is in this absolute flux is only difference as a universal difference - or the difference into which the many antitheses have been resolved

this difference as a universal difference - is the simple element in the play of Force itself and what is true in it - it is the law of Force


COMMENTARY:


the inner world - is consciousness' reflection on its object -

its object is that which is to consciousness immediately unknown

the inner world - is just the characterizations given to the object by consciousness

and these characterizations or descriptions are decisions regarding how to operate with the object

such operational decisions will always involve provisional definitions and strategies for action

what is immediate for the understanding is the unknown -

which is to say consciousness' awareness that it cannot fix its object in a determinate manner

and indeed the realisation that it has no theory of what such a fix - such determinateness amounts to

and further that any theory of determinateness even if provisional - is without foundation or basis

this is to say the object despite its appearances is unknown

and further that the appearances themselves have no basis in knowledge

what Hegel calls the state of flux is just the fact of the unknown as a relation between consciousness and the world

the relation is uncertain - appearance is uncertain


149.


ARGUMENT:


the absolute flux of appearance becomes a simple difference through its relation with the simplicity of the inner world - or the understanding

the inner being is an outcome of the flux or the flux is its essence

but it is a flux that is posited in the inner world as its truth

in other words negation is an essential moment of the universal - and negation is a universal difference

this difference is expressed in the law - which is the stable image of unstable appearance

consequently the supersensible world is an inert realm of ideas which though beyond the perceived world - for this exhibits law only through incessant change - is equally present in it and is its direct tranquil image


COMMENTARY:


consciousness is the inner world - the inner world is the internal dimension - its characteristic is awareness

the relation between consciousness and the non-conscious - between the internal and the external - is the unity of these two dimensions - this unity is appearance

the characteristic of appearance is uncertainty

this uncertainty is reflected in consciousness and in the external world

uncertainty is the essence of awareness

the inner dimension therefore is not an outcome of appearance - of the uncertainty

in a metaphysical sense it exists prior to appearance -

appearance though is what consciousness deals with

the uncertainty of appearance becomes the ground of consciousness - it becomes the basis of consciousness

the positing of this uncertainty is consciousness' reflection on appearance

assertion and negation are the operational actions of uncertainty

law is the denial of uncertainty

law is not first and foremost a stable image - it is rather the expression of the decision to act in the face of uncertainty

action is the denial of uncertainty

law is a reflective description of the ground for such action

any such ground is to be true - groundless - however we propose it as if it has foundation

the assertion of law is purely pragmatic -

it is finally based only on the need to act and to act in a 'rational' fashion - which is to say an ordered fashion

the tranquil image of law is a ruse


150.


ARGUMENT:


this realm of laws is the truth for the Understanding - and the content of the truth is in the law

this truth is only an initial truth and does not fill out the world of appearance

the law is present in appearance - but it is not the entire appearance

with every change of circumstance the law has a different actuality

thus appearance retains for itself an aspect that is not the inner world

there are indefinitely many laws

but this plurality contradicts the principle of the Understanding for which the True is the implicitly universal unity

the many laws must collapse into one law

but when laws coincide they lose their specific character -

i.e. the unification of all laws in universal attraction expresses no other content than just the mere Notion of Law itself - universal attraction merely asserts that everything has a constant difference in relation to other things

the expression universal attraction is important in so far as it is directed against the view that everything is contingent


COMMENTARY:


for the understanding truth is always an open question - we decide out of necessity - but recognise that such a determination of truth is pragmatic

laws are descriptions of proposed regularities - they are formulations of reflective analysis

the term 'law' has more to do with epistemological naiveté and vanity than anything else

we understand a so called law holds if it holds at all only within the set of circumstances it embraces or describes

any decision to use a law will involve the assumption that its content is true

a proposition is held to be true if we decide to proceed with it - that is - utilize it

a false proposition is a useless proposition

clearly a proposition regarded as true in one set of circumstances could be regarded as false in another

it is true that our descriptions of the world - our proposals for order and regularity cannot embrace the whole of appearance

however the 'whole of appearance' is nothing more than the unknown that has not been characterised by consciousness

a law can be seen as the setting up of a domain of knowledge - in the totality of the unknown

these domains - have currency so long as they effect action

we need to understand that at any time the great body of knowledge of the world is essentially a proposal - or really a multitude of proposals for dealing with the unknown

we can say that what is useful is good -

and this turns the light on utility - what is really useful to human beings?

it is clear that there is no universal answer to this question

my own view is that what is useful is what enables us to proceed

and that finally we all proceed or not in the unknown

Hegel thinks the true is the implicitly universal unity

this is rubbish

the true is what is useful

it is clear that this concept of utility implies multiplicity and flexibility

utility is the pure action of consciousness

'true' is the decision to proceed -

the basis of any such decision is another question -

it may be good or not

the decision is made -

the result will determine the wisdom of the action - or at least will be seen to - or held to - so determine

yes the idea of a universal law - its value - collapses as soon as you come up with a law of that kind -

any such law is without content

and it is so because by definition it excludes nothing

therefore there cannot be any particular content to it

nevertheless such 'laws' have value as myths - and out of myths come good stories - and who's not up for a good story?


151.


ARGUMENT:


in contrast to specific law we have universal attraction - or the pure notion of law

this notion is seen as the essence - but the true inner being - the determinateness of the specific law belongs to appearance

but the pure notion of law transcends not just specific law - but law itself

the determinateness is a vanishing moment - it is only the law that is true - not the moment

the Notion of law as universal attraction must to get its true meaning - be grasped in such a way - as what is absolutely simple and unitary

the differences in the law return to the inner world as a simple unity

this unity is the inner necessity of law


COMMENTARY:


the idea of the notion of law - of universal law is fair enough - it is just that - a notion

to define it so specifically as 'universal attraction' - is to give this notion - this universal notion a particular characterisation - and in so doing take away from the universality of the notion

a universal notion - the idea of a universal law - may have some heuristic value - it may - it may have some emotional value - but essentially the idea is the idea of what we do not know

to say it is 'universal attraction' destroys the notion - and its value

it's really a case of trying to have it both ways - universality - and specific characterisation -

the idea of essence again may be a useful stratagem - but essence in the sense that Hegel is putting - is - if it is anything - just what we don't know

I wouldn't say the essence is the unknown

but I would say essence is unknown

determinateness is strictly speaking an illusion and Hegel knows this - it's where he began

what do we say of determinateness?

the best we can say is that it is the decision to act -

to say the notion of law transcends law as such - is just to do the Hegel thing - but actually it is also to recognise that laws are made - and made for particular purposes - and so there cannot be any universality - that is in our descriptions of reality

the notion of law is for Hegel - a necessary posit - it is almost for him that it has to be - even though we have no experience of it

he wants it to be the simple that underlies the complex of experience - the unity that underlies the diversity

from a practical point of view I can see the utility of such

in practice we do use such a notion

however I would say the purest characterization of experience is to say it is unknown

for any other characterization i.e. as 'diversity' or 'unity' - is really an attempt to establish a basis for use -

and it is here that contingency and necessity resolve into action


NB:


how are we to determine utility?

what is useful?

my view is that the issue is open

that in truth we don't know in any absolute sense what is useful

we face problems and we face the unknown

I think that which is useful is that which enables us to proceed in the face of the unknown

now it could be said - well everyone proceeds anyway - no-one stops still -

there is always some action

but this is just to say from a logical point of view -

we have options and we will choose

yes

the question is what to choose?

and once the question is asked -

the state of skepticism is put on notice

so - the considered - the determined action - the chosen action - will be the act that takes us out of a position of uncertainty

why choose one course of action and not another?

again there are no a priori answers here

we decide for our reasons

and we may find these reasons have no basis when reflected upon

but nevertheless they are the reasons for the moment

they are the reasons that enable - enable action -

they are the 'appearance' of reason

and this is what I mean by utility

- not just any action -

but a considered action

now why should this be a definition of utility - and not just a description of a certain kind of action - i.e. - 'considered action'?

why that is - is 'considered action' - 'useful action'?

indeed - 'utility' is a philosophical classification

- no action is or is not useful in itself

to describe in this way is to place a framework on action

philosophically speaking there are any number of frameworks

action itself is - in itself - unknown

we give it characterization by framing it

there is no way of 'testing' philosophical frameworks - to decide - which is true

one's perspective here is an outcome of one's philosophical exploration

the argument is always - open


152.


ARGUMENT:


the law is present in a twofold manner - once as a law where the differences are expressed as independent moments - and in a simple withdrawal into itself which can be called Force in the sense of the Notion of Force - an abstraction which absorbs the
differences of what attracts and is attracted

simple electricity e.g. is Force - but the expression of difference falls within law – this difference is positive and negative electricity

in the case of the motion of falling - Force is the simple factor of gravity - whose law is that the magnitudes of the different moments of motion are related to one another as root to square

electricity itself is not difference per se - not essentially the dual essence of positive and negative electricity

it has the law of the mode of this being and it has the property of expressing itself this way

the property is the essential property of this Force - it belongs to it necessarily

necessity is an empty word

Force must - just because it must duplicate this way

of course given positive electricity negative too is given in principle

but that electricity should divide itself in this way is not a necessity

electricity as a simple force is indifferent to its law

it's Notion is indifferent to its being

it merely has this property - which means the property is not necessary

definition does not contain the necessity of its essence - it either exists because we find it or it exists by means of other Forces

that is its necessity is an external necessity

being through another is to relapse into a plurality of specific laws - which we left behind in order to consider law as law

it is only with law as law that we are to compare its Notion as Notion - or its necessity

but in all these forms necessity has shown itself to be an empty word


COMMENTARY:


this law of attraction - that which attracts and that which is attracted - is a law that cannot be put to the test - how could we devise a test to determine if the law does not apply - in terms of this law - any state of affairs is either that which attracts or that
which is attracted?

it is simply a case of a universal statement - and as such - as it does not exclude anything - it has no testable content - that is to say in principle it cannot be falsified

according to this law there cannot be anything that does not attract or is attracted

the only thing you can say for it is that it shapes focus - it directs our attention to the subject of force -

in speaking of electricity as a force Hegel says it is not essentially positive and negative - and it is not necessary that electricity should divide itself this way - that electricity is a simple force indifferent to its law of positive and negative attributes

we can say here that any phenomena can be categorised and then described - and that in essence this is the endeavour of science - levels of description

always we can say that the phenomenon in itself 'is indifferent to' its description

in describing consciousness places phenomena within more and more general descriptive frameworks

this is the business of dealing with phenomena

outside of this dealing the phenomena is unknown

it is only 'known' in terms of the descriptive attributes given to it

I should point out - we never begin - in this descriptive process with a pristine state -

always we come to description - in the midst of a given description - it is in response to this given description that we develop our theories - our stratagems for action

however at the same time we see that outside of description primary or secondary - what is given is unknown

so yes 'definition does not contain the necessity of its essence' -

by the same token there is not I think any non-pragmatic value in retaining the notions of essence and necessity

on necessity - to get right to it - we cannot know whether the world is necessary or contingent - the world as it is - if such a concept makes any sense - is simply the world undefined - which is to say unknown

contingency and necessity are best understood as tools - for dealing with what we face

they are concepts that have a role in certain activities and certain understandings

mathematics has used the notion of necessity as a concept fundamental to its operations

and empirical science has done the same with contingency


153.


ARGUMENT:


in the law of motion it is necessary that motion be split up into time and space or again into distance and velocity

thus motion is only the relation of these factors - the universal - is certainly divided in its own self

but these parts do not express themselves in a One

they are indifferent to one another - space is thought to be able to do without time - time without space - distance without velocity - just as their magnitudes are indifferent to one another - since they are not related to one another as positive to
negative - and are thus not related to one another in their essential nature

the necessity of the division is thus certainly here - but not the necessity of the parts for one another

but its just for this reason that the first necessity is a sham - a false necessity

for motion itself is not thought of as something simple as a pure essence - but as already divided - time and space are in themselves independent parts or essences - distance and velocity - modes of being - ways of thinking

if it is thought of as simple essence motion is no doubt gravity - but this does not contain these differences at all


COMMENTARY:


what you have with Hegel here is the placing of common sense and the science of the day in a philosophical arrangement

his philosophy is designed to show that the conceptions of space and time distance and velocity - can be further resolved into the broader categories of his metaphysics

in this way his philosophy is descriptive

he is proposing a description of the world

now I say this world is the relation between consciousness and the non-conscious - between the internal and the external

the world is this relation

science is a form of description - an account of this relation

what is clear is that there is no one account of the world - of the relation

human belief systems are testament to this fact of consciousness

how are we to judge one system against another?

what is preferable?

there is no standard that is not a player in the game -

descriptive systems are non-commensurable

what Hegel does is create categories which resolve apparent non-commensurable theories

but this in effect is just to further fill out his own vision - to show that it has 'universal applicability' - it is really just what any theorist will attempt to do

even so his description as a complete picture is just one of a number of possible complete pictures

and as there is no true objectivity in any of this - there is no objective standard to appeal to

you can only work within your descriptive framework - or change it - or take up with another

this is the artistry of living - of acting - it is what we do

possibility - this possibility of different views of the world - exists because 'knowledge' - in whatever form it is expressed - is finally only a stratagem for dealing with the unknown

the unknown gives us the reality of possibility - the indeterminateness of description

consciousness is the awareness of indeterminacy -

consciousness creates possible descriptions

these possible descriptions become real through our actions in the face of the unknown


154.


ARGUMENT:


either the universal - Force - is indifferent to the division that is the law - or the differences - the parts are indifferent to one another

the Understanding however has the Notion of this implicit difference just because the law is on the one hand the implicit being - but is at the same time inwardly differentiated

that this difference is an inner difference follows from the fact that the law is a simple force - or is the Notion of the difference - and is therefore a difference belonging to the Notion

but this inner difference still falls to begin with only within the Understanding - and is not yet posited in the thing itself

it is therefore only its own necessity that is asserted by the Understanding - the difference here is not a difference of the thing itself

this necessity which is merely verbal is thus a recital of the moments constituting the cycle of the necessity

the moments are indeed distinguished but their difference is expressly said to be not a difference of the thing itself - and consequently it is immediately cancelled again – this process is called explanation

a law is enunciated - from this its universal element or ground is distinguished as Force - but this difference is no difference - the ground is constituted exactly the same as the law

the single occurrence of lightning is apprehended as a universal - and this law is enunciated as the law of electricity - the explanation then condenses the law in Force as the essence of the law

this Force then is so constituted that when it is expressed - opposite electricities appear - which disappear again into one another - that is Force is constituted exactly the same as the law - there is no difference between them

Force and law have the same content


COMMENTARY:


a statement or law i.e. 'all a's are b's' - strictly speaking can never be asserted in the first place - we have no grounds for such a proposal

so we ask what is going on in the proposal of law?

it is simply this - universal statements give the appearance of certainty

they are in effect a simple denial of uncertainty

and I would put that they therefore function as platforms on which and from which we deal with - the true reality of uncertainty

for purposes of action we need such illusions -

they are false platforms - created for the purpose of looking forward and proceeding

in such proposals as 'all a's are b's' - what we have is an argument of unity -

the differences are there 'a' is 'a' - 'b' is 'b' - the argument is that all a's are b's - which is to dissolve the differences - the particularities - into what -?

clearly just the notion of singularity

and this is really the logic of the idea of singularity -

the argument that particularity dissolves -

dissolves into what?

well here the answer is Hegelian in a sense -

into the opposite of particularity

now it's not hard to see that this conclusion - has no content -

multiplicity is given - unity is posited as its opposite

but here the argument as much of Hegel's argument does - assumes there is always an opposite - and that the opposite has reality

it is true we can always construct an opposite simply by applying the negation sign

the fact that we can perform this operation - may well be very useful at times

however it doesn't follow that in performing that operation we are pointing to an actual state of affairs

Buddhism and other mystical traditions are based on the fallacy of negative content

the notion of singularity I am suggesting is without content -

clearly though - even as such it has function in our thinking

perhaps it gives us the idea of space

and in order to organize our actions such an idea is necessary

it is clear that when Hegel speaks of force and law as having the same content what we are getting from him is alternative descriptions of the unknown

these descriptions are - in terms of the unknown - equivalent

their difference is a matter of function


155.


ARGUMENT:


in this tautological movement the Understanding sticks to the inert unity of its object

and the movement falls only within the understanding

it’s an explanation that explains nothing - only repeats the same thing

in the Thing itself this movement gives rise to nothing new - it comes into consideration as a movement of the understanding

in it we detect what is missing in the law - the absolute flux - for this movement is directly opposite of itself - it posits a difference which is not only a difference for us

but one which the movement cancels as a difference

this is the same flux as presented itself as the play of forces - soliciting and solicited forces - but these distinctions were no distinctions - and immediately cancelled out

what is present here is not merely a bare unity in which no difference would be posited - but a movement in which the distinction is made - but cancelled

this process of explaining the to and fro of change - which before was outside of the inner world and present only in appearance - has now penetrated the supersensible
world itself

consciousness has passed over from the inner being as object - to the other side - into the Understanding - and it experiences a change there


COMMENTARY


yes - the cancelling out of the movement - if this is what happens it is a cancelling out to what?

if the movement is cancelled - what do we say of it?

that it is an illusion -

for either it is a real movement - which presumes movement is possible - actually occurs - or it is not -

and as to the status of such - if it is an illusion - what is this to mean?

if it is a comprehended movement - it has some reality

if you want to then say - well reality just doesn't support such a movement -

then it's pretty clear your theory of reality is what is out of whack

the focus of consciousness is like a template that is placed on all conscious experience

if you want to say time moves on - then this template moves with it

the focus of consciousness - of a consciousness - is the action of a particularity within a non-particular context

consciousness moves with the movement and therefore its focus - while a focus - is never still

the object in this movement is rendered unknown by the movement

reflective consciousness fixes the object as an argument

this is how the object is held in consciousness

reflective consciousness theorizes and describes the object

this action moves it from the phenomenal realm into the theoretical

this theoretical realm is no timeless form -

the act of description and particularly its expression in language - as it were holds the moment - this is the idea of it anyway

for operational purposes we assume we are then dealing with a fixed form - and one therefore we have some hope of dealing with and of manipulating

but really all we have done is create a descriptive event - which in its complexity is an argument

also it is worth noting we only operate on this level - in these terms given the very real fact of memory

and memory here I will put is clearly a necessary function for and of consciousness

and it is clear consciousness can only function in memory given a certain physical state of it functional external - the body

so I am saying the fact of focus - focus in time is no metaphysical conundrum - it is just the fact of it

reflectively we can say this is what happens

and yes we can try and explain it - and for a lot of reasons - this can be an important thing to do - it can help us function better in the world

but this is all it is - explanation is simply a ground for function


156.


ARGUMENT:


thus this change is not yet a change of the thing itself - but presents as pure change because the contents of the moments remain the same

this change becomes for the Understanding the law of the inner world

the understanding thus learns it is a law of appearance itself - that differences arise that are no differences and the self same repels itself

and differences cancel themselves - thus what is not self same is self attractive

thus a second law - difference which remains self same - this expresses that like becomes unlike and vice versa

the second law posits the permanence of impermanence

consequently the difference exhibits itself as a difference in the thing in itself or as an absolute difference

and this difference of the thing is thus the self same that has repelled itself from itself and posits an antithesis that is none


COMMENTARY:


the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious is the reality we face

thus for consciousness the object of consciousness does not appear as the thing itself

the thing itself is for all intents and purposes an abstraction - if anything - an abstraction from the appearance

so any change in the object is a change only in the appearance - the object as appearance

the thing in itself - on a phenomenal level is irrelevant

as a reflective argument it has a function in consciousness - but this is a theoretical function

the thing in itself cannot be known - so the issue of change does not arise

the object as an appearance is what?

well strictly we don't know

however the function of consciousness is to describe

so the object is consciousness' description

we know consciousness does not remain still

so descriptions change

in a logical sense the object of consciousness as an objective reality is the sum of possible descriptions

and this does not presume some fixed point that all possible descriptions refer to

the point of descriptions is itself up for argument

these epistemological issues are never resolved qua epistemology

'resolution' is only a decision to move or proceed in relation to a conception that provisionally stabilises the object of consciousness

here it must be understood that issues of 'change' and 'sameness' are arguments that are never settled qua argument

rather they are acted upon and the action is as close to resolution as is required

finally any action is - despite its apparent determinateness - an argument that can be opened up


157.


ARGUMENT:


through this principle the first supersensible world of laws - the immediate copy of the 

perceived world is changed into its opposite

the law was like its differences - that which remains selfsame - now it is posited that each of the two worlds is really opposite itself

the selfsame really repels itself from itself - and what is not the selfsame posits itself as selfsame

here the like is unlike itself and the unlike like itself

the second supersensible world is in this way the inverted world - the inversion of the first

for the supersensible world was only the immediate raising of the perceived into the universal element

it had its necessary counterpart in this perceived world which still retained for itself the principle of change and alteration

the first realm of laws lacked that principle but obtains it in the inverted world


COMMENTARY


to account for the relation that is consciousness in relation with the non-conscious -

to account that is for the world that appears - a world that presents but is unknown -

it is necessary to abstract from the phenomenal - the world of appearance - to its relata - 

consciousness - and its object

this is done quite instinctively - in fact it generally takes argument for us to see that what we have -

what we are presented with is the unity -

that is to say appearance here is the unity of the conscious and non-conscious

and therefore these categories - conscious and non-conscious - are steps back from the unity

the fact is though - and this is reality - we have no way of comprehending or dealing with the unity - unless these steps are taken

so in practice - the analytical position is the working position - what we call the real position -

and this is the division of the unity - into consciousness and non-consciousness -

this is the working posit - or the position of human beings

what I am arguing here is that we do not begin with consciousness as Descartes argued

but rather that we begin with the unknown as the given reality that is appearance -

and that this appearance can only be analyzed if we see it in terms of the conscious and non-conscious

it is in so doing that we apprehend the reality of a dimensional existence -

we see - we recognise consciousness as the internal dimension and - the non-conscious as that which is external

so the reality of consciousness in the world - I'm suggesting is the actual state of affairs - but it is also an analytical response to the unknown unity

consciousness recognizes itself - and its object - in response to the unknown

the unknown is where we begin

I hasten to add - the unknown is also where we end - but in the process we make a world - which is to say we give the unknown a working character - many characters

the greatness of Hegel's work is in the fact that he doesn't flinch on the attempt to give 

a comprehensive account of reality - he takes it on

and at the basis of this quite heroic endeavour is the assumption that we can know

I don't think he ever seriously questions this assumption

it strikes me that he attempts to begin in the midst of it all - that he has in mind the relation of consciousness and the non-conscious as his central focus

for Hegel you might say it is then something of a juggling act - he has the two balls in his hands

and what he argues for - what his juggling results in is the universal

the way I see it we begin with the unity and separate out to the categories of conscious and non-conscious

my unity though it is 'appearance' - is in an epistemological sense - the unknown

Hegel's unity - the universal - is he thinks the unity of all opposites - the unity that is knowledge and substance

my argument here is just that his universal is really no more than the unknown -

I am quite happy to accept that beyond appearance - and I mean this in the broadest sense - is not what does not appear - but what is unknown

Hegel in my terms wants to make the unknown - substantial - a substance - the universal substance

even if we were to begin with such a view - as Spinoza does - still the question - can we even say of this (universal) that it is a substance?

to my mind - the granting of substance - though it may seem rather harmless is nevertheless - without rational basis

by all means let the imagination run wild

Hegel's theory of inversion here - that what is perceived becomes its opposite in conception is really his attempt to give some logical justification for his metaphysics as a solution to his account of immediate perception

he can say here the world of conception is the real world - just inverted

if this is so - it is more than just a way of seeing things - Hegel wants to say it is in fact a truer reality -

OK - but you can always ask - why?

if one is the inversion of the other - what is the essential difference - surely just a matter of how it is seen?

and if indeed you can see the world in one of two ways - why go with the second - or why the first?

also you can ask what grounds do we have for this inversion?

that is why ditch the standard view that consciousness is not an inversion of the non-conscious world - or vice versa

on what do we base this idea of the reversal of position of the internal and external dimensions?

in is in - out is out - the relationship is essentially logical -

you could say here - Hegel has solved nothing - that he has tried to create the opposite to his theory of perception - by just inverting it - and is then presenting this as the solution

logically neat - but where is the world in all this?

I have deeper concerns with his account here

as I see it the world of change and alteration is a conceptual world

what we perceive immediately is the unknown - the undefined - the undescribed

reflective consciousness gives this world character - and yes you can define it in terms of selfsameness and its opposite -

and you can theorize further and argue to something like the opposite of this - Hegel's universal

all this is well and good - but be clear what you are doing at every stage is theorizing the unknown



158.


ARGUMENT:


according then to the law of this inverted world what is like in the first world is unlike to itself and what is unlike in the first world is equally unlike to itself - or it becomes like itself

expressed in determinate moments - this means that what is the law of the first world is sweet - in this inverted is sour - what in the former is black in the other is white

what is the law of the first is the north pole of the magnet - in its other supersensible in itself - in the earth - is the south pole

in another sphere revenge on an enemy is according to the immediate law to the satisfaction of the injured party - this law forces me to confront him as a person who does not treat me as such - and in fact bids me to destroy him as an individuality – this law is turned around by the principle of the other world into its opposite - the reinstatement of myself as a person through the destruction of the alien personality is
turned into self-destruction

if this inversion finds expression in the punishment of crime and made into a law - it's only a law of one world - which is confronted by the inverted supersensible world where what is despised in the former is honoured - and what in the former is honoured meets with contempt

the punishment which in the first world disgraces and destroys a man is inverted into the pardon which preserves his essential being and brings him to honour


COMMENTARY:


it is clear that the world of the unity of consciousness and non-consciousness - that which appears -

presents our perception and that perceived - as a unity

so that we can quite naturally say - what is - is what is seen

this is the first moment of awareness

consciousness does not appear in this unity

the object 'in itself' does not appear in this unity

what appears is the unity of consciousness and non-consciousness

so appearance is a singular experience

however the singular experience as a singularity is without differentiation

consciousness divides

it separates itself out and its object is that which it is not

the separation is based on awareness - awareness of consciousness - as internal - and thus its object as external

it is clear that the essential logical category of consciousness is negation

the operation of negation - is the operation that defines and differentiates consciousness from its object

opposition is one form of characterization of this act of differentiation (the logic of negation)

and inversion - one kind of opposition

anyway the point is consciousness acts in this way -

and it transfers this action to the unity - to the world of appearance -

consciousness acting on and in this unity differentiates

this fundamental action forms the logical or metaphysical basis for subsequent action

action in the world of appearance - the appearance that is unknown independently of this action

what thus really appears is the appearance of knowledge


NB.


the action of consciousness that reveals consciousness - that results in self-consciousness is reflection

in the initial state the appearance is unified -

consciousness reflects and thus reveals itself

and in this action distinguishes itself and posits its object

the point here is that consciousness is - in the initial state unknown

unknown to itself

its action - reflection reveals

there is nothing deeper to this

reflection is just what happens - what occurs

it is the revelation of internality

and consequently of externality

this is the first reflection

reflection on this initial reflection is not revelatory in a phenomenal sense

it is interpretive and thus theoretical


159.


ARGUMENT:


superficially this inverted world is the opposite of the first in the sense that it has the latter outside of it and repels that world from itself as an inverted actual world - that the one is appearance and the other the in-itself - that the one is the world for another whereas the other is the world as it is - what tastes sweet is really or inwardly sour

but such antitheses as inner and outer - of appearance and supersensible - as of two different kinds of actuality - we no longer find here

the repelled differences are not shared between two substances - this would result in the Understanding withdrawing from the inner world

the one side or substance would be the world of perception again in which one of the two laws would be operative - and confronting it would be an inner world - just such 

a sense world as the first - but in the imagination - it would be exhibited as a sense world without its characteristics

but in fact if the one posited world is a perceived world - and its in-itself - as its inversion is equally thought of as sensuous - the sourness would be the in itself of the sweet thing - and it would thus be a sour thing


COMMENTARY:


Hegel introduces the idea of inversion

in the context of the consciousness and the non-conscious - it is an interesting idea

there is a neat logic to the idea that consciousness is the inversion of the non-conscious - that what we 'see' is the inversion of what is -

while logically neat the idea has no content - what is inverted - is just what is (notinverted) - in a different position - a different way of seeing - the same thing

the metaphor is geometrical

the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness can be seen as an issue of position - but not in such a simplistic way - that is it is not just a matter of reversal

I have argued that consciousness is internality - the internal dimension of an entity (that has an internal dimension) - and that this is a fundamentally different philosophical position to the substance arguments of the Cartesians and the materialists (brain-identity theorists)

I argue we understand a thing fundamentally in terms of its dimensions - that the substance approach ought to be abandoned 

- that is we can know a thing - whatever it is - dimensionally -

that consciousness recognizes itself as internal - and sees its body as external

and that the notion of the unity - as unity - is unknown

so yes my own argument about mind and body is meta-geometrical -

the issue is dimension not substance

dimensions do not interact - they are the formal characteristics of a thing -

and that which has two dimensions is a different kind of thing to that which does not

or that which is one-dimensional is effectively non-dimensional

thus metaphysically speaking there are two dimensions - the entities that are so constructed are those entities that have an inside and an outside

internality - the second dimension

we variously describe this internal dimension as 'mind' 'consciousness' 'spirit' - even 'soul'

the essential nature of such an entity as a unity of dimensions - is unknown

we describe the unity in either internal and external terms

there is no non-dimensional language - no way to approach the unity as unity

what we have here is the unknown manifested two dimensionally

this is where we begin


160.


ARGUMENT:


from the idea of inversion - which constitutes the essential nature of one aspect of the supersensible world - we must eliminate the idea of fixing the differences in a different sustaining element

and this absolute Notion of the difference must be represented and understood purely as inner difference - a repulsion of the selfsame from itself and likeness of the unlike as an unlike

we have to think contradiction

for in the difference which is an inner difference the opposite is not merely one of two - if it were it would simply be without being an opposite - but it is the opposite of an opposite - or the other is immediately present in it

certainly I put the 'opposite' here - and the other of which it is the opposite there

thus the supersensible world which is the inverted world has at the same time over-arched the other world and has it within it

it is for itself the inverted world - i.e. - the inversion of itself - it is itself and its opposite in one unity

only thus is it difference as an inner difference - or difference in its own self - or difference as an infinity


COMMENTARY:


the internality and externality of thing are its dimensions -

which is to say the formal characteristics of its structure

now Hegel describes the relation of the sensible to the supersensible as inversion

do we say the inside of an entity is the inversion of the outside?

this is to give the relation a definite characterization

the idea is neat in a logical sense - i.e. it does preserve the unity of the entity and yet defines the difference in terms of perspective

and it seems to acknowledge the inside-ness of consciousness

and yes we could just say the inside of a thing is the outside - inverted

why I resist this characterisation is that it seems to carry with it much metaphysical baggage - i.e. the sensible world is in a state of flux - the supersensible the home of the universal -

this preserves the inversion but it is clear that the idea of inversion is not the simple geometrical one - it is metaphysically loaded

I think this is a mistake

I think we can give a simple and elegant characterization of mind and body that can be stated in terms that shows we do not need to fill it up with extraneous metaphysical issues and properties

that is we can say an entity has an inside and an outside - and we understand this just as stated - the notion of inversion is not necessary to the idea of inside - to the idea of the relation of inside to outside

what do we say of this relation?

that one is the opposite of the other?

'opposite' is easy - but like 'inversion' it seems to imply more than just an essential relation

internality and externality are essential qualities of a thing

these qualities are distinct - internality cannot be changed into externality or vice versa

the space of these qualities is distinct - they exist in different spaces

so I would argue it is not just a matter of a different perspective in the same space - which is the inversion argument

mind and matter are different dimensions regardless of perspective

furthermore perspective is a function of internality - internality is not a function of perspective

the internality of a thing is awareness

awareness is not the inversion of its absence

the absence of awareness is its non-existence

the non-existence of a thing cannot be inverted

there is nothing to invert


161.


ARGUMENT:


we see that through infinity law completes itself into an immanent necessity - and all the moments of the world of appearance are taken up into the inner world that the simple character of law is infinity means - (a) that it is self-identical but is also in itself different - (b) what is thus dirempted - which constitutes the parts thought of as in law - exhibits itself in a stable existence - and if the parts are considered without the Notion of the inner difference - then space and time - or distance and velocity - which appear as moments of gravity are just as indifferent and without a necessary relation to one another as to gravity itself - (c) through the notion of inner difference - these unlike and indifferent moments or space and time are a difference which is no difference - or only a difference of what is self same and its essence is unity - as a positive and negative they stimulate each other into activity and their being is rather to posit themselves as not being and to suspend themselves in the unity - the two distinguished moments both subsist - they are implicit and opposites in themselves


COMMENTARY:


the way I see it is like this -

the world we experience - the world of appearance is the first moment of awareness

reflection - which is an act or operation of consciousness divides the unity of appearance into consciousness and non-consciousness

and so we understand appearance as the relation of consciousness and non-consciousness -

the world as given - the world of appearance is initially unknown

the division of consciousness and non-consciousness - becomes for us the existential reality and the analytical reality -

this is the second moment of awareness

and so we can say that the operational reality is a divided reality - in the sense that we recognize that the unity has for us a conscious and non-conscious aspect

the understanding is that we can deal with the unity in terms of the relation of its aspects

the world in the first moment prior to the reflection that gives us the awareness of the conscious and non-conscious aspects is not a blank - but it is unknown

what is given in this first moment is analysed in the second - so that what appears is given characterization in consciousness

this is the beginning of the reflective process that gives us operational power

this power is the power of knowledge

this knowledge though is based on the unknown - it is consciousness' reflective response to the unknown - and therefore it has no foundation other than operation

and the truth is we operate in mystery - in the sense that why the world just is the way it is for us is never a matter we have - 'knowledge' of - but this understanding actually makes no difference to how we deal with what we have to deal with

so for operational purposes the world of appearance - becomes that which is external to consciousness

the inner world the world of thought is the resource we have to determine how to proceed outside of thought

Hegel has it that all the moments of appearance are taken up into the inner world -

that which is outside of consciousness and is placed in the focus of a consciousness is the world of appearance for that consciousness -

what this is for that consciousness is in the first place given in the very relation of consciousness and the non-conscious - but what this means is always a reflective possibility of the individual consciousness - and what it in fact means is shown in how the person operates - which is just thought translated into action

it is not possible to ascertain the full meaning of any action - it is here that we are faced with infinity - what in fact happens is we decide - that is cut-off the process and determine - and in so doing we posit the finite - we make our actions and the world of our action finite

infinity is the reality of the absence of knowledge

decision is the world made finite


162.


ARGUMENT:


this simple infinity or the absolute Notion may be called the simple essence of life

this self-identical essence is related only to itself

each sundered moment is a pure opposite and therefore each the opposite of itself - therefore not an opposite at all - but rather a pure self-identical essence

philosophy cannot answer the question 'how from this pure essence does difference or otherness issue forth?' - for the division into two moments has already taken place

difference is excluded from the self-identical and set apart from it

what was supposed to be self-identical is already one of these two moments instead of being the absolute essence

that the self-identical divides into two means that it supersedes itself as an otherness

the unity of which it is usual to say that difference cannot issue from it - is in fact one of the two moments - it is the abstraction of the simplicity or unitary nature over and against the difference

but in saying the unity is an abstraction - it is only one of the opposed moments - it is already implied that it is the dividing of itself - for if the unity is a negative it is opposed to something - then it is eo ipso posited as that which has an antithesis within it

the different moments of self-sundering and of becoming self-identical are therefore only this movement of self-suppression

for since the self-identical moment which becomes its opposite is an abstraction or is already a self-sundering - its self-sundering is therefore a suppression of what it is and therefore a suppression of its dividedness

its becoming self-identical is equally a self-sundering - what becomes identical with itself thereby opposes itself to self-sundering - it puts itself on one side - it becomes the sundered moment


COMMENTARY:


first up the term 'self-identical' is meaningless - the phrase suggests a relation where none holds - a relation exists between different things - therefore a thing is not related to itself - if it is related to anything - it is related to what is not itself

likewise 'self-sundering' makes no sense - if a thing is sundered - it is sundered by another thing

if 'self-identical' is the definition of essence - we can forget essence

alternatively we can simply recognize that the final nature of things is unknown

in saying that philosophy cannot answer the question 'how from pure essence does difference issue forth? - Hegel is for a moment recognising the truth of skepticism

that is he is acknowledging that we do not and cannot know the origin and nature of reality

but this acknowledgment is short lived - it is in his terms 'sundered' and I think never to be 'un-sundered'

really where Hegel shines is in his introduction of movement into the metaphysical realm

and it is a useful concept in relation to the problem of unity and diversity

his idea in short is that the unity diversifies and that the diversification unifies and that this movement is ongoing - that is it is of the nature of reality - reality is this movement

his logic of opposites is the conceptual underpinning or description for this reality

and he can say that his logic expresses the movement of reality and that the movement of reality is described or expressed in his logic

one cannot help but think that whatever else you might say against Hegel's argument

there is no doubt his identification of reality as a movement is of lasting significance
and value

for Hegel - it is the movement - the fact of change that is unchanging -

and this for him is the essence of life

as to this movement - it is quite simply unknown -

Hegel devotes all his power to describing it - 'explaining' it - but really all his efforts finally point to the fact that the 'movement' is no more than a name for the unknown

to my mind his dialectical argument amounts to saying that the idea of stable knowledge is an illusion

and I would go the one step further and say that therefore this account of knowledge and reality - cannot itself be held outside of it own logic

that is to say that such a metaphysics - like what it describes is only a moment in an ever changing reality

language fixes it to a page - therefore it has the appearance of being what it is not - unchanging

in fact like everything else it is ephemeral

from an artistic perspective it is a moment of revelation - even a moment of delight


163.


ARGUMENT:


infinity or this absolute unrest of pure movement - is being - is the soul of all that has gone before -

it is in the inner world that it has freely and clearly shown itself

appearance or the play of forces displays it - but it is as explanation that it first freely stands forth

and in being finally an object of consciousness - as that which it is - consciousness is thus self-consciousness

the Understanding's 'explanation' is primarily the only description of what self-consciousness is

the reason why 'explaining' affords so much satisfaction is just because in it consciousness is so to speak communing directly with itself - enjoying only itself - although it seems to be busy with something else - it is in fact occupied only with itself


COMMENTARY:


it is very disappointing to finally get to self-consciousness in Hegel's argument - and to get nothing from him

it appears that he does not see that the question of how the inner world of consciousness becomes an object of consciousness - is the question that must be answered in any theory of consciousness

it is not even on his radar - as if there is no question here

and this is the central issue of consciousness - the nature of self-consciousness -

how does the subject hold itself as object - how can the subject be object?

what kind of thing can be subject and object - how can we explain or comprehend this?

to simply say - consciousness exists as 'object consciousness' - and thus consciousness is self-consciousness - is at the best breathtakingly naive

in what sense - how - does consciousness exist as an object?

we have no account form Hegel on this issue

his next point is that the understanding's explanation of consciousness is the only description of what self-consciousness is -

so on this view - the understanding is something other than consciousness

to be cruel here you could say therefore the understanding is by definition - non-conscious - and this of course is ridiculous

or the alternative is - that the understanding is consciousness - and therefore consciousness' explanation of itself is the only description of self-consciousness

OK - so how does consciousness 'describe itself" - what is being described?

and again - how is that consciousness can regard itself as the object of consciousness?

these are all questions Hegel's seems not to have recognized - or if recognized decided not to address

and everything depends on the answers here

finally it's clear that he has put all this in the too hard basket - and just taken the apparently easy way out - an unexplained solipsism -

'it is in fact only occupied with itself'

as I said this is a sad chapter in Hegel's discussion

I was really hoping he would take this issue on - instead he has just sidestepped it

I am going to jump in here and put some conclusions -

consciousness is self-consciousness -

to be aware one must be aware that one is aware

so this is just the nature of consciousness - of awareness

by its nature consciousness is 'self-illuminating' - and this is where we begin

if so consciousness - does not become self-conscious

the categories of subject and object - of knower and known are constructs of consciousness deigned to give some logical foundation to our dealings with the unknown that is appearance

consciousness recognizes itself as internality - it is thus aware of its meta place

the world outside of consciousness is the external world

the external world is the object of consciousness

consciousness recognizes itself as knower -

the idea that consciousness is known - that you can know yourself - is to confuse subject and object

consciousness does not - cannot know itself

'itself' is internal - the known is external -

consciousness is not external to itself

consciousness is aware of itself - aware of itself as unknown

this is the essential nature of consciousness - that it recognizes itself as unknown

in fact it sees itself as unknowable

the category of knowability does not apply to consciousness - only to that which is outside of consciousness

awareness of self is simply and only the awareness of internality

and this awareness is not an awareness of something - of substance - it is an awareness of dimension -

which is simply to say it is an awareness of logic - of logical form

that is consciousness' awareness of 'itself'

my view is that the world of appearance is the relation of consciousness and its object

that this relation is the common ground of conscious and non-conscious being - it is the working reality

and so it is the case that consciousness reflects on what is given in this working reality

and what is it that is given?

I am going to put something quite radical in answer to this -

my view is that the relation of consciousness and the non-conscious is the common reality that is image -

the relation of mind to its object results in image

the ground that consciousness comes to in the second moment is the world of image

I say this here to get to the fact that image is not a characteristic of the internal - and it is not a characteristic of the external - not that such a view would generally need to be argued

image is the relation

image is the reality of the relation of the conscious and non-conscious

therefore as object the image is reflected on by consciousness

it is this reflective action that transfers the image as reflection to consciousness

so it will be asked - if so what is the internality of consciousness?

most would say it is the world of image - at the very least

the internality of consciousness is thought

and thought is without image

imagination is the action of thought in the world of image

it is consciousness' dealing with the world of image

and what can we say of the nature of the this relational world - this unity of the conscious and non-conscious?

it is not to be confused with the internal or with the external -

so how is it to be characterized?

my answer is both ways -

it's really the Blues Brother's joke - "what kind of music have you got here?" "we got both kinds - country and western"

the point is - we can only explain the unity in terms of thought or non-thought

in terms of mind or matter

the unity that is the unity of mind and matter is not definable - it is unknown


164.


ARGUMENT:


infinity becomes the object of the Understanding - but the Understanding falls short of infinity as such - since it apportions to two worlds - that which is a difference in itself - the self-repulsion of the self same and the self-attraction of the unlike

to the Understanding the movement as it is found in experience is a mere happening - and the self same and the unlike are predicates whose essence is an inert substrate

what is for the Understanding an object in a sensuous covering - is for us a pure Notion

the exposition of its Notion belongs to science - consciousness immediately has this Notion - and the notion comes onto the scene as a form belonging to consciousness itself - or as a new shape of consciousness

since this object of infinity is an object for consciousness - the latter is consciousness of a difference that is no less immediately cancelled

consciousness is for its own self - it is a distinguishing of that which contains no difference - or self-consciousness

I distinguish myself from myself - and in doing so I am directly aware that what is distinguished from myself is not different from me

I - the self-same being repel myself from myself - but what is posited as distinct from me or as unlike me - is immediately in being so distinguished - not a distinction for me

it is true that consciousness of an 'other' - of an object in general - is itself necessarily self-consciousness - a reflectedness-into-self - consciousness of itself - in its otherness

the necessary advance from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their truth 

was a Thing - an 'other' than themselves - expresses just this - that not only is consciousness of a thing possible only for a self-consciousness - but that self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes

but it is only for us that this truth exists - not yet for consciousness

but self-consciousness has become simply for itself - not yet as a unity with consciousness in general


COMMENTARY:


infinity in the sense of a conception of the endless or the boundless is a pseudo conception in that a concept is a concept because it is bound or defined - that is if this infinity makes some kind of existential sense - it cannot be conceived - what you have here is the mistake that the non-concept refers or signifies - an example of the general logical error that the negative refers - or is a sign of a kind of reality - when in fact all the negative is - is a sign of decision - the decision not to proceed -

beyond what is conceived - is relative to the conception - that which is not known - this is the best that can be made of this 'infinity theory'

the 'mere happening' Hegel refers to is just a description of the fact of consciousness facing the unknown - this unknown or 'mere happening' is the object of consciousness - it is just what consciousness must and does make something of

the 'object in a sensuous covering' is the world of appearance - that is the relation of consciousness and the non-conscious - the ground which consciousness reflectively interprets - for us it is a pure notion in the sense that it is the unknown - this is its
'purity' - if you want to go down the poetic track

science is indeed a tool for the exposition of the world of appearance as it is given as an unknown - and yes consciousness immediately has this notion - it is what is given
to consciousness - just in the act of consciousness' relation to the non-conscious - and yes the notion as any notion does belong to consciousness - the notion is a creation of
consciousness - and notions do give consciousness a characterization - but in so far as consciousness is a dimension - the internal dimension - what you will have is the play
of shapes within this space

Hegel defines self-consciousness as that which contains no difference - all this amounts to is the idea that self-consciousness is a unity - which in my terms is to say
it is the internal dimension of a thing -

now I happen to think that all consciousness is self-consciousness - and that therefore any distinction between consciousness and non-consciousness is a false distinction -
but for Hegel consciousness is not self-consciousness - self-consciousness is some kind of development of consciousness

therefore to say that self-consciousness is that with no difference - is really to say nothing -

we have no theory of self-consciousness from Hegel

he says I distinguish myself from myself - this makes no sense - there is no proper use of logic here - that which is - may be distinguished from that which is not - that which is therefore outside of itself - consciousness may distinguish that which it is not i.e. - the external world - but 'itself' - is not - external to consciousness

his idea that I repel myself from myself suggests the beginning of some kind of theory of how consciousness can create 'itself' - strange as this idea might be - but this line of inquiry ends quickly with the realization that any such distinction is 'not a distinction for me'

but the real kicker comes next - the argument that the 'other' is itself necessarily self-consciousness

as they say you can run but you can't hide - and this is the position Hegel is in - he has nowhere to go -

his failure to understand that consciousness / self-consciousness is internality - and that its object is externality - his failure that is to recognise and or establish the external world - as external - has left him only with consciousness - we cannot even say - 'the internal' - for Hegel does not understand that the essence of consciousness 

is internality - therefore his 'consciousness' - is nothing - literally nothing - the term has no meaning as a result of his deliberations -

he can't even retreat into solipsism - there is literally nowhere to go - for to this point he hasn't managed to establish the self - let alone the self as everything

what you have from Hegel is like an archaeological expedition that covers all the ground and uses every tool available - and even makes a number of new tools - but in the end after all the blood and sweat - all the high hopes and grand endeavours - finds nothing - and leaves nothing but a hole where once there was a serene landscape


165.


ARGUMENT:


we see that in the inner world of appearance the Understanding comes to know nothing else but appearance - not in the shape of a play of forces - rather it is the play of forces in its absolutely universal moments - in fact the Understanding experiences
only itself

raised above perception consciousness exhibits itself closed in a unity with the supersensible world through the mediating term of appearance - through which it gazes into this background lying behind appearance

the two extremes - the one of the pure inner world - the other that of the inner being gazing into this pure world - have now coincided - and have vanished - so too the middle term as something other than these two extremes

this curtain of appearance hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away - and we have the inner being gazing into the inner world - self-consciousness

it is manifest that behind the so called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world - there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves - as much in order to see - as that there may be something that can be seen

it is nevertheless evident that we cannot go behind appearance

for this knowledge of appearance and of its inner being - is a result of a complex movement whereby the modes of consciousness 'meaning' perceiving and Understanding vanish

and it will be equally evident that the cognition of what consciousness knows in knowing itself - requires a still more complex movement


COMMENTARY:


appearance as I have argued is the relation between the inner and outer worlds - between consciousness and non-consciousness

so appearance as such is neither of the inner or outer worlds - and for this reason I say it is clearly unknown - if not inner or outer - what is it - the answer quite clearly is that which is not known

the relation nevertheless exists and the object in the sense of the goal of consciousness is to make it 'known' - it becomes clear that this goal is not reached - but the endeavour results in the capacity to deal with what is presented and what is unknown

so yes I would agree the understanding comes to know nothing but appearance - and that this knowledge qua knowledge is an illusion - a ruse - a con

Hegel has no account of the external world - as external - and so for him - the 'knowledge' that results is a knowledge that has no basis outside of consciousness

he does speak a lot of the inner world - but strictly speaking he has no inner world to refer to - for an inner reality only has any sense and definition if it is the inner of an outer - and so for Hegel it is true the Understanding only experiences itself - but here's the twist - there is no self in Hegel that can do the experiencing -

consciousness is not raised above perception - perception is a function of consciousness -

and yes consciousness is a closed unity - the inside dimension is defined - and determined by the unity it is the inside of -

however there is no background to consciousness - there is no background to the inside - there is relative to the inside - only the outside - and the outside is just the external dimension of the unity

appearance is a 'mediating term' in the sense that appearance is that which results 

from the relation of consciousness and its object -

this relation is given - it is natural - there are no holes in it - it is simply the world we inhabit - in all its fullness

the inner world is pure - but the inner world just is the inner being - there is no differentiation between inner world and inner being -

and from the inside there is no 'gazing in' - there is no inside - in the inside -

the gazing is gazing out - and what is reflected into consciousness is the world conceived

there is no curtain of appearance - appearance covers nothing - there is nothing to cover

the relation of the inside and the outside is the creation that is appearance – appearance is an effect

the relation that is consciousness and the non-conscious does not vanish - but equally it is not seen - the unity that is the human being in the world can only be approached in terms of consciousness and what is outside of consciousness - the unity per se is ever present - but unknown

(c) greg t. charlton. 2025.